Conditions in the Pacific

8/3/2019 Conditions in the Pacific

1/67

H h t h i s b r i e f 'Ylow o f the pol1t 10al an d m11itary ca n 1 -

Uon o f the 'YarlouB o o e t r i e a border1tlg the Paa1fio O O e a J l ~l e t Q 8

conaU . . what th e s t r a t e cal condit ions i n th e Paoif ic are a t th e

pre81lnt Ulle troll t he s ta nd po in t o f the u n i t ed t t e8 .

A!.r pOTIer hAs oompletely changed the method o f applying

lI\i i tar ; r po e r . hUe i 108 e f f 10 ha a been very g rea t on land op-

81"aUona 1 i has not :;'010 Ohanged th e c b3 ra ot er o f land tereea or

t h e i r glliler methods of oporat ion. The use o f an a i r farce a t

the 1 D a ~ t 1 0 Z lo f a war m ~ be doois ive an d not r equ i r e the U e of

0Zl1l a ra y a ga in at another to obtain the d ec is lo n, b at i f the use

l e r 7 , poasib ly s t ae oavalry, an meny o f th o aaxl i a r lo8 that

have h e re to fOr e b ee n ell: loyed.

h is i s booause

(a l . . 81D"taoe 'yeup.]. Of,m.ot oonoeal 1 b o t from the view a ta l r o r a t t .

r po ' 8 e f f ec t on a navy, however, wl11 e n t i r 1y

(bl . . . . l a l " ~ O l 1 a lth bOl:lc, c l nea , ch4n1au "oap ns ,a i r . d wa t . . torpedllea, and can f i r e , ca n d a t r "1

ehaJlse a l l aetbo a aDd means fOJ'lllorly used by sea fo roes . To be-

o f al'Illiea beocaes necessary, they wi l l 8t111 use i n f an t r y, 81't11-

trOll laBd ba a . . are able to a t t ok thClll.

c1a with, IIIl slD"taoe veasels ga l l . e x i s t where'ftr a i r forces ac t ing


2/67

(0 )

(4)

aII4 ~ l O k l yp I l t ou i o t MUOD a i a &1D1&_o o d aII4 ~ t o r ta rq . a r t . . o w a a e l iha t baab Oi l bu1U or i la1. OaD bo b l l1 l t .

'r.IIere b DO offlo18J1t 1U181l. o t d e t e u . ~ D a ta i rc r a f t t r c a t.be " e o la the l l . e l" . . o l th e r byd U l l o throwlng w. pO D a, ballooD or t b a rbllr.L"


3/67

"1\8_ beoall8e 'hey oa n bo _ 1 1 7 d.tono.ed t r O l l _ GrAft; and. nt u th . . hand. OaD . . . . . 11)' .uppl ied d t b e r b1 a i r OJ' by 8llbmar

d l l l e

In between the uni teel t a t e . an d Japan. aD advano.

oannot be mada by th e southern ine w ith any jp'814t hope o f BuOOeliS

oa 8, as U l bo 8e n fn r the r on i n t h i . r e p o r ' . ep8Zl8.e a i r

po or oQllpl t e l y dOlll1 t e l l 11 ; , ConseqWtnU;y.. in a f 11' basea

'11111 have to l:e o.tab11 .lied on g t be o o u t to A l a u e &Dd tbenoe

to ~ a a d . . oOftr o f hioh an y dl reo t opera t ion . l igbinat th e

aa1Il la laD4 a t Japen wi l l have to be aacle. I n the eVeDt o f OT

1Irc aD ezrq to th e tu r eas t i t 1& l:lOt lnooJUl.1Yab18 t ba t he ad

_ 0 0 l _ _ t . l t not a gre t pa r t o f th e foroe a1 hi ; have to be

. 0 . 4 l t l th e l u l u pauage to Skagwq, Ala"', Ofti' th e h i t .~ ' 7 r a n ~ ,U I _ . dOllD the oa an d &CII'Oaa ll . . 1n g . . A J la l l ' ottllllal . . . 1\8&1 . . , Japan l t s e l t wollld be 4. . 1alv8 beoaua& a l l

- U l . a , a . ' e r a o t populatiol l aDd . -10ult \ l1 '&1 or U .

e ' q _ _ 9II1l..,.o t , t r o , are ooaseated. and . . . 11 10Gated.1a a l . ,.u aVIlat\ll '8 1" o f Pllpw an d od 01 ' QtheF l n t lM I l l . lle7 o t U p . . , t r O l l t h i . obIII'aotel" o f _

t ""JII"ea.


4/67

I

GEORGE T. BYE, I5 3 5 FIFTH AVE., NEW VO

JAPAN

In ooneidering the s i tua t ion of Japan 1n the Far F ~ B tand her

re la t ion to the United Sta tes , i t ie necessary to tak in to 'considera_

t ion her s ta tus 1n the pRst and the psychological condi t ion of her

people with respeot to fore1gn nations. Although on th su r f ce Japan

may appear to have ohanged a grea t deal , h er basic pr inc ip les and mann

of thought have varied but l i t t l e . -

In 1854. Japan was forced t o open her doors to 1ntercourse with

the Oiv1lized,world. I t was done by a squadron of Amer1can war vesse ls

pain ted black and with the muzzles of many cannon peer i from t h e i r

por ts tha t looked s t i l l blacker to t he J ap an es e. The United Sta t e s ,

haVing a r r ived in Ca11fornia, on t h ~eastern shore of the g r e a t p ac i f i c

~ a s oast1ng 1 ts gaze across i t to the shoreS of Cathay. OUr'merchants

had estab11shed themselves a t the Chinese c i ty of Canton and were

car rying on a l u c r a t i v e t rade , b u t Japan 's a t t i tu d e towaTds us and a l l

fore1gners was unbearable. Tho European nations were e s t b l i s h l them

se lve . permanently a t v a r ~ o u sp l ~ c e s1n As1a: the l i s h , the Dutch,

t he .S pa nia h, t he French. and the Portuguese. a t we w nted was t rade

and fa1r t reatment fo r our people engaged in t r ade , not the acqu l s i t i on

of t . r r 1 to ry alone. For a time our f lag flew from the ' onin I s l ands ,

the Loooh . and even Formosa, to give force to our demands. These

a r . , n ~of the grea t e s t s t r a t eg ica l importance to Japan.Th. lavase ls ol at i on o f Japan was a t an end, She c o u l ~no l

~ . r ~ 1 D 8up t h . dlplomatlc envoys from a f o r e i n power and de c a p i

te a . ahe d id th e eml .Bar ies of Kublal Khan l n the fourteenth

Gould no lODg.r take the Ch r i s t i a n m l s . 1 o n a ~ j e sand

' a t e . give them the water t o r t u r e , bury them a ~ __

and oruc l ty them." Sh e could- ~ 5 -A ' -


5/67

..

muti la te , a n ~ mistrea t the 0 ews o r v es se ls put t ing in to h e r ports

fo r supplies, or mariners wrecked on her shores.

t the tim or Commodore Per ry ' s v i s i t , the sm 11 is land of

Deshims, off the b rbor or a asaki , was t l e only l o c a l i ~ ywhere

toreigners were llowed to bave commercial in tercourse with Japan.

The e , a r e . Dutch represent t lves o f t h e i r ~ s t India company were con.

f ined to & s t r i p of land s ix hundred t ee t 10 . by two hundred fee t broad,

and only six t e e t above high t ide . This land was reclaimed trom the

water and connected to the l i t t l e town by a small stone bridge, a t the

end of whlch was a gate , c10 ely gu rded, t h e i r only means o f communi.

cation with the outside. "On t i s r es t r i c t ed b i t of t e r r i t o r y, gu rded

and confined l ike prison rs o r th ieves, c o ns ta nt ly s u bj ec te to the

most bull1Uati o ff l c l a rogance nd ros t r ic t ions" , from s ix teen to

twenty Dutchmen 1iveA and were allowed to car r ) on t rade w ith Japan.

The prof i t s . ~ r etremendous, however, w icb imp l l ed them on in t he i r

commercial deal lngs .Onoe a year, tbe Dutch resident h d t ~ make a journey to Yedo to

o ffe r th ShOgun h is respects and presents . i l e In Yedo, the Dutch

wer t r e t . d as prisoners a ~ d constantly aocomp nied .hroughout with~ b e .

guards a n a , , " " l n e " o t t ~ Japanese teudal lo rds . Final ly, the re s iden t

wsl r tce lvea in audienoe and h is presents l a ld out fo r inspect ion. Amon

o th e ra r t i 1 ,

thereW&S

always a l i b e r a l supply o f ' ropean wines andwhi e 1 . At t.

wa..a on 11

audie ce, the Dutch resident was made to "creep fo r.

n4 t . . t , and t l Un g on h is knees, be h is head toexact ly l i kein i n absolute s i lene , crawl!

A D ~ u l10n . a s over, the Dutch were le d fu rth er

. . , eouid be Viewed by the women re a iners o t

1r. The Sho un, during the audlence,

.,6-

,

t. b


6/67

N _ i n e d out o t eight o t the lXltoh ree1


7/67


8/67

Unl ted S t . a ~ . .na. Amerlcan . were proud o r the way J pan h d been

opene4 aDd o t \ h . pro re 1n we. tern o iv i l i z a t i on t t she was

Tbousands o t Am r i cnn . took t r i p s 0 J n a n 'lIe e great ly

! a p r . . . . 4 with the pre t ty t h l s they saw. the outward r r b l l l t y of

the . Japan . . . and how these a ren t oorb r l s re meliorat ing

. ry th lng about. the1r oountry. They oa e back a.fter avl been

wlned an d dined, 1th rea l ly woree t an no n O ' l ' l l e ~ eo t the r ea l con.

d1tlone i n the oountry, to repor t t t the J anese empire iaB pro

bly tbe mo.t wond rtu1 place 1n the world, physlca l ly, ment 111 an d

morall , .Japan began work1 hard on the m111tary s rv1ce. F1rs t she

lapor\ed French 1ne t ruo tor. . en F r nce "e.s overwhelmed by Germany

i n 1870-1, .he sh1t ted to Ger ny. The G r ~ a n sorgan1z d and t r a lned

th e J apa ne s. t o r war, GO t h a t tod y they h v the slm l e s t . most e ffec

lye and e ff101 .n t mi11tary y s t m 1n the world. i o t e t a t t e word

"ays " 1 8 used. '1'1118 does not nec ~ e a r l l yme n h a t i t 111 be the

h t l ee .

malt 1

n v1 was

o ~ t . 4and Bri t i8h i n s t r u o t o r s were ~ m p l o y e d .

~ t .h. 1 l1 , . \ l e , .J8pan beglU'1 to " f e e l h r o t s " G 1 t uere .and

th e 014 ~ a l r e\ 0 poasea8 h e r s e l t of tbe helpless s e of Korea

C na objeoted an d the Chlno.J anese w r ensu d in

1 , a r . : ~~ I ~ a ~ .toWr hi l p l e neaa JlUlde 1 t a " r o f s . dur t n a n d

.o . . 1.te11 v l c t o r i o u s . She seized the lums t h she desired

f a i . , but under the r saure o f t e o e B. p a r...be t . r r 1 t o r i e s ha d to be Iven ok to Ch1na

m ad Of t "I R u S S l a } h U e em'lny ~ n


9/67

Japan was careful to keep up her reputa t ion with th world a t

large, so as t& keep friends tha t oould be uoed In oaoe of emergenoy.

