G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner 

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and

RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the 

Court   of   Appeals   dated   29   October   2004   and   21 

March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed 

Luis   Panaguiton,   Jr.'s   (petitioner's)   petition   for 

certiorari   and   his   subsequent   motion   for 

reconsideration.2

The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

In   1992, Rodrigo   Cawili   (Cawili)   borrowed   various 

sums   of   money   amounting   to P1,979,459.00   from 

petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business 

associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued 

in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of 

the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore 

the   signatures   of   both   Cawili   and   Tongson.   Upon 

presentment   for   payment   on   18  March   1993,   the 

checks  were  dishonored,  either   for   insufficiency  of 

funds  or  by   the   closure  of   the   account.   Petitioner 

made   formal  demands   to  pay   the  amounts  of   the 

checks   upon   Cawili   on   23   May   1995   and   upon 

Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3

On   24   August   1995,   petitioner   filed   a   complaint 

against   Cawili   and   Tongson4 for   violating   Batas 

Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon 

City   Prosecutor's   Office.   During   the   preliminary 

investigation,   only   Tongson   appeared   and  filed  his 

counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been 

unjustly   included   as   party-respondent   in   the   case 

since   petitioner   had   lent   money   to   Cawili   in   the 

latter's personal capacity.  Moreover,   like petitioner, 

he   had   lent   various   sums   to   Cawili   and   in 

appreciation of his services, he was

offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He 

averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; 

in   fact,   he  himself  had  filed   several   criminal   cases 

against  Cawili   for  violation of B.P.  Blg.  22.  Tongson 

denied that he had issued the bounced checks and 

pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had 

been falsified.

To   counter   these   allegations,   petitioner   presented 

several   documents   showing   Tongson's   signatures, 

which   were   purportedly   the   same   as   the   those 

appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of 

an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself 

had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8

In   a   resolution   dated   6   December   1995,9 City 

Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause 

only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against 

Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the 

Department   of   Justice   (DOJ)   even   while   the   case 

against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a 

letter-resolution   dated   11   July   1997,10 after   finding 

that   it   was   possible   for   Tongson   to   co-sign   the 

bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered 

his  signature  in the pleadings submitted during the 

preliminary   investigation,   Chief   State   Prosecutor 

Jovencito   R.   Zuño   directed   the   City   Prosecutor   of 

Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case 

against   Tongson   and   to   refer   the   questioned 

signatures   to   the  National   Bureau   of   Investigation 

(NBI).

Tongson   moved   for   the   reconsideration   of   the 

resolution,   but   his  motion  was   denied   for   lack   of 

merit.

On   15  March   1999,   Assistant   City   Prosecutor  Ma. 

Lelibet   S.   Sampaga   (ACP   Sampaga)   dismissed   the 

complaint against   Tongson   without   referring   the 

matter   to   the  NBI  per   the  Chief  State  Prosecutor's 

resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that 

the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 

3326,   as   amended,12 which  provides   that   violations 

penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) 

years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on 

the   date   the   checks   were   dishonored,   or   on   20 

January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the 

complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 

August   1995   did   not   interrupt   the   running   of   the 

prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, 

and   not   administrative   proceedings.   Thus, 

considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four 

(4) years had already elapsed and no information had 

as   yet   been   filed   against   Tongson,   the   alleged 

violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already 

prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the 

order   of   the   Chief   State   Prosecutor   to   refer   the 

matter   to   the  NBI   could   no   longer   be   sanctioned 

under  Section 3,  Rule  112 of   the Rules  of  Criminal 

Procedure because the  initiative should come from 

petitioner   himself   and   not   the   investigating 

prosecutor.14 Finally,   ACP   Sampaga   found   that 

Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.15

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through 

Undersecretary   Manuel   A.J.   Teehankee,   dismissed 

the   same,   stating   that   the   offense   had   already 

prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16Petitioner filed 

a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. 

On 3  April  2003,17 the  DOJ,   this  time through  then 

Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in 

his   favor   and   declared   that   the   offense   had   not 

prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with 

the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the 

prescriptive   period   citing Ingco v.

Sandiganbayan.18 Thus,   the   Office   of   the   City 

Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three 

(3)   separate   informations   against   Tongson   for 

violation  of  B.P.  Blg.  22.19 On  8   July  2003,   the  City 

Prosecutor's   Office   filed   an   information20 charging 

petitioner with three (3)  counts of  violation of B.P. 

Blg. 22.21

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the 

DOJ,   presumably   acting   on   a   motion   for 

reconsideration   filed   by   Tongson,   ruled   that   the 

subject offense had already prescribed and ordered 

"the  withdrawal   of   the   three   (3)   informations   for 

violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying 

its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 

3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not 

provide   for   a   prescriptive   period   for   the   offenses 

thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does 

not   provide   for   the   prescription   of   the   offense   it 

defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and 

not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs 

the   prescription   of   offenses   penalized 

thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia

v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that 

the   proceedings   referred   to   in   Act   No.   3326,   as 

amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one 

before the prosecutor's office.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before 

the   Court   of   Appeals   assailing   the   9   August   2004 

resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by 

the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to 

attach a proper verification and certification of non-

forum

shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 

April   2003   resolution   of   the   DOJ   attached   to   the 

petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for 

the   reconsideration   of   the   appellate   court's 

resolution,   attaching   to   said   motion   an   amended 

Verification/Certification   of   Non-Forum 

Shopping.27Still,   the   Court   of   Appeals   denied 

petitioner's   motion,   stating   that   subsequent 

compliance   with   the   formal   requirements   would 

not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. 

Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is 

patently   without   merit   and   the   questions   raised 

therein   are   too   unsubstantial   to   require 

consideration.28

In   the   instant   petition,   petitioner   claims   that   the 

Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing 

his petition on technical  grounds and  in ruling that 

the petition before it was patently without merit and 

the   questions   are   too   unsubstantial   to   require 

consideration.

The DOJ,   in  its  comment,29 states that  the Court  of 

Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-

compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates 

that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the 

City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the 

running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. 

Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law 

which   does   not   provide   for   its   own   prescriptive 

period,   offenses   prescribe   in   four   (4)   years   in 

accordance with Act No. 3326.

Cawili   and   Tongson   submitted   their   comment, 

arguing   that   the   Court   of   Appeals   did   not   err   in 

dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that 

the offense of  violation of  B.P.  Blg.  22 has  already 

prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim 

that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the 

State,   violated   their   constitutional   right   to   speedy 

disposition of cases.30

The petition is meritorious.

First on the technical issues.

Petitioner   submits   that   the  verification attached  to 

his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially 

complies   with   the   rules,   the   verification   being 

intended   simply   to   secure   an   assurance   that   the 

allegations in the pleading are true and correct and 

not   a   product   of   the   imagination   or   a  matter   of 

speculation. He points out that this Court has held in 

a number of cases that a deficiency in the verification 

can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being 

neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31

Indeed,   the   verification   is   merely   a   formal 

requirement   intended   to   secure  an  assurance   that 

matters which are alleged are true and correct–the 

court may simply order the correction of unverified 

pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance 

with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be 

served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we 

find that by attaching the pertinent verification to his 

motion   for   reconsideration,   petitioner   sufficiently 

complied with the verification requirement.

Petitioner   also   submits   that   the   Court   of   Appeals 

erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that 

there was failure to attach a certified true copy or 

duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the 

DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before 

the

Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment 

of   the   DOJ   resolution   dated   9   August   2004,33 a 

certified true copy of which was attached as Annex 

"A."34 Obviously,   the  Court  of  Appeals  committed a 

grievous mistake.

Now, on the substantive aspects.

Petitioner   assails   the   DOJ's   reliance   on Zaldivia v.

Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal 

ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is 

tolled  only  upon filing  of   the   information  in  court. 

According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case 

is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled 

that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office 

for preliminary investigation suspends the running of 

the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the 

Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special 

law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known 

as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner 

notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the 

Court  of  Appeals'  pronouncements  would   result   in 

grave injustice to him since the delays in the present 

case were clearly beyond his control.38

There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately 

entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations

of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to

Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is   the   law 

applicable   to  offenses  under  special   laws which  do 

not   provide   their   own   prescriptive   periods.   The 

pertinent provisions read:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special  acts shall, 

unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in 

accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after 

four  years   for   those punished by  imprisonment  for 

more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x 

x

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of 

the commission of the violation of the law, and if the 

same be not known at the time, from the discovery 

thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for 

its investigation and punishment.

The   prescription   shall   be   interrupted   when 

proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, 

and shall  begin to run again  if  the proceedings are 

dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

We   agree   that   Act.   No.   3326   applies   to   offenses 

under   B.P.   Blg.   22.   An   offense   under   B.P.   Blg.   22 

merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than 

thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a 

fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. 

Blg.   22   prescribes   in   four   (4)   years   from   the 

commission  of   the  offense  or,   if   the   same  be  not 

known   at   the   time,   from   the   discovery   thereof. 

Nevertheless,  we   cannot   uphold   the   position   that 

only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of 

the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was 

passed   on   4   December   1926,   preliminary 

investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by 

justices  of   the  peace,   thus,   the  phraseology   in   the 

law,   "institution   of   judicial   proceedings   for   its 

investigation   and  punishment,"39 and   the  prevailing 

rule at  the time was that once a complaint   is  filed 

with   the   justice   of   the   peace   for   preliminary 

investigation,   the   prescription   of   the   offense   is 

halted.40

The historical  perspective on the application of  Act 

No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was approved 

on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of 

conducting the preliminary   investigation of  criminal 

offenses  was   vested   in   the   justices   of   the   peace. 

Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the 

cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that 

the   prescription   of   the   offense   is   tolled   once   a 

complaint   is  filed with   the  justice of   the peace  for 

preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the 

complaint signifies the

institution   of   the   criminal   proceedings   against   the 

accused.44 These   cases   were   followed   by   our 

declaration   in People v. Parao and Parao45 that   the 

first step taken in the investigation or examination of 

offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding 

which   suspends   the   prescription   of   the 

offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held 

that   the   filing   of   the   complaint   in   the  Municipal 

Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary 

examination   or   investigation,   should,   and   does, 

interrupt   the  period  of  prescription of   the  criminal 

responsibility, even if the court where the complaint 

or   information   is   filed   cannot   try   the   case  on   the 

merits.   In   addition,   even   if   the   court   where   the 

complaint or information is filed may only proceed to 

investigate the case, its actuations already represent 

the   initial   step   of   the   proceedings   against   the 

offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should 

be interrupted.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company

Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and 

the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which 

are both special laws, the Court ruled that the

prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of 

proceedings for preliminary investigation against the 

accused.   In   the  more   recent   case of Securities and

Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources

Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature 

and purpose of   the  investigation conducted by  the 

Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of 

the  Revised  Securities  Act,52 another   special   law,   is 

equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted 

by   the  DOJ   in   criminal   cases,   and   thus   effectively 

interrupts the prescriptive period.

The   following   disquisition   in   the Interport

Resources case53 is instructive, thus:

While   it  may   be   observed   that   the   term   "judicial 

proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before 

"investigation and punishment" in the old law, with 

the   subsequent   change   in   set-up   whereby   the 

investigation   of   the   charge   for   purposes   of 

prosecution has become the exclusive function of the 

executive   branch,   the   term   "proceedings"   should 

now   be   understood   either   executive   or   judicial   in 

character:   executive   when   it   involves   the 

investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the 

trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any 

kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the 

guilty   person   which   may   ultimately   lead   to   his 

prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.54

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured 

party   the right   to  obtain  vindication on account  of 

delays   that   are   not   under   his   control.55 A   clear 

example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed 

his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within 

the   four   (4)-year   prescriptive   period.   He   likewise 

timely   filed   his   appeals   and   his   motions   for 

reconsideration   on   the   dismissal   of   the   charges 

against

Tongson.   He   went   through   the   proper   channels, 

within   the   prescribed   periods.   However,   from   the 

time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the 

Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to 

the time the DOJ  issued the assailed resolution,  an 

aggregate   period   of   nine   (9)   years   had   elapsed. 

Clearly,   the  delay  was  beyond  petitioner's   control. 

After   all,   he   had   already   initiated   the   active 

prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, 

only   to   suffer   setbacks   because   of   the   DOJ's   flip-

flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 

3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not 

sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, 

should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further 

simply   because   of   circumstances   beyond   their 

control,   like   the   accused's   delaying   tactics   or   the 

delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We  rule  and   so  hold   that   the  offense  has  not   yet 

prescribed.   Petitioner   's   filing   of   his   complaint-

affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 

24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the 

proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and 

thus   effectively   interrupted   the   prescriptive  period 

for  the offenses they had been charged under B.P. 

Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of 

probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of 

prescription there is no longer any impediment to the 

filing of the information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE,   the   petition   is   GRANTED.   The 

resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 

2004   and   21  March   2005   are   REVERSED   and   SET 

ASIDE.  The resolution of   the Department  of   Justice 

dated   9   August   2004   is   also   ANNULLED   and   SET 

ASIDE.   The   Department   of   Justice   is   ORDERED   to 

REFILE the information against the petitioner.

PRESIDENTIAL   COMMISSION                G.R.   NO. 

140231

ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

(PCGG), represented by ORLANDO

L. SALVADOR,

                             Petitioner,

                                                                    Present:      

 

                                                                   YNARES-

SANTIAGO, J.,

                                                                       Chairperson,

               -   versus   -                                       AUSTRIA-

MARTINEZ,

                                                                   CHICO-

NAZARIO, and

                                                                   NACHURA, JJ.

                                     

HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO,

Office of the Ombudsman-Manila,

CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE PNB

BOARD OF DIRECTORS,

REYNALDO TUASON, CARLOS

CAJELO, JOSE BARQUILLO, JR.,

LORETO SOLSONA, PRIMICIAS

BANAGA, JOHN DOES, and

NORTHERN COTABATO SUGAR

INDUSTRIES, INC. (NOCOSII),                Promulgated:

                             Respondents.                  July 9, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  

- - - - - - - - - - - x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

            The   Presidential   Commission   on   Good 

Government[1] (petitioner)   filed   the   herein   Petition 

for Certiorari under   Rule   65   of   the   Rules   of   Court 

assailing   the   Resolution[2] dated   May   21,   1999   of 

Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in   OMB   No.   0-95-

0890 which dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint 

for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act 

(R.A.)   No.   3019[3] against   concerned   members   of 

Philippine National Bank (PNB) Board of Directors and 

Northern Cotabato Sugar   Industries,   Inc.   (NOCOSII) 

officers,   namely:   Reynaldo Tuason,   Carlos Cajelo, 

Jose Barquillo,   Jr., 

Loreto Solsona, Primicias Banaga and   John   Does 

(respondents);  and  the  Order[4] dated   July  23,  1999 

which   denied   petitioner's   Motion   for 

Reconsideration. 

 

          The facts:

 

          On October   8,   1992,   then   President   Fidel   V. 

Ramos  issued Administrative Order  No.  13 creating 

the Presidential  Ad Hoc Fact-Finding  Committee on 

Behest   Loans   (Committee)   which   was   tasked   to 

inventory   all   behest   loans,   determine   the   parties 

involved   and   recommend   whatever   appropriate 

actions to be pursued thereby.

 

On November   9,   1992,   President   Ramos   issued 

Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions 

of the Committee to include the inventory and review 

of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-

behest. 

 

The Memorandum set the following criteria to show 

the   earmarks   of   a   “behest   loan,”   to   wit:   “a)   it 

is undercollaterized;  b)   the  borrower  corporation  is 

undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement 

by high government officials like presence of marginal 

notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the 

borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a 

deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose 

intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-

feasibility of the project for which financing is being 

sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the 

loan release was made.”

 

Among   the   accounts   referred   to   the   Committee's 

Technical   Working   Group   (TWG)   were   the   loan 

transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.

 

          After   it   had   examined   and   studied   all   the 

documents relative to the said loan transactions, the 

Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII 

from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII’s insufficient 

capital   and   inadequate   collaterals.  Specifically,   the 

Committee's   investigation   revealed   that   in   1975, 

NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of 

Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII  was able to get 

155%   loan   value   from  the  offered   collateral   or   an 

excess  of  85%  from  the   required  percentage   limit; 

that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals 

was  a  public   land  contrary   to   the  General  Banking 

Act;   that   by   virtue   of   the  marginal   note   of   then 

President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was 

allowed to use the public   land as plant site and to 

dispense   with   the  mortgage   requirement   of   PNB; 

that NOCOSII's paid-up   capital   at   the   time   of   the 

approval  of   the guaranty was onlyP2,500,000.00 or 

only about 6% of its obligation.

 

          Based   on   the   Sworn   Statement   of   PCGG 

consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the 

Office   of   the   Ombudsman   the   criminal   complaint 

against   respondents.  Petitioner   alleges   that 

respondents   violated   the   following   provisions   of 

Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019:  

         

            Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In 

addition to acts or omissions of public officers already 

penalized   by   existing   law,   the   following   shall 

constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and 

are hereby declared to be unlawful:

 

x x x

 

            e. Causing undue injury to any party, including 

the   Government   or   giving   any   private   party   any 

unwarranted   benefits,   advantage   or   preference   in 

the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial 

functions   through  manifest   partiality,   evident   bad 

faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision 

shall   apply   to  officers  and  employees  of  offices  or 

government corporations charged with the grant of 

licenses or permits or other concessions.

x x x

 

            g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into 

any   contract   or   transaction  manifestly   and   grossly 

disadvantageous   to   the   same,  whether  or   not   the 

public officer profited or will profit thereby.

 

          The   respondents   failed   to   submit   any 

responsive   pleading   before   the the Ombudsman, 

prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda 

S.   Diaz-Salcedo to   resolve   the   case   based   on   the 

available evidence.

 

          In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-

0-95-0890,   GIO   Diaz-Salcedo recommended   the 

dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of 

evidence   or   lack   of   probable   cause   against   the 

respondents   and   for   prescription   of   the 

offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved   the 

recommendation on May 21, 1999.[5] 

 

          Petitioner   filed   a   Motion   for 

Reconsideration[6] but   it   was   denied   by   GIO   Diaz-

Salcedo in   the  Order  dated July   9,   1999,which  was 

approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.[7]

 

          Forthwith,  petitioner elevated the case to this 

Court and in support of its petition alleges that:

 

A)        The Respondent  Ombudsman gravely  abused 

his   discretion   or   acted   without   or   in   excess   of 

jurisdiction  in dismissing the complaint  filed by the 

Petitioner on the ground of Prescription considering 

that:

1.         THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER BEHEST 

LOANS AS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE 

UNDER   ARTICLE   XI,   SECTION   15,   OF   THE   1987 

CONSTITUTION;

 

2.         PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A 

TRUSTEE TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE BENEFICIARY;

 

3.         THE OFFENSES CHARGED ARE IN THE NATURE 

OF CONTINUING CRIMES AS THE STATE CONTINUES 

TO   SUFFER   INJURY  ON  EACH  DAY  OF  DEFAULT   IN 

PAYMENT. HENCE, PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT APPLY;

 

4.         PRESCRIPTION   AS   A   MATTER   OF   DEFENSE 

MUST   BE   PLEADED,   OTHERWISE,   IT   IS   DEEMED 

WAIVED;

 

5.         PRESCRIPTION   HAS   NOT   BEEN   INVOKED   IN 

THIS CASE.  SINCE IT MAY BE WAIVED OR MAY NOT 

BE   SET   IN   DEFENSE,   THE   OMBUDSMAN 

CANNOT MOTU PROPRIO DISMISS   THE   COMPLAINT 

ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION;

 

6.         ARTICLE   91   OF   THE   REVISED   PENAL   CODE 

WHICH ADOPTS THE “DISCOVERY RULE” SHALL APPLY 

IN THIS CASE;

 

7.         THE   LOAN   CONTRACT   AS   OTHER   LOAN 

TRANSACTIONS   IN  THE  NATURE  OF  BEHEST  LOANS 

ARE KEPT SECRET.[8]

 

B)  The  respondent  Ombudsman gravely  abused his 

discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction 

in   not   finding   that   a   probable   cause   exists   for 

violation by the private respondents of section 3 (e) 

and   (g)  of  RA  3019  despite   the  presence  of   clear, 

overwhelming andunrebutted evidence.[9]

 

 

          In   its   Comment,   the   Ombudsman,   without 

delving   on   the   issue   of   prescription,   in   view 

of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on

Behest Loans v. Desierto (1999),[10] contends   that   its 

finding   of   insufficiency   of   evidence   or   lack   of 

probable  cause  against   respondents  deserves  great 

weight and respect, and must be accorded full weight 

and credit. 

 

          No   comment   was   filed   by   the   rest   of   the 

respondents.

 

          The   issue   before   the   Court   is   whether   the 

Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in 

ruling   that:   (a)   the   offense   leveled   against 

respondents   has   prescribed;   and   (b)   no   probable 

cause exists against respondents.

 

          The petition is partly meritorious.

 

          Respondent   Ombudsman   committed   grave 

abuse   of   discretion   in   dismissing   the   subject 

complaint on the ground of prescription.

 

          Respondents  members   of   the   PNB   Board   of 

Directors and Officers of  NOCOSII  are charged with 

violation of R.A. No. 3019, a special  law.  Amending 

said   law,   Section   4, Batas Pambansa Blg.   195,

[11] increased   the   prescriptive   period   from   ten   to 

fifteen years.

 

          The applicable   law  in   the  computation of   the 

prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326,[12] as 

amended, which provides:

 

          Sec. 2.  Prescription shall begin to run from the 

day of the commission of the violation of the law, and 

if   the   same   not   be   known   at   the   time,   from   the 

discovery   thereof   and   the   institution   of   judicial 

proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

           

            The   prescription   shall   be   interrupted   when 

proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, 

and shall  begin to run again  if  the proceedings are 

dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

         

          The issue of prescription has long been laid to 

rest in the aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-

Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[13] where the Court held:

 

x x x it  was  well-nigh   impossible   for   the   State,   the 

aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. 

No.   3019   at   the   time   the   questioned   transactions 

were made because,  as  alleged,   the public  officials 

concerned   connived   or   conspired   with   the 

“beneficiaries of the loans.’ Thus, we agree with the 

COMMITTEE   that   the   prescriptive   period   for   the 

offenses with which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 

were   charged   should   be   computed   from   the 

discovery of   the   commission   thereof   and  not   from 

the day of such commission.

The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase ‘if 

the same not be known’ in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 

does not mean ‘lack of knowledge’ but that the crime 

‘is  not   reasonably  knowable’   is  unacceptable,   as   it 

provides   an   interpretation   that   defeats   or   negates 

the intent of the law, which is written in a clear and 

unambiguous   language  and  thus  provides  no   room 

for interpretation but only application.[14]

 

The Court reiterated the above ruling in Presidential

Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans

v. Desierto (2001),[15] thus:

 

In   cases   involving   violations   of   R.A.   No.   3019 

committed   prior   to   the   February 

1986 Edsa Revolution   that   ousted   President 

Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government 

as the aggrieved party could not have known of the 

violations   at   the   time   the   questioned   transactions 

were   made   (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R.   No.   140232, 

January   19,   2001,   349   SCRA   767; Domingo

v. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note   14; Presidential Ad

Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans

v. Desierto, supra, Note   16).   Moreover,   no   person 

would have dared to question the  legality  of  those 

transactions.  Thus,   the  counting of   the prescriptive 

period commenced from the date of discovery of the 

offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by 

the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.

