Consti Digests 2 (Autosaved)

7/30/2019 Consti Digests 2 (Autosaved)

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PROPER PARTY

G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993

DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA, PROF. RICARTE

M. PURUGANAN, IRMA POTENCIANO, ADRIAN CRISTOBAL, INGRID SANTAMARIA,

CORAZON FIEL, AMBASSADOR E. AGUILAR CRUZ, FLORENCIO R. JACELA, JR., MAURO

MALANG, FEDERICO AGUILAR ALCUAZ, LUCRECIA R. URTULA, SUSANO GONZALES, STEVE

SANTOS, EPHRAIM SAMSON, SOLER SANTOS, ANG KIU KOK, KERIMA POLOTAN, LUCRECIA

KASILAG, LIGAYA DAVID PEREZ, VIRGILIO ALMARIO, LIWAYWAY A. ARCEO, CHARITO

PLANAS, HELENA BENITEZ, ANNA MARIA L. HARPER, ROSALINDA OROSA, SUSAN CALO

MEDINA, PATRICIA RUIZ, BONNIE RUIZ, NELSON NAVARRO, MANDY NAVASERO, ROMEO

SALVADOR, JOSEPHINE DARANG, and PAZ VETO PLANAS, petitioners,

vs.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.,

in his official capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T.

CAPARAS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO,J.:

FACTS:CAPARAS, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Aquino, requesting her for

authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the

Philippines through PCGG and CHRISTIE'S concerning the scheduled sale on of eighty-two

(82) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the

Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late

President Marcos, his relatives and cronies.

President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary, authorized Chairman Caparas to sign

the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art

pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, signed the Consignment Agreementwith Christie's of New

York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction

the eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings as well as the silverware contained and such other

property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be

subject to the provisions of the agreement.1

Commission on Audit (COA) through then Chairman Domingo submitted to President

Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement to the

effect that:

a) the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the ConsignmentAgreement was ofdoubtful legality;

b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the governmentc) PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.;d) (d) the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance,

hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.2

PCGG wrote President Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement and refuting the

allegations of COA Chairman Domingo.3 On the same date, Director of National Museum

Gabriel S. Casal issued a certification that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement

did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically

qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage.

ISSUE: Whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to

exercise its power of judicial review over this case.

HELD: The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or

governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the

legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper

party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at

the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal


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question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.6But the most important

are the first two (2) requisites.

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot

invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.7This is premised on Sec.

2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted anddefended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in

the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs.

The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a

party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal

standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has

sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being

challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected

by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere

incidental interest.8Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not

one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.

9

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on

legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to obtain the enforcement of

a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution,10

and when

a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of

public funds.11

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the

preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to

restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty

to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also

anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties

collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of

art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners

have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in violation of

the Constitution.12

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They

themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of

the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. On this basis, the ownership

of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members

thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these

paintings when they were placed on exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos

couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and

anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by

the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from Malacaang

and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The

confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be

understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the

government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due

process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the

government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their

subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners

thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which areprotected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal

owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners

do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized

disposition.

Further, although this action is also o ne of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not

fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. A writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only

when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably

set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a


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positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek

is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners'

claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most

a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayercan qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit

can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public

funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the

purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such

funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.14

Obviously, petitioners are not

challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege

to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and

antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of

controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal

claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on

extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.16

A case

becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale,17

such as the case before

us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials

from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991

which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take

cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal

standing when paramount public interest is involved.18

We find however that there is no

such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.


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G.R. No. 155001 May 5, 2003

DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR., JOSEPH B. CATAHAN, JOSE MARI B. REUNILLA, MANUEL

ANTONIO B. BOE, MAMERTO S. CLARA, REUEL E. DIMALANTA, MORY V. DOMALAON,

CONRADO G. DIMAANO, LOLITA R. HIZON, REMEDIOS P. ADOLFO, BIENVENIDO C. HILARIO,

MIASCOR WORKERS UNION - NATIONAL LABOR UNION (MWU-NLU), and PHILIPPINE

AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), petitioners,

vs.

