COUC IL OF Brussels, 9 December 2011 14743/1/11 PUBLIC REV ...

PUBLIC

Conseil UE

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COU�CIL OF

THE EUROPEA� U�IO�

Brussels, 9 December 2011

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DOCUME�T PARTIALLY

ACCESSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC

(19.12.2011)

E�FOCUSTOM 109

�OTE

from: Hungarian delegation

to: Customs Cooperation Working Party

No. prev. doc. 11606/1/10 REV 1 ENFOCUSTOM 59

Subject: Draft final report on JCO FIREBLADE

Delegations will find below the draft final report on the Joint Customs Operation FIREBLADE.

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Table of contents

1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 3

2. THE LEGAL/CRIMINAL AREA IN WHICH THE OPERATION WAS

IMPLEMENTED .................................................................................................... 3

3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK......................................................................................... 4

4. PARTICIPANTS..................................................................................................... 5

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (OLAF) …...............................................................5

EUROPOL .............................................................................................................. 5

5. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ............................................................... 6

6. INFORMATION ON THREAT ASSESSMENT................................................... 6

7. SCHEDULE OF THE OPERATION ..................................................................... 7

7.1. Time schedule................................................................................................ 7

7.2. Briefing and IT training ................................................................................. 7

7.3. Operational phases......................................................................................... 8

7.4. Debriefing ...................................................................................................... 9

8. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION ...................... 9

8.1. Physical Operational Coordination Unit........................................................ 9

8.2. OCU liaison officers .................................................................................... 10

8.3. National Contact Point (NCP) ..................................................................... 10

8.4. Operational measures................................................................................... 11

9. RESULTS OF THE OPERATION....................................................................... 12

9.1. Number of transport reports communicated via V-OCU ............................ 12

9.2. Seizures........................................................................................................ 18

10. STATISTICS......................................................................................................... 19

11. FINANCING......................................................................................................... 19

12. WORKING LANGUAGE .................................................................................... 19

13. COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESS........................................................... 19

14. EVALUATION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................... 20

14.1. Assessment of the objectives of the operation............................................. 20

14.2. Evaluation and conclusion........................................................................... 21

14.3. Recommendations........................................................................................ 22

14.3.1. Business-related recommendations........................................................... 22

14.3.2. Technical recommendations for the AFIS V-OCU module...................... 23

15. ANNEXES ............................................................................................................ 23

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1. I�TRODUCTIO�

Within the framework of the Customs Cooperation Working Party (CCWP), Joint Customs

Operations (JCOs) are implemented with the aim of combating the smuggling of sensitive goods

and improving cooperation between Customs authorities and other relevant bodies. Customs

administrations are competent to control and tackle the smuggling of sensitive goods, such as

counterfeit products, as well as currency movements that may result from illicit activities.

According to the Guide for JCOs approved by the CCWP1, operations pursue strategic and tactical

objectives, which are defined in a business case submitted for the endorsement by the CCWP.

The import of counterfeit goods by criminal groups represents a serious threat to the budgets of the

Member States and the European Union in terms of tax evasion and endangering jobs in the affected

industries. In this context, the infringement of intellectual property rights caused by illegal imports

of counterfeit products should also not be ignored.

2. THE LEGAL/CRIMI�AL AREA I� WHICH THE OPERATIO� WAS

IMPLEME�TED

As set out in the multiannual overview of JCOs2 the Hungarian National Tax and Customs

Administration – in cooperation with the European Commission (OLAF) – volunteered to organise

an operation targeted at detecting organised crime in the area of intellectual property crimes and

counterfeiting and/or disrupting criminal groups trading in counterfeit products.

The aim of the operation was to check consignments of relevant commercial quantities entering the

EU by road, destined for the EU market. Third countries’ controls focused on transports entering

EU territory from the third countries via the external EU border. Member States not directly

involved in controls at the external borders participated in the operation by targeting consignments

suspected of transporting contraband that had evaded detection at the point of entry into the EU or

by providing operational intelligence. Participating countries other than Member States were

requested to report seizures of consignments infringing intellectual property rights (IPR) which

were destined for the territory of the EU or their own internal market.