As   to   when   the   period   of   prescription   was 

interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act 

No. 3326, as amended, provides that prescription is 

interrupted ‘when proceedings are instituted against 

the guilty person.[16]

 

          Records show that the act complained of was 

discovered in 1992. The complaint was filed with the 

Office   of   the   Ombudsman   on April   5,   1995,[17] or 

within   three   (3)   years   from  the  time  of  discovery. 

Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within the 

prescriptive period of 15 years.

 

          On   the   issue   of   whether   the   Ombudsman 

committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that 

no probable cause exists against respondents, it must 

be stressed that the Ombudsman is  empowered to 

determine whether there exists reasonable ground to 

believe that a crime has been committed and that the 

accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to 

file   the   corresponding   information   with   the 

appropriate   courts.[18] Settled   is   the   rule   that   the 

Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the 

Ombudsman’s   exercise   of   his   investigatory 

and prosecutory powers   without   good   and 

compelling   reasons   to   indicate   otherwise.[19] Said 

exercise of  powers  is  based upon his  constitutional 

mandate[20] and   the   courts  will   not   interfere   in   its 

exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for 

the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by 

the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but 

upon   practicality   as   well.   Otherwise,   innumerable 

petitions   seeking   dismissal   of   investigatory 

proceedings   conducted   by   the   Ombudsman   will 

grievously hamper the functions of the office and the 

courts,   in  much   the   same  way   that   courts  will   be 

swamped   if   they   had   to   review   the   exercise   of 

discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time 

they   decided   to   file   an   information   or   dismiss   a 

complaint by a private complainant.[21]

 

          While   there   are   certain   instances   when   this 

Court  may   intervene   in   the  prosecution   of   cases, 

such   as,   (1)   when   necessary   to   afford   adequate 

protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 

(2) when necessary for the orderly administration of 

justice   or   to   avoid   oppression   or   multiplicity   of 

actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which 

is   sub-judice;   (4)  when   the   acts   of   the  officer   are 

without   or   in   excess   of   authority;   (5)   where   the 

prosecution   is   under   an   invalid   law,   ordinance   or 

regulation;   (6)   when   double   jeopardy   is   clearly 

apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over 

the   offense;   (8)  where   it   is   a   case   of   persecution 

rather  than prosecution;   (9)  where the charges are 

manifestly   false   and   motivated   by   the   lust   for 

vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima

facie case against the accused and a motion to quash 

on that ground has been denied,[22] none apply here.

 

          After   examination   of the   records   and   the 

evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no 

cogent   reason   to   disturb   the   findings   of   the 

Ombudsman.

 

          No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed 

to   the   Ombudsman.  Grave   abuse   of   discretion 

implies   a   capricious   and   whimsical   exercise   of 

judgment   tantamount   to   lack  of   jurisdiction.[23] The 

exercise   of   power   must   have   been   done   in   an 

arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or 

personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as 

to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual 

refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in 

contemplation of law.[24]   

 

          The   disquisition   of   GIO   Diaz-Salcedo,   in 

dismissing   the   criminal   complaint,   as   approved   by 

Ombudsman Desierto, is worth-quoting, thus:

            Taking   into   consideration   the   provisions   of 

Administrative   Order   No.   13   and   Memorandum 

Order  No.  61,   the   subject   transactions   can  not  be 

classified as behest.

 

            Evaluation of the records of this case reveals 

that   the   loans   acquired   by   NOCOSII   are   actually 

foreign   loans   from   Midland   Bank   Ltd. 

of London.  There  were  no  direct   loans   released  by 

PNB but merely credit accommodations to guaranty 

the loans from Midland Bank.

 

            Anent complainant's claim that the collaterals 

offered   by   NOCOSII   are   insufficient,   it   should   be 

noted   that   under   PNB   Board   Resolution   No.   689 

dated July 30, 1975, one of the conditions imposed to 

NOCOSII   was   the   execution   of   contract   assigning 

all NOCOSII'sshare   of   sugar   and   molasses   to 

PNB.  NOCOSII was also required to increase its paid 

up capital  at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April  30, 

1976   up   to   April   30,   1980   or   a   total 

of P25,000,000.00.  In   addition   thereto,   the 

stockholders of NOCOSII were required to pledge or 

assign   all   their   present   and   future   shares   to   PNB 

while   the   accommodation   remains   standing.  The 

proposed plant site which was offered as collateral 

was   estimated   to   cost P307,903,000.00.  The 

foregoing   collaterals   offered  by  NOCOSII   are  more 

than sufficient to cover the loans of P333,465,260.00.

 

            Furthermore, since the loan was approved by 

PNB, it presupposes that all the required clearances 

were submitted by NOCOSII   including the clearance 

from the Office of the President; and having complied 

with   all   the   documentary   requirements,   NOCOSII 

became entitled to the release of the loan.

 

            Complainant further alleged that NOCOSII was 

undercapitalized   because   its   paid   up   capital   was 

only P50,000,000.00. Complainant, however, failed to 

consider the other assets of NOCOSII which also form 

part of its capital.  x x x[25]

 

                     

          The finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack 

of probable cause by the Ombudsman is borne out by 

the   evidence   presented   by   petitioner: firstly,   there 

were   no   direct   loans   released  by   PNB  but  merely 

credit   accommodations   to 

guaranty NOCOSII's foreign loans from Midland Bank 

Ltd.   of   London; secondly,  NOCOSII   effectively   came 

under   government   control   since   1975   when   PNB 

acquired a majority of the voting rights  in NOCOSII 

and was given the power to appoint  a  comptroller 

therein; thirdly, PNB's credit   accommodations   to 

NOCOSII  between 1975  and 1981   in   the  aggregate 

sum of P333,465,260.00 were sufficiently secured by: 

(1)   the   Assignment   of   Subscription   Rights   and/or 

Pledge of Shares dated September 5, 1975 whereby 

NOCOSII   officers   pledged   their   shares   of   stock, 

representing   90%   of NOCOSII's subscribed   capital 

stock, and assigned their subscription rights to future 

stocks in favor of PNB;[26] (2) the Deed of Assignment 

dated September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII assigned 

its share of sugar and molasses from the operation of 

its   sugar   central   located   at Barrio Mateo, Matalam, 

North Cotabato in   favor   of   PNB;[27] (3)   the   Joint 

and Solidary Agreement   dated   September   5,   1975 

whereby   the   NOCOSII   officers   bound   themselves 

jointly  and severally   liable  with the corporation for 

the   payment   of NOCOSII's obligations   to   PNB;[28] (4) 

the   Real   Estate  Mortgage   dated   October   2,   1981 

whereby   NOCOSII   mortgaged   various   buildings, 

machineries   and   equipments,   otherwise   known   as 

the NOCOSII Sugar Mill Plant, with an estimated value 

of P307,593,000.00   in   favor   of   PNB;[29] and   (5)   the 

Chattel   Mortgage   with   Power   of   Attorney   dated 

October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various 

transportation, agricultural  and heavy equipment in 

favor   of   the   PNB;[30] fourthly,   PNB   imposed   other 

conditions, such as, (1) the submission by NOCOSII of 

the Central  Bank's approval  of  its  foreign loans;  (2) 

the   submission   by   NOCOSII   of   the   required 

clearances from the National Economic Development 

Authority (NEDA) and/or Presidential Committee on 

Sugar   Industry   (PHILSUGIN);   (3)   submission   by 

NOCOSII of its milling contracts covering a total area 

of not  less than 14,000 hectares;  (4) submission by 

NOCOSII of the government permit that the planters 

can   cultivate   the   required hectarage;   (5)   further 

increase   in NOCOSII's total   paid-in   capital 

to P25,000,000.00   at P5,000,000.00   a   year   starting 

April   30,   1976   up   to   April   30,   1980;   (6)   deposit 

in NOCOSII's account   with   the   PNB   of   all   cash 

proceeds   of NOCOSII's foreign   loans   the   disposition 

of which shall be subject to the bank's control; and, 

(7) designation by the PNB of its own representatives 

in NOCOSII'sBoard   of   Directors   and   its   own 

comptroller who shall have the authority to control 

all disbursements and receipts of funds of NOCOSII.[31]

         

          The herein assailed Orders being supported by 

substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court 

to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of 

the   Ombudsman.   As   long   as   substantial   evidence 

supports the Ombudsman’s ruling, that decision will 

not be overturned.[32]

 

          WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.  Except 

as to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May 

21,   1999 and   Order   dated July   23,   1999 of   the 

Ombudsman   in   OMB   No.   0-95-0890 

are AFFIRMED.  No costs.

 

           SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158131 August 8, 2007

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, 

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JOSE V. MARTEL, OLGA S.

MARTEL, and SYSTEMS AND ENCODING

CORPORATION, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This   is   a   petition   for   review1 filed   by   the   Social 

Security System (petitioner) of the Decision2 dated 17 

October 2002 and Resolution dated 5 May 2003 of 

the  Court   of  Appeals.   The  Decision  of   17  October 

2002 affirmed the ruling of the Department of Justice 

(DOJ)   dismissing   petitioner’s   complaint   against 

respondents Jose V. Martel, Olga S. Martel and five 

other   individuals3 for  violation of  Section 22(a)  and 

(b)   in   relation to Section 28(e)  of  Republic  Act  No. 

1161   (RA  1161),4 as   amended  by  Republic  Act  No. 

8282 (RA 8282),5 for non-remittance of contributions 

to   petitioner.   The   5  May   2003   Resolution   denied 

petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Respondents   Jose   V.   Martel   and   Olga   S.   Martel 

(respondent   Martels)   are   directors   of   respondent 

Systems   and   Encoding   Corporation   (SENCOR),   an 

information technology firm, with respondent Jose V. 

Martel serving as Chairman of the Board of Directors. 

Petitioner   is   a   government-owned   and   controlled 

corporation  mandated   by   its   charter,   RA   1161,   to 

provide   financial   benefits   to   private   sector 

employees.   SENCOR   is   covered   by   RA   1161,   as 

amended by RA 8282, Section 22 of which requires 

employers   like   SENCOR   to   remit   monthly 

contributions to petitioner representing the share of 

the employer and its employees.

In   1998,   petitioner   filed   with   the   Pasay   City 

Prosecutor’s  Office  a   complaint  against   respondent 

Martels  and   their  five  co-accused   (docketed  as   I.S. 

No.   98-L-1534)   for   SENCOR’s   non-payment   of 

contributions   amounting   toP6,936,435.80   covering 

the period  January  1991 to  May 1997.  To pay  this 

amount,   respondent  Martels   offered   to   assign   to 

petitioner a parcel of land in Tagaytay City covered by 

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26340 issued under 

respondent  Martels’  name.  Petitioner  accepted   the 

offer "subject to the condition that x x x [respondent 

Martels] will x x x settle their obligation either by way 

of dacion en pago or through cash settlement within 

a reasonable time x x x."6 Thus, petitioner withdrew 

its complaint from the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office 

but reserved its right to revive the same "in the event 

that   no   settlement   is   arrived   at."   Accordingly,   the 

Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office dismissed I.S. No. 98-L-

1534.

In December 2001, respondent Jose V. Martel wrote 

petitioner   offering,   in   lieu   of   the   Tagaytay   City 

property, computer-related services. The record does 

not disclose petitioner’s  response to this  new offer 

but  on 7  December  2001,  petitioner  filed  with   the 

Pasay   City   Prosecutor’s   Office   another   complaint 

against respondent Martels and their five co-accused 

(docketed as  I.S.  No.  00-L-7142)   for  SENCOR’s non-

remittance of contributions, this time from February 

1991 to October 2000 amounting to P21,148,258.30.

In   their   counter-affidavit,   respondent  Martels   and 

their co-accused alleged that petitioner is  estopped 

from holding them criminally   liable since petitioner 

had accepted their offer to assign the Tagaytay City 

property   as   payment   of   SENCOR’s   liability.   Thus, 

according to the accused,  the relationship between 

SENCOR   and   petitioner   was   "converted"   into   an 

ordinary   debtor-creditor   relationship   through 

novation.

The Ruling of the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office

In   the  Resolution  of   28   February   2001,   Pasay  City 

Assistant  Prosecutor  Artemio  Puti   (Prosecutor  Puti) 

found probable  cause to   indict   respondent  Martels 

for  violation of  Section 22(a)  and (b)   in   relation to 

Section   28(e)   of   RA   1161,   as   amended   by   RA 

8282.7 Prosecutor Puti rejected respondent Martels’ 

claim of "negation" of criminal liability by novation, 

holding   that   (1)   SENCOR’s   criminal   liability   was 

already  "consummated"  before  respondent  Martels 

offered to pay SENCOR’s  liability and (2) the dacion

en pago involving the Tagaytay City property did not 

materialize.  Prosecutor  Puti  noted   that   respondent 

Martels   did   not   dispute   petitioner’s   claim   on 

SENCOR’s   non-remittance   of 

contributions.8 Accordingly,   the   Pasay   City 

Prosecutor’s Office filed with the Regional Trial Court 

of Pasay City the corresponding Information against 

respondent Martels,  docketed as Criminal  Case No. 

01-0517.

Respondent Martels appealed to the DOJ.

The Ruling of the Department of Justice

In the Resolution dated 18 May 2001 signed by DOJ 

Undersecretary   Manuel   A.J.   Teehankee,   the   DOJ 

granted   respondent   Martels’   appeal,   set   aside 

Prosecutor Puti’s Resolution of 28 February 2001, and 

ordered   the  withdrawal  of   the   Information filed   in 

Criminal   Case   No.   01-0517.   The   DOJ   found   that 

respondent  Martels   and   petitioner   entered   into   a 

compromise   agreement   before   the   filing   of   the 

Information  in  Criminal  Case  No.  01-0517  and  that 

such "negated" any criminal   liability  on respondent 

Martels’ part. The DOJ Resolution pertinently reads:

From the facts obtaining, it cannot be denied that the 

dismissal of the first complaint docketed as I.S. No. 

98-L-1534   constituted   the   compromise   agreement 

between   the   parties   whereby   complainant   SSS 

agreed to respondents’ mode of settling their liability 

through   a   "dacion en pago".   Consequently,   the 

original relation between the parties was converted 

to   that   of   an   ordinary   creditor-debtor   relationship 

thereby extinguishing the original obligation by a new 

one.   Complainant,   therefore,   cannot   insist   on   the 

original trust it had with respondents existing prior to 

the dismissal of the former complaint (I.S. No. 98-L-

1534) by filling [sic]  the present complaint  (I.S.  No. 

00-L-7142 now subject  of   this  appeal).   Incidentally, 

this Office considers the latter complaint as a mere 

refilling [sic] of the former already compromised and 

dismissed   [complaint],   because  of   the   similarity   of 

the parties and causes of action.

After the dismissal of the complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-

1534 and prior to the filing of the complaint at bar 

docketed   as   00-L-7142,   respondents   have   exerted 

great  effort  towards complying with the terms and 

conditions of the compromise by way of "dacion en

pago".   For   example,   respondents   cite   their 

arrangement   for  ocular   inspection  of   the  Tagaytay 

land by the Presidential Commission on Tagaytay-Taal 

and with the Municipal Engineer of Laurel, Batangas. 

The approval of the said commission to build a 12-

storey building had been complied with. This  is not 

disputed by complainant. Access roads were acquired 

by respondents   from adjacent owners,   ready to be 

titled in complainant’s name. Papers and permits like 

ecological impact certification, site resurvey, soil test 

and site appraisal were secured from various offices 

like   the   Municipality   of   Laurel,   the   Municipal 

Engineer,  the Presidential Commission on Tagaytay-

Taal,   the   Philippine   Volcanology   Commission,   the 

Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture, 

among others.

On   the  part   of   complainant,   it   equally   shows   [sic] 

adherence to the agreement to compromise. Records 

show that on October 1999, one of its officers, Atty. 

Mariano Pablo S. Tolentino, assistant vice-president, 

had expressed in writing his finding to the effect that 

"(they) are satisfied to see the lot that (respondents) 

have   negotiated   with   Congressman   Dumpit   that 

(respondents)   offered   as   access   road   to 

(respondents[’]) property" (Annex "8" of Petition for 

Review). And, as borne by the records, a Dacion En 

Pago Committee had been created  by  complainant 

SSS precisely to set the mechanism of the settlement 

in   motion.   Further,   respondents   proposed   an 

alternative  mode  of   settlement   through   computer-

related   services,  which   proposal  was   submitted   to 

complainant as late as December 1, 2000.

Verily,   the   foregoing   facts   indelibly   show   that   the 

parties   had   acted   with   an   obvious   intention   to 

compromise.   Hence,   respondents’   reliance   on   the 

doctrine of incipient criminal liability had [sic] factual 

and legal bases. While the rule provides that novation 

does   not   extinguish   criminal   liability,   this   rule, 

however holds true only if a criminal information is 

already filed in court. Before that bench mark point, 

the criminal liability is only at its incipient stage and 

the new relation between the parties forged at such 

stage had the effect of negating the criminal liability 

of   the   offender   (People   vs.   Galsim,   People   vs. 

Trinidad, 53 OG 731). x x x x

In   fine,   the   compromise   agreement   between   the 

parties   whereby   respondents’   obligation   will   be 

settled through a "dacion en pago" and the dismissal 

of the complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-1534 has [sic] all the 

earmarks of novation negating respondents’ criminal 

liability.   Ergo,   complainant   is   precluded   from filing 

the present criminal complaint against respondents.9

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the DOJ denied 

its motion in the Resolution of 20 September 2001.

Petitioner   appealed   to   the   Court   of   Appeals   in   a 

petition for certiorari.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In   its   Decision   of   17   October   2002,   the   Court   of 

Appeals   affirmed   the   DOJ’s   rulings   and   dismissed 

petitioner’s petition. The appellate court deferred to 

the DOJ’s power to review rulings of prosecutors and 

held that in reversing Prosecutor Puti’s findings, the 

DOJ did not act with grave abuse of discretion.10

Petitioner  sought   reconsideration but   the  appellate 

court denied its motion in the Resolution of 5 May 

2003.

Hence,   this   petition.   Petitioner   contends   that   the 

Court of Appeals erred in affirming the DOJ’s rulings 

because   (1)   respondent  Martels  were   charged  not 

with Estafa but with violation of Section 22(a) and (b) 

in relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended, a 

special   law   impressed   with   public   interest;   (2) 

petitioner did not agree to settle respondent Martels’ 

criminal   liability;   and   (3)   novation   serves   only   to 

negate civil, but not criminal, liability.

In   their   Comment,   respondent  Martels   countered 

that   the   DOJ   correctly   applied   the   concept   of 

novation   as   they   had   settled   SENCOR’s   liability. 

Respondent  Martels   added   that   as  of   the  filing  of 

their Comment, they had already paidP17,887,442.54 

of SENCOR’s liability.

In   its   Reply,   petitioner   contended   that   although 

respondent   Martels   attempted   to   pay   SENCOR’s 

overdue   contributions   through dacion en pago,   no 

payment   took   place,   as   evidenced   by   respondent 

Martels’   alternative   offer   to   provide   computer 

related services to petitioner instead of assigning the 

Tagaytay City realty. On respondent Martels’ partial 

payment of SENCOR’s liability, petitioner contended 

that   such  does  not  preclude   the   resolution  of   this 

petition.

The Issue

The issue is whether the concept of novation serves 

to abate the prosecution of respondent Martels for 

violation   of   Section   22(a)   and   (b)   in   relation   to 

Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule   in   the  negative  and  accordingly  grant   the 

petition.

The Concept of Novation Finds No Application Here

Novation,   a   civil   law   concept   relating   to   the 

modification  of   obligations,11 takes   place  when   the 

parties to an existing contract execute a new contract 

which either changes the object or principal condition 

of the original contract, substitutes the person of the 

debtor, or subrogates a third person in the rights of 

the   creditor.12 The   effect   is   either   to   modify   or 

extinguish the original contract. In its extinctive form, 

the   new   obligation   replaces   the   original, 

extinguishing the obligor’s obligations under the old 

contract.13

This Court first recognized the possibility of applying 

the concept of novation to criminal cases in People v.

Nery,14involving  a  case   for  Estafa.   In   that  case,   the 

Court observed that although novation is not one of 

the means recognized by the Revised Penal Code to 

extinguish criminal liability,15 it may "prevent the rise 

of   criminal   liability   or   to   cast   doubt   on   the   true 

nature of the original basic transaction," provided the 

novation   takes   place   before   the   filing   of   the 

Information with the trial court. We held:

The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the 

filing of the criminal information in court by the state 

prosecutors because up to that time the original trust 

relation  may   be   converted   by   the   parties   into   an 

ordinary   creditor-debtor   situation,   thereby   placing 

the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original 

trust.   But   after   the   justice   authorities   have   taken 

cognizance   of   the   crime   and   instituted   action   in 

court,  the offended party may no longer divest the 

prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, 

as  distinguished  from the civil.  The crime being an 

offense   against   the   state,   only   the   latter   can 

renounce it x x x.

It may be observed in this regard that novation is

not one of the means recognized by the Penal Code

whereby criminal liability can be extinguished;

hence, the role of novation may only be to either

prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt

on the true nature of the original basic transaction,

whether or not it was such that its breach would not

give rise to penal responsibility, as when money

loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other

similar disguise is resorted to   x   x   x.16(Emphasis 

supplied)

Thus,   novation   has   been   invoked   to   reverse 

convictions   in   cases  where   an   underlying   contract 

initially defined the relation of the parties such as the 

contract   in   sale  on  commission   in  Estafa  cases17 or 

the contract in sale of goods in cases of violation of 

the Trust Receipts Law.18 Further, the party invoking 

novation   must   prove   that   the   new   contract   did 

indeed take effect.19

The   facts   of   this   case   negate   the   application   of 

novation. In the first place, there is, between SENCOR 

and   petitioner,   no   original   contract   that   can   be 

replaced by a  new contract  changing the object  or 

principal   condition   of   the   original   contract, 

substituting the person of the debtor, or subrogating 

a   third   person   in   the   rights   of   the   creditor.   The 

original relationship between SENCOR and petitioner 

is  defined by  law – RA 1161,  as  amended – which 

requires   employers   like   SENCOR   to  make   periodic 

contributions   to   petitioner   under   pain   of   criminal 

prosecution.  Unless   Congress   enacts   a   law   further 

amending  RA  1161   to  give  employers   a   chance   to 

settle   their   overdue   contributions   to   prevent 

prosecution,   no   amount   of   agreements   between 

petitioner and SENCOR (represented by respondent 

Martels) can change the nature of their relationship 

and the consequence of  SENCOR’s  non-payment  of 

contributions.

