Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism by Rob. Schoenberger

7/27/2019 Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism by Rob. Schoenberger

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Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism

Author(s): Robert A. SchoenbergerSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Sep., 1968), pp. 868-877Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1953436 .

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CONSERVATISM, PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM*ROBERT A. SCHOENBERGER

University of MichiganI. INTRODUCTION

The empirical study of political ideology inmass publics must ultimately be related topolitical behavior; otherwise, the ideologicaldescription of such publics exists in an actionvacuum. Yet, the most detailed and sophisti-cated descriptions and analyses of Americanconservatives and their characteristics arethose which have most notably failed to con-nect their findings (about opinions, attitudesand ideologies) with consistent or predictablepolitical activity of any kind.'This absence of systematic linkage betweenbelief and behavior is primarily a consequenceof the general absence of ideological structurein the political orientation of the broad Amer-ican electorate.2 But it is also a consequence ofthe researchers' reliance on a priori ideologicalmeasures of doubtful validity.3Hence, when the student of politics is in-formed that reputed conservatives are, or tendto be, authoritarian, anti-Semitic and ethno-

* I am grateful to Donald Stokes, Dale Neumanand William Riker for their comments and sug-gestions on earlier versions of this paper.I T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J.Levinson and N. Sanford, The Authoritarian Per-sonality (New York, 1950); H. McClosky, "Con-servatism and Personality," this REviEw 52(1958), 27-45, esp. 44-45. See also M. Rokeach,The Open and the Closed Mind, (New York, 1960);and B. Anderson et al., "On Conservative Atti-tudes," Acta Sociologica, 8 (1965), 189-204.

2 A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller and D.Stokes, The American Voter (New York, 1960), p.249; P. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systemsin Mass Publics," in D. Apter (ed.), Ideology andDiscontent (New York, 1965), pp. 206-261.

3 See, e.g., The critiques by R. Christie, H. H.Hyman and P. Sheatsley in R. Christie and M.Jahoda (eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method of'The Authoritarian Personality' (Glencoe, Ill.,1954); M. Rokeach, op. cit., pp. 3-30; R. Brown,Social Psychology (New York, 1965), pp. 526-546.Campbell et al., op. cit., pp. 209-214, 512-515; W.Kendall, "Comment on McClosky's 'Conserva-tism and Personality,"', this REViEw 52 (1959),1111-1112; M. J. Rosenberg, "Images in Relationto the Policy Process: American Public Opinionon Cold-War Issues," in H. Kelman (ed.), Inter-national Behavior (New York, 1965), ch. 8.

centric,4 or imbued with ". . . feelings of worth-lessness, submissiveness, inferiority, timidity..., .... hostile and suspicious, . . . rigidand compulsive, ... inflexible and unyielding. . . , he must question the adequacy of thepolitical designation "conservative" both ondescriptive and predictive grounds.Because of these methodological and em-pirical problems, I suggest that the findings ofprior resaerch and hypotheses related to them,be tested in a different manner. For example,if one examines the membership and/or knownsupporters of organizations which exist to ag-gregate and channel conservative political de-mands, the analysis of political ideology andits correlates can be conducted in a definitivelypolitical context, with the labels being sup-plied (or implied) by the actors themselves.6Such an approach, using a criterion of activeself-definition, avoids the ambiguities both inabstract, a prior definitions of ideologicalpropensity and in the passive self-definitionoccasionally employed by pollsters ("Do youconsider yourself a conservative, a liberal or amiddle-of-the-roader?").

By shifting the focus to the level of con-scious, deliberate and specific supportive be-havior, comparisons are facilitated both amongideologically-based groups and between ag-gregates who "know" what they are, ideo-logically, and those who, operationally, mustbe told.74Adorno, et al., op. cit., pp. 265, 179.6 McClosky, op. cit., pp. 37-38.6 S. H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organizationof Conflict: On the Relationship Between Polit-

ical Thought and Behavior," Journal of Politics,28 (1966), 513-530, esp. 521-524. For relevant,not necessarily deliberate, examples of this ap-proach, see M. Chesler and R. Schmuck, "Par-ticipant Observation in a Super-Patriot Discus-sion Group," Journal of Social Issues, 19 (1963),18-30; R. Wolfinger et al., "American's RadicalRight: Politics and Ideology; in Apter (ed.), op.cit., pp. 262-293; F. Grupp, Jr., "Political Ac-tivists: The John Birch Society and the ADA," apaper delivered at the 1966 Annual Meeting of theAmerican Political Science Association, NewYork City.7The mere act of joining an ideologically-ori-ented group or party does not guarantee either