She wae ln no way ready to bld defiance to , e west rn o ~ r s , t ehe

knew tha t she muot t i gh t R u B s l ~or be destroyed. Fortunately for Ja an

Ruel ia 'e tremendous expansion in every way menaced the Empire o f Great

Brl ts in . se ia growled a t a c lo se d D ar da ne ll es . Th EI r threatened

Bri t i sh authoJ;1ty in IndlaJand almost as harmfUl 't o r t r1 ta ln would

be the e st ab li sh me nt o f a Bsian lee- f ree por t in the midst o f Chln

1 i t s comm ro i ai hhinese empind the gradual absorptl on

and mil i ta ry poss ib i l i t i e s nto the Musoovlte c ~ l ~

DalD3, a t the en of the Great Russt n ral1u y, l I t 1n an

time, and conneoted by seven thousand i l e s of l ron-masingly short~

bande . - . 1I0e oow, the center o f

Gsia, was to be t e rent white por t

in the oenter of China. The wonderful railway could ot be hlndered by

the B r i ti s h b a t tl e sh i p s. I t furnished a covered and protec ted way fo r

the forwarding ot Russian troops, t he i r advance aeents 0 ocoup t ion ,posseeelon and amalgamation. Thousands of thece w r r ors went forward. . eryw.ek . Somothing had to be ftone an d done qu ckly. ermany wascomplacent. wanting to get Runnia on 1 ta side 1n the HUro ean war w ich

W. . l I U l ' . to break out b ef ore lo ng . E land co n t e re e1th r seapower '01' lane: power to any degree for service in the eas t . Japan wae

a ready 11etener to En&land's prom1ses t ha t a l l others wo d be keptonward march was a ~ r e s t 9 dan her coess to n l e e - t r ee

!b e Allllo-Japaneee Treaty was prollU1gated nd r ea t " 1 t e power

l 1 t t ~ eye110* man. The Boxer t rouble , ln whioh

themselves well l ~ the eyes o f the t o re i ners .

over.Nippon. w1th

t ~ e r i t 1 sh al l iance i n

-40-


10/67

1

he r pooket, wlth the th rea t tha t she oould a lly h ers elf to other powers

agalnst England l f the Briton playod f ~ a e .turned out t e nat ion t o

'make ready fo r the caming fray with 'Russia. In th ie she was a s s i ' . e d

an d helped by h er Ally, . . . . . . " th e U nit ed Sta te a w ~ sflo od ed w it h propa.

ganda about the aggressio of the Russians. the inhulI8.n t rea tment

aooorded the Inhabi tan ts o f the oooupied t e r r i t o r i e s . an d wh t t h e i r

d. . . elopment o r m1l1tary and commercial power on the other side of the

Paolf io would mean to the United Sta te s . The people took th i s ser iously.

as the United Sta tes ha d had a t a s t e o f what colonizat ion by Russia

meant. M u a ~ o v i t e sha d penetra ted to within a few milee o f where SanFranolsco stands today and establ ished t h e i r v i l l ages . as they thought

then, permanently. They were d ev el op in g A lask a. an . dur i the '49 days

on the ooas t . shipped Wheat. meat an d f i e h . from the north to ca l l fo rn la .

Most of the propaganda was t rue as fa r ae the Uni ted Sta tes was ooncern.

ed and whole.hearted sympathy went out to Japan

Although the shipment o f war makl

the reques t of Ruesla. IIl1ch found 1 t e way

19v..~ " " M ' \equipme ~ was proh ib i ted a t

to Japan.

Tbe Russian ar.z'angements fo r the war were good but the qual i ty of'

b e r t roops , bel' . y s t e . and h er le ad er sh ip . were not worthy o f a l i t t l e

t h i r d olass po ere She was whipped and driven back on I n . A rea t

oar&! a ~ d awa. oolleoted and sen t through the Suez Canal an d Ind ian

Oo.an to Japan. I t . r r l v e d wi th the bottoms o f the ships foul and grass

a t o o t o r 'wo long on the The f l e e t bad l l t t l e war t r a i n l n . One o f

t.be ar.,eatA.t b a t t l hips was oollllllLnded by an ex . cap ta in o f Cossllck

wbOle oonslsted o f one hundred and twenty.e i h t vesse ls .

~ Bblp I t w a. wa tohed by the spy system o f the Japane.e. . I..... s. a t . ~ o ' k . din the narrow waters o f the S tr a it s o f

lamentable and i n e t f i c i e n t cQndlt ion, the

-0\1.


11/67

1

t ide o t bat t le almost turned to the side of the ssians. ro t an

a ~ ntage gained was turned quickly to ccount by the Japaneae.

fighting In vlew of an d under the protec t ion o f t h e i r own shores .The Russian f l ee t was dispersed. sunk a d d e s t r o y e ~as a military

fac tor In the Far Fast .

eanw. l le , the Russlan a ~ w a ~pu111 i t s e l f together and

i t was apparent th t sooner o r l a t e r the Japanese. now n earin g the

end o t t h e i r resources. W:lu1d be overwhelmed. Fortunately fo r them,

In te rna l dlssenslon ren r io t ln Russia. so tha t both countr ies were

will inr, to c a l l qul t s . President Roosevelt played the overture fo r

t h i s an d the f in t reaty was made ln PortslIIOuth, ew Hampshire, the

port trom which John Paul Jones sai led to beard the Br i t i sh 110n. and

where F a ~ tdled.

l t h th ls heralded as a wonderful Japanese v i c t o ~th ugh the

world. with Russia rendered h 1p1ess ln the Far s t fo r a t l o a o t a

coup e o t decades. and with an army and navy fu l l of enthuslasm and

p%'lde a t being the only people of the yellow Noe who had overwhelmed

a grea t White rope an power fo r man1 centuries , the ambltion of the

J'apane .. Iin.. no bounds. I t was "Dal-Nippon". G re at J ap an. IllUch8M e r . a s i t . . be t ha n a ny th in g Great Bri ta in had ever dreamed of .

Roman Fmplre o r tho ' p l re of the acedonians. Had

a t t e r o r g a n l ~ i n gthe mill tary pow r of Chlna. con

b o . tbe Pac i f l c to the Medlter ranean and crep t well up ln to

b la Ylctorlous ar"lea hac! b een s to pp ed ? All ~ ~ e ylacked

10n o t th l s fac t and a l i+ t1e prepara t lon In the study

o t gunpowder and ba t t1esh lps . Japan would

and 1Iou"d be t h e l r l eade r. The "Ce lea t l a l

to lds o t the f lag o f the r l s i ~


12/67

BUD 1 a w y th t would aake the oagollan conqu r e r s o f the world seem

l1ke 1nsl n 1 ~ l cn t bandl ts . This was the a t l tu d e o f ~ lnd of theJapane . . a f t e r 1905.

Tremendous ene was put In to lndue t r l l l z1 the country. The

s .a rch to r mw III&t.e 11l ls . ar t , lcu lar ly 1 ron, co 1 . nd wood, went on.

Iron mtnee were deYeloDed in the Yangt1.e valley 1n h ln n anohurla .

Forced col a lsa tio n o f these d i s t r l c t s under the prot ot lng bayonets

o f t h e i r t r o o ~ .was Pushed. Korea was o bb le d u p, b A D '" .. . a e , In

1910. ]lUro e , prep r l

Amerioa put 1n a stro

t o r the . rope n nar, looked he lp less ly on.

word fo r the m&lntenanc o f t e "open door" In

Thls so Incensed theh1na and the ln te gr l ty o f the

n o b l e heaJ't o f J& a n t ha t l iar \ 9 f I " ' M f l l e ~ ~ ~1 J an p aohed

"Asla t O l " the Aslat io " under the p r 6 p r l e ~ o r s h l po f J p n ln Chlna, 1n

the Phl11pplne8, 1n the toh East Ind ies , and In Ind a . Everyt 1 "a

golng ahead a t a r e a t ~ a t . . . Her n vy ulokly suml & .

nr


13/67

,

ra te or Bcarcely r iye miles per day. Tho Japanese plaInly

. a . wbat war with a . rea t . WhIte m l l i t ry power meant. I t was the f i r s t

big 301 they ha d encountered.

~ e yentered the war on the sIde of En,land. because they thou h t

anb a t - . . would be vIc tor ious: beoau e

s h i p . tha t were 1n t ho i r barbors) ro r

a l l o r ABla, an d p r t i cu l ly . g e t the German le1 nds of the M.al'lanna,

Caro11ne an d Pelew group, whIch were d i rec t ly aoross any supposed l ine

o r operatiQns or an Aoarican naval force oceedlng to the PhilIppInes

and Asia. Between a l l these closely s i t u ted I s l e t s . t he I r torpedo

c r a t t could operate w1th impunity while the . r ss greTI lon on the

bot to . . o r the Amorioan vesse l s . They bullded b e t t e r t an they knew

the , becauee these same 1s1ands make ide 1 l r bases . They captured

K1ao Chow an d proceeded to carry out t h e l r d slgns on Chin w en they

automobllee, were monopo11zed by S ta t e s ,. . ~: ~ " ~ ~ " ' " " ' ; ~ C l sa ' , . Am"rlc nl!l e r beglnnl to

. o r e t ha t A. ia wae t h e l r na tu ra l market , tha.t the war

o dete lne who wa to b . supreme.44-

.were qu i . t l y to ld " to lay o f f th t stu 'f! fo r &TIhl1e. It ..la ing a l l sor ta

o t roml .es , th y kept r i h t on,eeoret ly ho ever,u t t l ~ ~

t roops 1nvar ious plac 1n Ch1n , anchur1a, nd l a t e r , 1n Giberi F1nally.

Aaer10a . n te red the war an d the Jap neee were iven a . o t h e r setbaok when

t h e , tound the prod1g10us power t h a t the oountry . os se ss ed . S ta rt In g wIth

DO las, praot lca l11 , with1n a year he r forces turned tho t...;.pc

A8& p&Jl faa". SU d wrong, beoause 1n the sprIng of 1918'1\ was

t:lQlLIIiI D e I l - - . f I I to building her fencel!l ccord1 ly . A l l o t

.ye of th Amerloan people.

roe 1n As1a and the pac l t l c h d


14/67

r 15t.. a d th t the 1 15 JlI!1de 1 f' l! n o t b e

e8pecl&11y aa a r e s u l t o t t b u l l y 1 , a d OV rb a r l a t t l -

" " o f J I ' n .

'!h Japanes . 1 g t10n l ss", bee In s r l 0 to al l ) , &a w s the

t

-1 1 t l ~ a 1oond1t io . o t th H 11 n I s lands , wh re the J anese.born o la1ands wou d aoon outvote t e m r l oana . J a p ~ l ' S1 r l ee 1n

1 . ou r. , Y'f cloors, " e r e leo e r1oue.

war fi1J1ah d , gren t reeentme t as t I t th e unl 8 S t a t e s

th e a t t l de o t e t B r i t In 1n mB t In ln he 11" cs wlth J p

r e d " by Canada and A u e t r & l 1 . I t e r a l a t e d I n , i t wouldo rta1D17 l e a d to aer ioue d1ffe enoee 1n t e f u e. Two othe th l e

a1'fected Engla 15 T1ewpo1nt. F i r a t , E l l i s W B t h r o ~ nb ok from the

h O l f 0 and had beoome so di80rg& i z e d tha.t ahe wae 10 e r a se r lous

an o m e . a t l e a s t fo r th e t ime bein ; the o t r w s l iD - J n ' s

1e P c i ~ 1 0 . W l a n dont1nued intrigUing 1n Chinn, Ind ia an th e

\ 0 10 I t ! 'or way ou t o f h e r . 111anoe wi J n.