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and SECRETARY

LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and

Communications, respondents,

MIASCOR GROUNDHANDLING CORPORATION, DNATA-WINGS AVIATION SYSTEMS

CORPORATION, MACROASIA-EUREST SERVICES, INC., MACROASIA-MENZIES AIRPORT

SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR CATERING SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CORPORATION, and MIASCOR LOGISTICS CORPORATION,

petitioners-in-intervention,

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 155547 May 5, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA, CLAVEL A. MARTINEZ and CONSTANTINO G. JARAULA, petitioners,

vs.


AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, DEPARTMENT

OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity as

Head of the Department of Transportation and Communications, and SECRETARY SIMEON

A. DATUMANONG, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Public Works and

Highways, respondents,

JACINTO V. PARAS, RAFAEL P. NANTES, EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, WILLY BUYSON VILLARAMA,

PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., HARLIN CAST ABAYON, and BENASING

O. MACARANBON, respondents-intervenors,

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 155661 May 5, 2003

CEFERINO C. LOPEZ, RAMON M. SALES, ALFREDO B. VALENCIA, MA. TERESA V. GAERLAN,

LEONARDO DE LA ROSA, DINA C. DE LEON, VIRGIE CATAMIN RONALD SCHLOBOM,

ANGELITO SANTOS, MA. LUISA M. PALCON and SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA

PALIPARAN NG PILIPINAS (SMPP), petitioners,

vs.


AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY

LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and

Communications, respondents.

PUNO,J.:

DOTC engaged the services ofAeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of

the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the present airport

can cope with the traffic development up to the year 2010.

Sometime in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun,

Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then President Fidel V.

Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the construction and operation of a new

international airport terminal. To signify their commitment to pursue the project, they

formed the Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) which was registered with the Securities

and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 15, 1993.


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AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the

development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-

operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).1

DOTC Secretary Jose Garcia endorsed the proposal of AEDC to the National Economic and

Development Authority (NEDA). NEDA favorably endorsed the project to the ICC Cabinet

Committee which approved the same, subject to certain conditions, on January 19, 1996.

NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project.

Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen.

AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo, but still the project was

awarded to Paircargo.

The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreementin 1997 tofranchise and operate

the said terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998, it was amended in the matters of pertaining to

the definition of the obligations given to the concessionaire, development of facilities and

proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract.

Since MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has

a contract with several service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition

claiming that they would lose their job, and the service providers joined them, filed a motion

for intervention. Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the

legality of arrangements.

A group of congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she

will not honor PIATCO contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and

void.

In their consolidated Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the

Government Corporate Counsel prayed that the present petitions be given due course and

that judgment be rendered declaring the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the

Supplements thereto void for being contrary to the Constitution, the BOT Law and its

Implementing Rules and Regulations.

ISSUE:Whether or not herein petitioners have legal standing to file the present petitions

HELD:

Petitioners' Legal Standing to Filethe present Petitions

a. G.R. Nos. 155001 and 155661

In G.R. No. 155001 individual petitioners are employees of various service providers7

having separate concession contracts with MIAA and continuing service agreements with

various international airlines to provide in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and

ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing and

other services. Also included as petitioners are labor unions MIASCOR Workers Union-

National Labor Union and Philippine Airlines Employees Association. These petitioners filed

the instant action for prohibition as taxpayers and as parties whose rights and interests

stand to be violated by the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts.

Petitioners-Intervenors in the same case are allcorporations organized and existing under

Philippine laws engaged in the business of providing in-flight catering, passenger handling,

ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and

warehousing and other services to several international airlines at the Ninoy Aquino

International Airport. Petitioners-Intervenors allege that as tax-paying international airline

and airport-related service operators, each one of them stands to be irreparably injured by

the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts. Each of the petitioners-intervenors have

separate and subsisting concession agreements with MIAA and with various international

airlines which they allegeare being interfered with and violated by respondent PIATCO.