1 8435/11 ENFOCUSTOM 24 + COR 2.

2 7032/4/11 REV 4 ENFOCUSTOM 8 RESTREINT UE.

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3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

- Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the

administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the

Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters

as amended by Regulation (EC) No 766/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council1.

- Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on mutual

assistance and cooperation between customs administrations (Naples II)2.

- Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 of 22 July 2003 concerning customs action against

goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures to be taken

against goods found to have infringed such rights3.

- Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their

Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part4.

- Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their

Member States, and Ukraine5.

1 OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 48.

2 OJ C 24, 23.1.1998, p. 1.

3 OJ L 196, 2.8.2003, p. 7.

4 OJ L 26, 28.1.2005, p. 3.

5 OJ L 49, 19.2.1998, p. 3.

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4. PARTICIPA�TS

Member States Candidate/third

countries

International

organisations/EU

institutions

1. Austria Croatia Europol

2. Belgium Ukraine Commission (OLAF)

3. Bulgaria

4. Czech Republic

5. Estonia

6. Finland

7. Germany

8. Greece

9. Hungary

10. Italy

11. Latvia

12. Lithuania

13. Luxembourg

14. Malta

15. Netherlands

16. Poland

17. Portugal (observer)

18. Romania

19. Slovakia

20. Slovenia

21. Spain

During the preparatory phase and briefing meeting Moldova planned to take part in the operation as

a participating country, but during the operational phase, due to some unforeseen technical and

human resource problems, Moldova could not participate in the operation.

European Commission (OLAF)

European Commission (OLAF) provided expertise, intelligence support, and technical, financial,

and logistical support for the coordination and conduct of the operation.

EUROPOL

Europol participated as an observer in the operation in the framework of the protection of

intellectual property rights. It performed cross-checks of available and relevant data, and informed

participants about the results of such checks via the appropriate channels.

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5. ABBREVIATIO�S A�D ACRO�YMS

CCWP – Customs Cooperation Working Party

JCO – Joint Customs Operation

OLAF – European Anti-Fraud Office of the European Commission

WCO – World Customs Organization

Interpol – International Police Organization

Europol – European Police Office

EU – European Union

MAB – Mutual Assistance Broker

AFIS – Anti-Fraud Information System

OCU – Operation Coordination Unit

V-OCU – Virtual OCU

P-OCU – Physical OCU

NCP – National Contact Point

LO – Liaison Officers

D-day – 1st day of JCO's Operational Phase

EC – European Commission

TA – Threat Assessment

IPR – Intellectual Property Rights

6. I�FORMATIO� O� THREAT ASSESSME�T

Taking into account previous JCOs and the experience of most customs administrations, smuggling

activities by organised crime groups involving counterfeit goods have represented a serious problem

for many years. The available analysis (TA on IPR infringements prepared by the Hungarian

delegation and approved by the CCWP1) and experience resulting from the daily work of customs

administrations show that counterfeit products are mostly imported from the countries of the Far

East. The means of transport most commonly used by the perpetrators are vessels, road vehicles,

rail and postal (air) traffic.

1 15841/1/10 REV 1 ENFOCUSTOM 104 ENFOPOL 322 CRIMORG 198 DROIPEN 127.

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Taking into consideration the fact that in recent years a number of successful JCOs have been

carried out targeting maritime container smuggling (JCO SIROCCO, JCO DIABOLO I and II), the

topic of IPR could usefully, advantageously and beneficially be mapped and broadened by

enhanced controls on vehicle (road) transportation, with particular regard to and targeting those

types of textile products and accessories which appear in larger quantities on the basis of the

assessed seizure data. Combined means of transport in which road vehicles are concerned

(e.g. ROLA or RORO) were regarded as road transport for this operation.

In this respect, Hungary – taking into account its geographical position – decided to set the focus of

JCO on road transport only.

7. SCHEDULE OF THE OPERATIO�

7.1. Time schedule

The timing of the operation was established on the basis of Central European Time (CET).

The operation was divided into 3 phases, supported by a briefing and debriefing meeting and a final

report.