. . 11 t.he J a nese 11 d III&de 8' eh ab I'd d tlln:lC!e on Ch1na1IQyeott was 1nat.1tut.ed a i n s t Japane o o ~ s . ,n J '0 ne e

Geldno1a1 0 ! '!lUana 1n C ln a we:re 0. in te 'r r u ted d t h r n t t l d by~

w1 Cbine \ h a t mil110ns o t y ne worth o f t de w e l o a t t o Japan

,SAIlaJ'IiII" 1IIM'- U wa s t o offen! the Chin e peo leo Tb w ak Chin8ee

a d i r t _ n t t h ln Thle 0 u

ent 18 more or l e e e a

e

se l

Il_dozod i n ny .aye

un 1 san n 815 h i c h

. ean8 o f 01'8 lt1sed .::o:t.or 1 0 n . e eo oe o f

e t r l o u a , s e l t - c o n t 1 ed nd iii I t -l O t l I I ' l l U e . 1

8 0 0 t a 8 t !D v h M y 0:1'-

II r reA o u t I ' rt> r l na" p r a d i


15/67

(

i n EUrope n olothss nd ewashl::-uokllng throuc-h t h e i r oountry. The

Japanese a tt empte t oolonlzat ion I n ; nehurle., Chin n o s

bad ut ter ly ta11ed. Old II OM Chlnaaan" erosded tl m out_ o f the

Indust r ia1 t le1d everywhere. The Japaneso found th t t tey could plon

ee r nothlng. he the Chlnaman went Into t e v l ~ in fo res t , cut down

the t r ees Bnd roade h ls home, eh 1n a couple 0 y rs became bloom-

ing gar4en. the Jap couldn ' t l L f t the axe, l e ~ . a 1 o n ef e l l the t ree

ere large Breas had to be t i l l e d on the anchuri n 1 ne, the J

oou1d not plow s t r s i h t fUrrow excep fo r .few fee t the e lze o f h is

f l e l d 1n Japan. In ten years , more thAn seven mlll ion Chinose mmre4ln to "llanehurla f\8D.ln t tho cover t ree l ~ c e ~ o f the Ja p eee, and

dev&loped the country, where only on e hund Pod thounand Ja anese were

barely ab le to ma n ta ln themselves un a r the rotoet lon o f th bayonets

o f t h e i r sold e r s .

eh the same o o nd it io n e X is te in Koraa o r ea. No Indus_

~ t ~ ~. . and where IIhe 8tep d i n and oarrip.d on under th.46-

t r i a l d e10pment takes pI os TIl thout the oll!lO t co l e t e monopoliza

t ion o t the 1 bor and small produce market . by the Chineee. Yo a t o t the

artisanas, c o o 1 ~ e sand ohopkeepers, also are C Ineee . Ja w s torced

to rea lize tha t she could in no way compete eo nomica11y wi h the h i

nes . , The moment th t ~ h e t r i ed to do what th y did nd on the same

0 0 e t i t i " 1 " e 1 . s h e " s I I r 1y swallow d u 11ke a d1'O o r " t e r 1n

buoket . Her attempts in Sibar a a c 0 ~ m i r e we ent i

~ U / ' ~ J J ! - ' t u t U . Her people c Id not at"n tho oold lie theY' nd p l oThe e.xpedlt1on lIa. a cO!ltly t a l l u _ . By doi t h e " rand

c 1 0 the Far East , ,he bad aa t ra d 11 h r erstwhl1e

reUe4 0 0 h er word and none t rus ted hpr. he eo Id onl1

oce.stu1 occupat lon o r bUll noas herG th1 s h d a l ady


16/67

r

t l o o t h r be3onets, o r he her I ! l t a n ~ l l . r do f 11vl ~ a s below th at o f

the inhabl tants of t e r r i t o r i e s wh1ch her p ople went in to .

T h i . wao the ease 1n Hagal1 a n ~C 11fornln, Iher . he con i lone,re Ter, good for the developmen of Jll.p ~ e s ecolonlz t lon . In h se

t e r r i t o r i e s o f th United Sta te s , no t t e r l f a Japaneee becamo

natural ized a8 a c i t i zen of the United S t a t ~ Bor even i f born ort Amer-

loan .011,when,aoeordi to our const i tu t1on , he bee m "natuT1!l born

AII.rioan c i t i z e n " . he did not loee h is J panese ci t1zens.1p. He remained

Japan ent h is money to Jap n, was i t ' b l e fo r Ja anese m i l i t ry se r

.Tlce , carr ied on a l l the as i o n ~ ath t he cou d, an ln no way beoamean element of benef l t fo r the United 'St es . His code o f mar I e , of

e t h i c . , and h ls business honosty and in te r l t y e 0 l f f e r a n t fro

our tha t no assimilat10n l s possible. Tho race l ssue became so acute

t h a t the United Sta tes was on the verge of p ss exclus lon e t s -

-s a l n . t a l l Japanese immlgra ti on . but des l r ted t the e rnas t behestof the Japanese government, who promlned t h a t t ey w u re u l t thei l la1grat lon, sen people of Bultab1e charac te r and aep out undeBirables~

apanese a f f a i r s ln ABla had reached a condit ion 1n 1921 ~

oul soon 18-

o i l l io n ! o f do' l a r s use less ly.

the c O : l f e r ~ n c et o r th l iml t t l o n o

naval const ruct lon ~ u 1 1 a nowhere

Mans 01' spond1.

to!" o a l l l

40ne b1 the U"li ted Sto.teo 1n the utumn o f 1921.

-A7-

.of the ba t t losh ips 0 t the Vl In l c p o s b y t l eSerr lce showed th t these l e v i th n

. . . she could no 10 e r ma nta1.n h r 1.e n n 1 a t t i t udeouts lders , one

Japan

to.arlS which was n t . very f a r re'tovad from a t "'lIit!a

... . ; . . . * = ~ ~ t ; - ~ ~ ~ iPeary / fpened up the country. e was rea y to


17/67

f

I t Japan t a i led to oontorm to t he p ro vi sl on s o t t h l s conterence, sh e

u ld be pushed out in to the diplomatl0 cold , compi t e ly. She knew t he t

E land and Amerloa ha d agreed ahead o t t lme, an d th t theA lo-Japaneseal l ianoe had beoo e so die tas te fu l to Amerio t h a t E land was e e r to

give i t up. Japan knew the oards we e stacked a galn st h er, sO'she kept

quIe t and agreed t o erything outwardly. The ~ o n t e r e n c emade Jap

g e t out o f Klao Chou and S hantung.

China 's slde ha d been well handled, largely by the a id o f the

Uni ed Sta tes . Her author i ty was great ly extended over the t e r r i t o ry

t h a t had f or me rl y b ee n taken away fr9m her by the v r ious powers.

Japan now began to rea l i ze what ~ n d u s t r i a l i z l n gher own country

llleant. Her ~ r a lpopulat ion f locked more and more to the c i t i e s toaJ>-

enjoy the high w a ~ e Bo f the ~ a o t o r yworker. Sma I as i h e r cul t iva-

t ab le area , only one_twelfth or the eurfece o f her i lands , she began

to fee l the lack o f laborers on the farms. The prices o f agr lcu l t u r a l

prodUot. went up. Her l aborers , taking a cu e from the westerners , be an

organizing in to labor unions. Her r t i s ans obtained an e i h t hour day.

Their wages were boosted u n t i l now they re about seveaty e rcen t o f

tho In A . ~ r i o aan d England, an d as the Japanese turn out only bou

. . . enty percent a . lIILloh work p er day, the to t l l i outpu t per d o l l r , o f

ooa t , i . about the same as in the west. General l speakinp, h e r mechbn

1 a N u o e l l e n t worlmen. Her raw m ate ria ls c os t tremendously, i ron

t imes what they do in th United a t a t e s .

t ha t hnr former cheap t abor an pro

th ine o f the pas t , Ilnd t h a t , havi- I n d u s t r i l i z ed,

l e v e l . an d Dtandards o f l iv in ,; as the

wa. 60ing to h ~ v .grea t 01ff iou l ty i n m . ~ntaln1ng

.48_


18/67

I

,here_It agains t western c o m p o ~ i o n .par t i cu l r ly American c o m ~ e t l t

Thelr t e a r o f century w snow beglnni to come t rue . America waa

beglnning to overproduce more nd mor , .nnd the mark t of ABla tormed

the grea tes t ou1let . She mu t compote on the continent of Asla with

America u n t i l such time s she could put the 1 t t e r out 0 business ln

a m l l ~ t a r yw y a n d drive her oompletely out of Asla.

' l 'b6refore, Japnn swur16 the pendulum once agaln. She began pro_

p l t 1 a t l the Chinese In ev e way so as to ga in t h e i r favor. The

bayonets were hidden from view by a th in cur t in anq f ~ n ~ n c 1 n l . p 1 :>

t lon was begun ln earnes t . Japan began buyl up a l l c ~ n c e s B i o n ln~sla. es tab l lsh lng b nks th t money on l ands . n I l so r t s of c o

c la ! ventureD, BO as to ge t c"ntro l o f them, then _. to organ1.ze and ad~ . t t

mlnis t e r them according to tho r i t i s h system. She l ~ havi Gome suc-

cess alODE these l lnes and 1e puehin t h e m _ d l l l g e ~ t l Y .m n t e r r l

t o r l a l . tandpoin t , Instead o f t r y i ~to obble up a l l of Asla an the~ t

world. aswas

hpr former 1dea, and 1nw

lch-sherece i od qui te

pa in fu l

I e ...... she l s now t ry ina to c o n s o ~ i d a t eher p o ~ c r10, . a l l the

g very r i ch , con 'a in ce r t a ln add1tion to be

l s l a n d . f r 1 ~ 1 n gthe coast o f Asia trom a ~ c h n t

.u lao

Chese l a l a n ~ s ,to th e ~ l a yPonln-

people whioh Japan oan eae11y h ndle an d organize . Somo, such a theI ~

-

t a t nn a i r force can p a t r o l a l l o f them

1 . now oentered on h er a i r force nd " e l ' J -

th i r noees in to

r sepn ted by onlyn:-apo

e Be 'lI'1 w rob1.ps poltl

lh111p lrw a re l ~ t c dby a. r ce t 1 t . h B s good rn l l ; tary ch rac

good so ld le rs as the 'Jnpnnone theme lvas . A ll


19/67

~ l n gelae 1s secondary. Already th i s new arm 1s rap1dly pproach-

108 the .econd 1n B1ze 1n the world, be1ng exceeded ln number only

by France. Japan hopes under these c nd t lona to m ke the easterncoast of 81a a Japaneae la ke , c on tr ol le d ln every manner by h er

mil l tary power, which ln ca.e o f e m e r g e n c y ~ w o u l dbe a b l to dispose

qUickly o f any a l r or naval force w ~ l Q a~ l @ R tc o m ~ o mthe western

world. Agaln, her fear 1s of the United Sta te s , beoause she knows t h a t

we have a natur 1 br1dge o f 1s1ands from AlasK a1most to tne shores

of Asia, wh11e the d1stance across the Bering S t r a i t from America to

Asia . is only f lf ty_two miles .

Japan 1s ln no way a f ra id o f our na val pouer bu t 1s 1n deathly

fea r o f our a i r force , even more th n l e Engl nd a f r a l d of tha t of

France. Japan of te rs an l dea l t a rge t fo r a i r pper t i ons . Her t ~ ns

are bul1t of wood and paper to r e s i s t the deVAstations o f earthqu kes:

her water supp11es are qu lte at tackable; and, should an enemy obtaln

cont ro l of the a i r , her shipp1 , b r i i raw mater ia ls from Ch.1na -her 11fe blood 1n case of a nat ional emergency _ can be quickly sunk.

