CP Ragland - Descartes on Divine Providence and Human Freedom

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Descartes on Divine Providence and Human Freedom 159

Descartes on Divine Providence and Human Freedom

by C.P. Rag la nd (St. Louis)

Abstract: Gods providence appears to threaten the existence of human freedom.This paper examines why Descartes considered this threat merelyapparent. Sectionone argues that Descartes did not reconcile providence and freedom by adopting

a compatibilist conception of freedom. Sections two and three argue that for Descar-

tes, Gods superior knowledge allows God to providentially arrange free choices

without causally determining them. Descartes position thus strongly resembles the

middle knowledge solution of the Jesuits. Section four examines the problematic

relationship between this solution and the creation of the eternal truths, arguing that

Descartes position depends on his unique understanding of divine simplicity.

Descartes believed that God exercises particular providence over ourworld. Such providence involves two things. First, before creating theworld God establishes or preordains a plan for history that coverseven the minutest details. According to Descartes, this plan extends toall the most particular actions of men (AT 4: 315 / CSMK 273)1so thatthe least thought cannot enter the mind of man if God has not wishedand willed from all eternity that it enter therein (AT 4: 3134 / CSMK272). Second, God creates the world exactly according to his pre-estab-lished model, so that the world cannot but unfold according to Godsplan.2As Descartes says, nothing can possibly happen other than as ithas been determined from all eternity by this Providence; so that provi-dence is like a fate or immutable necessity (AT 11: 438 / CSM 1: 380).

1 Parenthetical references to Descartes in the body of the paper use the followingabbreviations:AT Adam, Charles / Tannery, Paul (eds.), Oeuvres de Descartes. 2nd ed.,

11 vols. Paris: 197486.

CSM The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Vols. 1 and 2, transl. JohnCottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge1985.

CSMK The Philosophical Writings of Descartes.Vol. 3, transl. John Cotting-ham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny. Cam-bridge 1991.

Translations are from CSM or CSMK unless otherwise noted.2 Aquinas discusses the two aspects of Divine Providence in Summa Theologica

I.22.3. For a contemporary discussion of the same topic, see Freddoso 1988, 3.

Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philosophie 87. Bd., S. 159188 Walter de Gruyter 2005ISSN 0003-9101

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Many would think that if God micromanages things in this way, thenwe cannot have free will. Descartes, however, thought that particularprovidence leaves room for human freedom. In one of his more carefulreflections on providence, he writes: we must recognize that every-thing is guided by divine Providence, of which the eternal decree is soinfallible and immutable that, except for those things that this samedecree has willed to depend on our free will, we must consider everythingthat affects us to occur of necessity and as it were by fate (my empha-sis; AT 11: 439 / CSM 1: 380). This paper will investigate Descartes rea-sons for thinking that providence and freedom are compatible.

If God has particular providence, then his causal contribution to theworld is sufficient to ensure the fulfillment of his preordained plan.This seems to imply that God predetermines all our choices, and thisdivine determinism seems to imply that we are not free. Hence the prob-lem of providence and freedom. There are two basic kinds of strategyfor solving this problem. Compatibilist strategies deny the apparent im-plication from determinism to unfreedom. Incompatibilist strategiesaccept that determinism would eliminate freedom, but deny that provi-dence implies determinism. In part one of this paper, I argue that Des-cartes employed an incompatibilist strategy.

Incompatibilist strategies divide up over how God ensures that crea-

tures will follow his preordained plan. Does God get free creatures tomake the right choices by means of his concurrence his ongoingcausal contribution that sustains creatures and cooperates with theiractions? Causalincompatibilists answer Yes; they say, in effect, thatGod guarantees the right results at any given time by causally influenc-ing creatures at that time, but they insist that this causal influence is notdeterministic. Non-causalincompatiblists answer No; they claim thatGod can get the right results even without ongoing causal influence.The second section of this paper examines two important late scholastictheories of providence and concurrence: the causal incompatibilisttheory of physical premotion favored by the Dominicans, and thenon-causal incompatibilist theory of middle knowledge favored by theJesuits. In part three, I argue that Descartes adopts a non-causal strat-

egy for reconciling providence and freedom. In part four, I examine theproblematic relationship between this non-causal strategy and Descar-tes notorious claim that God created the eternal truths. I suggest thatDescartes position on providence and freedom is interestingly con-nected to his understanding of divine simplicity, and is a unique hybridof the Jesuit and Dominican views.





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I. Was Descartes a Compatibilist?

Perhaps the most straightforward way to reconcile freedom with par-ticular providence is to adopt a compatibilist conception of free will. Inthis section I examine the two compatibilist views that commentatorshave taken Descartes to hold: asymmetrical freedom and two-way com-patibilism. I argue that the asymmetrical freedom view would not helpDescartes reconcile providence with freedom. Then I show that Descar-tes was probably not a two-way compatibilist.

Descartes defined free will only once, in the Fourth Meditation:

[T]he will, or freedom of choice [] simply consists in this: that we are able to do

or not do (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather [vel potius],simply in this: that we are carried in such a way toward what the intellect proposes

for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, that we do not feel ourselves

determined to it by any external force. (AT 7: 57 / CSM 2: 40)

According to the first clause of this definition, freedom is a two-waypower to do or not do, so that doing something freely requires being ableto do otherwise. However, Descartes may have intended the or rather toretractthe idea that alternative possibilities are necessary for free choice.3

On this retraction reading of Descartes definition of freedom, the es-sence of Cartesian freedom consists notin two-way power but in beingunconstrained, acting spontaneously, or doing what we want to do.4

In his particularly lucid statement of the retraction reading, AnthonyKenny rests his case on what I call the great light passage. In that pas-sage, Descartes reflects on the Second Meditations cogitoargument,and says:

I could not but judge [non potui non judicare] something which I understood soclearly to be true; not because I was compelled so to judge by any external force,

but because a great light in the intellect was followed by a great inclination in the

will, and thus I have believed this more spontaneously and freely as I have been

less indifferent to it. (AT 7: 589 / CSM 2: 41; my italics)

3 For example, Beyssade 1994, 206, says, vel potius [] introduces a correction

and withdraws what precedes [].4 On the basis of the or rather, Gilson 1913, 310, concluded that Descartes defi-nition of freedom renounces the requirement of indeterminism for our liberty,and is satisfied by the simple absence of constraint. Beyssade 1994, 194, seemsto agree, saying that in the original Latin text of the Meditations, freedom doesnot require a two-way power, but consists merely in being unconstrained: it is thespontaneous movement towards something. Kenny 1972, 17f., equates sponta-neity with doing what one wants to do, and says that spontaneity alone is essen-tial to Cartesian freedom.





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According to Kenny, this passage shows that Descartes could not havedone otherwise than assent to the cogito, and yet his assent was free be-cause spontaneous. In the case of the cogito, Kenny says, Descartesexpressly denies that [the ability to act either way] exists.5

In my own view, Descartes did not intend the two passages aboveto deny that two-way power is necessary for freedom.6However, forpresent purposes we need only consider how Cartesian freedom wouldrelate to divine determinism if Kenny were correct. For the sake of ar-gument, then, lets suppose that Descartes thought the following: whenconfronted with a clear and distinct perception in the intellect, the willlacks two-way power, but nevertheless remains free. However, as Kennyhimself notes, Descartes also thinks that whenever we perceive some-thing with lessthan perfect clarity, we are able to affirm it, deny it, orsuspend judgment (AT 7: 59 / CSM 2: 41).7He says that God has givenme the freedom to assent or not assent in those cases where he did notendow my intellect with a clear and distinct perception (AT 7: 61 /CSM 2: 42).8

Thus, on Kennys reading, Descartes overall conception of freedomseems to be asymmetrical.9 Freedom is most fundamentally thepower to avoid error (AT 7: 61 / CSM 2: 43), or (in positive terms) thepower to assent to the true or to pursue the good. Thus, when obscure

perceptions in the intellect make it possible for us to go wrong, weremain free only if at the same time it is alsopossible for us notto gowrong (i.e. freedom requires two-way power). But when clear and dis-tinct perceptions determine us in the right direction, freedom does notrequire that we also be able to move in the wrong direction (i.e. freedomis spontaneity alone).