The   indispensability   of   a   prior   contractual   relation 

between   the   complainant   and   the   accused   as 

requisite for the application of novation in criminal 

cases was underscored in People v. Tanjutco.20 In that 

case,  the accused,  who was charged with Qualified 

Theft,   invoked People v. Nery to   support   his   claim 

that the complainant’s acceptance of partial payment 

of   the   stolen   funds   before   the   filing   of   the 

Information with the trial court converted his liability 

into   a   civil   obligation   thus   rendering   baseless   his 

prosecution. The Court rejected this claim and held 

that unlike in Nery, there was, in that case, no prior 

"contractual   relationship   or   bilateral   agreement, 

which   can  be  modified  or   altered  by   the  parties," 

thus:

Reliance on the aforecited Nery case,  in support of 

the contention that the acceptance by complainant 

of  payment   converted   the   liability  of   the  accused-

appellant   into   a   civil   obligation   or   else   that   it 

estopped said complainant from proceeding with the 

prosecution   of   the   case,   is   misplaced   and 

unwarranted.

[I]n the Nery case, which is an action for estafa, there

was contractual relationship between the parties

that can be validly novated by the settlement of the

obligation of the offender. Whatever was said in

that case, therefore, cannot be invoked in the

present case where no contractual relationship or

bilateral agreement, which can be modified or

altered by the parties, is involved. There is here

merely a taking of the complainant’s property by

one who never acquired juridical possession

thereof, qualified by grave abuse of

confidence.21 (Italicization  in the original;  boldfacing 

and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, there is here merely an employer’s failure 

to pay its contributions to a government corporation 

as mandated by that corporation’s charter.

Secondly,   as   Prosecutor   Puti   correctly   noted,   the 

agreement   between   petitioner   and   respondent 

Martels   for   the   latter   to   pay   SENCOR’s   overdue 

contributions through the assignment to petitioner of 

a   piece   of   realty   never   materialized.   Petitioner’s 

acceptance of respondent Martels’ offer was subject 

to   a   suspensive   condition   that   "x   x   x   [private] 

respondents will x x x settle their obligation either by 

way  of dacion en pago or   through   cash   settlement 

within a reasonable time x x x." This condition was 

not   met   because   three   years   after   respondent 

Martels’   offer,   petitioner   did   not   receive   any 

payment.   In   fact,   respondent   Jose  Martel,   at   that 

point, changed the terms of the supposed settlement 

by   offering   computer-related   services   instead   of 

assigning the Tagaytay City realty. In their Comment 

to   the  petition,   respondent  Martels  explained   that 

they   made   such   alternative   offer   because   "the 

processing of  the papers for  the Tagaytay property 

met with some delay."22 In short, respondent Martels 

failed to make good on their promise in 1998 to settle 

SENCOR’s   liability   through dacion en pago.   The 

circumstances   the   DOJ   cited   as   proof   of   the 

compromise   agreement’s   alleged   implementation 

were   nothing   but   steps   preparatory   to   the   actual 

payment of SENCOR’s overdue contributions.

In   sum,   we   hold   that   any   payment   respondent 

Martels   would   have   made   to   petitioner   (and   it 

appears   that   pending   this   petition,   respondent 

Martels partially paid SENCOR’s liability) only affects 

their  civil,   if  any,  but  not   their  criminal   liability   for 

violation   of   Section   22(a)   and   (b)   in   relation   to 

Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended. As noted in 

the Resolution dated 28 February 2001 of the Pasay 

City Prosecutor’s Office, respondent Martels do not 

dispute   SENCOR’s   non-remittance   of   contributions 

from   February   1991   to   October   2000.   Thus,   the 

existence   of   probable   cause   against   respondent 

Martels, SENCOR’s directors,23 is beyond doubt.

Prosecutors’ Findings Not Conclusive

In   dismissing   petitioner’s   petition,   the   Court   of 

Appeals held:

[T]his   Court   has   no   power   to   determine  whether 

probable cause to warrant prosecution exist or not. x 

x x [T]he determination of whether or not probable 

cause exists  to warrant the prosecution  in court  of 

[respondent   Martels]   should   be   consigned   and 

entrusted to the Department of Justice as reviewer of 

the findings of the public prosecutor x x x.

In this Petition, We are being asked to assume the 

function of Public Prosecutor by determining whether 

probable cause exists or not. Such is a function that 

this Court should not be called upon to perform x x 

x.24

This is a misstatement of the law. This Court and the 

Court   of   Appeals   possess   the   power   to   review 

findings   of   prosecutors   in   preliminary 

investigations.25 Although   policy   considerations   call 

for   the   widest   latitude   of   deference   to   the 

prosecutor’s   findings,26 courts   should   never   shirk 

from exercising their power, when the circumstances 

warrant,   to   determine   whether   the   prosecutor’s 

findings are supported by the facts, or as in this case, 

by   the   law.   In   so   doing,   courts   do   not   act   as 

prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary, exercising 

their   mandate   under   the   Constitution,   relevant 

statutes,   and   remedial   rules   to   settle   cases   and 

controversies.   Indeed,   the   exercise   of   this   Court’s 

review   power   ensures   that,   on   the   one   hand, 

probable criminals are prosecuted27 and, on the other 

hand,   the   innocent   are   spared   from   baseless 

prosecution.28

WHEREFORE,   we GRANT the   petition.   We SET

ASIDE the   Decision   dated   17   October   2002   and 

Resolution dated 5 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. 

We REINSTATE the   Resolution   dated   28   February 

2001 of the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 165510-33 July 28, 2006

BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, 

vs.

HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as

the Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For   resolution   is   petitioner’s   Motion   for 

Reconsideration1 assailing   the   Decision   dated 

September 23, 2005, the dispositive portion of which 

states:

WHEREFORE,   the   petition   is   DISMISSED.   The 

resolutions   dated   July   12,   2004   and   September   6, 

2004   of   the   Office   of   the   Special   Prosecutor,   are 

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman 

gravely  abused   its  discretion   in   recommending   the 

filing of 24 informations against him for violation of 

Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman 

cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were 

previously   dismissed   by   the   Sandiganbayan   in   its 

Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of 

prescription may be raised even for the first time on 

appeal   and   thus   there   is   no   necessity   for   the 

presentation of evidence thereon before the court a 

quo.   Thus,   this   Court   may   accordingly   dismiss 

Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the 

Sandiganbayan  and  Criminal  Case  Nos.  04-231857–

04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of 

Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

In   its   Comment,3 the  Ombudsman   argues   that   the 

dismissal  of   the  informations   in  Criminal  Case Nos. 

13406-13429   does   not   mean   that   petitioner   was 

thereafter   exempt   from   criminal   prosecution;   that 

new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman 

should   it  find probable  cause   in   the  conduct  of   its 

preliminary   investigation;   that   the   filing   of   the 

complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good 

Government   (PCGG)   in   1987   and   the   filing   of   the 

information   with   the   Sandiganbayan   in   1989 

interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence 

of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 

2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on 

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment4 that, in 

accordance with  the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 

6770   or   theOmbudsman Act of 1989, the 

Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with 

a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary 

investigation   on   the   alleged   offenses   of   the 

petitioner;   that  considering   that  both  RA No.  3019 

and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of

Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts

and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When

Prescription Shall Begin To Run,   are   silent   as   to 

whether prescription should begin to run when the 

offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised 

Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, 

should be applied.

The   issues   for   resolution   are:   (1)   whether   the 

preliminary   investigation   conducted   by   the 

Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was 

a   nullity;   and   (2)  whether   the   offenses   for  which 

petitioner are being charged have already prescribed.

Anent the first  issue, we reiterate our ruling  in the 

assailed  Decision   that   the  preliminary   investigation 

conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 

13406-13429   is   a   valid   proceeding   despite   the 

previous dismissal   thereof  by the Sandiganbayan  in 

its Minute Resolution5 dated February 10, 2004 which 

reads:

Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429–PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T. 

ROMUALDEZ

Considering   that   the   Decision   of   the   Honorable 

Supreme   Court   in   G.R.   Nos.   143618-41,   entitled 

"Benjamin   ‘Kokoy’   Romualdez   vs.   The   Honorable 

Sandiganbayan (First Division, et al.)" promulgated on 

July 30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders issued 

by this Court on June 8, 2000 which, among others, 

denied   the   accused’s   motion   to   quash   the 

informations   in   these   cases;   that   in   particular   the 

above-mentioned   Decision   ruled   that   the   herein 

informations  may   be   quashed   because   the   officer 

who filed the same had no authority to do so; and 

that   the   said   Decision   has   become   final   and 

executory  on  November  29,  2002,   these   cases  are 

considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the 

archives.

The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our 

ruling   in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan6 where 

petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayan’s Order dated 

June   8,   2000   in   Criminal   Case   Nos.   13406-13429 

which denied his  Motion to Quash,   terminated the 

preliminary   investigation   conducted   by   Prosecutor 

Evelyn   T.   Lucero   and   set   his   arraignment   for 

violations of  Section 7 of  RA No. 3019 on June 26, 

2000.7 In   annulling   and   setting   aside   the   aforesaid 

Order of the Sandiganbayan, we held that:

In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a 

mere   remediable   defect   of   form,   as   in Pecho v.

Sandiganbayan where   the   wording   of   the 

certification   in   the   information   was   found 

inadequate,   or   in People v. Marquez,   where   the 

required   certification   was   absent.   Here,   the 

informations  were   filed   by   an   unauthorized   party. 

The   defect   cannot   be   cured   even   by   conducting 

another   preliminary   investigation.   An   invalid 

information is no information at all and cannot be the 

basis for criminal proceedings.8

In   effect,   we   upheld   in Romualdez v.

Sandiganbayan9 petitioner’s   Motion   to   Quash   and 

directed the dismissal  of Criminal  Case Nos. 13406-

13429   because   the   informations  were   filed   by   an 

unauthorized party, hence void.

In such a case,  Section 6,  Rule 117 of the Rules of 

Court is pertinent and applicable. Thus:

SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a

bar to another prosecution; exception. –   An   order 

sustaining   the   motion   to   quash   is   not   a   bar   to 

another prosecution for the same offense unless the 

motion was based on the grounds specified in section 

3(g) and (i)10 of this Rule.

An order  sustaining a  motion to quash on grounds 

other   than extinction of  criminal   liability  or  double 

jeopardy   does   not   preclude   the   filing   of   another 

information for a crime constituting the same facts. 

Indeed, we held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals11 that:

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient 

complaint or information in the former prosecution. 

If,   therefore,   the   complaint   or   information   was 

insufficient  because   it  was   so  defective   in   form or 

substance that the conviction upon it could not have 

been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of 

the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no 

authority to file the information, the dismissal of the 

first   information would not be a bar  in petitioner’s 

subsequent prosecution. x x x.12

Be   that   as   it   may,   the   preliminary   investigation 

conducted by the Ombudsman  in the  instant  cases 

was   not   a   violation   of   petitioner’s   right   to   be 

informed   of   the   charges   against   him.   It   is   of   no 

moment   that   the   cases   investigated   by   the 

Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those 

cases   which   have   already   been   dismissed   by   the 

Sandiganbayan,   to  wit:   Criminal   Case   Nos.   13406-

13429. As we have previously stated:

The  assignment  of  a  docket  number   is  an   internal 

matter   designed   for   efficient   record   keeping.   It   is 

usually  written   in   the  Docket  Record   in   sequential 

order corresponding to the date and time of filing a 

case.

This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers 

of the dismissed cases was merely for reference. In 

fact,   after   the   new   informations   were   filed,   new 

docket   numbers  were   assigned, i.e., Criminal   Cases 

Nos. 28031-28049 x x x.13

Besides,   regardless   of   the   docket   numbers,   the 

Ombudsman   conducted   the   above-referred 

preliminary   investigation   pursuant   to   our   Decision 

in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan14 when   we 

categorically declared therein that:

The  Sandiganbayan  also  committed  grave  abuse  of 

discretion   when   it   abruptly   terminated   the 

reinvestigation   being   conducted   by   Prosecutor 

Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in G.R. 

No.   105248   for   the   holding   of   a   preliminary 

investigation was based on our ruling that the right to 

a   preliminary   investigation   is   a   substantive,   rather 

than   a   procedural   right.   Petitioner’s   right   was 

violated  when   the   preliminary   investigation  of   the 

charges   against   him  were   conducted  by   an  officer 

without   jurisdiction   over   the   said   cases.   It   bears 

stressing   that   our   directive   should   be   strictly 

complied  with   in   order   to   achieve   its   objective  of 

affording petitioner his right to due process.15

Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses 

charged,   we   should   first   resolve   the   question   of 

whether   this  Court  may   validly   take   cognizance  of 

and   resolve   the   aforementioned   issue   considering 

that as we have said  in the assailed Decision,  "this 

case has never progressed beyond the filing of  the 

informations  against   the  petitioner"16and that  "it   is 

only prudent that evidence be gathered through trial 

on   the  merits   to   determine   whether   the   offense 

charged has already prescribed."17 We reconsider our 

stance and shall rule in the affirmative.

Rule   117   of   the   Rules   of   Court   provides   that   the 

accused may, at any time before he enters his plea, 

move   to  quash   the  complaint  and   information18 on 

the  ground   that   the  criminal  action or   liability  has 

been   extinguished,19 which   ground   includes   the 

defense of prescription considering that Article 89 of 

the Revised Penal  Code enumerates prescription as 

one   of   those   grounds   which   totally   extinguishes 

criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a 

trial on the merits of a criminal case, the accused can 

very well invoke the defense of prescription.

Thus,   the  question   is  whether  or  not   the  offenses 

charged   in   the   subject   criminal   cases   have 

prescribed?   We   held   in   the   case   of Domingo v.

Sandiganbayan20 that:

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense 

charged, the following should be considered: (1) the 

period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the 

time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) 

the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.21

Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 

7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of 

Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during 

his   tenure   as   Ambassador   Extraordinary   and 

Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during 

his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department 

of Foreign Affairs.

Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses 

punishable   therein   shall   prescribe   in   15   years. 

Significantly, this Court already declared in the case 

of People v. Pacificador22 that:

It appears however, that prior to the amendment of 

Section 11 of R.A.  No. 3019 by B.P.  Blg.  195 which 

was  approved on March  16,  1982,   the  prescriptive 

period for offenses punishable under the said statute 

was   only   ten   (10)   years.   The   longer   prescriptive 

period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 

of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does 

not   apply   in   this   case   for   the   reason   that   the 

amendment,   not   being   favorable   to   the   accused 

(herein   private   respondent),   cannot   be   given 

retroactive   effect.   Hence,   the   crime   prescribed   on 

January  6,  1986  or   ten   (10)   years   from  January  6, 

1976.23

Thus,   for   offenses   allegedly   committed   by   the 

petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same 

shall  prescribe  in  10 years.  On the other  hand,   for 

offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during 

the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same 

shall prescribe in 15 years.

As to when these two periods begin to run, reference 

is   made   to   Act   No.   3326   which   governs   the 

computation of  prescription of  offenses  defined by 

and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 

3326 provides:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of 

the commission of the violation of the law, and if the 

same be not known at the time, from the discovery 

thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for 

its investigation and punishment.

The   prescription   shall   be   interrupted   when 

proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, 

and shall  begin to run again  if  the proceedings are 

dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

In   the  case  of People v. Duque,24 we  construed   the 

aforequoted   provision,   specifically   the   rule   on   the 

running of the prescriptive period as follows:

In   our   view,   the   phrase   "institution   of   judicial 

proceedings   for   its   investigation   and   punishment" 

may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be 

deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 

2 may be read as:

"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the 

commission  of   the  violation  of   the   law;  and   if   the 

same be not known at the time, from the discovery 

thereof;"

or as:

"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the 

commission  of   the  violation  of   the   law,  and   if   the 

same be not known at the time, from the discovery 

thereof   and until institution   of   judicial   proceedings 

for   its   investigation   and   punishment."   (Emphasis 

supplied)25

Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of 

the offenses herein began to run from the discovery 

thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the 

complaint   filed   by   the   former   Solicitor   General 

Francisco   I.   Chavez  against   the  petitioner  with   the 

PCGG.

In   the   case   of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding

Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto26 this  Court 

already took note that:

In   cases   involving   violations   of   R.A.   No.   3019 

committed   prior   to   the   February   1986   EDSA 

Revolution   that   ousted   President   Ferdinand   E. 

Marcos,   we   ruled   that   the   government   as   the 

aggrieved   party   could   not   have   known   of   the 

violations   at   the   time   the   questioned   transactions 

were made. Moreover, no person would have dared 

to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, 

the counting of the prescriptive period commenced 

from the  date  of  discovery  of   the  offense   in  1992 

after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential 

Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.27

However, both respondents in the instant case aver 

that,  applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal  Code 

suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from the 

Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented 

the prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from 

running.

We disagree.

Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to 

whether   the   absence   of   the   offender   from   the 

Philippines   bars   the   running   of   the   prescriptive 

period. The silence of the law can only be interpreted 

to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend 

such  an   interruption  of   the  prescription  unlike   the 

explicit  mandate  of  Article   91.   Thus,   as   previously 

held:

Even   on   the   assumption   that   there   is   in   fact   a 

legislative gap caused by such an omission,  neither 

could the Court  presume otherwise and supply the 

details   thereof,  because  a   legislative   lacuna cannot 

be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the 

guise  of   the   interpretation,  enlarge   the  scope  of  a 

statute  and  include therein  situations  not  provided 

nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the 

time   of   the   enactment,   whether   careless   or 

calculated,   cannot   be   judicially   supplied   however 

after   later  wisdom  may   recommend   the   inclusion. 

Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what 

they think should be in it or to supply what they think 

the   legislature  would  have   supplied   if   its  attention 

has been called to the omission.28

The only  matter  left to be resolved  is  whether  the 

filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 as well 

as   the   filing   of   the   informations   with   the 

Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-

13429   in   1989   interrupted   the   running   of   the 

prescriptive period such that when the Ombudsman 

directed   petitioner   to   file   his   counter-affidavit   on 

March 3, 2004, the offenses have already prescribed.

Under   Section  2  of  Act  No.   3326,   the  prescriptive 

period   shall  be   interrupted   "when  proceedings  are 

instituted against the guilty person." However, there 

is   no   such   proceeding   instituted   against   the 

petitioner to warrant the tolling of   the prescriptive 

periods of the offenses charged against him.

In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,29 petitioner averred 

that   PCGG  acted  without   jurisdiction   and/or   grave 

abuse   of   discretion   in   conducting   a   preliminary 

investigation   of   cases   not   falling   within   its 

competence.30 This Court, in its resolve to "deal with 

the merits of the case to remove the possibility of any 

misunderstanding  as   to   the  course  which   it  wishes 

petitioner’s   cases   in   the   Sandiganbayan   to 

take"31declared invalid –

the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG 

over   the   24   offenses   ascribed   to   Romualdez   (of 

failure   to   file   annual   statements   of   assets   and 

liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction of said offenses.32

In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,33 petitioner assailed 

the   validity   of   the   informations   filed   with   the 

Sandiganbayan   in   Criminal   Case  Nos.   13406-13429 

considering that the same were subscribed and filed 

by the PCGG. In granting petitioner’s plea, this Court 

held, thus:

Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized 

party.   The   defect   cannot   be   cured   by   conducting 

another   preliminary   investigation.   An   invalid 

information is no information at all and cannot be the 

basis for criminal proceedings.34

Indeed,   the   nullity   of   the   proceedings   initiated   by 

then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG 

and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is 

judicially   settled.   In   contemplation   of   the   law,   no 

proceedings   exist   that   could   have   merited   the 

suspension of the prescriptive periods.

Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the 

running   of   prescription   is   that   which   is   filed   or 

initiated   by   the   offended   party   before   the 

appropriate   body   or   office.   Thus,   in   the   case 

of People v. Maravilla,35 this   Court   ruled   that   the 

filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for 

purposes of preliminary investigation had the effect 

of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in 

the case of Llenes v. Dicdican,36 this Court held that 

the filing of a complaint against a public officer with 

the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of 

prescription.

In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed 

with   the  wrong   body,   the   PCGG.   Thus,   the   same 

could   not   have   interrupted   the   running   of   the 

prescriptive periods.

However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio 

contends   that   the   offenses   charged   against   the 

petitioner   could   not   have   prescribed   because   the 

latter was absent from the Philippines from 1986 to 

April  27,  2000 and thus the prescriptive period did 

not run from the time of discovery on May 8, 1987, 

citing  Article   91   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code  which 

provides that "[t]he term of prescription should not

run when the offender is absent from the Philippine

Archipelago."

Mr. Justice Carpio argues that –

Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 "x x x 

supplementary   to   [special   laws],   unless   the   latter 

should   x   x   x  provide   the   contrary."  Nothing   in  RA 

3019   prohibits   the   supplementary   application   of 

Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the 

prescriptive period in Section 11 of RA 3019, before 

and   after   its   amendment,   should   run   only   after 

petitioner   returned   to   this   jurisdiction  on   27  April 

2000.

There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is 

silent,  Article 10 of the RPC applies suppletorily,  as 

the Court has held  in a  long  line of decisions since 

1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court 

has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC 

to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on 

the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of 

Article  10  of   the  RPC  is   thus  well-settled,  with   the 

latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu

v. People.

He also expresses his apprehension on the possible 

effects   of   the   ruling   of   the  Majority   Opinion   and 

argues that –

The accused should not have the sole discretion of 

preventing   his   own   prosecution   by   the   simple 

expedient of escaping from the State’s jurisdiction. x 

x   x   An   accused   cannot   acquire   legal   immunity   by 

being a fugitive from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x.

To allow an accused to  prevent  his  prosecution by 

simply   leaving this   jurisdiction unjustifiably  tilts   the 

balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to 

the detriment of the State’s ability to investigate and 

prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible 

global   travel,   this   Court   should   not   encourage 

individuals   facing   investigation   or   prosecution   for 

violation   of   special   laws   to   leave   Philippine 

jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. 

The majority opinion unfortunately chooses to lay the 

basis for such anomalous practice.

With all due respect, we beg to disagree.

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this

Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be 

punishable under special laws are not subject to the 

provisions   of   this   Code.   This   Code   shall   be 

supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should 

specially provide the contrary.

Pursuant   thereto,   one  may   be   tempted   to   hastily 

conclude that a special   law such as RA No. 3019 is 

supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and 

all   cases.   As   it   is,  Mr.   Justice  Carpio   stated   in   his 

Dissenting Opinion that –

There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is 

silent,  Article 10 of the RPC applies suppletorily,  as 

the Court has held  in a  long  line of decisions since 

1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court 

has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC 

to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on 

the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of 

Article  10  of   the  RPC  is   thus  well-settled,  with   the 

latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu

v. People.

However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory 

application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, 

by virtue of Article 10 thereof,  finds relevance only 

when the provisions of the special law are silent on a 

particular matteras evident from the cases cited and 

relied upon in the Dissenting Opinion:

In the case of People v. Moreno,37 this Court, before 

ruling that the subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of 

the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of 

violations   of   Act   No.   3992   or   the Revised Motor

Vehicle Law,   noted   that   the   special   law   did   not 

contain   any   provision   that   the   defendant   can   be 

sentenced  with   subsidiary   imprisonment   in  case  of 

insolvency.

