PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1)ADM, Bernas vs. Capulong, et al (May 27, 1993)Facts: Respondents in the case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the University, seek re-admission. They have been refused admission into ADM having found guilty of violating Rule No 3 in the Rules of Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. As a result of an initiation of Aquila Legis, Lennie Villa died of serious physical injuries. Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized due to the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion, which happened in Feb 8-10, 1991. The Disciplinary Board found the respondents guilty of hazing, either by active part or through acquiescence. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, University President, imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. On March 18, 1991, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction. The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal. Respondent judge issued the write of preliminary injunction.Issue: Whether the respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to dismissal from petitioner universityRuling: Petition is granted and order of respondent judge, who committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of charges against them. There is no indication that such right has been violated. Respondent students’ rights in a school disciplinary proceeding have been meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings held before they were expelled. Minimum standard to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions are (1) students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired (3) informed of the evidence against them (4) right to adduce evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authority to hear and decide the case. Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of the order, they were denied procedural due process. Disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross-examine. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students’ participation in a hazing act need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. The charge filed is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character. It is not subject to the rigorous requirement of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal information or complaint.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1)People vs. Nazario (Aug. 31, 1988)Facts: The defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Order, being the owner and operator of a fishpond, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to pay minimum taxes required of him as fishpond operator. The accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and there is not law empowering municipalities to pass ordinance taxing fishpond operators. The trial court returned a verdict of guilty.Issue: Whether the lower court erred in not declaring the ordinance null and void for being ambiguous and uncertainRuling: As a rule, a statue or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. In no way the ordinances at be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term manager. He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds and had employed laborers to maintain them. While it appears that it is the National Government which owns them, the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinance. Appeal is DISMISSED.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1)LAO GI, et al vs. CA, CID (Dec. 29, 1989)Facts: On Sept. 3, 1958, the Secretary of Justice found Filomeno Chia, Jr., alias Sia Pieng Hui, to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father is a Filipino citizen. However, on October 3, 1980, the Minister of Justice set aside his citizenship on the ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. On March 9, 1981, a charge for deportation was filed with the CID against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Jr., his wife and children. In this case, it appears that petitioners are charged with having entered the Philippines by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection or admission by the immigration authority at a designated port of entry.Issue: Whether due process was denied from the petitionersRuling: While it is not disputed that it is also within the power and authority of the commissioner to require an alien to register, such a requirement must be predicated on a positive finding that the person who is so required is an alien. In this case where the very citizenship of the petitioner is in issue, there should be a previous determination by the CID that they are aliens before the petitioners may de directed and required to register as aliens. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extra-ordinary administrative proceeding affecting freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be dented. The charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment before any charge should be filed in the CID. A preliminary investigation must be conducted to determine if there is sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation.

Petition is GRANTED and the questioned order of the respondent CID is set aside. CID is directed to continue hearing the deportation case against the petitioners and thereafter, based on the evidence before it, resolve the issue of citizenship of petitioners, and if found to be aliens, to determine whether or not the petitioners should be deported and/or otherwise ordered to register as aliens.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1)Rivera vs. CSC, Land Bank of the Philippines (January 4, 1995)Facts: Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit of LBP and was charged with dishonesty, receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties, committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft Laws, and pursuit of private business vocation or profession without permission required by CSC. Rivera allegedly told Perez that he would facilitate the processing, approval and release of his loan if he would be given 10% commission. Rivera was further charged having served and acted, without prior authority required by CSC, as the personal consultant of Lao and consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. LBP held Rivers guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank. The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera. Issue: Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in composing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusionsRuling: Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera’s appeal to CSC to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. CSC resolution is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to CSC for the resolution, sans the participation of CSC Commissioner Gaminde, as she was the Board Chairman of MSPB whose ruling is thus appealed.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1)Balacuit, et al vs. CFI of Agusan del Norte & Butuan City, City of Butuan (June 30, 1988)Facts: This is a petition for validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed in April 21, 1969 penalizing those who sell tickets requiring children from 7 to 12 to pay full instead of just one-half. Petitioners are managers of movie theaters. The trial court upheld its validity. Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 640 is valid and constitutional Ruling: The operation of theaters are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. The City of Butuan, realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate, now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance. To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. There must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance. Under the guise of the police power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitralily invaded by the legislative department. The ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, it must be reasonable. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. The decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, therefore, null and void.

EQUAL PROTECTION (Art. III, Sec 1)People of the Phil vs. Jalosjos (Feb. 3, 2000)Facts: Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts1 is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. Issue: Whether respondent should be given since he is a public officialRuling: The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) – Stop and FriskPosadas vs. CA, People of the Phil (August 2, 1990)Facts: On October 16, 1986, while in the premises of RMC, members of the Integrated National Police of the Davao Metrodiscom spotted petitioner, below 18 yrs old, carrying a "buri" bag and noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade. The petitioner failed to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions and was found guilty. CA affirmed the decision.Issue: Whether the warrantless search on the petitioner is validRuling: Under the Rules of Court, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. As between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. A police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." The search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. 9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.

SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) – Stop and FriskPeople of the Phil vs. Mengote (June 22, 1992)Facts: Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. He pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. On August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at Tondo, they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. Mengote was found with a revolver and his companion had a fan knife. Danganan identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon and pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. Issue: Whether the arrest was lawful & whether the revolver is admissible as evidenceRuling: A person can be arrested without warrant after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense or in the presence of the arresting officer. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, Mengote was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses.

SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) – Consented SearchSpouses Veroy vs. Layague, Dumlao (June 18, 1992)Facts: Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at Skyline, Davao City. In June 1988, they transferred to Quezon City where they are presently residing. The care and upkeep of their residence was left to two (2) houseboys. The key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by petitioners. On April 12, 1990, Capt. Obrero, raided the house of herein petitioners in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone to ask permission to search the house. Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet. The authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was relayed by Capt. Obrero to Major Macasaet who answered that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by telephone on the matter and that the permission was given on the condition that the search be conducted in his presence. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet conducted the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. A locksmith, Badiang, had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the search. Capt. Obrero recovered handgun, printed materials, etc. Issue: Whether the articles were inadmissible as evidence for being violative of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizuresRuling: Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime. The criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED.

SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) – Consented SearchPeople of the Phil vs. Damaso @ Mendoza (August 12, 1992)Facts: On June 18, 1988, Morados stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza/Damaso and guided the group to the house rented by appellant. When they reached the house, the group found that it had already been vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Bernie Mendoza, the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented by appellant. The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. Damaso was originally charged in an information filed before the RTC Dagupan with violation of PD 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. The trial court found him guilty of the said offense. Issue: Whether there was a valid search and seizureRuling: In the case at bar, there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in obtaining evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the evidence as presented against him is weak to justify conviction. The testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own personal knowledge. It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But, one should not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. There are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. None of these exceptions is present in this case. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Tanciangco and Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costs de oficio.

SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) – Arrest WarrantAbdula vs. Guiani (February 18, 2000)Facts: After evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw found a prima facie case for murder against herein petitioners. On 3 January 1995, the respondent judge issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioners. Petitioners argued that the enforcement of the warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the information was prematurely filed and that the petitioners intended to file a petition for review with the Department of Justice.Issue: Whether the order of arrest issued is validRuling: Petitoiner points to the fact that the information was filed at around 4:00 p.m. of the January 2, 1995 and the order of arrest was immediately issued the following day or on January 3, 1995. Moreover, petitioner argues, respondent judge did not even issue an order stating that there is probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. After a careful analysis of these arguments, we find merit in the contention of petitioners. It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause "personally." This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives. The judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. It is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed." The statement is an admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendations. The circumstances thus require that respondent look beyond the bare certification of the investigating prosecutor and examine the documents supporting the prosecutor's determination of probable cause. Consequently, the

warrant of arrest should be declared null and void. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.

SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) – Warrantless Search: Incident to ArrestPeople of the Phil vs. Musa (January 27, 1993)Facts: On December 13, 1989, Sgt. Amado Ani conducted surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Zamboanga City. The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani approached Mari Musa. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani inspected the contents and was convinced that the contents were marijuana. Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house. Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. The trial court found Musa guilty of selling marijuana.Issue: Whether the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen is validRuling: The Constitution declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. In a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. The NARCOM agents could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. The "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana. The guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the RTC AFFIRMED.

SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) – Warrantless Search: Incident to ArrestNolasco, Roque, Tolentino vs. Pano, et al (October 8, 1985)Facts: On August 6, 1984 at 11:30 am, ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously been issued against NOLASCO. ROQUE was accused of rebellion. At 12:00 nn, the CSG searched the residence of Roque wherein a search warrant was previously issued at 9:00 am. They seized documents and written materials, portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. Issue: Whether the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure and whether probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness.Ruling: The court finds merit in the petition. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. The extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched. What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the search did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order. Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. WHEREFORE, while the Search Warrant is hereby annulled and set aside, the personalities seized may be retained by the CSG for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.

SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) – Warrantless ArrestPeople of the Phil vs. Gerente (March 10, 1993)Facts: On April 30, 1990, Gerente had in his possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs. On the same date, he, with two other companions, assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim. Policemen proceeded to where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. The policemen proceeded to the house of the Gerente and introduced themselves as policemen. They frisked the appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil.Issue: Whether the evidence is admissible in courtRuling: The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. The Court does not agree. The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. The policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED

SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) – Warrantless Search : Plain ViewDel Rosario vs. People of the Phil (May 31, 2001)Facts: In May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. A search warrant was issued. After appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search of the house. The search yielded firearms and ammunition. The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration stating that the person named therein had not been issued a firearm license referred to a different Vicente “Vic” del Rosario.Issue: Whether the search conducted was illegal and whether the evidence seized were inadmissibleRuling: The Court finds the petition impressed with merit. The certification stated that Vicente “Vic” del Rosario of Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. As against this, petitioner submitted that he was not the person referred to in the said certification because he is Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of both. Such certification referred to another individual and thus, cannot prevail over a valid firearm license duly issued to petitioner. With respect to the revolver that the police raiding team found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioner’s house, the firearm was not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for the search of petitioner’s house. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial “fruit of a poisonous tree.” It shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. The firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner’s house. The seizure was illegal. The seizure of evidence in ‘plain view’ applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Specifically, seizure of evidence in “plain view” is justified when there is: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. The Court hereby REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court ACQUITS petitioner of the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.