On this asymmetrical conception of freedom, the will would remainfree even if it were alwayssubject to determination by clear ideas. Des-cartes says: if I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should

5 Kenny 1972, 19.6 In Ragland forthcoming a and forthcoming b, I argue that Descartes definition

of freedom and the great light passage both require two-way power for freedom.This becomes clear when we understand the full context in which these passagesare found.

7 Kenny 1972, 20.8 Descartes reiterates this idea in his reply to Gassendis Fifth Set of Objections,

where he suggests that at least in cases of obscure perception, the will has thefreedom to direct itself, without the determination of the intellect, towards oneside or the other (AT 7: 378 / CSM 2: 260).

9 See Wolf 1980, 151166.





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never have to deliberate about the right judgment or choice, but Iwould remain wholly free (AT 7: 58 / CSM 2: 40). He also says:

God could easily have brought it about that without losing my freedom, and des-

pite the limitation in my knowledge, I should nonetheless never make a mistake.

He could, for example, have endowed my intellect with a clear and distinct percep-

tion of everything about which I was ever likely to deliberate []. (AT 7:61 /

CSM 2:42)

Read through the lens of the asymmetrical view, these passages seem to

describe a possible world in which every free choice is determined byclear perceptions in the intellect, which are in turn brought about byGod. Thus it would seem that Cartesian freedom is in principle com-patible with divine determinism.

Nevertheless, the asymmetrical view would not help Descartesreconcile providence with freedom. For in the actual world we makemistakes, and these mistakes are part of Gods providential plan. Andon the asymmetrical view, God could not determine us to sin or errwithout compromising our freedom. If God ensures that we play thedarker roles in the providential drama by causally determining us toerr, then (on the asymmetrical view) we are no longer free because it isimpossible for us to avoid going wrong. To save freedom, Descarteswould have to deny that God causally determines our mistakes (and

this would be to adopt one of the incompatibilist strategies discussedbelow).10

I think that in Descartes definition of freedom the or rather prob-ably means or in other (better) words.11 On this reading, the firstclause says that freedom requires the ability to do or not do, and thesecond clause spells out necessary and sufficient conditions for havingthat ability: we have it just in case we are not determined by an externalforce. This suggestion is ambiguous, and can be interpreted along eithercompatibilist or incompatibilist lines. Here I will note some difficultieswith what I consider the best compatibilist interpretation in this vein,that of J. K. Campbell.12

Campbell distinguishes between one-way compatibilists, who deny

that two-way power is essential to freedom, and two-way compatibil-ists, who require two-way power for freedom, but deny that such power

10 Descartes does just that in the Principles, saying God is not the cause of our er-rors (AT 8a: 16 / CSM 1: 203).

11 Kenny 1972, 18, considers, but rejects this reading of the or rather.12 Campbell 1999, 179f. For a somewhat similar reading, see Petrik 1992, chaps. 4

and 5, esp. 77f., 83f.





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164 C.P. Ragland

is removed by determinism.13Campbell argues that Descartes is a two-way compatibilist. It is not hard to see how he reaches this conclusion.We have just seen that for Descartes, the statement I could have doneotherwise (i.e. I had two-way power with respect to my choice) isequivalent to I was not determined to do what I did by an externalforce. But plausibly this latter is equivalent to I would have doneotherwise had internal forces been different. If this plausible assump-tion is correct, then Descartes should think that I could have doneotherwise in the sense necessary for freedom, just in case I would havedone otherwise had internal forces been different. If we take internalforces to be reasons, then we reach Campbells conclusion:

What is essential to Descartes theory is his endorsement of the following: Scouldhave done otherwise only if (1) Swould have done otherwise ifShad different rea-sons and (2) Swould have had different reasons if certain aspects about the pasthad been different.14

On this hypothetical analysis of two-way power, God could determineallof our choices good andbad without compromising our freedom.Even if God determines me to have certain reasons, and those reasonsin turn determine me to act in a certain way, I can still satisfy Camp-bells conditions (1) and (2). For God could have preordained me tohave different reasons, and if he had done so, I would have behaved dif-

ferently.15

The following passage strongly supports Campbells reading:

What is freedom of the mind? Certainly it is to will in such a way that we do not

feel there to be anything that impedes us from willing the direct opposite, shouldthat seem right to us. With this definition posited, no one can deny that we are free.Of course, if we define freedom so that it is not in my will if there is any power

which even if I am not aware of it can bend my will toward this or toward that

in such a way that it certainly wills this and not that, then freedom thus defined

is not possible for a created thing once we have posited the omnipotence of the

Creator. (AT 11: 648; my emphasis)

Here Descartes gestures at the hypothetical analysis of alternative pos-sibilities, and defines freedom in a way that renders it obviously com-

patible with divine predetermination.

13 Campbell 1999, 180.14 Ibid., 194.15 Regarding theological problems of freedom in Descartes, Campbell 1999, 180,

says, I wont discuss them in this chapter since I think that what I do say appliesto these cases as well. I have tried to show how Campbells reading would applyto the case of providence.





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However, we should not make too much of the passage just quoted, because we

cannot be sure that Descartes wrote it. This text was found in Leibnizs papers among

a number of disconnected remarks under the title Cartesius. The passages are not inLeibnizs handwriting, but there are some corrections written in his hand. Adam and

Tannery conclude that Leibniz must have thought these remarks really were from

Descartes, but they themselves would not dare to assure that it is an authentic text

(AT 11: 647). Even if Descartes did write the passage, we cannot be sure when he

wrote it. To determine Descartes mature philosophical perspective on providence

and freedom, we should rest considerably more weight on the Principles of Philos-ophy, which contains his only published remarks on that subject. And those remarksare inconsistent with two-way compatibilism.

In PrinciplesI.40, Descartes says that We can easily get ourselvesinto great difficulties if we attempt to reconcile [] divine preordi-nation with the freedom of our will, or attempt to grasp both thesethings at once (AT 8: 20 / CSM 1: 206). This should make us suspectthat when he wrote the Principles, Descartes did not embrace two-waycompatibilism. For on that compatibilist account of alternative possi-bilities, it is obviousthat God can control our choices without under-mining our freedom. If Campbells interpretation were correct, it wouldbe very surprising for Descartes to claim that there are great difficultiesin reconciling freedom and providence.16

A few lines later, Principles I.41 confirms our suspicion. Descartessays:

But we shall get out of these difficulties if we remember that our mind is finite,

while the power of God is infinite [] We may attain sufficient knowledge of this

power to perceive clearly and distinctly that God possesses it; but we cannot get a

sufficient grasp of it to see how it leaves the free actions of men undetermined(AT 8:20 / CSM 1: 206; my emphasis).

Descartes says explicitly that God leaves us free only by leaving ourchoices undetermined. This text strongly suggests that Descartes didnot resolve the tension between providence and freedom by adopting atwo-way compatibilist account of freedom. His strategy was rather toargue that providence does not imply determinism. To better under-stand Descartes view, we should now consider two late-scholastic the-

ories that employ the same strategy.

16 Surprising, but not impossible. For example, one might be a compatibilist, butalso think that it requires a lot of difficult thinking to arrive at the correct (com-patibilist) view of freedom. So I rest my case on Principle 41, not Principle 40.Thanks to Dan Kaufman for making me think more about this point.





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II. Concurrence and Scholastic Incompatibilist Strategies

A provident God plans how the story of the world will go beforeheactually makes anything. To be provident in this way, God must knowthe truth value of all conditional future contingents(CFCs), which arestatements of the form If A were to happen then Bwould happen.Armed with a knowledge of such deliberative conditionals, God cancalculate with certainty which effect wouldresult, directly or indirectly,from any causal contribution He might choose to make17to the world.Therefore he can compare various possible histories of creation, anddecide which he prefers, before making anything actual.