The f11ght of the Amerlcan planes t h r o u h the Aleutlan I s l nds and

Japan he1ghtened t r ~ sfeel lng. After t r y i ln every 'covert way to

. top the t l l h t , which ahe consldered was merely a reconn l s sance of

the Japaness I s lands by the Americans, she a l l o led them to 0 thLu'w


20/67

~ l n gelse i s secondary. Already t h i s new arm l s rap ld ly p roach-

ing the .econd in size in the world, belng exceeded ln number only

by France. Japan hopes under these c na t t lons to make the e a s t e r n '

coaet of s ia a Japanese l ake . oontrol led ln every m nner by h er

mil l tary power, w ich ln case o f e m e r g e n c y ~ w o u l db e a b l ~to dispose

qUlckly or any a l r or naval force W f i l Q ~~ l @ R tc o m ~ o mthe western

world. Agaln, her fear io of the United Sta tes . beoause she knows t h a t

we have a natur 1 brldge of i s l ands from Alask almost to tne shores

o f Asia. while t he d ls tan oe aoross the Bering S t r a i t from Amerlca to

Asla . l s only fl f ty_two mlles .

Japan i s in no way a f ra id o f our naval power but i s ln deathly

fea r of our a i r force, even more th n l s ~ l a n da f r a i d of t h a t o f

France. Japan offe rs an ldea l ta rg e t fo r a i r pper t i o n s . Her to ns

are b u ll of wood and paper to r e s io t the deVRstations o r earthqu kes:

her water suppl ies are quite at tackable ; and, should an enemy obta ln

control of the a l ~ . her shippi , b r i i raw mater ia ls from China -her l i f e blood in case of a nat lonal emergency - can be quickly sunk.

The f l l gh t o f the Amerlcan planes throu h t he A le ut ia n I s lands and

Japan helghtened t h i s fee l ing . After try1 i n every covert way to

stop the t l l h t , whlch sh e conal ered was merely a reconn i ssance o f

the Japanese Is lands by the Americans, she allowed them to go through

an dt o f no

1 s e ~ t irely

unfalt

over . . elcomlant!

h e l p l

th . , knows *hat a tremendous chal1,lte i s coming 1n the met . o ~

o t conductlng o v e r ~ e a .campalgns. The naval systems of the p s t w i l l

S l . . . . . , to the a i r system of the t u t u r e . ~She 1s reac!y from the naval

,. . aa:point, but i . a t ra id o f the a1r. She 1s t ry1 n a strenuously to. \ - ~'0 0

ber 4 . t i o l e n c 1 ~ a n di s beglnn1ng to put the United S t a t e . wel l

a i r deyelopment 13 clothed th more seorecy th50-


21/67

. . t h . organlzat ion an d t r in i r o f her a ~ b ~ o r ethe Ruaslan war.

She DOW has many more men, more maohines. an d more f a c t ~ r l e slarking

oq h e r Air force , ) e s , th ree tlmes oyer, than haelthe United t a t e s .

In the prosecution of her cnmpaign of f in an cia l p en etr at io n in to

Asla, Japan has constantly held l t up to the Chinese tha t sho, Japan,

was the only Asi t i c power t ha t was a f i r s t c lass 10 ld power, t h a t

he r o ~ ewere no discr iminated agains t a ~ ~ w h e r e ,an d tha t the United

Sta tes was af ra id to take any m e a s u r ~ oo f t ha t kind because i t was

lIIerel1 a heterogenous mass of ahopke pere a.nd b e o d l e r . The Chinese

kn.w b e t t e r than t '1is an d they knew t ha t Ihen r . Hanihara, the Japanese

ambassador a t . aahington, announced to our Sta te Department t h a t "Grave

Consequeneeo" would folloi7 an exelucion ac t , th3.t the Japs "had cpokcd

t h e i r goose" with Amorica. I t hurts the ;rapanese pres t ige t e r r i b l y.

Thelr pr ide was mortally offended because they cont inued to l ose f r iends

throughout the l 'Iorld. T he ir p rl de suffered more an d !tOre u n t i l the

"pr ide business" had a bad c se o f the "jumps" on a l l occasions. Their

pr ide and t h e i r pr&stige in China are tho main th ings affec ted y the

.xo1usion &ct. The average Japanese knows no more n o t America than

the tarmer behind the Kansas plol'/ knows about nchuria . He 1s to ld

b l h l . . u p ~ r i o r st ha t the nat10nal pr ide haa been hur t by merien an d

. th at ln st .ad of being the grea t benefac to r as he had boon l e ad to

b i l l . . . . the United Sta tes l ' now the darkes t o f demor-a

I_h n.eded stopplng on badly a d needs ore of 1 t . A l i t t l eU do a g r e a t d .a l o f good ln the fu tu re . Unfortunatoly, our

_ . . _ . t 1 0 N p N a " n t a t l v e l n Japlln handled our ca.se very b d ly. '.Ihen. . . . . . o f t h . exolus1on law. came up. l a s t e d of-maintain1ng a

. ' , T o ~ T l U , t .as the repreaentat1ve o f the gren t American repub

e ut te rance to 111: o r t s o f puer i l e atatements and


22/67

oompla1nts w1th the grea tes t pub l ic i ty. These gav, the decided 1m

pression 1n Japan th t the Con"ress of the United Sta te s was ac t ing~ , ' ~,

co ntrary to not only o f the executive, but of the m Jor i ty

of the people o f the oountry. This has tended to 1ncrease the a g i t a t i oaga ins t Amer1cans. In m rked con t r as t to t h i s was the aot ion of our

r e p r e s e ~ t a t l v e1n Ch1na, who 1n a f ine , b u s l n e ~ s 1 1 k es ta tement t o ld

the Ch1nese a l l about o ur re as on s. why 1 t was done, and what would

happen 1n the fu ture . I t had a splendld effeo t a l l o v e r Asla and

c ou nte ra cte d, to a grea t extent ,

The J a p a n e e e ~ 4 ~bo l l

n i l done 1,n J a p ~ ~......_.......~ ' ~ ~ . . . . - - . . J ~~ ant1-Americ n_ ~t a t lon

whlch 1s rea l ly looked on wlth favor, , i f , not got ten up;

by tbe ru11ng olaeses; I t s objec t i s to eee i f America w i l l be "ec r

Nothing ser ious w i l l be done because Japan has no rea l reason to go to.

war a t t h i e t ime, and because ehe hae no al11es. i ~ e she f ee l s per-

fec t ly able to f igh t a defensive w r against the United S ta t e s , she do

not want to f1 h t an offensive war, and does not want to f igh t a t a l l

without an a l l y. An a l ly 18 a very d i ff i ou l t th1 to o bta in . She has

t r i e d every open1ng to f ind one 1 n E urop e. She tho h t fo r a while t h

GermBn1 would be a ready l i s t ene r, but Germany no t only sees thrau b

e v e r ~ t h i n gt h a t Ja pan does, but k ~ o w st h a t a st rong American pos i t ion

1n Asia i s the bes t gu ~ n t e eof whlte dominance in the world.

There i s no use fo r any one to quest ion the necess i y of 'white

do81nance. I f the whites do not dominate, then the yellow raoe l i l l .Germ&n7 waa tbe or ig ina tor of tae express ion . "yellow p e r i l ~an d du in

th e war DO one- bu t a white man BeITed under b er banners in rope. So

i t 1 . toward. Ruaaia t h a ~Japan now l eans , bu t no matter how muoh she

leana e re , ahe w i l l find a broken s t a f f when the t ime comes, b oause

. a l f ro a tbe t a o t th at the Russians have a oo d deal of ' "whi te " in


23/67

t h e . a ~ a y .t h e i r policy o f expansion e as tw ar d r un s d i rec t ly contrary

to Japan ' l hopei of Asiat io Empire.

AI to China. Japan has learned fu l l well tha t sh e cannot organize

her ln I l t a ry way' a t t h i l t ime. To do t h i s requires a grea t deal o f

money to handle the big m n and a tremendous a unt o f equipment, off i ce r s ,

an d non-commlssioned off ioers to organize Chinese t roops. The Japanese

h ve tew o t these a t t r i b u t e s an d are not accustomed t o o rg an iz in g and

us in g tro op s of a s ub Je ot p eo pl e. England, Ge ny or the United Sta tes

could do much b e t t e r with them. Furthermore, the Chinese do not want

any more t rouble than they have. from any people. place o r country.They want to b e l e t alone. They oonsider t h a t biolo i c a l l y an d economlc

a l l y ~ h e ywill gradual ly absorb anything wlth th ich they come in contac t .

They want a l l others to keep out o f China. I f outs iders l n s i s t on

coming. they w1l1 throw them out l t they can. but I f they cannot, they

Will l e t ' the slow process

....._ ~' t/hat worrle's th m,

of biolog1cal assimilat10n do i t s w o r k . , ~

most are the N or th Europ eans and Americans.

beoause th ey do not stay in Chln m1x with the peopl an d become,

Iwallowed up among them ln a few years . but on the contrary, 0 home

an d renew t h e i r vlgor. thousands o t miles away from s l a . The Chinese

conslder. however. t h a t none of the wh1tes wi l l become so strong t h a t

they w111 b e able to take China J under t h e i r arm. b ~ and baggage, be

cause the whltes f igh t so much among themselves. They thinS t ha t l f the

experiment of government (as they oons1der I t ) 1s success 1 1n the

Unlted Sta tes . t ha t t h l s power ~ wield a tremendous ln f luenoe ln the

. fu ture. bu t . . t o r the t i l le being and t o r many deoades to come, the United

S t a t . u a t . t a n d to r the 1 n t e g ~ i t yo t Ch1na. beoauee by doing t h a t the

whole bod7 o f Ch1na w111 be kept open fo r the l a l e o t Amer1can goode

. . ~ ~ ~ .w111 Dot be allowed to p ar \l t lo D th e oountry an d Japan wl11 bee rbed 1n her ambitions.

-5'." ' . , ~ .

.. ~ .. ,""I


24/67

'! 'heretore, look where she wll1, J pa n 1s unable to f ind an 11y.

She i s f l i r t 1 w i t h , nce, but the Gaul, impotent in hs i , wants to

keep good t e e l i there on account o f h is poesesslons ln Ind ' -China.

The Japanese are alao a f ra id of merlc n t r de r ep r l s a l s . ore

than one-h t o f the t o t a l to re l n t rade of the Jap nese empire io i t h

America. OVer n in ety p er ce nt o f a l l h er s i l k oes to America, h i l

the importll from the United S ta tes o f metal p ro du ct s, o ot to n, he tthe

i n v r io ' 8 forms, and lumber, h ve become v er y im po rta nt in economl0

l i t e o t J'apan, and a re t h i Il she cannot very well ge t alo wl t h o u t .

Whlle1 t 111

aquelltion whether the United

StateswO'11d boycott Japanese

ooda ae a counter meallure agains t n Japanese boycott , any c t ion on

the p ar t o f the Ja Bnese to offe r a enera l boycott agains t Amerlcan

goode would probably lead to lar.

There a re III!lDl more Jap eee in merlcan pooeeselons than there

are Americane ln J panese possesslons. Those ln Hawali and Amerlc ,

amountlng to some two hundred thousand, are well t r ea ted , protected in

t h e i r vested r l htll, an d t r ee to o i rcu la te ae they des i re . Any declded

I1lI11 t reatment o f Americana in Japanese t e r r i t o r y would r esu l t i n gene

clean-up o t Japaneae in America a ~ d probably l n Hawali. They m1 h t . . ~

be en t i r e ly expelled from the co n t ry and t h e i r property disposed o t

.at once to American c i t i . e n s .

