CODESRIA INTERNATIONAL COLLQUIUM

LUSOPHONIE IN AFRICA: HISTORY, DEMOCRACY AND INTEGRATION

28-30 APRIL 2005, LUANDA, ANGOLA

THE INTERNAL AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS OF THE CYCLE OF WAR AND PEACE

IN GUINEA-BISSAU.

ALEXANDER K. D. FREMPONG

kaadupong2002@yahoo.co.uk

Introduction

A common feature of post-Cold War conflicts in Africa has been the tendency for

what begins as an internal conflict to assume regional dimensions. The crisis in

Guinea-Bissau, which sparked off in June 1998, is no exception. Indeed that crisis

was never truly internal. The very trigger of the conflict - the dismissal of military

Chief of Staff Ansumane Mane for allegedly smuggling arms to the Cassamance

rebels - was regional in nature. The Gambian roots of Mane, the intervention of

Senegal and Guinea without ECOWAS’ consent, and the fact that the crisis in Guinea-

Bissau became the third leg of ECOWAS’ peacekeeping ‘tripod’ are all other

manifestations of the regional dynamics of the crisis. Over the past six years, this

former Portuguese colony has alternated between war and peace, between

constitutional rule and military adventurism, which on several occasions forced

ECOWAS leaders to dip deep into their conflict management toolkit to come out

with solutions.

Relative to its Portuguese counterparts in Southern Africa, Angola and

Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau appeared peaceful until mid 1998; but there is no

doubt that the deep roots of the current crisis can be found in its colonial history, its

1

war of liberation and the trajectories of its post-colonial past. The story of Guinea-

Bissau is that of an African country, which decolonised through armed struggle,

subsequently went through various phases of socialist-inspired state planned

development policies under a single party system until circumstances forced it to

liberalize its economy in the 1980s and a decade later, its politics is (Rudebeck

2001:10). Its military exemplifies that institution’s janus-faced role in Africa as

leaders of the democratic struggle and destabilizers of democratic governance. And

more significant for our purposes here, the Guinea-Bissau case is also a typical

example of how lack of internal good governance led to instability with regional

ramifications

This work examines the cycle of war and peace and its regional implications against

a historical sketch of Guinea-Bissau and in the process also assesses the

effectiveness or otherwise of the ECOWAS conflict management mechanism. It

concludes by distilling lessons from both the experiences of Guinea-Bissau and

ECOWAS.

The paper is organised into the following sections. This introduction is followed by a

brief theoretical discourse on internal conflict and regional intervention to provide

basis for analysis. The next two sections examine the background to, and the causes

and dynamics of, the civil war. The involvement of regional neighbours and

ECOWAS as a body in the management of the crisis is then given critical analysis.

The section that follows examines the various phases of Guinea-Bissau’s post

conflict governance and the regional responses to each of them. The rest of the

paper is devoted to distilling Lessons and Conclusion

Aspects of Intra-State Conflict and Regional Intervention

Sahnoun (1996: 89-96) argues that internal conflicts find a common root in

insecurity based on factors such as the perceived threats of starvation or the

prospects of exclusion and fragility through diminishing access to resources. This

basic insecurity gives rise to a variety of types of conflict. In states that lack a strong

2

sense of national unity, insecurity may coalesce around ethnic divisions and give

rise to ethnic conflicts; or it may become focused along religious differences and

spark off religious violence. Issues left over from the colonial past and lately the

Cold War have also provided crises around which larger conflicts develop. Some

other forms of insecurity express themselves directly as socioeconomic grievances,

and demand for social injustice. And in the perceived absence of non-violent avenue

for change, demands for justice may turn violent. Sahnoun argues further that the

increasing tendency of such insecurity to erupt into overt conflict itself points to a

‘governance deficit’. Governments at both local and national levels are unable or

unwilling to give adequate and effective response to issues of insecurity. Often

governments actually aggravate insecurity, as for instance, when the political elite

seek to protect particular economic and political interests, even if this would result

in an increase in existing local ethnic, religious or social tension (Ibid: 93).

The above argument, no doubt is a useful starting point, and there is general

consensus that violent conflicts reflect a structural crisis of institutions mediating

conflicting interests and access to resources, citizenship and nationhood (Hussein &

Gnisci 2003: 7). But the sources of conflicts in Africa are complex and multifaceted,

involving many actors and thus making it impossible to reduce them to a single

cause or source; local, national, regional and international forces combine to fuel

every war on the continent (Rugumamu 2002). These causes are often broadly

grouped into structural and trigger factors. The structural factors are the root cause

or imbalance of opportunities and include political, social and economic patterns

such as state repression, lack of political participation, poor governance

performance, the mal-distribution of wealth, ethnic make up of society, and the

history of inter-group relations. These factors increase a society’s vulnerability to

conflict. The accelerating or triggering factors, on the other hand, often consist of

developments or events that bring underlying tensions to the forefront and cause

the situation to escalate – a new radical ideology, increased or renewed incidence of

political repression, sharp economic shocks, changes in or collapse of central

authority, new discriminatory policies, external intervention or weapon

3

proliferation. Sometimes, the trigger may have as much to do with the demagoguery

and personal ambitions of the initiator as with any underlying injustice, but the

bloody and bitter fighting alter almost irrevocably relationships within the society

(Ibid). In the context of Guinea-Bissau, it is clear that while the dismissal of Mane

triggered off the crisis, it had its roots deep in the country’s history

The regional dimensions of contemporary internal conflicts are now widely

accepted. While each conflict may have specific local or national dimensions and

causes, there are always undeniable cross-border linkages through the flow of

involuntary migrants, links, between political elites and rebels groups in

neighbouring states, involvement of regional powers and often illicit flow of

weapons, goods and natural resources like diamonds, gold and timber, what is

describe as the political economy of war (Hussein & Gnisci 2003: 6).

