COVER STORY STATE POLLS

SAFFRONSETBACK

By INDERJIT BADHWAR

EST month's mini-general election had a strange, and youcould say, even transcendent quality to it. The polling vir-tually coincided with the anniversary of the December 6

demolition and the concomitant deluge of violence. But a yearlater, in the political denouement to that fateful event, theiconography was neither bloody, nor vengeful nor charac-terised by any ineluctable, jackbooted march of religiousbigotry. The prevailing images were those of serenity in whicha quiet and peaceful political transformation took mostpoliticians by surprise.

The recurring metaphor for this election was "referen-dum"—the direct approval or disapproval by a majority of alimited issue. The term was used (id inflnitum by BJP leaders. PartyPresident L.K. Advani andKalvan Singh, the folk heroof the Babri Masjid demo-lition, had repeatedly in-toned that the people's ver-dict in the state polls wouldvindicate the act. In flour-ishes of electoral rhetoric,Kalvan Singh stated that ifthe BJP got even one seat lessthan the 221 it held in UttarPradesh—the cradle of theSangh brotherhood's "cul-tural nationalism"—itwould be tantamount torejection of the mandirmovement. The party got44 fewer seats. Far short offorming the Government.

The pace, the tone, theidiom and the referencepoint for these electionshad been set by the BJP.Party leaders had exhorted audiences to decide whether theDecember 6 incident was an exhibition of "national shame" oran act of "national pride", marking the beginning of the"largest national movement" in history, as the BJP'S Ayodhyawhite paper put it. The poll was also to be the day of the people'sjudgement on the dismissal of the BJP'S four state govern-ments. Aaj chaar pradesh, kal sara desh (Victory in four statestoday, the rest of the country tomorrow), was the slogan.

But national movements are not supposed to fizzle out inwhimpers of confusion and denials. For it was strange indeedto see the party resile from its public postures. Having lost inMadhya Pradesh and Hirnachal Pradesh and faring badly inUttar Pradesh and Rajasthan, BJP leaders denied that they hadever called the elections a referendum. Then in the strangesttwist of all. their national leaders even attributed their losses to

THE PARTY STANDINGS

Total ^ V' ^* *Seats Cong(I) BJP JD SP-BSP

Uttar ,„* 28 177 27 176Pradesh (46) (211) (91) (42)

Rajasthan 200* (™ ^ ^

Himachal ,R 52 8 0Pradesh (9) (46) (11)

Delhi 70 14 49 4

IND. &OTHERS

14(14)22

(11)8(21

3

Elections were held for 422 seats in Uttar Pradesh and 199 seatsin Rajasthan. Figures in brackets indicate previous party position.

"Madhya Pradesh: The Congress(I) won comfortably with 173 seats

all the other parties unfairly ganging up against them. Thisspoke volumes about the BJP'S position. For this was a party thathad advocated "ganging up" against the Congress(I) in 1989when it allied with V.P. Singh and the Left. And then, after itbegan to gain steam on its own, it prided itself on its uniquenessand isolation in which it stood out as the sole representative ofthe Hindus against a hostile secular world. This note of self-pityabout what was once its splendid isolation also reflects theacceptance of reality: that no party can continue to forcedivisive single-agenda issues down people's throats.

What the electorate seeks is performance and an activeparticipation in the power structure. V.P. Singh's Mandal plankand the BJP'S Hindutva certainly found a place in the hearts of

millions of Indians. But pushthem beyond a certain pointwhere they become sociallycorrosive to the exclusion ofother issues and interestgroups, and the pendulumbegins to swing backagainst one-point agendasto broader-based ones.

Whatever the com-bination of caste and localissues, they worked thistime in their own way tocheckmate the Hindutvamillenarians who hadpropagated the gospel thattheir brand of cultural na-tionalism would steam-roller all differences be-tween castes and regions.In fact, there were certaincommon elements that cutacross regional lines during

these elections which militated against the BJP'S calculations. Inthe rural areas particularly, there was a noticeable swing awayfrom extremism on account of three elements: a late-dawningbut increasing common-sense perception that Ram should notbe exploited for political purposes (the demolition of the mosque,the wiping out of the "irritant" had already weakened the oldappeal): a gradual fear that the violence that rocked Bombay wascounterproductive to economic betterment and jobs: and the fearthat communal rioting ultimately strengthens what the villagersdespise the most: the local police forces.

And this time the Muslims did nothing to help the BJP. Theyopenly rejected the mullahs and the fatwas and made sure thatfundamentalist fortresses like Aligarh and Moradabad remainedfree of shows of Muslim communalism that irritate ordinaryHindus. They waited instead to strike, not through separatist

30

leaders, but through the system. And while in Rajasthan andMadhya Pradesh they reluctantly chose the Congress) I). in UttarPradesh they chose Mulayam Singh Yadav. Mulayam alsoseemed to have learned that the art of winning elections is notforcing issues as he did the last time but political sciagraphy:knowing how to shade in the emerging political contours—Hindutva receding. Congress(I) in decline, the Janata Dalreduced to a Bihar regional party.

Politics abhors a vacuum. And you can't ignore numberswhen they stare you right in the face. Among Uttar Pradesh'svoters, for example. Harijans constitute about 21 per cent.Yadavs over 17 per cent, and Muslims nearly 19 per cent.Together it's a winning combination. But numbers alone do notwin elections. A leader has to enunciate a clear theme, andMulayam's brand of anti-BjPism was evocative. Even thoughV.P. Singh in 1989 awakened the political tastebuds of thebackwards through his Mandal and anti-corruption cocktail,the full potential of the combine that ultimately benefitedMulayam remained unused because V.P. Singh had played therole of OBC champion and the Harijans stayed mostly with theCongress) I ) and the Muslims divided their votes. Even the OBCsdid not unify solidly behind V.P. Singh because the leadership ofthe movement remained in the hands of upper caste Thakursand Jats. In 1991. when Hindutva occupied the commandingheights of politics, the Janata Dal was badly divided and the OBCand even Harijan voters shifted their allegiance from traditionalbases to the BJP.

But this time it was different. In most elections, theMuslims look for protection. And in recent ones theYadavs have been looking for real power, exercised notthrough a surrogate like Ajit Singh or V.P. Singh ortraditional consensus politics but through one of their | Svery own. like Laloo Prasad Yadav in Bihar. For the firsttime the Dalits, taking a cue from the Yadavs, begansensing the power that comes from having your ownparty rather than riding on the coat-tails of theCongress(I). and they swung towards Kanshi Ram. This |;>;fwas a potent combination that the Muslims could ignoreonly at their peril if they wanted a Hindu alliance todefeat the BJP. And this time they did not break rank.