In G.R. No. 155661, petitioners constitute employees of MIAA and Samahang Manggagawa

sa Paliparan ng Pilipinas - a legitimate labor union and accredited as the sole and exclusive


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bargaining agent of all the employees in MIAA. Petitioners anchor their petition for

prohibition on the nullity of the contracts entered into by the Government and PIATCO

regarding the build-operate-and-transfer of the NAIA IPT III. They filed the petition as

taxpayers and persons who have a legitimate interest to protect in the implementation of

the PIATCO Contracts.

Petitioners in both cases raise the argument that the PIATCO Contracts contain stipulations

which directly contravene numerous provisions of the Constitution, specific provisions of

the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and public policy. Petitioners

contend that the DOTC and the MIAA, by entering into said contracts, have committed

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which can be remedied

only by a writ of prohibition, there being no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law.

In particular, petitioners assail the provisions in the 1997 Concession Agreement and the

ARCA which grant PIATCO the exclusive right to operate a commercial international

passenger terminal within the Island of Luzon, except those international airports already

existing at the time of the execution of the agreement. The contracts further provide that

upon the commencement of operations at the NAIA IPT III, the. With respect to existing

concession agreements between MIAA and international airport service providers regarding

certain Government shall cause the closure of Ninoy Aquino International Airport

Passenger Terminals I and II as international passenger terminals services or operations ,

the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA uniformly provide that such services or

operations will not be carried over to the NAIA IPT III and PIATCO is under no obligation to

permit such carry over except through a separate agreement duly entered into with PIATCO.8

With respect to the petitioning service providers and their employees, upon the

commencement of operations of the NAIA IPT III , they allege that they will be effectively

barred from providing international airline airport services at the NAIA Terminals. The

petitioning service providers will thus be compelled to contract with PIATCO alone for such

services, with no assurance that subsisting contracts with MIAA and other international

airlines will be respected. Petitioning service providers stress that despite the very

competitive market, the substantial capital investments required and the high rate of fees,

they entered into their respective contracts with the MIAA with the understanding that the

said contracts will be in force for the stipulated period, and thereafter, renewed so as to

allow each of the petitioning service providers to recoup their investments and obtain a

reasonable return thereon.

Petitioning employees of various service providers at the NAIA Terminals I and II and of MIAA

on the other hand allege that they stand to lose employment.

The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake

in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens

the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of

difficult constitutional questions."9 Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a

person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be

able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he

sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its

enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way . It must

appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege

to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or

penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.10

We hold that petitioners have the requisite standing. In the above-mentioned cases,

petitioners have a direct and substantial interest to protect by reason of the

implementation of the PIATCO Contracts. They stand to lose their source of livelihood, a

property right which is zealously protected by the Constitution. Moreover, subsisting

concession agreements between MIAA and petitioners-intervenors and service contracts

between international airlines and petitioners-intervenors stand to be nullified or terminated

by the operation of the NAIA IPT III under the PIATCO Contracts. The financial prejudice

brought about by the PIATCO Contracts on petitioners and petitioners-intervenors in these

cases are legitimate interests sufficient to confer on them the requisite standing to file the

instant petitions.


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b. G.R. No. 155547

In G.R. No. 155547, petitioners filed the petition for prohibition as members of the House

of Representatives, citizens and taxpayers. They allege that as members of the House of

Representatives, they are especially interested in the PIATCO Contracts, because the

contracts compel the Government and/or the House of Representatives to appropriate

funds necessary to comply with the provisions therein. They allege that the Government

obligations in the PIATCO Contracts which compel government expenditure without

appropriation is a curtailment of their prerogatives as legislators, contrary to the mandate

of the Constitution that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance

of an appropriation made by law."12

Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not

brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other

government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the

public interest. Although we are not unmindful of the cases of Imus Electric Co. v.

Municipality of Imus13

and Gonzales v. Raquiza14

wherein this Court held that appropriation

must be made only on amounts immediately demandable, public interest demands that we

take a more liberal view in determining whether the petitioners suing as legislators,

taxpayers and citizens have locus standi to file the instant petition. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v.