Thus, while the immediate triggers of conflict may not be regional in character,

there are various transmission mechanisms through which conflict can spread

throughout a region. Particularly in Africa, national borders are porous and do not

stop violence and disorder from the spreading through cross border solidarity

between local populations and strategic alliances between conflict actors. A conflict

system then develops with interconnectedness at local, national and regional

levels(Ibid). In this study however, the regional dimension was even more direct,

the very trigger was linked to alleged arms sales to the separatist movement of a

next-door neighbour.

Generally, international organizations were reluctant to intervene in domestic

conflicts, largely in deference to non interference in domestic affairs of member

states until post Cold War conflicts radically changed that. The attendant refugee

flows and threats to regional stability and the extent of humanitarian disaster have

all forced regional bodies in particular to intervene in these so called ‘new wars’ or

‘internationalized internal conflicts’ (Frempong 1999)

4

The literature on regional intervention in intrastate conflicts highlights the

potential, as well as the inherent contradictions in such an endeavour. Northedge

and Donelan (1971: 245) justify regional intervention on the ground that states in a

particular region are better acquainted with the problems and characteristics of the

area and better able to understand the motives and pressures which impel the

conflicting parties; and therefore, are in a better position to know the kind of

settlement which stands a better chance of being viable. But Meyers (1974: 345-

373) is of the view that the mere existence of similarities of interests, problems and

loyalties are not sufficient to guarantee success if the conflict management capacity

of the regional organization is weak.

Amoo (1993: 247) paints a bleaker picture. In his view, ‘in any particular conflict

situation that attracts regional intervention; member-states invariably have their

own separate and often conflicting agendas’. (Ibid) As a result, conflict dynamics and

mediatory processes become more complex and intractable particularly when

‘member-states in pursuit of incompatible goals proffer moral and military support

to parties in conflict’ (Ibid). Stedman (1997: 570) confirms this view with the

argument that in regional efforts at halting internal conflicts end up prolonging the

wars because ‘they transform wars that would have ended quickly with one side

winning into protracted stalemates.’ It should be interesting how the intervention

of Senegal and Guinea and ECOWAS impacted on Guinea-Bissau

But Salim (1990: 175-190) draws attention to the other side of the story. He

emphasizes that regional mediation in internal conflicts is a sensitive issue and that

some internal conflicts are so complicated that they do not lend themselves to easy

resolution regardless of the credentials and efforts of the mediators. This is

especially so in cases where the personalities involved see the resolution of a given

conflict linked to their political future; or when the conflict involves so deep

emotional feelings that it becomes an exercise in futility to try to advance reasoned

5

arguments. This perhaps explains why the Mane forces, defying the Abuja Accord

and ECOMOG presence, ousted Vieira.

Wilson examines the military effectiveness of regional peace operations. He

indicates that by virtue of their institutionalized form, it is often thought that

regional organizations would enjoy more military infrastructures which would

make them more effective in peace operations.(Wilson 2003: 96) But in practice

regional bodies do not possess military capabilities other than those which their

members may choose to combine for action on ad hoc basis. And if the organization

happens to be, like in the case of ECOWAS, one in which the militaries of the

member states are themselves ill equipped, their combined capacity becomes very

limited indeed. This has been the lot of ECOWAS in all the conflicts it has intervened

in, a situation which became more manifest in Guinea-Bissau.

Wilson (2003:100) further argues that a real danger can rise in situations in which

the regional body is so much under the domination of a single state in respect of

which there are suspicion as to whether it can be trusted to act in conformity with

the objectives of the organization. In this direction, the absence of Nigeria in Guinea-

Bissau is given in-depth analysis.

Multiparty mediation, like it occurred in Guinea-Bissau, has its prospects and

challenges. On the positive side, multiparty mediation, by providing alternative

channels may allow stalled talks resolve or may serve to develop support for

already negotiated options.(Crocker, Hampson & Aall 1999:9). But it also poses

problems of ‘managing complexity, co-ordinating the use of comparative

advantages, maximising leverages, avoiding crossed wires and conflicting agendas,

and maintaining coherence’(Ibid: 19) Not surprisingly, the organisation of

multiparty mediation has been likened to seeking the cooperation of cats. Like cats,

independent third parties rarely feel any obligation or even a desire to cooperate

and they retain the ability to move away from mediation or to launch competing

initiatives. (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2001: 501-502). This work demonstrates

how relations between ECOWAS and the Council of Portuguese Speaking Countries

6

(CPLP) in Guinea-Bissau captured both the good and the bad in multiparty

mediation.

Background to the Crisis

The West African state of Guinea-Bissau shares borders with its French name-sake,

Guinea-Conakry (Republic of Guinea) and Senegal; has a geographical size of 36,000

square kilometres and a population of between one and one and half million. There

are about 22 ethnic groups with traditional political systems ranging from the

relatively centralised patrilineal states in the interior, Fula and Mandinga, to the

acephalous states on the coast, Banlanta, Manjako and Pepel; and on the archipelago

(Bijagos, Cocoli and Pajendinca); with a sizeable proportion of mixed descent.

Although endowed with rich and extensive fishing grounds and reserves of as yet to

be exploited natural resources including bauxite, phosphate and petroleum, Guinea-

Bissau is one of the poorest countries in Africa and in effect the world (Mekenkamp

1999). This diversity and economy restraint have played their respective roles in

the crisis, but the deep roots lie in Guinea Bissau’s political history.

From Colonial Rule to Immediate Post-Independence Era

European influence in Guinea-Bissau began with the Portuguese explorers arriving

in mid 1400s, attracted by the rivers and their potential as trading routes to the

interior. In 1446, Portuguese seafarer Nuno Tristao made claim of Guinea-Bissau for

Portugal, a claim that was upheld at the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885 at which

Africa was shared among the European powers. But effective colonial rule began

only from the 1920s. Colonial rule under the Portuguese was harsh and brutal, a

regime of forced labour and primitive taxation controlled by Cape Verdean

administrators (ISS Fact File).

In 1951, Guinea-Bissau was declared an overseas territory of Portugal and this

together with the stubborn refusal of the Portuguese to grant independence

peacefully inevitably led to war. In 1956, Amilcar Cabral founded the African Party

7

for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which became the heart of

African nationalist resistance. It was therefore an important milestone on the road

to independence. Peaceful efforts to attain independence were pursued until the end

of 1962 when a guerrilla war was declared and waged by PAIGC until early 1970s.