Most Catholic thinkers of Descartes day agreed that God knowsall true CFCs. However, there was significant disagreement about howGod knows CFCs. This disagreement was connected to disputes abouthow God executes his providential plan. Broadly speaking, there weretwo main schools of thought: the Dominican or Thomist position,and the Jesuit or Molinist position (named after its originator Luis deMolina). Though they disagreed about CFCs in general, Ill be focus-ing on what these two positions said about a special class of CFCs:conditionals of freedom saying what creatures would freely chooseunder certain conditions.

Dominicans and Jesuits both believed in Gods general concurrence with createdcauses. According to the theory of concurrence, God not only conserves the world in

existence at each moment, but also concurs with the causal activity of creatures:

God joins with them in causing their effects. Concurrence is a middle position be-

tween two extremes: mere conservationism (the idea that God merely conserves crea-

tures in existence, and the creatures produce their effects all by themselves), and

occasionalism (the thesis that creatures do nothing at all and God is the only true

cause of created effects). According to the doctrine of concurrence, when a creature

causes an effect God also causes that effect, but in a different order of causality.18For

example, when a rock breaks a window, God is the primary or first cause of the

breaking, and the rock is the secondary or created cause of the breaking.

Dominicans and Jesuits agreed that in concurrence, God acts to pro-duce the same effect that the creature produces, but they disagreed

about whether God also acts on the creature itself, premoving it tocause its effect.19 According to the Dominicans, some premotion on

17 Freddoso 1998, 3; my italics. For an excellent, more extended discussion of thepoints made in this paragraph, see ibid.1f., 34f. See also Flint 1988, 155f.

18 Sleigh/Chappell/Della Rocca 1998, 1200.19 Freddoso 1988, 18; Sleigh/Chappell/Della Rocca 1998, 1201f.





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Gods part is required to explain why the creature moves from potencyto act (from merely being ableto cause the effect, to actuallycausing it).Premotion is not only necessary, but also sufficient for the creature tocause a particular effect. Through this premotion, God actively governshistory, at each moment causing each creature to cause its effects inexact conformity with Gods providential plan. The Dominicans, then,had a causalaccount of how God ensures the fulfillment of his plans: ateach moment, he premoves agents to make the right choices.

The Jesuits rejected premotion as inconsistent with human freedom.According to Molina, for example, that agent is called free which,when all the requisites for acting are posited, can act or not act, or canso do one thing that it can also do the contrary.20 As a requisite(necessary condition) that is also sufficientfor a particular act of will,premotion would eliminate freedom as Molina defines it. ThereforeMolina claims that Gods general concurrence [] is notan influenceof Gods on the cause [] but is instead an influence along with thecause directly on the effect.21

On the Dominican theory of premotion, God knows CFCs aboutcreatures choices by knowing how he would premove them to behave.For example, the statement If Eve were in Eden, she would eat the fruitturns out to be a consequence of a more explanatorily basic statement

about God, namely that If Eve were in Eden, God would premove Eveto eat the fruit. We might say that in the Dominican picture, CFCsabout free creatures are in an important sense reducible to CFCs aboutGod about Gods counterfactual intentions to premove creatures incertain ways.

This makes Gods knowledge of CFCs freeknowledge. Scholasticsdistinguished between Gods knowledge of simple intelligence or natu-ral knowledge, and Gods knowledge of vision or free knowledge.22Byhis natural knowledge, God knows all necessary truths. God knowsthese truths, but does not do anything to makethem true. Their truth isexplanatorily prior to Gods free choice. By his free knowledge, Godknows all truths that are explanatorily posterior to his free choice. Suchtruths are all contingent, because they depend on Gods contingent free

choice. For the Dominicans, CFCs about free creatures would be ob-

20 Molina 1953, I Q14 A13 D2 n3; 14. Suarezs definition of freedom is very similar.See Suarez 1994, 319.

21 Molina 1988, 239.22 See Aquinas, Summa TheologicaI.14.9.





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jects of free knowledge because they are simply consequences of Godsfree decision to premove creatures in various ways.

By contrast, the Jesuits could not claim that CFCs about creaturesdepended on prior CFCs about premotion. Instead, they insisted thatif creatures are truly free, then CFCs about them are explanatorilybasic, not derivable from any prior truths. For the Jesuits, God does notdetermine the truth-values of CFCs: they are simply true or false fromall eternity, just like necessary truths of mathematics. Therefore, theyare not an object of Gods free knowledge. But neither can CFCs be anobject of Gods natural knowledge because they are logically contin-gent. Molinists therefore proposed a third species of divine knowledge:middleknowledge. The following chart summarizes the Molinist clas-sification of Gods knowledge.

Type of Knowledge: Natural Middle FreeModal status of truths: Necessary Contingent Contingent

Relation to Gods choice: Prior Prior Posterior

Gods knowledge of CFCs is middle knowledge because it seems tofall between the other two sorts of knowledge. Like natural knowledge,it is prior to Gods will, and like free knowledge, it is of contingentthings.23

Because the Jesuits thought of CFCs as explanatorily basic, theycould use them to reconcile particular providence with indeterministichuman freedom. In their view, God uses his knowledge of CFCs tomake agents fulfill the divine plan withoutcausing their choices. Forexample, suppose the divine plan calls for Eve to freely eat the fruit. Toget her to do this, God first checks his log of CFCs to see if there areany circumstances under which Eve would freely eat the fruit. If so,then God simply creates Eve in the correct circumstances, and she eatsthe fruit no causation required. Molinism, then, offers a non-causalaccount of how God exercises his providence: given his knowledge ofCFCs, God does not needto premove agents at each moment to get theright results. Providence does not imply divine determinism because itdoes not involve a causal mechanism.

Because they thought that God uses premotion to maintain provi-dential control, the Dominicans had to choose between two differentstrategies for preserving freedom: they could either adopt a compatibil-ist account of freedom, or argue that divine premotion despite beingan infallibly efficacious causal mechanism is not a form of causal de-

23 My account of the three types of divine knowledge follows Flint 1988, 152f.





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terminism. Lets focus on the latter, causal incompatibliststrategy. It is amysterious view, and its advocates seem forced to emphasize Godstranscendence and our cognitive limitations. For example, Aquinasclaims in some places that God can unfailingly direct the will withoutthereby necessitating its choice. He explains that this claim seems para-doxical only because our causal models are derived from the interac-tions of beings withinthe created order, where an unfailing cause is anecessitating cause. However, God transcends the created order, and soour causal reasoning is inadequate to his mysterious creative activity.24

The Molinist solution also involves a mystery: it is hard to see howGod could know CFCs about creatures free choices, because it is hardto see how such CFCs could be true at all. For on the Molinist picture,there could not be anything to make CFCs about free choices true.25

They cannot be true (as the Dominicans would have it) in virtue ofprior CFCs about how God would premove creatures. Nor can Godsimply will to make them true, since they are supposed to be true priorto Gods will. Nor can they be made true by creatures actual freechoices, for God is supposed to know such CFCs before he makes anycreature actual. As Freddoso puts it, the Jesuit theory of middle knowl-edge requires that God have epistemic certitude regarding states of af-fairs that do not (at least as yet) have metaphysical certitude26. For our

purposes, it is useful to consider two different Jesuit responses to thisproblem.

Molina himself claimed: the certitude of this middle knowledge has its source []

in the depth and unlimited perfection of the divine intellect, a perfection by which

God knows with certainty what is in itself uncertain.27To comprehend a crea-

tures essence is to know what it mightdo. For God to know what a creature woulddodemands a cognition that penetrates far deeper than comprehension as just defined,

a cognition that came to be known in Molinist literature as supercomprehension28.

Molina realized that supercomprehension is mysterious, but tried to justify the idea

by appealing to Gods infinite cognitive powers and the finitude of creatures.

