Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellees,vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO,defendants,MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH)bonding company and defendant-appellant.F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees.Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio.Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano for defendant-appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.DIZON,J.:On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also the followingaffirmative relief: "to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id.p. 97). Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones covered by the following assignment of errors:I. That the Honorable Courta quoerred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance with the other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.II. That the Honorable Courta quoerred in ordering the issuance of execution against the herein bonding company-appellant.III. That the Honorable Courta quoerred in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution filed by the herein bonding company-appellant as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of execution.Not one of the assignment of errors it is obvious raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.On January 8, 1963 five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows:It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for collection of money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an important one which merits serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse decision.There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be worthy of consideration in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaia de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956; Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14591, September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of appellants submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue" (See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify, this case to the Supreme Court.1wph1.tACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let the record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case which shall forthwith be set forth We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred bylachesfrom invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almostfifteen years beforethe Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdictionfor the first time.It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additionalaffirmative relief that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition lack of jurisdiction of the courta quonot being one of them.Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppelin pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel bylaches.Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conductnot because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse as well as inPindagan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962;Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092;Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, andMejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the courta quoas well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quotein toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as follows:In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for collection of a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against defendants' properties. The attachment, however, was subsequently discharged under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied on the ground that there was "no showing that a demand had been made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of the amount due under the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p. 60).Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of the judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against the surety, with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the surety received copy of said motion and notice of hearing.It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel asked that he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so an order was issued in open court, as follows:1wph1.tAs prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, isgiven until Wednesday, November6, 1957,to file his answerto the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs,after which this incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution.SO ORDERED.Given in open court, this 2nd day of November, 1957, at Cebu City, Philippines.(Sgd.) JOSE M. MENDOZAJudge(Record on Appeal, pp.64-65, emphasis ours)Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the period given him, the court, on December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety; and on December 12, 1957, the corresponding writ of execution was issued.On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the same was "issued without the requirements of Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court having been complied with," more specifically, that the same was issued without the required "summary hearing". This motion was denied by order of February 10, 1958.On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-stated order of denial; which motion was likewise denied by order of March 26, 1958.From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March 26, 1958 denying the surety's motion to quash the writ of execution and motion for reconsideration, respectively the surety has interposed the appeal on hand.The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing required by Section 17 of Rule 59, which reads;"Sec. 17.When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any bond given pursuant to the provisions of this role to secure the payment of the judgment shall become finally charged on such bond, and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice andsummary hearing in the same action." (Emphasis ours)Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp. 793-794); and as to the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the discretion of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the incident up for consideration.In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the courta quogave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the motion "for the simple reason that all its defenses can be set up during the hearing of the motion even if the same are not reduced to writing" (Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above, the record will show that when the motion was called, what the surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order given in open court upon request of the surety's counsel that after the four-day period within which to file an answer, "the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution"; and counsel apparently agreed, as the order was issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection thereto.It is also urged that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59,supra, there is no need for a separate action, there must, however, be a separate judgment against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Not so, in our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section 12 of Rule 59, "to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may recover in the action," and stands "in place of the property so released". Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the execution is "returned unsatisfied" (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.Reyes, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 143647 November 11, 2005YUSUKE FUKUZUME,*Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,**Respondent.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before us is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888, which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 146 dated October 21, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-083, finding herein accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years and to pay private complainant the sum ofP424,000.00; and the CA Resolution dated June 16, 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.2The facts of the case are as follows:Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires.3Sometime in July 1991, Yu, accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate,4who was the vice-president of Manila Electric Company, went to the house of herein accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in Paraaque.5Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation (Furukawa) and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires.6Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).7Believing Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume.8The initial agreed purchase price wasP200,000.00.9Yu gave Fukuzume sums of money on various dates which eventually totaledP290,000.00, broken down as follows:P50,000.00, given on July 12, 1991;P20,000.00, given on July 22, 1991;P50,000.00, given on October 14, 1991; and,P170,000.00, given on October 18, 1991.10Fukuzume admitted that he received the same from Yu and that he still owes him the amount ofP290,000.00.11To support his claim that the aluminum scrap wires being sold are indeed owned by Furukawa, that these scrap wires are with NAPOCOR, and that Furukawas authorized representatives are allowed to withdraw and dispose of said scrap wires, Fukuzume gave Yu two certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December 27, 1991 purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and signed by its legal counsel by the name of