Arms and military training were obtained from the Communist bloc, particularly,

the Soviet Union and East Germany, as well as Cuba. The protracted war culminated

in the unilateral declaration of independence in 1973, the downfall of the fascist

dictatorship in Portugal in 1974, and the hasty dismantling of the Portuguese

empire (Ibid).

The PAIGC’s founder, Amilcar Cabral, had been described as ‘one of Africa’s most

revolutionary leaders’, who led ‘the most complete political and military success

ever achieved by an African political movement against colonial rule’ (Chabal 1983:

Back Cover). In 1972, Amilcar had formed a People’s Assembly in preparation for

independence but he was assassinated in January 1973. His assassination, months

before independence, by a disgruntled former close associate (Wikipedia), marked

the beginnings of Guinea-Bissau’s post-independence political woes. It set a bad

precedent which would be repeated (albeit not always with fatalities) in 1980 and

1998/99 when disgruntled former associates would remove the head of state. It also

created suspicion within the party that would never be fully overcome. His Cape

Verdean co-founder, Aristede Pereiera, succeeded him and led the transition to the

unilateral declaration of independence in September 1973. The April 1974

Portuguese coup led to the recognition of Guinea-Bissau’s independence that same

year and Cape Verde’s in 1975. The PAIGC oversaw the government in both states

with Luis Cabral, Amilcar’s half brother and Aristide Pereira as the respective first

presidents. In the process PAIGC had set the precedent as the only single party

holding power in two countries simultaneously.

This pre-independence history bequeathed tensions to the newly independent state

that had continued to bedevil its political and socio-economic life. Ethnic rivalry

particularly between indigenous Guineans citizens and those of Cape Verdean

8

descent, lack of investment in economic infrastructure and a strong tradition of

resistance to authoritarian governance have all contributed to the post

independence struggles of Guinea-Bissau (ISS Fact File).

After a decade of bloody struggle, hopes were high that genuine political and

economic independence would be achieved. But politics was quickly monopolised

by the ruling PAIGC which became increasingly authoritarian in its effort to exercise

control over its party rank and file and the population in general. It described itself

as ‘the supreme expression of the sovereign will of the people’ and banned all

organised political activities falling outside its control. An active national police

ensured that dissent was effectively stifled. The security forces of President Luis

Cabral’s government executed about a hundred individuals suspected of

collaboration with the Portuguese regime. In 1975, those suspected of complicity in

a failed coup attempt were similarly executed (Mekenkamp 1999; ISS File). But in

1980, General Bernardo Vieira, liberation war hero who had also held various

positions since independence, led a mutiny and overthrew President Luis Cabral

(ISS Fact File). Luis was arrested and detained for 13 months before he was exiled

first to Cuba and later France where he stayed till 1999, after the ouster of Vieira

from power (Wikipedia)

The Vieira Era

Vieira’s assumption of office in 1980 effectively ended any ideas about union with

Cape Verde (See details later). It also did not in any appreciable way improve the

style of governance. Vieira maintained a firm grip of power. After four years of

unconstitutional rule through a military-dominated revolutionary council, (but still

in the name of PAIGC), constitutional rule was restored in 1984 leading to one party

election that year and in 1989. Over the period, tensions among black Guinean

ethnic groups assumed greater and worse proportions. Agitation, particularly

among the majority Balanta ethnic group, about a third of the national population,

led to a series of attempted coups in the 1980s. The most serious occurred in 1985

led, reminiscent of Vieira’s own 1980 coup, by Vice President Colonel Paulo Coreira.

9

He and five of his close associates were later executed, an action which would come

back to haunt Vieira when the rebellion began in 1998 (ISS Fact File).

Vieira had pursued a policy of accelerated economic liberalization under a World

Bank /IMF Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) and the resultant devaluation and

austerity measures heightened opposition to Vieira(ISS Fact File). In addition, the

hard-line PAIGC ideologues and liberation war veterans saw such policies as a

dilution of Amilcar Cabral’s ideals. As a result, groupings emerged within the PAIGC

in the late 1980s to join the increasing international pressure for multi-party

democracy. Vieira grudgingly accepted the principle in 1990, but the form of the

political liberalization was determined exclusively from by the PAIGC and entirely

directed from the top. After a national PAIGC conference in October 1990, the

National Assembly in May 1991 approved constitutional amendments for a multi-

party system. In 1992, a wide variety of opposition parties emerged and opposition

demonstrations were allowed for the first time. But because neither Vieira nor the

PAIGC was genuinely interested in the transformation, multi-party elections were

repeatedly postponed until July 1994 (Ostheimer 2001; ISS Fact File).

The opposition parties lacked the cohesion to win the first multi-party elections. The

PAIGC secured nearly two-thirds majority (62 out of 100) in the National Assembly

but, as a demonstration of his dented popularity, Vieira only managed a narrow and

somewhat dubious second ballot victory (ISS Fact File). The revelation of 1994 and

more significant for the future of Guinea-Bissau, however, was Kumba Yala, who

contested Vieira in the run-off. A teacher by profession and a PAIGC ideologue, he

had formed the Party for Social Renewal (PRS) in 1992 in protest to the perceived

deviation of the PAIGC under Vieira from the ideals of the founding fathers. Yala in a

photo finish run-off was narrowly defeated 48%-52% (Mekenkamp 1999).

PAIGC National Secretary Saturnino de Costa was appointed Prime Minister after

the 1994 elections and led a government widely criticised for economic

mismanagement and incompetence. In May 1997, Vieira had following student

10

demonstration sacked de Costa. His replacement, Carlos Correira’s appointment had

initially attracted a legal tussle between Vieira and the opposition in Parliament for

lack of consultation, in violation of a constitutional proviso (BDHRL January 1998).

(This same provision would later create problems for Yala also).