Suarez, on the other hand, rejected the idea of supercomprehension.29How can

anyone, even God, know as true a proposition for which there is no truthmaker? Sua-

24 For a discussion of the relevant texts from Aquinas see Shanley 1998, 114f.25 This kind of grounding objection to Molinism is articulated clearly in Adams

1990, 110f.26 Freddoso 1988, 52.27 Molina 1988, 248.28 Freddoso 1988, 51.29 Suarez, De scientia Dei futurorum contingentium 2.7.6, in Suarez 185678, 11:

366f.





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rez proposed a truthmaker: any CFC about a creatures free choice is made true by a

non-deterministic tendency (habitudo) toward that choice within the possible crea-ture itself. For Suarez, then, Gods middle knowledge is grounded ultimately in the

possible free creatures that exist from all eternity as objects of Gods thought.30But

Suarez did not purge his view of mystery, for it is hard to see how a genuinely non-

determining tendency can make it certainhow the creature would behave.

To sum up, incompatibilist strategies seek to reconcile providencewith freedom by denying that providence entails theological determin-ism. We have considered two such strategies. The non-causal strategy,

exemplified by Molinists, wards off the threat of determinism by deny-ing that God uses his concurrence to exercise providential control.Because of middle knowledge, God can providentially arrange thingswithout premoving or otherwise causing our choices. The causal in-compatibilist strategy, exemplified by some Dominicans, maintainsthat at each moment God maintains providential control viahis con-currence: he premoves us to fulfill the providential plan, but thisinfluence (mysteriously) leaves our free choices undetermined. Let usnow consider which of these strategies Descartes employed: causal ornon-causal. It seems clear that Descartes believed in divine concur-rence, but did he think that God uses such concurrence to maintainprovidential control?31

III. Descartes Non-Causal Solution

According to PrinciplesI.41, God is so powerful that he can providen-tially preordain free choices while leaving them undetermined. HowGod accomplishes this is beyond our power to understand; it is a divinemystery like the Trinity or the Incarnation. As Descartes says in hisearly Private Thoughts, The Lord has made three marvels: somethingout of nothing, free will, and God in Man (AT 10: 218 / CSM 1: 5).Rather than explaining how free will and particular providence coexist,Descartes tries to make us comfortable with our ignorance in thismatter: we should not expect to answer such questions, because they are

about divine power, which can do more than we can conceive.

30 Suarez, Tractatus de Gratia Deiprol. 2, c.7, n.2125, in Suarez 186578, 7: 9496.Adams 1990, 114f., discusses Suarezs view.

31 Descartes either explicitly affirms or implicitly assumes the existence of divineconcurrence in AT 8a: 24f., 61 / CSM 1: 210, 240; AT 7: 14, 60f., 109 / CSM 2: 10,42, 79; and AT 3: 360, 429 / CSMK 180, 193f.





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Descartes appeal to mystery fits nicely with the causal incompatibil-ist strategy for reconciling providence and freedom. Dominicans em-ploying that strategy argued that we tend to think of divine premotionas deterministic only because we cannot properly model causal re-lations between God and the world. The similarity between their claimsand Descartes is striking. However, Descartes correspondence withPrincess Elizabeth suggests that his position is more complex and orig-inal than these parallels with the Dominican view might lead us to ex-pect. In fact, Descartes offers a non-causal reconciliation of providenceand freedom, but with a distinctively Cartesian and mysterious twist.

In correspondence, Descartes told Princess Elizabeth that knowingGods existence, perfection, and infallibility is useful to us becauseit teaches us to accept calmly all the things which happen to us as ex-pressly sent by God (AT 4: 2912 / CSMK 265). Elizabeth objectedthat philosophical reflection on divine providence cannot lead us toaccept the evils imposed on us by other peoples free choices, becausesuch choices cannot be both free and expressly sent by God (AT 4: 302).Descartes replied: all the reasons that prove that God exists and is thefirst and immutable cause of all effects that do not depend on humanfree will prove similarly, I think, that he is also the cause of all the ef-

fects that do so depend (AT 4: 314 / CSMK 272).But Elizabeth was not convinced. If we are truly free, she argued,

our choices cannot depend on God (AT 4: 3224). Descartes repliedwith the following two natures passage:

As for free will, I agree that if we think only of ourselves we cannot fail to deem

it independent; yet when we think of the infinite power of God we cannot fail to

believe all things depend upon him, and consequently that our free will is not

exempt from such dependence. For it involves a contradiction to say that God has

created human beings of such a nature that the actions of their will do not depend

on his. It is the same as saying that his power is both finite and infinite: finite, since

there is something which does not depend on it; infinite, since he was able to create

that independent thing. But as the knowledge of the existence of God ought not

prevent us from being assured of our free will, since we experience it and feel it in

ourselves, so also the knowledge of our free will should not make us doubt theexistence of God. For the independence we experience and feel within us, and

which suffices to render our actions praiseworthy or blamable, is not incompatible

with a dependence of another nature according to which all things are subject to

God. (AT 4: 3323 / CSMK 277)

As in PrinciplesI.41, Descartes maintains that our inability to compre-hend howGod leaves our choices free should not make us any less cer-





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tain about either Gods power or our own freedom. But this passageadds something to the Principlesaccount: the idea that a free agentscontrol over her choice and Gods providential control over that samechoice are of two different natures. Still, though, the text does not de-cide between the two competing readings that we are considering. Thedependence of another nature by which we depend on God could beeither a non-necessitating causal dependence, or a non-causal depend-ence.

Fortunately, Elizabeth asked Descartes to say more about these twodifferent natures. In her view it is

[] impossible for the will to be at the same time free and attached to the decrees

of providence []. I do not see their compatibility at all [] nor do I see how this

dependence of the will can be of another nature than its liberty, if you do not take

pains to teach me of it. (AT 4: 336)32

Descartes explained more about the dependence of the will in what Icall the dueling passage.

[] I pass to the difficulty your Highness proposes concerning free choice, the

dependence and liberty of which I shall try to explain by a comparison. If a king

who has prohibited duels, and who knows very assuredly that two gentlemen of

his kingdom, who live in different towns, are in a quarrel and are so angry with

one another that nothing could prevent them from fighting if they meet; if, I say,

this king commissions one of them to go on a certain day to the town of the other,

and also commissions this other to go on the same day to the place of the first,

he knows very assuredly that they will not fail to meet and to fight, and thus

to contravene his ban on dueling, but for all that he does not constrain them to do

so; and his knowledge, and even the will he had to determine them in this way,

does not prevent them from fighting, when they meet, as voluntarily and freely as

they would have done if he had known nothing of it and it was by some other cir-

cumstance that they encountered each other, and they can just as justly be pun-

ished, because they have contravened his ban. Now what a king can do in that case

with respect to certain free actions of his subjects, God, who has an infinite pre-

science and an infinite power, infallibly does with respect to all those of men. And

before he had sent us into this world, he knew exactly what would be all the incli-

nations of our will; it is he himself who has put them in us; it is he also who has dis-

posed all the other things which are outside us in order to bring it about that such

and such objects would present themselves to our senses at such and such times,

on the occasion of which he knew our free will would determine us to such or

such thing; and he has thus willed it, but for all that he has not willed to constrain

us to it. And as one can distinguish in this king two different degrees of will, the

one by which he willed that these gentlemen would fight each other (since he

32 In translating this passage I consulted the translation in Blom 1978, 172.





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brought it about that they would meet) and the other by which he has not willed it

(since he prohibited duels), in the same way theologians distinguish in God an ab-

solute and independent will (by which he wills that everything should happen just

as it does) and another which is relative, and which relates to the merit or demerit

of men, by which he wills that one obey his laws. (AT 4: 35254 / CSMK 282; my

translation)

This dueling story is Descartes final word in the discussion with Eliza-beth. Though Aquinas and Erasmus had used similar examples forslightly different purposes, Descartes clearly uses the dueling story to il-

lustrate a non-causal account of providential control very similar to theone employed by Molinists.33

Descartes aims to teach Elizabeth how our dependence on Godand his providential decrees is of another nature than the independencewe experience within us. We experience our freedom as causalindepen-dence: our freedom consists in the fact that we do not feel ourselvesdetermined [to our choices] by any external force (AT 7: 57 / CSM 2:40). To explain how a causally independent will can remain subject toGods providential control, Descartes like the Molinist appeals toGods knowledge of CFCs. God knew from all eternity what we wouldchoose in certain circumstances, and so he can providentially order ourchoices without causally influencing our wills, just as the king manipu-

lated the gentlemen in the story. Our dependence on Gods providenceis of another nature because it is a non-causaldependence founded onGods superior knowledge of us.