Japan, the re to re , baa more to lose tM n sh o has to g ln

trom eoonomic rep r iaa l s . I t they are inaugurated, i t wll1 be with

a view o t to rc ing the Untted Sta tea 1nto an oftensive are

There are two eohools o t thought 1n Japan ae to the mll1 t ry ac

t l on tha t abould be t a t with the Unlted Sta tes . Both of these des i re

the o o _ l e t e exte:na 10n o t th e A _rlo an nat ion aa a commerclal,

41 t i o o r . 1 l l t . r'1 t t o r 1D the r !!A.t. They Meo nlze th t i t,

.54-


25/67

weaker ln every way; also , that sooner or 1 t e r,

the United Sta te . keeps on, sooner or l a t e r t h e y ~ w i l lb e made

th e U nited States

an easy t a rge t for an overseas expedition. Now they th ink d1ffe ent ly

and know that ln case of an unsuccessful w a r ~ " _Japanese expanSion

United 5 t t e s wasropean war. They - . . : : . : = . . . - . . . . ; ~ : . : ; . ; ; , ; ; ; .efo 0 the

. i l l b e stopped, t ha t her armaments will be l lmited, ' and t ha t sh e wi l l

cease to eXist as a great power. Both par t i es agree tha t the proper

wil l c on si de r th e maintenance of a gre t mili tary force by any s1 t i c

nat ion as a direct menace to the safety of the American n t ion nd

A lo-Saxon "destlny" ln the Pacif ic . The fore , sooner or l a t e r , they

must f i h t . The only question i s hOW, when and where.

They are not so sure of t he i r mili tary b i l i t y now as they "ere

strategy l s to do as much as poss1ble of the f igh t i near t h e i r own

shores, where, I f the United S t t s sends a nave.l arm dB.. i t i s sure to

be destroyed. The Japanese a r e ~ m u c hbe t t e r prep rea), co 'para t ive lY,

than the er ican . . At th i s t1me, a l so . Engl nd i s very much occu-~ied wl th affa i r s on the continent of rope. nd t ~ e t , " , I l ! l ' , ~ of hera i r and n val base a t Slnga ore has been held up by the 1 bor government

a t present 1n power 1n England.

Orie par ty. the re fo re t w ~ s h e sto begin h o s t i l iU es a t once, by

declar ing tha t no Amerlcan gOOdS s ~ l 1be imp


26/67

by Japan to pro tec t h er p o si tl on . ThIs 1'1111 b e foll O'1e d by th e se lzu re

o f one o f the Hawal1an Ia lands , probably the Is land o f Nl1hau, and an

a l r and submarine base Gst ab l1ehed t h e . I e th i s l s belng done,

a l l ' opera t lons fo r the d es tr uo tl on o f the f\tel tanks and o the r works

a t Pear l Harbor w i l l be undertaken. Aeron u t l c a l s lege wll l then be

lnaugurQted aga lns t a l l t he H a w a ll a nl sl a nd s . an d a l l vesse ls approach-,

log w11l be at taoked through the a l r o r under the water.

As th lngs stood when I Inspected the defenses o f the Haw l1an

I s la n ds In November an d Deoember. 1923. th l s could have been done wlth

eaa8 by Japan. The only th1JJg t h a t oan s top 1 t ' l s an adequate a l l 'detense o r the roup o f 1slands.. I t III1st be remembered t h a t the defense

scheme t o r the Hawal1an I s l ands Involves merely the defense of the

I s land of Oahu a lone aga lns t an a t tack by small boa t s l and l t roops

from the sh lps . In th l s day nd age, I t I s an u t t e r l y l n e ff ec t lve/

method o t 'd et en se b ec au se the shore detenses an the t h l s usef \ t l In

can b . eas l ly destroyed by an enemf possess lng con t ro l

o r the a l l ' . An a t taok o f t h i s kln would Involve comparat lvely l l t t l e

e f f o r t and only a small p a r t Of the war mald resources o f Japan.

The Phll1pplnes notild be at tacked In a a lml la r manner. TIlth an

adequate a l r detense the re , the Japanese would have gre t d l f f l c u l t y

.J.n tIaII: the 18land o f Luzon. The obJeot o f theee ope%'Qtlons wouldb e t o r Japan to poseees h ere el t o f a l l the southern pproachea to Asla

and e i t h e r force an Immediate naval a t tack along the southern route by

. . . , o t the Hawal1an b l a n d o r the adoptlon o f a complete ch ng e In

th e AlII r lcan plan to an at taok bJ th e n or th em route by way o f l l lska

and the Aleut lan I s land This t.he Japanese are very much a f r a l d o f .

1'h. l D l t 1 suo . . . . . . A' t . b l , . . s tand now. would probably be wlth th e

I M . '!'h1a Would ~ a o 1 l 1 t . a t eA l b l e unders tand! 111 t h o t h e r


27/67

to expend IIIa1'lJ 11ves and a grea t deal of t asu%'C on a long drawn out

powere to keep hands o f t , would tremendouslY lncrease t h l r prest lge

wlth the Chlnese, and they think th t l t would have a reat e t feot on

Should the United Sta tes . a t th l s Juncture. s t r ive to continue

her campaign. the fr1endly o ffloes of o ther powors would be requested

to bring an en d to the hos t l l1 t l es . something slmll r to the act lon 1n

are notp

r t lcular ly"anxlous

Bslan war. Thls would dound to the rea t adVantsG:e

r Fast.n the

the m l ~ dof the merlcan publlc. who

campal

the case of the

o t the Japanese. An otfens1ve war by Japan ag l n s t the Paolt lc ooast

by Tiay c i f the Aleutian I s l nds and Alaska l s adVocated by some.

The other party th ln ks 1 ha t although i n i t i a l suooesses mlght be

- galned by Japan. tha t a prolonged war wl th Amerloa would mean h er u l t l -

m t e ruin. tha t Japan must walt untl1 Arne loa 1 agaln lnvolved in a

European. o r ioce other war. when Japen can get n a l ly an d at tack the

United Sta tes to greater a d V a n t ~ e .In the meantlme. she must lork up

her economic oonditlon. ~ e r pres t lge on th e o on tin en t o f i a . and

h er general posl t lon among the natlons. which a t th l s tlme l s none too

ood.

Jus t a t ~ ~ ~ ~ :the part1 w a n t i ~immediate actlon ' 1 s the onemost heard from.

There 1 . anothEr fea ture about the Japanese t ha t must be takeninto s er 10 us a oc ou nt . They are o t I I a l q ext rac t ion . w th many o f the

a t t r ibu tes o t tha t !Wooe t l rm ly lllPlanted 1n them. They a re apt to :Nn

"&80k" o r go"juramentado" a t an, t1me t ha t the1r f ee l l B are euft l01ont-

17 w r o u g h t ~oauee i t . T h i . oondition ex1eta not only in the ind1v111ual

bu t i n l a r s . bodi and also . . , u t e n d to the whole s ta te . The reoent

10n o t o t To a t t e r the earthquake h


28/67

e rs were also disposed o f .

f)

~Th ! ~ M11:d1C1lW'eo c mpletely l o s t , thous

kl1)!ed, simply because they hated them.

a 0 . . . in po ln t .

l e Koreans were

) ~

nds of hel

Some fore ign

~ ~ ~ ~ : 4 7 5 i ! F f l i ~ " l ! I & i g . ~ ~

o-A ~. \nother e1 em n t 0 f 1II l re s t M = 1 ; A = i i P i i l ! R f l " " " ' * R ; l i l : l l

-,a.:t::::J=:::a=_It!::::6I5-lndustrlalizll.tion, the s tand ros o f the p oo pl e h av.." ...

b ee n ra1 aed to such an ex ten t t h a t whenever subsides from t1me

to t ime, th e expenses of 1iv1 are so h i h

commerceeM.as to ~ 1 i M -a r e a t deal o f

d1soontent among the workers. Since the e s t bl ishment of un ive r sa l

_compulsory edUcation, prac t ic l l y a l l the people c n r ead . They a re--"

red w ith a l l so r ts o r n spapbrs \'Ih ch, Ithou h very s t r i c t l y cont ro l led

by th e G overn me nt , have 11 "'ood de 1 o f soc i l i s t i e mat te r i n them. There

a re III!1I\J s o c i a l l s t i o and co n l r t i c s o c i e t i e s which "have always more

lnf1uence a t a t lme of bus iness depression. The presen t l s a per iod

espec la l ly com n~ ' U Q M '

P o ple b e1 le ve ~ b - the Amerioan 'pollcy o f pl811ng the Chinese aga lns t the J panese so t h a t

th e Unlted S t a t e . mA1 derlve commerclal benef l t from i t w R - l - e : ! i - : I : 8 -

o r t h a t klnd"; the 1en l s do. n pre t ty low,

American d o l l a r. The government makes the

l teople b l a _ th e g oy erru ae nt fo r f a l l l t.o pro teo t th e orke rs l n s t

c a p l t a l l and not pushing t h e l r pres t ige broad s u f t l c l e n t l y. So the re

a re a l l e o r t .o t

etrong undercurren ts llQI'I which y become ser iousenoush a t U I I t i _ to r equ i r e t h a t war be de.

1111:e th e oink1I 1 . i d o r 1s t h a t somethi

.58-

..

'!be Uni ted s ta tee 0 llDOt s tand complacently by undor the se1 f-

t . . -eon t ro l IDOre than h a l f o r Jap n ' s t de, t h a t she 18, -

.b e l e a t r a l d Or u s , t c , e t o . She 1s p e r t e c t l y ab le to

. . !"loue and dangerous manner.

a."INJ"


29/67

o t the Malne ln Havana harbor mlght happen ln on e o f he : - l ' 0 r t s . They

were ve17 nel:"Voua when the am y t r anspor t Tho s c a l l e d ~asak l to

coal. on her way t r o l l M ani la a nd Chlna en route to S n Franclsco ln JUne,a t the h e l F ~ tor the antl_Amerloan ag l ta t lon . e ry th l was watohed

around the shlp and par t l cu la r ly the coal as i t as passed ln , to

prevent explos1ve. o r ohemioal weapons belng, depos l teu ln the bunkers.

They a re a f rn ld t h a t a mob ml h t g e t out o f cont ro l 1n on e o f the 1 rge

c l t l e . and k i l l and savagely t l l a t e some Amerlcans. In e l t h e r o r these

casee the government ~ n o w 8t h a t Amerlca would "go a f t e r them w lth sv ery

th lng ahe had". They want most decldedly to esoape a casus be1l1 of

t h l e t 1 n d . 110 aa to malte l t ap e a r a lw ay, 1 f t he re l s a war, t h a t

Amer10a 1s m orally wrong an d l s jumpl on Japan because she l s a weaker

power, the . . . eong ehe put up l n the 1 ss lan war l n 1904.Japan e s t l . a t e . t h a t , l f war comes, Amerlca 111 begln

. . . . the . e tho d . and systems o t the l a s t war. She l s th er efo re p re

par lng h e r wbole wal'-malt1ng powers ao t h a t every a a n t e can be

taken o f n n deve lop_n te 1n the a r t of w"r. Her av1 t i o n l a rece lv lng

t l r . t o ~ n . l d e r a t l o n .a . are alao h e r submarlnes and 11 h t c r u l s e r s . A ll

h er plane a re oa re tu l ly worked out nd kept up- to -da te . She knows th t, ,war 1 . aolll1ng 1101118 day w1 th the

coa t . . . , ~ e r. e l ' J eXistenoe.Unlted Sta te s and th t i t w l l l be

The Un l ted S t teemust not ren e r h e r s e lt

oo- .J ,e t .e lJ detelUl81e.e by n the one han t a \'Iar \'11thJ'apa . . 1 . an 881b111ty. and on the other. by e t l c k l to methods

IlD4 o f t1IIB war a . ob .o le te as the bow and arrow,. compared to

t i le ur.r nne.alLlt lU7 lII t 'on . . 't \.011 o r an ll1pOrtant tu re 1B always he.rd to g e t

.....~ _ 1 . NSarded ae the prospeot lve enellij" o f th e one

sought . Thle 1B par t lou l r1y eo ? "


30/67

It,,. _:

~ '

J

!be 81. . and oondit1on o f the Japanese Army 1s well known. They ~ " ' ' ' ' ' ' l I . P i b o u ttwo bwldred an d t '1 t ty thousand men under arms. ,, 1 th a t o t a l

. . .la' 'wo .11110n t ra1ned men. The1r armament 1s get t ing a 1 1 t t l e I t 18 about. t. n t l 1 . a n nO'll since they "e re equ1pped with the1r

H n t . . . . po n All o r t h . i r u t e r 1 e l 1B wearing out a t about the sam

80 \bat. a o on dd . . . . .b l .

outlay '11111 be required to replaoe 1 t .