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1968 CONSERVATISM, PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM 869II. SETTING

One major effort to mobilize conservativesfor political action has been made in New Yorkstate. There in 1961 a group of intellectuals,journalists, business and professional menfounded the Conservative Party of New York,with the stated aim of (1) offering a conserva-tive alternative to the relatively liberal pro-grams and candidates of the two major partiesand the seemingly influential Liberal Party,and (2) eventually pressuring the state Repub-lican (and conceivably, the Democratic) partyto move to a suitably conservative posture.8The Party, a segment of whose membershipwill be discussed herein, has experienced slowbut steady growth since 1962. Its gubernatorialpoll increased from 141,877 (2.4%) in 1962 to510,023 (8.4%) in 1966. Three ConservativeCongressional candidates (in 1966) and theParty's candidate for Mayor of New YorkCity (in 1965) have received more than 10% ofthe total vote in their constituencies. TheParty's mean vote percentage in 16 New YorkState Congressional Districts was 6.4% in1966.The core of the Conservative Party's sup-porters can be readily located from publicregistration lists. This analysis is based uponthe interview responses of a random sample ofmale Conservative Party members in MunroeCounty, New York, which comprises the Cityof Rochester and its suburbs.9 Interviews (eachideological support or even interest. A discussionand justification of certain analytical exclusionscan be found in R. A. Schoenberger, Conservativesand Conservatism (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,University of Rochester, 1966; University Micro-film No. 67-8986), pp 40-44.

8 The key points of the Conservative PartyPlatform, derived from ". . . the American tradi-tion of individual liberty, limited constitutionalgovernment, and defense of the Republic againstits enemies," include belief in balanced budgets,opposition to or curbing of ". . . centralization ofgovernmental power, monopoly union power, de-ficit spending and oppressive taxation. . .", thewish for the confinement of ". . . the SupremeCourt . . . to its proper judicial functions," sup-port for the "Neighborhood School" principle,opposition to state legislative reapportionment,public housing and foreign aid (except for "ourfriends"), See "Introducing: The ConservativeParty of New York State" (New York, 1965), un-paged pamphlet. Available from ConservativeParty State Headquarters, 141 E. 44 St., NewYork, New York 10017.9 Females were excluded primarily because ofthe need to economize resources. Informal in-

TABLE 1. MISANTHROPY

Conserva- Repub-Per cent who agree that tives licans(N = 45) (N = 48)

1. "Most people can betrusted." 91% 92%2. "People are more in-clined to look out forthemselves than tohelp others." (89) (75)3. "Human Nature isfundamentally co-operative." 78 924. "No one is going tocare much what hap-pens to you, when youget right down to it." (40) (35)5. "If you don't watchyourself, people willtake advantage ofyou." (58) (71)

Proportions in parentheses are those giving themisanthropic response.lasting about 90 minutes) were completed with45 Conservatives,'0 in a universe of 325, andwith a control sample of 48 Republicans, thelatter intended to provide a contrast betweenConservatives (all but one of whom had been aRepublican) and their unchanged, generallyless ideological, former fellow partisans.

III. FINDINGSA. Personality. Conservatives do not appearto differ substantially from Republicans oneither of the two psychological measures em-ployed. On specific assertions of social trust

and distrust (Morris Rosenberg's "misan-thropy" scale"), the results are, at best, am-biguous. Comparing total male sample re-quiries discovered, as one would suspect, thatnumerous Conservative females registered asthey did only at their husband's request.The 1966 Conservative Congressional candidatein the district dominated by the eastern, and mostpopulous, half of Monroe County polled 6.4% ofthe vote.10 The upper case "C" is used only when re-ferring to registered Conservative Party membersor to the Party itself.11M. Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and PoliticalIdeology," American Sociological Review, 21(1956), 690-695; and "Misanthropy and Atti-tudes Toward International Affairs," Journal ofConflict Resolution, 1 (1957), 34-45.