Though the dueling passage as a whole strongly suggests a non-causal strategy,

one line in particular introduces some ambiguity. Notice that Descartes says: before

[God] had sent us into this world, he knew exactly what would be all the inclinations

of our will; it is he himself who has put them in us. According to Jean Laporte, thismeans that God knows how we would choose (in every possible circumstance) pre-

cisely because he knows (for every possible circumstance) how he would premove our

wills.34However, I bel ieve that Laportes reading of the dueling passage is mistaken.

When Descartes says that God put inclinations in us, Laporte takes this to mean

that God premoves us to make certain decisions. But a careful look at the passage

does not bear out this interpretation. Descartes first says that (A) God knew exactly

what would be all the inclinations of our will; it is he himself who has put them in us.

Then he says that (B) God arranged things outside us to ensure that such and

such objects would present themselves to our senses at such and such times, [C] on

the occasion of which he knew our free will would determine us to such or such

33 See Erasmus 1995, 50 (section 34), and Aquinas, Summa TheologicaI.22.2 andI.116.1.

34 Laporte 1951, 81f.





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174 C.P. Ragland

thing. Laporte seems to assume that the free determinations in (C) are identical to

the inclinations in (A). But there is nothing in the text to indicate that they are the

same. On the contrary, it is much more natural to suppose that the inclinations in

(A) are simply that inclinations, or factors internal to the will. Descartes point is

that God causes allthe circumstances of our choices: not only our external physicalsurroundings (B), but also our internal psychological inclinations (A). The point of

(C) is that God knows what we would choose to do in those circumstances, even

though he does not premove our choices. Furthermore, even if (A) means that God

has placed free determinations in us, it does not follow that he places them in us by

means of premotion (more on this point below).

A further question might be raised by Descartes claim that we remain free because

God has not willed to constrainus to such actions. Is Descartes here opting for acompatibilist conception of freedom as merely the absence of constraint? I think not.

For in Descartes time incompatibilists, too, spoke of constraint or coercion. Sua-

rez, for example, says that a free faculty acts freely as long as it is not subject to any

extrinsic force by which it might be coercedor properly speaking, necessitated.35

The coercive extrinsic force Suarez has in mind is divine premotion. The term con-

straint had both compatibilist and incompatibilist senses, so its mere presence in this

passage does not prove that Descartes was adopting a compatibilist view of freedom.

I conclude that in the dueling passage, Descartes adopts a non-causalincompatibilist solution to the problem of freedom and providence.However, if enough other passages contradict the dueling passage, thenit may not express Descartes considered position. And there are someapparently conflicting passages. I will now consider them and show whythey are in fact compatible with Descartes strategy in the dueling pas-sage.

Descartes tells Elizabeth that God is the first and immutable causeof all the effects that depend on the human will, so that everything thathappens comes entirely from him: the least thought cannot enterthe mind of man if God has not wishedand willedfrom all eternity thatit enter therein (my emphasis; AT 4: 31314; CSMK 272). Descartessays that nothing can possibly happen other than as it has been deter-minedfrom all eternity by this Providence; so that providence is like afate or immutable necessity (my emphasis; AT 11: 438; CSM 1: 380).Dont these passages suggest God causally determines everything?

Though Descartes language sometimes sounds strongly determin-istic, it does not conclusively rule out a non-causal strategy for recon-ciling freedom and providence. For scholastic Molinists who clearlyemployed the non-causal strategy sometimes used such strong lan-guage to describe Gods providential governance. Suarez, for example,

35 Suarez 1994, 316.





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says: [] by his eternal act of will God canpredetermineeffects thatare consonant with his providence; again, he can move the wills ofhuman beings to what he wills, when he wills, and how he wills. How-ever, Suarez insists that this does not require the physicalpredetermi-nation of free choice or anything similar that would damage freedom ofchoice36. Suarez suggests that there are two kinds of predetermination:providential and physical (sufficient causal). Through middle knowl-edge, God can exercise providential predetermination without physi-cally predetermining us. Descartes dueling passage suggests a similardistinction: Gods providential predetermination is based on superiorknowledge, not causal influence. In my view, Descartes deterministic-sounding language refers only to providential predetermination and isthus consistent with the non-causal strategy of the dueling passage.

Another worry comes from Descartes description of divine concur-rence. Just after Descartes tells Elizabeth that God is the cause of ef-fects that depend on the human will, he says:

the distinction of the schools between universal and particular causes is not in

place here: for what makes it that the sun, for example, being the universal cause

of all flowers, is not on that account the cause that tulips differ from roses, is that

the production of these flowers also depends upon other particular causes which

are not at all subordinated to the sun; God, however, is a universal cause of every-

thing in such a way that he is in the same manner total cause; and thus nothing canhappen without his will (AT 4: 314; CSMK 272).

Descartes point is this: when a creature like me causes an effect, Godconcursor works with me to produce the effect. But this does not meanthat God produces one aspect of the effect and I produce another,so that we each do only part of the work. Instead, my causal role issubordinate to Gods, so that God is in some sense responsible for mycontribution as well as his own. Therefore, God is the totalcause: hiscausal contribution in concurrence is sufficient to produce the wholeofthe effect. Descartes is restating the standard position on concurrencearticulated by Aquinas:

[] the same effect is ascribed to a natural cause and to God, not as though part

were effected by God and part by the natural agent, but the whole effect proceedsfrom each, yet in different ways, just as the whole of the one same effect is ascribed

to the instrument, and again the whole is ascribed to the principal agent.37

36 Suarez: Metaphysical Disputations22.2.41, in Suarez 2002, 197.37 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles3.70.





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176 C.P. Ragland

For both Descartes and Aquinas, natural causes are subordinate toGod in something like the way a tool is subordinate to its wielder. Thisnotion of subordination might be taken to imply that God premovesnatural causes.38

However, this agreement with Aquinas does not prove that Descartesbelieved in premotion. Instead, he may have taken a position similarto Suarezs. Suarez agreed with Aquinas that the First Cause is aper seand immediate cause and, within his own genus, a total cause of thesecondary causes effect and action.39He also agreed that in concur-rence the action depends on two principles which are related to oneanother in such a way that the one [the creature] is subject to the other[God] that is, is inferior to it, and posterior to it, and dependent onit.40The creature is subordinate to God in something like the way atool or instrument is subordinate to its user, but we must not take thisanalogy too literally, for created causes unlike tools are not movedby God. Suarez says:

It is not required for subordination and, indeed, it cannot be the case that the

First Causes concurrence should consist in something [i.e., premotion] that is be-

stowed in the manner of a first act upon the secondary cause in the actual action

itself.41

Subordination, as Suarez understands it, does not require divine pre-

motion, but arises simply from the fact that creatures depend on Godfor their existence at every moment (the aspect of concurrence thatDescartes himself emphasizes most). Descartes may have understoodsubordination in a similar way, so his position does not necessarily con-flict with the non-causal strategy.

However, in the following passage from the Conversation with Bur-man, Descartes expressly disagrees with the Jesuits.

38 Molina seems to have thought that if God is a total cause of our actions, then weare subordinate to God, and if we are subordinate to God, then he premoves us

to act. For Molina claims that God and free creatures are partial, coordinatedcauses of free choice. For example, he says: Indeed the total effect is both fromGod and from secondary causes, but neither from God nor from secondarycauses as from a total cause, but as from partial causes each of which at the sametime requires the concurrence and influx of the other (Molina 1953, 170 = Con-cordiaII Q14 A13 D26 n15).