• pre-operational phase (28 March – 4 April 2011)

• operational phase (5 April – 14 April 2011)

• post-operational phase (15 April – 6 May 2011)

7.2. Briefing and IT training

The briefing was held in Brussels on 22 February 2011.

During the meeting the representatives of the participating countries discussed the draft operational

plan with a view to agreement on its final version.

Afterwards the participating countries started their preparations for the operation at national level.

During the preparatory phase, the emphasis was on organisational, technical and practical issues

relating to the operation.

The European Commission (OLAF) provided IT training on the AFIS V-OCU VIASUR module for

the delegates from third countries and the delegates from Hungary (as coordinators).

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7.3. Operational phases

Pre-operational phase

During the pre-operational phase the communications were tested and the data for lists of risk

companies were sent to the European Commission (OLAF).

Operational phase

The operational phase consisted of the selection of consignments crossing the borders or assembled

inland, the gathering, exchange, sharing and analysis of intelligence, risk assessment and control

activities and the organisation of subsequent actions aimed at seizures of smuggled goods and/or

criminals.

The operation was coordinated from the physical OCU set up within European Commission

(OLAF) premises in Brussels.

The only communication system used between the coordinator, OCU and all NCPs was the AFIS

V-OCU - module Viasur. Participating third countries could access the AFIS V-OCU - module

Viasur directly via a secured internet connection and designated workstations.

The operational working time for all NCPs, mobile groups and the OCU was irregular and also

included one night shift. The exact timetable is set out below:

Date Day Time

From To

1 05.04.2011 Tuesday 10 AM 06 PM

2 06.04.2011 Wednesday 08 AM 08 PM

3 07.04.2011 Thursday

4 08.04.2011 Friday 06 PM 12 PM

5 09.04.2011 Saturday 00 AM 06 AM

6 10.04.2011 Sunday

7 11.04.2011 Monday 08 AM 08 PM

8 12.04.2011 Tuesday 10 AM 06 PM

9 13.04.2011 Wednesday 08 AM 02 PM

10 14.04.2011 Thursday 06 AM 12 AM

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Post-operational phase

During the post-operational phase all pending cases (opened during the operational phase) were

closed, and the results and feedback from the participating countries were evaluated.

7.4. Debriefing

The debriefing meeting was organised in close cooperation with the Hungarian National Tax and

Customs Administration and European Commission (OLAF). The meeting took place in Budapest

on 24 June 2011 and was devoted to the discussion of JCO's results and the draft final report which

was then agreed by all participants.

8. ORGA�ISATIO�AL STRUCTURE A�D IMPLEME�TATIO�

JCO FIREBLADE was supported by an organisational structure consisting of a Physical

Operational Coordination Unit (P-OCU) at international level and National Contact Points (NCPs)

at national level (one per participating country). Regional NCPs could have been established at

regional level as well.

In order to improve the efficiency and organisation of the JCO, the Virtual Operational

Coordination Unit (V-OCU) provided by European Commission (OLAF) was set up as a means to

exchange information between the participating countries. When any participating country or

organisation needed to send larger files containing e.g. pictures or scanned documents, MAB mail

was used.

8.1. Physical Operational Coordination Unit

The OCU was responsible for:

• international coordination and information exchange;

• maintaining contact with NCPs;

• processing the flow of information;

• drafting and publishing daily reports in the OCU library;

• organising daily briefings in order to plan activities.

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8.2. OCU liaison officers

Europol and some participating countries (Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Croatia,

the Czech Republic and Latvia) sent liaison officers to the P-OCU in Brussels.

Each OCU liaison officer was responsible for specific geographical regions based on linguistic and

regional knowledge, business expertise and other skills. The main task of the OCU liaison officers

was to coordinate measures, where and when necessary, assist the NCPs and clarify problems. In

the event of technical problems the OCU liaison officers supported the NCPs and distributed the

information by other means.

The Europol deputies checked their own databases to find any additional and supporting

information concerning suspect means of transport, persons or companies checked by the NCPs.

8.3. +ational Contact Point (+CP)

Each participating country set up its own NCP. During the operational phase all NCPs were in

permanent contact with their national inspection teams and the P-OCU in Brussels via V-OCU

and by phone.