The Kanshi Ram-Mulayam Singh brand of secu-larism has thrown up its own kind of polarisationwhich was reflected on polling day in Uttar Pradesh.Most of the urban centres in the state were divided oncommunal lines because Hindus tend to seeMulayam's party as a "Muslim" party while ruralareas witnessed a caste divide on a large scale. And ifthe worst-case-scenario prophets of doom have theirsay. the upshot could again pave the way forgrowing communal tension in the cities and debili-tating caste extremism in the form of mili tant Yadavgangsterism in the rural areas.• Possible. But certainly, one of the cardinal lessons ofthese elections has been that whenever Indian politicsswings to any extreme the pendulum always swingsback and that be it Hindutva. Mandal. or promises ofthe21 st century, even the most casteist and communalequations break down in the face of a government'spoor performance or rampant corruption.

And in any case, the election verdict is a mixedbag for political parties. The Congress)I) showed thepotential of reviving itself if charismatic leadersenunciate a clear and forceful line as they did inMadhya Pradesh. The party still remains a nationalforce to be reckoned with as does the BJP. notwith-standing its setbacks. Whatever the forces of "social

justice" may claim, they are scarcely in the position oferectinga national alternative to either the Congress(I) or the BJP. V.P.Singh may take solace in his Mandal mantra but his party is ina shambles. Its vote banks have deserted it. Its leaders areconfused. Its chronic problem of infighting will hit the partythis time more seriously, affecting its credibility. And thedisappearance of this third force from national politics couldlay the groundwork for a final confrontation at the Centrebetween the Congress(I) and the BJP. —with ZAFAR AGHA

CONGRESS(I)

A Badly Needed Reprieve

Though they did not say so, Congressmen were profoundlyrelieved to discover that the party had performed muchbetter than many of them had dared to hope. The BJP had

managed to convey such an impression of strength that somesections of the Congress(I) had been psychologically intimidated.The final results exorcised that fear when desperately desiredvictories came in Himachal Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.

While in Rajasthan the Congress(I) could have done better ifit had not been beset by factionalism, Madhya Pradesh showedthat when leaders like Arjun Singh, Scindia, Kamal Nath and theShuklas united to tackle the BJP in a determined fashion, it couldwin votes. Unfortunately for Rao. it showed that charismatic

Prime Minister Rao: finally, he has something to wave about

DKfl-MBKR li. Wi * INDIA TODAY 31

COVER STORY STATE POLLS

state leaders bent on addressing fundamental issuescould have ensured better results in the other states too.

The party has two major problems on its hands.Firstly, the emergence of strong caste and communalpolitics has left little appeal for its centrist kind of politics.Secondly, there are still some disgruntled elements whowould prefer to have a more dynamic leader than Rao.Union Minister of State P.R. Kumaramangalam fired thefirst salvo, demanding the resignation of the entire cwc.

But this was before the Madhya Pradesh verdict wasknown. The results there came as a godsend forNarasimha Rao, vindicating his decision to dismiss thefour BJP governments and demonstrating to his detrac-tors that, despite their anxieties about his vote-winningabilities, the party had put up a creditable show. Whichwas why Rao curtly told Kumaramangalam to resign. Itmakes Rao's position much more comfortable, althoughsome will no doubt harp on the fact that he was a feeblevote-winner given how his public meetings flopped.

One significant consequence is that Rao can nowpress ahead with his economic reforms. CommerceMinister Pranab Mukherjee said after the MadhyaPradesh victory: "It is an endorsement of our policies.The reforms process is now irreversible and we willpursue it with more zeal.'' Indeed, Rao can go to the pollsin two years' time and tell voters that economicliberalisation has done wonders for the country and thathe succeeded in keeping the BJP at bay.

To revive the party further, Rao will have to pursue amore aggressively secu lar line to win over the Muslims. Itshould not be too difficult as Muslims, despite theirdetermined rebuff to the party in Uttar Pradesh, know that it isstill the only force at the national level that can combat the BJP.

Those who had prophesied the Congress(I)'s total eclipsewill have to reconsider. Certainly, its support base in the northis shaky and its traditional votebanks are looking exceedinglydodgy, but it has shown itself to be a fighting force against aformidable challenger and that it should never be underesti-mated. After all, it is not some political wannabe. It has aprodigious history, enormous financial resources and animpressive organisation behind it. It will be to Rao's advantagethat he can say that the party under his leadership has beenspared the worst, enabling it to forge ahead with economicreforms and showing the country that it has not lost its nervevis-a-vis the BJP. And all this, he might add, without the benefitof charisma or oratory. —ZAFAR AGHA

BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY

Charting a New Course

FOR L.K. Advani and the BJP, it is not only seats that havebeen lost in these elections but also a precious momen-tum. Not to mention loss of face. From the time of the BJP-

sponsored bandh in February to the Janadesh yatras under-taken by four top leaders to mark the start of the electioncampaign, it was intent on declaring that it was the only partyon the move. Perched on a self-proclaimed higher moralground, the BJP warned that the four state elections weremerely a precursor of things to come and their victory wouldfinally rob Rao of any excuse to continue in power.

Eventually, none of that came to pass. In Uttar Pradesh, theBJP registered just 33 per cent of the vote, a mere 2 per centincrease over its 1991 figure and despite a record 55 per centturnout this time. Having climbed from two Lok Sabha seats in

Advani: why isn't the party line working?

1984 to 88 in 1989 and then 119 in 1991 using the Ram card, theBJP saw no reason to scale down its Ram rhetoric in UttarPradesh, especially since these were the first elections after thedemolition. Though the leadership did try to diversify, one seniorRSS leader explained the failure by saying: "The BJP cannotchange tack so fast because it takes a long time for the RSS torecommend any change." This is why, despite instructions tohawks like Murli Manohar Joshi and Uma Bharati not to be toorabid, the party still ended up harping on the old themes.

Yet, none of this worked as well as it had in the past. For onething, non-Bjp parties confronted the BJP head-on over thedemolition issue. Joshi, for one, may now argue that the partyshould have pushed a more militant line but with A.B. Vajpayeeunlikely to endorse any anti-Advani move and Joshi stillconsidered the most unpopular of the trio, Advani willprobably have the final say in any policy changes.

