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1. Araullo vs. Aquino, GR 209287, July 1, 2014

Facts:

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefore will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be re-allotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).

Issue:

1. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).

2. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.

3. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional. 4. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.5. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

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Ruling:

Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).

1. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.

2. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen).  Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

3. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are “savings”

These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers.  Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

Whether or not the sourcing of un-programmed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

4. No. Un-programmed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before un-programmed funds were used.

Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

5. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can

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no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

2. Belgica et al. vs. Ochoa et al., GR 208566, November 19, 2013

In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.

The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

Over the years, “pork” funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 General Appropriations Act for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – “JLN” standing for Janet Lim Napoles – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.

As for the “Presidential Pork Barrel”, whistle-blowers alleged that “[a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].”

* ISSUES:

A. Procedural Issues

1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy

2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review

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3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue

4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”

WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…

1.) …separation of powers

2.) …non-delegability of legislative power

3.) …checks and balances

4.) …accountability

5.) …political dynasties

6.) …local autonomy

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

WON the phrases:

(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and

(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power

* HELD AND RATIO:

A. Procedural Issues

No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy

1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya

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Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.

Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:

i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.

ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government’s own recognition that reforms are needed “to address the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter.

It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. If only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This is  applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

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2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review

2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).

3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue

3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.

4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis

4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.

On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any powerful countervailing considerations,

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like cases ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.

Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not apply.

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”

WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…

1.) …separation of powers

2.) …non-delegability of legislative power

3.) …checks and balances

4.) …accountability

5.) …political dynasties

6.) …local autonomy

…separation of powers

1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).

Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must

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therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.

In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.

…non-delegability of legislative power

2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law  a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.

…checks and balances

3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.

The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she

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recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”

…accountability

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

However, the Court  cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of  impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

…political dynasties

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

…local autonomy

6.) YES.  The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

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C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and

YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.

That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”

However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.

(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.”

The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

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3. People vs. Andan, GR 116439, March 3, 1997

Re.: Extrajudicial Confessions to Mayor and Media Admissible

Facts:Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide. The offense was committed on February 19, 1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a 2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing.On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela. While on her way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. By night time, Marianne, who was still unconscious, was dragged by appellant to their backyard that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she moved, prompting appellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and abandoned her. At 11am her body was discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of "traumatic injuries." Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team. The investigation pointed to the appellant. Appellant's nearby house was searched but he was not there. On February 24, a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, he denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with evidence, appellant relented but implicated two of his neighbours, and that he was merely a lookout. Larin and Dizon were likewise brought there by the police. The following day a physical examination conducted on the suspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back.By that time, people and media representatives were already at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered that they talk privately. The mayor led him to the office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. Since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that on said date he was at his parent's house for the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the next day. Appellant claimed that after he was picked up by the police on February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and killed Marianne. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He was found guilty of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized accordingly. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue:W/N the appellant’s confession not being assisted by a counsel is in violation of the constitution, and is therefore inadmissible as evidence against him.

Ruling:Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be

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deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

4. People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57

Facts:On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue:Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling:NO. The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.

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5. Estrada vs. Desierto, GR 146710, March 2, 2001

with Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 146738, March 2, 2001

FACTS:

The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior and subsequent to the event we know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were elected as president and vice-president respectively. The downfall of the Estrada administration began when For. Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and released his exposé that petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal as having received large sums of money. After this expose, a lot of different groups and many personalities had asked for the resignation of the petitioner. Some of which are the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For. Pres. Corazon Aquino who asked petitioner to make the “supreme self-sacrifice”. Respondent also resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services and also asked petitioner for his resignation. 4 senior economic advisers of the petitioner resigned and then Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47 representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.

By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker Manny Villar had transmitted the Articles of Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the 21 senators took oath as judges to the impeachment trial with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. The impeachment trial was one for the ages. It was a battle royal of well known lawyers. But then came the fateful day, when by the vote of 11-10, the judges came to a decision to not open the second envelop allegedly containing evidence showing that the petitioner had a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde” containing P3.3 billion. The not opening of the 2nd envelop resulted to the people going to the streets and the public prosecutors withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes marched to EDSA shrine and declared “on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government.” PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson together with some Cabinet members made the same announcement.

June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM, negotiations started for the peaceful transition of power. But at around 12 noon, respondent took oath as the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner and his family left Malacanang. He issued the following Press Statement:

“20 January 2001

STATEMENT FROM

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.  While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.  I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people.   I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

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I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

MABUHAY!

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:

“Sir:

By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office.   By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC. The said resolution confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC justices to the CJ during the oath taking that happened on January 20. Soon, other countries accepted the respondent as the new president of the Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No. 175 “expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines.” It also approved Resolution No. 176 “expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation’s goals under the Constitution.”