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870 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 62TABLE 2. MISANTHROPY, BY RESPONDENTS

WITH AT LEAST SOME COLLEGE


1. "Most people can betrusted." 93% 95%2. "People are more in-clined to look out forthemselves than tohelp others." 85 803. "Human Nature isfundamentally co-operative." 78 904. "No one is going tocare much what hap-pens to when youget right down to it." 37 505. "If you don't watchyourself, people willtake advantage ofyou." 58 60

sponses to each of the items (Table 1), it isapparent that the dominant direction of Con-servative response is the same as that of theRepublican sample. Moreover, the inter-sample differences are not consistent in direc-tion, Conservatives appearing to be moretrusting than the Republicans on item five andnotably less so on two and three.Since there is a long-recognized tendencyfor poorly educated people to respond un-critically to assertions like these and becauseof the disporportionate number of Conserva-tives with relatively high educational achieve-ment,12 I have isolated this segment of thesamples (Table 2). Here, the distances betweenthe resulting sub-samples diminish, with no-table but non-significant differences occurringonly on two of the five items (3 and 4). Again,the differences are not consistent in directionsThis absence of significant'4 differences be-tween samples recurs in an "authoritarian-equalitarian" scale, borrowed from a largerbattery employed by the Survey ResearchCenter in 1952 (Table 3). Here, however, Con-

12 Eighty-nine per cent had attended college,62% received the bachelor's degree and 31% hadstarted or completed graduate or professionalschool requirements.

13 The average item-percentage difference be-tween Conservatives and Republicans in Table 2is -0.8 (sign indicates normative evaluation).The range is + 13 to -12 across items.

TABLE 3. AUTHORITARIANlSM-EQUALlTARIANISM

Conserva- Repub-Per cent who agree that ties licans(N = 45) (N = 48)

1. "Human Nature beingwhat it is, there willalways be war andconflict." 73% 77%2. "Most people who don'tget ahead, just don'thave enough willpower." 51 523. "A few strong leaderscould make this coun-try better than all thelaws and talk." 22 384. "An insult to yourhonor should not beforgotten." 22 33

servatives tend to be less authoritarian on eachof the four items, with the largest differenceappearing on the sole assertion with overt po-litical content ("a few strong leaders . . . betterthan all the laws and talk.").Comparing the college-educated sub-samples(Table 4), the gaps between samples increase;Conservatives continue to respond in a lessauthoritarian pattern. The normative differ-ences"5 between Conservatives and Republi-cans consistently favor the former.'B. Civil Liberties. The major politicallyrelevant characteristic imputed to the mal-adjusted American conservative is his willing-ness to suppress, or to tolerate the suppression,of the civil liberties of his fellow-citizens.17 The14 X2, p


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1968 CONSERVATISM, PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM 871TABLE 4. ATJTHORITARIANISM-EQUALITARIAN1SM,

BY RESPONDENTS WITH ATLEAST SOME COLLEGE


1. "Human Nature beingwhat it is, there will al-ways be war andconflict." 72% 80%2. "Most people who don'tget ahead, just don'thave enough willpower." 50 603. "A few strong leaderscould make this coun-try better than all thelaws and talk." 20 404. "An insult to yourhonor should not beforgotten." 20 25

discovery or expectation of such behavior un-derlies and justifies most analyses of radicalright organizations and joins the authoritarianpersonality to right-extremist, anti-libertarianperspectives."To explore the possibility that Conserva-tives may not be attached to the standards ofAmerican civil liberties, I employed a ten-itemmeasure covering key features of the Bill ofRights, a measure primarily derived from oneapplied to a 1957 sample of Berkeley collegestudents."8Comparison of the responses (Table 5) indi-cates that Conservatives offer predominantand broad support to libertarian assertionsand comparable opposition to anti-libertarianones. Where this finding does not obtain-onassertions supporting "double jeopardy" (item8) and opposing academic freedom of belief(item 9)-it is notable that the reservations ofscribe are anti-libertarian. See Peter Viereck'sphrase ". . . authoritarian reactionaries...Yhypocritically pretending to be devoted to civilliberties," in D. Bell (ed.), The Radical Right(Garden City, N. Y., 1964), p. 196.