39 Suarez: Metaphysical Disputations22.2.13, in Suarez 2002, 178.40 Suarez: Metaphysical Disputations22.2.45, in Suarez 2002, 199.41 Ibid.





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Concerning ethics and religion, on the other hand, the opinion has prevailed that

God can be altered, because of the prayers of mankind; for no one would have

prayed to God if he knew, or had convinced himself, that God was unalterable. In

order to remove this difficulty and reconcile the immutability of God with the

prayers of men, we have to say that God is indeed quite unalterable, and that he

has decreed from eternity either to grant me a particular request or not to grant it.

Coupled with this decree, however, he has made a simultaneous decree that the

granting of my request shall be in virtue of my prayers, and at a time when, in ad-

dition, I am leading an upright life; the effect of which is that I must pray and live

uprightly if I wish to obtain anything from God. This then is the situation from

the point of view of ethics; and here, after weighing the truth of the matter, the

author finds himself in agreement with the Gomarists, rather than the Arminians

or even, amongst his brethren, the Jesuits. (AT 5: 166 / CSMK 348)

Etienne Gilson sees this passage as directly contradictory to the duelingpassage. He claims that Descartes is Thomist with Burman, Molinistwith Elizabeth, taking whatever position seems most expedient whenhe is pressed by an interlocutor.42

Gilsons conclusion is hasty, because the passage mentions neitherthe nature of freedom nor its relation to providence. The subject of thepassage is whether prayer can change Gods mind.43Furthermore, I donot think we should rest much weight on this passage because the posi-tion it expresses is confused. The Jesuits would not have thought that

prayers alter God, but would have agreed with Descartes high view ofdivine immutability and providential control. Even the Arminianswould have agreed with it, as Descartes himself knew.44 It makes nosense for Descartes to claim that he disagrees with the Jesuits on thispoint. Either he profoundly misunderstood the theology of his formerteachers, or Burmans document somehow misrepresents Descartes.I suspect the latter. The Conversation with Burmancontains many en-lightening passages, but this is not one of them.

I have argued that Descartes non-causal strategy in the dueling pas-sage is consistent with his other remarks about divine concurrence andimmutability. In doing so, I have drawn heavily on parallels betweenDescartes position and the Molinism of Suarez. However, the duelingpassage also seems to conflict with Descartes views about divine sim-

42 Gilson 1913, 394.43 For an interesting discussion of this passage, see Cottingham 1976, xxxix.44 In a letter to Elizabeth about from about two years earlier, after insisting in the

very same way that prayers do not alter God, Descartes concluded: I believethat all theologians agree on this, including the Arminians, who seem the mostjealous of the rights of free will (AT 4: 316 / CSMK 273).





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plicity and the creation of the eternal truths. Examining this problemwill make it clear that despite the parallels with Suarez, Descartes is notreally a Molinist, but instead employs his own unique version of thenon-causal strategy.

IV. Providence and the Eternal Truths

Descartes thinks that because God is simple, Gods will and intellectare identical.45 Therefore it is impossible to imagine that anythingis thought of in the divine intellect as good or true, or worthy of beliefor action or omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to make itso (AT 7: 432 / CSM 2: 291).46For Descartes, then, allof Gods knowl-edge is free knowledge. He cannot agree with the Jesuits that God hasmiddle knowledge of CFCs about free choices, for such middleknowledge would not depend on Gods free choice.

More importantly, Descartes takes divine simplicity to imply that[Gods] will is the cause not only of what is actual and to come, butalso of what is possible and of the simple natures. There is nothing wecan think of or ought to think of that should not be said to depend onGod (AT 5:160 / CSMK 343). Hence eternal truths, whether math-

ematical or metaphysical, depend on God alone, who, as the supremelegislator, has ordained them from eternity (AT 7:436 / CSM 2:294).But if God determines the nature of all truth (AT 7:432 / CSM 2:292),then God must determine the truth of CFCs. As we have seen, theJesuits denied that God determines which CFCs are true, while theDominicans affirmed this. Therefore, Descartes creation doctrine con-cerning eternal truths puts him in agreement with the Dominicans on akey point.

However, though Descartes agrees with the Dominicans that Goddetermines the truth-values of CFCs, he does not agree with themabout howGod determines them. For the Dominicans, CFCs aboutcreatures free choices follow from corresponding CFCs about divine

45 See, for example, Principles I.23: [Gods] understanding and willing does nothappen, as in our case, by means of operations that are in a certain sense distincton from another; we must suppose that there is always a single identical and per-fectly simple act by means of which he simultaneously understands, wills and ac-complishes everything (AT 8a: 14 / CSM 1: 201).

46 See also the 2 May 1644 letter to Mesland (AT 4: 119 / CSMK 235), which againindicates that for Descartes, Divine simplicity implies the absence of any priorityof intellect over will in God.





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premotion. God determines their truth-value indirectly, by first deter-mining the truth-value of CFCs about himself. But for Descartes, Goddirectlydetermines the truth of CFCs, by the same incomprehensibleact that generates all truths, even the necessary truths of mathematicsand geometry. Premotion is not involved. Thus Descartes position onprovidence and freedom is neither straightforwardly Jesuit norstraightforwardly Dominican; it is more like a unique hybrid of the twoearlier positions.

As I understand it, Descartes picture of divine providence involvesthree (explanatory, not temporal) stages of creation. First, God createsthe eternal truths, including CFCs. At this stage, God creates thesimple natures, including the natures of free creatures quapossible.Next, God uses his knowledge of CFCs to figure out exactly how theworld would develop from any of its possible starting points. Finally,God actualizes the starting point that will lead to his desired result.Once they have been created, creatures operate on their own just asGod knew they would. Gods concurrence sustains creatures in exist-ence and cooperates with their actions, but does not controltheir ac-tions. This is a non-causal understanding of providence because Godscontrol comes from his knowledge of CFCs rather than from his con-currence.

This picture avoids some of the difficulties of the Jesuit and Domini-can positions. As we have seen, Molinists have a hard time explaininghow CFCs can be true, since none of the available facts seem capable ofgrounding their truth in the right way. Descartes avoids this problem byclaiming that God grounds the truth of CFCs. Dominicans face arather different problem: how can Gods premotion infallibly ensurethat creatures behave as God wants without thereby necessitating theiractions and undermining their freedom? Creatures seem like puppetsmoved at each instant by the strings of premotion. Descartes avoids thisproblem by denying premotion. In Descartes view, God does not main-tain providential control by causally influencing actual creatures.

However, the picture I attribute to Descartes has a serious problem:creatures may not be puppets, but they certainly seem like robots,

merely acting out a program that God wrote when he created theCFCs. To see this, suppose that God makes true the following CFC: ifEve were placed in the garden, she would eat the fruit. Suppose furtherthat God places Eve in the garden. These two suppositions logically en-tail that Eve will eat the fruit. So even if Eves action is causallyunde-termined, it is still a logicalconsequence of Gods activity (of creatingthe CFC and creating Eve in the garden). Eves action follows inevitably





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from factors beyond her control, and hence is not free in the libertariansense. And what is true for Eve would be true of all her children. If Godfixes the truth-value of CFCs, then it seems all our actions are logicallydetermined by Gods choice, and hence nobody is free. In short, Des-cartes belief that God created the eternal truths including CFCs seems to render the non-causal account of providence ineffective as atool for preserving libertarian freedom.

Some might object that this problem of logical determinism undermines my inter-

pretation. For when I attribute the non-causal account to Descartes, I claim (in ef-fect) that he adopted a failing strategy, and this may seem uncharitable. Further-

more, it could be argued that I have tried to give Descartes a more precise position

than he really had. As we noted earlier, in PrinciplesI.41 Descartes declares that thereconciliation of freedom and providence is a mystery beyond our comprehension.