SPEECH, PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. III, Sec 4) – Forms of RestrictionAdiong vs. COMELEC (March 31, 1992)Facts: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347. Section 15 provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21. Section 21 provides that it is unlawful publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate, assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. The petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections.Issue: Whether the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom. The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The prohibition becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas. The Court is constrained to rule against the COMELEC prohibition. Petition is GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC is DECLARED NULL and VOID.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATON (Art. III, Sec 3) Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA. Zamora, Ortanez (August 4, 1994)Facts: On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence. A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied. CA dismissed the petition. Issue: Whether the tape recordings are admissible as evidenceRuling: The tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.

SPEECH, PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. III, Sec 4) – Forms of RestrictionAyer, et al vs. Capulong, et al (April 29, 1988)Facts: Petitioner Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as well as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them. It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. On 23 February 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with application for TRO with the RTC of Makati, seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution". The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series without private respondent's consent and over his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. Respondent court issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners. Issue: Whether the granting of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners is a restraint on their right of free expression. Ruling: Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of expression the Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies. The production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. To exclude commercially owned and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country. The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy. The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," 6 like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing of interest test". The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation or type of situation". The production and filming of the projected motion picture does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy." The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Order of respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE.

SPEECH, PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. III, Sec 4) – Forms of RestrictionVasquez vs. CA, RTC, People (September 15, 1999)Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. In April 1986, he and some 37 families went to see then NHA General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo. After their, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day, April 22, 1986, a news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the latter’s statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation and that the accused meant and intended to convey, as in fact he did mean and convey false and malicious imputations that said Jaime Olmedo is engaged in landgrabbing and involved in illegal gambling and stealing of chickens at the Tondo Foreshore Area. The trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty of libelRuling: With regard to the other imputations made by petitioner against complainant, it must be noted that what petitioner stated was that various charges (for attempted murder against petitioner, gambling, theft of fighting cocks) had been filed by the residents against their barangay chairman but these had all been dismissed. Petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. His allegation that, through connivance with NHA officials, complainant was able to obtain title to several lots at the Tondo Foreshore Area was based on the letter of NHA Inspector General. In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right and duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him the burden of proving that he acted with good motives and for justifiable ends. For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the RPC. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self- governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. Public discussion is a political duty and the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people. The non-inclusion of the periodicals was a transparent hypocrisy, an ostensibly pious if not at all convincing pretense of respect for freedom of expression that was in fact one of the most desecrated liberties during the past despotism. Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SPEECH, PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. III, Sec 4) – Forms of RestrictionKapunan, Eslao vs. De Villa, et al (December 6, 1988)Facts: In the aftermath of the failed August 28, 1987 coup d'etat, a PMA Board of Officers was created to investigate the alleged involvement of officers and cadets of the PMA. PMA Superintendent Dayan verbally instructed the PMA Board of Officers to take the testimonies of certain witnesses. These statements became the basis for the recommendation of the AFP Board for the filing of charges against petitioners. A prima facie case was found against petitioners and the case was recommended for trial by a general court martial. Petitioners' motion to dismiss was also denied. Petitioner Kapunan was allegedly summoned to the General Headquarters of the AFP for a dialogue, but upon his arrival thereat on September 4, 1987 he was ordered confined under "house arrest". On May 19, 1988, Gen. De Villa ordered the release of Kapunan in connection with the Olalia case since no charges had been filed therein, but ordered that he remain under confinement as an accused in the case before respondent General Court Martial No. 8. He has been so detained since then. Issue: Whether Kapunan may issue press statements or give press conference during the period of his detentionRuling: On the matter of the restriction imposed on petitioner Kapunan as conditions for his "house arrest", particularly that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during the period of his detention at his quarters in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City [Rollo, p. 70], the Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered. The Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition

SPEECH, PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. III, Sec 4) – Forms of RestrictionOsmeña. Garcia vs. COMELEC (March 31, 1998)Facts: §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the COMELEC. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming elections. Osmeña is candidate for President of the Philippines, while Garcia is governor of Cebu Province, seeking reelection. They contend that events after the ruling in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections "have called into question the validity of the very premises of that decision.Issue: Whether the said provision is unconstitutionalRuling: there is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC. The main purpose of §11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction on speech is limited both as to time and as to scope. Media ads do not partake of the 'real substantive evil' that the state has a right to prevent and that justifies the curtailment of the people's cardinal right to choose their means of expression and of access to information. The clear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign remedy for all free speech problems. §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of communication or information for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for political campaigns; that the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech; that any restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality. The petition is DISMISSED.

SPEECH, PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. III, Sec 4) – Contempt and ObscenityPita vs. CA, Bagatsing, Cabrera (October 5, 1989)Facts: On December 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The CA dismissed the appeal.Issue: Whether the publications were validly seized Ruling: The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done to say, indeed, that if "the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes," 12 the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. The established basic guidelines are, to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society. In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and has not been, an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. Thee presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process. The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It appearing, however, that the magazines subject of the search and seizure have been destroyed, the Court declines to grant affirmative relief. To that extent, the case is moot and academic.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATON (Art. III, Sec 3) Zulueta vs. CA. Martin (February 20, 1996)Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The RTC enjoined the petitioners from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.Issue: Whether the petitioner should return the documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consentRuling: Petitioner's contention has no merit. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. The petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SPEECH, PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. III, Sec 4) – Contempt and ObscenityIglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, et al (July 26, 1996)Facts: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." The trial court ordered BRMPT to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for all the series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program. Court of Appeals 15 reversed the trial court.Issue: Whether the program is constitutionally protected as a form of expressionRuling: The Court reverses the ruling of the appellate court. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE insofar as it sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121.

SPEECH, PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. III, Sec 4) – Assembly and PetitionMalabanan, et al vs. Ramento, et al (May 21, 1984)Facts: Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus proceeding. Petitioners are students of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation and pursuant to a permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly. They manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. They marched toward outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. This petition may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from the fact that by virtue of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court petitioners were allowed to enroll in the ensuing semester, with three of them doing so and with the other two equally entitled to do so.Issue: Whether there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speechRuling: This Court accordingly rules that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the decision of respondent Ramento, the penalty imposed being unduly severe. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which "is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing . . . of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent." : "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required." Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." While the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects, if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others. . . . But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior — materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." As tested by such a standard, what is the verdict on the complaint of petitioners that there was a disregard of their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. It must be in their favor, but subject to qualification, in view of their continuing their demonstration in a place other than that specified in the permit for a longer period and their making use of megaphones therein, resulting in the disruption of classes and the stoppage of work by the non-academic personnel in the vicinity of such assembly. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to present. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. The petition is GRANTED.

SPEECH, PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. III, Sec 4) – Assembly and PetitionNestle vs. Sanchez (September 30, 1987)Facts: During the period July 8-10, 1987, respondent Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia, intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1981 in front of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers. These acts were done even after their leaders had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Issue: Whether there was a violation of the rights of free speech and assemblyRuling: The Court accepts the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice." The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equally a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. The individuals herein cited are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. Contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. III, Sec 5) – Non-Establishment ClauseManosca, et al vs. CA, et al (January 29, 1996)Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at Taguig, Metro Manila. When the parcel was ascertained to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed a resolution declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. The opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure and he explained: "According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an event, achievement, characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a national landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized . . . “ Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity.Issue: Whether the resolution gives preference to members of Iglesia ni CristoRuling: Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation," to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. Petition is DENIED.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. III, Sec 5) – Free Exercise ClauseISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et al (July 9, 2003)Facts: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.Issue: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religionRuling: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. III, Sec 5) – Free Exercise ClauseEbralinag, et al vs. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (March 1, 1993)Facts: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God”. They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols. They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control. Issue: Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledgeRuling: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses, this religious which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes. After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, science, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be condusive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all. While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right. The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. III, Sec 5) – Free Exercise ClauseAng Mga Kaanib vs. Iglesia (December 12, 2001)Facts: Respondent Iglesia ng Dios Kay Cristo Jesus, Haligi at Suhay ng Katotohanan (Church of God in Christ Jesus, the Pillar and Ground of Truth), is a non-stock religious society or corporation registered in 1936. Sometime in 1976, one Eliseo Soriano and several other members of respondent corporation disassociated themselves from the latter and succeeded in registering on March 30, 1977 a new non-stock religious society or corporation, named Iglesia ng Dios Kay Kristo Hesus, Haligi at Saligan ng Katotohanan. Respondent corporation filed with the SEC a petition to compel the Iglesia ng Dios Kay Kristo Hesus, Haligi at Saligan ng Katotohanan to change its corporate name to another name that is not similar or identical to any name already used by a corporation, partnership or association registered with the Commission. Petitioner is compelled to change its corporate name and be barred from using the same or similar name on the ground that the same causes confusion among their members as well as the public. SEC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to change its corporate name. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the decision of the SEC En Banc. Issue: Whether the court of appeals failed to properly appreciate the scope of the constitutional guarantee on religious freedomRuling: The additional words "Ang Mga Kaanib " and "Sa Bansang Pilipinas, Inc." in petitioner's name are, as correctly observed by the SEC, merely descriptive of and also referring to the members, or kaanib, of respondent who are likewise residing in the Philippines. These words can hardly serve as an effective differentiating medium necessary to avoid confusion or difficulty in distinguishing petitioner from respondent. This is especially so, since both petitioner and respondent corporations are using the same acronym — H.S.K.; not to mention the fact that both are espousing religious beliefs and operating in the same place. The fact that there are other non-stock religious societies or corporations using the names Church of the Living God, Inc., Church of God Jesus Christ the Son of God the Head, Church of God in Christ & By the Holy Spirit, and other similar names, is of no consequence. It does not authorize the use by petitioner of the essential and distinguishing feature of respondent's registered and protected corporate name. Ordering petitioner to change its corporate name is not a violation of its constitutionally guaranteed right to religious freedom. In so doing, the SEC merely compelled petitioner to abide by one of the SEC guidelines in the approval of partnership and corporate names, namely its undertaking to manifest its willingness to change its corporate name in the event another person, firm, or entity has acquired a prior right to the use of the said firm name or one deceptively or confusingly similar to it. The instant petition for review is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. III, Sec 5) – Free Exercise ClauseCenteno vs. Villalon-Pornillos, et al (September 1, 1994)Facts: Sometime in 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD. An information was filed against Centeno for violation of PD No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner questions the applicability of PD No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.Issue: Whether State regulating solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution. Ruling: All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes. The constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom. Even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy. Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of PD No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable. The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged.