In the case of People v.  Li  Wai Cheung,38 this Court 

applied   the   rules   on   the   service   of   sentences 

provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in 

favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple 

violations of RA No. 6425 orThe Dangerous Drugs Act

of 1972 considering the lack of similar rules under the 

special law.

In   the   case   of   People   v.   Chowdury,39 the   Court 

applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Revised Penal 

Code to define the words "principal," "accomplices" 

and "accessories" under RA No. 8042 or the Migrant

Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it 

was not defined therein although it referred to the 

same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the 

crime of illegal recruitment.

In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the 

question   of   whether   or   not   the   absence   of   the 

accused   from   the  Philippines  prevents  or   tolls   the 

running of the prescriptive period is more apparent 

than real.

Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, 

Act   No.   3326   was   already   in   effect   as   early   as 

December   4,   1926.   Section   3   thereof   categorically 

defines   "special acts" as "acts defining and

penalizing violations of the law not included in the

Penal Code".

Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding 

Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,40 this Court 

was categorical in ruling that –

The   law   on   prescription   of   offenses   is   found   in 

Articles   90   and   91   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code   for 

offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized 

under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies.

Section   2   of   Act   No.   3326   provides   that   the 

prescription shall  begin to run from the day of the 

commission  of   the  violation  of   the   law,  and   if   the 

same be not known at the time, from the discovery 

thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for 

its investigation and punishment. The running of the

prescriptive period shall be interrupted when

proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,

and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are

dismissed for reasons not constituting

jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not 

provide   that   the  absence  of   the  accused   from  the 

Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive 

period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered 

from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting 

Act  No.  3326,  did  not  consider   the absence of   the 

accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the 

running of the prescriptive period.Expressio unius est

exclusio alterius. To elaborate, -

Indeed,   it   is   an   elementary   rule   of   statutory 

construction that the express mention of one person, 

thing,  act,  or  consequence excludes all  others.  This 

rule   is   expressed   in   the   familiar  maxim   "expressio 

unius est exclusio alterius."  Where a statute,  by  its 

terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may 

not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to 

others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the 

legislature   would   not   have   made   specified 

enumerations in a statute had the intention been not 

to   restrict   its  meaning  and   to  confine   its   terms   to 

those expressly mentioned.41

Had the legislature intended to include the accused’s 

absence   from   the   Philippines   as   a   ground   for   the 

interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, 

the same could have been expressly provided in Act 

No. 3326. A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax

Reform Act of 1997 where   the   legislature  made  its 

intention clear and was thus categorical that –

SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision

of this Code – All violations of any provision of this 

Code shall prescribe after five (5) years.

Prescription shall  begin to run from the day of  the 

commission  of   the  violation  of   the   law,  and   if   the 

same be not known at the time, from the discovery 

thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for 

its investigation and punishment.

The   prescription   shall   be   interrupted   when 

proceedings are instituted against the guilty persons 

and shall  begin to run again  if  the proceedings are 

dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

The term of prescription shall not run when the

offender is absent from the Philippines.   (Emphasis 

supplied)

According   to  Mr.   Justice   Carpio,   Article   91   of   the 

Revised Penal Code fills the so-called "gap" in Act No. 

3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the operation 

of  the prescriptive period for  violations of  R.A.  No. 

3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code can and 

shall   still  be  applied   in  cases  where the accused  is 

absent   from   the   Philippines.   In   effect,   Article   91 

would supplement Act No. 3326.

This could not have been the intention of the framers 

of the law.

While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal 

Code  makes   the   Code   suppletory   to   special   laws, 

however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit of 

"special law" as contemplated and used in Article 10 

of the RPC.

In   the   case  of United States v. Serapio,42 the  Court 

had the occasion to interpret the term "special laws" 

mentioned   in  Article   7   of   then  Penal   Code  of   the 

Philippines,  which   is  now Article  10 of   the  Revised 

Penal  Code,  as   referring   to  penal   laws   that  punish 

acts not defined and penalized by the Penal Code of 

the Philippines. Thus –

This contention makes it necessary to define "special 

laws," as that phrase is used in article 7 of the Penal 

Code. Does this phrase "leyes especiales," as used in 

the Penal Code (article 7) have the meaning applied 

to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally 

used?   x   x   x   It   is   confidently   contended   that   the 

phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code 

(article 7) is not used with this general signification: In 

fact,  said phrase may refer  not  to a  special   law as 

above defined, but to a general law. A careful reading 

of   said   article   7   clearly   indicates   that   the   phrase 

"leyes   especiales"  was  not  used   to   signify   "special 

laws" in the general signification of that phrase. The 

article,   it  will  be  noted,  simply  says,   in  effect,   that 

when a crime is made punishable under some other 

law than the Penal Code, it (the crime) is not subject 

to the provisions of said code.43

Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 

as   supplements   to   RA  No.   3019,   the   same   result 

would   obtain.   A   conflict   will   arise   from   the 

contemporaneous  application of   the   two  laws.  The 

Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the absence 

of the accused from the Philippines shall be a ground 

for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 

3326 does not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must 

prevail   over   Article   91   because   it   specifically   and 

directly   applies   to special laws while   the   Revised 

Penal   Code   shall   apply   to special laws only 

suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide 

the contrary.   Indeed,  elementary  rules  of  statutory 

construction dictate that special legal provisions must 

prevail over general ones.

The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpio’s reservations 

about the effects  of  ruling that the absence of  the 

accused from the Philippines shall  not suspend the 

running   of   the   prescriptive   period.   Our   duty, 

however, is only to interpret the law. To go beyond 

that and to question the wisdom or effects of the law 

is   certainly   beyond   our   constitutionally   mandated 

duty. As we have already explained –

Even   on   the   assumption   that   there   is   in   fact   a 

legislative gap caused by such an omission,  neither 

could the Court  presume otherwise and supply the 

details   thereof,  because  a   legislative   lacuna cannot 

be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the 

guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute 

and   include   therein   situations   not   provided   nor 

intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time 

of   the   enactment,  whether   careless   or   calculated, 

cannot   be   judicially   supplied   however   after   later 

wisdom may   recommend   the   inclusion.  Courts   are 

not authorized to insert into the law what they think 

should   be   in   it   or   to   supply  what   they   think   the 

legislature  would  have  supplied   if   its  attention has 

been called to the omission.44

Mr.   Justice   Carpio   also   remarks   that   the   liberal 

interpretation of the statute of limitations in favor of 

the accused only relates to the following issues: (1)

retroactive or prospective application of laws

providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2) the

determination of the nature of the felony committed

vis-à-vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the

reckoning of when the prescriptive period

runs. Therefore, the aforementioned principle cannot 

be   utilized   to   support   the   Majority   Opinion’s 

conclusion   that   the  prescriptive  period   in  a   special 

law continues to run while the accused is abroad.

We take exception to the foregoing proposition.

We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on 

prescription   in   criminal   cases   equally   provides   the 

authority   for   the   rule   that   the   prescriptive   period 

runs   while   the   accused   is   outside   of   Philippine 

jurisdiction. The nature of the law on prescription of 

penal statutes supports this conclusion. In the old but 

still   relevant   case   of   People   v.  Moran,45 this   Court 

extensively  discussed   the   rationale  behind  and   the 

nature of prescription of penal offenses –

"We   should   at   first   observe   that   a   mistake   is 

sometimes made in applying to statutes of limitation 

in criminal suits the construction that has been given 

to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two classes 

of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil 

suits the statute is interposed by the legislature as an 

impartial arbiter between two contending parties. In 

the construction of the statute, therefore, there is no 

intendment   to   be  made   in   favor   of   either   party. 

Neither   grants   the   right   to   the   other;   there   is 

therefore   no   grantor   against   whom   the   ordinary 

presumptions, of construction are to be made. But it 

is, otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted 

by   the   State.   Here   the   State   is   the   grantor, 

surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, 

and declaring the offense to be no longer the subject 

of   prosecution.' The statute is not a statute of

process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but

an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time

oblivion shall be cast over the offence; that the

offender shall be at liberty to return to his country,

and resume his immunities as a citizen and that

from henceforth he may cease to preserve the

proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt

are blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation 

are   to   be   liberally   construed   in   favor   of   the 

defendant,   not   only   because   such   liberality   of 

construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, 

but  because the very  existence of   the statute,   is  a 

recognition and notification by the legislature of the 

fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of 

innocence,   has   assigned   to   it   fixed   and   positive 

periods   in   which   it   destroys   proofs   of   guilt. 

Independently   of   these   views,   it   must   be 

remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is 

not only productive of expense to the State, but of 

peril   to   public   justice   in   the   attenuation   and 

distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of 

testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions 

should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such 

promptitude should be vigorously maintained.  They 

are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by 

the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its 

subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best 

evidence that can be obtained." (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed,   there   is   no   reason   why   we   should   deny 

petitioner   the   benefits   accruing   from   the   liberal 

construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. 

Prescription   emanates   from   the   liberality   of   the 

State.   Any   bar   to   or   cause   of   interruption   in   the 

operation  of  prescriptive  periods   cannot   simply  be 

implied   nor   derived   by   mere   implication.   Any 

diminution of this endowment must be directly and 

expressly sanctioned by the source itself,  the State. 

Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of 

the grantee thereof, the accused.

The   foregoing   conclusion   is   logical   considering   the 

nature of the laws on prescription. The exceptions to 

the running of or the causes for the interruption of 

the prescriptive periods may and should not be easily 

implied.   The   prescriptive   period   may   only   be 

prevented from operating or may only be tolled for 

reasons explicitly provided by the law.

In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we ruled that:

It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that 

in   the   interpretation  of   the   law on  prescription  of 

crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is 

to   be   adopted.   The   said   legal   principle   takes   into 

account   the   nature   of   the   law   on   prescription   of 

crimes which is an act of amnesty and liberality on 

the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the 

case of People v. Moran, this Court amply discussed 

the  nature  of   the   statute  of   limitations   in  criminal 

cases, as follows:

The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily 

and   grudgingly   applied,   but   an   amnesty,   declaring 

that after a certain time oblivion shall  be cast over 

the offense; that the offender shall  be at  liberty to 

return to his country, and resume his immunities as a 

citizen;  and that   from henceforth  he may cease to 

preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs 

of his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that statues of 

limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the 

defendant,   not   only   because   such   liberality   of 

construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, 

but  because   the  very  existence  of   the   statute   is  a 

recognition and notification by the legislature of the 

fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of 

innocence,   has   assigned   to   it   fixed   and   positive 

periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.47

In  view of  the foregoing,   the applicable  10-and-15-

year prescriptive periods in the instant case, were not 

interrupted by any event from the time they began to 

run on May 8, 1987. As a consequence, the alleged 

offenses  committed by the petitioner   for   the years 

1963-1982 prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or 

on  May   8,   1997.   On   the   other   hand,   the   alleged 

offenses  committed by the petitioner   for   the years 

1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from May 8, 1987 or 

on May 8, 2002.

Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor 

initiated   the   preliminary   investigation   of   Criminal 

Case   Nos.   13406-13429   on   March   3,   2004   by 

requiring   the   petitioner   to   submit   his   counter-

affidavit,   the  alleged  offenses   subject   therein  have 

already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right 

to  prosecute  petitioner   for   the  offenses   subject  of 

Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the 

Sandiganbayan  and  Criminal  Case  Nos.  04-231857–

04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of 

Manila.

WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   petitioner’s 

Motion   for   Reconsideration   is GRANTED.   Criminal 

Case   Nos.   28031-28049   pending   before   the 

Sandiganbayan  and  Criminal  Case  Nos.  04-231857–

04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of 

Manila are all hereby ordered DISMISSED.

August 13, 1992

G.R. No. 100285

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

NAPOLEON DUQUE, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Trinidad, 

Reverente,   Makalintal,   Cabrera   and   Monsod   Law 

Office for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Appellant   Napoleon   Duque  was   charged  with   and 

convicted of violating Section 38 in relation to Section 

39 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, known as The Labor 

Code   of   the   Philippines.   The   charge   of   illegal 

recruitment  was   set   out   in   the   information   in   the 

following terms:

That on or about and/or sometime in January 1986, 

at Calamba, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this 

Honorable   Court,   the   above   named   accused   well 

knowing that he is not licensed nor authorized by the 

proper   government   agency   (POEA)   to   engage   in 

recruitment   of  workers   for   placement   abroad,   did 

then   and   there  wilfully,   unlawfully   and   feloniously 

recruit   Glicerio   Teodoro,   Agustin   Ulat,   Ernesto 

Maunahan,   Norma   Francisco,   Elmo   Alcaraz   and 

Marcelino Desepida as workers abroad exacted and 

actually   received   money   from   the   above-named 

victims, to their damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law.[[1]]

The  evidence   in   chief  of   the  prosecution consisted 

principally   of   the   testimony   of   the   following 

witnesses:   Agustin   Ulat,   Elmo   Alcaraz,   Marcelino 

Desepida   and   Norma   Francisco.   Their   testimonies 

were   summarized   in   the   trial   court's   decision   as 

follows:

. . . sometime in January 1986, he (Agustin Ulat) was 

invited   by   the   accused   to   his   house   in   Calamba, 

Laguna. Thereat accused informed him that he was 

recruiting workers for Saudi Arabia and that he was 

interested   in   getting   (sic)   him.   Accused   likewise 

presented to  him that  he  (accused)  was a   licensed 

recruiter  (TSN,  22 Oct.  1990,  pp.  6-7).  The accused 

told   him   to   secure   his   birth   certificate,   an   NBI 

clearance   and  medical   certificate.   He  was   able   to 

secure   an  NBI   clearance  which   he   showed   to   the 

accused. The latter thereafter told him that he would 

secure the rest of his papers like passport, visa and 

medical certificate for him and for this, accused asked 

him to prepare the amount of P20,000.00. He did not 

have   that   money,   so   he   mortgaged   his   lot   for 

P20,000.00   to   the   cousin   of   the   accused,   Socorro 

Arlata.   He   immediately   gave   this   amount   to   the 

accused who assured him that he would be able to 

leave within two months. The accused did not issue a 

receipt for that amount despite his request.  He did 

not persist in asking the accused because he trusted 

him, accused coming from an affluent family and a 

member of a well-known Catholic  organization,  the 

"Cursillo"   (TSN,   22   Oct.   1990,   pp.   4-9).   However, 

accused failed to employ him at Saudi Arabia within 

two months despite repeated promise (sic) to do so. 

Thus,   he   demanded   the   return   of   his  money   but 

accused failed. Finally, he decided, together with the 

other   complainants,   to   file   a   complaint   against 

accused before the Philippine Overseas Employment 

Agency (POEA). . . .

Elmo   Alcaraz,   Marcelino   Desepida   and   Norma 

Francisco   individually   testified   to   the   following: 

sometime   also   in   January   1986,   they  went   to   the 

house of accused for work abroad as the latter had 

earlier told them that he was recruiting workers for 

the   Saudi   Arabia.   The   accused   asked   money   to 

process   their  papers.  Alcaraz  was  able   to   give   the 

accused   on   22   February   1986   the   amount   of 

P5,000.00,   but   the   accused   failed   to   issue   him   a 

receipt and he did not persist in asking for it because 

he trusted the accused on (TSN, 5 Nov. 1990, pp. 5-

7). Desepida was able to give the accused on 18 Feb. 

1986, the amount of P7,000.00 as placement fee for 

which the accused did not issue a receipt although he 

promised   to   issue  one  the  next  day.  However,   the 

following day, when he reminded the accused of the 

receipt, he refused saying that he (Desepida) should 

trust   [the  accused].  Francisco  was  able   to  give   the 

accused   P9,000.00   on   21   February   1986   in   the 

presence of the other applicants (TSN, 26 Nov. 1990, 

p. 5). But, the accused again failed to issue a receipt 

despite demand. She was told by the accused to trust 

him   (Ibid.,   p.   6).   However,   the   accused   failed   to 

return   their   money   notwithstanding.   Thus,   all   of 

them   decided   to   file   a   complaint   with   the   POEA 

against   the   accused.   There,   they   executed   a   joint 

affidavit (Exh. "A").[[2]]

During   the   trial,   Duque   denied   the   charges.   He 

controverted   the   allegation   that   he   had   recruited 

complainants   for   overseas   employment.   He   also 

denied   that   he   had   received   any   monies   in 

consideration of promised employment. However, he 

acknowledged   that   his   house   had   served   as   a 

meeting   place   for   a   certain   Delfin   and   one   Engr. 

Acopado who allegedly  were   the  persons  who had 

promised complainants, work abroad.

On the basis of the positive identification by private 

complainants of appellant Duque as the person they 

had talked to for placement abroad, the person who 

had collected fees from them and who had received 

information   from   them  needed   for   arranging   their 

departure for abroad, the trial court concluded that 

accused   Duque   was   primarily   responsible   for 

promising   placement   and   inducing   private 

complainants   to   part   with   their   money.   The 

prosecution also  submitted a  certification  from the 

licensing   branch   of   the   Philippine   Overseas 

Employment Administration ("POEA") stating that no 

records existed whatsoever of a grant to the accused 

of   a   license   or   authority   to   recruit   for   overseas 

employment.   The   dispositive   part   of   the   decision 

reads:

Wherefore,   this   Court   finds   the   accused   guilty 

beyond reasonable doubt, [of] violation of [Art.] 38 in 

relation to [Art.] 39 of P.D. 442 otherwise known as 

the   Labor   Code   of   the   Philippines,   and   hereby 

sentences   the   accused   to   suffer   the   penalty   of 

reclusion perpetua and a fine of P100,000.00 without 

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to 

indemnify   the   offended   parties:   Agustin   Ulat   the 

amount   of   P20,000.00;   Marcelino   Desepida   the 

amount of P7,000.00;  Norma Francisco the amount 

of   P9,000.00;   and   Elmo   Alcaraz   the   amount   of 

P3,000.00 and the cost of suit.[[3]]

Before this Court, appellant Duque raises only one (1) 

issue: that of prescription of the criminal offense for 

which he was convicted.

The recruitment of persons for overseas employment 

without the necessary recruiting permit or authority 

form the POEA constitutes a crime penalized, not by 

the Revised Penal Code, but rather by a special law, 

i.e., Article 38 in relation to Article 290 of the Labor 

Code.   Article   290   of   the   Labor   Code   provides,   in 

relevant part, that:

Art. 290. Offenses penalized under this Code and the 

rules  and   regulations   issued  pursuant   thereto   shall 

prescribe in three (3) years.

xxx xxx xxx

The   Labor   Code,   however,   does   not   contain   any 

provisions on the mode of computation of the three-

year prescriptive period it established.

The Solicitor General states, and we agree with him, 

that Act No. 3326 , as amended, entitled "An Act to 

Establish   Periods   of   Prescription   for   Violations 

Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances 

and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run" 

(emphasis supplied), supplied the applicable norm. 4 

Section   2   of   Act  No.   3326,   as   amended,   reads   as 

follows:

Section 2: . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Prescription shall  begin to run from the day of  the 

commission  of   the  violation  of   the   law,  and   if   the 

same be not known at the time, from the discovery 

thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its 

investigation and punishment.

Examination   of   the   abovequoted   Section   2   shows 

that   there   are   two   (2)   rules   for   determining   the 

beginning of the prescriptive period: (a) on the day of 

the commission of the violation, if such commission 

be known; and (b) if the commission of the violation 

was   not   known   at   the   time,   then   from   discovery 

thereof   and   institution   of   judicial   proceedings   for 

investigation   and   punishment.   Appellant   Duque 

contends that the prescriptive period in the case at 

bar   commenced   from   the   time   money   in 

consideration of promises for overseas employment 

was   parted   with   by   complainants.   Duque   thus 

contends that   the prescriptive period began to run 

sometime   in   January   1986.   The   information   was, 

however, filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor 

of Laguna on 22 May 1990, i.e., more than four (4) 

years   later.   Duque   concludes   that   the   offense   of 

illegal recruitment had accordingly prescribed by May 

1990.

We are not persuaded. Article 38 of the Labor Code 

as amended reads as follows:

Art.   38.   Illegal   Recruitment.   -   (a)   Any   recruitment 

activities,   including   the   prohibited   practices 

enumerated   under   Article   34   of   this   Code,   to   be 

undertaken   by   non-licensees   or   non-holders   of 

authority   shall   be   deemed   illegal   and   punishable 

under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor 

and Employment or any law enforcement officer may 

initiate complaints under this Article.

(b)   Illegal   recruitment   when   committed   by   a 

syndicate   or   in   large   scale   shall   be   considered   an 

offense   involving   economic   sabotage   and   shall   be 

penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal   recruitment   is   deemed   committed   by   a 

syndicate   if   carried  out  by  a  group of   three   (3)  or 

more persons conspiring and/or confederating with 

one another   in  carrying  out  any  unlawful  or   illegal 

transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the 

first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed 

committed in large scale if committed against three 

(3) or more persons individually or as a group.

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly 

authorized representatives  shall  have the power to 

cause the arrest and detention of such non-license or 

non-holder   of   authority   if   after   investigation   it   is 

determined that his activities constitute a danger to 

national   security   and   public   order   or   will   lead   to 

further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall 

order the search of the office or premises and seizure 

of  documents,   paraphernalia,   properties  and  other 

implements used in illegal recruitment activities and 

the closure of companies, establishments and entities 

found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers 

for   overseas   employment,   without   having   been 

licensed or authorized to do so. (Emphasis supplied)

It  will  be  seen   that   illegal   recruitment  has   two  (2) 

basic  elements,   to  wit:   (a)   recruitment  activities  as 

listed in Articles 38 and 34 of the Labor Code; and (b) 

the  lack  of   the necessary   license or  authority   from 

the POEA to engage  in  such activities.  Recruitment 

for overseas employment is not in itself  necessarily 

immoral or unlawful. It is the lack of necessary license 

or   permit   that   renders   such   recruitment   activities 

unlawful and criminal. Such lack of necessary permit 

or   authority,   while   certainly   known   to   appellant 

Duque   back   in   January   1986,   was   not   known   to 

private   complainants   at   that   time.   Indeed,   private 

complainants   discovered   that   appellant   did   not 

possess   such   authority   or   permit   only  when   they 

went to the offices of the POEA for the purpose of 

filing   a   claim   for   return   of   the   money   they   had 

delivered   to   appellant   Duque.   Since   good   faith   is 

always presumed, the complainants were entitled to 

assume the appellant Duque was acting in good faith 

when he presented himself as a recruiter for overseas 

placement.   Even   if   it   be   assumed   arguendo   that 

ordinary   prudence   required   that   a   person   seeking 

overseas employment ought to check the authority 

or status of persons pretending to be authorized or to 

speak   for   a   recruitment   or   placement   agency,   the 

offended parties'   failure   to  do so did  not  start   the 

running of the prescriptive period.   In the nature of 

things,   acts   made   criminal   by   special   laws   are 

frequently   not   immoral   or   obviously   criminal   in 

themselves;   for   this   reason,   the   applicable   statute 

requires that if the violation of the special law is not 

known at the time, then prescription begins to run 

only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the 

unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.

Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act No. 3326 as 

illogical   or   absurd.   A   literal   reading   of   Section   2 

appears   to   suggest   that   two   (2)   elements   must 

coincide   for   the   beginning   of   the   running   of   the 

prescriptive period: first, the element of discovery of 

the commission of  the violation of  the special   law; 

and second,   the  "institution of   judicial  proceedings 

for   its   investigation   and   punishment."   It   is   then 

argued by appellant that because the co-existence of 

these   two   (2)   requirements   is   necessary   under 

Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the relevant prescriptive 

period would never begin to run.

Here  appellant  has  a  point.  However,   it   should  be 

noted, firstly,  that the literal  reading that appellant 

suggests,   does   not   benefit   appellant,   for   the 

prescriptive period in the case at bar had not in any 

case been exhausted since prosecution of appellant 

commenced only a few months after the POEA and 

the complainants had discovered that appellant had 

no   governmental   authority   to   recruit   for   overseas 

work and was merely pretending to recruit workers 

for   overseas   employment   and   to   receive   money 

therefor, i.e., that appellant did not even attempt to 

locate   employment   abroad   for   complainants. 

Secondly, we do not think there is any real need for 

such a literal reading of Section 2. As is well-known, 

initiation of proceedings for preliminary investigation 

of the offense normally marks the interruption of the 

period   of   prescription.   Under   appellant   Duque's 

literal   reading,   the  prescription  period  would  both 

begin  and be   interrupted  by   the  same occurrence; 

the net effect would be that the prescription period 

would   not   have   effectively   begun,   having   been 

rendered academic by the simultaneous interruption 

of   that   same   period.   A   statute   providing   for 

prescription of defined criminal offenses is more than 

a statute of repose and constitutes an act of grace by 

which the State, after the lapse of a certain period of 

time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the 

criminal act. A statute on prescription of crimes is an 

act of liberality on the part of the State in favor of the 

offender.[[5]] The applicable well-known principles of 

statutory   interpretation   are   that   statutes  must   be 

construed   in   such   a  way   as   to   give   effect   to   the 

intention of the legislative authority,[[6]] and so as to 

give   a   sensible   meaning   to   the   language   of   the 

statute and thus avoid nonsensical or absurd results,

[[7]]  departing   to   the  extent  unavoidable   from the 

literal   language   of   the   statute.   Appellant's   literal 

reading would make nonsense of Section 2 of Act No. 

3326.

In   our   view,   the   phrase   "institution   of   judicial 

proceedings   for   its   investigation   and   punishment" 

may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be 

deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 

2 may be read as:

Prescription shall  begin to run from the day of  the 

commission  of   the  violation  of   the   law;  and   if   the 

same be not known at the time, from the discovery 

thereof;

or as:

Prescription shall  begin to run from the day of  the 

commission  of   the  violation  of   the   law,  and   if   the 

same be not known at the time, from the discovery 

thereof  and  until   institution of   judicial  proceedings 

for   its   investigation   and   punishment.   (Emphasis 

supplied)

We   believe   and   so   hold   that   the   applicable 

prescriptive period  in the case at bar began to run 

from the time the recruitment activities of appellant 

Duque were ascertained by the complainants and by 

the   POEA   to   have   been   carried   out   without   any 

license   or   authority   from   the   government.   The 

discovery by the complainants and by the POEA was, 

as a practical matter, simultaneous in character and 

occurred   sometime   in   December   1989   when   the 

complainants went to the POEA with the complaint 

for recovery of the placement fees and expenses they 

had paid to appellant Duque, and the POEA, acting 

upon   that   complaint,  discovered  and   informed   the 

private complainants that Duque had operated as a 

recruiter without the essential government license or 

authority.   Accordingly,   the   offense   of   illegal 

recruitment had not prescribed when the complaint 

was  filed  with   the  Provincial  Prosecutor's  Office   in 

April   1990   and  when   the   information  was  filed   in 

court in May 1990.

It is relevant to note that the same result would be 

reached by giving supplemental  effect to provisions 

of the Revised Penal Code in the application of Article 

290 of the Labor Code.  8 Article 91 of  the Revised 

Penal Code reads as follows:

Art. 91. Computation of the prescription of offenses. - 

The  period  of   prescription   shall   commence   to   run 

from the day on which the crime is discovered by the 

offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and 

shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or 

information, and shall commence to run again when 

such   proceedings   terminate   without   the   accused 

being   convicted   or   acquitted,   or   are   unjustifiably 

stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The   term   of   prescription   shall   not   run   when   the 

offender   is  absent   from the Philippine  Archipelago. 

(Emphasis supplied)

Under the above-quoted Article 91, the prescriptive 

period in respect of the offense of illegal recruitment 

began to run on the date of discovery thereof by the 

private complainants and the authorities concerned 

(POEA)   sometime   in   December   1989   and   was 

interrupted   on   16   April   1990   when   the   affidavit-

sworn complaint  was filed before the Office of  the 

Provincial  Prosecutor,  9  and certainly  by May 1990 

when the criminal information was filed in court by 

the Assistant Provincial  Prosecutor of Laguna. Once 

more,   the  appellant's  defense  of  prescription  must 

fail.

Under Section 39 of the Labor Code as amended, the 

penalty  of   life   imprisonment   is  properly   imposable 

where the illegal recruitment is committed "in large 

scale," i.e., where it is "committed against three (3) or 

more persons individually or as a group." 10 In the 

case   at   bar,   private   complainants   are   more   than 

three (3) in number. Moreover, appellant Duque had 

represented to the public at large, including private 

complainants, that he was a licensed

recruiter.  11  Duque's  house  served  as  his  business 

office and he asked the private complainants to see 

him   in   his   house.   12   There,   complainants   were 

"briefed"   as   to   the   requirements   for   overseas 

employment   before   their   supposed   departure   and 

were each required to secure a clearance from the 

National   Bureau   of   Investigation.   13   Considerable 

sums were collected from each of the complainants 

supposedly to "facilitate" the processing of passports, 

medical   certificates   and   other  working   papers.   14 

Complainants  were,   in   addition,   shown  documents 

which  purported   to  be   job  placement  orders.   This 

organized modus operandi  was repeated  in respect 

of   each   of   the   complainants   and   presumably   in 

respect   of   other   persons   who   were   similarly 

victimized by appellant. There is no question that the 

recruitment activities of Duque were organized and 

"large scale" in nature. 15

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by 

the   trial   court   is   hereby  AFFIRMED,  with   the   sole 

modification that the penalty properly imposable and 

hereby   imposed   is   life   imprisonment   and   not 

reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

                              Plaintiff-Appellee,

  

  

                        - versus –

    

FRANCISCA   TALARO,*   GREGORIO   TALARO,** 

NORBERTO   (JUN)   ADVIENTO,   RENATO   RAMOS, 

RODOLFO  DUZON,***  RAYMUNDO ZAMORA**  and 

LOLITO AQUINO,

                               Accused.

 

NORBERTO   (JUN)   ADVIENTO,   RENATO  RAMOS   and 

LOLITO AQUINO,

                               Accused-Appellants.

G.R. No. 175781

 

Present:

 

     CORONA, C.J.,

     CARPIO,

     VELASCO, JR.,

     LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

     BRION,

     PERALTA,

     BERSAMIN,

      DEL CASTILLO,****

     ABAD,

     VILLARAMA, JR.,

     PEREZ,

     MENDOZA,

     SERENO,

     REYES, and

     PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

 

Promulgated:

        March 20, 2012

x----------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------x

  

DECISION

  

PERALTA, J.:

  

         This is an automatic review of the Decision[1] of 

the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on December, 

15, 2005, in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 125, in 

relation to Section 3 of Rule 56, of the Rules of Court. 

The   CA   affirmed   with   modification   the   judgment 

rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38 

of   Lingayen,   Pangasinan,   thereby   finding   accused-

appellants  Norberto   (Jun)  Adviento,   Renato  Ramos 

and Lolito Aquino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 

the crime of Murder and sentencing them to death, 

but acquitting accused Rodolfo Duzon.

 

                 Accused-appellants were charged before the 

RTC   of   Urdaneta,   Pangasinan,   with   the   crime   of 

murder under an Information reading as follows:

 

            That on or about the 26th day of April 1994, in 

the Poblacion of the Municipality of Laoac, Province 

of   Pangasinan,   and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this 

Honorable   Court,   the   said   accused,   conspiring, 

confederating with each other, with intent to kill, and 

with   treachery,   and   evident   premeditation,   in 

consideration   of   a   price,   and   by  means   of  motor 

vehicle, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and 

feloniously attack and shoot one MELVIN ALIPIO, with 

a handgun hitting the latter in the different parts of 

his   body   and   the   wounds   being   mortal   caused 

directly   the   death   of   said  MELVIN   ALIPIO,   to   the 

damage and prejudice of his heirs.

 

CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.[2]

            

                  The   testimonies  of  prosecution  witnesses 

showed the sequence of  events  shortly  before and 

after   the   killing   of   victim  Melvin   Alipio   to   be   as 

follows.

 

                 Raymundo Zamora is the nephew of Gregorio 

Talaro,   the   husband   of   Francisca   Talaro.     In   the 

morning of April 24, 1994, when Zamora went home 

for   breakfast   after   driving   his   tricycle,   he   found 

Francisca   Talaro,   Lolito   Aquino,   Renato   “Atong” 

Ramos,   and   Norberto   “Jun”   Adviento   conversing 

among themselves under a santol tree in front of his 

(Zamora's)  house.    He went near the group to find 

out what they were talking about and he learned that 

his aunt,  Francisca Talaro,  was transacting with the 

other three accused-appellants for the killing of Atty. 

Melvin Alipio.  He was merely a meter away from the 

group   so   he   heard   the   group's   conversation.     He 

learned   that  Francisca  Talaro  would  give   the   three 

accused-appellants   an   advance   payment   of 

P30,000.00 and then another P30,000.00 after Atty. 

Melvin Alipio is killed, with said last payment to be 

delivered   in   Barangay   (Brgy.)   Bactad.     The   three 

accused-appellants   then   nodded   their   heads   in 

agreement.     After   learning   of   the   group's   plan, 

Zamora got scared and stayed away from the group, 

but   three   days   after   that  meeting   in   front   of   his 

house, he was asked by Francisca Talaro to drive her 

and   her   husband   Gregorio   to   Brgy.   Bactad.     The 

Talaro  spouses  alighted  at  a  place   in  Brgy.  Bactad, 

while Zamora stayed in his tricycle and merely waited 

for them.  He assumed that the couple delivered the 

payment of P30,000.00 to someone in Brgy. Bactad.

[3]

 

                  Accused-appellant   Lolito   Aquino,   when 

questioned   during   preliminary   investigation, 

admitted   that   he   and   co-accused   Renato   Ramos 

conducted   a   surveillance   on   Atty.   Alipio   in   the 

afternoon of April 25, 1994.[4]

 

                 Around 6 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 

1994,   tricycle   driver   Rodolfo   Duzon   was   at   the 

parking area in the poblacion of Urdaneta waiting for 

passengers,  when  accused-appellant  Renato  Ramos 

approached him.   Accused-appellant  Ramos offered 

to pay Rodolfo Duzon P200.00 for the latter to drive 

Ramos'   motorcycle   to   Laoac,   Pangasinan   to   take 

some onions  and  turnips   there.    Duzon agreed,   so 

after bringing his own tricycle home to his house in 

Bactad, Urdaneta, he then drove Ramos' motorcycle 

to   the   poblacion   of   Urdaneta.     At   the   poblacion, 

Ramos bought a basket where he placed the onions 

and   turnips.    Ramos   then   told  Duzon   to  drive   the 

motorcycle to Laoac, but they first passed by Garcia 

Street in Urdaneta.   At a house along Garcia Street, 

Ramos   alighted   and   talked   to   someone   whom 

Rodolfo   Duzon   later   came   to   know   as   accused-

appellant Lolito Aquino.  Ramos then told Duzon that 

after   coming   from   Laoac,   Duzon   should   leave   the 

motorcycle at that house on Garcia Street with Lolito 

Aquino.  Ramos and Duzon then proceeded to Laoac, 

stopping   at   a   gas   station   where   they   fueled   up. 

Ramos   alighted   from   the   motorcycle   at   the   gas 

station and,   taking  along  the  basket  of  onions  and 

turnips, walked towards Guardian Angel Hospital (the 

clinic   owned   by   the   Alipios).     Five   minutes   after 

Ramos alighted, Duzon heard three gunshots coming 

from the west,  and moments  later,  he saw Ramos, 

who   was   coming   toward   him,   being   chased   by 

another man.  When Ramos got to the motorcycle, he 

ordered Duzon to immediately drive away, and poked 

a gun at Duzon's back.   Ramos then instructed Duzon 

as to the route they should take until they reached 

Urdaneta where Ramos alighted, leaving Duzon with 

instructions to bring the motorcycle to Garcia Street, 

leave it with Lolito Aquino, then meet him (Ramos) 

again at the poblacion where he (Duzon) will be paid 

P200.00 for his services.   Duzon did as he was told, 

but when he met with Ramos at the poblacion and 

asked for the P200.00, Ramos got mad and shouted 

invectives at him.  A few days later, he again ran into 

Ramos   who   warned   him   to   keep   his   silence, 

threatening to kill him (Duzon) too if he tells anyone 

about the killing.   Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun) 

Adviento also threatened him not to reveal to anyone 

whatever he knows about the crime.   That was why 

Duzon  decided   to  keep  quiet.     Later,  however,  he 

revealed the matter to his brother, Victoriano Duzon, 

who accompanied him to the Criminal Investigation 

Services (CIS) Office in Urdaneta so he could give his 

statement.     He   executed   affidavits,   assisted   by   a 

lawyer   from   the   Public   Attorney’s   Office   (PAO), 

attesting   to  what  he  knew about   the  crime,   in  his 

desire to be a state witness.[5]

 

                 Witness Rene Balanga, who was the helper of 

the   spouses   Atty.  Melvin   and  Dr.   Lina   Alipio,  was 

cleaning   the   windows   at   the   clinic   of   Dr.   Alipio 

around 8 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994.  He 

heard three gunshots coming from the garage of the 

clinic,   which   was   around   ten   meters   away   from 

where he was.    Immediately after the gunshots, he 

saw a man quickly walking out from the garage, going 

towards the main gate, but he was not able to clearly 

see the face of the man.   He merely observed that 

the man was around 5'4” to 5'5” in height, medium-

built, wearing a blue jacket and faded maong (denim) 

pants.  He ran towards the garage and there, he saw 

Atty. Melvin Alipio lying dead.   He then chased after 

the man so he could identify him better but he did 

not   succeed   in  doing  so  because   the  driver  of   the 

motorcycle   that   the   gunman   was   boarding   was 

already drawing something out from the rear portion 

of   the   motorcycle.     After   the   assailant   sped   off, 

Balanga went to the police station in Laoac to report 

the   crime   and   give   his   statement   before   the   CIS. 

Sometime   later,   at   the   CIS   Office,   he   identified 

Rodolfo Duzon as the driver of the motorcycle used 

by the gunman to get away.[6]

 

                 Another eyewitness, Eusebio Hidalgo, whose 

son was confined at the clinic, was sitting at a bench 

in the garage of the clinic on the morning of April 26, 

1994.  Two other women who were looking for Atty. 

Alipio  also sat  at   the bench with him after he told 

them that Atty. Alipio was still having his breakfast. 

After a   few minutes,  a  man arrived  looking  for  Dr. 

Alipio,  and also sat at the bench.   Thereafter,  Atty. 

Alipio came out to the garage and talked to the two 

women.   When Atty. Alipio finished talking to them, 

the  man   sitting  with   them on   the  bench   suddenly 

stood  up   and   shot  Atty.   Alipio   three  times.     Atty. 

Alipio was merely one meter away from the assailant 

when  the   latter   shot  him.    After   the  shooting,   the 

assailant walked away.   Hidalgo then saw the helper 

at the clinic, Reny Balanga, run after the assailant, but 

the   latter  had whistled  to  his  companion  who was 

waiting on his motorcycle and the two were able to 

speed away aboard said vehicle.    Hidalgo identified 

the assailant from a picture[7] shown to him.[8]  The 

picture was that of Renato Ramos.[9]

 

          A few weeks after Atty. Melvin Alipio had been 

killed,  Zamora  was   in   the parking   lot   in  Sta.  Maria 

Norte in Binalonan, when   accused-appellant Aquino 

approached  him and   told  him   to   remind  Francisca 

Talaro   that   she   still   has   to   pay   him   (Aquino) 

P10,000.00.  Zamora then immediately told his uncle 

Gregorio Talaro about Aquino's message and the very 

next day, Gregorio went to Zamora's house with the 

P10,000.00.     Gregorio   could   no   longer   wait   for 

Aquino   so   he   just   left   the   money   with   Zamora, 

instructing him to hand it over to Aquino when the 

latter arrives.   Later that day, Zamora saw Aquino so 

he told him (Aquino) to just get the money from his 

house.   About three weeks later, Aquino again went 

to Zamora's house, this time saying he needs another 

P5,000.00 just in case he needs to escape.   Zamora 

then   contacted   Francisca   Talaro   and   conveyed 

Aquino's   message   to   her.     The   following   day, 

Gregorio again went to Zamora's house and left the 

P3,000.00 for Aquino. That afternoon, Zamora again 

told Aquino to just pick up the money from his house. 

Zamora observed that Aquino seemed happy enough 

with the P3,000.00 he received.[10]

 

         Zamora said that he thinks the Talaros had Atty. 

Alipio   killed   because   the   latter   was   not   able   to 

comply with his contractual obligations to the Talaros 

to complete the construction of a building.   Dr. Lina 

Alipio,   the  wife   of   the   victim   Atty.  Melvin   Alipio, 

confirmed   that   indeed,   the   victim entered   into   an 

agreement with Rodolfo Talaro, the Talaro spouses' 

son,   for   the   construction   of   a   building,   but   the 

construction was not finished within the agreed one-

year period because of the sudden rise of prices for 

materials.    Atty. Alipio asked Rodolfo for additional 

payment   so   he   could   finish   construction,   but   the 

latter   refused   to  pay  more.    Dr.  Alipio   stated   that 

eventually, Atty. Alipio and Rodolfo agreed that Atty. 

Alipio would return all the money he received from 

Rodolfo and the whole property would,   in turn,  be 

turned over to Atty. Alipio.  Atty. Alipio was unable to 

return the money despite several demands made by 

Rodolfo, and Dr. Alipio believes this is the reason why 

the Talaros had her husband killed.  Dr. Alipio further 

testified on matters regarding expenses for the wake 

and burial, and the earnings of her husband.[11]

 

                 Dr. Arnulfo Bacarro conducted the autopsy on 

the   victim and   stated   that   three   slugs  were   taken 

from the body of the victim, and the cause of death 

was internal hemorrhage.[12]  Police officers testified 

on how they conducted the investigation, stating that 

accused-appellant  Aquino  and Zamora's   statements 

were   taken   in   the   presence   of   their   respective 

lawyers.     They  maintain   that   no   bodily   harm  was 

inflicted on the accused-appellants while they were 

being investigated.[13]

 

                 On the other hand, accused-appellant Lolito 

Aquino stated that he was taken by CIS men without 

a  warrant  of  arrest;   that  he  was  mauled  by  police 

authorities   while   under   detention,   but   could   not 

undergo a medical check-up due to fear from threats 

that he would be killed by police authorities if he did 

so; that he was assisted by a PAO lawyer when he 

made   his   confession,   but   he   did   not   read   the 

contents   of   the   document,   Sgt.   Tomelden   just 

ordered him to sign the same;  that the PAO lawyer is 

not his own choice; that he does not know Rodolfo 

Duzon and Raymundo Zamora; and that he was not 

present at the meeting held in Raymundo Zamora's 

yard.    He   admitted,   however,   that   the  motorcycle 

used by the gunman belongs to him; and that he first 

agreed   to   be   a   state   witness   because   he   was 

promised to be paid P20,000.00 and that he would be 

placed in the witness protection program.[14]

 

                 Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento's 

defense is denial and alibi.   He claimed that he was 

not present during the April 24, 1994 meeting held to 

plan the killing of Atty. Alipio, because on said date 

and   time,   he   was   in   the   house   of   Congressman 

Amadito   Perez,   for   whom   he   works   as   driver-

messenger,   and   that   morning,   he   also   drove   the 

Congressman's   family   to  church   to  hear  mass.    On 

April 26, 1994, he also reported for work at the house 

of   the Congressman from 8 o'clock   in   the morning 

until 5 o'clock in the afternoon.   He likewise denied 

personally knowing any of his co-accused except for 

Duzon whose face is familiar to him.[15]

 

                 After   trial,   the  RTC rendered  judgment  as 

follows:

 

           Wherefore, in the light of all the considerations 

discussed  above,   this   court  hereby  finds  and  holds 

the   accused   Francisca   Talaro,   Norberto   (Jun) 

Adviento,  Renato Ramos,  Rodolfo  Duzon and Lolito 

Aquino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime 

of   Murder   defined   and   penalized   under   the 

provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as 

amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and conformable 

thereto, pursuant to law, hereby imposes on each of 

the   accused   the   death   penalty   and   to   pay 

proportionately the costs of the proceedings.

 

                     The court   further  orders   the accused to 

indemnify,   jointly   and   severally,   the   heirs   of   the 

deceased the sum of P83,000.00 as actual damages; 

P100,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as death 

indemnity;   P10,000.00   as   [attorney's   fees]   paid   to 

their private prosecutor and P2,400,000.00 as loss in 

the   earning   capacity   of   the   deceased   without 

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

 

                      Taking   into   consideration   that   accused 

Francisca  Talaro   is  already  75  years  old,   the  death 

penalty   meted   upon   her   shall   be   commuted   to 

reclusion   perpetua   with   the   accessory   penalties 

provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.

 

           And considering that the evidence adduced by 

the prosecution against the accused Gregorio Talaro 

is   not   sufficient   to   sustain   his   conviction   of   the 

offense filed against him, the court hereby declares 

accused   Gregorio   Talaro   not   guilty.     The   court 

likewise declares Raymundo Zamora acquitted of the 

offense filed against him.

 

           Let an order of arrest be issued against accused 

Renato   Ramos   who   escaped   from   jail   during   the 

pendency of this case, to be served by the NBI, CIC 

and PNP of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.

 

           SO ORDERED.[16]

  

                 The case was then brought to this Court for 

automatic   review   in   view  of   the   penalty   of   death 

imposed   on   accused-appellants.   However,   in 

accordance with the ruling  in  People v.  Mateo,[17] 

and the amendments made to Sections 3 and 10 of 

Rule 122,  Section 13 of Rule 124,  and Section 3 of 

Rule 125 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, 

the   Court   transferred   this   case   to   the   CA   for 

intermediate review.

 

                 On December 15, 2005, the CA rendered its 

Decision,   the  dispositive  portion  of  which   reads  as 

follows:

 

                       WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 

decision  of   the  Regional   Trial   Court,   Branch  38  of 

Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. U-8239, is 

hereby   AFFIRMED   with   the   MODIFICATION   that 

accused-appellant Rodolfo Duzon is ACQUITTED   on 

reasonable doubt and his release is hereby ordered 

unless he is being held for some other legal cause.