The NCPs reported selected consignments, collected information and organised controls during all

phases of the operation. The NCPs also collected and reported intelligence retrieved from their own

national sources.

All NCPs were responsible for:

• national coordination and information exchange;

• immediate response to operational information requests from participating countries and the

OCU;

• maintaining contacts with national inspection teams and the OCU;

• processing messages in the V-OCU.

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8.4. Operational measures

8.4.1. Commercial cargo traffic (lorries)

A list of risk indicators for road transport was provided, as found in Annex 3 to the Operational

Plan. The participating countries selected relevant consignments, according to the operational

targets and applicable risk indicators.

In order to maximise intelligence, the NCP was able to pass all available information on the

selected consignments to the other NCPs/ OCU via the V-OCU.

The use of the OCU implied that each reported selection at least needed to be seen by every NCP. It

is of course recognised that not every selected consignment attracted any supplementary

information.

8.4.2. Non-commercial and passenger traffic

The participating countries also selected vehicles other than commercial traffic, e.g. buses, cars,

vans, and special vehicles that fitted local risk indicators.

In order to maximise the exchange of information, the NCPs were able to pass all other information

about the selected vehicles to other NCPs involved and keep the OCU informed.

8.4.3. Selection to carry out checks and seizures/detentions

Targeted physical checks based on the received information had to be carried out on suspicion

according to national legislation and decisions. The results of these checks needed to be reported via

the system.

Whenever it was not possible to check a consignment (e.g. because the transport had left before

critical intelligence became available), the NCP or OCU had to alert all other NCPs and the OCU in

order to organise either verification at the destination or an inland intercept.

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9. RESULTS OF THE OPERATIO�

9.1. +umber of transport reports communicated via V-OCU

During the whole period of JCO's execution, i.e. during the pre-operational, operational and post-

operational phases, a total of 123 transport reports, including 23 (19) seizure reports, were entered

by NCPs into V-OCU. Other seizures – thanks to the enhanced control activities – were carried out

by the participating countries without previous alerts in V-OCU.

Europol liaison officers checked all the information and had several hits. All hits were made

available to the Coordinator and other NCPs concerned.

As regards the number of transport reports created, the fourth day of the operation (11 April 2011)

was the most productive. On that day, the participating countries created 33 transport reports in V-

OCU for comment by other NCPs. An overview of the transport reports created per day is outlined

in the chart below.

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As regards the number of transport reports introduced per country, most were created by Bulgaria

(32), Hungary (27), Slovenia (13), Ukraine (11) and Croatia (10). A general overview is presented

in the chart below.

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The most reported transports of suspicious goods started their journey (i.e. were loaded) in Turkey

(64), Ukraine (9) and Serbia (7). Other details are mentioned in the chart below. For more than 50%

of the consignments – and more than 50% of the seizures – Turkey was declared as the country of

loading.

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The suspicious goods mentioned in the transport reports were destined for the countries listed in the

chart below.

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The goods most frequently declared in the transport reports are shown in the following table.

Almost 72% of the consignments were declared as textile products or textile articles.

GOODS TYPE

�UMBER OF

TRA�SPORT

REPORTS

Textiles and textile articles (chapter 50 to 63) 88

Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks,

seatsticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof; prepared feathers

and articles made therewith; artificial flowers; articles of human hair

(chapter 64 to 67)

22

Multiple good categories 6

Products of the chemical or allied industries (chapter 28 to 38) 4

Base metals and articles of base metal (chapter 72 to 83) 3

Miscellaneous 3

Raw hides and skins, leather, furskins and articles thereof; saddlery

and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles

of animal gut (other than silkworm gut) (chapter 41to 43)

3

Machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment; parts

thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound

recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles

(chapter 84 to 85)

3

Unknown 2

Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking,

precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; clocks and

watches; musical instruments; parts and accessories thereof (chapter

90 to 92)

1

Miscellaneous manufactured articles (chapter 94 to 96) 1

Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials;

ceramic products; glass and glassware (chapter 68 to 70) 1

Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment

(chapter 86 to 89) 1

Live animals; animal products (chapter 01 to 05) 1

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9.2. Seizures

The operation targeted counterfeit textile products, shoes and accessories (e.g. belts, etc.). Seizures

of other kinds of smuggled goods such as narcotic drugs and cigarettes as well as currency

movements were also reported.