At the beginning of 1998, Vieira tried to re-capture his waning popularity and

consolidate his position. He postponed elections scheduled for July to October;

shared key posts among his closest associates and at his party’s congress got himself

also elected the party’s president. This last action however violated the Guinea-

Bissau constitution that prohibited the president of the Republic from holding the

position of president in a political party. These undemocratic actions were criticised

by the opposition and the media (Mekenkamp 1999). It was under these

circumstances that the dismissal of military chief of staff General Ansumane Mane in

June 1998 triggered off rebellion that spread like bush fire across the country. That

effectively plunged Guinea-Bissau into its vicious cycle of instability which is

outlined below.

The Civil War

An exchange of gunfire in Bissau city between soldiers loyal to President Bernardo

Vieira and mutinous soldiers supporting then newly-dismissed Armed Forces Chief

of Staff Ansumana Mane in the early morning of 7 June 1998 heralded the start of

eleven months of civil conflict which led to the eventual end of Vieira’s almost two

decades’ rule (Massey 2004). Since then, political stability in Guinea-Bissau has

become a very scarce commodity indeed.

Causes

The well known trigger of the conflict - Mane’s suspension and subsequent dismissal

over alleged negligence in controlling arms smuggling to the Casamance rebels

(MFDC) in neighbouring Senegal- apparently set the Guinea Bissau crisis into a

11

regional pattern of personal vendetta that characterized the immediate post-Cold

War crises in West Africa. The trigger of the Liberian crisis was a friendship

between then president Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor that had gone sour; Foday

Sankoh led the rebellion again the All People’s Congress(APC) government which

had imprisoned him twenty years earlier for his involvement in an abortive coup.

And in Guinea-Bissau, the two protagonists, Vieira and Mane had been long-time

comrades until the arms smuggling scandal of January 1998 pulled them fatefully

apart.

There is no doubt that Mane had a personal axe to grind with Vieira. As comrades-

in-arms from the liberation struggle, Mane had supported Vieira in his 1980 ouster

of Luis Cabral but any hopes for a political reward had not materialized over

eighteen years; and Mane remained in the military as Chief of Staff until his

suspension in January 1998. Worse still, the reason for his dismissal turned out to

be a preventive strike on the part of Vieira to cover up his personal involvement, or

at least that of his very close associates, in the very scandal of arms trafficking

(Ostheimer 2001; Rudebeck 2001: 23-24). But to analyse the crisis only in terms of

the revenge of a scapegoat would be an oversimplification of a complex issue. There

were several other internal factors.

By 1998 Guinea-Bissau had moved away from the original revolutionary vision of

political society articulated by PAIGC co-founder Aristedes Perreira –‘the model

which our party builds is one in which participation at the base is guaranteed in all

decisions, and at every level, by a democratic organisation and method’(Cited in

Davidson 1981: 165; Massey 2004: 76). A primary reason for the fighting, therefore,

was an irrevocable split in the ruling PAIGC. For instance Mane, in spite of his

support for the deposition the PAIGC founder’s brother, still invoked the long

socialist tradition of Amilcar and felt Vieira had been a sell-out to modern economic

reform (http://www.conflicttransform.net.pdf p.123; Rake 1988). And there were

many like him in the PAIGC particularly among the liberation war veterans who

12

soon lent their support to Mane. Thus, in a sense, it was a structural and/or

ideological conflict among the factions in the ruling party.

For the political opposition, the Vieira government represented a democratic deficit.

Despite its status as a ‘democratically elected government’, it had failed to distribute

power resources to the political elite. The opposition accused Vieira of repeated

violation of the constitution and denounced the impunity of corrupt government

officials. In the years before the war the Vieira government made little attempt to

develop a culture of accountability or to build institutions for the protection of

human rights. In 1998, an Anti-Corruption Committee and a Tribunal had been set

up with no indication on the part of top government officials for respecting them

(Mekenkamp 1999; AFP 9 June 1998; http://www.conflicttransform.net.pdf p.127)

These developments seriously diminished the legitimacy of the regime. Therefore,

when in January 1998, a shipment of weapons from the Bissau army was seized en-

route to Casamance led to the arrest of about twenty low-ranking soldiers and the

fateful suspension of Mane for dereliction of duty, opposition parties in Bissau made

political capital out of it. It cited structural failure in the chain of command in

government and the armed forces and a break down of trust between the two

institutions (Massey 2004:78)

Frustration within the military, as an institution, was an important contributory

factor. Mane had easily succeeded in mobilizing 90% of the soldiers firmly under his

command because the military after supporting Vieira in 1980 was marginalised by

his government. It had lost its funding and privileges and its officers were already

aggrieved by their low salaries and poor conditions of work. Many were using the

proceeds from cannabis smuggling and sale of weapons to the MFDC, which had

long persisted, as a self-financing mechanism (Ostheimer 2001). The Casamancais

had funded their activities by trading cannabis for arms across the Senegal-Guinea-

Bissau border. The Guinea-Bissau army sent to secure the borders are often and

gradually drawn into the lucrative smuggling racket (Rake 1998). But from 1995,

Vieira’s public commitment to fight the rebellion in the cross-border region

13

endangered the lucrative but illegal trade. The strong support for the rebellion

therefore had its roots in the changes in the Guinea-Bissau official policy towards

the Casamance crisis (http://www.conflicttransform.net.pdf p.126).

Not only was the citizenry as a whole disengaged from the Vieira regime but the gap

between state and society had become deeper than before as new hopes and

expectations raised by the process of democratization were quickly dashed. The

situation in Guinea-Bissau by 1998 illustrated the deep gulf between the rhetoric of

commitment to democracy and the actual outcome in terms of national policy. After

continuous deception by various governments since independence, the contrast

between this harsh reality and the promises of the first multiparty election had by

mid 1998 become both unacceptable and unbearable (Rudebeck 2001: 10 & 28).