Rather than saddling Descartes with a specific, but unworkable, account of that rec-

onciliation, would it not be more charitable (and plausible) to simply note that Des-

cartes appealed to mystery on this issue? Though the correspondence with Elizabeth

seems to present a specific view of the reconciliation, PrinciplesI.41 may seem to sug-gest on the contrary that such specific accounts are neither necessary nor possible

for us to give. As interpreters, perhaps we should privilege Descartes published posi-

tion in the Principles.However, Descartes position in the relevant passage from the Principlesdoes not

really conflict with the more specific view he suggested to Elizabeth. Here is the text

ofPrinciplesI.41 in full:

We shall get out of these difficulties [of reconciling freedom and providence] if we

remember that our mind is finite, while the power of God is infinite the power by

which he not only knew from eternity whatever is or can be, but also willed it and

preordained it. We may attain sufficient knowledge of this power to perceive

clearly and distinctly that God possesses it; but we cannot get a sufficient grasp of

it to see how it leaves the free actions of men undetermined. Nonetheless, we have

such close awareness of the freedom and indifference which is in us, that there is

nothing we can grasp more evidently or more perfectly. And it would be absurd,

simply because we do not grasp one thing, which we know must by its very nature

be beyond our comprehension, to doubt something else of which we have an inti-

mate grasp and which we experience within ourselves. (AT 8:20 / CSM 1:206)

Descartes does not say that specific reconciliations of freedom and providence, suchas the one he later sketched for Elizabeth, are illegitimate. His remarks here doimplythat any such specific account will involve difficulties, and the account he gave Eliza-

beth is no exception: it is hard to see how our free actions can be undetermined if

God creates the CFCs.

So PrinciplesI.41 does not conflict with my interpretation, and might even sup-port it. In the opening lines of the passage, Descartes focuses our attention on the

fact that God knew from eternity whatever is or can be. The or can be suggests





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that Descartes is concerned here with Gods knowledge ofpossibilia or essences.47

This concern is just what we would expect if Descartes thought Gods providence

depends on his knowledge of CFCs (which are true of such essences). Descartes then

identifies the fact that generates our great difficulties: God not only knew these es-

sences, but willedthem. Descartes language here suggests that he sees Gods creationof essences or eternal truths as the most serious threat to freedom. Again, this is just

what my interpretation leads us to expect.

So in the opening ofPrinciplesI.41, Descartes seems to be hinting that there is animportant, but problematic, connection between the creation of the eternal truths

and his understanding of providence. That Descartes senses such a connection is

confirmed by his strategy for getting out of the difficulties surrounding providence.

For, as the following comparison reveals, it is essentially the same strategy that he

uses to avoid otherdifficulties generated by the creation of the eternal truths.Principles I.41 suggests that we perceive both divine preordination and human

freedom clearly and distinctly.48Our only reason for doubting either of them is the

apparent contradiction between them: we cannot grasp the relation of compatibility

between Gods providential control, on the one hand, and our freedom, on the other.

But Descartes insists that is no reason to deny the relation, because one of the

relata(Gods power) is something that we should never have expected to understandanyway. When God or the infinite is in question, Descartes told Hyperaspistes,

we must consider not what we can comprehend for we know that they are quite

beyond our comprehension but only what conclusions we can reach by an argu-

ment that is certain (AT 3: 430 / CSMK 194). Since providence and freedom are

both clear and distinct, we must believe them despite their apparent incompatibility.Descartes employs the same strategy for avoiding difficulties in other passages that

concern the eternal truths. Descartes believed that because God created the eternal

truths, God was free to make it not true that all the radii of the circle are equal just

as free as he was not to create the world (AT 1: 152 / CSMK 25). God was free, in

other words, to create contradictory states of affairs. Descartes discusses this in his

Sixth Replies.

Again, there is no need to ask how God could have brought it about from eternity

that it was not true that twice four make eight, and so on; for I admit this is unin-

telligible to us. Yet on the other hand I do understand, quite correctly, that there

cannot be any class of entity that does not depend on God; I also understand that

it would have been easy for God to ordain certain things such that we men cannot

understand the possibility or their being otherwise than they are. And therefore itwould be irrational for us to doubt what we do understand correctly just because

there is something which we do not understand and which, so far as we can see, thereis no reason why we should understand.(AT 7: 436 / CSM 2: 294; my italics)

47 Della Rocca 2005, note 45, notices the possible significance of this phrase.48 See also PrinciplesI.39 (AT 8a: 19 / CSM 1: 20506) on the self-evidence of free-

dom.





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182 C.P. Ragland

Similarly, in a letter to Mesland, Descartes says:

I turn to the difficulty of conceiving how God would have been acting freely and

indifferently if he had made it false that the three angles of a triangle were equal to

two right angles, or in general that contradictories could not be true together. It iseasy to dispel this difficulty by considering that the power of God cannot have any li-mits, and that our mind is finite []. The first consideration shows us that Godcannot have been determined to make it true that contradictories cannot be true

together, and therefore that he could have done the opposite. The second con-

sideration assures us that even if this be true, we should not try to comprehend it,

since our nature is incapable of doing so. (AT 4: 118 / CSMK 235; my italics)

Descartes admits that we cannot comprehend how God could make contradictories

true together. But since (in Descartes view) we have clear reasons to assert that God

has such power, and since we should not expect to understand divine power anyway,

this incomprehensibility is no reason to reject the creation doctrine. As in PrinciplesI.41, Descartes tries to dismiss objections by appealing to both the incomprehensi-

bility of divine power and the certainty of what we clearly perceive. In these passages,

which deal explicitly with the eternal truths, Descartes uses a strategy very similar to

the one in PrinciplesI.41. This provides further confirmation that in the Principlespassage, Descartes is implicitly thinking of the eternal truths.

In short, I admit that there is a problematic connection between thenon-causal account of providence I attribute to Descartes and his doc-

trine that God created the eternal truths: the creation doctrine gener-ates a kind of logical determinism. This is certainly a problem for Des-cartes, but I do not think it works against my interpretation, becausePrinciplesI.41 suggests that Descartes himself was aware the problem,and thought he could get around it by appealing to the mystery of di-vine power.

Furthermore, saying that Descartes simply appealed to mystery re-garding providence and freedom without adopting any specific ac-count of providence is actually lesscharitable than my interpretation.On my interpretation, Descartes belief in Gods incomprehensiblepower to preordain free actions is simply an instance of his more gen-eral belief in Gods incomprehensible power to create eternal truths.For to say that God can preordain free actions is ultimately to say that

God can create CFCs about us without undermining our freedom. Thepower in question is Gods power over a species of eternal truth. So themystery to which Descartes appeals to resolve the problem of provi-dence and freedom is really the very same mystery to which he had al-ready committed himself on other grounds. Thus his appeal to mysteryin PrinciplesI.41 does not get him into any deeperphilosophical troublethan he was already in. By contrast, if we think that Descartes problem





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of providence and freedom has no connection to his views about theeternal truths, then we must conclude that Descartes appealed to mys-tery on two separate scores. I take it to be a significant advantage of myinterpretation that it inhibits the proliferation of mysteries within Des-cartes philosophical system.

To be clear, I do not think that Descartes attempt to reconcile par-ticular providence and libertarian freedom is successful. Descartes mayavoid causal determinism by means of a Molina-like non-causal strat-egy, but he falls into a kind of logical determinism with his claim thatGod created CFCs. However, I doubt that Descartes himself wouldhave been very troubled by the deterministic implications of his cre-ation doctrine. In closing, I will try to explain though I cannotjustifyDescartes lack of concern. I can best explore this issue by comparingDescartes view to Molinism.