R. Y. Rodriguez.12At the time that Fukuzume gave Yu the second certification, he asked money from the latter telling him that it shall be given as gifts to some of the people in NAPOCOR. Yu gave Fukuzume money and, in exchange, the latter issued two checks, one forP100,000.00 and the other forP34,000.00.13However, when Yu deposited the checks, they were dishonored on the ground that the account from which the checks should have been drawn is already closed.14Subsequently, Yu called up Fukuzume to inform him that the checks bounced.15Fukuzume instead told him not to worry because in one or two weeks he will give Yu the necessary authorization to enable him to retrieve the aluminum scrap wires from NAPOCOR.16On January 17, 1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a letter of even date, signed by the Director of the Overseas Operation and Power Transmission Project Divisions of Furukawa, authorizing Fukuzume to dispose of excess aluminum conductor materials which are stored in their depots in Tanay and Bulacan.17Thereafter, Fukuzume agreed to accompany Yu when the latter is going to take the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound.18When Yu arrived at the NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date, Fukuzume was nowhere to be found.19Hence, Yu proceeded to show the documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel. However, the people from NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization letter issued by Furukawa dated January 17, 1992.20NAPOCOR also refused to acknowledge the certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December 27, 1991 claiming that these are spurious as the person who signed these documents is no longer connected with NAPOCOR as of December 1991.21Unable to get the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to Fukuzume and asked from the latter the refund of the money he paid him.22Fukuzume promised to return Yus money.23When Fukuzume failed to comply with his undertaking, Yu sent him a demand letter asking for the refund ofP424,000.00 plus loss of profits.24Subsequently, Yu filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).25In an Information, dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of Makati, Fukuzume was charged with estafa committed as follows:That sometime in the month of July, 1991 up to September 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y Ng, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make false representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the duly authorized representative of Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd., in the Philippines, and was authorized to sell excess aluminum conductor materials not being used by Napocor and Furukawa, the accused knowing full well that those representations were false and were only made to induce and convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy said materials, who believing said representations to be true, gave and delivered the total amount ofP424,000.00 but the accused once in possession of the money, far from complying with his obligation to deliver said aluminum conductor materials to herein complainant, with intent of gain, unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, applied and used for his own personal use and benefit the said amount and despite repeated demands failed and refused and still fails and refuses to account for, to the damage and prejudice of Javier Yu y Ng in the aforementioned amount ofP424,000.00.CONTRARY TO LAW.26Upon being arraigned on February 28, 1995, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty.27Trial ensued.In its Decision dated October 21, 1996, the trial court found Fukuzume guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and hereby orders him to suffer the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years. With respect to his civil liability, accused is hereby ordered to pay complainant the amount ofP424,000.00 plus legal interest from the date of demand until fully paid.SO ORDERED.28Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, Fukuzume filed an appeal with the CA.On March 13, 2000, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court but modifying the penalty imposed, thus: although the trial court correctly imposed the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years, it failed to determine the minimum penalty for the offense committed (prision correccionalin its maximum period toprision mayorin its minimum period but imposed in the maximum period), hence, the penalty is modified to six (6) years and one (1) day ofprision mayorin its minimum period, as the minimum, to not more than twenty (20) years ofreclusion temporalin its maximum period, as maximum.29Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, except for the aforementioned modification in the prison term of appellant, is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.30Hence, herein petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following grounds:THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI HAS JURISDICTION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSE WAS EXECUTED PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE FRAUD.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE ORIGINAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN NOVATED AND CONVERTED INTO A MERE DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP, THEREBY EXTINGUISHING THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY THEREOF, IF ANY.31We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged. The CA ruled:The trial court of Makati has jurisdiction. Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (Rule 110, Sec. 15, Rules of Court). Although the false representation and verbal contract of sale of the aluminum scrap wires took place at appellants residence in Paraaque, appellant and private complainant nevertheless admitted that the initial payment ofP50,000.00 for said transaction was made at the Hotel Intercontinental in Makati City (Record, pp. 15, 68). Hence, an element of the crime that the offended party was induced to part with his money because of the false pretense occurred within the jurisdiction of the lower court giving it jurisdiction over the instant case.The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI on April 19, 199432and the affidavit of Fukuzume which was subscribed on July 20, 1994.33With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged therein that on July 12, 1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount ofP50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount ofP50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latters house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in Paraaque. Yu testified thus:Q Mr. Witness, you testified the last time that you know the accused in this case, Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume?A Yes, sir.Q Now, would you enlighten us under what circumstance you came to know the accused?A I know the accused Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume through Mr. Hubati.Q And why or how did Mr. Hubati come to know the accused, if you know?A Mr. Hubati came to my place dealing with the aluminum scrap wires.ATTY. N. SERINGYour Honor, may I move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive to the question.COURTPlease wait until the answer is completed.Q Now, you met this Mr. Hubati. How?A He came to me offering me aluminum scrap wires.FISCAL E. HIRANGQ When was that, Mr. Witness?A That was in 1991, sir.COURTWhen?FISCAL E. HIRANGYour Honor please, may the witness be allowed to consult his memorandum.A July 12, 1991, sir.Q And what transpired during that time you met Mr. Hubati?A We went to the house of Mr. Fukuzume and game (sic) him some amount of money.Q Now, would you tell the Court the reason why you parted to the accused in this case the amount of money?A In payment of the aluminum scrap wires and we have documents to that effect.Q Now, please tell us what really was that transaction that took place at the house of Mr. Fukuzume on that particular date?A Our agreement with Mr. Hubati and with Mr. Fukuzume is that, I am going to give money in payment of the aluminum scrap wires coming from Furukawa Eletric Company.Q How much is the amount of money which you agreed to give to the accused?A Our first agreement was forP200,000.Q Where is that aluminum scrap located?A The electric aluminum scrap wires was or were under the care of the National Power Corporation but according to Mr. Fukuzume it belongs to Furukawa Electric Company.Q In short, Mr. Witness, on July 12, 1991, you only gave to the accused the amount ofP50,000?ATTY. N. SERINGObjection, Your Honor.FISCAL E. HIRANGThe complainant testified he gaveP50,000. I am asking how much the complainant gave to the accused on that particular date.A On July 12, I gave himP50,000 on that date.Q NotP200,000?A No, sir.34Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits takenex parteare inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.35More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere inMakati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.36CitingUy vs. Court of Appeals,37we held in the fairly recent case ofMacasaet vs. People38that:It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.39(Emphasis supplied)Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing it to take jurisdiction and to try the case and to render judgment.40In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows:1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.41The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yus sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts ofP50,000.00 