Case Facts RTC Decision CA Issue Doctrine Court's Decision

Rogelio Roque is convicted with the crime of

frustrated homicide.

Guilty beyond reasonable doubt - Frustrated

Homicide

**Petioner filed MR - and was denied Rule 45 - Certiorari Petition must be denied. The errors raised by

petitioner is not within the ambit of Rule 45.

Petition for review on certiorari raises only

QUESTION OF LAW.

Petition for certiorari was denied. Court

convicted him with the crime of frustrated

homicide with modication - ordering

petitioner to pay moral and temperate

damages - P25,000 each with interest of 6%

per annum

He is a Baragay Kagawad of Brgy. Masagana. Imprisonment of 6 yrs, prision correccional -

10 yrs prision mayor

CA affirmed in full RTC's decision Unlawful Aggression was not satisfactorily

proven since the appelant has not

satisfactorily shown that the victim was

armed with a gun

The court affirms the CA's confirmation on the

RTC's decision that the petitioner is guilty of

frustrated homicide and not merely of less

serious physical injuries.

Petioner shot Reynaldo at the nape and kicked

him on the face and back.

Unlawful Aggression was not justified in firing

the victim the second time

In attempted or frustrated homicide, the

offender must have the INTENT TO KILL the

victim. Regardless of whether the victim suffrs

injuries. If the intent to kill is suffieciently

borne out, the crime is frustrated homicide.

It is evident that the victim received two

gunshot wounds in the head. The location of

the wound plus the nature of the weapon

used are indication of the accused-appellant's

objective is not to merely warn or

incapacitate a supposed aggressor.

His parents arrived and took him to the

hospital for emergency medical treatment.

Presence of Intent to kill: (1) victim received

two gun shots; (2) petioner prevented brgy

officials to help the wounded victim.

There is also intent to kill when the petitioner

prevented the barangay officials from

intervening and helping the bleeding victim.

It should not be the gravity of the result of the

injury but the criminat intent of the

malefactor.

Alfredo is charged with a crime of frustrated

homicide.

RTC convicted the petitioner: crime of

Frustrated Homicide (Art 250, RPC) and

indeterminate penalty of 6 mos & 1 day

Prision Correccional (Min) to 6 yrs & 1 day

Prision Mayor (Max). Compensatory Damages

of P14,170.35.

Petitoner appealed alleging that his guilt was

not proved beyond reasonable doubt; intent to

kill was not established, injuries sustained

were scuffmarks because of a fist fight and

that he did not inflict any stab wounds and

that he only caused slight physical injuries.

If peitioner was properly found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt.

Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on

the part of the offender. Without proof of

such intent, the felony may only be serious

physical injuries. Intent to kill may be

established through the overt and external

acts and conduct of the offender before,

during and after the assault, or by the nature,

location and number of the wounds inflicted

on the victim.

Both the trial and the appellate court agreed

that intent to kill was present. We concur with

them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife

in his assault on Alexander. The medical

records indicate, indeed, that Alexander

sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one

on his upper left chest and the other on the

left side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was

unprovoked with the knife used therein

causing such wounds, thereby belying his

submission, and firmly proving the presence

of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt

about the wound on Alexander’s chest being

sufficient to result into his death were it not

for the timely medical intervention.

Ro

qu

e v

s P

P. (

FRU

STR

ATE

D H

OM

ICID

E)A

lfre

do

de

Gu

zman

vs.

PP

(FR

UST

RA

TED

HO

MIC

IDE)

Alexander Flojo (victim) was first hit on the

nape. while fetching water by Alfredo. Flojo

informed the land lady what her brother did to

him while fetching water. In the middle of the

evening, Flojo fetched again water when

Alfredo appeared in front of him and stabbed

him on his left face and chest. The son-in-law

of Alexander saw him bleeding on the left

portion of his body and was begging for help.

Alexander told him that Alfredo stabbed him.

Son in law then immediately brought him to

the hospital for medical assistance.

CA affirmed petitioner's conviction. Elements of frustrated homicide:(1) Intent to

Kill, use of deadly weapon during assault; (2)

victim sustained a fatal or mortal wound but

did die because of timely medical assistance;

and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances

for murder (art 248) is present.