Guingona,15

this Court held "[i]n line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi,

ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit

civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to

question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of

various government agencies or instrumentalities."16

Further, "insofar as taxpayers' suits

are concerned . . . (this Court) is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be

entertained."17

As such ". . . even if, strictly speaking, they [the petitioners] are not covered

by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement

and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional

questions raised."18

In view of the serious legal questions involved and their impact on

public interest, we resolve to grant standing to the petitioners.


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G.R. No. 157509 January 18, 2005

AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE (AIWA) and its Affiliated Unions: Mitsubishi

Motors Workers Phils. Union; Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Supervisors Union, Nissan Motors

Phils., Inc. Workers Union, Toyota Motors Phils. Workers Union, DURASTEEL WORKERS

UNION, FILSHUTTERS EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION, NATIONAL LABOR UNION, PEPSI-

COLA SUPERVISORS AND EMPLOYEES UNION, PSBA FACULTY ASSOCIATION, PLDT SECURITY

PERSONNEL UNION, PUREFOODS UNIFIED LABOR ORGANIZATION, SAMAHANG

MANGGAGAWA NG BICUTAN CONTAINERS CORP., SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG

CINDERELLA, SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG LAURAS FOOD PRODUCTS, petitioners,

vs.

HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. PATRICIA STO.

TOMAS, in her capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:

Petitioners, composed of ten (10) labor unions, call upon this Court to exercise its power of

judicial review to declare as unconstitutional an executive order assailed to be in derogation

of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.

FACTS: In an original action for certiorari, petitioners invoke their status as labor unions and

as taxpayers whose rights and interests are allegedly violated and prejudiced by Executive

Order No. 185 whereby administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including the executive labor

arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of

Labor and Employment.

Petitioners argue that:

NLRC was an integral part of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)under the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Justice.

Executive Order No. 2922 was issued whereby the NLRC became an agencyattached to the DOLE for policy and program coordination and for administrative

supervision.

Article 213 of the Labor Code was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy

coordination only; while the administrative supervision over the NLRC was

turned over to the NLRC Chairman.

petitioners affirm their locus standi contending that they are suing for and inbehalf of their members estimated to be more or less fifty thousand (50,000)

workers who are the real parties to be affected by the resolution of this Court.

They likewise maintain that they are suing in behalf of the employees of the NLRC

who have pending cases for dismissal.

The respondents alleged that:

the petition does not pose an actual case or controversy upon which judicialreview may be exercised as petitioners have not specifically cited how E.O. No.

185 has prejudiced or threatened to prejudice their rights and existence as labor

unions and as taxpayers.

petitioners have no locus standito assail the validity of E.O. No. 185, not even intheir capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt from payingtaxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997.

Even assuming that their individual members are taxpayers, respondents maintainthat a taxpayer suit will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not require additional

appropriation for its implementation.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi

HELD: Exercise of the power of judicial review requires the concurrence of the following

requisites, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
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substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be

exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question

be passed upon in order to decide the case.

Legal standing or locus standiis defined as a "personal and substantial interest in the case

such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the

governmental act that is being challenged."11

For a citizen to have standing, he must

establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly

illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;

and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.12

Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any

personal injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As labor unions representing

their members, it cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and interests

considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not

extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the

exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.13

Thus, only NLRC personnel who may find

themselves the subject of the Secretary of Labors disciplinary authority, conferred by

Section 1(d) of the subject executive order , may be said to have a direct and specific

interest in raising the substantive issue herein. Moreover, and if at all, only Congress, and

not petitioners, can claim any injury14

from the alleged executive encroachment of the

legislative function to amend, modify and/or repeal laws.

Neither can standing be conferred on petitioners as taxpayers since petitioners have not

established disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution .15A

taxpayers suit is properly brought only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing

power of Congress.16

As correctly pointed out by respondents, E.O. No. 185 does not even

require for its implementation additional appropriation.
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G.R. No. 155336 November 25, 2004

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented by its

President, MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:Facts: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act 8522,

otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998 . It provided for

SpecialProvisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy.

The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the Commission on Human

Rights (CHR). These special provisions tackle Organizational Structure and the Use of Savings.

On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then Chairperson Aurora P.