Ftis enemies within theparty, however, are alreadysaying that only six monthsafter he took over as presidentthe party has suffered a severesetback. Joshi will be joined byothers who will demand areturn to militant Hinduism.But these demands will betempered by the knowledgethat the relatively moderatetone adopted by their leadersduring this election was notfrom desire but from necessityfor it had become painfullyobvious from the Janadeshyatra that the Ram mantrawas failing to elicit the sameenthusiasm. It might have

The BJPappears tohave learntit cannotcontinue asa single issueparty andstill hope togrow.

32 I N D I A T O D A Y » DECEMBER 15. 199!

COVER STORY STATE POLLS3HAWAN SINGH

worked once but wouldn't forever. Also, Hindu militancymight be harder to resuscitatein Uttar Pradesh given the SP-BSP alliance, although partyleaders hope the alliance willcrack up due to caste tensionsbetween the Yadavs and Dalits.

The BJP will be quick tochart a fresh strategy. It ap-pears to have learnt the lessonthat the name of Ram will notkeep conjuring up the votes itneeds and that it cannot con-tinue as a single issue party if ithopes to make more headway."From Ram mandir, weshould turn to Ram Rajyabased on concrete socio-eco-nomic policies," said K.N.Govindacharya, party generalsecretary. A pointer to its fu-ture stand is that it intends toadopt policies designed to winover the Dalits and backwardcastes even if it means dilutingits previous opinions, fash-ioned by upper caste Hindus."A reverse in a couple of states does not worry us," said onenational executive member. "But more and more backwardsand SCs whom we consider to be Hindus leaving the Hindutvafold certainly does." Redressing this problem, along withemphasising the party's approval of Mandal and the promotionof the social charter which the party announced last June, willform the main part of its post-debacle "get in touch with thepeople" campaign to be launched in December. All in all, thelotus has undoubtedly shed a few petals. But it hasn't wiltedyet. —YIJBARAJ GHIMIRE

JANATA DAL

Swallowing a Bitter Pill

FOR the Janata Dal, the results from Uttar Pradesh havebeen a draught of bitter irony. While the party had longploughed a lonely furrow on its twin planks of social

justice and secularism, it is the SP-BSP combine that has reapedthe benefits. The Janata Dal has had to countenance the loss ofits vote bank of Muslims, SCs/STs and the backwards to thealliance and finds itself reduced from its position as the mainopposition—it won 91 seats in 1991—to a minor player,locked in battle with the Congress(I) to spare itself thehumiliation of also-ran status.

In fact, of the four main parties in Uttar Pradesh, it was theJanata Dal which garnered the smallest percentage of votes. It gota paltry 13 per cent, compared to the SP-BSP'S 3 3 per cent, the BJP'S33 and the Congress(I)'s 20. More galling yet, in the fight for theminority vote, while the alliance got 55 per cent and the Con-gress(I) 21 per cent, the Janata Dal was left with just 15 per cent.This, despite the Delhi Shahi Imam's fatwa in its favour.

The party's dismal fate was sealed when the BSP'S KanshiRam took his SC-ST votes to Mulayam Singh. It did not take theMuslims long to realise that the duo would be the safest bet todefeat the BJP. Moreover, the party did not have a leader ofMulayam Singh's stature to project as chief minister. And

V.P. Singh: lying down and rolling with the punches

after V.P. Singh's withdrawal from the campaign due to ill-health coupled with the party's perennial insolvency, theJanata Dal campaign ran aground in the last crucial week.

The virtual rout in the crucial state has reduced the party to aregional grouping. Deserted by its vote banks, bereft oforganisational structure and blighted by a squabbling leadership,the Janata Dal has become something of an anachronism. "Intoday's political environment, there is little justification for theJanata Dai's existence," says party leader Ramakrishna Hegde.

The Janata Dai's lacklustre performance elsewhere is anindicator of its future. In Rajasthan, it frittered away the Jatvote thanks to the infighting between Jat chieftains 0.P. Chau-tala and Ajit Singh. And in Himachal Pradesh, where the Jan-ata Dal was never a strong force, the results confirmed its non-existent position and the fact that the state has adopted a two-party system with the BJP and Congress(I) ruling alternately.

The Janata Dal hardly had a strategy. Even the euphoriaover the pre-poll unity of the various factions evaporated asDevi Lai, Chautala and Yashwant Sinha deserted the fold. The

pro-Mandal lobby led by LalooYadav and Sharad Yadavtook a strident line, whileHegde, George Fernandes andBiju Patnaik pressed for amore broad-based policy."We can't survive as a singleissue party," said Fernandes.

There is every reason tosuspect that leaders who cametogether only recently will gotheir separate ways. Ajit Singhis already feeling uneasy withthe polarisation between theSP-BSP alliance and the BJP oncaste and communal lines."Most of my supporters havegone to the BJP," he admits.

While the party plans its

Deserted byits vote banksand reducedto a mereregionalgrouping, theJanata Dalis a spentforce today.

34 INDIA TODAY « DKCl-MHKK IS. IWi

next move, the leaders still do not see eye to eye. Laloo Yadavwants the party to support a BSP-SP government in Uttar Pradeshto keep the BJP out, but Ajit Singh thinks otherwise—there's nolove lost between him and Mulayam Singh. But the biggestquestion is about the leaders themselves. Ajit Singh's men havebeen humbled in his dens of Baghpat. Barnala and Sardana. InChandra Shekhar's citadel, Ballia, the party failed to win a singleseat. And V.P. Singh's hometown, Manda, went to the BSP.

Indeed, the outcome of these polls could not have come at aworse time for V.P. Singh. His health is failing and his party isin disarray. Within the Janata Dal, the forces and theindividuals he nurtured have begun to turn their backs onhim. And here's the irony: having given his all to the OBCs.V.P. Singh now finds himself labelled an upper caste leader.Scoffed a senior partyman: "You cannot talk of social justiceand be an upper caste leader." —JAVED M. ANSARI

THE STATES

Surprise OutcomesUTTAR PRADESH

The Rise of Mulayam Singh

IF a week in politics is a long time, three weeks of campaign-ing is an eternity. Long enough to wipe out old forces andraise new ones. Mulayam Singh clearly realised very early

on that the vacuum that would be left by the Congress(I)suffering yet another rout in Uttar Pradesh, the Janata Dalbeing wiped out and the BJP juggernaut slowing down, couldbe filled by another force—his party' s formidable alliance withKanshi Ram's BSP.