We have no cogent reason to deviate from or

to disregard the findings of the trial and

appellate courts on the credibility of

Alexander’s testimony. It is not disputed that

the testimony of a single but credible and

trustworthy witness sufficed to support the

conviction of the petitioner. This guideline

finds more compelling application when the

lone witness is the victim himself whose

direct and positive identification of his

assailant is almost always regarded with

indubitable credibility, owing to the natural

tendency of the victim to seek justice for

himself, and thus strive to remember the face

of his assailant and to recall the manner in

which the latter committed the crime.

Alexander sustained two stabbed wounds. (1)

On the zygoma, left side and (2) upper left

chest which penetrated the thoracic wall and

left lung of the victim.

Factors in determining the presence of intent

to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors;

(2) nature, location and number of wounds

sustained by the victim; (3) conduct of the

malefactors before, during, or immediately

after the killing of the victime; and (4)

circumstances under which the crime was

committed and the motives of the accused.

The honorable court AFFIRMS the decision of

the RTC. That the petitioner is guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE

and sentences him to 4yrs of prision

correccional to 8yrs and 1day of prision

mayor. Moral Damages of P30,000; and

compensatory damages of P14,170.35, plus

interest of 6% per annum; and directs the

petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of

its loan transactions for the period December

1, 2000 to June 15, 2001, and thereby found

out that fraud and certain irregularities

attended the same. Specifically, it discovered

the non-remittance of some loan payments

received from its clients based on the

provisional receipts issued by its account

officers, as well as the daily collection reports

corresponding to the said provisional receipts.

Tupag was unable to testify. CA affirmed RTC's decision. Whether or not CA erred in sustaining

Benabaye's conviction for the crime of Estafa

through misappropriation.

Conversion of material possession: THEFT.

Conversion of material and juridical

possession: ESTAFA.

Petition was granted. RTC and CA ruling were

reversed and set asside. Charges against

Benabaye and Tupag are dismissed.

Alf

red

o d

e G

uzm

an v

s. P

P (

FRU

STR

ATE

D H

OM

ICID

E)C

he

rry

An

n B

en

abay

e v

. PP

. (ES

TAFA

)

Benabaye (Bookkeeper) claimed, among

others, that the discrepancies could be

clarified by her supervisor, Tupag(Micro

Finance Unit Supervisor), to whom she had

submitted her daily cash transfer slips

together with the corresponding provisional

receipts

(1) Both Benabaye & Tupag - guilty of Estafa,

Art 315, par 1(b); (2) 6yrs & 1 days of Prision

Mayor to 20 yrs Reclusion Temporal; (3)

P688,833 of actual damages

Benabaye's continuing intention to commit

estafa constituted a single intention although

committed on different dates. There is a

conspiracy between Benabaye & Tupag - both

had access and facility to determine if

payments were properly remitted.

JURIDICAL POSSESSION: possession which

gives the transferee a right owns the thing

which the transferee may set up even against

the owner.

Elements of Estafa: (1) goods have been

received and under an obligation involving

duty to make delivery of or to return the

same; (2) misappropriation or conversion of

such money or property to the offender or

denial of such receipt; (3) misappropriation or

conversion or denial is to the prejudice of

another; (4) there is a demand made by the

offended party on the offender.

A sum of money received by an employee on

behalf of an employer is considered to be only

in the material possession of the employer.

Payment of a 3rd person to the teller is

payment to the bank itself; teller is a mere

custodian/keeper of funds received; has no

independent right/title to retain or possess

the same against the bank. An agent, on the

other hand, can even assert, as against his

own principal, an independent, autonomous,

right to retain the money or goods received in

consequence of the agency; as when the

principal fails to reimburse him for advances

he has made, and indemnify him for damages

suffered without his fault.

While it is true that only Benabaye was able

to successfully perfect her appeal, the rule is

that an appeal in a criminal proceeding

throws the whole case open for review of all

its aspects, including those not raised by the

parties. Procedure as above-quoted, a

favorable judgment, as in this case, shall

benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or

those who appealed from their judgments of

conviction but for one reason or another, the

conviction became final and executory,

Benabaye's discharge for the crime of Estafa

is likewise applicable to Tupag. Note that the

dismissal of the Estafa charge against Tupag

is similarly without prejudice to the filing of

the appropriate criminal charge against him

as may be warranted under the

circumstances pertinent to him.