The final lists of direct seizures are outlined in Annex 1.

The seizures were made by the customs authorities at the borders or inland premises. Almost every

seized good was being transported by road in trucks.

The experience of this operation shows that the number of seizures made in commercial traffic is

considerably higher than in non-commercial and passenger traffic.

The number of seizures in each country is listed in the chart below.

Besides the seizures mentioned, the participating countries also made many seizures which were not

covered by the criteria of the operational plan or were executed outside VIASUR as set out in

Annex 2 and Annex 3.

Summarising the – direct – results above, the total amount of seized counterfeit textile

products, accessories and footwear was 28 000 pieces/pairs.

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10. STATISTICS

After the post-operational phase all participating countries were requested to submit the “End of

Operation Report” on the statistics relating to the activities performed by the NCPs as well as their

opinions and comments. This feedback was sent by 19 countries.

Full statistical data processed in cooperation with European Commission (OLAF) is summarised in

the annexes 4 and 5.

11. FI�A�CI�G

Pursuant to the Article 42a of the Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97, as amended by the

Regulation (EC) No 766/08, the European Commission (OLAF) covered travel and

accommodation costs in connection with the participation of Member State and third country

representatives at the briefing and debriefing meetings, and also at the training session. The

European Commission (OLAF) also reimbursed the travel expenses, accommodation costs and

daily allowances of the liaison officers seconded to P-OCU for the operation phase of the JCO.

12. WORKI�G LA�GUAGE

The working language was English during the operation.

13. COMMU�ICATIO� WITH THE PRESS

With the authorisation of the Coordinator of the JCO, the coordinator of the OCU liaised with the

European Commission (OLAF) spokesman who contacted the representatives of the Anti-Fraud

Communicators Network in order to prepare the press release and other communications that

announced the official results.

A press release was issued after the debriefing meeting in Brussels on 27 June 2011.

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14. EVALUATIO�, CO�CLUSIO� A�D RECOMME�DATIO�S

14.1. Assessment of the objectives of the operation

14.1.1. Strategic and tactical objectives

The CCWP has agreed the following long-term strategic objectives for JCOs with the aim of

combating organised crime and cross-border smuggling:

• Improve practical cooperation between Customs administrations, with the European

Commission, and with Europol

This objective was achieved.

• Deliver tangible results in terms of e.g. seizures/detained goods, identification of new threats

and disruption of criminal gangs

This objective was partially achieved.

• Increase the enforcement capabilities of Customs administrations, in the MS as well as

Candidate Countries and other third countries participating in JCOs, notably by developing

their operational capacities


• Contribute to the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice, in particular by

combating terrorism in line with the competences of customs authorities

This objective was partially achieved.

• Increase seizures/detentions in terms of both weight and numbers


• Promote the development and use of IT systems for the exchange and enrichment of the

information


• Obtain additional information, which cannot be obtained in the course of normal operational

activity


• Update existing TA referred to in the applicable business case for the JCO in order to define

the existing risk, or to test a potential threat in areas where there is a lack of intelligence

and/or TA


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14.1.2. Operational objectives

Taking into account the aims of the CCWP at various levels, the following operational objectives

have been formulated for JCO FIREBLADE:

• Coordinated increase of intelligence led selection for inspections


• Identify illicit consignments containing fake textile products, shoes and accessories


• Carry out customs controls on those consignments


• Carry out controlled deliveries, in accordance with national legislation, if the circumstances

permit

This objective was not achieved.

• Make use of all expertise and facilities available


• Identify the individuals responsible for the illicit consignments and apprehend them


• Collection, analysis and dissemination of information obtained on the items seized or detained


14.2. Evaluation and conclusion

The available analysis (TA on IPR infringements prepared by the Hungarian delegation and

approved by the CCWP1) and experience resulting from the daily work of customs administrations

show that counterfeit products are mostly imported from (Far) Eastern countries. Taking into

account the experience of this operation, it can be stated that the TA broadly described the real

situation.