On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice president. On February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona. On the same day, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated. Several cases were filed against the petitioner which are as follows: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner.  It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz:  Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso.  On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set.  On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.   It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.” Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto.  He prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent

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President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents “to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001.” On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents’ comments “on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.”

In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for “Gag Order” on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:

“(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;

(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic.”

ISSUES:

I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada.  In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.

IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.

DECISION:

I No. The case is legal not political.

II No. He is not a president on leave.

III No. The impeachment proceedings was already aborted. As a non-sitting president, he is not entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution

IV There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.

RATIO/REASON:

1. I. Whether or not the case involves a political question

Respondents contend that the cases at bar pose a political question. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became a President through the People power revolution. Her legitimacy as president was also accepted by other nations. Thus, they conclude that the following shall serve as political thicket which the Court cannot enter.

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The Court rules otherwise. A political question has been defined by our Court as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.  It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyo administration should be treated similarly with the Aquino administration. Respondents propose that the situation of the Arroyo and Aquino administrations are similar. However, the Court finds otherwise. The Court has made substantial distinctions which are the following:

Aquino ArroyoGovernment was a result of a successful revolution

Government was a result of a peaceful revolution

In the Freedom constitution, it was stated that the Aquino government was instilled directly by the people in defiance of the 1973 Constitution as amended.

Arroyo took the oath of the 1987 Constitution. She is discharging the authority of the president under the 1987 constitution.

It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. But this would not apply as the Court finds substantial difference between the 2 EDSA Revolutions. It would show that there are differences between the 2 governments set up by EDSA I and II. This was further explained by the Court by comparing the 2 EDSA Revolutions.

EDSA I EDSA IIExtra-constitutional. Hence, “Xxx IN DEFIANCE OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, AS AMENDED”—cannot be subject of judicial review

Intra-Constitutional. Hence, the oath of the respondent as President includes the protection and upholding of the 1987 Constitution.—resignation of the President makes it subject to judicial review

exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government

exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President

Political question Legal Question

In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and not political.

1. II. Whether or not petitioner resigned as President

Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble:  there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. There is no required form of resignation. It can be expressed, implied, oral or written. It is true that respondent never wrote a letter of resignation before he left Malacanang on June 20, 2001. In this issue, the Court would use the totality test or the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had resigned. The Court knows the amount of stress that the petitioner had suffered. With just a blink of an eye, he lost the support of the legislative when then Manny Villar and other Representatives had defected. AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes had already gone to EDSA.  PNP Chief Director General Panfilo Lacson and other cabinet secretaries had withdrawn as well. By looking into the Angara diaries, it was pointed out that the petitioner had suggested a snap election at May on which he would not be a candidate. Proposing a snap election in which he is not a candidate means that he had intent to resign. When the proposal for a dignified exit or resignation was proposed, petitioner did not disagree but listened closely. This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the

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reality that he had to resign.  His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace.  It was a matter of time.

The negotiations that had happened were about a peaceful transfer of power. It was already implied that petitioner would resign. The negotiations concentrated on the following: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioner’s resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. Also taken from the Angara diaries, The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako.  Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.  Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga.  (I am very tired.  I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful.  I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my name, then I will go .” The quoted statement of the petitioner was a clear evidence that he has resigned.

The second round of negotiations were about the consolidating of the clauses which were proposed by both sides. The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned.  It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact.  The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.

When everything was already signed by the side of the petitioner and ready to be faxed by Angara, the negotiator for the respondent, Angelo Reyes, called to Angara saying that the SC would allow respondent to have her oath taking. Before petitioner left Malacanang, he made a last statement.

The statement reads: ‘At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.  While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.  I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people.   I will not shrink from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.

MABUHAY!’”

By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms the following: (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.  He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.  Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.  Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.  Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.

Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary leave of absence. This is evidenced by a letter which reads as follows:

“Sir

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By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office.  By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”

The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use this letter during the week long crisis. It would be very easy for him to say before he left Malacanang that he was temporarily unable to govern, thus, he is leaving Malacanang. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner.  If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act.  If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal significance.

Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His legal basis is RA 3019 which states:

“Sec. 12.  No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.”

During the amendments, another section was inserted which states that:

During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:

“Sec. 15. Termination of office — No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency.”

The original senate bill was rejected because of the 2nd paragraph of section 15. Nonetheless, another similar bill was passed. Section 15 then became section 13. There is another reason why petitioner’s contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit.  Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them.  Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning.  The Court holds otherwise. The impeachment proceeding may be arguable. However, even if the impeachment proceeding is administrative, it cannot be considered pending because the process had already broke down. There was also a withdrawal by the prosecutors to partake in the impeachment case. In fact, the proceeding was postponed indefinitely. In fact, there was no impeachment case pending when he resigned.

1. III. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

This issue arose from the January 20 letter which was addressed to then Speaker Fuentebella and then Senate President Pimentel. Petitioner’s contention is that he is a president on leave and that the respondent is an acting president. This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner’s stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order.  It provides:

“SEC. 11.  Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and

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duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.  Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue.  For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."