Navarette-Recia and Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras,

Vicente P.Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution A98-047n 04 September1998,

adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the

Commission . Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla

positions, namely: one Director IV position,with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional

Office, four Security Officer IIwith Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary

Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners.

On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No.A98-055 providing for the upgrading or

raising of salary grades of certain positions in the Commission. It likewise provided for the

creation and upgrading of other positions. To support the implementation of such scheme,

the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount

generated from savings under Personnel Services.

By virtue of Resolution A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR collapsedthe vacant

positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification.

Among the positions collapsed were: one AttorneyIII, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three

Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said

staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the Department of Budget and Management

(DBM) with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied

the request.

In light of the DBM's disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the Civil

Service Commission (CSC)-National Capital Region Office recommended to the CSC-Central

Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM's disapproval of the

plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of the Commission on Human Rights

Employees' Association (CHREA), in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR,

requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.

CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority

mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well

as creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request in a Resolution dated

16 December 1999, and reversed the recommendation of the CSC

Respondent CHR contends that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there exists

no official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide

organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its

president, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr., has the authority to sue the CHR. The CHR contends that

it has the authority to cause the upgrading, reclassification, plantilla creation, and collapsing

scheme sans the approval of the DBM because it enjoys fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE: Does petitioner have locus standi to bring the suit?


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HELD: On petitioner's personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a

proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a

result of the act complained of.13

Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that

the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level

positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees.

This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR's upgrading scheme, if found to be

valid, potentially entails eating up the Commission's savings or that portion of its

budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the

employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took

cognizance of the CHREA's request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital

Region Office. CHREA's personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals

when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this

technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in

the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so

would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.14
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CITIZEN STANDING

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,

vs.

HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.

JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,

MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and

FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN,J.:

FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to

publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,

letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of

implementation and administrative orders.

The respondents contend that

this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personalityor standing to bring the instant petition.

that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directlyaffected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances

in question2

said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to

institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"

within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board

or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law

specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or

unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or

office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the personaggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court

alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered

commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified

time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the

petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason

of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Petitioners maintain that:

since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compelthe performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for

their petition to be given due course.

ISSUE:Do the petitioners havelegal personality or standing to bring the instant petition?

HELD: "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases

where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right

to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for

the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved.

Nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is

to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in

interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show

that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a

citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.


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Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a

proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a

special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.

Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the

proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this

character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule

in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to

the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a

general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for

the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for

the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon

the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted

upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround

this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the

relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could

be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the

Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this

character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the

aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition.

Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by

no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute

this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the

same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered

to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.


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G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

respondents.

CARPIO,J.:

The Facts

On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways,

signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines

("CDCP") to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also

included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCPobligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total

reclaimed land.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No.

1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to

develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1

On the same

date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the

"lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2

under the Manila-Cavite

Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so

that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA."

Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29,

1981, which stated:

"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in

the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to

progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed

upon

x x x

(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede

and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of

CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of

December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise

disposed of by CDCP as of said date,

President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to

PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and ReclamationProject (MCCRRP) covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"

located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City.

PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private

corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands.

then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and

denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams."

Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the

Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations , conducted a joint

investigation. Among the conclusions of their report are:

the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of thepublic domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and

therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands;


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15

(2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) theJVA itself is illegal.

President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal

Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA. The Legal Task Force upheld the

legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees. 11

Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going

renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V.

Ramos.

Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the

Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No.

132994 seeking to nullify the JVA.

petitioner Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for

Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary

Restraining Order. Petitioner contends that:

the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimedlands to AMARI.

The terms of any renegotiation of the JVA be disclosed in accordance with theright of the people to information on matters of public concern.

the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain is a blatant violation of theConstitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private

corporations.

PEA argues that:

petitionerhas no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce hisconstitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to

perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution.

petitionerhas not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of thesigning or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual

controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.

The Issue: WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDITO BRING THIS SUIT;

The Court's Ruling:

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to

compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.

There are two constitutional issues involved here:

First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the

equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino

citizens.