Benabaye failed to offer evidence that Tupag

had actually received the amount. Tupag lost

his remedy to appeal - Sec 6 (5), Rule 120.

Benabaye is a mere collector of loans and

remits the same by the end of the day. Thus,

NO JURIDICAL POSSESSION. In the light,

Tupag (the supervisor and co-accused) was

not appointed as an agent of Siam Bank and

thus no juridical possession of the subject

sums, must also be discharged of the same of

ESTAFA in view of Sec 11(a), Rule 122.

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several

accused.— (a) An appeal taken by one or

more of several accused shall not affect those

who did not appeal, except insofar as the

judgment of the appellate court is favorable

and applicable to the latter.

Ch

err

y A

nn

Be

nab

aye

v. P

P. (

ESTA

FA)

Sanchez was charged with violation of Sec 11,

Art 2 of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous

Drugs Act of 2002). He was in possession,

control and custody of shabu.

RTC rendered its decision finding that Sanchez

was caught in flagrante delicto, in actual

possession of shabu. It stated that the police

operatives had reasonable ground to believe

that Sanchez was in possession of the said

dangerous drug and such suspicion was

confirmed when the match box Sanchez was

carrying was found to contain shabu.

(1) CA erred when it held that the accused

was caught in flagrante delicto, hence a

search warrant is not needed; and, (2) non

compliance of Sec 21 (1), Art 2 of RA 9165

does not automatically render the seized

items inadmissible in evidence.

SC reversed the RTC and CA’s decision. The SC

observed that the CA confused the search

incidental to a lawful arrest with the stop-and-

frisk principle. The distinctions have been

made clear in Malacat v. Court of Appeals.

The police acted on an information that Intang

was selling drugs to tricycle drivers and were

dispatched to a barangay at Imus, Cavite to

conduct an operation. They spotted a

motorcycle carrying Sanchez coming out of the

house of Intang. The group chased the tricycle.

After they caught up, they requested Rizaldy

to alight. They noticed that Rizaldy held a

match box. Rizaldy asked if could see the

contents of the match box of which he agreed.

However, they suspected that it was a

regulated drug, the group brought the two to

the police station.

Judgment was rendered convicting Sanchez

that he violated Sec 11, Art 2, of RA 9165.

Suffer imprisonment from 12 yrs to 15 yrs and

to pay fine of P300,000.00

The specimen gave positive results that the

substance is indeed shabu.

A “stop-and-frisk” is where a police officer

observes unusual conduct which leads him

reasonably to conclude in light of his

experience that criminal activity may be afoot

and that the persons with whom he is dealing

may be armed and presently dangerous,

where in the course of investigating this

behavior he identifies himself as a policeman

and makes reasonable inquiries, and where

nothing in the initial stages of the encounter

serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own

or others' safety, he is entitled for the

protection of himself and others in the area to

conduct a carefully limited search of the outer

clothing of such persons in an attempt to

discover weapons which might be used to

assault him. While probable cause is not

required to conduct a “stop-and-frisk,” it

nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a

hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk.” A

genuine reason must exist.

RIZ

ALD

Y S

AN

CH

EZ Y

CA

JILI

v. P

P. (

DR

UG

S)

Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues

that the warrantless arrest and search on him

were invalid due to the absence of probable

cause on the part of the police officers to

effect an in flagrante delict oarrest under

Section 15, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. He

also contends that the failure of the police

operatives to comply with Section 21,

paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165

renders the seized item inadmissible in

evidence and creates reasonable doubt on his

guilt.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as

the precedent arrest determines the validity of

the incidental search, the legality of the arrest

is questioned in a large majority of these

cases, e.g.,

whether an arrest was merely used as a

pretext for conducting a search. In this

instance, the law requires that there first be a

lawful arrest before a search can be made --

the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,

assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer

may search the person of the arrestee and the

area within which the latter may reach for a

weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize

any money or property found which was used

in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of

the crime, or that which may be used as

evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee

with the means of escaping or committing

violence.