The frustration and resentment of the ordinary people against the Vieira regime was

captured, with pastoral flavour, by the Bishop of Bissau Settimio Ferrazzetta in

August 1998:

This war reveals a great social sin, obvious since years back. The people

have to react. The people of Guinea-Bissau are peaceful, they know how

to suffer but only up to a certain point… (Delivered at a mass and cited in

Rudebeck 2001: 28)

In addition, as one of the world’s poorest countries Guinea-Bissau had to rely

heavily on external aid but conditionalities from international donors instigated

economic and political liberalisation that somehow affected Vieira’s security of

tenure adversely. Stringent fiscal policies deepened the deprivation of the populace

(Massey 2004: 77).

By mid-1998, therefore, the Vieira government was completely isolated; cut off not

only from its traditional support base in the military and the PAIGC, but also from

the entire society, both civil and political. Thus, while the crisis was ignited by the

arms scandal, it was a manifestation of long kept resentment of the Vieira regime –

one widely perceived as both authoritarian and illegitimate. The arms scandal, then,

14

only provided a catalyst for political dissent, but it turned more violent than any one

could anticipate.

Beside widespread popular disaffection towards Vieira internally, the government’s

foreign policy, particularly its relations with Senegal (as carefully discussed in the

section on regional dimension), added a further key causal factor underlying the civil

war. As Massey (2004: 76) puts it, the Guinea-Bissau crisis ‘sat amidst a web of

[regional] geopolitical split and posturing.’

Dynamics of the War

The conflict displayed interesting internal dynamics of the war up to the coup of

May 1999 that effectively marked the end of the Vieira regime. To begin with, there

were apparent contradictions about the initial perceptions of the crisis. The initial

impression conveyed by international media based on official declarations from

Bissau was that of a mutiny by a few disgruntled soldiers that could in all

probability be quickly quelled but the situation soon became more complex with the

rebellion gaining the support of a large majority of serving military officers and the

liberation war veterans. Viera’s government desperate attempt presented itself as a

democratically elected power with loyalist forces fighting to restore order

increasing fell apart (Rudebeck 2001: 23).

Two days after the outbreak of the 7June violence, Mane self-proclaimed he safe into

existence the ‘Junta Militar’( Military Junta) that demanded dialogue with Vieira,

democratic elections and general improvement in the governments way of doing

things. Political parties opposed to Vieira’s mismanagement supported the rebels

demand for democratic governance. The junta also increasingly won the support of

civil society. But Vieira refused to resign referring to his mandate and insisting he

continued till the end of his term. (http://www.conflicttransform.net.pdf p 127;

Mekenkamp 1999).

15

Politically isolated and abandoned by most of the country’s military, Vieira was

forced to rely on foreign military force. The Senegalese and Guinean intervention

became operational with surprising rapidity. But this rescue operation led to the

paradoxical situation where the government fought with only ten percent of its

forces with support of the foreign troops fighting the ninety percent backed by

veterans of the liberation struggle. The Senegalese troops were reported to have

acted more like a brutal foreign occupying force rather than the army of a legal

government. The hasty intervention and the continued presence of the Senegalese

and Guineans prolonged the war and led to its spread across the country (Ibid).

Significantly, at this initial stage in the crisis, there was no clear ethnic dimension

although many different ethnic groups exist and the cultural images held by

Guineans about themselves are deeply marked by their multiplicity. The lines of

division between those who fought each other were primarily political- for and

against the Vieira regime and the party that had ruled the country since

independence (Rudebeck 2001: 29).

Internal efforts to end the crisis began in the first week with the formation of the

‘Goodwill Commission’ comprising, community leaders prominent individuals and

religious groups led by Bishop Ferrazzetta; but Vieira categorically refused various

mediatory efforts. Instead Vieira adopted a tough stance against the rebellion;

sought and gained ECOWAS’ support (Mekenkamp 1999). The Goodwill Commission

from September also staged ‘Marches for Peace’ and sent petitions to UN and EU to

intervene (Mekenkamp 1999) But it was the parliament of Guinea-Bissau played an

independent and significant role; in the midst of the crisis it functioned as a forum

for the assumption of civilian political responsibility.

As early as the third day of the war, Parliament (National Assembly) adopted a

resolution urging the belligerents to cease fighting immediately and to start

negotiating. Earlier in January 1998, it had taken the bold step of setting up an ad

hoc committee to investigate The National Assembly ordered into the arms

trafficking scandal. Its report was scheduled for mid June 1998 and perhaps if Vieira

16

had not pre-empted it by replacing the suspended Mane, the crisis could have been

averted. Also, at an extraordinary meeting in November 1998, a large majority of

deputies, including many from Vieira’s PAIGC, passed a resolution ‘withdrawing’

parliament’s ‘political confidence in the President’ and demanding the immediate

and unconditional retreat of all foreign troops. It had accused Vieira of violating the

Constitution by calling foreign troops without consulting Parliament. This was a

forceful action in favour of democratic constitutionality. And Vieira never recovered

from this firm challenge to his political and constitutional authority (Rudebeck

2001: 31).

By November 1998, various close neighbours, ECOWAS and CPLP, after initial

difficulties had succeeded in sealing a fragile ceasefire with the Abuja Peace

Agreement. It was in the process of implementing that agreement that the Mane

forces overthrew the Vieira government. An important factor that strengthened

Mane’s hand in that direction was his vindication by the parliamentary committee

report released in April 1999, which indicated that the real culprits in the arms

scandal were high-ranking officers in the presidential security. Indeed, rather than

accusing Mane, the report inferred that Vieira was aware of the trade but was

unable or unwilling to intervene (Massey 2004: 79).

The Regional Dimension

Guinea Bissau is one country whose history and politics are intricately intertwined

in special ways and at different levels with its regional neighbours. It bears a

common name and a history of socialism with its eastern neighbour, Republic of

Guinea; it has a common colonial and immediate-post independence history with

Cape Verde Islands; and bears similar security problems with Senegal in terms of

Cassamance. Also, it has a population half of which are of Senegalese, Cape Verdean,

Guinean, Gambian and Malian origin and shares with Francophone West Africa the

CFA (IRIN, 18 August 1999). And, it was the civil war that brought the focus of the

sub-regional body, ECOWAS on Guinea-Bissau. Under the circumstances, any

17

meaningful analysis of the regional dimensions of the crisis would entail a better

understanding of these special relationships and how this affected their respective

as well as collective roles in the management of the crisis.