The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of

government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory

law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from

alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of theConstitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez

v. PCGG,28

the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of

transcendental importance to the public, thus -

"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of

the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts


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16

that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning

the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the

issues raised are of'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the

social, economic and moral well being of the people.'

Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal

interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in

this case.

Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and

access to official records, documents and papers a right guaranteed under Section 7,

Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen.

Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain

petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino

citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed."

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of

constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources -

matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.


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ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING

G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994

KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,

vs.

HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY

BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondents.

KAPUNAN,J.:

FACTS: Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to

LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge

passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a

period of one (1) year.

Finding the implementation of the fare range scheme "not legally feasible," Remedios A.S.

Fernando suggests that the implementation of the proposed fare range scheme this year be

further studied and evaluated.

private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP )

filed an application for fare rate increase.

private respondent PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare.

The application was opposed by the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C.

Bautista alleging that the proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable and that the

application contained no allegation on the rate of return of the proposed increase in rates.

public respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase.

LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the

implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587

private respondent PBOAP announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the

existing fares

The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and validity of certain

memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the Department of Transportation and

Communications (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board

LTFRB)2

which, among others

authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease theprescribed transportation fares without application therefor

establish a presumption of public need in favor of applicants for certificates ofpublic convenience (CPC) and place on the oppositor the burden of proving thatthere is no need for the proposed service, in patent violation not only of Sec. 16(c)

of CA 146, as amended, but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating that fares

should be "just and reasonable."

Respondents argue that petitioners have no locus standi

ISSUE:Does Petitioner KMU have the standing to sue?

HELD: YES

One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the

controversy has the standing to sue. The rule therefore requires that a party must show a

personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a

favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify

the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf.8


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In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave

and irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned

memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was

violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda,

circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys

everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passengerfares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly,

their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.

Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is

ready to brush aside this barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of

the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. And this act of

liberality is not without judicial precedent.

. . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality

which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the

importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers

Cases, [G.R. No. L-2044 (Araneta v. Dinglasan); G.R. No. L-2756 (Araneta

v. Angeles); G.R. No. L-3054 (Rodriguez v. Tesorero de Filipinas); G.R. No.

L-3055 (Guerrero v. Commissioner of Customs); and G.R. No. L-3056

(Barredo v. Commission on Elections), 84 Phil. 368 (1949 )], this Court

brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance

to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and

definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary

taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and

non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute

actions before this court to question the constitutionality or validity of

laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or

instrumentalities.


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[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN.

PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS: the President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for

the purpose of crime prevention and suppression in view of the alarming increase in violent

crimes in Metro Manila.

The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff AFP, the Chief of the PNP and the

Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the

said order.

In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief

Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000[1] (the LOI)

which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan,

would be conducted.[2] Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police

Chief of Metro Manila.

The President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila

through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols.

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,

the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for

the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or

suppressing criminal or lawless violence.

Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign

are merely temporaryin nature and for a reasonable period only.

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI

02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and

unconstitutional, arguing that:

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVEOF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:

a) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY,EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW

ENFORCEMENT WORK;

b) BSAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THEMILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT)

IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;

c) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THEMILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATIONIS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT

SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.[10]

IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP

in law enforcement.

In its comment, Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the

President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal

standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny

since the same involves a political question.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner has legal standing

HELD: petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of

standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave


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abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation

of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.

The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts

as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether

or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Requisites:

the existence of an actual and appropriate case a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in

the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of thegovernmental act that is being challenged.[13] The term interest means a material

interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in

the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to

uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP

asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its

duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient

to clothe it with standing in this case.

This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.

Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial

interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule

139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve

the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the

Marines.

It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the

petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present

action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying

opinions on the issue

IBP has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the

questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members has sustained any form of

injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any

of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the

deployment of the Marines.

Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character , it is likewise too vague, highly

speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.

Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a

consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity

of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the

IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP

must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain

judicial resolution of the controversy.


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***NOTE: Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a

suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is

involved.[16] In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi

of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance

to the people.[17] Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public,

the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.[18]

In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues

which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as

precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless

violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency

problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away.