The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or

modify the findings of facts and conclusions

reached by the RTC and, thus, upheld the

conviction of the accused for violation of

Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

According to the CA, there was probable cause

for the police officers to believe that Sanchez

was then and there committing a crime

considering that he was seen leaving the

residence of a notorious drug dealer where,

according to a tip they received, illegal drug

activities were being perpetrated. It concluded

that the confiscation by the police operative of

the subject narcotic from Sanchez was

pursuant to a valid search.

In the case at bench, neither the in flagrante

delicto arrest nor the stop- and-frisk principle

was applicable to justify the warrantless

search and seizure made by the police

operatives on Sanchez. A search as an incident

to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of

Court.24 It bears emphasis that the law

requires that the search be incidental to a

lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that

a lawful arrest must precede the search of a

person and his belongings; the process cannot

be reversed. Here, the search preceded the

arrest of Sanchez. was no arrest prior to the

conduct of the search.

Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was

arrested before the search, still the

warrantless search and seizure must be

struck down as illegal because the

warrantless arrest was unlawful.

2 Elements of WARRANTLESS ARREST Par (a)

of Sec (5) (in flagrante delicto) - (1) person to

be arrested must execute an overt act that he

just committed, is actually committing, or is

attempting to commit a crime; (2) the overt

act was done in the presence or within the

view of the arresting officer.

The evidence on record reveals that no overt

physical act could be properly attributed to

Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of

the police operatives that he had just

committed, was committing, or was about to

commit a crime. There was no probable

cause as to warrant the arrest. Verily,

probable cause in this case was more

imagined than real.

Requisites of PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE: (1) The

law enforcer in search of evidence has a prior

justification for an intrusion or is in authority

to view a particular area; (2) the discovery of

evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (3) it is

immediately apparent to the officer the itm

which he observes to ba an evidence of a

crime, contraband or is subject to seizure.

Measured against the foregoing standards, it

is readily apparent that the seizure of the

subject shabu does not fall within the plain

view exception. First, there was no valid

intrusion. As already discussed, Sanchez was

illegally arrested. Second, subject shabu was

not inadvertently discovered, and third, it

was not plainly exposed to sight.

RIZ

ALD

Y S

AN

CH

EZ Y

CA

JILI

v. P

P. (

DR

UG

S)

The prosecution failed to establish an

unbroken chain of custody, resulting in

rendering the seizure and confiscation of the

shabu open to doubt and suspicion. Hence,

the incriminatory evidence cannot pass

judicial scrutiny. Thus, the chain of custody

requirement has a two-fold purpose: (1) the

preservation of the integrity and evidentiary

value of the seized items, and (2) the removal

of unnecessary doubts as to the identity of

the evidence.

Petition was granted. RTC and CA Resolution

are reversed and set aside. Sanchez is

acquitted on reasonable doubt.

Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals,

Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as buyer, entered

into a deed of absolute sale and purchase of

shares of stock on July 15, 1988. The contract

was allegedly entered into to prevent these

shares of stock from being sold at public

auction to pay the outstanding obligations of

Antonio Garcia.

RTC acquitted the petitioner because of

insufficiency of evidence. It was held that the

complainant (Ferro) was aware of the status of

the club shares.

CA granted the appeal (civil aspect) and

awarded Ferro P1,000,000 as actual loss with

legal interest and atty's fees - P20,000.

As a general rule, this court through its

appellate jurisdiction can only decide on

matters or issues raised by the parties.

However, the rule admits

of exceptions. (1) When the unassigned error

affects jurisdiction over the subject matter or

(2) when the consideration of the error is

necessary for a complete resolution of the

case,this court can still decide on these issues.

On September 6, 1989, the class "A" share in

Alabang Country Club, were sold at public

auction to Philippine Investment System

Organization. On September 3, 1990, the

information based on the complaint of Ferro

Chemicals, Inc. was filed against Antonio

Garcia before the Regional Trial Court.

Ferro appealed to CA as to the CIVIL ASPECT

OF THE CASE: that the decision was not in

accordance with the law and the facts of the

case.