Pre-war Regional Neighbour Relations

Bissau-Praia

Guinea Bissau’s relationship with Cape Verde predated Portuguese colonial rule. In

the 18 Century for example, falling farm production forced massive emigration of

Cape Verdeans. At various stages in their colonial history, both colonies had been

ruled together. During the liberation struggle, Cape Verde developed further closer

ties to Guinea-Bissau as a result of the formation of PAIGC in 1956 supported by

both colonies. Amilcar Cabral, the PAIGC’s founder and ideologist, had planned that

the two economically similar countries could fight together for freedom and

development once independence is achieved. And when the liberation war broke up

in the early 1960s in Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verdean patriots joined the fight. (World

Guide, 2001/2002).

The party initially comprised mostly Cape Verdeans in the senior ranks and

mainland Guinean soldiers in the junior ranks. When Amilcar was assassinated in

1973, Aristide Pereira (later the first president of Cape Verde) assumed temporary

leadership of the PAIGC. But Black Guineans, who saw it as an effort to entrench the

political power of the island mesticos, fiercely resisted this, especially after Cape

Verde’s independence in 1975. The first years of post independence politics was

dominated by the undercurrent of this power struggle within the single party

system of the PAIGC. In the 1975-1980 period, Luis Cabral and Aristide Pereira took

steps towards establishing a federation between their two countries; and indeed,

their national assemblies sat together as the Council of the Union(World Guide

2001/2002). Viera’s 1980 coup disrupted negotiations for the federal constitution

as relations between the two states temporally nose-dived. The Cape Verdean

leadership reaffirmed the principles of Amilcar but reshaped the name of its party to

the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) to assert its

18

independence from Guinea-Bissau. Mediation efforts by Angola and Mozambique

had by August 1982 restored relations between the two neighbours and allowed

Vieira to attend the November 1982 conference of ex-Portuguese colonies in Praia,

the Cape Verdean capital. In the process however plans for unification were

abandoned. Relations between the two countries remained cordial even with the

assumption of office of the Movement for Democracy (MPD) with Antonio Monteiro

as president in 1991 (World Guide 2001/2002).

Bissau-Conakry

Ties between the two Guineas were closest in the 1960s and 1970s. The manner in

which Sekou Toure had defied France and wrestled independence for Guinea-

Conakry, was a source of inspiration for the leaders of the PAIGC. In addition, the

ruling Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) like the PAIGC had pursued its own brand

of socialism. It was therefore not surprising that Guinea-Conakry provided a rear

base for the sister-Guinean liberation fighters. In these respects, Guinea was very

much unlike Bissau’s neighbour to the west, Senegal, had not supported the PAIGC

in its liberation struggle. At one stage in the struggle, Portuguese Governor in

Guinea-Bissau, Antonio de Spinola had to invade Conakry to free hundreds of

Portuguese prisoners of war held by the PAIGC. But it was also in Conakry that the

PAIGC met its worst tragedy, the assassination of Amilcar (Wikipedia). Over the

decades, relations had remain cordial as evidenced by the agreement which allowed

Guinea (with Senegal) to intervene in the Bissau’s crisis.

Bissau-Banjul

Near-neighbour Gambia has far more close historical and cultural ties with Guinea-

Bissau than geography alone depicts. The ethnic relations between the Guineans

and the Casamancais of southern Senegal which shares borders with Gambia is one

aspect of this relationship. Like Mane, there are many Guineans who are

descendants of, or themselves first generation, Gambian migrants. There had also

been talks about the ‘sceptre of the 3Bs’- a speculative union between Bissau,

Bignona in Cassamance and Banjul, the capital of Gambia, which has often given

Dakar authorities worries (Massey 2004: 78). Above all, Gambia was supposedly a

signatory to the agreement that brought Senegal and Guinea into Bissau and the

19

varying interpretation of that agreement spiced up the trajectories of the Guinea-

Bissau crisis.

Bissau-Dakar

The most significant and also most controversial of the neighbourly relations,

however, are those with Senegal. And the crux of that relationship is the Casamance

region of southern Senegal which until 1886 when the French took over was under

Portuguese rule (http://www.conflicttransform.net.pdf p.123). The strong affinity

between Guinea-Bissau and Casamance goes well beyond the separatist activities in

the latter region. The two areas share a history in the Mandinka kingdom of Gabu

and culturally they represent ethnic groups such as Balanta, Biafada and Jola and

fluid borders exist between them(Massey 2004:77).

Another dimension of this intriguing relationship was the Guinea-Bissau liberation

war. Officially, the Dakar government had not supported the liberation struggle, but

the PAIGC had tacit support from the Casamancais. Casamance provided PAIGC rear

bases, refuge, safe haven and even fighters during Bissau struggle for independence.

Against this background, relations between Dakar and Bissau since the early 1980s

when the Casamancias MFDC launched its separatist activities, have waxed but

more often waned over Casamance. Naturally, Senegalese mistrust of Guinea-

Bissau’s intentions intensified following the outbreak of secessionist violence in

southern Senegal in 1982.

At the ideological and tactical levels, the MFDC’s demand for self-determination and

guerrilla warfare are akin to the PAIGC’s liberation struggle and conservative

Senegalese have not hesitated to draw those revolutionary parallels. There has also

been the somewhat ‘natural’ tendency on the part of Guinea-Bissau to return the

Casamancais’ earlier favour with provision of bases, arms and moral support. As a

result, Bissau’s frequent reassurances to Dakar have often been taken with

diplomatic pinch of salt. It is, therefore, least surprising that Cassamance triggered

the crisis in Guinea-Bissau.