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G.R. No. 131719 May 25, 2004

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT, AND THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, OWWA PUNO,

ADMINISTRATOR, and POEA ADMINISTRATOR, petitioners,

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ASIAN RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER

(ARCO-PHIL.), INC., representing its members: Worldcare Services Internationale, Inc.,

Steadfast

International Recruitment Corporation, Dragon International Manpower Services

Corporation, Verdant Manpower Mobilization Corporation, Brent Overseas Personnel, Inc.,

ARL Manpower Services, Inc., Dahlzhen International Services, Inc., Interworld Placement

Center, Inc., Lakas Tao Contract Services, Ltd. Co., and SSC Multiservices, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR.,J.:

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act

of 1995, took effect on July 15, 1995. The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the

Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the April 7,

1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin.

However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine

Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of

Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional certain

sections of the said republic act.

the ARCO-Phil prayed that the court issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the

enforcement of Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (m) on illegal recruitment, Section 7 on penalties

for illegal recruitment, and Section 9 on venue of criminal actions for illegal recruitments, viz:

With the effectivity of RA 8042, a great majority of the duly licensed recruitment

agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear of being

prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.

The loss or injury that the recruitment agencies will suffer will then be

immeasurable and irreparable. As of now, even foreign employers have already

reduced their manpower requirements from the Philippines due to their

knowledge that RA 8042 prejudiced and adversely affected the local recruitment

agencies.3

The respondent ARCO-PhilThe averred that

Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and,as such, violated the equal protection clause as the law encouraged the

deployment of skilled Filipino workers

the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to theexclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid classification.

Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and

due process and to the "equality of the person."

that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution

10prohibiting ex-post

facto laws and bills of attainder.

Petitioners assert that: Respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clear right/s

or that of its member-agencies to be protected by the injunctive relief and/or violation of

said rights by the enforcement of the assailed sections of R.A. 804. It failed to adduce in

evidence a certified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said

members authorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings. Neither is the suit

of the respondent a class suit so as to vest in it a personality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the


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respondent is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are

profit-oriented. T

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has locus standi

HELD:

The Respondent Has Locus Standi

The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members.

This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members.16

An association

has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are

affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its

constituents.17

In this case, the respondent filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules

of Court for and in behalf of its eleven (11) licensed and registered recruitment agencies

which are its members, and which approved separate resolutions expressly authorizing the

respondent to file the said suit for and in their behalf.

Respondent was organized for the purposes of promoting and supporting the growth and

development of the manpower recruitment industry; providing, creating and exploring

employment opportunities; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of

Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or

association.

The respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because

it and its members are in every practical sense identical. The respondent asserts that the

assailed provisions violate the constitutional rights of its members and the officers and

employees thereof. The respondent is but the medium through which its individual

members seek to make more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of

their grievances.19

***However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of

unskilled workers.

We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in

failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered recruitment

agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 6320

of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment

agencies for which the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the

amended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.21


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G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA,

EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO,

JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V.

VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO

TAADA, and REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,

vs.

TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the President;

RENATO CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Executive Secretary and Chairman of the

Presidential review Committee on the Lotto, Office of the President; PHILIPPINE CHARITY

SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; and PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,

respondents.

DAVIDE, JR.,J.:

Petitioner (KILOSBAYAN) is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited

citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth,

justice, and national renewal. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and

Wigberto Taada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as

members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens.

Senators Webb and Taada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as

members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines.

FACTS: Pursuant to the charter of PCSO which grants it the authority to hold and conduct

"charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities , the PCSO decided to

establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and

diversifying its sources of funds.

After learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the

Berjaya Group Berhad, "a multinational company engaged in running both Lotto and Digit

games, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO."

As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad organized with some Filipino investors a Philippine

corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which "was

intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services required

for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO."1

PCSOformally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery

system for the PCSO.

Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that the Berjaya Group

"undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%," by selling 35% out of the original

75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.

Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to

operate the country's on-line lottery system.10

This announcement was published in the

Manila Standard, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the Manila Times on 29 October 1993.