31/67

wlt.b the Japanese. A.ll o f hor people I\re in s t ruc tod trom t h e i r enr

11 e s t ohildhood not to divulge anyth i of a m ill ta ry n ' tu re to fo re l n

ell'll. This l s ca r r ied -absolutely to ext reoes an reDultD i n the a t t H u d e

a t the Japanese, which we a l l notioe , o f avoid i i Gues, equivooat ing ,

an d downright misrepresenta t Ion . On the other hand, the r ea t e s t

s t r e s s 1s l a l d on the galning o f infoTm1lt lon from t 1e o th e r person,

whioh agaln 1 . oa rr le d to fo o l lsh extremes. The J a ~ n e s ct h a t comes

i n t o l o u r o tf io e , fo r 1nstanoe, wll1 note every piotu c on th e a l l .

111 note a l l the buttona on your clothes, and \7111 rep/)r t on the most

t r 1 v i a l t h 1 ~ 8 .Thls gaining' o f infoI'lD:ltlon on a l l fo re i matters an

concea l i t h e l r own,ao t lv i t i e s 1s 10 e s t bl1shed .p rao t lce wIth

th . . . . T ! ~ ~ .~ ~ o n > . 1 " ~ ti ~ . , ~C 0 ' 1 " r n,G.l1ft'all1 spealt1 ~ .:the i r mili ta ry " ' O i ' - 8 a . n l i ~ ' t 1 o nresombles he f o ~ ..

, 'German 8 y s t e . a n d 18 very well adapted to t he I r n ads . Th system

natural.17. inolud the i n d u s t r i a l mobl l l t a t lon o f the c?untry and thet.uftllQB out o t l L l ~ n d ao f equipment In quant l t y , before nd rluri

war. Tbe1r arm, appeare to be Duff lc ien t fo r any o f t h e i r prospec t lve

nee4a, . i t h e r t o r t a ld the offensive on th e o on tin en t o f a l o r e l e

wbell'll, o r fo r a c t i on the defenslve i n t h e l r 0 n count r o r 1n an y

o t t b e l r pOi ion I ' t be held 1n mind t h a t the whole l 1 t t o l ' o f Asia , from

KalMl.t i l ra to th e Southern l i m i t o f a l r c r a f t r ad ius from rmos 1e

. . . . I :lJ . r a i r force domlnanoe,and oomlll1nic t on from Japan to teoI.tlJ . . l' o t 1& can oal , be stopped by b r in g l sup e r io r a i r po e r

So 10 , the re fo re , ae Japan can hold oontrol o t

aa ' o f A.la she w i l l bave f ree oommunication t r o .

oot iD.n t nd oan t ra ns po rt h er mil l t ry r o r c e . ,

-60-


32/67

a r t i eu la r ly acroas the St ra l t s of Shlmonosekl. with tnc i l i ty

. Japan 's navy conforms i n organiza t l and t r a in i to th t of

England and I s desl ned. of course. primarily fo r defense agains t the

United States . Since the adVent or a i r p o ~ e r ,the policy of naval

e xp an si on h as been 30mewhat modified and a gre t deal of a t t en t i on i s,b ein g g iv en to the development o f aubmarines. Fif teen hundred ton

submarines have been bUil t , twenty-five hundred ton submarines are

being b u i l t , and i t i s 8ald tha t submarines o f f or ty -f iv e hundred tons

are contemplated. These large submarines wil l form excel lent a u x i l

to a i r force s ope ra ting on Islands. They could ac t as fuel,ammunitionand spar t par ts t ransports . also as airp lane t ransports .

' ~ e nI went to Nagasaki. in the middle of Ju ly. the f i r s t ba t t l e

f l e e t of the Japanese was in the h a r b o r ~This flee d been maneuverin

in the direc t ion of the Bonin Is lands for some time and I as re tu rning t

make a to u r of the princ1pal Jap nese ports to perm1t the people to s

the ships . This f l e e t consisted o f two ' ba t t l e cru iserc , the Konge andKlrishIma, two bat t lesh ips . the Nayoto and ton. e1 hteen f1 r s t l ine

dest royers and eight submarines. with four supply eh1ps and one subma

r ine tender. They were anchored in the bay from the mouth 1nward, 1n

the followi o rder a bat t lesh ips . bat t le oruisere . 11ght oru1sers,

des t royers and auppll sh1pe. I saw the f l ee t move out the morn1.ng of

J Ul l e ig ht ee nt h. The weather was quite cloudy, w ith c on sI de ra bl e fog

and the Yhib i l1 ty ra ther bad. The f l r s t In t imat ion t ha t we ha d th t

t h . o ra f t were moving out was the coming of two squadrons of single

t e r Sopwlth pureui t airplanes from the airdrome o f Sa.sebo. Theee

fo l lo . . d b.J . evera l two-seater obse rvat ion p lanee. The s u b m ~ t i l l . _OWId o u t o f th e harbor, followed by the dest royers . the 11 h t

t t l . oru ia . re . the ba.t t leships and the supply vesse l s .

-61_


33/67

~ e whole t h i s t ruck me as being ve ry well e xe ou te d a nd swoo hly

d o n . I had observed the elrewa o f these vesse l s 1n a sa id on th e

p eoeding d y . They looked l n good shape. wel l c lo thed , and e l1 -d i so i p l i n e d . s the lmmigration ques t ion was c u s i a re t dea l

o f ant1-Americ n f e e l i l n Japan. l t was feared t h ~ tt he re m h t

be some c l aah between the Americans on bo rd the Amerlcan t r anepo r t_

~ . . Thom a . about to a r r i v e , and the J anese , so th a a l l the oal10

wtre wlthdrawn tram the c i ty s oopn as the Thomas appeared.

There l s a "questlon whether the ear thquake rea l ly hur t t h e i r

naval establ10hment o r no t . Their naval p o r t and dock y rds a t Yoko-

s u a were badly damaged a s were some o f t h naval veose1s. They. w . ~ .

a loo l o s t some fue l 011, but the amount des t royed l s a ~ I Q Q * l Q R .I

do not th lnk _ t h e i r m v a l power has boen diminished by the ear th

quake. On the o th e r hand. i t m y have i nc re as ed . T he ir worthless

qu l ment.,and n r e a t dea l o f o th e r equipment destroyed.l)..l' ..

WiRale"ObaOlesoent) . . . w i l l be rep1aoed by newer a r t i c l e s .

A l o t o t a t t en t ion i s b e i given to !ture, nay 1 p o r t on th e

e a s t ooaat o t Japan. Th1a 18 aleo be ng made a p r inc ipa l a i r c l ' a f t

a t l o n and a fue l baae. The fue l 16 being l aoed both on the i s land

o t )ture and on the mainland opposi te . I do not t h ink t h t any cam

pa lgn . a l n a t Japan. based on me 1y c u t t l n g o t f h er supply o f f u e l

f roa ~ r a e o .suaatra. and o the r poin ta ~ a d l s t a n o e , l i l l be su ccefUl , beoau b et .e en h er reBervea o f 0 11 , th e" Bh el1 011" Ih ich she i s

beS l to 8 . t f r o . Manohuria, and the developmen o f o th e r 011 i n

. . ~ an d th e l s land Of sakha l ln . ahe w i l l have enouph to supply h

. . . . a . . . plana t o r th e use o f the navy w i l l undoubtedly conte

-62 .


34/67

p la t e 1ng the surface vesse l s near home under pro toc tion o f her

pOwer. pushinB h er submarinos well out to sea , d i r e c t i thom aga in s t

hos t i l e commerce, an d using them as auxi l ia r ies to her a i r force .

There i8 a g rea t deal o f discussion in Japan, ao the re i s i n

o the r p laces , about the f u t i l i t y o f maintaining a g r e a t sur face f l e e t

due to the development o f a i r power.

v/hat the fUtu holds fo r Japan in an ae ronau t ica l way i s , o f

course . a quest ion . The crea t ion o f a s u it ab le m i li ta ry a v i a t i o n de

pends pr imar i ly on haVing a personnel which i s capable o f atanding

10DS

1n the a i r . Only a few countr ies have t h i sc h a r a c t e r i s

The Chinese, fo r in s tance , who w ~ k every ood p i l o t s nd exce l len t

mechanics, are incapable of d elop1 a B re at m 1 li ta ry av1at ion, be-

country, 18 a b s e n t ~and u n t i l a form o f governo give up l i f e fo r

cause the spark o r element of pa t r io t i sm nhich causes the Will ingness

the g r e a t e s t a i rolas t o f l y. and may end up by developi

63-

ment 1s adopted by the Chinese which w i l l be ~ o o k e dup to ~ n drespecte~ f'.Al'""Y'\. I t.4U ~ ~ (d..o.. "A..Qby h e r f ig ht1 nc c lasses , an e ff i c i en t ~ i ary av1at ion oannot be pro

duced. On the o th e r hand Japan i s capable of a tandinr lo ssee . One C

be sure t ha t her p u rs u it a vi at io n 17ill stand as heavy l o s s e s as any

o tbe r : whether she would accomp11sh as much.J 1n p r o p o r t i o ~as o t h e r

powers i s a no th er m at te r. This would be a fUnct10n o f t ra1ning an d o

th e pro . . r h a n d l 1 ~o f h e r a r fo rces .0 - "rt"\ ~ /

As thlA!S stend. i t t akes no l o ~ e rto t each Jap nese to f ly tha

i t do Anglo.Saxons. Nat a l l y they are not so conversan t with mech

i c a l arrangements and the1 r minds are not molded ln to a l r ways o f thin

1ms, but they are g e t t i n g a l l o f t h i s Jus t as we did t en o r f1f teen, . a r s 1180. They a re improVing a l l the t ime. One a f t en hears 11:" sa ld

t.IIat . . . . ille oannot n y . Nothlng 1s more fa l lao ious than th1s . They


35/67


36/67

l r l r s t t oarr lers , in a d l t on, h ve

li e or t tcondUct an a l r o rt en sl ve a ga in st Jap n, u 1m . . lb l

to proteot themselves ainet other surf' oe vesse l such aD sub r ine

d . t r0 l e ra . c ru l se r s and bat t lesh ips , so tha t a c 'nslderable out lay

1 . Deoe. ry to r the l r protec t ion alone. Heve 1t ,v.o

from whloh to ope ra te ;and as naval vessels c o t 0 e_ to except un e

a l r protect lon, the , wlll have no effec t against the J p ncse a i r pow

Conaequentl1. what will h ~ v eto be done Is to sh an of tens lve from

Is land to leland throu h yhe north by wa y of ,. Al s , the

ID.lrUee. to the coaet of Japan, I I klng d1 . c t t taclts on the centersof_ atrength of the Japanese em l r e . I beHave th t n operation alon

th at l ine would be perfeotly p r l l ~ t i o a b l eand would roq i r e much l ess

outlay than any operntlolUl by my o f th Hal'lall n I s I ndo, Gu m, and

the P h l ~ l p p 1 n e a .The northern r o u t e ~ a n n o tbe urned a t te ioal ly

nor can I ta nan t b e attacked. I t i8 1n a decisive re nhere a the

8 0 U t b e r o route l s not 1n a decisive a ~ e a ,because of e s t r c th o f

the Jap&n6ae o o ~ n l o ~ t l o n e .