18 See, e.g., S. A. Stouffer, Communism, Con-formity and Civil Liberties (Garden City, N. Y.,1955), pp. 94-97; D. Bell, op. cit., pp. 88, 358; R.Wolfinger et al., op. cit., pp. 270-273.19 H. C. Selvin and W. 0. Hagstrom, "Deter-minants of Support for Civil Liberties," BritishJournal of Sociology, 11 (1960) 51-73.

Conservatives are largely shared by Berkeleyrespondents.On nine of the ten items, Conservative re-sponses are more libertarian than those of theRepublican sample, usually by significantmargins.20 Even when only the highly educatedrespondents are considered, large inter-sampledifferences remain, with Conservatives demon-strating greater support for civil liberties thanRepublicans.21Beyond the item analysis, a summary tableof libertarianism (Table 6) indicates that alarge majority of Conservatives favor most ofthe libertarian assertions, with an overwhelm-ing difference between Conservatives and Re-publicans. Moreover, 92% of the Conservativesand only 58% of the Republicans offered morepro-libertarian than anti-libertarian responses.22Although the measure is admittedly crude,weighing each item equally, one is able toclearly differentiate Conservatives from Re-publicans along lines of commitment to or atleast acceptance of libertarian assertions. Ofmost obvious importance is the consistentlylibertarian attitude complex of both Conser-vatives and, to a slightly lesser degree, thesmall group of Goldwater Republicans.These findings do not permit the inferencethat Conservatives will be in the forefront ofany movement to expand or even protect thegenerality of civil liberties. Robert Lane hassuggested that this fight is usually led by atriumvirate composed of the legal, clerical andteaching professions,22 none of which is repre-sented among the Conservatives. The latter

20 The average item-percentage difference be-tween Conservatives and Republicans is +17.1;between Conservatives and Goldwater-votingRepublicans, +8.4. If any inference is to bedrawn, it is that Goldwater Republicans are lessanti-libertarian than Johnson-voting Republi-cans.21 The average distance between college-edu-cated Conservatives and Republicans dimishes to

+11.6.22 The mean Conservative score (defined as thenumber of prolibertarian responses) is 7.8 of apossible 10; for Republicans it is 6.0. College-educated Republicans have a mean of 6.75 andGoldwater-voting Republicans (8 of whom havenot attended college) a mean of 7.1 (!). College-attending Conservatives achieve a score of 7.9.23 R. E. Lane, "The Fear of Equality," thisREVIEW, 53 (1959), 35-51. See also, S. A. Stouffer,op. cit., J. W. Prothro and C. M. Grigg, "Funda-mental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agree-ment and Disagreement," Journal of Politics, 22(1961) 276-294.



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TABLE 5. ATTITUDES TOWARD CIVIL LIBEREES BY ALL RESPONDENTS AND BY RES-PONDENTS WITH ATLEAST SOME COLLEGE EDUCATION

All Conserva- AllRe- Berkeley College CollegePercentwhoagreehat tives publicans StudentsaRepublicanstniSeerVae(N= 45) (N =48) (N= 894) (N= 20) (Nc 40)

aThe proportiongiving the libertarianresponse s parenthesized.Data from H. C. Selvin andW. Hagstron,"Determinants f Support or CivilLiberties."British Journal of Sociology, 11 (1960)pp. 52-53. I have reversedone and slightly altered ourof theiritems. Responsesarenot controlledby sex.b Questionnot usedby Selvinand Hagstrom.6 Phrasingemployedby SelvinandHagstromorStoufferunsuitable orcomparison-

(67) (65)

d DiflerencesbetweenConservatives ndRepublicansarex2 significant,p


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1968 CONSERVATISM, PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM 873TABLE 6. RELATIVE SUPPORT FOR

CIVIL LIBERTlESa

Conservatives Republicans(N = 45) (N = 48)