on July 12, 1991,P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991,P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 andP170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount ofP50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latters house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Fukuzume himself alleged in his affidavit dated July 20, 1994 that in an unspecified date, he receivedP50,000.00 from Yu at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we cannot rely on this affidavit for the reason that it forms part of the records of the preliminary investigation and, therefore, may not be considered evidence. It is settled that the record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case in the RTC.42InPeople vs. Crispin,43this Court held that the fact that the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC. Such record must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of the same.44Since neither prosecution nor defense presented in evidence Fukuzumes affidavit, the same may not be considered part of the records, much less evidence.From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafashould be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or consideredmotu propioby the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.45Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.46While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case ofTijam vs. Sibonghanoy,47wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary to consider the other issues raised in the present petition.WHEREFORE, the instant petition isGRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888areSET ASIDEon ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146. Criminal Case No. 95-083 isDISMISSEDwithout prejudice.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 167764 October 9, 2009VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO,Petitioners,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:Before the court is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA Resolution2dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.In an Information3dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as follows:That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN," quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit:MEET DR. PORTIGO,COMPANY PHYSICIANPHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health of their patients. Especially if they are employed by a company to serve its employees.However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation office, SMC employees are fuming mad about their company physician, Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation in looking after the health problems of employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos, Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19 last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her under observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum myoma and must undergo an operation.Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry, sources said, after knowing that the family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own without his nod as he had one to recommend.Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the hospital two weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of difficulty in urinating and defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to the hospital.The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the family and the patient herself who woke to find out her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side.This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral frankly turned it down because it would only be a waste of money since the disease was already on the terminal state.The company and the family spent someP150,000.00 to pay for the wrong diagnosis of the company physician.My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the conscience of physicians to remind them that their profession is no license for self-enrichment at the expense of the poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat their patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are cheaper and more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's milk is many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the brands they peddle. These hospitals separate newly born from their moms for days, conditioning the former to milk formula while at the same time stunting the mother's mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death!My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994, Her body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation and insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.CONTRARY TO LAW.4Upon being arraigned5on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counselde parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued.On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision6finding petitioners guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a fine ofP1,000.00 each.7Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order8dated February 20, 1998.Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmedin totothe RTC decision.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE "LIBELOUS" WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OFPANAY NEWSAND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS.9Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and her family and expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication of the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to report matters of public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject article was an opinion column, which was the columnists exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher ofPanay News, did not have to share those views and should not be held responsible for the crime of libel.The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue,i.e., whether or not the element of malice required in every indictment for libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing anew of the evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on records some facts or circumstance of weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may alter the result of the case a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not require the evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review oncertiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.InFukuzume v. People,10the Court ruled:It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.11The Court finds merit in the petition.Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People12that:It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore,the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)13Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation, to wit:Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first publishedor where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)InAgbayani v. Sayo,14the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.15Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience the Court quotes again, to wit:That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN...."The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" only showed that Iloilo was the place wherePanay Newswas in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.InChavez v. Court of Appeals,16which involved a libel case filed by a private individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information of which reads:That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be published in "Smart File," a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....17the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance with Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition:x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word "published" is utilized in the precise context of noting that the defendants "cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in Manila." The Information states that the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were published in Manila. The place "Manila" is in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading national dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are published and first printed in Cebu.1avvphi1Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since the publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart File is in general circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these newspapers are in general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to avoid.18InAgustin v. Pamintuan,19which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that the libelous article was "published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire Philippines," the Court did not consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City was the venue of the printing and first publication of the alleged libelous article.Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place.Again, inAgustin v. Pamintuan,20where the Information for libel alleged that the "offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community," the Court did not find such allegation sufficient to establish that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained its ruling in this wise:The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.21Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.22Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.WHEREFORE,the petition isGRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 areSET ASIDEon the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 isDISMISSEDwithout prejudice.SO ORDERED.