As the other parties tried to gather what remained of theirdignity, Mulayam Singh was the only politician who washappy while political reputations and hopes crumbled allaround him. It was the sheer scale of his victory that was soimpressive. In 1991, the SP and the BSP had together won 42seats. Last fortnight, the combine won 176, just one short ofthe BJP'S tally, demolishing the widespread prediction that theBJP would be the only party able to form a government.

The SP-BSP combine made inroads into every region of thestate in a total vindication of Mulayam's adamant (some saidfoolish (refusal to do a deal with V.P. Singh's Janata Dal and hisconfident (most said ludicrous) prediction that his alliancewith Kanshi Ram would take them to victory, despite theherculean obstacles in their way.

V.P. Singh had hoped that the 91 seats his party had won inthe 1991 elections, combined with the 42 that Mulayam Singhrepresented, would provide a winning chance for the Janata Dal."Nobody could have even touched us if Mulayam had joined us,"said V.P. Singh wistfully afterthe results were announced.

Mulayam Singh had a verygood reason for spurning V.P.Singh's advances. He was wor-ried that if the two had fieldedjoint candidates against the BJP,the sight of Muslims voting enbloc for them would have driventhe Hindus straight into thearms of the BJP, as it had in 1991.This time, he did not want totake any risks over communalpolarisation in that he wantedto avoid Hindu voters seeingany obvious ganging up of allthe anti-Bjp parties outside thepolling booths. He preferredthem to see Muslims lining up to

The BJP ishoping thatthe Mulayam-Kanshi Ramcombine willbreak due tocaste tensionsbetween theirtwo groups.

Mulayam Singh: the dark horse gallops to victory

vote only for his candidates and he reckoned that as long as he waseffective in projecting himself as a viable alternative to the BJP, theMuslims would not even look at the other parties.

With this in mind, he undertook whirlwind tours of thestate, paying special attention to Muslim areas, soon after hejoined hands with Kanshi Ram. The two represented a hugevote bank comprising around 1 crore Yadavs and 1.58 croreHanjans. It didn't take long for the Muslims to realise that thiswas a winning combination which they could not afford toignore. So they voted for it en bloc. The turnout of Muslimvoters was 70 to 80 per cent, the highest ever in the state.Among Harijans too, there was a real enthusiasm for votingbecause they saw a definite chance of Kanshi Ram ending upsharing power with Mulayam Singh.

This communal polarisation did, of course, give some-thing of a boost to the BJP in the sense that a last-minute Hindubacklash, particularly in urban areas, was an importantcomponent of the increased voter turnout that took place inthe state. It went up by 8 per cent from 49 per cent in 1991.INDIA TOD AY'S detailed analysis of the increased turnout showsthat 2 per cent of it went in favour of the BJP. But the Hindu

COVER STORY STATE POLLS

backlash was not enough to give it the majority it needed.And against the paltry 2 per cent that the BJP got from theextra turnout, Mulayam Singh and Kanshi Ram got nearly 6per cent of it from the Muslims and Yadavs.

From the results of the 422 seats (three were counter-manded) made available by the Election Commission, the SP-BSP combine had gained across all five regions. The BJP, incontrast, made gains in only one region—western UttarPradesh. The major gains for the SP-BSP were in thepreviously Bjp-dominated eastern Uttar Pradesh where, itwon 34 seats, 18 more than in 1991.

NUMBERS apart, how did Mulayam the man andcampaigner do it? A critical element was hisheadstart in presenting himself as a prospective

alternative to the BJP way before the election campaignstarted. He organised frenetic public meetings starting lastAugust. He was fully aware of his constraints. The main onewas obvious: for a one-man party to contest al!42 5 seats wasa daunting task. Equally difficult was to banish his image asa cocky Hindu-baiter and un-abashed Muslim appeaser if hehoped to forge a Hindu-Muslim alli-ance against the BJP. The secondtask was a psychological one and hehandled it with ease by graduallypainting himself into a moderateSanatani Hindu, a devotee ofHanuman and Krishna and aimingbarbs at Imam Bukhari and conser-vative mullahs.

The first task was one of logistics.He reserved three to four days aweek for small public meetings inmoffusil areas which he knew hewould not be able to visit again oncethe heat was on. He did not evenhave a second rung of leaders whomhe could depend on to carry hisparty's standard. By October endMulayam had completed more than

PARTY POSITIONTotal seats 425

CONG(I)

80 small and big public meetings across the state.Another major limitation was his lack of oratorical

virtuosity to match that of Advani's, Vajpayee's or for thatmatter Kalyan Singh's histrionics. He decided, instead, toplay to the gallery by raising populist local issues—thepromotion of sub-inspectors, permanent jobs for homeguards, the repeal of the anti-cheating act against studentsand the abolition of sales tax for traders, to name just a few.One of his pet assurances was: "Main saari samasyaon ka haldoonga par abhi topehledesh aurpradesh ko bachana hai" (I willfind solutions to all your problems but first we have to savethis country and the state). This was his larger "secular"message,'that the true, moderate Hinduism had to besalvaged from the ravages of the BJP. The message was farmore effective in rural India than in the towns.

And throughout, Mulayam hung on to Kanshi Ram as aprized possession even though the BSP chief was often a liabilityduring public functions. Kanshi Ram sounds like a manpossessed with a revanchist mission rather than a politicianout in the field.wooing voters. But Mulayam handled him with

utmost care and humoured him aswell whenever necessary.

Now that the combine has madeit, Mulayam can certainly look for-ward to a bed of thorns. KanshiRam's increasingly vituperative ut-terances against other castes andtheir leaders—whom the combineneeds badly if a coalition govern-ment is to work—is not going to helpMulayam who sees healing as amajor political mission. AndMulayam is also handicapped, asare all one-man party leaders, by theabsence of any second line leader-ship to share his load.