Not only in Descartes view, but in Molinism as well, creatures choices seem to

follow logically from factors beyond their control. Consider again the example of

Eve and the fruit. There are two factors that entail Eves choice. The first is Gods cre-

ation of Eve in the garden; this factor is under Gods control, not Eves. The second

factor is the truth of the conditional ( if Eve were placed in the garden, she would eat

the fruit). Unlike Descartes, the Molinist insists that this factor is notunder Godscontrol. However, it is hard to see how it could be under Evescontrol, either. Shecannot determine its truth-value by making her actual choice, for the CFC was true

long before her choice, and would have been true even if she had never existed. But if

Eve cannot control the truth of the relevant CFCs by choosing, then it seems that

this factor is not under her control. Neither factor is under her control, and both to-

gether entail her action. So her action is not free.

In response to this problem, Molinists might focus on how we exercise control over

CFCs. As we saw in part one, Suarez claimed that any CFC about a creatures free

choice is made true by a non-deterministic tendency (habitudo) toward that choicewithin the possible creature itself. Perhaps Suarez could say that a creature is respon-

sible for a CFC if the truth of that CFC is rooted in the creature quapossible, or inthe creatures eternal essence. On this understanding of control, CFCs about Eve, for

example, would be under her control because their truth or falsehood is grounded in

her nature, and so her actions would not be entailed entirely by factors beyond her

control.

It seems possible that Descartes understood control in this way. If hedid, then it is unlikely that he would have considered Gods creation ofCFCs a threat to freedom. In the letter of 27 May 1630 to Mersenne,Descartes says that God is the author of the essence of created things,no less than of their existence; and this essence is nothing other than theeternal truths (AT 1: 152, CSMK 25). And despite being created byGod, these essences are genuinely eternal:





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I do not think that the essences of things, and the mathematical truths which we

can know concerning them, are independent of God. Nevertheless I do think that

they are immutable and eternal, since the will and decree of God willed and de-

creed that they should be so. (AT 7: 380; CSM 2:261)

If I can have control over a CFC simply because it is grounded in myeternal essence, then I can have such control in Descartes picture. Thefact that God created my essence would not undermine this control.

But what if Descartes did notaccept the above conception of howCFCs come to be under our control? What could he say then? Molin-ists who rejected the above understanding of control might simplyadmit that we dont control which CFCs are true of us, but claim thatwe dont needsuch control to be free. Because CFCs specify what wewouldfreelydo, so long as nothing other than usdetermines the truth ofthe CFCs, we are genuinely free.49And on the standard Molinist view,it seems that nothing determines the truth of CFCs; certainly Goddoesnt. They are explanatorily basic, i. e. their truth is not determined

or explained by anything else. They are, as it were, just brute facts.Might Descartes have tried this line of response?

Given his unorthodox views about divine power, Descartes might bewilling to claim that God can create explanatorily basic CFCs. As wehave seen, in some discussions of the eternal truths, he suggests that

God could have made contradictory statements (like two times four isnot eight) true. In others, he suggests that God cando this: I boldlyassert that God can do everything which I perceive to be possible, butI am not so bold as to assert that he cannot do what conflicts with myconception of things I merely say that it involves a contradiction(AT 5: 272 / CSMK 363; see also AT 5: 22324 / CSMK 3589). Onesuch passage is especially salient:

I agree that there are contradictions which are so evident that we cannot put them

before our minds without judging them entirely impossible, like the one which you

suggest: that God might have brought it about that his creatures were independ-

ent of him. But if we would know the immensity of his power we should not put

these thoughts before our minds []. (AT 4:119 / CSMK 235)

Descartes seems to be hinting that God can make an independent crea-ture despite the fact that doing so involves a contradiction. Creating anexplanatorily basic CFC seems strongly analogous with if not ident-ical to creating an independent creature (quapossible). So perhaps

49 I would like to thank Michael Della Rocca for suggesting this line of Molinistresponse to me in correspondence about an earlier draft of this paper.





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Descartes would be willing to make the paradoxical claim that God candetermine CFCs to be undetermined.

However, I doubt that Descartes would be willing to say that Godactually hasmade such a contradiction true. In a passage quoted in fullabove, Descartes moves from the premise that it involves a contradic-tion to say that God has created human beings of such a nature thatthe actions of their will do not depend on his, to the conclusion that wecannot fail to believe all things [including our free will] depend uponhim (AT4: 3323; CSMK 277). This inference suggests that Descartes isnot willing to affirm actual contradictions, even with regard to divinepower. So Descartes cannot insist that CFCs are explanatorily basic, andthus cannot help himself to this second Molinist line of response.

Instead, I suspect that even if Descartes did not accept the above the-ory about howCFCs come to be under our control, he would neverthe-less insist that they areunder our control. For if we are free (as Descar-tes claims we know by experience), and our freedom implies our controlover CFCs, then we must have control over CFCs. Gods creation ofCFCs may seemto undermine our control, but in fact it does not. This,I suspect, is the main idea at work in Descartes appeal to mystery inPrinciplesI.41, and it is interestingly rooted in Descartes views abouthow language applies to God.

Descartes insists that no attributes belong to God and to ourselvesin the same sense (AT 7: 137 / CSM 2: 98), and that no essence canbelong univocally to both God and his creatures (AT 7: 433 / CSM 2:292). As Michael Della Rocca has noted, this lack of univocity meansthat statements about Gods activities may not have the implicationsthat we would normally expect.50For example, Descartes claim thatGod freely created an eternal truth Pseems to imply that Pcould havebeen false, and hence is not necessary. Nevertheless, Descartes insiststhat Pis necessary despitebeing created by God.51So it would not besurprising for Descartes to claim, in a similar fashion, that CFCs areunder our control despite being determined by God.

Descartes extends this lack of univocity specifically to divine activ-ities in the following passage:

Of course I do not think that any mode of action belongs univocally to both God

and his creatures, but I must confess that the only idea I can find in my mind to

represent the way in which God or an angel can move matter is the one which

50 See Della Rocca 2005, sections VII and VIII.51 For this reading, see Della Rocca 1999, 64f.





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shows me that way in which I am conscious I can move my own body by my own

thought. (AT 5: 347 / CSMK 375)

What Descartes here says about the causation of motion, I suspect, hewould expand to causation generally: we understand divine action bymeans ofourconcept of causation, a concept that is inadequate to thereality of Gods activity. Gods action is analogous to ours, but not en-tirely like it. In the sense of the term cause that applies to creatures, ifanother creature were to cause a CFC to be true of me, then that CFC

would not be under my control. However, in the sense of cause thatapplies to God, it may not be true that if God causes a CFC to be trueof me, then that CFC is not under my control. Since we cannot avoidthinking of God through our own concept of causation, we cannot help

falling into great difficulties when we try to reconcile providence andfreedom. But in reality, God has (somehow) created CFCs for whichwe are responsible.

As we have seen, some Dominicans claimed that divine premotiononly seemsto determine our actions, because all of our models for cau-sation are drawn from within creation and are thus inadequate to therelation between creation and creator. I suspect that Descartes ap-pealed to the inadequacy of our concepts in the same way, not to rec-oncile freedom with premotion, but to reconcile his roughly Molinist

account of providence with the creation of the eternal truths. I do notfind this strategy plausible in the hands of either the Dominicans orDescartes, but nevertheless there is good reason to think that Descarteshimself would have found it plausible, given his conception of the di-vine essence as non-univocal and incomprehensible.

In the Second Replies, Descartes suggests that his doctrine of non-univocal predication follows from Gods absolute immensity, simplic-ity, and unity (AT 7: 137 / CSM 2: 98). So Descartes understanding ofdivine simplicity is the source not only of his deepest difficulties con-cerning providence and freedom, but also of his preferred way of escapefrom those difficulties. When Descartes discussed freedom and provi-dence, he was not haphazardly tossing out what he thought his inter-locutors wanted to hear52, but rather giving consistent expression toone of his most fundamental and central intuitions about God.53

52 Gilson 1913, 394.53 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the South-Central Seminar in

Early Modern Philosophy, April 2002. For their helpful comments and criti-cisms, I would like to thank the participants at that seminar, as well as MarilynAdams, Tad Brennan, Dan Kaufman, and an anonymous reviewer for this jour-





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