SPEECH, PRESS & ASSEMBLY (Art. III, Sec 4) – Contempt and ObscenityGonzales, et al vs. Katigbak, et al (July 22, 1985)Facts: The motion picture, Kapit sa Patalim was classified "For Adults Only." The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of the Malaya Films. The respondent is the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, with Maria Kalaw Katigbak as its Chairman and Brig. Gen. Wilfredo C. Estrada as its Vice-Chairman. For petitioners, such classification "is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression. The film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film.Issue: Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion.Ruling: Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. Press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, is absolute. It can be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent.' ". It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There is, however, some difficulty in determining what is obscene. On the question of obscenity, therefore, and in the light of the facts of this case, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent Board is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave. WHEREFORE, this Court DISMISSES this petition for certiorari solely on the ground that there are not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in the classification of Kapit sa Patalim as "For Adults Only."

FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. III, Sec 5) – Non-Establishment CauseGarces, et al vs. Hon. Estenzo, et al (May 25, 1981)Facts: A wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash donations pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of said council, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. The image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day as per Resolution No. 6 which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest refused to return custody of the image to the council until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. The parish priest and his co-petitioners thereafter filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and state. freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church. The lower court dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the resolution.Issue: Whether the resolution contravene the constitutional provision that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion”Ruling: The Supreme Court held, that the questioned resolutions did not contravene any constitutional provision since the image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money, and in connection with a socio-religious affair, the celebration of which is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. Judgment of the lower court AFFIRMED.

RIGHT TO TRAVEL (Art. III, Sec 6) Silverio vs. CA, Gaviola, People of the Philippines (April 8, 1991)Facts: Petition for Review on Certiorari. On 14 October 1985, petitioner was charged with violation of the Revised Securities Act. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. On 26 January 1988, People of the Philippines filed a motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings. The RTC issued the order as the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused he has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court. CA denied the petition.Issue: Whether the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public healthRuling: There is no reversible error. The bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him. For violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. The condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law. It should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED.

RIGHT TO TRAVEL (Art. III, Sec 6) Yap vs. CA, People of the Philippines (June 6, 2001)Facts: For misappropriating amounts, petitioner was convicted of estafa. The RTC denied the motion to fix bail for his provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. CA granted the said motion but with conditions that a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court, and that a hold departure order be issued against him and that he surrender his passport.Issue: Whether petitioner's constitutional liberty of abode and travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail was unduly restrictedRuling: Petitioner contests the condition that he secure such certification/guaranty from the Mayor, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel. Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving the Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the order. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines are not absolute rights. The order of the CA releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the provision in the Constitution. It is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so. The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner's bail pending appeal is reduced. In all other respects, the resolutions of the CA are AFFIRMED.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. III, Sec 7) Valmonte, et al vs. Belmonte (February 13, 1989)Facts: Special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction. Valmonte wrote to Belmonte, GSIS General Manager, requesting the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos, certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan or access to such documents. It was denied on the ground that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be. Issue: Whether the petitioners are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.Ruling: An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of information they disseminate. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. The right to information is not absolute. It is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Its funds assume a public character. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus proceedings, which is that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law. Right to privacy is constitutionally protected. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. This right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature and may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. The GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. Petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious. However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, which to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the such members who were able to secure such clean loans. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and are entitled to access to official records, the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern. The instant petition is hereby GRANTED and respondent General Manager of the GSIS is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. III, Sec 7) Gonzales vs. Narvasa, et al (August 14, 2000)Facts: Petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information for the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacañang..Issue: Whether the petitioner has to right to such informationRuling: Section 7 of the Bill of Rights is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts. The right to information as a public right and "when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right." However, Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning "matters of public concern", a term which "embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public." Respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioner's letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern. With regard to petitioner's request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business. The petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ORDERED to furnish petitioner with the information requested.

RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE (Art. III, Sec 8) Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. vs. Blanco, Court of Industrial Relations (November 12, 1981)Facts: Employed in 1959 by LITEX, Blanco joined the then existing labor union, the Litex Employees Association (LEA). In 1960, LEA entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with LITEX which was to expire in 1965. The CBA contained a closed-shop provision. LEA's Constitution and by-laws also provided for the expulsion of members who are affiliated with other labor unions. In 1964, Blanco and several LITEX employees organized the Confederation of Industrial and Allied Labor Organization (CIALO). The Court of Industrial Relaitons (CIR) certified LEA as the sole bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of LITEX. LITEX dismissed 18 of its employees found to have violated the union Constitution and by-laws and the CBA for having joined the CIALO. Six of the dismissed employees and Blanco filled a case for illegal dismissal. The CIR dismissed the case as regards the six employees but ordered the reinstatement with backwages of Blanco. Falling to obtain reconsideration of the ruling, LITEX sought review thereof.Issue: Whether the CBA is a restriction of the right of freedom of association.Ruling: Petition is meritorious. The Supreme Court held that the closed-shop agreement was a valid form of union security, and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. It was grave abuse of/discretion for respondent Court to order the reinstatement with backwages of Blanco who was found to be in an identical position as the five other employees whose separation from the service was upheld by the said Court. Respondent Blanco could be dismissed on the ground of willful disobedience to rules, orders and instructions of the employer which were reasonable and lawful, known to the employee and pertaining to duties which he discharged. If his name was not included in the list of 18 employees recommended for dismissal, it was because he had been dismissed three days before by the company. And if he had not been dismissed by the company, his dismissal would have been demanded by LEA considering that he was one of those investigated by LEA's grievance committee which had approved the recommendation to dismiss them on the charge of being members of another union. The appealed Decision in so far as it held that petitioner violated the Industrial Peace Act in dismissing respondent Epifanio D. Blanco and ordering his reinstatement by petitioner, is hereby SET ASIDE.

RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE (Art. III, Sec 8) Bel Air vs. Dionisio (June 30, 1989)Facts: Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant for the collection of the association dues assessed on the lot owned by the defendant as member of the plaintiff association. Without applying for membership in plaintiff association, defendant in this case, like the other members, automatically became a member because he is the registered owner of a lot located inside the Bel Air Village. The inferior court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff. Issue: Whether such membership collides with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of associationRuling: There is no dispute that the title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all encumbrances except notations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association. One of the obligations of a member of the respondent association is to pay certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association which is being collected by the Board of Governors. The dues collected are intended for garbage collection, salary of security guards, cleaning and maintenance of streets and street lights and establishments of parks. The amount to be paid by each lot owner is computed on the basis of the area per square meter of the lot owned by every member. The transaction between the defendants and the original seller (defendant's immediate predecessor) is a sale and the conditions have been validly imposed by the said vendor/the same not being contrary to law, morals and good customs and public policy. The fact that it has been approved by the Land Registration Commission did not make it a governmental act subject to the constitutional restriction against infringement of the right of association. The constitutional proscription that no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against his will applies only to government acts and not to private transactions like the one in question. If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the plaintiff association. The instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. III, Sec 7) Chavez vs. PCGG, Gunigundo (December 9, 1998)Facts: Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government. Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.Issue: Whether the right to information includes access to the terms of government negotiations, prior to their consummation or conclusionRuling: The petition is imbued with merit. Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves. The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, the Court rules that the petition at bar should be allowed. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. The following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. It is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. The recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. It is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. The petition is GRANTED. The agreements which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. III, Sec 7) Vda. De Urbano, et al vs. GSIS, et al (October 19, 2001)Facts: Petitioners mortgaged their property to the respondent GSIS to secure a housing loan. As petitioners failed to pay their loan when it fell due, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage. Petitioner vda. de Urbano wrote the GSIS Board of Trustees (the "Board") to inform them of her desire to redeem the subject property and for advice on the procedure for redemption. GSIS responded advising her to pay the total redemption price of P154,896.00 on or before the expiry date of redemption. Unable to find financing to repurchase the subject property, petitioners requested for re-mortgage through repurchase of the subject property. Respondent Crispina dela Cruz commenced negotiations with respondent GSIS for her purchase of the petitioners' foreclosed property. A Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property was executed between GSIS and private respondent de la. Cruz. Having learned about the sale of the subject property to dela Cruz, petitioner Aurelio Arrienda wrote to the GSIS protesting the said sale and requesting its reconsideration and recall. Petitioners filed the instant case before the RTC of Quezon City. The lower court dismissed the complaint. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.Issue: Whether the petitioners were deprived of their right to information.Ruling: The petition is devoid of merit. GSIS sold the subject property to respondent dela Cruz only after giving petitioners an almost one year opportunity to repurchase the property and only after ascertaining that the purchase price proposed by private respondent dela Cruz in payment of the subject property would benefit the GSIS. Nor can petitioners, on the strength of Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., impute bad faith on the part of GSIS when the latter did not disclose to petitioners that it was negotiating with private respondent dela Cruz for the sale of the subject property as soon as it started the negotiations. The constitutional right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," to "transactions involving public interest." The negotiation and subsequent sale of the subject property by the GSIS to private respondent dela Cruz was by no stretch of the imagination imbued with public interest as it was a purely private transaction. The petition is DENIED and the impugned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. III, Sec 9) PPI vs. COMELEC (May 22, 1995) Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing members of PPI to provide free print space for use as COMELEC space. PPI asks the SC to declare Resolution 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies against the taking of private property for public without just compensation. Issue: Whether the resolution violates prohibition against the taking of private property for public use without just compensationRuling: That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its implementing letters with some criminal or other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the COMELEC’s original intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from publishers. It is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed. To compel print media companies to donate COMELEC space amounts to taking of private personal property for public use or purposes. Section2 of the said resolution failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory donation. The monetary value of the compulsory donation may be very substantial indeed. The requisite for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity has not been shown by COMELEC. The unwillingness or reluctance of COMELEC to buy print space lies in the heart of the problem. It has not been suggested nor demonstrated that COMELEC has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by legislative authority. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the Constitution but not without payment of just compensation. Section 2 of Resolution 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. There was no effort to show that the police policies – essentially a power of legislation – has been constitutionally delegated to COMELEC. There was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisite of a lawful taking under police power. Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part. Section 2 is SET ASIDE as null and void. TRO is made permanent. Petition is DISMISSED in part as to Section 8.

EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. III, Sec 9) Moday vs. Court of Appeals, et al (February 20, 1997)Facts: Petition for review of a decision of the CA. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate the petition for expropriation of a parcel of land, belonging to the petitioners. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said resolution and returned it with the comment that expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still other lots available.Issue: Whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang PanlalawiganRuling: The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the CA. Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government’s right to appropriate in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The Snagguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval does not render said resolution null and void. Their power to declare a municipal resolution invalid is on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the mayor to issue. Said resolution is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioner’s property. The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. Instant petition is DENIED. The questioned decision and resolution of the CA are affirmed. TRO is lifted.

EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. III, Sec 9) - TakingNational Power Corporation vs. Spouses Gutierrez, CA (Jan. 18, 1991)Facts: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA. NPC is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objective, which among others is the construction, operation and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution through the Philippines. Its lines have to pass the lands of private respondents. The value granted was at P5 per square meter. CA sustained the trial court.Issue: Whether the petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines.Ruling: While it is true that plaintiff is only after a right of way easement, it nevertheless deprived defendants of their proprietary rights. Because of the high tension current conveyed, danger to life and limbs may be cause beneath said wires cannot be discounted. Plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property. The facts considered, the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. The limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation. Just compensation is the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the government are the criteria for determining the just compensation. The said award is proper and not unreasonable. Petitioner only sought an easement of right-of-way and the power of eminent domain may be exercised although title was not transferred to the expropriator. Assailed decision the CA is AFFIRMED.

NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS (Art. III, Sec 10) Caleon vs. Agus Development Corporation, CA (April 7, 1992)Facts: Petition for review on certiorari. Private respondent Agus Development Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land in Manila, which it leased to petitioner Rita Caleon. Petitioner constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without the consent of the private respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two of the four doors. Upon learning of the sub-lease, private respondent through counsel demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased premises. The trial court ordered the petitioner and all persons claiming possession under her to vacate the premises, to remove whatever improvement she introduced on the property and to pay private respondent. CA dismissed the petition.Issue: Whether or not the lease of an apartment includes a sublease of the lot on which it is constructed, as would constitute a ground for ejectment under Batas Pambansa BLg. 25.Ruling: Petitioner's contention is untenable. The lease of a building naturally includes the lease of the lot, and the rentals of the building include those of the lot. The occupancy of a building or house not only suggests but implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which they are constructed. Petitioner in leasing her apartment has also subleased the lot on which it is constructed which lot belongs to private respondent. it is now beyond question that the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. In fact, every contract affecting public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 shows that the subject matter of the law is the regulation of rentals and is intended only for dwelling units with specified monthly rentals constructed before the law became effective. It is from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared by this Court as a police power legislation. The Petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS (Art. III, Sec 10) Siska Development Corporation vs. Office of the Pres., Spouses Sering (April 22, 1994)Facts: Petition for certiorari. Petitioner, a subdivision owner-developer, entered into a Contract to Sell with Guadalupe Sering. Guadalupe Sering, with the consent of petitioner, transferred all her rights and interests over the aforesaid lot in favor of respondent Socorro Sering, wife of respondent Jose Sering. Private respondents assumed the transferor's obligation by paying the monthly amortizations for the lot. They defaulted in the payment of their monthly amortizations, but petitioner still accepted the late payments. Petitioner sent private respondents a notice of rescission of the Contract to Sell for failure to pay the monthly amortizations on time. Petitioner, however, cancelled the said notice of rescission, after private respondents updated their payments. Petitioner, however, imposed the condition that private respondents' account "must be kept current" and that should it be necessary to rescind the contract for a second time, the second rescission would be final. Private respondents again defaulted in paying their monthly amortizations. When respondent Jose Sering offered to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price, an employee of petitioner refused to accept the payment, alleging that the contract had already been cancelled. However, said respondent protested that he had not received any notice of rescission from petitioner.Issue: Whether the relationship between the parties is governed solely by the Contract to Sell because said contract was entered into long before the passage of the Maceda LawRuling: Private respondents never received the notice of rescission sent by petitioner. The sending of a notice of cancellation to the buyer is mandated by the Maceda Law. Without expressly stating so, petitioner's line of argument invokes the non-impairment clause of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 10). The purpose of said clause is to safeguard the integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, contracts should not be tampered with by subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights and obligations of the parties. The will of the obligor and obligee must be observed; the obligation of their contract must not be impaired. Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There is an impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. The requirement of notice of the rescission under the Maceda Law does not change the time or mode of performance or impose new conditions or dispense with the stipulations regarding the binding effect of the contract. Neither does it withdraw the remedy for its enforcement. At most, it merely provides for a procedure in aid of the remedy of rescission. While the contract was entered into before the effectivity of the Maceda Law, the rescission took place when the said law was in full force and effect. But even before the effectivity of said law, jurisprudence made necessary a notice of rescission. While juridical action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions, jurisprudence requires that a written notice be sent to the defaulter informing him of the rescission. Petition is DISMISSED.

EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. III, Sec 9) Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation (July 20, 1998)Facts: The Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land. The complaint was filed “for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. The trial dismissed the case. CA affirmed the said decision.Issue: Whether or not the Resolution of the Parañaque Municipal Council is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 in the exercise of the power of eminent domain by the plaintiff-appellant.Ruling: The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless; 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws; 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. The local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. The power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. An LGU, like the Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. The Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can “reach every form of property which the State might need for public use. While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice. Petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioner’s proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over subject property.

EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. III, Sec 9) - TakingNational Power Corporation vs. CA, Mangondato (March 11, 1996)Facts: NAPOCOR took possession of a land, owned by private respondent, under the mistaken belief that it forms part of the public land reserved for use by NAPOCOR for hydroelectric power purposes. Respondent demanded compensation from NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to compensate insisting that the property is public land and that it had already paid ‘financial assistance’ to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the property belongs to respondent. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court was justified in deviating from the well-settled doctrine that just compensation is the equivalent of the value of the property taken for public use reckoned from the time of takingRuling: The general rule in determining “just compensation” in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The exception finds application where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated. However, it is difficult to conceive of how there could have been an extra-ordinary increase in the value of the owner’s land arising from the expropriation, as indeed the records do not show any evidence that the valuation of P1,000.00 reached in 1992 was due to increments directly caused by petitioner’s use of the land. The petitioner has the burden of proving its claim that its occupancy and use - not ordinary inflation and increase in land values - was the direct cause of the increase in valuation from 1978 to 1992. An examination of the undisputed factual environment would show that the “taking” was not really made in 1978. A number of circumstances must be present in the ‘taking’ of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.” The petitioner’s entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority, for it believed the property was public land. Only in 1990 did the petitioner recognize private respondent’s ownership and negotiate for the voluntary purchase of the property. A Deed of Sale with provisional payment and subject to negotiations for the correct price was then executed. Clearly, this is not the intent nor the expropriation contemplated by law. This is a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale. Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or refused to exercise the power of eminent domain. Petitioner effectively repudiated the deed of sale it entered into with the private respondent when it authorized its president to negotiate that payment “shall be effected only after Agus I HE project has been placed in operation.” It was only then that petitioner’s intent to expropriate became manifest as private respondent disagreed and, barely a month after, filed suit. In sum, petitioner has failed to show why it should be granted an exemption from the general rule in determining just compensation. Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the judgment appealed from AFFIRMED, except as to the interest on the monthly rentals, which is hereby reduced from twelve percent (12%) to the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum.

EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. III, Sec 9) - TakingMarine Radio, et al vs. Reyes, et al (November 6, 1990)Facts: The petitioners are self-described "Filipino entrepreneurs deeply involved in the business of marine radio communications in the country. They are also operators of "shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore public marine coastal radio stations, and are holders of certificates of public convenience duly issued by the NTC. Among other things, they handle correspondence between vessel passengers or crew and the public. DOTC unveiled a maritime coastal communications system project, designed to ensure safety of lives at sea. It was set out to provide, among other things, ship-to- shore and shore-to-ship public corresponding, free of charge. Sec. Reyes replied that MARCAPI’s main business concern is public correspondence, which is only fourth in the order of priority of services to be offered by the present maritime project. Primarily, it will offer distress and safety communications service which is obligatory in the maritime mobile service. The petitioners brought the instant suit, alleging, in essence, that Secretary Rainerio Reyes had been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. Issue: Whether the act complained of is equivalent to a taking without just compensation.Ruling: There is no merit in this petition. There can hardly be any valid argument against providing for public corresponding, free of charge. It is compatible with State aims to serve the people under the Constitution, and certainly, amid these hard times, the State can do no less. The Court is not of the thinking that the act complained of is equivalent to a taking without just compensation. It does not seem that the DOTC, by providing for free public correspondence, is guilty of an uncompensated taking. Rather, the Government merely built a bridge that made the boat obsolete, although not entirely useless. Certainly, the owner of the boat can not charge the builder of the bridge for lost income. And certainly, the Government has all the right to build the bridge. The petition is DISMISSED.

EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. III, Sec 9) – Public UseManotok, et al vs. NHA, Republic of the Philippines (May 21, 1987)Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Letter of Instruction instituting a nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program and to adopt slum improvement as a national housing policy. The Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program included the properties known as the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area in its priority list for a zonal improvement program. The President also designated the NHA to negotiate with the owners of the property for the acquisition of the same. This, however, did not materialize as the negotiations for the purchase of the property failed. The President issued Proclamation No. 1810 declaring all sites Identified by the Metro Manila local governments and approved by the Ministry of Human Settlements to be included in the ZIP upon proclamation of the President. The Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area were among the sites included. Issue: Whether the government had the right to expropriate the said areasRuling: The power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions in the Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its exercise in order to protect the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The State is not subject to any limitation other than those imposed by the Constitution which are: first, the taking must be for a public use; secondly, the payment of just compensation must be made: and thirdly, due process must be observed in the taking. The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory everytime a specific decree or law orders the expropriation of somebody's property and provides its own peculiar manner of taking the same. Neither should the courts adopt a hands-off policy just because the public use has been ordained as existing by the decree or the just compensation has been fixed and determined beforehand by a statute. Although due process does not always necessarily demand that a proceeding be had before a court of law, it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard are given to the owner to protect his property rights. There are exceptional situations when, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the requirement of due process may not necessarily entail judicial process. But where it is alleged that in the taking of a person's property, his right to due process of law has been violated, the courts will have to step in and probe into such an alleged violation. A necessity must exist for the taking of private property for the proposed uses and purposes but accepted the fact that modern decisions do not call for absolute necessity. It is enough if the condemnor can show a reasonable or practical necessity, which of course, varies with the time and peculiar circumstances of each case. In the instant petitions, there is no showing whatsoever as to why the properties involved were singled out for expropriation through decrees or what necessity impelled the particular choices or selections. The provision of P.D. 1669 which allows NHA, at its sole option, to put portions of the expropriated area to commercial use in order to defray the development costs of its housing projects cannot stand constitutional scrutiny. P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process of law and, therefore, they must fail the test of constitutionality. The decrees, do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation. The fixing of the maximum amounts of compensation and the bases thereof which are the assessed values of the properties in 1978 deprive the petitioner of the opportunity to prove a higher value because, the actual or symbolic taking of such properties occurred only in 1980 when the questioned decrees were promulgated. The decision of the government to acquire a property through eminent domain should be made known to the property owner through a formal notice wherein a hearing or a judicial proceeding is contemplated. This shall be the time of reckoning the value of the property for the purpose of just compensation. The questioned decrees transgress the petitioners' right to just compensation. Having violated the due process and just compensation guarantees, P. D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 are unconstitutional and void. The petitions are hereby GRANTED. Presidential Decree Numbers 1669 and 1670 which respectively proclaimed the Tambunting Estate and the Estero de Sunog-Apog area expropriated, are declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. III, Sec 9) – Just CompensationSantos vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, Diaz, Ong, Aquino (September 7, 2000)Facts: Edgardo Santos is the plaintiff in an Agrarian Case for the determination of just compensation regarding properties which were taken by DAR. A preliminary valuation in the amount of P3,543,070.66 had in fact been previously released by the Land Bank in cash and bond; thus deducting it from the total amount adjudged. Issue: Whether just compensation should always be paid in cash.Ruling: The judgment mandated compensation to the petitioner "in the manner provided by R.A. 6657. There is certitude with regard to this assertion. Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the judgment. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment ought to have been construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the final judgment, to which execution must conform. Paying in cash, as petitioner demands, is not compatible with such judgment. The traditional method for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.

EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. III, Sec 9) – Public UseEstate of Salud Jimenez vs. Phil Export Processing Zone (January 16, 2001)Facts: Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA) initiated expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels of Riceland, one of which is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez. More than 10 years later, the trial court upheld the right of private respondent PEZA to expropriate. Petitioner contended that said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. The trial court reconsidered the order. Petitioner and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement. Private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 as agreed. The trial court annulled the said compromise agreement. The CA upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement. Issue: Whether the expropriation order is final and whether the purpose of said expropriation is indeed for public use.Ruling: Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first phase ends either with an order of expropriation (where the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a final one since it finally disposes of the case. The second phase concerns the determination of just compensation. The trial court gravely abused its discretion by setting aside the order of expropriation which has long become final and executory and by ordering the return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. In the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term “necessary”, in this connection, does not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. The expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the purpose of being leased to banks and for the construction of a terminal has the purpose of making banking and transportation facilities easily accessible to the persons working at the industries located in PEZA. The expropriation of adjacent areas therefore comes as a matter of necessity to bring life to the purpose of the law. In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. Payment of just compensation should follow as a matter of right immediately after the order of expropriation is issued. Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, the delay to constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must be deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice. Equity dictate that this case be remanded to the trial court for hearing of the expropriation proceedings on the determination of just compensation and for its prompt payment to the petitioner. The instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite City is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings.

EMINENT DOMAIN (Art. III, Sec 9) – Just CompensationRobern Development Corporation vs. Quitain, NPC (September 23, 1999)Facts: Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land which the NPC is seeking to expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project. in spite of petitioner’s opposition, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession. Issue: Whether the Writ of Possession validly issued, considering that the trial court had not conducted any hearing on the amount to be deposited.Ruling: The CA was correct in its rulings, but in the interest of substantial justice, the petitioner should be given an opportunity to file its answer. The issue of whether or not the expropriation proceedings were authorized by the Board of Directors or that those who signed the complaint were authorized representatives are evidentiary in character determinable only in the trial proper. Eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation. It may appear to be harsh and encompassing, but judicial review limits the exercise of eminent domain to the following areas of concern: (1) the adequacy of the compensation, (2) the necessity of the taking, and (3) the public-use character of the purpose of the taking. If there are objections and defenses that require the presentation of evidence and the hearing of arguments, the trial court should not immediately issue an order of expropriation. There is no prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate possession of the land involved in expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owners. However, the requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings have changed. The determination of ‘just compensation’ in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the ‘just-ness’ of the decreed compensation. The plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the NPC’s Motion for the issuance of the Writ, despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit. the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) petitioner is granted a period of ten days from the finality of this Decision within which to file its answer; (2) NPC shall deposit, also within ten days from the finality if this Decision, the full amount required under the aforecited Rule; and (3) the trial court shall, in its final decision, fix the rental for the use and the occupation of the disputed property, from the date of NPC’s entry until its deposit of the full amount required under the 1997 Rules.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. III, Sec 12) – When Right AttachesPeople of the Philippines vs. Dimaano, et al (June 15, 1992)Facts: The accused were convicted by the trial court to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and Multiple Frustrated Homicide, and taking into consideration the presence of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and of the use of superior strength, and the absence of any appreciable mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The extra-judicial statements of appellants were not assisted by counsel. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in not holding that the confrontation arranged by the Caloocan City police between the private complainant and her witnesses and the appellants, wherein the latter were presented to the former for purposes of identification, was violative of the constitutional right of the appellants to be represented by counsel in all stages of the investigation.Ruling: Anent the allegation of the appellants that their identification by the private complainants at the police headquarters in the absence of their counsel violated their constitutional right to counsel, sufficient it to say that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. At such point or state, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense. In the instant case, when the appellants were identified by the complainants at the police line-up, the former had not yet been held to answer for the criminal offense for which they have been charged and convicted. The police could not have, therefore, violated their right to counsel as the confrontation between the State and them had not yet begun. Police line up is not part of the custodial inquest, hence, the appellants were not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the appellants are held guilty of the offense of robbery with homicide