For the Congress(I) and theJanata Dal, the election was atrauma. The brutal rejection theysuffered at the hands of the votersoutdid the surprises and jolts of

JANATA SP-BSP OTHERSDAL

UTTAR PRADESH GAINS/LOSSESCENTRAL

75 SeatsLIE

Seats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 3

BJP 31

Janata Dal 4

SP-BSP 37

-16

+2

-7

+25

ROHILKHAND50 Seats

Seats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 3 -1

BJP 24 -9

Janata Dal 4 -5

SP-BSP 16 +13

Total Seats 425*^Elections heldfor 422 seats

Gain/Loss of seatsover previous election

Gonda ~"\ .Ayodhyu

Assamgarli ~

BUNDELKHAND21 Seats

Seats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 2 2

BJP 7 4

Janata Dal 2 +2

SP-BSP 10 +5

WEST U.R101 SeatsSeats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 7 +4

BJP 56 +16

Janata Dal 12 -19

SP-BSP 25 +17

EAST ILK159 SeatsSeats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 7 -6

BJP 49 -34

Janata Dal 5 -34

SP-BSP 87 +73

U.R HILLS19 Seats

Seats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 6 +3

BJP 10 -5

Janata Dal 0 -1

SP-BSP 1 +1

36

COVER STORY STATE POLLS

Mulayam Singh with his ally, Kanshi Ram: a masterful display of political acumen

1991. The Congress(I), which had hinged its hopes on thehectic 'Vikas Yatras' of its leaders as well as on GovernorMotilal Vora, and had expected to improve its tally of47, hasdrawn a big blank. Veteran Congressman N.D. Tiwari hadanticipated winning nearly 100 seats as the campaign drewto a close. On a similar note, V.P. Singh thought that hisparty would be in full control of the eastern and westernparts of the state from where the Janata Dal planned tocollect more than 200 seats. "We dominate both sides of themap. Let the others fight for the rest," he had said.

But even the worst losers could not deny Mulayam Singhand Kanshi Ram their moment of indisputable triumph. Thefact remains that they have a lot on their hands. As long asthe Congress(I) or the Janata Dal give them support, they

can form the new govern-ment. It will open a newchapter of alliances in thestate. And horse-trading.The most likely scenario isthe SP-BSP combine forminga government with thecombined support of theCongress(I) and Janata Dal.The BJP went through themotions of staking its claimto form a government in abid to put on record the factthat despite being the singlelargest party, it was not ableto form a government be-cause none of the other par-ties agreed to support it. Butthere is one school of

For theMuslims,the SP-BSPalliance wasa winningcombinationthey couldignore only attheir own peril.

thought which claims that the BJP might try its hand atwooing Ajit Singh and some Independents in order to springa surprise on Mulayam Singh that would match the shockquotient of the surprise he and Kanshi Ram sprang oneveryone. —DILIP AWASTHI with DEEPAK GIDWANI

RAJASTHAN

The Horse-trading Begins

IT was the unkindest joke of all. Both the Congress(I) and theBJP polled the same number of votes in Raj asthan—about38 per cent each. But by polling just 0.31 per cent more than

the Congress(I), the BJP managed to secure 95 of the 199 as-sembly seats for which elections were held. The Congress(I) got76 seats. Obviously, the large number of party rebels, Indepen-dent candidates and other parties cut into its vote-bank.

The BJP is, however, disappointed at not securing a clearmajority. Said former chief minister Bhairon SinghShekhawat: "I had not expected the tally to be so low. Welost some sure seats too."

For the non-Bjp parties, the election results have a clearmessage: they must get together if they want to defeat theBJP, or the split in the anti-Bjp votes will result in the partycontinuing to win more seats despite getting fewer votes.

Given that this time round, the alliance between the BJPand the Janata Dal—which had seen them sweep to powerin the 1990 Assembly elections—had disappeared, thesituation altered dramatically. Instead of a three-horse race,the tussle was between the BJP and the Congress(l) and bothseemed evenly poised at the start. The Congress(I), whichcaptured 33 per cent of the vote in the previous Assembly

DECEMBER 15. 149! » I N D I A T O D A Y 41

COVER STORY + STATE POLLS

Bhairon Singh Shekhawat: he won but his former cabinet colleagues were decimated

elections, added five per cent more to its tally and gained 26seats as a result, mainly at the expense of the Janata Dal. TheBJP too cut into the Janata Dai's votes and ended up with 10more seats than its earlier tally of 85. But as compared tovoting patterns in the Assembly segments in the Lok Sabhaelections in 1991, both parties suffered drops in their votepercentages. The BJP lost two per cent and the Congress(I)lost as much as six per cent.

THIS was probably a direct outcome of the presence of a largenumber of rebels in the fray and a reflection of the large-scaleresentment over the ticket distribution in both the

Congress(I) and the BJP. The Congress(I) had a particularlydisgruntled bunch on its hands after it gave 17 tickets to therelatives of powerful state lead-ers. As a result, nearly 50 Con-gressmen, including 17 formerMLAs and six former ministers,contested against official nomi-nees. Many of them won.

What was surprising,though, was the fate of some ofthe political bosses. Shekhawatwon the safe seat of Bali inPali district but lost in Ganga-nagar. Another victim was theglamorous Vasundhara RajeScindia, the BJP MP fromJhalawar, who lost fromDholpur. Most of Shekhawat'sformer cabinet colleagues alsolost. The Congress(I) too suf-fered a jolt when its two former

The messagefor the non-BJP partieswas that if theywant to keepthe BJP out ofpower, theymust uniteagainst it.

chief ministers, Hiralal Deopura and Jagannath Pahadia, lost.Former home minister Digvijay Singh, who had defected fromthe Congress(I) to the Janata Dal and then to the BJP and thenback to the Congress(I) just before the elections, was alsodefeated.

Oddly enough, even the relatives of the political heavy-weights ended up losing. The wives of two Union ministers—Abrar Ahmed's wife Yasmeen Abrar and Rajesh Pilot's wifeRama Pilot—lost. So did the sons of Buta Singh and HarideoJoshi. Two of Balram Jakhar's nephews and a nephew of Jatstrongman Nathuram Mirdha were also defeated.

Compared to the 1990 assembly elections, when theCongress(I) had secured only 50 seats, the party recovered itsposition in the four major belts—Marwar, Mewar, Bikanerand Shekhawati. Even though the BJP gained in Bikaner andmaintained its traditional hold over Hadoti, it lost in Marwar,Mewar and Shekhawati.