11

KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting

up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations.12

Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of

Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop

Malacaang," and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease, KILOSBAYAN, with

its co-petitioners this petition.

petitioners claim that:

. . . X X THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTAND THE PCSO GRAVELY ABUSE[D] THEIR

DISCRETION AND/OR FUNCTIONS TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION

AND/OR AUTHORITY IN RESPECTIVELY


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a) PCSO is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries "in

collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,

company or entity";

b) a Congressional franchise is required before any person may be

allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications system;

c) a less than 60% Filipino-owned and/or controlled corporation, like the

PGMC, is disqualified from operating a public service, like the said

telecommunications system; and

d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the

Foreign Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042) to install, establish and operate

the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems.18

Private respondent PGMC asserts that

a. [it] is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, as suchindependent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery

franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration,

association or joint venture' with PGMC

b. the execution and implementation of the contract does not violate theConstitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery

franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal

c. petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest inthe subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners has locus standi

HELD: YES. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in

the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the

landmark Emergency Powers Cases,29

this Court brushed aside this technicality because " the

transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled

promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. Insofar as

taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion

as to whether or not it should be entertained,"30

or that it "enjoys an open discretion to

entertain the same or not."31

And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide

discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its

addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

:

. . . For another, we have early as in the Emergency Powers Cases that where serious

constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these

cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,technicalities of procedure."

In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of

Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed

to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or

validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or

instrumentalities.

The Court finds the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The

issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those

involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably

affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest

barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the

envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to

raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of

its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the

respondents tried to take advantage of.


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TAXPAYERS STANDING

G.R. No. 159139 January 13, 2004

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MA. CORAZON M. AKOL,

MIGUEL UY, EDUARDO H. LOPEZ, AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, REX C. DRILON, MIGUEL HILADO,

LEY SALCEDO, and MANUEL ALCUAZ JR., petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS SR.; COMELEC

BIDDING and AWARD COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EDUARDO D. MEJOS and MEMBERS GIDEON

DE GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA, LAMBERTO P. LLAMAS, and BARTOLOME SINOCRUZ JR.;

MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFIC CONSORTIUM, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN,J.:

The Facts:

Congress passed Republic Act 8046 ,5

which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide

demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test

the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM).

Congress enacted Republic Act 84366

authorizing Comelec to use an automated election

system (AES) for the process of voting, counting votes. It also mandated the poll body to

acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and

materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.

COMELEC decided against full national implementation and limited the automation to the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, due to the failure of the

machines to read correctly some automated ballots in one town, the poll body later ordered

their manual count for the entire Province of Sulu.8

Comelec adopted a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct

biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System ; namely, Phase I - Voter

Registration and Validation System; Phase II - Automated Counting and Canvassing System;

and Phase III - Electronic Transmission.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the

sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of

Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.

COMELEC issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid."

Basically, thepublic bidding was to be conducted under a two-envelope/two stage system.

DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in the technical

evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures,Comelec awarding the project to MEGA PACIFIC

CONSORTIUM.

FIVE individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information Technology

Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma.

Corazon Akol) wrote a letter14

to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. Theyprotested the

award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in

which the bidding process had been conducted."

Respondents chorus that petitioners do not possess locus standi, inasmuch as they are notchallenging the validity or constitutionality of RA 8436. Moreover, petitioners admitted that

no law had been violated by the award of the Contract. Furthermore, they allegedly have no

actual and material interest in the Contract and, hence, do not stand to be injured or

prejudiced on account of the award.

Petitioners -- suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens -

- argue that


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the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and of nationalinterest.

Comelecs flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualifiedentity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process ,

thus any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the

people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of

government.

The award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public fundsin gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws

governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

The Issue: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi

YES. Our nations political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the

outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject

matter of this case is "a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest";18

in

other words, it is of "paramount public interest"19

and "transcendental importance."20 This

fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this

Court whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching significance to our society."21

Petitioners legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld.

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of

"illegal disbursement of public funds,"22

or if public money is being "deflected to a

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