After studying in-depth the series of events that happened after petitioner left Malacanang, it is very clear that the inability of the petitioner as president is not temporary. The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. The Court says that they cannot, for such is an example of a political question, in which the matter has solely been left to the legislative,

1. IV. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. If yes, what is the extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. The “immunity” the petitioner points to is the principle of non-liability.

The principle of non-liability simply states that a chief executive may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. He is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he cannot be said to have exercise discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act.   What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not.  In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority.  If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination.

The Court rejects the petitioner’s argument that before he could be prosecuted, he should be first convicted of impeachment proceedings. The impeachment proceeding was already aborted because of the walking out of the prosecutors. This was then formalized by a Senate resolution (Resolution #83) which declared the proceeding functus officio. According to the debates in the Constitutional Convention, when an impeachment proceeding have become moot due to the resignation of the President, proper civil and criminal cases may be filed against him.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President.  The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character.  They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption.  By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity

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of a non-sitting president.  Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.   It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. As for civil immunity, it means immunity from civil damages only covers “official acts”.

1. V. Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting an investigation of the cases filed against him for he has already developed a bias against the petitioner. He submits that it is a violation of due process. There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury.  Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is different.  US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. During cases like such, the test of actual prejudice shall be applied. The test shows that there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. The Court rules that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.  Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.

According to the records, it was the petitioner who assailed the biasness of the Ombudsman. The petitioner alleges that there were news reports which said that the Ombudsman had already prejudged the cases against him. The Court rules that the evidence presented is insufficient. The Court also cannot adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. Investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

6. Angara vs. Electoral Commission, GR L-45081, July 15, 1936

FACTS:Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.On Oct. 17, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy;Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

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In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

7. Imbong et al. vs. Ochoa et al., GR 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS:Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.

While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law;

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and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.

ISSUES: 1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy; 2) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.

HELD:

1) In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.

REMEDIAL LAW: actual case or controversy

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is

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immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.

Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

REMEDIAL LAW: facial challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

REMEDIAL LAW: locus standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective

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petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.

REMEDIAL LAW: transcendental importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperiled to be violated. To do so, when the

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life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

REMEDIAL LAW: declaratory relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent- to act as a population control measure.

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are separate.

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortificient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.

2)

POLITICAL LAW: right to life

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

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As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development.

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's wellbeing.

Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

POLITICAL LAW: when life begins

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: plain and legal meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal

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meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum -from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: intent of the framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."

From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.

Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the

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commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object -it is a living human being complete with DNA and chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

POLITICAL LAW: the right to health

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.

It bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo -under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician -be maintained.

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical

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practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

POLITICAL LAW: freedom of religion and the right to free speech

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all -the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa.

The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 ofthe 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less

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question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute.

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

POLITICAL LAW: legislative acts and the free exercise clause

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church...are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent

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neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A. No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs m exchange for blind conformity.

POLITICAL LAW: exception; life threatening cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.

POLITICAL LAW: academic freedom

The Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

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At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.

POLITICAL LAW: due process

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

POLITICAL LAW: equal protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles and definition of terms of the law.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted

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authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "under include" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification.

POLITICAL LAW: involuntary servitude

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with Phil Health being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with Phil Health, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to

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provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bono or otherwise.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: natural law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution.

While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

POLITICAL LAW: constitutionality of the RH law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago, are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

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Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to moderm methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bono reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation;

and

8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

8. Lambino et al. vs. COMELEC, GR 174153, October 25, 2006

FACTS:

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Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plesicite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by Art. 17 of the Constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying sections 1-7 and sections 1-4 of Art. 7 and by adding Art. 18. The proposed changes will shift the present bicameral-presidential form of government to unicameral-parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked Santiago vs. COMELEC ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative.

2. WON this court should revisit its ruling in Santiago vs. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the constitution.

3. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.

RULING:

According to the SC, the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a people's initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. NO. the initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the constitution on direct proposal by the people. The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed a the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.

2. The initiative violates Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the constitution disallowing revision through initiatives. The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision". It is intended that the third mode of changing the constitution as stated in Sec. 2, Art. XVII refers only to proposals for amendments. Merging legislativve and executive is a radical change.

3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary. Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec. 2, Art. 17 to be a valid initiative, there a is a need first to comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735.

PETITION DISMISSED.

9. People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 807

FACTS:

The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar?

RULING:

NO. The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

10. Garcia vs. Drilon et al., GR 179267, June 25, 2013

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts:              

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified.  After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “exercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues:

1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

2. WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

3. WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution

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4. WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution

5. WON the CA seriously erred in declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Ruling:        

1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO ex parte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4.  The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.  The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.  The same holds true with the issuance of BPO.  Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.