The upshot of the election results is a hung assembly which hasalready led to a great deal of horse-trading. Both the BJP and theCongress(I) are trying their best to woo their rebels and theIndependents who won. The 21 Independent MLAs are the mostsought after. They are being put up in luxury hotels and are beingwined and dined. Many Congress(I) leaders, including Bhajan Lai,whose name has become synonymous with moneybag politics,have descended on Jaipur to secure their support. Not to be out-done, the BJP has converted its state office, where the IndependentMLAs supporting it have been put up, into a virtual fortress.Shekhawat, a pastmaster in the art of political bartering, is learntto have split the Janata Dal, with two of its MLAs pledging theirsupport to him. Nor is the horse-trading likely to be over with theformation of the government because it will be headed by a partywith a wafer-thin majority, leaving it in danger of being toppled.

An analysis of the voting pattern shows that the BJP got

42 I N D I A T O D A Y » D E C E M B E R 15. 1993

more seats than the Congress(I) because of a division in thesecular votes. Although the BJP tried to rouse passions on theHindu nationalism issue, it failed to work. In fact there werehardly any issues in the polls, forcing the parties to resort tomore mundane matters such as the image of the candidate,the development record and caste combinations.

IN terms of caste equations, the Congress(I) had a clear edgeover the BJP because of the support of the powerful Jat voterswho play a dominant role in 40 constituencies. Besides,

Governor Baliram Bhagat, who allegedly played a partisan rolein favour of the Congress(I), tried hisbest to muster the support of the OBCs,SCs and STs by his politically-inclineddecisions just before the polls. But theBJP played the same card. While select-ing party candidates, Shekhawat notonly kept in view the caste of thecandidate but also his sub-caste. As aresult, the caste factor did not help theCongress(I) despite its high expecta-tions on this account.

Nor did issues such as develop-ment and stability lure the voters.Most of all, the Congress(I) failed tohighlight the failures of the dismissedBJP government. Shekhawat, on theother hand, launched a virulent cam-paign lambasting President's Rule inthe state, asking people to return himto power and undo the injustice ofhis sacking.

PARTY POSITIONTotal seats 200

9585

Seats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Total Seats 200**Elections heldfor 199 seats

BIKANER22 SeatsSeats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 8 +1BJP 10 +7Janata Dal 1 -9Others 3 +1

MARWAR42 Seats

Seats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 17 +8BJP 19 0Janata Dal 0 -12Others 6 +4

SHEKHAWATI80 Seats*

Seats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 34 +12BJP 33 +5Janata Dal 2 -22Others 10 +4

HADOTI18 SeatsSeats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 5 +3BJP 12 -3Janata Dal 0 -1Others 1 +1

In fact, the BJP enjoyed a big advantage in Rajasthanby having a leader of Shekhawat's stature. While the Cong-ress(I) leaders were involved in infighting, the BJP suc-ceeded in putting up a joint front under the leadership ofShekhawat, who was projected as the next chief minister. The70-year-old leader launched a whirlwind campaign in thestate and was on the road for practically 18 hours every day,travelling to all the 200 constituencies.

In sharp contrast, the Congress(I) did not have a singleleader who could have campaigned all over the state. BothHarideo Joshi and Nathuram Mirdha suffered from health

problems. While Joshi did not cam-paign at all, Mirdha did, but his appealwas limited to the Jat areas. Otherleaders such as state Congress(I) chiefParasram Maderna and Rajesh Pilotalso proved to be political pygmies. In away, it was the party's failure to projecta strong contender for chief minister-ship that harmed its prospects.

With the elections over, Shekhawat'scharisma is likely to ensure that hebecomes the next chief minister, alongwith the fact that he has a wide appealthat can cut across ideological affili-ations, is not perceived as a fundamental-ist and is clear of the corruption taintwhich affected the image of his BJPcounterpart in Madhya Pradesh. Theother possible contender being Joshi,who is bed-ridden, Shekhawat shouldhave a smooth ride.

Apart from the disadvantage ofhaving to rely on men like Joshi, who could not move aroundvery much, campaigning for it instead of real crowd-pullers,the Congress(I)'s electioneering was a thoroughly misman-aged affair. Maderna was too busy in his own constituency tolook after organisational affairs. The BJP'S campaign, on theother hand, was extremely well organised. If the Congress(I)lost it was not because the BJP was any better. It was because itsleaders refused to close their ranks to face the BJP challenge.

—N.K. SINGH

HIMACHAL PRADESH

Basic Issues Triumph

ON the face of it, it was a "no wave" election in HimachalPradesh. But the landslide victory of the Congress(I) inthe elections to the state Assembly not only surpassed

the expectations of the party itself, it also stunned the BJP andupset the electoral arithmetic of politicians and pollsters alike.Riding on what turned out to be a strong anti-Bjp undercur-rent, the Congress(I), despite having gone to the hustings as afaction-riddled party, romped home with a three-fourthsmajority in the 68-member Assembly. While in the 1990elections its tally was a poor nine, this time it bagged 52 seats.More importantly, it has avenged its crushing defeat at thehands of the Bjp-Janata Dal alliance last time.

The BJP'S bid to regain power was demolished and it couldretain only eight seats, its lowest-ever tally in the state. This wasjust one more than the seven seats cornered by Congress(I) rebelscontesting as Independents. By all parameters, the poll outcomecame as a severe indictment of the performance of the 33-monthBJP rule in the state. Disenchantment with the Shanta Kumar

D E C E M B R R 15. 1993 » I N D I A T O D A Y 43

C O V E R S T O R Y S T A T E P O L L S

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government translated into a vote for change. "We have beenpunished for certain perceived anti-people decisions," admit-ted Shanta Kumar. The anti-Bjp sentiment turned out to be sostrong that, barring one, all the members of the dismissed BJPministry were defeated, mainly by Congress(I) lightweights.

PREDOMINANTLY, local bread-and-butter issues influ-enced voting behaviour. The verdict was a cumulativereaction to the unpopular decisions of the BJP govern-

ment which had alienated two very influential sections in thestate: government employees and apple-growers. Last year thegovernment had crushed the employees' agitation and en-forced the 'no work, no pay' principle, causing resentmentamong the 1.60 lakh employees. As nearly every household inHimachal Pradesh has one or more members in governmentservice, the BJP'S stance cost it dearly.

The BJP'S total rout in the old Himachal areas, atraditional Congress(I) bastion where the BJP had madeinroads in the 1990 election, was mainly due to the applelobby's ire against the mishandling of the apple-growers' stirover the withdrawal of a subsidy by the BJP government. Thefailure of the BJP regime to fulfil itspopulist development programmesalso loaded the dice against it.