The detenslve s t ngth of an. OJN!.-t.."*' ~

le land s been re t ly mented

b1 th e a4Yent of a l r power. s a I r power can destroy sur f ce ahi 1

n tshold l s I nds D 0 r taol11t1es . much s ma ll er t or ce s

thaD . . . . the c u e to rMrly.

Clo . . atch should be It pt on the J a ~ a n e s ei r evolo men, no

onl t i n Japan 1tse l f ' but 1n a l l o th e r c ou n tr io s.

!b e J paneae s ta r ted the ser10us and continued ev lopmont of

a t vu lne r b i l l ty of th l r country to

rut re1 0 .n t In

t . 0 tremendous Impol1z1

d e c l d l

-65-

new aM . the

aUon 111 1918. In th t year.

t , t b e . rod lO'ls e t f o r t . . . th Un1ted t te s h d. _ ~ WOUld, i f kept uP. be


37/67

1n u a r

o an iza t ions , modele

w s be un ..j;. " ~ I V ,~ X ? e r enacess r y : f l r s t , the

next, the m nufacture and productio

aa ..Jo.l;llln had to de cnd on the purch ae o f alrpJ. nehlng. s 10

' e l r &n.:lnell abroad. tlhe could not hope -t o


38/67

r u J ~P O L I T I C A L ~ C O N D I T I OIN THE FAR EAST

P o l i t i c a l condi t ions in the P a c i f i c have c hanged g re a t ly in

th e l a s t te n y ea rs . Before th e European ITar, t . e white man dominatedth e Asia t i c contineDt p o l i t i c a l l y, commercially and in a m i l i t a r y way,

t o a much g r e a t e r extent than i s now the caee . Phys ica l ly, should th e

whi te coun t r i e s d e ~ i d eto apply mi l i t a ry forcll in th e a r Eas t , they

a re capab le of ex e r t in g more power now than they were ab le to before

European War. Pro p o r t io n a te ly, vhe w hite people have b e t t e r Armies,

be t te r. A ir Fo rces , an d b e t t e r Navies, b e t t e r means of cons t ruc t ing

war mate r i a l , an d b e t t e r means of applying i t than the Asia t ics

have, inc lud ing Japan .

/ On the o th e r hand, the a t t i t u d e of mind of the white people ,

growing out of war t i r e d n e s s , th e lack of a des i re t o exer t p ressu re

p h y s i c a l l y, and th e growing sent iment amot'lg th e ,. l iI .La 1'ee1'1e of al low -

ing dependencies and formerly sub jec t people t o etermine fo r them-

s e l v e s t h e i r methods of government, have led to a g r e a t weakening

of the whi te man's pres t i ge an d i n i t i a t i v e . Pres t i ge i s a very impor

t a n t t h ing with th e As i a t i c s . The Eas te rn e r s have always aons idered

t hemselves super io r t o the Europeans , mental ly, s p i r i t u a l l y and

b i o l o g i c a l l y. They have bowed only t o th e European m i l i t a r y ower

and ex ce l l en ce in th e sc iences .' -- ,

NeY! condi t i ons re su l t ed rom in t roducing t ro o p s from I n d i a ,14

Ch1na and th e v ar io us p a r t s o f Asia, onAthe European b a t t l e f i e l d s ,

and th e consequent neces s i ty fo r th e~ ....c0untr4:es using them t o g ive

Indo

some guaranty o f g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l autonomy t o th e people o f th o se

countr1es '0 as t o hold t h e i r a l l eg iance dur ing th e War. /

th e Vlar, J ah-


39/67

t h e f or me r c om m er ci al c o n d i t i o n s . The e n t i r e e l i m i n a t i o n , fo r t h e

p r e s e n t a t l e a s t , o f Germany a s a m i l i t a r y power in t h e Southe rn

P a c i f i c , and o f Ruse ia in t h e Nor the rn P a c i f i c , h as a ls o d is tu rb e d

t h e o l d . b a l a n c e .

The g r e a t w h i t e powers t h a t s t i l l m a i n t a i n a f o o t h o l d in t h e

Fa r E a s t are England, France and t h e United S t a t e s . While Hol land

c a n n o t be c on sid ere d a s a g r e a t power on t h e c o n t l n e n ~Europe ,

h as a t r emen d o u s c o l o n i a l empire in t h e F ar E a s t . ~ ~ { i e f te x t e n d s from

n o r t h t o so u th fo r a d i s t a n c e o f twe lve hundred m i l e s and from e a s t J t

t o wes f o r ~ c ~ e :t housand m i l e s . J : r ~ 1 .~ V~ Th e combined p o p u l a t i o n s o f t h e c o un tr i e s i n t h e F a r E a s t b e l o n g -in g t o t h e w ~ i t epowers alsfi8 amount t o more t h a n one q u a r _ e r o f t h e~ ' 1 1

p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e ~ w o r l d . ~ A m o n ga l l o f t h e s e n a t i v e peop le t h e r e i s

g r e a t p o l i t i c a l u n r e s t ~ ~ ~ i lo f t h e a g i t a t i o n a ims a t e xp el l i n g t h e

Whi te s from dominion ove r t h m. I t t a k e s d i f f e r e n t forms i n d i f f e r e n t

p l a c e s . I n I n d i a and t he P h il ip p in e s, i t i s done open ly and a i r e d i n

t h e l o c a l p r e s s . In t h e Dutch E a s t I n d i e s and i n ~ r e n c hI n d o - C h in a ,

i t i s c a r r i e d on s e c r e t l y and behind c l o se d d o o r s . In China , i t i s

pushed by t h e d e f a c t o governmen

I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h e d i f f e r e n t sys tems o f c o l o n i a l ad

m i n i s t r a t i o n adop ted by E ng la nd , H olla nd and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n

t h e i r f a r E a s t e r n p o s s e s s i o s .

r ~ T h eB r i t i s h o r i g i n a l l y a r r i v e d i n I n d i a se e k i n g commerc ia l g a i n~ and d ro v e o u t t h e Dutch and P o r tu g u e s e who had a rr i v ed t h e r e ahead o f

t h e They came a s armed t r a d e r s and a l l t h e i r d e v e l o p m ~ n tw as w i t h

t h e v 1 . . o f t u r t h e r i n g commerce With t h e mother c o u n t r y . I n c a r r y i n gt , ~ 1 beoame a l l i e d t o one a f t e r a n o t h e r o f t h e I n d i a n p r i n c i -

-2 -


40/67

In o rde r to fu r th e r t h e i r t r ade an d crea te a favorable im

p ress io n among the Indian coun t r i e s , the English i n t e r f e r e d as l i t t l e

a s PosFible with th e n a t iv e customs, r e l ig o n s an d cond i t ions . As

long as peace continued and t r ade was no t i n t e r r u p t e d , the B r i t i s h

al lowed matte rs to take t h e i r own course in I n d i a . I t became impera

t ive ,however, t o extend t h e i r p o l i t i c a l dominion in order t o hold

the t r a d e , an d with in th ree hundred years, th e au thor i ty of Great

B r i t a i n had been ex ten de d over the whole of Ind ia . Only recen t ly

has any a t t empt been made t o educate the people accord ing to European

s t an d a r and t o t each them the pr inc ip l e s of s e l f government accord-

ing t o th e system of the Common Law. I t i s a se r ious ques t ion

~ e r or not t h i s i s a good th ing fo r I n d i a .In marked c o n t r a s t t o th e Br i t i sh p o l i t i c a l method in Ind i a

Dutch syctem. The Dutch, in t h e i r East I n d i e s , took over th e

manner of h and ling th e SUbject popula t ion which had been ex e rc i sed by

th e former Hindoo r u l e r s . This was to exac t compulsory l ab o r from th e

peop le held in s u b j e c t i o n . By r equ i r ing t h a t a l l th e people deve op

i r r i g a t i o n . prepare arab le ground, p lan t t r e e s and otherY/ise augment,~h e a g r i c u l t u r a l resources of the cO'Jntry. a tremendous,development

~ w v t 1I t must be re me mber ed . however, t h a t t h i s wasAforced

l abo r. p r a c t i c a l l y s lavery. The Government monopolized a l l of th e

t r a d e and would not encourage , t o an apprec iab le e x t e n t , the i ~ i

g r a t i o n o f whi tes from the mother country. Everything was conducted

as a Government monopoly from which th e mother coun t ry an d Government~ ' "~ 0' ""

der ived th e p r o f i t . The wonderful co n d i t io n of Java todaY0is a r e s u l t

Ohamme"ans

!W Spaniards who used th e meth::xJ.s o f th e

- 3 -

o f t.h&t sJs t

P h i l i p p i n e s . the people were fo rc ib ly conver ted t o


41/67

in prose ly t ing che countr J . The people were "made t o go to church,

made t o say t h e i r prayers , an d made t o conform to the Spanish p o l i t i -

c a l organ iza t ion . This syEtem was picked up and c a r r i e d on by th e

United Sta t e s , andwe

havec o n e i n U e d ~ y

r equ i r ing compulsory educat i o n , compulsory governmental organ iza t ion an d compulsory f ranchise

~ t h pa r t of th e people .Of th e t h ree d i ff e r e n t sYFtems, each h as ad van tag es an d d i s -

advantages . From an a l t r u t s t i c s tandpoin t , our at tempt t o handle a

s u b j e c t people as we h av e Q on e,a nd our admin i s t r a t ion in th e Ph i l i p

p ines , a re ~ n i q u e .I bel ieve t h a t today the means o f m a in ta in in g

l i f e more near ly meet th e co nd i t ion s of th e people in th e Ph i l i p

p ines than in an y o th e r p lace . They have plen ty o f food, they have

p r o t e c t i o n fo r t h e i r l i v e s an d proper ty an d t h e i r t a x e s are extreme

ly low, lower in fac t than in an y country in th e Eas t .

The o th r co lon ia l powers in the Far ~ a s t lOOK wi th grea t

i n t e r e s t an d apprehension u p ~ nwhat th e United s t a t e s does wi th the

P h i l i p p i n e s . I f independence i s accorded t o th e P h i l i p p i n e s , i t w i l l

s o e nc ou ra ge th e people o f Ind ia and th e people o f the Dutch posses s -

i o n s , n s r t i c u l a r l y, t h a t se r ious r e s u l t s are expected , because with

such an example before them t h e i r people would never s top a g i t a t i n g .

Behind a 1 t h is p o li t i c a l unres t s ta nd s J ap an , who unquest ion

a1llly cont inues her propaganda of "Asia fo r th e A sia tic s" everywhere,

because with Occiden ta l n a ti on s e lim i na te d, Japan vould reap th e wholeCOlDJllE-rc i a l reward .

A ll A sia tic s now look on America as th e one whi te na t ion which

w i l l be ab le above a l l o t h ~ r st o a s s e r t i t s e l f on t h e western s ide o f

t h e a o 1 t l o . England has always held t h a t p os it io n h er et o reo Since

of t h e Anglo-Japanese t r e a t i e E , t h e B r i t i s h and Ameri

average~ s i a t i c

as very mu

toen ne s a m ~PEo


42/67

Mil i t a ry ,c; ,ndit ione in th e Far East an d among a l l th e VI i t e

c ;,u ntr ie e a re qu i t e s i m i l a r. They occupy t h e i r r espec t ive d o m a ~ n sTIith

ground , a i r and naval forces for the purpose of keeping th e i n h a b i t a n t s

uhder ..control 'cand fo r r epe l l ing ex te rna l invas1on:fffhere i s no i n t e n t

o r purpo e a t presen t on th e pa r t o f one w i t e na t ion to t ake away

from another V I ~ i t enat ion i t s t e r r i t o r i a l pos eas ions in the Far E a s t .