Stronger 69% 21%Weaker 31% 79%100 %/0 100%0

a The cut is made at the place where the fre-quency distributions for the two groups ofrespondents intersect, i.e., at eight pro-liber-tarian responses.are nearly all corporation employees workingin executive, engineering, accounting, statisti-cal or technical capacities.C. Extremism. The relationship betweenconservatism and rightist extremism (or radi-calism) has never been clear. It has not beenpossible to estimate the ratios of conservativeswilling and desiring to effectuate policy changesthrough traditional democratic procedures, in-cluding third parties, to those who prefer orabide techniques of personal and group harass-ment, slanderous or libelous allegations andput forward or support wild-and probably un-attainable-policy objectives (e.g. "impeachEarl Warren," "get the U.S. out of the U.N."abolish the 16th Amendment").In the current context, the extremist style isprincipally manifested by a perception (pre-sumably common to Birchers, Christian Cru-saders-both Hargis and Schwarz versions-,Minutemen, etc.) that the group's enemies areengaged in a generally successful conspiracyagainst its continued well-being or even sur-vival, having infiltrated and gained significantcontrol over major decision-making and com-munications centers of American society.24Specifically, it is charged that the United Na-tions, the executive and judicial branches ofthe federal government, the major politicalparties, the schools, the press, unions, andfinanciers are all subject to control or major in-fluence by the conspirators (i.e., Communists)or their "pseudo-liberal," "Fabian socialist,"fellow-travelling associates.25

24 R. Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in Amer-ican Politics and Other Essays (New York, 1965),Ch. 1. See also J. Higham, Strangers in the Land(New Brunswick, N. J., 1955), pp. 81, 85, 180; E.Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (Glencoe, Ill., 1952),ch. 1.

25 J. Stormer, None Dare Call it Treason (Flo-rissant, Mo., 1964); P. Schlafly, A Choice Not an

Regardless of whether such beliefs are per-vasive among members and supporters of"radical right" organizations they do not, withrare exceptions, appear to dominate the Welt-anschauung of Conservatives. Whatever theirvarious perceptions of the influence of domesticCommunism, the subject seldom appears any-where on their lists of problems confrontingthe political system. Only two Conservativesmentioned domestic Communism in any form.(One, also a member of the John Birch Society,complained that the government was riddledwith ". . . Reds and security risks"; the other-who claimed that the John Birch Society was". .. a collection of neurotics and buffoons"-complained about ". . . the increase of leftistsubversion in education . . . and in civil rightsgroups.")Conservatives do not rationalize their act ofjoining the new party as an anti-Communiststep. Rather, they view it as either a protestagainst the liberal policies and leadership ofthe state Republican Party or a positive iden-tification with the conservative movement orphilosophy or both.When asked if they could think of any or-ganization hurting the conservative cause(only 7 of 45 thought any was helping), 71%named the John Birch Society, with 60%oin-cluding the members as well as the leadershipin their indictments. Their comments weredotted with such epithets as "kooks," "radi-cals," 'bigots," "a WASP front," and otherbarely printable phrases. Among the far-rightgroups, only the John Birch Society and theAmerican Council of Christian Churches (ledby C. C. McIntyre) received any praise, eachfrom one respondent. Sixteen percent couldthink of no organization either to praise or todamn.It would appear, based on their responses tothe questions discussed above, that the largemajority of Conservatives consciously avoidadopting both the presumed perspective andthe group identification of right-wing extrem-ists. A final check on the accuracy of this find-ing is contained in an analysis of their responsesto the items on a "domestic Communistthreat" scale (Table 7). Conservative responsesto each assertion, covering American societyin general, college faculties and each of the

Echo (Alton, Ill., 1964); C. Manly, The TwentyYear Revolution (Chicago, 1954). See esp., A. G.Heinsohn (ed.), Anthology of Conservative Writ-ings in the United States: 1932-1960 (Chicago,1962) and any publication of the John BirchSociety or its Western Islands Press.

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874 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 62TABLE 7. PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNIST DANGER OR INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

Conservatives- Republicans CollegePer cent who agree that (Ns=t45) (NR =c48) Republicans(N =45) (N =48) ~~(N20)1. "Communist professors donot have very much influencein American colleges anduniversities." 42 48 452. "The danger to the UnitedStates from Communists liv-ing here is not as great as thedanger from Russia orChina." 56 73 753. "Communists do not havevery much influence in the

Democratic Party." 67 81 754. "Communists do not havevery much influence in theRepublican Party. 84 85 90Within arithmetic limitations, the five non-college educated Conservatives, responded exactly asdid their colleagues to each of the items.

major political parties, were, in the aggregate,similar to the Republicans but consistently,though not significantly, more threat-perceiv-ing. Only once, with regard to Communist in-fluence in colleges and universities, did even abare majority of Conservatives reject one ofthe assertions.Although the data do not support any in-ference that most Conservatives are totallydevoid of a belief in serious Communist influ-ence in major domestic institutions, only aminority (26%) accepted at least three of theseextremist assertions.26 If the extremist criteriaare tightened somewhat, to include either adesire to see the U. S. withdraw from the U.N.or to impeach Earl Warren, the percentage inthis category drops to 17 (8 respondents).(Only one, the Bircher, responded negatively toall six items.) No Republicans were found inthe latter group of extremists.