The outcome of this operation highlights the need to organise similar types of operation, preferably

in cooperation with other selected third countries, since the overall effectiveness and success of

JCOs can be increased in this way.

1 15841/1/10 REV 1 ENFOCUSTOM 104 ENFOPOL 322 CRIMORG 198 DROIPEN 127.

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14.3. Recommendations

14.3.1. Business-related recommendations (see also Annex 6)

• Future JCOs, aimed at detecting the smuggling of counterfeit products in every means of

transport, should focus on commercial traffic, because the experiences of this operation

confirm that the threat is huge and definitely exists.

• The analysis and coordination capacities of Europol should be used more, and more

frequently. It is suggested that Europol (AWF COPY) become the focal point for national

threat assessments and risk analyses prepared on IPR subjects.

• The possibility of cooperation with the European Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy,

the agency responsible for the effective utilisation of synergies deriving from the

cooperation between the public and the private sector (such as right holders and consumers),

should be explored.

• Training, seminars, courses and programmes, also aiming at exchange of experience, should

be organised with the involvement and active participation of right holders in order to ensure

that the employees of the authorities taking a significant part and playing key roles in the

fight against counterfeit and pirated goods acquire adequate and appropriate qualifications

and experience in international cooperation.

• In order to cope with the situation where a vehicle has already left the border when

important information becomes available, the participants should, during the operation, have

access to a system such as A-TIS (which is currently under development to replace the Early

Warning System Transit – EWS). The system should be able to trace any consignment, not

only sensitive goods as currently defined in the transit regulation, and should be equipped

with an alert function notifying important events captured by NCTS during the transport.

• In order to foster information exchange in the field of IPR fraud, the current CIGINFO

System should indicate whether the consignment in question contained genuine and/or fake

tobacco products (…). It should be also considered to store non-cigarette related IPR files in

a specific system under the MAB.

• The questionnaire in the End of Operation report should be assessed for each JCO, amended

where needed and clarified and accepted during the briefing meeting.

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• Clear instructions on when to use the request for a check at the place of destination should

be agreed during the briefing meeting.

• Since the results of the operation fully justified the findings of the TA, (…) it is

recommended – in accordance with the Guide for JCOs – to conduct a scientific analysis on

the scope of action prior to the actual launch of a JCO.

14.3.2. Technical recommendations for the AFIS V-OCU module (see also Annex 6)

The following options should be enabled during future developments:

• Attaching pictures (or other files) to a report;

• (…) Bulk upload of movement reports (…);

• (…) System back-up synchronised with the working hours (…);

• (…) Creation time of a movement report should be indicated;

• Re-arranging (…) new and open folders (…) to:

o show essential information for prioritising the working order;

o show own reports in a different colour (for easier monitoring of comments);

o introduce tool tips behind a value of a column (…) (for easier overview of movement

reports);

o keep search result as a subset,

• Highlight transport reports upon a positive result and automatically extract seizure

information.

15. A��EXES

Annex 1: Direct seizures

Annex 2: Indirect seizures (which did not exactly fit into the scope of the operation)

Annex 3: Seizures out of the scope of the operation (results of the enhanced controls)

Annex 4: V-OCU statistics drawn up by European Commission (OLAF)

Annex 5: Summary of National Reports drawn up by European Commission (OLAF)

Annex 6: Checklist of JCO Recommendations’ monitoring file

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ANNEX 1

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A��EX 6

CHECKLIST

JCO Recommendations' monitoring file

�ame of JCO JCO FIREBLADE

Mode of transport Road

Recommendations General/Specific

Business Case 11606/1/10 REV 1 ENFOCUSTOM 59

Operational Plan final

Lead MS Hungary

Co-runner/s -

Partners European Commission (OLAF)

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Complete column C and D by declaring if available general recommendations in the monitoring file have been applied (A) or not (N/A) for this

operation.