~ Al Western nat ions look w it h a pp re he ns io n a t t e r i s

have comparat ively l i t t l e value fo r repe l l ing nvas ion an d) , - - '

e Ilnd

m t a r y p o . f r of Japan . Japan ' s t o ~ a lmil i t a ry s t rength i s grow ng

c o n s t a n t l y, and ehe i s r e l a t i v e l y s t ronger in a l l ways than she has

ever been 1n h er h i s to r y.

Ch n a ' s enormoue mumber of eo ld i e r s are f i t on y fo r domestic

l e s s fo r an offens ive campaign aga ins t any o ther power.

China, now p r a c t i c a l l y separated in to th ree p r in c ip a l p a r t s

and many sm all ones , exe r t s l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l i nf lu en ce o u ts id e o f i t s

Owncon f ines . Commercially,however, and b i o l o g i c a l l y, i t s e ff e c t s

t r e ~ e n C o u Ean e i s being cons tan t ly extended, not only i n th e south

and across th e equator, but i n the nor th c l e a r up to the Arct ic 6 i r c l e .

Th e f a l l i n g a p a r t o f th e sovere ign a t h o r i t y in China has l e f t no

re spons ib l e head of th e country with whom white na t ions can d e a l ,

wi th t ~ e r e s u l t t h a t t r e a t i e s an d t r e a t y r i g h t s a re not r e s ~ e c t e d ,

nor can fo re igne rs demand from the p resen t Government p r o t e c t i o n anc

have i t accorded them as was the case f i f t e e n year s ago. This aga ln

d imin i shes th e p r e s t i g e of th e w ~ i t eman

. . ~ ~ S l a m ,t ~ e only abso lu te m o n a r c ~ yl e f t i n th e worl tOday, wi th

~ e exoept1on o f th e smal l count ry of Sarawak in Borneo, i s ext remelytavorable ropeans. Wedged i n between th e B r i t i s h in the S t r a i t s

. . ~ , r ~ . n c h1n Indo-China , an d a f r a i d o f Japanese domlna_ ~ J


43/67

o f

ch o o l s .

e i r p i l o t s

of making t h e i r own a mu-

l e s an d a r t i l l ry

e n t i ~ nt o t h e i r a i r fo rce .

i s taken in a via tio n.

grea t d ea l

inc ludes Burma, has an exce l l en t an d anc ien t

i s based on the p r i n c i p l e o f having s u f f i c i e n t

Observat ion D

Th Siamese re now

ve given'y

Howitzers in the ar ena l s .

, an d a g r e a t e a l of

n i t i o n

They have

The a i

and Chinese absorp t ion from the nor th , i t has comparat ively l i t t l e

~ o l i t i c a lor mi l i t a ry p o te n t i a l i t y in th e Eas t .

Siam mainta ns a mi l i t a ry force fo r th e p u r ~ o s eo f keeping her

own ~ o , u l a t i o nt r a n q u i l and t h e o r e t i c a l l y for r epe l l ing invas ion .

Serv ice i s supposed t o be un ive rsa l and ob l iga to ry. There are about

t h i r t y f ive thousand men cons tant ly under arms and a out s ix ty percen t

o f th e males of mi l i t a ry age have p as se d t hr ou gh the Army.

a r t l l e r y c ~ n s i s t sof t h r e e - i ch guns in the hands of t ro op s

t ro o p s in In d ia i t s e l f t o mainta in th e au thor i ty o f England, t o re p e l

I. J ~ I n d i a , which~ m i l i t a r ysys tem. I t

/invas ion both on th e nor thern f r o n t i e r an d along th e seacoas t , an d t o

organ ize a d d i t i o n a l t roops when necessa y fo r se rv ic e o u ts id e o f I n d i a .

Th e Ind ian Army c o n s i s t s of about seventy seven thousand r e g u l a r

B r i t i s h white t roops and about one hundred and e igh ty thousand n a t i v e

t r o o p s .

The white t ro op s a re i n sp lend id aond i t i on , wel l commanded, wel

ot t icered , and well equipped . A ll a r t i l l e r y , a r se n a l s and supply p o i n t

. 1 I I I .. . , ta , \ t I I .. 4 :_ a t whi te t r o o p s .

t roops , reorgan ized s ince th e War, have lOst most-1 . . -


44/67

of t h e i r o ld pro fes s iona l o ff i ce r s , and neVi 'men, more o r l e s s unfami l i a r

w i th c on di ti on s in Ind ia are on duty with them. Inetead of having. ,Who eAuni ts come from p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l i t i e s or s ingle t r i b e s , d i f f e r e n t

se c t s an d cas t e s compose the severa l companies in th e b a t t a ions . I

t h ink t h a t th e Indian nat ive t roo ps are no t p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f i c i e n t

and t h e i r l oya l ty in case of domestic d is tu r rance i s ques t ionab le .

I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o sse how the presen t p o l i t i c a l u n res t in

Ind i a , designed to shake o f f the Br i t i sh yoke, can become a m i l i t a r y

problem. U nless th e n ative t roops d e s e r t the Br i t i sh standard and

r a l l y around some po ten ta te , they can accomplish l i t t l e . Even then ,,

Without ou ts ide ass i s t ance , they could no t overcome the B r i t i s h

t r ops . The maintenance of t r a n q u i l i t y , t h e r e f o r e , a t presen t ,

i s a po l ice problem . The cu t t i ng down of the number of white t roops

in In d ia undoubtedly would r e s ~ l tin se r ious consequences.

n e r a l . Simi la r

i s a separa e arm

f r o n ~ i e r san d t o be usedo protec

I t i s not quip ed t o r e s i s t th e a t t a c k o f

a:ny la rge power.

y

a i r fo rces

The a i r fo r e in In d ia i s e l l

t o th e Army

aga in s t

under an A ir V

The S t r a 1 t s Se t t l em en t s , another v al ua bl e E n gl is h p o ~ s e 5 s i o ~on ta in & Q 8 U t elxt.oJ flull " I l l l l ' l I e l ' l ~of th e world I s t i n supply, a g r e a t

d e a l o f th e ru bb er s up ply , and th e i s l and of Singapore, which a t th e

p r e s e n t tim e 1s th e c o n t r o l l i n g s t a a t e g i c a l naval pos i t ion fo r a l l

ocean b ~ n dt r a f f i c between Europe and Asia . As an a i r base , an

un in t e r rup t ed a i r l i n e c ~ l dbe es t ab l i shed from Singapore along

t h e Pa c i f i c i s l a n d s o t f th e co as t o f Asia c l e a r t o th e Pen insu la o f

hos t 11

' V

t cros8ing more than s ix ty t o e ig hty m iles of wate r

B r i t i 8 h have begun th e cons t ruc t ion o f an

'1-


45/67

a i r and n a v a l s t a t i o n a t t h i s p ~ i n t .\ ~ i l ea p p r o p r i a t i o n s fo r t h e

deve lopment o f t h e base have been i n t e r r u p t e d from t ime t o t i m e by

p o l i t i c a l changes i n England , a g r e a t d e a l h a s a l r e a d y been accom

p l i s h e d . The l a n d fo r t h e v a r i o ~ ss t a t i o n s h as been t u r ne d o v e r t o

t h e B r i t i s h G ove rnm ent, an a c e r t a i n amount o f c l e a r ~ n gh as been

done a t b o t h t h e A ir an Naval s t a t i o n s . D i v i l d ry docks a l r e a d y

e X i s t , w _ch have abou t t h i r t y f o u r f e e t o f w a t e r on t h e s i l l .

A number o f f u e l o i l d e p o t s ~ i t hp ip es c on ne ct i ng them a re now i n

o p e r a t i o n , a l s o s e v e r a l ammuni t ion d e p o t s , and a l a r g e r a dio

s ta t i o n , i n s t a l l e d a s h ~ r tt ime a g o .

I n c a se o f h o s t i l i t i e s , Singapore i s v e ry w e l l equ ipped a t

t h e p r e s e n t t ime t o f u l f i l l t h e f unc t ions o f a n a v a l and a i r b a s e .

o f

o n t h e . The. t r

s ma l l

t o l a s t ab u tmmu n i t i

en and have

r

t h e i n t e i o r . ' 01 r':;--w..'VU V ~

0 ~ h ec e n t e r o f Dutch a c t i v i t i e s { i s i n th e i s l a n d o f J a v a . f h e

,V m i l i t a r y f o r c e s a r e organ ized t o c o n t r o l th e n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n s and{ j = ~

t o o f f e r r e s i s t a n c e t o an e x t e r n a l a t t a c k . ~ f l 8 ~ A t P g g ~ SCODs1st o f t I l !A tiAJ. ~ ~ I

a l ; l s ! s R Q w l t h a t g t a l ~ ~ b o u ttw e n ty t h o u ~ a n dmen T h e i a r t _ l e r y

r e e - i n c r i f l e s and h h o w i t z e r s ,

t r o o p s a r e a l l o f f i c e r e d by w h i t e s and t h e r a n k i n g non-commiss ioned

o f f i c e r s a r e w ~ i t emen. The r a n k s a r e r e c r u i t e d from t h e f i g h t i n gr r ~

t r i b e ~f o r t h e mes t p a r t from t h e C e l e b e s . These me n a ~ e v e ry much

11ke o u r ow n ~ o r o si n t h e P h i l i p p i h e s . me n

co:! td be tUR'ec1 ou t in c , e A o f wer--. T h e s , < - _ y , , ~ ' f ' 1

two , r a I n e d


46/67

a p i l o t ' s

ns of e m e - ~ ~.. . '

~n e i t h e ra i r forces nor ground forces are su f f i c i e n t t o re s iE t an i n v a ~on

of a f i r s c l a s s power.

T ~ e Dutch Is land of Natuna, capable of grea t d e v e l o ~ m e n tas

an a i r an naval s t a t i o n , absolu te ly cont ro ls he S t r a i t s of Malacca.

f ea r i t s seizure by the Japanese a t the s l i g h t e s t provoca t ion .

Japan ' s power unquest ionably i s growmng t ronger cons t an t ly, and

p o l i t i c a l , commercial and t e r r ~ t o r i a lfoothold upon th e con t inen t

of Asia i s becoming more secure . In sp1te of th e d1ff i c I t i e s conncct -

ed with ~ h e i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of her count ry, she i s develop1ng new

f i e l 9 fo r h er coomerce and c r e a t i . g s ~ . p l yp o in ts fo r ~ a t e r i a l swh_ch

she l a cks , such as i ron a d o i l . These t h ings make h er more and more

independent of outs ide ass i s t ance , e i t h e r p o l i t i c a l , commercial orm i l i t a r y.

The s i z e an d condi t ion of th e Japanese Army i s wel l known.

T ~ e yhave about tw o hundred an d f i f t y thousand men under arms, with

a t o t a l o f about two mi l l i on t r a ined men. Their armament i s g e t t i n g

a l i t t l e o l d . I t i s abou t tw enty year s now s ince they were equipped

with t h e i r p r e s e n t weapons. A ll of t h e i r m a t e r i e l i s w earing o ut a t

abou t th e same t ime so t h a t a considerably o u t ~w i l l be r equ i red

Conditions in the Pacific

Documents

Transcript of Conditions in the Pacific