IV. THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATIVESAs most Conservatives are quick to acknowl-edge, it is their political views which separatethem importantly from other segments of thepopulation.In their responses to a series of general open-

ended and specific closed-ended questions, boththe most salient political interests of Conserva-26 Fifty-eight per cent accepted no more thanone; 31% accepted none. Comparable figures forcollege-educated Republicans were 65 % and30%; for all Republicans, 72% and 29%.

tives and those dimensions on which theystand farthest apart from the sampled Repub-licans coincide.Analysis of the verbal responses indicatesclearly that the major political interest of Con-servatives is in the role, direction and/or activ-ities of the federal government in domesticeconomic affairs, with a concomitant fearforthe present and future freedom of the individ-ual in a "government dominated" society. Asubstantial majority of Conservatives (60%)commented at some length about their dislikeof (1) government intervention into the affairsof business and businessmen, (2) the "socialis-tic" direction in which the nation's economyis moving, or (3) the size and power of the gov-ernment in general.2An additional 25% focussed upon the in-dividual rather than the government actingupon him. They expressed the belief thatpeople were becoming dependent upon "gov-

27 The segregation of responses into these, andallied, categories is for the purpose of expositoryconvenience. There is evidence that respondentsfalling into only one would quickly endorse the re-marks of their colleagues in the others. For ex-ample, 80 % of the Conservatives (36 of 45) agreedthat "it seems clear that the United States is onthe way to becoming a Socialist country," al-though only ten mentioned the word "socialism"during the interviews. Seventy-four per cent (34of 48) of the Republicans disagreed with the as-sertion.

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1968 CONSERVATISM, PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM 875TABLE 8. ATTITUDES TOWARD FEDERAL

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ROLES*

Conserva- Repub-Per cent opposed to any tives Recansdral rol in tives litansfederal role ia (N =45) (N = 48)

1. Financing Education(building and operatingcosts) 91 542. Financing PublicHousing 78 253. War on Poverty 80 314. Medical Care for theAged 60 65. a. Combatting Depres-sions 24b. Combatting Depres-sions through publicexpenditures 58 196. Setting Minimum WageRates 62 33

* All inter-sample differences in Table 8 aresignificant, p


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876 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 62But there are common political and socialdenominators by which Conservatives can bedistinguished from other political aggregates.The Conservatives examined here are mostlywell-educated, well-paid family men, with

upper-status occupations and suburban resi-dences.29 They are bound together politicallyby a consistent and highly salient oppositionto the modern welfare and regulatory role ofthe federal government, combined with a solidhostility to the perceived power and influenceof labor unions. While other political dimen-sions attract their interest and concern theyrarely rank as high, occur as frequently orelicit such near-uniformity of attitude.30In short, Monroe County Conservatives canbe characterized by their relatively high aver-age socio-economic position and by their pos-session of a distinct and coherent ideologywhich, while limited in breadth, is appropriate(within the American political tradition) totheir socio-economic position.These findings seriously contradict the con-clusions of McClosky and the Berkeley group.Most Conservatives do not fit the mold ofpsychic maladjustment, anomy, alienation andoutgroup hostility found jointly or separatelyby these scholars. There are two possibilitieswhich may account for the strong psychologi-cal-political correlations heretofore discoveredand their general absence from my sample. Oneis that the kind of conservatism represented bythe New York Conservatives is crucially differ-ent, in terms of key issues and social and demo-graphic sources, from the variant(s) mani-fested by the radical right. Recent researchinto the background and attitudes of radicalright activitists suggests that this is likely.A large segment of Ira Rohter's sample ofOregon rightists is disproportionately older,rural-born, less well educated, lower in incomeand occupational status and likely to belong tofundamentalist religious denominations than ismy sample.31 His respondents are found to becomparatively maladjusted on eleven of twelvepsychological measures.32(They werepolitically