           

            Further, in lieu of the awards made by the trial 

court in favor of the heirs of deceased Atty. Melvin 

Alipio, accused-appellants are ordered to pay, jointly 

and severally,   the  heirs  of   the victim the  following 

amounts:   (1) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (2) 

P75,000.00   as   civil   indemnity;   (3)   P50,000.00   as 

moral   damages;   and   (4)   P25,000.00   as   exemplary 

damages;

 

            SO ORDERED.[18]

  

         The case is now before this Court on automatic 

review.     The   prosecution   opted   not   to   file   a 

supplemental   brief   with   this   Court.     Accused-

appellants   Lolito  Aquino  and  Renato  Ramos   jointly 

filed their supplemental brief where it is argued that 

the   two   should   be   acquitted   because   (1)   the 

prosecution   evidence   is   insufficient   to   prove   that 

Lolito Aquino was part of the conspiracy to kill Atty. 

Melvin Alipio; and (2) the identity of Renato Ramos 

was  never  established.    Accused-appellant  Noberto 

(Jun)  Adviento  argued   in  his  Appellant's  Brief  filed 

with   the   CA,   that   the   prosecution's   evidence   is 

insufficient to establish conspiracy, and there are no 

aggravating circumstances to justify the imposition of 

the death penalty.

  

          The Court agrees with the CA's conclusion that 

the   evidence  on   record  proves  beyond   reasonable 

doubt that accused-appellants Lolito Aquino, Renato 

Ramos,  and Norberto (Jun) Adviento,  together with 

Francisca Talaro, conspired to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio.

  

          Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal 

Code is  defined as the unlawful  killing of a person, 

which   is   not   parricide   or   infanticide,   attended   by 

circumstances   such   as   treachery   or   evident 

premeditation.     The   presence   of   any   one   of   the 

circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code 

is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.[19]

 

                 In People v. Sanchez,[20] the Court held that 

“[t]he essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an 

aggressor  without   the   slightest  provocation  on   the 

part  of   the  victim,  depriving   the   latter  of   any   real 

chance   to   defend   himself,   thereby   ensuring   the 

commission   of   the   crime   without   risk   to   the 

aggressor.”   There can be no cavil that the evidence 

on   record   shows   treachery   in   the   killing   of   Atty. 

Alipio,   thus   qualifying   the   crime   as  murder.     The 

assailant,   identified   as   accused-appellant   Renato 

Ramos, just suddenly fired upon Atty. Alipio at a very 

close   distance,  without   any   provocation   from   said 

unarmed victim, who was then just conversing with 

some other people.

 

         There is also evident premeditation because the 

evidence   shows   that   a   couple   of   days   before   the 

actual   shooting   of   Atty.   Alipio,   Raymundo   Zamora 

already saw and heard accused-appellants Norberto 

(Jun)   Adviento,   Renato   Ramos,   and   Lolito   Aquino, 

talking   to   Francisca   Talaro   and   coming   to   an 

agreement to kill Atty. Alipio.

 

                  Pitted   against   the   prosecution   evidence, 

accused-appellants' only defense is that the evidence 

is insufficient to prove they are part of the 

conspiracy   to  commit   the murder.    Said  defense  is 

sorely wanting when pitted against the prosecution 

evidence.

 

                 In People v. Bautista,[21] the Court reiterated 

the hornbook principle of conspiracy, to wit:

 

             Conspiracy exists when two or more persons 

come to an agreement concerning the commission of 

a   felony   and  decide   to   commit   it.    Where   all   the 

accused   acted   in   concert   at   the   time   of   the 

commission of the offense, and it is shown by such 

acts   that   they   had   the   same  purpose   or   common 

design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is 

sufficiently  established.     It  must  be   shown  that  all 

participants   performed   specific   acts   which   such 

closeness and coordination as to indicate a common 

purpose or design to commit the felony.

 

            x x x x

 

            Each conspirator is responsible for everything 

done by his confederates which follows incidentally 

in the execution of a common design as one of  its 

probable  and natural  consequences  even  though  it 

was not intended as part of the original design. x x 

x[22] (Emphasis supplied)

           

                 In this case, the existence of a conspiracy has 

been   established   by   the   testimony   of   Raymundo 

Zamora,   positively   identifying   all   three   accused-

appellants as the ones he saw and heard transacting 

with Francisca Talaro on April  24,  1994 to kill  Atty. 

Melvin   Alipio   for   the   price   of   P60,000.00,   and 

pointing to Lolito Aquino as the one who demanded 

and received part  of  the payment after Atty.  Alipio 

had   been   killed.     The   credibility   of   Raymundo 

Zamora's   testimony   is   further   bolstered   by   Lolito 

Aquino's   admission[23]   that  he  and  Renato  Ramos 

even   conducted   surveillance   on   the   victim   a   day 

before Renato Ramos carried out the shooting, and 

that   the   motorcycle   used   as   a   getaway   vehicle 

belonged   to   him.     Rodolfo  Duzon   also   pointed   to 

Renato  Ramos  as   the  gunman;  he  also  pointed   to 

Renato  Ramos  and Norberto   (Jun)  Adviento  as   the 

ones who threatened to kill him if he talks to anyone 

about   the   shooting.    All   the  proven   circumstances 

point to the conclusion that accused-appellants acted 

in concert to assure the success of the execution of 

the   crime;  hence,   the   existence  of   a   conspiracy   is 

firmly established.

 

                  Lolito   Aquino's   admission,   and   accused-

appellants'   positive   identification   of   Raymundo 

Zamora   and   Rodolfo   Duzon   cannot   be   belied   by 

accused-appellants'  mere  denial.       It   is  established 

jurisprudence   that   denial   and   alibi   cannot   prevail 

over   the   witness'   positive   identification   of   the 

accused-appellants.[24]       Moreover,   accused-

appellants  could not give any plausible reason why 

Raymundo Zamora would testify falsely against them. 

In People v. Molina,[25] the Court expounded, thus:

 

                        In light of the positive identification of 

appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no 

ill motive on their part or on that of their families was 

shown that could have made either of them institute 

the case against the appellant and falsely  implicate 

him in a serious crime he did not commit, appellant's 

defense of alibi must necessarily fail.   It is settled in 

this   jurisdiction   that   the   defense   of   alibi,   being 

inherently  weak,  cannot  prevail  over   the  clear  and 

positive   identification   of   the   accused   as   the 

perpetrator   of   the   crime.   x   x   x[26]     (Emphasis 

supplied)

 

                       Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino claimed he 

merely admitted his participation in the crime out of 

fear   of   the   police   authorities   who   allegedly 

manhandled  him,  however,   the   trial   court   did  not 

find his story convincing.  The trial court's evaluation 

of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is 

conclusive on this Court as it is the trial court which 

had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor 

of  witnesses.[27]       The   Court   again   explained   the 

rationale for this principle in Molina,[28] to wit:

 

            As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's 

evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is viewed as 

correct and entitled to the highest respect because it 

is  more competent   to so conclude,  having had the 

opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and 

deportment on the stand, and the manner in which 

they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore 

can better determine if  such witnesses were telling 

the   truth,   being   in   the   ideal   position   to   weigh 

conflicting   testimonies.   Further,   factual   findings   of 

the   trial   court   as   regards   its   assessment   of   the 

witnesses' credibility are entitled to great weight and 

respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of 

Appeals   affirms   the   said   findings,   and  will   not   be 

disturbed   absent   any   showing   that   the   trial   court 

overlooked   certain   facts   and   circumstances   which 

could  substantially  affect   the outcome of   the case.

[29]

                        

The Court cannot find anything on record to justify 

deviation from said rule.

 

                 Accused-appellant Renato Ramos insisted that 

he  was  not  properly   identified   in  open   court,   and 

considering that there are so many persons named 

“Renato Ramos,” then there can be some confusion 

regarding his identity.  There is no truth to this claim. 

Ramos   was   properly   identified   in   open   court   by 

Raymundo Zamora, as one of the men he saw and 

heard transacting with Francisca Talaro for the killing 

of Atty. Alipio.[30]   Hence, there can be no doubt as 

to  which  Renato  Ramos   is  being   convicted   for   the 

murder of Atty. Alipio.

 

         Another strong indication of Lolito Aquino's and 

Renato  Ramos'   guilt   is   the   fact   that   they   escaped 

from detention while the case was pending with the 

trial  court.    Renato Ramos escaped from prison on 

December 20, 1994,[31]  while Lolito Aquino escaped 

on May 5, 1996.[32] It has been repeatedly held that 

flight betrays a desire to evade responsibility and is, 

therefore, a strong indication of guilt.[33]   Thus, this 

Court finds no reason to overturn their conviction.

 

                 Nevertheless,   this  Court  must  modify   the 

penalty   imposed   on   accused-appellants   Norberto 

(Jun) Adviento, Lolito Aquino, and Renato Ramos.   In 

People v. Tinsay,[34] the Court explained that:

                 On June 30, 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 (R.A. 

9346),  entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of 

Death   Penalty   in   the   Philippines,   took   effect. 

Pertinent provisions thereof provide as follows:

 

                     Section 1.   The imposition of the penalty of 

death is hereby prohibited.  Accordingly, Republic Act 

No.   Eight   Thousand   One   Hundred   Seventy-Seven 

(R.A.   No.   8177),   otherwise   known   as   the   Act 

Designating   Death   by   Lethal   Injection   is   hereby 

repealed.     Republic   Act   No.   Seven   Thousand   Six 

Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659) otherwise known 

as   the   Death   Penalty   Law   and   all   other   laws, 

executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose 

the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended 

accordingly.

 

                     Section 2.   In lieu of the death penalty, the 

following shall be imposed:

  

                     (a)   the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when 

the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of 

the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

 

           x x x x

 

                     SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses 

punished   with   reclusion   perpetua,   or   whose 

sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by 

reason  of   this  Act,   shall   not  be   eligible   for  parole 

under   Act   No.   4103,   otherwise   known   as   the 

Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

 

It has also been held in People vs. Quiachon that R.A. 

No. 9346 has retroactive effect, to wit:

 

            The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is 

applicable   in   this   case  pursuant   to   the  principle   in 

criminal   law,   favorabilia   sunt   amplianda   adiosa 

restrigenda.     Penal   laws   which   are   favorable   to 

accused are given retroactive effect.  This principle is 

embodied   under   Article   22   of   the   Revised   Penal 

Code, which provides as follows:

 

                    Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws 

shall  have a retroactive effect  insofar as they favor 

the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual 

criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 

of this Code, although at the time of the publication 

of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced 

and the convict is serving the same.

 

                     However, appellant is not eligible for parole 

because   Section   3   of   R.A.  No.   9346   provides   that 

“persons convicted of offenses pushed with reclusion 

perpetua,   or  whose   sentences  will   be   reduced   to 

reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be 

eligible for parole.”

  

                       Hence, in accordance with the foregoing, 

appellant   should   only   be   sentenced   to   suffer 

reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[35]

            

                  The  awards   for  damages  also  need  to  be 

modified.   In People v. Alberto Anticamara y Cabillo, 

et   al.,[36]   the   Court   held   that   in   accordance  with 

prevailing jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the 

imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion 

perpetua  pursuant   to  R.A.  No.  9346,   the  award  of 

moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 

to   P75,000.00,   while   the   award   for   exemplary 

damages,   in   view   of   the   presence   of   aggravating 

circumstances, should be P30,000.00.

 

                 WHEREFORE,   the Decision of   the Court  of 

Appeals dated December 15, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 

No.   00071   is   hereby   AFFIRMED   with   the 

MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed on 

accused-appellants is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua 

without possibility of parole in accordance with R.A. 

No.   9346;   and   INCREASING   the   award   of   moral 

damages   from   P50,000.00   to   P75,000.00,   and   the 

award   of   exemplary   damages   from   P25,000.00   to 

P30,000.00.    The rest of the award of the Court of 

Appeals   is   hereby   maintained.

G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner, 

vs.

PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE

SY and DEXIE DURAN, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

Tinga, J.:

Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the 

Decision2 dated   17   August   2006   and 

Resolution3 dated   25   April   2007   by   the   Court   of 

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou

P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and

Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey

Reso Dayap.

The   case   had   its   origins   in   the   filing   of   an 

Information4 on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial 

Prosecutor’s   Office,   Sibulan,   Negros   Oriental, 

charging  herein  petitioner   Jeffrey  Reso  Dayap  with 

the   crime   of   Reckless   Imprudence   resulting   to 

Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage 

to Property. The pertinent portion of the information 

reads:

That   at   about   11:55   o’clock   in   the   evening   of   28 

December   2004   at   Brgy.   Maslog,   Sibulan,   Negros 

Oriental,   Philippines,   and  within   the   jurisdiction  of 

this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did 

then and there,  willfully,  unlawfully  and feloniously 

drive   in   a   reckless   and   imprudent   manner   a   10-

wheeler   cargo   truck   with   plate   number   ULP-955, 

color blue, fully  loaded with sacks of coconut shell, 

registered   in   the   name  of   Ruben  Villabeto   of   Sta. 

Agueda  Pamplona,  Negros  Oriental,   thereby  hitting 

an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-

379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with 

two   female   passengers,   namely:   Dexie   Duran   and 

Elvie Sy, thus causing the instantaneous death of said 

Lou Gene R.  Sendiong,   less serious physical   injuries 

on   the   bodies   of   Dexie   Duran   and   Elvie   Sy   and 

extensive   damage   to   the   above-mentioned   Colt 

Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina P. 

Weyer of 115 Dr.  V.  Locsin St.,  Dumaguete City,  to 

the  damage of   the heirs  of   the  same Lou Gene R. 

Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-

mentioned.

An act  defined and penalized by Article 365 of  the 

Revised Penal Code.

On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court 

(MTC)   of   Sibulan,   Negros   Oriental,   petitioner   was 

arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.5

On   17   January   2005,   respondents   Pretzy-Lou   P. 

Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a 

motion   for   leave   of   court   to   file   an   amended 

information.6 They   sought   to   add   the   allegation  of 

abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The 

driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the 

victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong 

was still  alive  inside the car;  he was only extracted 

from the car by the by-standers."7

On   21   January   2005,   however,   the   Provincial 

Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the 

motion   to   amend   the   information   be   considered 

withdrawn.8 On  21   January  2003,   the  MTC granted 

the   withdrawal   and   the   motion   to   amend   was 

considered withdrawn.9

Pre-trial   and   trial   of   the   case   proceeded. 

Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the 

prosecution   had   rested   its   case,   petitioner   sought 

leave   to   file   a   demurrer   to   evidence   which   was 

granted.   Petitioner   filed   his   Demurrer   to 

Evidence10 dated   15   April   2005   grounded   on   the 

prosecution’s   failure   to   prove   beyond   reasonable 

doubt   that   he   is   criminally   liable   for   reckless 

imprudence,   to   which   respondents   filed   a 

Comment11 dated 25 April 2005.

In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted 

the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of 

reckless   imprudence.   The   MTC   found   that   the 

evidence   presented   by   respondents   failed   to 

establish the allegations in the Information. Pertinent 

portions of the order state:

An examination of the allegations in the information 

and   comparing   the   same   with   the   evidence 

presented by the prosecution would reveal that the 

evidence   presented   has   not   established   said 

allegations. The facts and circumstances constituting 

the allegations charged have not been proven.  It   is 

elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must 

prove his own affirmative allegations.

x x x x

Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this 

Court find that it was the accused who committed the 

crime as charged. Its witnesses have never identified 

the   accused   as   the   one   who   has   committed   the 

crime. The prosecution never bothered to establish if 

indeed it was the accused who committed the crime 

or   asked   questions  which  would   have   proved   the 

elements of the crime. The prosecution did not even 

establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving 

the truck at the time of the incident. The Court simply 

cannot find any evidence which would prove that a 

crime has been committed and that  the accused  is 

the person responsible for it. There was no evidence 

on   the   allegation   of   the   death   of   Lou   Gene   R. 

Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was 

offered in evidence. The alleged less serious physical 

injuries  on  the  bodies  of  Dexie  Duran and Elvie  Sy 

were not also proven as no medical  certificate was 

presented   to   state   the   same   nor   was   a   doctor 

presented   to   establish   such   injuries.   The   alleged 

damage   to   the   [C]olt   [G]alant   was   also   not 

established   in   any   manner   as   no   witness   ever 

testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence 

was   also   presented   to   state   the   damage.   The 

prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it 

was the accused who was responsible for the death 

of  Lou Gene R.  Sendiong  and the   injuries   to  Dexie 

Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the Colt 

Galant. The mother of the victim testified only on the 

expenses   she   incurred  and   the   shock   she  and  her 

family have suffered as a result of the incident. But 

sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the 

accused   who   committed   the   crime   and   be   held 

responsible for it. This Court could only say that the 

prosecution has practically bungled this case from its 

inception.

x x x x

The   defense   furthermore   argued   that   on   the 

contrary,   the   prosecution’s   [evidence]   conclusively 

show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] 

to   the   lane   of   vehicle   2   [the   cargo   truck]   is   the 

proximate cause of the accident. The court again is 

inclined to agree with this argument of the defense. 

It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident 

as   indicated   in   the   police   blotter   and   can   only 

conclude that the logical explanation of the accident 

is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, 

thus hitting the latter’s inner fender and tires. Exhibit 

"7" which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of 

its   damage   which   was   the   effect   of   vehicle   1’s 

ramming   into   the   rear   left   portion   of   vehicle   2 

causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, 

its  tires  busted  and  pulled  out   together  with   their 

axle. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the 

entire housing connecting the tires to the truck body 

to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side 

and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this 

accident   that  caused the swerving,  not  of   [sic]  any 

negligent act of the accused.

x x x x

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution 

to prove two things—the fact of the crime, i.e.,  the 

presence of all the elements of the crime for which 

the  accused   stands   charged,  and   the   fact   that   the 

accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, 

the prosecution has miserably failed to prove these 

two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge 

its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, an 

accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.

x x x x

WHEREFORE,  premises  considered,   the  demurrer   is 

granted   and   the   accused   JEFFREY   RESO   DAYAP   is 

hereby  acquitted   for   insufficiency  of  evidence.   The 

bail   bond   posted   for   his   temporary   liberty   is   also 

hereby   cancelled   and   ordered   released   to   the 

accused or his duly authorized representative.

SO ORDERED.13

Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari 

under Rule 65,14 alleging that the MTC’s dismissal of 

the case was done without considering the evidence 

adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that 

the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the 

case should proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 

of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the 

civil   liability of the accused in spite of the evidence 

presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial 

Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.

In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed 

the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of 

the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the 

civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTC’s 

recital   of   every   fact   in   arriving   at   its   conclusions 

disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the 

evidence presented by the prosecution. The records 

also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial 

of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 

119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no 

longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due 

course   to   the  accused’s  demurrer   to  evidence,   the 

filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The 

RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on 

the   accused’s   civil   liability,   especially   since   the 

judgment  of  acquittal  did not   include a declaration 

that the facts from which the civil liability might arise 

did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect 

of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to 

remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion 

of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal 

Trial   Court   of   Sibulan   on   accused’s   acquittal   is 

AFFIRMED.  The case   is  REMANDED to   the court  of 

origin or its successor for further proceedings on the 

civil aspect of the case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.16

Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of 

the  RTC  order,   but   these  were   denied   for   lack   of 

merit in the order17 dated 12 September 2005.

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the 

Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. 

SP.   No.   01179.   The   appellate   court   subsequently 

rendered   the  assailed  decision  and   resolution.  The 

Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of 

the   total   value   of   the   properties   damaged,   the 

criminal  case falls  under the jurisdiction of the RTC 

and the proceedings before the MTC are

null   and   void.   In   so   ruling,   the   appellate   court 

cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos

v. Garcia)18which   ruled   that   in   complex   crimes 

involving reckless   imprudence resulting  in homicide 

or   physical   injuries   and   damage   to   property,   the 

jurisdiction  of   the   court   to   take   cognizance  of   the 

case   is   determined   by   the   fine   imposable   for   the 

damage   to   property   resulting   from   the   reckless 

imprudence,   not   by   the   corresponding   penalty   for 

the physical injuries charged. It also found support in 

Sec.  36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of  1980 

and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which 

govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in 

offenses   involving   damage   to   property   through 

criminal  negligence  where   the   imposable  fine  does 

not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no proof of the 

total value of the property damaged and respondents 

were  claiming  the  amount  of P1,500,000.00  as  civil 

damages, the case falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction. 

The   dispositive   portion   of   the   Decision   dated   17 

August 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   judgment   is 

hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the 

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, 

Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits 

of the case.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of 

Appeals decision,20 arguing that jurisdiction over the 

case   is   determined   by   the   allegations   in   the 

information,   and   that   neither   the   1991   Rule   on 

Summary   Procedure   nor   Sec.   36   of   the   Judiciary 

Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the 

RTC’s jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court 

of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for 

lack   of   merit   in   the   Resolution   dated   25   April 

2007.21 It reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper 

jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a 

willful,   unlawful,   felonious   killing   as   well   as 

abandonment of the victims.

In the present petition for review, petitioner argues 

that   the  MTC had   jurisdiction   to  hear   the  criminal 

case   for   reckless   imprudence,   owing   to   the 

enactment  of  Republic  Act   (R.A.)  No.  7691,22 which 

confers   jurisdiction   to  first-level   courts  on  offenses 

involving   damage   to   property   through   criminal 

negligence.  He asserts that the RTC could not have 

acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled 

and   officially   withdrawn   amended   information 

alleging abandonment. Respondents are also faulted 

for challenging the MTC’s order acquitting petitioner 

through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 

65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.

The petition has merit. It should be granted.

The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred 

in   ruling   that   jurisdiction  over   the  offense  charged 

pertained to the RTC.

Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case 

on the basis of the Information dated 29 December 

2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime 

of   reckless   imprudence   resulting   to   homicide,   less 

serious physical injuries and damage to property. The 

Court   of  Appeals   however   declared   in   its   decision 

that  petitioner  should  have been charged with   the 

same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of 

abandonment   of   the   victims.   It   appears   from   the 

records   however   that   respondents’   attempt   to 

amend the  information by charging  the aggravated 

offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved 

the Provincial Prosecutor’s motion to withdraw their 

motion to amend the  information.  The  information 

filed   before   the   trial   court   had   remained 

unamended.23 Thus,   petitioner   is   deemed   to   have 

been  charged  only  with   the  offense  alleged   in   the 

original   Information   without   any   aggravating 

circumstance.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any 

person  who,  by   reckless   imprudence,   commits  any 

act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a 

grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its 

maximum period toprision correccional in its medium 

period. When such reckless imprudence the use of a 

motor   vehicle,   resulting   in   the   death   of   a   person 

attended   the   same   article   imposes   upon   the 

defendant   the   penalty   of prision correccional in   its 

medium and maximum periods.