A B C D

�o. Existing general recommendations A or �/A Remarks /Reason

1. Relevant training should be provided before an operation commences A For the third countries and the

coordinators, E-learning for MSs

2. Ensure effective and secure means of communication A OLAF VIASUR

3. Test communication prior to operation A Applied during pre-op. phase

4. The opening hours of the OCU/NCP should be consistent with the needs of the

operation N/A Applied during briefing

5. Every participating NCP should have the same opening hours N/A Applied during briefing

6. Changes to the operational plan should be agreed by all involved parties A Applied during briefing

Complete column C and D by declaring if available specific recommendations in the monitoring file have been applied (A) or not (N/A) for this

operation.

A B C D

�o. Existing specific recommendations ROAD A or �/A Remarks /Reason 1. If using designated time and locations (Border Crossing Points - BCPs) for

100% reporting of consignments, make sure that selected BCPs having the

traffic pattern being targeted

N/A Applied during briefing

2. Constant contact on the part of the OCU with NCPs to check their readiness

should be maintained during all operations A Applied during briefing

3. The specific functionalities of ViaSur ought to be introduced, in order to apply

them to road transport operations A Applied during briefing

4. The exact time of entering reports into the system and time of sending

comments should be inserted into the system A Applied during briefing

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Complete column A and B with any proposals for new general recommendations to be included in the monitoring file.

A B C D

�o. Proposals for new general recommendations

1. Future JCOs, aimed at detecting the smuggling of counterfeit products in

every means of transport, should focus on commercial traffic, because

the experiences of this operation confirmed that the threat is huge and

definitely exists.

A Applied during the debriefing

2. The analysis and coordination capacities of Europol should be used

more, and more frequently. It is suggested that Europol (AWF COPY)

become the focal point for national threat assessments and risk analyses

prepared on IPR subjects.


3. The possibility of cooperation with the European Observatory on

Counterfeiting and Piracy, the agency responsible for the effective

utilisation of synergies deriving from the cooperation between the public

and the private sector (such as right holders and consumers), should be

explored.


4. Training, seminars, courses and programmes, also aiming at exchange of

experience, should be organised with the involvement and active

participation of right holders in order to ensure that the employees of the

authorities taking a significant part and playing key roles in the fight

against counterfeit and pirated goods acquire adequate and appropriate

qualifications and experience in international cooperation.


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Complete column A and B with any proposals for new general recommendations to be included in the monitoring file.

A B C D

5. In order to cope with the situation where a vehicle has already left the

border when important information becomes available, the participants

should, during the operation, have access to a system such as A-TIS (…).

The system should be able to trace any consignment, not only sensitive

goods as currently defined in the transit regulation, and should be

equipped with an alert function notifying important events captured by

NCTS during the transport.


6. In order to foster information exchange in the field of IPR fraud, the

current CIGINFO System should indicate whether the consignment in

question contained genuine and/or fake tobacco products (…). It should

be also considered to store non-cigarette related IPR files in a specific

system under the MAB.


7. The questionnaire in the End of Operation report should be assessed for

each JCO, amended where needed and clarified and accepted during the

briefing meeting.


8. Clear instructions on when to use the request for a check at the place of

destination should be agreed during the briefing meeting.


9. Since the results of the operation fully justified the findings of the TA

(…), it is recommended – in accordance with the Guide for JCOs – to

conduct a scientific analysis on the scope of action prior to the actual

launch of a JCO.


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Complete column A and B with any proposals for new specific recommendations to be included in the monitoring file.

A B C D

�o. Proposals for new specific recommendations - (…) the following

options should be enabled during future developments:

1. Attaching pictures (or other files) to a report. A Applied during the debriefing

2. (…) Bulk upload of movement reports (…). A Applied during the debriefing

3. (…) System back-up synchronised with working hours (…). A Applied during the debriefing

4. (…) Creation time of a movement report should be indicated. A Applied during the debriefing

5. Re-arranging (…) new and open folders (…) to:

o show essential information for prioritising the working

order;

o show own reports in a different colour (for easier

monitoring of comments);

o introduce tool tips behind a value of a column (…) (for

easier overview of movement reports);

o keep search result as a subset.


6. Highlight transport reports upon a positive result and automatically

extract seizure information.


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COUC IL OF Brussels, 9 December 2011 14743/1/11 PUBLIC REV ...

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Transcript of COUC IL OF Brussels, 9 December 2011 14743/1/11 PUBLIC REV ...