The CA found that Antonio failed to disclose

the Philippine Investment and Savings

Organization's lien over the club shares.

Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the case? RTC HAS NO JURISDICTION. Lack of

jurisdiction results in voiding all of the trial

court's proceedings and the judgment

rendered. Estafa is punishable by arresto

mayor, or imprisonment of 1 mo, 1 day to 6

mos. Which is under the jurisdiction of the

first level courts. (Pangilinan vs. CA) Thus, we

apply the general rule that jurisdiction is

vested by law and cannot be conferred or

waived by the parties. Even on appeal and

even if the reviewing parties did not raise the

issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not

precluded from ruling that the lower court

had no jurisdiction over the case

The trial court's lack of jurisdiction cannot be

cured by the parties' silence on the matter.

The failure of the parties to raise the matter

of jurisdiction also cannot be construed as a

waiver of the parties. Jurisdiction is conferred

by law and cannot be waived by the parties.

RIZ

ALD

Y S

AN

CH

EZ Y

CA

JILI

v. P

P. (

DR

UG

S)A

NTO

NIO

M. G

AR

CIA

V. F

ERR

O C

HEM

ICA

LS (

ESTA

FA)

He was charged with estafa "under Article 318

(Other Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code for

allegedly misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals,

Inc that the shares subject of the contracts

entered into were free from all liens and

encumbrances.

Oct 15 1997, Makati City's Prosecutor and

Ferro Chemicals filed a petition for certiorari

with SC, assailing RTC's decision and order of

acquitting Garcia. That the petitioner was

deprived of their substantive right to due

process of law. A verification/certification was

signed by Ramon Garcia (pres of Ferro) against

Forum shopping, disclosing that the notice to

appeal was towards the civil aspect of the

case.

<-- The resolution on November 16, 1998, the

court dismissed the petition for certiorari.

Wheher the act of Ferro in filing a notice of

appeal before CA and petition for certiorari

assailing the same trial court decision

constitutes forum shopping.

FERRO COMMITTED FORUM SHOPPING. Test

and Requisites in determining Forum

Shopping: TEST: (1) whether the elements of

litis pendentia are present or(2) whether a

final judgment in one case amounts to res

judicata in another. ELEMENTS: (1) identity of

the parties; (2) identity of the rights asserted

and reliefs prayed for, where reliefs are

founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of

the 2 preceding particulars, such that any

judgment rendered in the other action will

amount to res judicata in the action under

consideration.

There is no question that Ferro Chemicals,

Inc. committed forum shopping when it filed

an appeal before the Court of Appeals and a

petition for certiorari before this court

assailing the

same trial court decision. This is true even if

Ferro Chemicals, Inc.'s notice of appeal to the

Court of Appeals was entitled "Notice of

Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of

The Civil Aspect of the Case).

The "civil aspect of the case" referred to by

Ferro Chemicals, Inc. is for the recovery of

civil liability ex delicto. However, it failed to

make a reservation before the trial court to

institute the civil action for the recovery of

civil liability ex delicto or institute a separate

civil action prior to the filing of the criminal

case.

When the trial court's decision was appealed

as to its criminal aspect in the petition for

certiorari before this court, the civil aspect

thereof is deemed included in the appeal. It is

also evident that Ferro committed forum

shopping in its appeal.

o This notice of appeal is without prejudice to

the filing of an appropriate petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

on the criminal aspect, upon the giving of due

course thereto, private complainant shall

endeavor to seek the consolidation of this

appeal with the said petition.

As to the third requisite, on the assumption

that the trial court had jurisdiction over the

case, this court's decision in G.R. No. 130880

affirming the trial court's decision acquitting

the accused for lack of an essential element

of the crime charged amounts to res judicata

to assert the recovery of civil liability arising

from the offense.

AN

TON

IO M

. GA

RC

IA V

. FER

RO

CH

EMIC

ALS

(ES

TAFA

)

Litigants cannot avail themselves of two

separate remedies for the same relief in the

hope that in one forum, the relief prayed for

will be granted.

Whether Ferro was entitled to the awards

given as a civil liability ex delicto?