The   offense  with  which   petitioner  was   charged   is 

reckless   imprudence   resulting   in   homicide,   less 

serious physical   injuries and damage to property,  a 

complex   crime.   Where   a   reckless,   imprudent,   or 

negligent  act   results   in   two  or  more  grave  or   less 

grave   felonies,   a   complex   crime   is 

committed.24 Article   48   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code 

provides that when the single act constitutes two or 

more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense 

is a necessary means for committing the other, the 

penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, 

the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since 

Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes 

through   negligence   in   view   of   the   definition   of 

felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable 

by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) 

or fault  (culpa).25 Thus,  the penalty  imposable upon 

petitioner,   were   he   to   be   found   guilty,   is prision

correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months 

and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 

months and 1 day to 6 years).

Applicable   as   well   is   the   familiar   rule   that   the 

jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is 

conferred   by   the   law   in   force   at   the   time   of   the 

institution of the action, unless such statute provides 

for a retroactive application thereof.26 When this case 

was   filed   on   29  December   2004,   Section   32(2)   of 

Batas   Pambansa   Bilang   129   had   already   been 

amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended 

the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal 

cases   to   include   all   offenses   punishable   with 

imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective 

of   the   amount   of   fine,   and   regardless   of   other 

imposable   accessory   or   other   penalties   including 

those   for   civil   liability.   It   explicitly   states   "that   in 

offenses   involving   damage   to   property   through 

criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original 

jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for 

reckless

imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its 

medium and maximum periods should fall within the 

jurisdiction   of   the  MTC   and   not   the   RTC.   Clearly, 

therefore,   jurisdiction   to   hear   and   try   the   same 

pertained   to   the  MTC   and   the   RTC   did   not   have 

original   jurisdiction   over   the   criminal 

case.27 Consequently,   the   MTC   of   Sibulan,   Negros 

Oriental  had properly  taken cognizance of  the case 

and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.

As the  records  show,   the  MTC granted petitioner’s 

demurrer   to   evidence   and   acquitted   him   of   the 

offense on the ground of   insufficiency of  evidence. 

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as 

the  one  at  bar,   is   "filed  after   the  prosecution  had 

rested   its   case,"  and when  the  same  is  granted,   it 

calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by 

the   prosecution   and   its   sufficiency   to   warrant 

conviction  beyond   reasonable  doubt,   resulting   in  a 

dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an 

acquittal   of   the   accused."28 Such   dismissal   of   a 

criminal  case by the grant of demurrer to evidence 

may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place 

the   accused   in   double   jeopardy.29 But   while   the 

dismissal   order   consequent   to   a   demurrer   to 

evidence   is  not  subject   to  appeal,   the  same  is   still 

reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the 

Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings 

of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing 

court,   and   the  only   legal   basis   to   reverse   and   set 

aside   the   order   of   dismissal   upon   demurrer   to 

evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in 

acquitting   the   accused,   committed   grave   abuse   of 

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction 

or   a   denial   of   due   process,   thus   rendering   the 

assailed judgment void.30

Accordingly,   respondents   filed   before   the   RTC   the 

petition for certiorari  alleging that the MTC gravely 

abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing 

to   consider   the   evidence   of   the   prosecution   in 

resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow 

the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of 

Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not 

abuse   its   discretion   in   dismissing   the   criminal 

complaint.   The  MTC’s   conclusions   were   based   on 

facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving 

that   the   MTC   failed   to   consider   the   evidence 

presented by the prosecution. The records also show 

that   the  MTC correctly   followed the  procedure  set 

forth in the Rules of Court.

The   second   issue   is  whether   the  Court  of  Appeals 

erred   in   ordering   the   remand   of   the   case   of   the 

matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing 

the   remand   of   the   case   to   the   RTC   for   further 

proceedings on the civil  aspect,  as well  as with the 

RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically 

preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect 

of the case. The extinction of the penal action does 

not  carry  with   it   the  extinction of   the  civil   liability 

where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt 

as  only  preponderance  of  evidence   is   required;   (b) 

the court declares that the liability of the accused is 

only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does 

not   arise   from or   is   not  based  upon   the   crime  of 

which the accused is acquitted. 31 However, the civil 

action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if 

there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal 

action that the act or omission from which the civil 

liability may arise did not exist32 or where the accused 

did   not   commit   the   acts   or   omission   imputed   to 

him.33

Thus,   if   demurrer   is   granted   and   the   accused   is 

acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to 

adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless 

the court also declares that the act or omission from 

which the civil liability may arise did not exist.34 This is 

because   when   the   accused   files   a   demurrer   to 

evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on 

the criminal  and civil  aspects of  the case.  The only 

evidence   on   record   is   the   evidence   for   the 

prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue 

an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer 

to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the 

case   for   continuation   of   trial   for   the   accused   to 

adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and 

for   the private  complainant  to  adduce evidence by 

way  of   rebuttal.   Thereafter,   the   court   shall   render 

judgment on the civil aspect of the case.35

A   scrutiny   of   the   MTC’s   decision   supports   the 

conclusion   that   the   acquittal   was   based   on   the 

findings that the act or omission from which the civil 

liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did 

not   commit   the   acts   or   omission   imputed   to  him; 

hence, petitioner’s civil liability has been extinguished 

by  his   acquittal.   It   should   be  noted   that   the  MTC 

categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence 

which would prove that a crime had been committed 

and that accused was the person responsible for it. It 

added that the prosecution failed to establish that it 

was petitioner who committed the crime as charged 

since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the 

one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of 

the  incident.  Furthermore,  the MTC found that the 

proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the 

rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving of 

the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo 

truck   and  not   the   reckless  driving  of   the   truck  by 

petitioner,  clearly  establishing that petitioner  is  not 

guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is 

no more need to remand the case to the trial court 

for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since 

petitioner’s   acquittal   has   extinguished   his   civil 

liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of 

Appeals’   Decision   dated   17   August   2006   and 

Resolution  dated  25  April   2007   in  CA-G.R.   SP.  No. 

01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 

16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, 

Negros   Oriental   in   Criminal   Case   No.   3016-04 

granting   the   Demurrer   to   Evidence   and   acquitting 

petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense charged 

therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-

Appellee, v. RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD

SARAPIDA TAURAK, Accused-appellants.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

There are people who are simply incapable of feeling 

pity or compassion for others.

Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in 

her   heart   when   she   lost   her   two-year   old   son, 

Christopher,   two   weeks   before   Christmas   on 

December 13, 1999. And again upon being reunited 

with   him   some   16   months   later   when   he   could 

neither recognize her nor remember who he was.

Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel 

and   agonizing   separation   of  mother   and   child   be 

punished to the full extent of the law.

At  about  3:00  p.m.  on  December  13,  1999,  Teresa 

went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to 

a McDonald's outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., 

Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a 

vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their 

food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher 

followed   Zenaida   to   the   counter.   Barely   had 

Christopher gone from his mother's sight when she 

realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister 

frantically   looked   for   him   inside   and   outside   the 

premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their 

continued   search   for   the   child   was   futile,   they 

reported   him   missing   to   the   nearest   police 

detachment.

The   following  day,   Teresa  went   to   several   TV  and 

radio   stations   to   inform   the   public   of   the   loss   of 

Christopher and to appeal for help and information. 

Despite   the  publicity,  however,  Teresa   received  no 

word   about   Christopher's   whereabouts.   Worse, 

pranksters   were   gleefully   having   a   field   day 

aggravating her misery.

On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a 

woman   who   sounded   like   a   muslim.   The   caller 

claimed   to  have  custody  of  Christopher  and  asked 

for P30,000 in exchange for the boy.

On   March   27,   2001,   the   same   muslim-sounding 

woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent 

photo  of  her   son   from  the   Jalal  Restaurant  at   the 

Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when 

Teresa   went   there,   someone   gave   her   a   recent 

picture   of   Christopher.   She   then   contacted   the 

mysterious  woman   through   the   cellphone   number 

the latter had previously given her. When the woman 

instructed   her   to   immediately   board   a   ship   for 

Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised 

the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct 

the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang's 

Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.

Teresa   sought   the   help   of   the   Presidential   Anti-

Organized Crime Task Force  (PAOCTF).  A team was 

formed  and  Police  Officer   (PO)31 Juliet  Palafox  was 

designated to act as Teresa's niece.

Together   with   the   PAOCTF   team,   Teresa   left   for 

Mindanao on April  4,  2001.  On April  7,  2001,   they 

arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated 

meeting place.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

At around 8:30 a.m.,  while Teresa and PO3 Palafox 

were   waiting   at   Pitang's   Carinderia,   two   women 

came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad 

Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and 

PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. 

Teresa replied that   they were waiting for  a  certain 

Rocma  Bato,   the  name written  at   the  back  of   the 

picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She 

showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she 

knew   Bato.  Mamantak   then   told   Teresa   that   she 

would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in 

Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly 

the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 

Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher. 

Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with 

her  but   they   refused.  Taurak   reluctantly  agreed   to 

leave   Mamantak   with   them   while   she   fetched 

Christopher.

Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, 

Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was 

in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her 

but   the  latter   insisted on their  agreement  that   the 

boy   be   handed   over   at   the   carinderia.   Taurak 

relented,   left  and came back  after  several  minutes 

with Christopher.

Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. 

However,   the   child   was   unmoved.   He   no   longer 

recognized   nor   understood   her   for   he   could   only 

speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, 

the   boy   gave   a   muslim   name   with   "Taurak"   as 

surname.

Mamantak   and   Taurak   interrupted   Teresa   and 

demanded   the   ransom  money.   She   answered   that 

her   niece   had   it   and   pointed   to   PO3   Palafox. 

Thereafter,  Mamantak   and  PO3  Palafox  boarded  a 

jeepney  which  was  parked  outside,  under  Taurak's 

watchful   eyes.   Inside   the   jeepney,   PO3   Palafox 

handed   the   ransom  money   to  Mamantak.   At   this 

juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and 

the   PAOCTF   team   then   closed   in   and   arrested 

Mamantak and Taurak.

Christopher   relearned   Tagalog   after   a   month   and 

gradually began to forget the incident. On the other 

hand,   Teresa   almost   lost   her   sanity.   At   the   time 

Christopher  was kidnapped,  she was pregnant  with 

her third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually 

died.

The   sisters   Mamantak   and   Taurak   were   charged 

withkidnapping   for   ransom   under   the   following 

Information:

That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and 

within  the  jurisdiction of   this  Honorable  Court,   the 

above-named accused conspiring, confederating and 

mutually   helping   one   another   and   grouping 

themselves   together,   did   then   and   there,  willfully, 

unlawfully   and   feloniously   take,   carry   away   and 

deprive Christopher Basario, a two-year old minor of 

his liberty against his will for the purpose of extorting 

ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as 

a   condition   for   his   release   amounting   to   THIRTY 

THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00)  to the damage and 

prejudice of Christopher Basario in said amount and 

such other amount as maybe awarded to him under 

the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Mamantak   and   Taurak   pleaded   not   guilty   when 

arraigned. After pre-trial, trial ensued and the parties 

presented their respective evidence.

In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges 

against  them. Taurak testified that at  the time and 

date   of   the   alleged   kidnapping,   she  was   peddling 

wares   in   Divisoria  market,  Manila.  When   she   saw 

Christopher wandering about aimlessly, she talked to 

him but he did not seem to understand her. She took 

the boy under her care and waited for someone to 

come  for  him.  No  one  did.  As   it  was  already  7:00 

p.m.,   she   brought   the   boy   home  with   her   to   the 

Muslim Center in Quiapo.

The next day, she and her husband took the boy to 

the nearest police outpost but no one was there so 

they just brought the boy to their stall. They opted to 

keep the boy until his parents could claim him.

On February 17,  2001,  Taurak brought  the child  to 

Maganding,   Sultan   Kumander,   Lanao   del   Sur. 

Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and asked for 

Christopher's picture for confirmation. It was at this 

point   that   Taurak   arranged   a  meeting   at   Pitang's 

Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 7, 

2001.   She   did   not   bring   the   boy   at   first   as   a 

precautionary  measure.   Only   after   confirming   that 

Teresa   was   the   boy's   mother   did   she   relinquish 

custody   to   her.   However,   she  was   shocked  when 

members of the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She 

protested because she was innocent. There were no 

charges against her nor was there a warrant for her 

arrest.

Mamantak   corroborated   her   sister   Taurak's 

testimony.  She claimed that  she was at  Nunungan, 

Lanao del Norte on December 13, 1999. At that time, 

she did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak 

who was in Manila and whom she had not seen for 

some   time.   They   met   again   on   April   7,   2001   at 

Pitang's Carinderia but only by chance. She happened 

to be there when Taurak came. When Teresa arrived 

later,  Taurak  talked to  her  and then  left,   returning 

after a few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak 

saw for the first time. Taurak told her that she had 

found the boy and was returning him to his mother. 

Mamantak   stayed   in   the   carinderia   all   the   while, 

waiting   for   her   ride   home   at   4:00   p.m.   She   was 

stunned when PAOCTF members  suddenly  arrested 

her   and  her   sister   as   she  had  not   committed   any 

crime and there was no warrant for her arrest.

After   evaluating   the   respective   evidence   of   the 

parties,   the   trial   court   rendered   a   decision2on 

November  30,   2004  finding  Taurak  and  Mamantak 

guilty as charged:

WHEREFORE,   judgment   is   hereby   rendered   finding 

both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused 

RAGA   SARAPIDA   [MAMANTAK]   GUILTY   beyond 

reasonable   doubt   of   the   crime   of   Kidnapping   for 

Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are 

hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION

PERPETUA.   Both   accused   are   hereby   jointly   and 

severally   ordered   to   pay   the   Christopher   Basario 

represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the 

amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages 

and   PHP50,000.00   as   moral   damages.  With   costs 

against the accused.

Both   accused   are   given   credit   for   the   preventive 

imprisonment   undergone   by   them   during   the 

pendency of this case.

SO ORDERED.3

Taurak   and   Mamantak   appealed   to   the   Court   of 

Appeals.   In   a   decision4 dated  March   31,   2006,   the 

appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not 

considering the demand forP30,000 as a demand for 

ransom. Such circumstance required the  imposition 

of   the   death   penalty.   Thus,   the   appellate   court 

affirmed   the   conviction   of   Taurak   and  Mamantak 

with   modification   amending   the   penalty 

from reclusion perpetua to   death.5 Pursuant   to 

Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative 

Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified 

the case to this  Court  and accordingly  ordered the 

elevation of the records.6

We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification 

of penalty.

Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 

of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic 

Act (RA) 7659:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - 

Any   private   individual   who   shall   kidnap   or   detain 

another, or in any other manner deprive him of his 

liberty,   shall   suffer   the   penalty   of reclusion

perpetua to death.

1.   If   the  kidnapping  or  detention  shall  have   lasted 

more than three days.

2. If   it  shall  have been committed simulating public 

authority.

3.   If   any   serious   physical   injuries   shall   have   been 

inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if 

threats to kill him shall have been made.

4.   If   the  person   kidnapped  or   detained   shall   be   a 

minor,   except   when   the   accused   is   any   of   the 

parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or 

detention   was   committed   for   the   purpose   of 

extorting   ransom   from   the   victim   or   any   other 

person,   even   if   none   of   the   circumstances   above-

mentioned were  present   in   the  commission  of   the 

offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of 

the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or 

dehumanizing   acts,   the  maximum  penalty   shall   be 

imposed.

The crime has the following elements:

(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of 

the parents of the victim7 or a public officer who has 

a duty under the law to detain a person;8

(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner 

deprives the latter of his liberty;

(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal 

and

(4)   in   the   commission   of   the   offense,   any   of   the 

following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping 

or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is 

committed   by   simulating   public   authority;   (c)   any 

serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person 

kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made 

or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, 

female or a public official.

If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention 

is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and 

illegally   detained   for   the   purpose   of   extorting 

ransom,   the   duration   of   his   detention   becomes 

inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes 

punishable   by   death   even   if   none   of   the 

circumstances  mentioned   in   paragraphs   1   to   4   of 

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present.9

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual 

deprivation of  the victim's   liberty  coupled with the 

intent of the accused to effect it.10 It includes not only 

the   imprisonment   of   a   person   but   also   the 

deprivation of  his   liberty   in  whatever   form and for 

whatever length of time.11 And liberty is not limited 

to mere physical restraint but embraces one's right to 

enjoy   his   God-given   faculties   subject   only   to   such 

restraints necessary for the common welfare.12

The two-year-old  Christopher  suddenly  disappeared 

in   Binondo,  Manila   and  was   recovered   only   after 

almost 16 months from Taurak and Mamantak (both 

of them private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao del 

Norte. During the entire time the boy was kept away 

from   his   mother,   he   was   certainly   deprived   or 

restrained   of   his   liberty.   He   had   no   means, 

opportunity or capacity to leave appellants' custody 

and return to his family on his own. He had no choice 

but to stay with total strangers, go with them to a far 

away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to 

him. At such a very tender age, he was deprived of 

the   liberty   to   enjoy   the   company   and   care   of   his 

family, specially his mother.

Taurak  unlawfully  kept   the  child  under  her  control 

and   custody   and   even   brought   him   to   Lanao   del 

Norte.   She   demanded P30,000   in   exchange   for   his 

return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantak's 

actions (e.g.,  her presence in the carinderia and her 

acceptance  of   the   ransom)   showed  without   doubt 

that   she   was   aiding   her   sister   and  was   acting   in 

concert  with  her.   These  were   the   identical   factual 

findings of both the trial and appellate courts. There 

is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently 

supported by evidence.

Taurak's   story   that   she   merely   gave   Christopher 

refuge was incredible. It was like the apocryphal tale 

of a man accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse 

was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home 

not knowing that there was a cow tied to the other 

end.  She never  even  tried   to  bring   the  boy   to   the 

proper   authorities   or   surrender   him   to   the 

Department   of   Social  Welfare   and   Development's 

social  workers  in her barangay or  in the city hall  at 

any time during the 16 months he was with her. And 

how   could   Teresa   have   initiated   her   phone 

conversations   with   Taurak   when   they   were   total 

strangers to each other?cralawred

Similarly,   Mamantak's   account   that   she   was   at 

Pitang's  Carinderia  only  by   coincidence  and   that   it 

was only there that she first saw Christopher invites 

nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies of 

the prosecution witnesses on her role in arranging for 

the payment of ransom and the release of the kidnap 

victim   (e.g.,   confirming   the   identity   of   Teresa   and 

demanding and receiving the ransom money) showed 

otherwise.   The   evidence   clearly   established   that 

Mamantak   was   a   principal   in   the   kidnapping   of 

Christopher.

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from 

the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible 

in   itself.13 The   trial   and   appellate   courts   correctly 

ruled that the statements of Taurak and Mamantak 

did not deserve credence. Moreover, factual findings 

of   the   trial   court,   including   its   assessment   of   the 

credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight 

thereof, are accorded great, if not conclusive, value 

when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.14

The   Court   of   Appeals   considered   the   demand 

for P30,000   as   a   qualifying   circumstance   which 

necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. On 

the other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as 

too   measly,   compared   to   what   must   have   been 

actually   spent   for   the   care   and   subsistence   of 

Christopher for almost two years. It therefore treated 

the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement of 

expenses   incurred   for   taking   care   of   the   child. 

(Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement 

for "board-and-lodging.")

Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or 

demanded for the redemption of a captured person 

that will release him from captivity.15 No specific form 

of ransom is required to consummate the felony of 

kidnapping   for   ransom   as   long   as   the   ransom   is 

intended  as   a  bargaining   chip   in   exchange   for   the 

victim's   freedom.16 The  amount  of  and  purpose   for 

the ransom is immaterial.

In this case, the payment of P30,000 was demanded 

as a condition for the release of Christopher to his 

mother.   Thus,   the   Court   of   Appeals   correctly 

considered it as a demand for ransom.

One   final   point   of   law.   While   the   penalty   for 

kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from 

the victim or any other person under Article 267 of 

the   Revised   Penal   Code17is   death,   RA   934618 has 

banned   the   death   penalty   and   reduced   all   death 

sentences toreclusion perpetua without eligibility for 

parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty 

imposed   on   appellants   from   death   to reclusion

perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

In   line   with   prevailing   jurisprudence,   the   award 

of P50,000   civil   indemnity19 was   proper.   Pursuant 

to People v. Garalde,20 the  award  of P50,00021 moral 

damages   is   increased   toP200,000   considering   the 

minority  of  Christopher.  Moreover,  since  the crime 

was attended by a demand for ransom, and by way of 

example   or   correction,   Christopher   is   entitled 

toP100,000 exemplary damages.22

WHEREFORE,   the   appeal   is   hereby DENIED.   The 

March 31, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in 

CA-G.R.   CR-H.C.   No.   00729 

is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.   Appellants   Raga 

Sarapida  Mamantak  and  Likad  Sarapida  Taurak  are 

hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the 

crime of  kidnapping for  ransom for which they are 

sentenced   to   suffer   the   penalty   of reclusion

perpetua without   eligibility   for   parole.   They   are 

further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, P50,000 

civil   indemnity, P200,000   moral   damages 

and P100,000   exemplary   damages   to   their   young 

victim Christopher Basario.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER

PAJARILLO, petitioners, 

vs.

LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY

TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE

TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ

TANGCO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by 

Safeguard   Security   Agency,   Inc.   (Safeguard)   and 

Admer   Pajarillo   (Pajarillo)   assailing   the 

Decision1 dated   July   16,   2004   and   the 

Resolution2 dated   October   20,   2004   issued   by   the 

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.

On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline 

Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan 

Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per 

advise   of   the   bank's   cashier   as   she  would   sign   a 

specimen   card.   Evangeline,   a  duly   licensed  firearm 

holder with corresponding permit to carry the same 

outside   her   residence,   approached   security   guard 

Pajarillo,  who was  stationed outside   the  bank,  and 

pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit  the 

same   for   safekeeping.   Suddenly,   Pajarillo   shot 

Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the 

abdomen instantly causing her death.

Lauro  Tangco,   Evangeline's  husband,   together  with 

his   six  minor   children   (respondents)   filed  with   the 

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal 

case   of   Homicide   against   Pajarillo,   docketed   as 

Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 

78.   Respondents   reserved   their   right   to   file   a 

separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC 

of  Quezon  City   subsequently   convicted   Pajarillo   of 

Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000.3 On 

appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with 

modification  as   to   the  penalty   in  a  Decision4 dated 

July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 

25, 2001.

Meanwhile,  on January 14,  1998,  respondents  filed 

with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint5 for 

damages   against   Pajarillo   for   negligently   shooting 

Evangeline   and   against   Safeguard   for   failing   to 

observe the diligence of a good father of a family to 

prevent the damage committed by its security guard. 

Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary 

damages and attorney's fees.

In   their   Answer,6 petitioners   denied   the   material 

allegations   in   the   complaint   and   alleged   that 

Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of 

a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; 

that   Evangeline's   death  was   not   due   to   Pajarillo's 

negligence  as   the   latter  acted  only   in   self-defense. 

Petitioners   set   up   a   compulsory   counterclaim   for 

moral damages and attorney's fees.

Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC 

rendered   its   Decision,7 the   dispositive   portion   of 

which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of 

the   plaintiffs,   the   heirs   of   Evangeline   Tangco,   and 

against   defendants   Admer   Pajarillo   and   Safeguard 

Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay 

the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:

1.   ONE   HUNDRED   FIFTY   SEVEN   THOUSAND   FOUR 

HUNDRED   THIRTY   PESOS   (P157,430.00),   as   actual 

damages

2.   FIFTY   THOUSAND   PESOS   (P50,000.00)   as   death 

indemnity;

3.   ONE  MILLION   PESOS   (P1,000,000.00),   as  moral 

damages;

4.   THREE   HUNDRED   THOUSAND   PESOS 

(P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;

5.   THIRTY   THOUSAND   PESOS   (P30,000.00),   as 

attorney's fees; and

6. costs of suit.

For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby 

DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 8

The   RTC   found   respondents   to   be   entitled   to 

damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely 

acted   in   self-defense.   It   gave   no   credence   to 

Pajarillo's   bare   claim   that   Evangeline   was   seen 

roaming   around   the   area   prior   to   the   shooting 

incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to 

the head office and the police authorities.  The RTC 

further   ruled   that   being   the   guard   on   duty,   the 

situation  demanded   that  he   should  have  exercised 

proper   prudence   and   necessary   care   by   asking 

Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of 

shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been 

convicted   of   Homicide   in   Criminal   Case   No.   0-97-

73806;   and   that   he   also   failed   to   proffer   proof 

negating liability in the instant case.

The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo 

to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled 

that  while   it  may be conceded that  Safeguard  had 

perhaps   exercised   care   in   the   selection   of   its 

employees,   particularly   of   Pajarillo,   there   was   no 

sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised 

the   diligence   of   a   good   father   of   a   family   in   the 

supervision   of   its   employee;   that   Safeguard's 

evidence simply showed that it required its guards to 

attend   trainings   and   seminars   which   is   not   the 

supervision   contemplated   under   the   law;   that 

supervision   includes   not   only   the   issuance   of 

regulations   and   instructions   designed   for   the 

protection of persons and property, for the guidance 

of their servants and employees, but also the duty to 

see to  it   that  such regulations and  instructions are 

faithfully complied with.

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On 

July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the 

dispositive portion of which reads:

IN   VIEW   OF   ALL   THE   FOREGOING,   the   appealed 

decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification 

that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in 

this   case   is   only   subsidiary   under   Art.   103   of   the 

Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs.9

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the 

CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 

2180   in   relation   to  Article  2176  of   the  Civil   Code, 

on quasi-delicts,   but   the  provisions  on   civil   liability 

arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; 

that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide 

in a final and executory judgment and is said to be 

serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged 

civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the 

Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable 

in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon 

conviction,   because   said   liability   arises   from   the 

offense charged and no other;   that   this   is  also the 

civil   liability   that   is   deemed  extinguished  with   the 

extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement 

that   the   fact   from   which   the   civil   action   might 

proceed  does  not  exist;   that  unlike   in   civil   liability 

arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a 

good   father   of   a   family   in   the   employment   and 

supervision   of   employees   is   inapplicable   and 

irrelevant   in   civil   liabilities   based   on   crimes   or ex-

delicto;   that  Article  103 of   the Revised Penal  Code 

provides that the liability of an employer for the civil 

liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint 

or solidary.

Petitioners   filed   their   Motion   for   Reconsideration 

which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 

20, 2004.

Hence,   the   instant   Petition   for   Review 

on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, 

to wit:

The   Honorable   Court   of   Appeals   gravely   erred   in 

finding petitioner Pajarillo   liable to respondents  for 

the payment of damages and other money claims.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when 

it  applied Article 103 of  the Revised Penal  Code  in 

holding petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with 

petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of damages and 

other money claims.

The   Honorable   Court   of   Appeals   gravely   erred   in 

failing   to   find   that   petitioner   Safeguard   Security 

Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the selection 

and supervision of  its  employees,  hence,  should be 

excused from any liability.10

The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is 

guilty  of  negligence  in shooting Evangeline;  and (2) 

Safeguard   should   be   held   solidarily   liable   for   the 

damages awarded to respondents.

Safeguard   insists   that   the   claim   for   damages   by 

respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under Article 

217611 of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is 

jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it 

has established that it had exercised due diligence in 

the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be 

exonerated from civil liability.

We will  first  resolve whether  the CA correctly  held 

that   respondents,   in   filing   a   separate   civil   action 

against   petitioners   are   limited   to   the   recovery   of 

damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case 

the liability of Safeguard as employer under Articles 

102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code12 is subsidiary 

and the defense of due diligence in the selection and 

supervision of employee is not available to it.

The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is 

only subsidiary.

The law at the time the complaint for damages was 

filed   is   Rule   111   of   the   1985   Rules   on   Criminal 

Procedure, as amended, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - 

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil  action 

for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted 

with  the criminal  action,  unless   the offended party 

waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it 

separately,  or  institutes the civil  action prior to the 

criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under 

the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 

32,   33,   34,   and   2176   of   the   Civil   Code   of   the 

Philippines arising from the same act or omission of 

the accused.

Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil 

action and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.

The   CA   found   that   the   source   of   damages   in   the 

instant case must be the crime of homicide, for which 

he   had   already   been   found   guilty   of   and   serving 

sentence   thereof,   thus  must   be   governed   by   the 

Revised Penal Code.

We do not agree.

An act or omission causing damage to another may 

give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of 

the   offender, i.e.,   (1)   civil   liability ex delicto,   under 

Article   100   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code;   and   (2) 

independent   civil   liabilities,   such   as   those   (a)   not 

arising from an act or omission complained of as a 

felony, e.g., culpa contractual   or   obligations   arising 

from   law   under   Article   31   of   the   Civil   Code, 

intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa

aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) 

where the injured party is granted a right to file an 

action   independent   and   distinct   from   the   criminal 

action under  Article  33 of   the Civil  Code.  Either  of 

these liabilities may be enforced against the offender 

subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil 

Code   that   the   offended   party   cannot   recover 

damages twice for the same act or omission or under 

both causes.13

It   is   important   to   determine   the   nature   of 

respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause 

of  action  is  determined by  the  facts  alleged  in   the 

complaint  as  constituting the cause of  action.14 The 

purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it 

is   to  be  determined  not  by   the  claim of   the  party 

filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but 

rather   by   the   complaint   itself,   its   allegations   and 

prayer for relief.15

The pertinent portions of the complaint read:

7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard 

assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank – Katipunan 

Branch, Quezon City, who was employed and under 

employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence 

there is employer-employee relationship between co-

defendants.

The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe 

the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent 

damage to herein plaintiffs.

8.   That   defendant   Admer   Pajarillo   upon   seeing 

Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of 

her   bag,   suddenly   without   exercising   necessary 

caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the use of 

his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline 

M. Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x

x x x x

16.   That   defendants,   being   employer   and   the 

employee are jointly and severally liable for the death 

of Evangeline M. Tangco.16

Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that 

the latter are invoking their right to recover damages 

against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for 

the  injury  caused by Pajarillo's  act  of  shooting and 

killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which 

provides:

ARTICLE  2176.  Whoever  by  act  or  omission  causes 

damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is 

obliged to pay  for  the damage done.  Such fault  or 

negligence,   if   there   is   no   pre-existing   contractual 

relation between the parties  is  called a quasi-delict 

and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The scope of  Article  2176  is  not   limited  to  acts  or 

omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court

of Appeals,17 we held:

x   x   x  Well-entrenched   is   the   doctrine   that   Article 

2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, 

but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As 

far  back as  the definitive case of  Elcano v.  Hill   (77 

SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:

"x   x   x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or

negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by

law" but also acts criminal in character, whether

intentional and voluntary or

negligent. Consequently,   a   separate   civil   action   lies 

against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not 

he   is   criminally   prosecuted   and   found   guilty   or 

acquitted,  provided   that   the  offended  party   is   not 

allowed,  if  he  is actually charged also criminally,  to 

recover   damages   on   both   scores,   and   would   be 

entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award 

of   the two,  assuming the awards  made  in   the two 

cases   vary.   In   other  words,   the   extinction   of   civil 

liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, 

refers exclusively to civil   liability founded on Article 

100   of   the   Revised   Penal   Code,  whereas   the   civil 

liability   for   the same act  considered as  quasi-delict 

only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a 

declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act 

charged   has   not   happened   or   has   not   been 

committed by the accused.  Briefly stated,  We here 

hold,   in   reiteration   of  Garcia,   that   culpa   aquiliana 

includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be 

punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)

The civil action filed by respondents was not derived 

from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal 

case   but   one   based   on culpa aquiliana or quasi-

delict which   is   separate   and   distinct   from   the   civil 

liability   arising   from   crime.18 The   source   of   the 

obligation sought to be enforced in the civil  case is 

a quasi-delict not  an  act  or  omission  punishable  by 

law.

In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where   the   issue 

involved   was   whether   the   civil   action   filed   by 

plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-

delict, we held:

x  x  x  The  trial  court   treated   the  case  as  an action 

based on a crime in view of the reservation made by 

the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case 

No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a 

separate civil action. Said the trial court:

It  would appear that plaintiffs  instituted this  action 

on   the   assumption   that   defendant   Pontino's 

negligence   in   the   accident   of   May   10,   1969 

constituted  a quasi-delict.   The  Court   cannot   accept 

the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 

92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared 

as  complainants.  While   that  case  was  pending,   the 

offended   parties   reserved   the   right   to   institute   a 

separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to 

file a separate civil  action for  damages  is  reserved, 

such civil action is to be based on crime and not on 

tort.  That  was   the   ruling   in   Joaquin  vs.  Aniceto,   L-

18719, Oct. 31, 1964.

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by 

the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.

x x x x

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs 

has the choice between an action to enforce the civil 

liability  arising from crime under Article 100 of the 

Revised   Penal   Code   and   an   action   for quasi-

delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a 

party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer 

solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, 

subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the 

diligence of a good father of the family.

In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an 

action   for   damages   based   on quasi-delict. The fact

that appellants reserved their right in the criminal

case to file an independent civil action did not

preclude them from choosing to file a civil action

for quasi-delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)

Although the  judgment   in  the criminal  case finding 

Pajarillo   guilty   of   Homicide   is   already   final   and 

executory,   such   judgment   has   no   relevance   or 

importance to this case.21 It would have been entirely 

different   if   respondents'   cause   of   action   was   for 

damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is 

correct   in   finding   Safeguard   to   be   only   subsidiary 

liable  pursuant   to  Article  103 of   the  Revised Penal 

Code.22

As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, 

respondents' cause of action is based on quasi-delict. 

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury 

is caused by the negligence of the employee, there 

instantly arises a presumption of law that there was 

negligence on the part of the master or the employer 

either in the selection of the servant or employee, or 

in the supervision over him after selection or both. 

The   liability  of   the  employer  under  Article  2180   is 

direct   and   immediate.   Therefore,   it   is   incumbent 

upon   petitioners   to   prove   that   they   exercised   the 

diligence of a good father of a family in the selection 

and supervision of their employee.

We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo 

was negligent in shooting Evangeline.

The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether 

a  person   is   negligent  or  not   is   a  question  of   fact, 

which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a 

petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is 

limited to reviewing errors of law.23 Generally, factual 

findings  of   the   trial   court,  affirmed by   the  CA,  are 

final   and   conclusive   and  may  not   be   reviewed  on 

appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the 

inference  made   is  manifestly  mistaken,   absurd   or 

impossible;   (2)   when   there   is   grave   abuse   of 

discretion;   (3)   when   the   findings   are   grounded 

entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) 

when   the   judgment   of   the   CA   is   based   on 

misapprehension  of   facts;   (5)  when  the  findings  of 

fact  are conflicting;   (6)  when the CA,   in  making  its 

findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the 

same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant 

and   appellee;   (7)   when   the   findings   of   fact   are 

conclusions without citation of specific evidence on 

which   they  are  based;   (8)  when   the  CA manifestly 

overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the 

parties   and   which,   if   properly   considered,   would 

justify   a   different   conclusion;   and   (9)   when   the 

findings   of   fact   of   the   CA   are   premised   on   the 

absence   of   evidence   and   are   contradicted   by   the 

evidence on record. [24]

A thorough review of the records of the case fails to 

show any cogent reason for us to deviate from the 

factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the 

CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in 

shooting Evangeline.

Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's 

purpose in going to the bank was to renew her time 

deposit.25On   the   other   hand,   Pajarillo   claims   that 

Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the 

same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in 

self-defense.

Pajarillo   testified   that  when   Evangeline   aimed   the 

gun at him at a distance of about one meter or one 

arm's   length26he   stepped   backward,   loaded   the 

chamber   of   his   gun   and   shot   her.27 It   is   however 

unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make 

such   movements   if   indeed   the   gun   was   already 

pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted 

Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.

Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in 

shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension that 

Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such 

claim   is   befuddled   by   his   own   testimony.   Pajarillo 

testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline 

roaming   under   the   fly   over   which   was   about   10 

meters away from the bank28 and saw her talking to a 

man thereat;29 that  she  left the man under the fly-

over,  crossed the street  and approached the bank. 

However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, 

the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was 

seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting 

suspiciously  prior   to   the   shooting   incident.   In   fact, 

there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention 

of   his   head   guard   or   the   bank's   branch  manager 

regarding his concerns or that he reported the same 

to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 

15 meters from the bank.

Moreover,   if   Evangeline   was   already   roaming   the 

vicinity of the bank, she could have already apprised 

herself   that   Pajarillo,  who  was  posted  outside   the 

bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two 

guards inside the bank30manning the entrance door. 

Thus,   it   is  quite   incredible   that   if   she   really  had  a 

companion, she would leave him under the fly-over 

which   is  10  meters   far   from the bank and stage a 

bank robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact, 

she would have known, after surveying the area, that 

aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance 

to   the   bank   as   there   were   guards   manning   the 

entrance door.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from 

the  mouth   of   a   credible   witness,   but   it   must   be 

credible in itself — such as the common experience 

and observation of mankind can approve as probable 

under   the   circumstances.  We  have   no   test   of   the 

truth of human testimony, except  its  conformity to 

our   knowledge,   observation   and   experience. 

Whatever   is   repugnant   to   these   belongs   to   the 

miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.31

That   Evangeline   just   wanted   to   deposit   her   gun 

before entering the bank and was actually in the act 

of   pulling   her   gun   from   her   bag  when   petitioner 

Pajarillo recklessly  shot her,  finds support from the 

contentions raised in petitioners' petition for review 

where they argued that when Evangeline approached 

the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her 

bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset 

by fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, 

shot   and   killed   the   deceased   out   of   pure 

instinct;32 that   the   act   of   drawing   a   gun   is   a 

threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun 

was   intended   to   be   used   against   petitioner 

Pajarillo;33 that the fear that was created in the mind 

of  petitioner  Pajarillo  as  he saw Evangeline Tangco 

drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real 

and   the   former  merely   reacted   out   of   pure   self-

preservation.34

Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of 

Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's claim of self-defense 

cannot  be accepted specially  when such claim was 

uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence 

other than his  testimony which was even doubtful. 

Pajarillo's   apprehension   that   Evangeline  will   shoot 

him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is 

therefore   clear   that   the   alleged   threat   of   bank 

robbery was just a figment of Pajarillo's imagination 

which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on 

his part.

Petitioners   argue   that   Evangeline   was   guilty   of 

contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed 

firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun 

in   such   establishment   where   people   would   react 

instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline 

been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before 

drawing   the  gun  and  did  not   conduct  herself  with 

suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; 

that she should not have held the gun with the nozzle 

pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or 

robbery.

We are not persuaded.

As   we   have   earlier   held,   Pajarillo   failed   to 

substantiate   his   claim   that   Evangeline   was   seen 

roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting 

suspiciously   prior   to   the   shooting   incident. 

Evangeline's   death   was   merely   due   to   Pajarillo's 

negligence   in   shooting  her   on   his   imagined   threat 

that Evangeline will rob the bank.

Safeguard   contends   that   it   cannot   be   jointly   held 

liable   since   it   had   adequately   shown   that   it   had 

exercised the diligence required in the selection and 

supervision   of   its   employees.   It   claims   that   it   had 

required   the   guards   to   undergo   the   necessary 

training and to submit the requisite qualifications and 

credentials which even the RTC found to have been 

complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it 

did   not   exercise   the   diligence   required   in   the 

supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims 

that   it   conducts  monitoring   of   the   activities   of   its 

personnel,   wherein   supervisors   are   assigned   to 

routinely check the activities of  the security  guards 

which include among others, whether or not they are 

in their proper post and with proper equipment, as 

well   as   regular   evaluations   of   the   employees' 

performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his 

firearm contrary to Safeguard's operating procedure 

is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed 

its  duty  of  proper   supervision;   that   it  was   likewise 

error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to 

it that the procedures and policies were not properly 

implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.

We are not convinced.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is 

demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, 

but   also   for   those   of   persons   for   whom   one   is 

responsible.

x x x x

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by 

their employees and household helpers acting within 

the scope of   their  assigned tasks,  even though the 

former are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x x

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease 

when the persons herein mentioned prove that they 

observed all the diligence of a good father of a family 

to prevent damage.

As   the employer  of  Pajarillo,  Safeguard   is  primarily 

and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by 

the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in 

the   selection   and   supervision   of   his   employee   by 

operation of law. This presumption may be overcome 

only   by   satisfactorily   showing   that   the   employer 

exercised the care and the diligence of a good father 

of a family in the selection and the supervision of its 

employee.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers 

are   required   to   examine   them   as   to   their 

qualifications,  experience,  and   service   records.35 On 

the other hand,  due diligence  in the supervision of 

employees includes the formulation of suitable rules 

and regulations for the guidance of employees and 

the issuance of proper instructions intended for the 

protection of the public and persons with whom the 

employer has relations through his or its employees 

and   the   imposition   of   necessary   disciplinary 

measures  upon employees   in  case  of  breach  or  as 

may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts 

indispensable   to   the   business   of   and   beneficial   to 

their   employer.   To   this,   we   add   that   actual 

implementation   and   monitoring   of   consistent 

compliance  with   said   rules   should  be   the   constant 

concern of the employer, acting through dependable 

supervisors   who   should   regularly   report   on   their 

supervisory functions.36 To establish these factors in a 

trial   involving   the   issue   of   vicarious   liability, 

employers   must   submit   concrete   proof,   including 

documentary evidence.

We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had 

exercised   the  diligence   in   the   selection  of  Pajarillo 

since   the   record   shows   that   Pajarillo  underwent   a 

psychological   and   neuro-psychiatric   evaluation 

conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where 

no   psychoses   ideations   were   noted,   submitted   a 

certification on the Pre-licensing training course for 

security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.

The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short 

of   the   diligence   required   in   the   supervision   of   its 

employee,   particularly   Pajarillo.   In   this   case,  while 

Safeguard   presented   Capt.   James   Camero,   its 

Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance 

of   company   rules   and   regulations,   such   as   the 

Guidelines   of   Guards   Who   Will   Be   Assigned   To 

Banks,37 Weapons   Training,38 Safeguard   Training 

Center   Marksmanship   Training   Lesson 

Plan,39Disciplinary/Corrective  Sanctions,40 it   had  also 

been established during Camero's cross-examination 

that   Pajarillo   was   not   aware   of   such   rules   and 

regulations.41 Notwithstanding  Camero's   clarification 

on   his   re-direct   examination   that   these   company 

rules and regulations are  lesson plans as a basis of 

guidelines   of   the   instructors   during   classroom 

instructions and not necessary to give students copy 

of the same,42 the records do not show that Pajarillo 

had attended such classroom instructions.

The   records   also   failed   to   show   that   there   was 

adequate training and continuous evaluation of the 

security   guard's   performance.   Pajarillo   had   only 

attended   an   in-service   training   on  March   1,   1997 

conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as 

security   guard   of   Safeguard,   which   was   in 

collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that 

the concept of such training was purely on security of 

equipments to be guarded and protection of the life 

of the employees.43

It   had   not   been   established   that   after   Pajarillo's 

training   in   Toyota,   Safeguard   had   ever   conducted 

further   training   of   Pajarillo   when   he   was   later 

assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature 

of   business   with   that   of   Toyota.   In   fact,   Pajarillo 

testified that being on duty in a bank is different from 

being  on  duty   in   a   factory   since   a   bank   is   a   very 

sensitive area.44

Moreover,  considering  his   reactions  to  Evangeline's 

act of just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., 

of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was 

no training or seminar given on how to handle bank 

clients and on human psychology.

Furthermore,   while   Safeguard  would   like   to   show 

that there were inspectors who go around the bank 

two times a day to see the daily performance of the 

security guards assigned therein, there was no record 

ever  presented of  such daily   inspections.   In   fact,   if 

there was really  such  inspection made,   the alleged 

suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken 

noticed and reported.

Turning now to the award of damages, we find that 

the   award   of   actual   damages   in   the 

amount P157,430.00   which   were   the   expenses 

incurred by respondents in connection with the burial 

of Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award 

of P50,000.00   as   civil   indemnity   for   the   death   of 

Evangeline is likewise in order.

As to the award of moral  damages,  Article 2206 of 

the  Civil  Code provides   that   the  spouse,   legitimate 

children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants 

of   the   deceased  may   demand  moral   damages   for 

mental   anguish   by   reason   of   the   death   of   the 

deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the 

injured   party   to   obtain   means,   diversions   or 

amusements   that  will   serve   to   alleviate   the  moral 

suffering   he/she   has   undergone,   by   reason   of   the 

defendant's   culpable   action.   Its   award   is   aimed   at 

restoration,   as   much   as   possible,   of   the 

spiritual status quo ante;thus   it   must   be 

proportionate   to   the   suffering   inflicted.45 The 

intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of 

the   victim   is   proportionate   to   the   intensity   of 

affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever 

with the wealth or means of the offender.46

In this case, respondents testified as to their moral 

suffering caused by Evangeline's death was so sudden 

causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother 

to six children who were all minors at the time of her 

death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one 

million   pesos   as  moral   damages   to   the  heirs   of   a 

seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro

Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,48 we 

likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as 

moral  damages to the parents  of  a  third year  high 

school student and who was also their youngest child 

who died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death 

left  a   void   in   their   lives.  Hence,  we  hold   that   the 

respondents are also entitled to the amount of one 

million pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in the 

lives of her husband and minor children as they were 

deprived   of   her   love   and   care   by   her   untimely 

demise.

We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages 

in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of 

the Civil  Code,  exemplary damages are  imposed by 

way of example or correction for the public good, in 

addition   to   moral,   temperate,   liquidated   or 

compensatory   damages.49 It   is   awarded   as   a 

deterrent   to   socially   deleterious   actions.   Inquasi-

delict,   exemplary   damages  may   be   granted   if   the 

defendant acted with gross negligence.50

Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's 

fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, 

exemplary damages are awarded. Hence,  we affirm 

the   award   of   attorney's   fees   in   the   amount 

of P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The 

Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals 

isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that   the   civil 

liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. 

is SOLIDARYand PRIMARY under  Article  2180 of   the 

Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.