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. III, Sec 12) – When Right AttachesPeople of the Philippines vs. Bandula (May 27, 1994)Facts: After he and his wife were individually hog-tied and their house ransacked, JUANITO GARAY, a lawyer, was found dead with 3 gunshot wounds. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused Aurelio Bandula guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. Admitted also in evidence were the alleged extrajudicial confessions of accused Bandula and Dionanao that they were merely forced to participate in the commission of the crime by "Boy Tall" and "Boy Short." These extrajudicial confessions made by the accused extracted during custodial investigation have all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an admissible confession, it appearing from the confession itself that accused were informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly represented by counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna).Issue: Whether the extrajudicial confessions executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choiceRuling: It can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula was investigated immediately after his arrest, he had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. Yhere are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Sec. 12, Art. III. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation. If there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation, any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted accused when he executed his extrajudicial confession, still his confession is inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. In fine, the Court cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and use the same against them or any of them. Where there is doubt as to their voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto. On reasonable doubt, the conviction of accused-appellant AURELIO BANDULA Y LOPEZ by the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING him of the crime charged.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. III, Sec 12) – When Right AttachesPeople of the Philippines vs. Marra, et al (September 20, 1994)Facts: The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of Nelson Tandoc. Marra initially denied any participation in the killing. Nevertheless, when confronted with the fact that somebody saw him do it, Marra admitted the act although he alleged it was done in self-defense. Understandably, appellant gave a different version of the incident in court.Issue: Whether or not Marra was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing but invoked self-defenseRuling: The testimony to the confession of Marra is of significant weight, but the admissibility thereof shall also be passed upon. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made the admission. There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement. Indeed, he could have refused to answer questions from the very start when the policemen requested that they all go to his residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. They were just probing into a number of possibilities. In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein may be given in evidence against him and, in certain circumstances, this admission may be considered as part of the res gestae. Any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. In any event, even without his admission, the case against appellant has been duly established by the other evidence of the prosecution, as earlier discussed. The judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Samuel Marra y Zarate guilty of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the penalty and civil liabilities therein stated is hereby AFFIRMED.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. III, Sec 12) – Counsel of ChoicePeople of the Philippines vs. Olvis, et al (September 30, 1987)Facts: Death sentences were imposed on each of the three accused-appellants for the crime of murder. Accused first-named, Anacleto Olvis, was acquitted. While in custody, the three executed five separate written confessions each. The first confessions were taken in the local Philippine Constabulary headquarters. The second were made before the Polanco police. The three accused reiterated the same confessions before the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog City sub-office. They executed two confessions more, again before the Philippine Constabulary and the police of Polanco. Issue: Whether or not these statements, as any extrajudicial confession confronting the Court, can stand up in court.Ruling: Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant, may waive effectuation of indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has converted with an attorney and thereafter consent to be questioned. An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings delineated have been given. The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person who most needs Counsel. If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incriminate tion and his right to retained or appointed counsel. The confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity. The accused-appellants were not assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel. The lack of counsel makes those statements, in contemplation of law, 'involuntary,' even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically. While it is stated therein that this Office had just requested the services of Atty. Navarro, there is nothing there that would show that Atty. Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice. Atty. Navarro was summoned by the NBI. But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once, but twice. We refer to the forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their apprehension. Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self- incrimination. All evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of the Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence. Accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant Romulo Villarojo is found GUILTY of homicide.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. III, Sec 12) – To Be InformedPeople of the Philippines vs. Nicandro (February 11, 1986)Facts: The Court of First Instance of Manila convicted accused accused Nelia Nicandro y Velarma of violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(e), (f), (1), (m), and (o) Article I, of Republic Act 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act). Upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights, appellant orally admitted having sold the 4 sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket, but refused to reduce her confession to writing. Issue: Whether the court gravely erred in admitting prosecution evidence which were obtained in violation petition of accused constitutional rights. Ruling: By custodial interrogation, questioning is initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms. The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed" implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly and intelligently. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. III, Sec 12) – Waiver of RightsMagtoto vs. Manguera, et al (March 3, 1975)Facts: Petition for writs of certiorari. Respondent judges declared the confessions of the accused in the two cases as admissible and declared the inadmissibility of the confessions of the accused in the third case, although they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before the effectivity of the New Constitution.Issue: Whether the order of the respondent judges were correctRuling: This constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. Now, a confession is admissible in evidence without previous proof of its voluntariness on the theory that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved. And once the accused succeeds in proving that his extrajudicial confession was made involuntarily, it stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing which never existed. It is incompetent as evidence and must be rejected. The defense need not prove that its contents are false. Even as the new constitutional right of a detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of any confession given by him in violation thereof declared inadmissible in evidence, to be prospective, and that confessions obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution are admissible in evidence against the accused, his fundamental right to prove that his confession was involuntary still stands. All the confessions involved in said cases are hereby declared ADMISSIBLE in evidence.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (Art. III, Sec 12) – Waiver of RightsPeople of the Philippines vs. Dacoycoy, et al (May 8, 1992)Facts: Latoga and Dacoycoy were found guilty of the felony beyond reasonable doubt by the Regional Trial Court in 1982 for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. That there were no eyewitnesses to the crime imputed to the accused, and that the only evidence linking them thereto are their extrajudicial confessions which were executed by them without the assistance of counsel of their choice, and which they both subsequently repudiated at the trial. Dacoycoy filed an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal," which this Court granted. The appeal proceedings pending only as regards Angeles Latoga.Issue: Whether the trial court grievously erred in admitting and basing the decision of conviction of the accused solely on his extra-judicial confessionRuling: That Latoga's confession was given and signed without assistance of counsel of his choice is not disputed. The appellant's point is well taken. His extrajudicial confession must be disallowed and his conviction set aside. The doctrine in Morales v. Enrile, et al. has since been reiterated in several subsequent cases. It must be stressed, the principle was made to apply to confessions given by suspects during custodial investigations prior to April 26, 1983 This Court has construed the provision as allowing a waiver by a suspect of his rights while under custodial investigation. While initially, this Court's holding was that such a waiver was valid and could properly be given effect merely upon some adequate showing that it had been made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, its subsequent rulings imposed the requirement, as just pointed out, that the waiver of those rights be made in the presence and with the assistance of the suspect's counsel. Of course, the 1987 Constitution now clearly and explicitly requires that the waiver be in writing and in the presence of counsel. The need of assistance of counsel as a pre-requisite for according validity and effect to a waiver of rights in custodial investigation laid down by the 1973 Constitution, was already existent. Since appellant Latoga's extrajudicial confession was admittedly given by him without the assistance of counsel, it should not have been admitted in evidence against him; and since that confession constitutes his only link to the felony of robbery with homicide with which he is charged, no finding of guilt thereof may be made against him. Judgment of the Trial Court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the appellant, Angeles Latoga y Lagco @ Ely and @ Angel, is ACQUITTED.

BAIL (Art. III, Sec 13) Yap, Jr. vs. CA, People of the Philippines (June 6, 2001)Facts: For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa. Petitioner filed a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal. Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00. Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail. CA upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General.Issue: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail for the provisional liberty of petitioner pending appeal in the amount of P5.5 million.Ruling: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. The court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements. In the present case, where petitioner was found to have left the country several times while the case was pending, the CA required the confiscation his passport and the issuance of a hold-departure order against him. Appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial or whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; cannot be allowed because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court. Although it cannot be controverted that the CA, despite the foregoing considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable. The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner's bail pending appeal is reduced from P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00.

BAIL (Art. III, Sec 13) People of the Philippines vs. Manes (February 17, 1999)Facts: The RTC convicted the accused of the crime of murder. The prosecution recommended no bail for the provisional liberty of the accused. The accused filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the prosecution. The trial court, however, did not hear the petition for bail. Neither did the accused invoke the right to bail at any stage of the trial. Issue: Whether the trial court committed a serious error of law when it went on with the trial of the case without hearing the petition for bail that was set for hearing several times.Ruling: Under the law, in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no right to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the accused. While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear his application summarily and promptly, such right may be waived expressly or impliedly. In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed. However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only in the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention of the trial court at the earliest opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to bail. What is more, the issue has been rendered academic by the conviction of the accused. When an accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.

BAIL (Art. III, Sec 13) Obosa vs. CA, People of the Philippines (January 16, 1997)Facts: The accused, with three others, was charged with murder on two counts. The Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was strong. At the time of the commission of the two offenses, the accused Obosa was a virtual "escapee". By virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge, accused was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on the pretext that the judge needed his presence so that the judge could inquire about the whereabouts of the accused therein. While accused Obosa was out of prison, he was able to participate in the commission of the double murder now charged against him. The lower court found the accused Obosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide on twocounts. Obosa filed a bailbond, which the lower court approved. On the same day, the lower court issued an order of release. The prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released accused Obosa also on the same day notwithstanding that, as hereinabove stated, at the time of the commission of the double murder, accused Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery. CA cancelled the petitioner’s bail bond and nullified the trial court's order which granted bail to petitioner.Issue: Whether the accused may be granted bail after such conviction for homicide, a non-capital offense.Ruling: An appellant who, though convicted of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. Such appellant can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In such an instance, the appellant cannot but be sorely tempted to flee. On appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review, even factual questions may be increased and may once more be weighed and evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of conviction upon the original charge is ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it had done so in this case, such determination subsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a lesser offense, since such determination is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing on whether petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the charge. While the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at the discretion of the court, that discretion — particularly with respect to extending the bail — should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding the majesty of the law and the administration of justice. Bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused, who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital offense charged and that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion. It inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions. The instant petition is hereby DENIED.