The extinction of the penal action does not

necessarily carry with it the extinction of the

civil action, whether the latter is instituted

with or separately from the criminal action.

The offended party may still claim civil liability

ex delicto if there is a finding in the final

judgment in the criminal action that the act or

omission from which the liability may arise

exists.

3 instances not withstanding accused acquittal

that the offended party may still claim civil

liability ex delicto: (a) acquittal is based on

reasonable doubt as only preponderance of

evidence is only required; (b) court declared

that the liability of the accused is only civil (c)

civil liability does not arise from or is not

based upon the crime of which the accused is

acquited.

Petition granted in setting aside CA's decision

and resolution over the assailed RTC decision.

Daluraya was charged in an Information for

Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in

connection with the death of Marina Oliva.

Marina was crossing the street when a car ran

over her. She was brought tio the hospital for

medical attention but eventually died.

the RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the

MeTC’s ruling,declaring that "the act from

which the criminal responsibility may spring

did not at all exist."

the CA granted the petition and reversed the

RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla

the amounts of P152,547.00 as actual

damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and

P50,000.00 as moral damages.

whether or not the CA was correct in finding

Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva’s

death despite his acquittal in the criminal

case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in

Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence.

The petition is meritorious.

Every person criminally liable for a felony is

also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused

of the crime charged, however, does not

necessarily extinguish his civil liability.

Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing

the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the

RTC, that Daluraya’s acquittal was anchored

on reasonable doubt, which would

necessarily call for a remand of the case to

the court a quo for the reception of

Daluraya’s evidence on the civil

aspect.1âwphi1 Records disclose that

Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact

that "the act or omission from which the civil

liability may arise did not exist" in view of the

failure of the prosecution to sufficiently

establish that he was the author of the crime

ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil

liability should be deemed as non-existent by

the nature of such acquittal.

AN

TON

IO L

. DA

LUR

AY

A V

. MA

RLA

OLI

VA

(R

ECK

LESS

IMP

RU

DEN

CE

RES

ULT

ING

IN H

OM

ICID

E)A

NTO

NIO

M. G

AR

CIA

V. F

ERR

O C

HEM

ICA

LS (

ESTA

FA)

The daughter, Marla, filed a criminal case for

reckless imprudence resulting in Homicide

against Antonio, the driver.

In so ruling, the CA held that the MeTC’s

Order showed that Daluraya’s acquittal was

based on the fact that the prosecution failed to

prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As

such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil

liability.

2 kind of acquittal, with different effects on

the civil liability of the accused: (1) acquital on

the ground that the accused is not the author

of the actor omission complained of. This

closes the door for civil liability (Rule 111). (2)

acquital based on the reasonable doubt of

guilt of the accused. Even if the guilt is not

clearly established, he is not exempt from civil

liability which may be proved by

preponderance of evidence only.

An eye witness affirmed the incident saw the

nissan bearing the plate number UPN 172.

Prosecution offered evidences to support the

civil damages sustained by the family.

Moreover, the CA considered the following

pieces of evidence to support its finding that

Daluraya must be held civilly liable: (a) the

inadmissible sworn statement executed by

Daluraya where he admitted that he drove the

subject vehicle which hit Marina Oliva; (b) the

conclusion derived from Serrano’s testimony

that the woman he saw crossing the street

who was hit by a Nissan Vanette with plate

number UPN-172, and the victim who

eventually died, are one and the same; (c) the

Philippine National Police Referral Letter of

one Police Chief Inspector Virgilio Pereda

identifying Daluraya as the suspectin the case

of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide

involving the death of Marina Oliva, and

stating that he brought the victim to the

Quezon City General Hospital for treatment

but was declared dead on arrival; and (d) the

subject vehicle was registered in the name of

Daluraya’s aunt, Gloria Zilmar, who authorized

him to claim the vehicle from the MeTC.

In Dayap v. Sendiong, the Court explained

further:

The acquittal of the accused does not

automatically preclude a judgment against

him on the civil aspect of the case. The

extinction of the penal action does not carry

with it the extinction of the civil liability

where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable

doubt as only preponderance of evidence is

required; (b) the court declares that the

liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the

civil liability of the accused does not arise from

or is not based upon the crime of which the

accused is acquitted. However, the civil action

based on delict may be deemed extinguished

if there is a finding on the final judgment in

the criminal action that the act or omission

from which the civil liability may arise did not

exist or where the accused did not commit the

acts or omission imputed to him.