Clearly, the anti-establishmentsentiment vis-a-vis the BJP took pre-cedence over its poll planks. The BJPcommitted a tactical blunder byfielding all its 48 MLAs in the dis-solved assembly. Though the deci-sion was aimed at averting anydissidence, it recoiled by enforcingthe anti-establishment factor. Even-tually, only four of the 48 won.

Noticing mid-campaign that theanti-establishment undercurrentwas getting stronger, the BJP tried todivert the focus from local issues. Butthere were no takers for the Ramtemple and Hindutva card that itwhipped up. Atal Behari Vajpayeewent to the extent of seeking anapology from the estranged sections.Nothing, however, worked. Neither could the party capitaliseon the Congress(I)'s 'weak* candidates—a result of the tussleover party tickets between PCC(I) chief Virbhadra Singh andUnion Minister of State Sukh Ram.

The caste factor too went against the BJP, particularly inthe Kangra region. TheShanta Kumar govern-ment's decision to challengethe Mandal report in theSupreme Court pushed thebackwards, the ScheduledCastes and Scheduled Tribestowards the Congress(I). Itwas clear from the BJP man-aging to score only two seatsout of the 19 reserve constit-uencies in the district whilein the '90 elections the BJP-Janata Dal alliance hadswept the region. A majorcasualty of the caste factorwas Shanta Kumar who lostto Congress(I) lightweight

OLD HIMACHAL42 SeatsSeats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 34 +27BJP 2 -24Janata Dal 0 -7Others 6 +4

NEW HIMACHAL.26 SeatsSeats won Gain/in 1993 Loss

Cong(I) 18 +16BJP 6 -14Janata Dal 0 -4Others 2 +2

HIMACHALPRADESHGAINS/LOSSESTotal seats 68

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V^.. .}•( ;Man^H /CKinnaur J\j£Bi(a'$pur .̂.y . , - "v \^

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PARTY POSITIONTotal seats 68

1990

1993

11

CONG(I) BJP JANATA OTHERSDAL

Swing infavour ofCong(I)

SwingagainstBJP

Theanti-BJPoutcome of thepoll showsthat politics inthe state hasreverted todevelopmentalissues.

Rana Man Chand on his home turfof Sulah, dominated by the Rajputs.

The election results in Kangraand the rest of the lower Himachalareas exploded the myth of theregion being the stronghold of theBJP. Apart from Kangra, the partyfaced major reverses in Bilaspur,Mandi, Solan, Sirmaur, Hamirpurand Una districts. Kangra proved abountiful hunting ground for theCongress(I) rebels. The victory ofseven rebels, six of them alignedwith Virbhadra Singh, proved hiscontention that potential winnerswere kept out.

What, however, does not augurwell for the Congress(I) is the fac-tionalism in the party which is likelyto become intense as the rivals try tograb a bigger share of the cake.

Already, Virbhadra Singh and Sukh Ram are locked in abattle for the coveted chief ministership. Yet, for now. theCongress(I) is euphoric and the BJP doesn't know where tolook. RAMESH VINAYAK

MADHYA PRADESH

A Conclusive Change

F (!

I ORMER Madhya Pradesh chief minister Kailash Joshimay have won his Baghi seat by the skin of his teeth.Unfortunately for the BJP, some of its other leaders were

not so lucky. While Joshi scraped through, beating hisCongress(I) rival by a meagre 336 votes, at least 15 otherheavyweights from the BJP ended up losing at the hustings.

The BJP'S defeat in Madhya Pradesh is clear and conclu-sive. The party, which had come to power with 220 of the320 seats in the last elections, could get only 114 seats of the316 that went to the polls. The Congress(I), which won only56 seats last time, has almost trebled its tally to 173. Withelections for four other seats scheduled later, the Congress(I)has already gained a comfortable majority of 15. This is not

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C O V E R S T O R Y S T A T E P O L L S

One reasonfortheBJP'sdefeat inMadhyaPradesh wasthe failure ofits Hindutvaslogan,

to say that the BJP has beenrouted in the state. The factthat it lost by wafer-thinmargins—in one case fewerthan 10 votes—is signifi-cant. It was the runner up inas many as 101 seats.

A significant change in thestate is the rise of a new star,the BSP. From just two seats in1990, it has increased its tallyto 12 and was the runner up inseven other seats. Its area ofinfluence is the Rewa andGwalior divisions borderingUttar Pradesh.

After the Congress(I)'simpressive win, the logical

next step was the battle for the chief ministership. As S.C.Shukla, one of the contenders, said: "It was easier to win theelections; the real fight starts now." Although DigvijaySingh and Kamal Nath are also in the race, their chances aredim since both of them are unacceptable to MadhavraoScindia. In fact, Scindia could be a strong contender himselfbecause a desperate Arjun Singh may back him just toprevent his rival, S.C. Shukla, from coming back to power.

The Singh group will be handicapped by the fact that theCongress(I) has not done very well in his area. Not only did itlose the Churhat seat, Singh's home turf, it also got only oneout of seven seats in Rewa, two out of six seats in Satna andthree out of six seats in Sidhi. In sharp contrast,Chhattisgarh, where the Shukla brothers had a major say inticket distribution, returned about 60 per cent of thecandidates fielded by the Congress(I). This, and the fact thatthe Shuklas are close to Rao, may eventually tilt the balancein S.C. Shukla's favour.

Now that the Madhya Pradesh voter has made his choiceclear, the question is: why did the BJP lose in a state where ithad a fairly strong base? One reason for its defeat is that theBJP kept harping on the Hindutva card which failed to cutmuch ice with the voters in the state. Said Kailash Joshi:"Our workers forgot everything else. They just shouted JaiShri Ram." The reaction of other BJP leaders to the party'sdefeat is similar. Said Uma Bharati: "Everyone touches apriest's feet in a temple but when he stands in an election, hissecurity deposit gets forfeited."

The only place where the BJP'SHindutva slogan had some impactwas in the urban areas. The partyswept the polls in Indore, Bhopal,Jabalpur and Raipur where the ur-ban middle classes, presumably up-per caste Hindus, were swayed bythe line of "Hindutva in danger".But even that did not work in Gwa-lior, where the BJP faced a strongchallenge in Scindia.