20

A closely related aspect of the love-hate relationship between the two neighbours

has been border dispute particularly maritime rights over their common,

prospectively oil-rich, waters. In 1 989, this long standing dispute over maritime

border, compounded by Senegal’s military incursion into Guinea-Bissau territory in

pursuit of MFDC rebels, nearly resulted in war and was only resolved in the 1990s

after it was taken for arbitration at the International Court of Justice (ISS Fact File)

The Bissau-Dakar relations also have extra-regional ramifications with Cold War

undertones on the one hand and French-Portuguese rivalries on the other. The pro-

West Senegal, regarded as the bastion of French and western interests in the

western bulge of Africa, was very wary of the socialist inclinations of PAIGC as a

liberation movement. And when the latter assumed office in Bissau, Dakar had

largely perceived their common border as a frontline of the Cold War (Massey 2004:

77). Since the 1990s France and former colonial master, Portugal, have been

competing to extend their respective influence over Guinea-Bissau. From 1995,

France apparently had the upper hand with the admission of Guinea-Bissau into the

CFA monetary zone and Portugal was bidding its time for an opportunity to turn the

tables. This rivalry played a large part in the dynamics of the management of the

Guinea-Bissau of the crisis: France through ECOWAS and Portugal, the CPLP.

The Vieira government had traded its country’s entry into the CFA zone with

increased commitment to support Senegal against the MFDC. This resulted in a

politico-military pact in 1995 which was later extended to Guinea and Gambia. One

result of this rapprochement was the militarization of their common border, to the

extent that by 1998 the MFDC was accusing Guinea-Bissau of lending military

support to Senegal. At the same time, Senegal voiced suspicions that in spite of the

accord, arms continued to flow from Bissau to the MFDC (Massey 2004: 78). Vieira

had sought by Mane’s suspension and subsequent dismissal to calm Senegalese

nerves. But what he had underestimated was how the government’s new policy had

interfered in the lucrative cross border arms trafficking and alienated his military

officers, who as already indicated saw it as a self-financing mechanism.

21

Intervention Strategies of Regional Neighbours

From the foregoing, it was not surprising that the four regional neighbours got

quickly involved in the crisis. The intriguing aspect was the different approaches

they adopted. Senegal and Guinea chose the military option; and Cape Verde and

Gambia, the diplomatic.

The military intervention of Senegal in particular was not unexpected but aspects of

that move were steeped in controversy. First, the rapidity with which Senegal

entered Guinea- Bissau - deploying a contingent of up to 1500 in a matter of days -

smacked of something premeditated. Or were the Senegalese troops in combat

readiness for another operation against the MFDC when the crisis began? Second,

Senegal had circulated to regional governments a diplomatic justification of

humanitarian imperative. But it soon became increasingly clear that the besieged

Vieira had invoked the 1995 pact. Why should Senegal provide a humanitarian alibi

if the ‘secret’ pact made provision for military intervention? Interestingly, Gambia, a

signatory, had insisted that the pact was a collective agreement which did not cover

military intervention in the internal affairs of its signatories.

There was no doubt, however, that that Senegal’s own security concerns were

uppermost in its decision to forcefully intervene in Guinea-Bissau. On the one hand,

if a coup succeeded in Bissau it would strengthen the hand of the Casamance

separatists, and on the other, the situation provided an opportunity for Senegalese

troops to have direct access to MFDC rear bases in Guinea-Bissau with the view of

forging a final military solution in Casamance ( Ostheimer 2001; Massey 2004: 82) .

The Senegalese intervention however proved disastrous. It found itself (together

with Guinea) fighting on the side of a government whose military support had

shrunk to the size of the presidential guard and suffered serious casualties initially.

Instead of dousing the embers of fire, the Senegalese intervention rather inflamed

them. Earlier Senegalese assaults on MFDC bases in Guinea-Bissau had alienated the

Guinean populace. And with their return in support of the unpopular government,

22

they were seen as an invasion force and ‘the biggest impediment to peace

negotiations’ (EIU, Country Report: Guinea-Bissau, Third Quarter, 1998, p.32). The

Senegalese presence also induced the MFDC to fight on the side of the junta forces

(Massey 2004: 79).

Guinea had also intervened apparently on the basis of the controversial pact with up

to 500 troops; but Ostheimer (2001) has suggested that Guinea did that to counter

Senegal’s major role in regional affairs. If this were so, then the conflicting objectives

of the ‘rescue operators’ did not augur well for the unity of purpose that the

situation called for. It was also possible that Guinea had relished the opportunity to

revive its ‘revolutionary’ ties with its western neighbour. But the Conteh

government had security considerations of its own. Striving to stem off dissidence

from bases within its eastern neighbours–at-war, Liberia and Sierra Leone, it least

wanted another opening on its western frontier; nor was it prepared for a third

wave of refugee flow in a roll.

Guinea-Bissau’s liberation war partner, Cape Verde chose to operate diplomatically

throw the recently revived Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP).

Its Foreign Minister, Jose Luis Jesus, chaired the CPLP’s Contact Group that clinched

the first major breakthrough in the peace process. His leadership qualities, as later

discussed, impacted positively in achieving cooperation between CPLP and ECOWAS

(Massey 2004: 89).

In sharp contrast to the Senegal-Guinea dual military intervention, Gambia opted for

a two-pronged activist diplomacy. Within two weeks of the outbreak of the conflict,

Gambia sent its Foreign Minister, Mohammed Lamin Sedat Jobe, to mediate an end

to the bloody revolt. On 16 June 1998, President Yahya Jammeh himself visited,

Praia, Nouakchott (Mauritania), Conakry and Dakar in an effort to seek regional

opinion on the conflict and to canvass support for his peace initiative(CNN.com 17

June 1998).

23

Like other regional neighbours, historical, cultural, humanitarian and more so,

security concerns prompted Gambia’s diplomatic intervention. The outbreak of the

conflict was a worrying escalation in violence only a short distance from Gambia’s

southern border. Banjul recognised a firm link between the secessionist campaign in

Casamance and the war in Guinea-Bissau. And given the proximity, the potential for

cross-border contagion and the possibility of serious refugee flows, Gambia clearly

had a stake in ensuring the resolution of the conflict (Massey 2004: 86). Jammeh

might have also anticipated the boost in his personal prestige and that of smallish

Gambia, the success of his peace strategy would bring.