BAIL (Art. III, Sec 13) People of the Philippines vs. Donato, Salas (June 5, 1991)Facts: Respondent judge granted bail to the accused Salas, who was charged for the crime of rebellion. At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in military custody. Rebellion is punishable with the penalty of prision mayor, which makes it bailable. At the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the application for bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which the private respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for bail.Issue : Whether the right to bail may, under certain circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right may be waived.Ruling: Bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a bailable offense. Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. 31 To that extent the right is absolute. The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. It was error for the respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer punishable by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its effectivity. It is not favorable to him. private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail. Consequently, having agreed to remain in legal custody, private respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail. that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private respondent. The Orders of respondent Judge are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Art. III, Sec 14) – Right to be InformedPeople of the Philippines vs. Santocildes (December 21, 1999)Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of rape of a girl less than nine (9) years old. Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime charged.Issue: Whether the accused-appellant was deprived though no fault of his own to be defended by a person authorized to practice law amounting to denial of due processRuling: The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. The assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for new trial.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Art. III, Sec 14) – Speedy, Public & Impartial TrialTai Lim vs. Judge Arcilla, People of the Philippines (October 26, 1999)Facts: Petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss" the case invoking his right to a speedy trial. The trial court issued an Order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that the Criminal Case filed against him be ordered dismissed for failure of the prosecution to prove its case despite 11 postponements spread over an unreasonably long period of one year and three months in violation of the right of petitioner, as an accused, to speedy trial. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Issue: Whether the petitioner was deprived of his right to speedy trial.Ruling: The petition is without merit. Not all the eleven postponements were made at the instance of the prosecution. The reasons for the prosecution's postponements were reasonable and were not intended merely to delay the proceedings of the case. The hearing of the case had to be postponed several times because there was no proof that the prosecution witnesses were duly served with subpoena. It would be unjust to pounce on the absence of the witnesses as a basis for dismissing the case when there was a valid excuse for their absence, that is, there was no proof that they were duly served with subpoena. The other reasons for the postponement of the hearing are circumstances beyond the control of the prosecution. The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the constitution but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. It secures rights to an accused but it does not preclude the rights of the State to seek justice. Both the State and the accused are entitled to due process. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to speedy trial allows reasonable continuance so as not to deprive the prosecution its day in court. What the constitution prohibits is vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, manufactured by them ministers of justice. Not every delay in the trial is vexatious, capricious or oppressive. In the legal firmament, vexatious suggests an act which is willful and without reasonable cause, for the purpose of annoying and embarrassing another or one lacking justification and intended to harass. Oppressive connotes an unjust or cruel exercise of power or authority. Capricious action, on the other hand, means willful and unreasoning action. The Court finds that there is no basis for petitioner's allegation that his constitutional right to speedy trial has been violated. One must take into account that a trial is always subject to reasonable delays and postponements, and in the absence of any showing that the same were capricious, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity of prosecuting petitioner. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. The petition is DENIED for lack of showing that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. III, Sec 7)- Speedy, Public and Impartial TrialPeople of the Philippines vs. Mayor Sanchez, et al (January 25, 1999)Facts: Mayor Sanchez and the rest of the accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts. Issue: Whether the publicity given to this case impaired the right to a fair trial of the accusedRuling: It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. The assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Art. III, Sec 14) – Speedy, Public & Impartial TrialPeople of the Philippines vs. Judge Gines, Labo, Floresca (May 27, 1991)Facts: Petitioner assails the order of Judge Gines, which dismissed the criminal case against Labo and Floresca. An information for libel was filed against Labo and Francis Floresca in connection with the publication of the article captioned "Inihablang Ex-Justice". Accused Labo and Floresca waived their right to appear at the hearing of the case. The respondent court issued the now assailed Order dismissing the case as against respondents Labo and Floresca for failure of private complainant Justice Guerrero to appear despite the vigorous objection of the fiscal who requested that the hearing of the case be deferred as the Fiscal's Office was then conducting a preliminary investigation with respect to Benefredo Esquivel.Issue: Whether the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated to entitle them to the dismissal of the case.Ruling: the Court finds that said right has not been violated in the case at bar and thus holds that the dismissal of the case as regards private respondents Labo and Floresca is premature and erroneous. The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures rights to a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. The Court is convinced that private complainant's absences at the hearings of the case were in good faith and that he had justifiable and meritorious reasons therefor. Said absences are evidently not capricious, oppressive, nor vexatious to the two accused who had waived their appearance at the trial of the case. It should be remembered that the right to a speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays and postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body operations, as in the instant case where it was satisfactorily proven that private complainant had to undergo eye operations, hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad. Speedy trial means one that can be had as soon after indictment is filed as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence prepare for trial. While accused persons do have rights, many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights. The petition is GRANTED in part. The Orders of public respondent judge are SET ASIDE.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (Art. III, Sec 14) – Right to Confront and Be Heard Gimenez, Mercado vs. Judge Nazareno, de la Vega (April 15, 1988)Facts: Private respondent was charged with the crime of murder. Private respondent escaped from his detention center and failed to appear in court. The lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the private respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. The lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. The court ruled the case against respondent shall remain pending, without prejudice on the part of the said accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present his defense whenever the court acquires back the jurisdiction over his person. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court. Issue: Whether the accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.Ruling: A "trial in absentia" may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. However, the lower court erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused only. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escaped from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. His right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by him. An escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. The judgment of the trial court in so far as it suspends the proceedings against the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render judgment upon the innocence or guilt of the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. in accordance with the evidence adduced and the applicable law.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. III, Sec 7)- Right to be InformedPeople vs. Bermas (April 21, 1999)Facts: The accused was found guilty of the crime of rape. There were a number of changes as to the lawyers assigned to the accused.Issue: Whether the accused was denied his constitutional right to effective and vigilant counsel.Ruling: In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has been adduced, it is also essential that the accused has been duly afforded his fundamental nights. This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. It is a right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment. An accused must be given the right to be represented by counsel for, unless so represented, there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be as inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process, which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of one and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one can be provided to him at his request. Let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the basis of the complaint.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. III, Sec 7)- Speedy, Public and Impartial TrialHon. Garcia, Lorenzana vs. Hon. Domingo, Calo, Carbonnel (July 25, 1973)Facts: The arrest of private petitioner for a traffic violation was sought to be effected by the two respondent policemen thus resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried jointly by city court Judge. Hearings were conducted on 14 separate occasions without objection on their part, and without an iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. All the 14 trial dates — except 3 — fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days. During all the 14 days of trial, the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only 1 day when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any case, no pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari.Issue: Whether respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of right to public trial guarantee the holding of the trial of the other respondents inside the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia named as the petitioner. Ruling: The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. In this case, there is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be our present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. It suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen. The writ of certiorari prayed for is GRANTED nullifying, setting aside, and declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix Domingo.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Art. III, Sec 15)Moncupa vs. Enrile, Ver, Kintanar, Gorospe, Castro (January 30, 1986)Facts: Petitioner, together with others, was arrested and detained. The next day, on the allegation that he was a staff member of NDF, a Presidential Commitment Order was issued against him. It was ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents. Petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court. The petitioner was temporarily released from detention. It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him.Issue: Whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release. Ruling: The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitutes restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. The present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. The petition is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are declared null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Art. III, Sec 15)Ilagan, et al vs. Enrile, et al (October 21, 1985)Facts: Ilagan was arrested on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense. One of the visiting lawyers, Arellano, was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned Mission Order. Risonar detained on the basis of a Mission Order. Respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that an Information for Rebellion against the detained attorneys, that a Warrant of Arrest had been issued against them and praying that this Petition be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic. Issue: Whether this petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.Ruling: The petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the RTC of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose. If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. This petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. III, Sec 17)People of the Philippines vs. Gamboa (February 25, 1991)Facts: Gamboa was charged with the crime of murder and was found guilty. He was subjected to paraffin test.Issue: Whether the trial court erred in not rejecting the paraffin test results as inadmissible evidence.Ruling: As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a gun. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. III, Sec 17)People of the Philippines vs. Rondero (December 9, 1999)Facts: Accused was convicted of the crime of homicide. The hair strands which were found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with hair specimens taken from the victim and accused-appellant, were sent to the NBI for laboratory examination. The NBI suggested that hair strands be pulled, not cut, from the suspect and from the victim on the four regions of their heads so that all parts of the hair strands, from root to tip, may be presented. The hair strands taken from accused-appellant and the victim were later indorsed to the NBI for laboratory testing. Comparative micro-physical examination on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's, while the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics to those of the victim's.Issue: Whether the taking of the hair strands from the accused without his consent and submitted to the NBI for investigation was in violation of his right against self incrimination.Ruling: What is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. Decision of the RTC is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of special complex crime of rape with homicide

SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. III, Sec 17)People of the Philippines vs. Codilla, Lucañas, Putulin (June 30, 1993)Facts: Accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Appellant asserts that the police investigators induced positive identification by placing him and the two other appellants in a police line-up by themselves only and by having them undress, thus violating their right against self-incrimination.Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination of the accused was violatedRuling: The right against self-incrimination has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion. It prohibits the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. An act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. This should be distinguished from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute which are not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation, like requiring him to take part in a police line-up. It has been held that to require a person to remove his garments would not be violative of the right against self-incrimination. To require the accused to put on a pair of pants and a hat to determine whether they fitted him for measuring or photographing of a party, or the removal or replacement of garments or shoes, are not within the privilege against self-incrimination too. Assailed judgment of the court is AFFIRMED.

SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES (Art. III, Sec 16)Angchangco vs. Ombudsman, et al (February 13, 1997)Facts: Prior to his retirement, petitioner served as a deputy sheriff and later as Sheriff IV in the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. In 1989, petitioner caused the satisfaction of the decision by garnishing NIASSI's daily collections from its various clients. In an attempt to enjoin the further enforcement of the writ of execution, Atty. Calo, Jr., President of NIASSI, filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against petitioner. The RTC initially issued a TRO but later dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Atty. Calo likewise filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for graft, estafa/malversation and misconduct relative to the enforcement of the writ of execution. Although the administrative aspect of the complaints had already been dismissed, the criminal complaints remained pending and unresolved, prompting petitioner to file several omnibus motions for early resolution. When petitioner retired in September 1994, the criminal complaints still remained unresolved, as a consequence of which petitioner's request for clearance in order that he may qualify to receive his retirement benefits was denied. Issue: Whether the petitioner is deprived of his right to speedy disposition of his casesRuling: The Court finds the present petition to be impressed with merit. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases. It is correct, as averred in the comment that in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. The Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to GRANT the same. Ombudsman Cases are ordered DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman is further directed to issue the corresponding clearance in favor of petitioner.

SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES (Art. III, Sec 16)Licaros vs. Sandiganbayan (November 22, 2001)Facts: Petitioner is Vice-President and Treasurer of Home Savings Bank. Money was deposited in the said bank on representation that it came from some Chinese businessmen from Iloilo. He suspected that the money may have been stolen and reported it to Central Bank officials. Petitioner was included in the charge for robbery as an accessory. More than 10 years after the case submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision. Issue: Whether petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case has been violatedRuling: The Petition is meritorious. Where the court does not act promptly on the adjudication of a case before it and within the period prescribed by law, the accused’s right to a speedy disposition of the case is just as much prejudiced as when the prosecution is prolonged or deferred indefinitely. Accordingly, with all the more reason should the right to the speedy disposition of a case be looked upon with care and caution when that case has already been submitted to the court for decision. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases ‘before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.’ This protection extends to all citizens, x x x and covers the periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. Unlike the right to a speedy trial, this constitutional privilege applies not only during the trial stage, but also when the case has already been submitted for decision. That the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner for violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case is justified by the following circumstances: (1) the 10-year delay in the resolution of the case is inordinately long; (2) petitioner has suffered vexation and oppression by reason of this long delay; (3) he did not sleep on his right and has in fact consistently asserted it, (4) he has not contributed in any manner to the long delay in the resolution of his case, (5) he did not employ any procedural dilatory strategies during the trial or raised on appeal or certiorari any issue to delay the case, (6) the Sandiganbayan did not give any valid reason to justify the inordinate delay and even admitted that the case was one of those that got “buried” during its reorganization, and (7) petitioner was merely charged as an accessory after the fact. The Petition is hereby GRANTED and, as against petitioner criminal case pending before the Sandiganbayan is DISMISSED.

SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. III, Sec 17)Villaflor vs. Summers (September 8, 1920)Facts: Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The court ordered to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. She was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise. An examination by reputable and disinterested physicians with due care will be taken as not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. No objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby DENIED.

SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. III, Sec 17)People of the Philippines vs. Paynor (September 9, 1996)Facts: Paynor was charged with the crime of murder. On the strength of a positive identification of a witness, appellant was detained at the police station. Issue: Whether there was a violation of his constitutional right when he the police stripped him of his clothing and personal items, and the same were later introduced as evidence during the trial.Ruling: The protection of the accused under custodial investigation, which is invoked by appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution provides that such accused shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the right to waive the right to counsel in the presence of counsel, and that any confession or admission obtained in violation of his rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. As held in People vs. Gamboa,i this constitutional right applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion. Judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SELF-INCRIMINATION (Art. III, Sec 17)People of the Philippines vs. Yatar (May 19, 2004)Facts: Yatar was sentenced to death the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide. Subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.Issue: Whether the blood sample taken from appellant as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution. Ruling: This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. A person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel. Decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.

EX POST FACTO & BILL OF ATTAINDER (Art. III, Sec 22) – Ex Post FactoFajardo vs. CA, Hon. Pedronio, People, Station Commander (February 1, 1999)Facts: The case is an appeal via certiorari taken by petitioner from a decision of the Court of Appeals that denied due course to his motion for probation in a criminal case arising from his conviction of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner was convicted for violation of BP 22. Petitioner filed a motion for probation contending that he was eligible for probation because at the time he committed the offense in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction was still qualified to apply for probation and that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused who had interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application, and, hence, not applicable to him. Petitioner maintains the view that PD 1990, issued on October 5, 1985, is null and void on the ground that at that time President Marcos could no longer exercise legislative powers as the Batasan Pambansa was functioning and exercising sole legislative powers.Issue: Whether petitioner could qualify to apply for probation under PD 968 since he had appealed from his conviction in 1988, after PD 1990 amending Presidential Decree No. 968, became effective in 1986, providing that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.Ruling: The contention is without merit. At that time, President Marcos was vested with legislative powers concurrently with the Batasan Pambansa. PD 1990 became effective on July 16, 1986. It is not ex post facto in its application. The law applies only to accused convicted after its effectivity. An ex post facto law is one that punishes an act as a crime which was innocent at the time of its commission. Presidential Decree No. 1990, like the Probation Law that it amends, is not penal in character.ii It may not be considered as an ex post facto law.iii At the time of the commission of the offense charged--violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22--in 1981, petitioner could have appealed if convicted and still availed himself of probation. However, petitioner was convicted on May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time, petitioner no longer had the option to appeal and still apply for probation if unsuccessful in the appeal. Presidential Decree No. 1990 was then in full effect. Hence, he could no longer apply for probation since he had appealed. The Court DENIES the petition.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Art. III, Sec 21) – 1 st Jeopardy Terminated Argel vs. Judge Pascua (August 20, 2001)Facts: This is an administrative complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law filed by Miguel Argel against Judge Herminia M. Pascua. Complainant alleged that Judge Pascua convicted him of murder notwithstanding the fact that he had already been previously acquitted by respondent. Respondent Judge alleged that she rendered the judgment of acquittal dated 22 July 1993 because she erroneously thought that there was no witness who positively identified the accused, herein complainant, as the perpetrator of the crime. Her mistake was brought about by the fact that the testimony of the eyewitness was not attached to the records at the time she wrote her decision. However, when she re-read her notes after her attention was called by the lawyer of the private complainant that there was such an eyewitness, respondent confirmed that there was indeed one. Hence she "revised" her previous decision and rendered the Decision dated 19 August 1993 finding the accused guilty of murder. Issue: Whether the right against double jeopardy of the complainant was violated.Ruling: In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment] except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent and the decision became final and immutable on the same day. Respondent should have known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. For Gross Ignorance of the Law respondent Judge Herminia M. Pascua is FINED P20,000.00.

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DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Art. III, Sec 21) – 1 st Jeopardy Attached Vincoy vs. CA, People (June 14, 2004)Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. In May 1996, a complaint for estafa against petitioner was filed petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. It was, however, dismissed on the ground that petitioner’s obligation was purely civil in nature and for complainant’s failure to attend the hearings. In October 1996, the complaint was refiled charging the same offense against petitioner. Issue: Whether the dismissal of the first complaint is a bar for petitioner’s prosecution.Ruling: The dismissal of a similar complaint for estafa filed by Lizah Cimafranca before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City will not exculpate the petitioner. The case cannot bar petitioner’s prosecution. It is settled that the dismissal of a case during its preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy since a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial and is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and accused is probably guilty thereof. It cannot be considered equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Petition is DENIED.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Art. III, Sec 21) – 1 st Jeopardy Terminated Merciales vs. CA, People, Nuada, et al (March 18, 2002)Facts: Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision of the CA denying her petition to annul the Order of the RTC of Legazpi City which dismissed the charge of rape with homicide based on a demurrer to evidence filed by private respondents, accused therein. The prosecution elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, the accused moved to set the case for hearing, invoking their constitutional right to speedy trial. The case was set for oral argument on December 11, 2001. Petitioner maintains that the reopening of the criminal case will not violate the accused’s right to double jeopardy. More particularly, she ascribes prosecutorial and judicial misconduct in the undue haste which attended the prosecution’s premature resting and the trial court’s grant of the demurrer to evidence when the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has not been completed. The public prosecutor knew that he had not presented sufficient evidence to convict the accused. Yet, despite repeated moves by the accused for the trial court to continue hearing the case, he deliberately failed to present an available witness and thereby allowed the court to declare that the prosecution has rested its case. Likewise guilty for serious nonfeasance was the trial court. Issue: Whether the reopening of the criminal case will violate the accused’s right against double jeopardy.Ruling: It is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their consent. Otherwise put, the dismissal of the case below was invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is, due process. Petition is GRANTED.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Art. III, Sec 21) – 1 st Jeopardy Attached EX POST FACTO & BILL OF ATTAINDER (Art. III, Sec 22) – Ex Post FactoPeople vs. Hon. Nitafan, Imelda Marcos (February 1, 1999)Facts: Three criminal informations were filed against Marcos for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960. Without private respondent yet taking any action or filing any motion to quash the informations, respondent judge issued an order requiring petitioners to show cause why criminal case number 92-107942 should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates private respondent’s right against ex post facto law. Respondent judge concluded that “since the date of violation alleged in the information was prior to the date and complete publication of the Circular charged to have been violated, the information in this case appears peremptorily dismissible, for to apply the Circular to acts performed prior to its date and publication would make it an ex post facto law, which is a violation of the Constitution. On the same day, respondent judge issued another order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the two other criminal informations should not be dismissed on the ground that private respondent’s right to double jeopardy was violated. It is respondent judge’s posture that the three cases form part of a series of transactions which are subject of the cases pending before Branch 26-Manila, all these cases constitute one continuous crime. Respondent judge issued an order dismissing criminal case no. 92-107942 on the ground that the subject CB Circular is an ex post facto law. , respondent judge also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases (92-107943 & 92-107944) ruling that the prosecution of private respondent was “part of a sustained political vendetta” by some people in the government aside from what he considered as a violation of private respondent’s right against double jeopardy. Issue: Whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latter’s right against ex post facto law and double jeopardyRuling: The right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. The filing of a motion to quash is a right that belongs to the accused who may waived it by inaction and not an authority for the court to assume. Assuming arguendo that a judge has the power to motu proprio dismiss a criminal charge, yet contrary to the findings of respondent judge, the grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy herein invoked by him are not applicable. On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every law carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court. To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action. With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Respondent judge has no other basis on whether private respondent had already been arraigned, much less entered a plea in those cases pending before the said Branch. Even assuming that there was already arraignment and plea with respect to those cases in Branch 26-Manila which respondent judge used as basis to quash the three informations pending in his sala, still the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Those cases are still pending and there was as yet no judgment on the merits at the time respondent judge quashed the three informations in his sala. Petition is GRANTED.