29 The median family income for Conservativesin 1964 was nearly $12,000; 85% earned morethan $8,000. Ninety-six per cent were employed inwhite-collar jobs, 84% in business, managerial,professional or technical capacities.30 The Party platform, summarized in note 8, is

an accurate, if too short and general, summary ofthe views of the majority of the sample.31 I. S. Rohter, Radical Rightists: An EmpiricalStudy (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Michi-gan State University, 1967), pp. 124-144.32 Ibid., pp. 154-265, passim.

efficacious.) Mark Chesler and RichardSchmuck have found similar, though fewer,such associations in their midwestern samples,but suggest that a political "value strain"-theunhappy perception of the difference betweenwhat is (or will be) and what should be-under-lie adoption or acceptance of radical right per-spectives.33 It must be noted that heavy con-centrations of older, less well-trained and eco-nomically successful, fundamentalist and rural-born individuals have been found by all stu-dents of the subject except Wolfinger, who be-lieves that San Francisco area Christian Anti-Communist Crusaders, at least, . . . are notsocial and psychological cripples."34Despite some elements of overlap, it may bein order to hypothesize that two major strainsof right-wing attitudes and behavior are dis-tinguishable on the basis of 1) politicalgrounds-one concerned primarily with ques-tions of economic and social policy, the otherwith a powerful and conspiratorial domesticCommunist threat; 2) social differences-one asegment of the young, educated, technologi-cally competent and economically successfulmiddle to upper-middle class, the other older,less competent and less "'successful" on thesedimensions; and 3) psychological differences-one reasonably well adjusted to their environ-ment and able to cope with, though dissentingfrom, the major political tendencies of theirtime, the other hostile toward many of the so-cial forces of the era and less able to keep theirsocial-psychological balance when confrontingthem.It is urgent to separate analytically the typeof conservatism displayed by the New YorkState Conservative Party and the radical var-iant(s) which provide support for the JohnBirch Society. The persistent political warfarebetween William Buckley's National Review(the major journalistic supporter of New YorkConservatives) and the John Birch Society,inter alia, indicate that those differences arestrongly reflected in the political arena. Thedistinction seems to me to be that betweenreasonable political intelligence and its ab-

33M. Chesler and R. Schmuck, "Social Psycho-logical Characteristics of Super-Patriots" inR. A. Schoenberger (ed.), T'he American RightWing (New York, forthcoming, 1969).34 R. Wolfinger, et. al., "The Radical Right . .

op. cit., p. 285. Another recent study, of Dallasrightists, concludes that the availability of rightistorganizations may better account for rightistbehavior than psychological predispositions. SeeA. C. Elms, "Psychological Factors in Right-Wing Extremism," in Schoenberger, op. cit., cb. 6.



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1968 CONSERVATISM, PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM 877sence, with their associated causes and corre-lations.The second explanation of the discrepancybetween my findings and those of McCloskyand the Berkeley group is that "conservatives"attitudinally defined and derived from a popu-lation cross-section and those surveyed on thebasis of overt, politically relevant behavior areactually two distinct empirical universes shar-ing the same label. The former group of inac-tive, inefficacious, alienated and largely ill-educated individuals may be psychologicallyconservative but no evidence has been offeredto demonstrate a consistent relationship to anybroad variant of political conservatism. (Thatmany radical rightists are recruited fromMcClosky's universe of "extreme conserva-tives" appears probable, however.)

McClosky himself found that the correla-tions ". . . between classical conservatism . . .and . . . party affiliation, attitude on economicissues and liberal-conservative self-designa-tion . .. tend to be fairly low......5It is clear, on the evidence presented here,that some people who identify, register andvote as Conservatives do not possess the per-sonality attributes assigned to "conservatives"selected on other bases. For this group, at least,politics is primarily a legitimate means to ex-press political and economic dissatisfactionsand desires, one which dominates, if not super-cedes, its utility as a political outlet for clinicaland social psychological maladjustments.35 H. McClosky, "Conservatism and Personal-

ity," op. cit., pp. 44-45.

Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism by Rob. Schoenberger

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