A punctilious examination of the MeTC’s

Order, which the RTC sustained, will show

that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the

conclusion that the act or omission from

which the civil liability may arise did not

exist, given that the prosecution was not

able to establish that he was the author of

the crime imputed against him . Such

conclusion is clear and categorical when the

MeTC declared that "the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses are wanting in

material details and they did not sufficiently

establish that the accused precisely

committed the crime charged against

him." Furthermore, when Marla sought

reconsideration of the MeTC’s Order

acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated and

firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not

able to establish that the accused was the

driver of the Nissan Vanette which bumped

Marina Oliva" and that "there is no

competent evidence on hand which proves

that the accused was the person responsible

for the death of Marina Oliva

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Daluraya filed an urgent motion to dismiss

(demurer) asserting that he was not positively

identified by any of the witness as the driver of

the vehicle that hit the victime, and there is no

clear and competent evidence of how the

incident transpired.

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused

is acquitted by the court, the accused has the

right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of

the case unless the court also declares that

the act or omission from which the civil

liability may arise did not exist. This is because

when the accused files a demurrer to

evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence

both on the criminal and civil aspects of the

case. The only evidence on record is the

evidence for the prosecution. What the trial

court should do is issue an order or partial

judgment granting the demurrer to evidence

and acquitting the accused, and set the case

for continuation of trial for the accused to

adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case

and for the private complainant to adduce

evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the

court shall render judgment on the civil aspect

of the case.

MeTC RULING: Granted Daluraya;s demurrer

and dismissed the case for lack of sufficient

evidence. Deconstructing the testimonies of

the prosecution witnesses individually, the

MeTC found that: (a) Marla merely testified on

the damages sustained by her family but she

failed to identify Daluraya as the driver of the

vehicle that hit her mother; (b) Serrano also

did not identify Daluraya as the driver of the

said vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz merely testified on

the autopsy results; and (d) PSI Gomez, while

he did investigate the incident, likewise

declared thathe did not witness the same.

In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court

requires that the judgment state "whether the

evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed

to prove the guilt of the accused or merely

failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable

doubt. In either case, the judgment shall

determine if the act or omission from which

the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Marla appealed the said case to RTC. Petition was granted. Decision and Resolution

of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Decision of the RTC is REINSTATED.

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Elpidio was outside the house of his sister

Isabelita when he heard his nephew, Winston,

throwing invectives at him. Elpidio confronted

his siter who also threw curses against him

which made him slapped his sister. Elpidio was

under the influence of alcohol.

During trial, Salvador died. Eventually the trial

court acquitted Tiotus, Saligan and Tommy but

found Gary and Rolando guilty beyond

reasonable doubt.

CA affirmed the decision. Information does not allege all the elements

and necessary ingredients of the specific

crime of attempted murder.

An appeal by certiorari to SC only raises

questions of law distinctly set forth in the

petition. The present case reaises issues and

arguments involving questions of facts. Thus,

the petition is at once dismissible for its failure

to comply with the requirement of Rule 45 of

the rules of court, that the petition should only

raise questions of law.

The information filed contains all the

elements of the crime of attempted

murder.The Information partly reads: x x x

but the said accused did not perform all the

acts of the execution which should have

produced the crime of murder, as a

consequence, by reason of causes other than

their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the

injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de

Leon are not necessarily mortal. From the

above-quoted portion of the Information, it is

clear that all the elements of the crime of

attempted murder has been included.

The Brgy Chairman heard the commotion and

pacify the people, and eventually pursuaded

Elpidio to go home of which he drank coffee to

pacify himself.

not all elements of attempted murder are

present in the case

The distinction between a “question of law”

and a “question of fact” is settled. There is a

“question of law” when the doubt or

difference arises as to what the law is on a

certain state of facts, and which does not call

for an examination of the probative value of

the evidence presented by the parties-

litigants.