Another reason for the BJP'S de-feat, according to no less than for-mer chief minister Sunderlal Patwa,was the performance of his govern-ment. Said dissident BJP leader V.K.Sakhlecha: "The Patwa govern-ment's credibility was low and theparty has paid a price for it."

The BJP also paid a price for its

PARTY POSITIONTotal seats 70

49

14

CONG(I) BJP JANATA OTHERS•'-£ V- • '•'•-: - DAL •

infighting. The distribution of tickets on a purely factionalbasis led to considerable resentment within the party. TheCongress(I) too could have done still better if its leaders hadbeen able to put up a united front over the distribution oftickets. Shukla estimates the party lost about 30 to 40 seatsjust because of the distribution of tickets to undeservingcandidates. In Chhattisgarh, for instance, the chances of atleast six official Congress(I) candidates were wrecked byrebel candidates.

The one advantage the Congress(I) had was the galaxy ofleaders—Arjun Singh, S.C. Shukla, V.C. Shukla, Madhav-rao Scindia, Kamal Nath and Digvijay Singh. Apart, ofcourse, from the fact that the disillusioned Madhya Pradeshvoter needed a change in government. —N.K. SINGH

DELHI

The Old Loyalties Languish

THE Delhi Congress(I) chief H.K.L. Bhagat's cuttingcomment on the verdict, "I'd like to congratulate theJanata Dal for ensuring a BJP win in Delhi", was really a

grope for an excuse where there was none. In this war ofattrition, the Janata Dal, even if it happened to ensure theCongress(I)'s defeat in 20 assembly constituencies, wasfighting to win. The record was set straight by Delhi JanataDal chief Ram Vir Singh Bidhuri: "What happened in UttarPradesh? The Congress(I) put up people who wouldn't win...eating into our votes."

And as for the BJP—in its moment of triumph—there is littleneed for reflection. Party leaders privately acknowledge thatthey did not expect such an overwhelming majority (49 seatsout of 70) even in their wildest dreams. Especially as Delhi,which has traditionally been bitterly polarised between theCongress(I) and the BJP, has witnessed many a direct fight withclose victory margins. Usually, the trend in past elections haswitnessed the BJP and the Congress(I) sharing the booty andgetting around 40 per cent each of the votes polled. This timeround, though, the BJP has kept up its performance (40.6 percent), the Congress(I) is down (33 per cent) and the Janata Dal(at 12 per cent) is taking its first steady steps in the capital.

In an issueless election, parties desperately depend ontraditional vote banks. The BJP, with its extraordinaryorganisational skills, had its vote banks wrapped up. The

Punjabis and Bania traders hadbeen mobilised and were well usedto fill up ballot boxes. But the loyaltyof the Congress(I) vote banks—Muslims, SCs-STs and jhuggi-jhopridwellers—had to be tested, torn asthey were between the Congress(I)and the Janata Dal. In almost 20constituencies, when the votespolled for the Janata Dal and theCongress(I) were taken together,they far exceeded the BJP'S votes.Another important factor this timewas the Sikhs who, facing an assem-bly election for the first time sincethe anti-Sikh riots of 1984, totallysupported the BJP.

But what irks most Congressmenis that Delhi's election was the onlyone contradicting a national trend—that of checkmating the saffron wave.

1993ELECTIONS

46 I N D I A T O D A Y » DECEMBER 15. 1993

COVER STORY + STATE POLLS

A delighted Madan Lai Khurana: Delhi's new "guardian angel"

Polling around the largely urban and educated constituencieswas high, hovering around 60 per cent. But there was adifference. If earlier the jhuggi-jhopri dwellers and residents ofillegal colonies were mobilised in a big way on election day, thistime the huge sea of "middle class" voters swooped down onthe polling booths. All parties acknowledge this. And thissection voted en bloc for the BJP whereas the attention of jhuggivoters lay divided in multi-cornered contests. The voters wereclearly trying to say something.

BUT what? As the chief minister-designate, Madan LaiKhurana, grinned from ear to ear and ran up a tidy sumon celebratory kaju barfl, he came up with an answer:

"The frustrations...of water and electricity problems to a deafbureaucracy...everybody identified this with the Centre."The weariness of Delhi voters, tired of headaches ranging

from rising onion prices tothe menace of Red Line buses,had to be channelised some-where. No matter how hardthe Congress(I) tried, itcouldn't get away from beingidentified with the Centre andthese problems. It may havebeen a negative vote or per-haps voters saw in the BJP areasonable alternative, whatKhurana calls "a mai-baap".

And if Khurana with hisgutsy performance has be-come the mai-baap of Delhi,many Congress(I) leadersfind themselves unstable ontheir own turf. A classic

The Janata Dalsplit theCongress(I)vote in almost20 seats,handing theseats and Delhito the BJP.

example is the Outer Delhi MP Sajjan Kumar, whoseconstituency is now being humiliatingly called a BJPstronghold. It is a semi-rural area dominated by Jats whosepreference for the BJP has the Congress(I) in a tizzy. Onshaky ground too is Bhagat, whose East Delhi Lok Sabhaconstituency still seems to sport saffron after his 1991defeat. Rebellion is brewing. Already rumours of luringhim out with a Rajya Sabha seat seem to be doing therounds. And Congress(I) workers are demanding a newcharismatic leader.

So it's back to the drawing board for the Congress(I),with Jag Parvesh Chandra, former chief executive council-lor, summing up its position: "At best we can act like aresponsible opposition.'' There is a lot of ominous introspec-tion in the party about the wrong choice of candidates andthe ensuing rebellion. Questions are being asked about howthe unsuccessful glamour brigade of Kiran Choudhury,Anjali Rai and Usha Krishna Kumar had ever been giventickets in the first place. "We need a complete overhaul,"say party leaders.

As for the BJP, it plans to go ahead with the tone of blusterthat is characteristic of its chief minister to be.' 'Delhi will notbe ashamed of us," Khurana says. But what does that mean?Political observers feel the BJP in Delhi would prefer the roleof a reformist party pursuing practical programmes for thepeople rather than playing the communal card becausethere is too much at stake. Yet, if the high command decidesto continue its anti-Muslim line nationally, then Khuranatoo will not be averse to doing his own bit of Muslim-bashing. For example, by raising the question of Bangla-deshi refugees in Delhi. Whether he really addresses Delhi'sproblems or remains a figurehead in a weak assembly wherethe lieutenant-governor still holds most of the powerremains to be seen. —VIJAY JUNG THAPA

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