There is an attempt when the offender

commences the commission of a felony

directly by overt acts, and does not perform

all the acts of execution which should

produce the felony by reason of some cause

or accident other than his own spontaneous

desistance.The essential elements of an

attempted felony are as follows: The offender

commences the commission of the felony

directly by overt acts; He does not perform all

the acts of execution which should produce

the felony; The offender's act be not stopped

by his own spontaneous desistance; The non-

performance of all acts of execution was due

to cause or accident other than his

spontaneous desistThe first requisite of an

attempted felony consists of two (2)

elements, namely: (1) That there be external

acts; (2) Such external acts have direct

connection with the crime intended to be

committ

Elpidio went back to his sister's house to

reconcile. He passed by the Kagawad's house

to accompany him but was told to just go

home. However he proceeded alone.

no treachery or any QUAC to speak of in this

case

On the other hand, there is a “question of

fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as

to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

Simply put, when there is no dispute as to

fact, the question of whether or not the

conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a

question of law.

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Upon arrival, he saw Titus his nephew and

Gary Fantastico, his sister's son in law, and

asked where their parents are. However, both

did not show any respect to him that they

cursed at him.

failure to appreciate mitigating circumstance In Rivera v. People, this Court considered the

following factors to determine the presence of

an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the

malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and

number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3)

the conduct of the malefactors before, at the

time, or immediately after the killing of the

victim; and (4) the circumstances under which

the crime was committed and the motives of

the accused.

This Court also considers motive and the

words uttered by the offender at the time he

inflicted injuries on the victim as additional

determinative factors. All of these, were

proven during the trial. Needless to say, with

or without the phrase, what is important is

that all the elements of attempted murder

are still alleged in the Information.

Out of anger, Elpidio kicked the door open and

saw the elder son, Salvador behind the door

holding a rattan stick or arnis. Salvador his

Elpidio twice. The third time, Elpidio defended

himself which made him grappled with his

nephew on the floor.

there are mistakes in the finding of facts of

the CA and RTC

One must not forget the well entrenched rule

that findings of facts of the trial court, its

calibration of the testimonial evidence of the

parties as well as its conclusion on its findings,

are accorded high respect if not conclusive

effect. This is because of the unique advantage

of the trial court to observe, at close range,

the conduct, demeanor and deportment of

the witness as they testify.

Titus went to the two and sprayed something

on Elpidio's face. Unable to free from

Salvador, he bit his nephew's head.

conviction was based on the weakness of the

defense evidence not on the strength of the

prosecution evidence

In this particular case, there was no

treachery. There is treachery when the

offender commits any of the crimes against

persons, employing means, methods, or forms

in the execution, which tend directly and

specially to insure its execution, without risk

to the offender arising from the defense which

the offended party might make. The essence

of treachery is that the attack comes without a

warning and in a swift, deliberate, and

unexpected manner, affording the hapless,

unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance

to resist or escape.

Gary hit Elpidio with an axe while he was

about to go out of the house. Elpidio tried to

defend himself but was unable to do so. The

three chased him out.

testimony that it was the petitioner who

attacked him is uncorroborated and self

serving

2 elements of TREACHERY: (1) the

employment of means of execution that gives

the persons attacked no opportunity to defend

themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of

execution were deliberately or consciously

adopted

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Rolland Villanueva hit Elpidio on the back of

his head with a lead pipe. Elpidio then begged

his assailants to stop, but to no avail.

Abuse of superior strength is present

whenever there is a notorious inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor,

assuming a situation of superiority of strength

notoriously advantageous for the aggressor

selected or taken advantage of by him in the

commission of the crime.

Abuse of superior strength was present when

all the malefactors were armed while the

victim was unarmed and drunk. "To take

advantage of superior strength means to

purposely use excessive force out of

proportion to the means of defense available

to the person attacked."

Mang Gil tried to break them off but to no

avail. Only stopped when a bystander

witnessing at their commotion fainted. Elpidio

pretended to be dead that he was rushed to

the hospital.

Petition is for review is denied. Decision and

resolution by CA is affirmed with modification.

A case of attempted murder under art 248

was filed. -- all pleaded not guilty.

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