Gambia’s efforts suffered initial setbacks largely because both Vieira and the

Senegalese authorities felt Gambia was partial towards the rebellion. It did not

escape Senegalese President Abdul Diouf and Vieira that Mane had been born in

Gambia and had relatives there even though he had lived in Bissau and become a

national hero there. Jammeh also shared his Jola ethnicity with a majority of the

Casamancais; his birthplace on the Gambian-Casamance border led to suspicions

that he was lending his support, moral and practical, to the MFDC rebellion (Massey

2004: 87).

In October 1998 however, Jammeh succeeded in bringing Vieira and Mane face to

face to the negotiation table at a meeting in Banjul, from where he flew with the two

men to attend the 21st ECOWAS summit in Abuja. In Abuja, Jammeh stayed a day

longer to witness the signing of the Abuja Accord. Gambia crowned its diplomatic

success by being the first country to send, in February 1999, a contingent for the

600 ECOMOG troops charged with the responsibility of enforcing the ceasefire

under the peace agreement.

ECOWAS’ Intervention

The outbreak of violence in Guinea-Bissau soon after Liberia and Sierra Leone was

in itself bad enough for the regional body, ECOWAS but the ‘bilateral’ intervention of

24

Senegal and Guinea complicated matters. The two neighbours had acted without

ECOWAS’ consent and the defence pact justification was reminiscent of Nigeria’s

unilateral intervention in Sierra Leone following its May 1997 coup. The worrying

impression was that any state or group of states willing and able could hijack

ECOMOG for their selfish purposes (Berman& Sams 2000: 129). ECOWAS also had to

grapple with whether or not to denounce a rebellion that was becoming increasingly

popular locally. Should it throw its support behind a regime which though

democratically elected appeared to have lost its legitimacy?

ECOWAS and CPLP: Conflict and Cooperation

These dilemmas informed ECOWAS’ delayed initial response. At its 3 July 1998

Abidjan ministerial meeting to discuss the crisis, Vieira had insisted the mutiny was

a threat to the peace, security and stability of his country as well as those of the sub-

region and requested the deployment of ECOMOG to intervene. The meeting

condemned the rebellion, reaffirmed support for the Vieira government and the

democratic process and endorsed the Guinea and Senegal’s rapid intervention. It

further recommended the extension of ECOMOG’s mandate and activities to Guinea-

Bissau and set up a Committee of Seven comprising Burkina Faso, Cote d Ivoire,

Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal, to seek UN approval and to implement

the recommendations. (It became a Committee of Nine in October with the inclusion

of Cape Verde and Togo). The meeting had adopted a three-phased approach. While

accepting the need for negotiation, the ECOWAS ministers emphasised further

interventionist measures - the imposition of sanctions and the use of force by

ECOWAS- not excluded (Massey 2004: 87; Mekenkamp 1999).

By its tacit support for the Vieira government and the endorsement of the

controversial forceful intervention, not only did the dilemmas (earlier discussed)

remain, but ECOWAS effectively became an actor instead of a mediator. The rebels

perceived the Community as protecting the beleaguered sitting president and with

the rebels operating from a position of military strength and local support, the crisis

25

was not yet ripe for resolution - the logic of war had not yet ceded to the logic of

peace.

Perhaps more worrying was the fact that ECOWAS’ support for sitting president

Vieira had extra regional implications. It revived Franco-Portuguese rivalry. The

ECOWAS endorsement of the Senegalese presence was favourable by extension to

France. On its part, Portugal saw in the rebellion an opportunity to reassert its

influence in Guinea-Bissau. Portugal had reportedly supplied the Mane forces with

satellite equipment and had criticised Vieira for using foreigners to harass the

people from whom he derived his mandate (Mekenkamp 1999). These opposing

standpoints of France and Portugal fed into the climate of suspicion the enveloped

the respective diplomatic initiatives of ECOWAS and CPLP.

The CPLP while expressing the need for an urgent return to constitutional rule,

called for the setting up of a mediation mechanism as the more realistic option. But

ECOWAS saw the CPLP option as Portugal’s handiwork, and called on the UN

Security Council to stop Portugal from undermining the regional efforts at resolving

conflict as well as from supporting the rebels. ECOWAS had forcefully argued that

with the Senegalese and Guinean troops on the ground, the focus of any mediation

should remain regional (IRIN-West Africa Weekly Update 56, 10 July 1998). And it

was not by accident or for purely altruistic reasons that France advocated

‘exclusively West Africans solving West African problems’(Mekenkamp 1999). This

rivalry between ECOWAS and CPLP stalled peaceful solution to the conflict for

several weeks.

On balance, it was apparent that the CPLP option was more neutral and succeeded

by the end of July in clinching a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) calling for

formal negotiations, the establishment of a demilitarised zone around the strategic

town of Mansoa, the deployment of peacekeepers and the opening of corridors for

humanitarian aid. An appendix to the MOU envisaged the warring factions

maintaining their relative positions at the start of the ceasefire. This initial triumph

26

by CPLP hinged on the benefits of a shared language and colonial heritage but more

so because it was, compared to ECOWAS, removed from the dynamics of regional

politics. (IRIN-West Africa Update 59, 27 July 1998; Massey 2004: 91).

When the CPLP insisted on a proposed peacekeeping force under its own auspices,

deliberately kept silent over the Senegalese and Guinean presence and indirectly

invited ECOWAS to participate in the negotiations at the same level as the UN, EU

and OAU, it appeared to have taken the wind out of ECOWAS’ sail. Fortunately,

instead of further rivalry, the CPLP success generated cooperation from ECOWAS. At

the conference of the Committee of Seven in Accra on 4 August, ECOWAS reviewed

its strategy. While still reaffirming its support for Vieira, it adopted more

conciliatory attitude toward both CPLP and the Junta. This paved the way for the

eventual CPLP-ECOWAS Joint Meeting of 25 August that firmed up the initial cease-

fire. The Foreign Minister of Cape Verde and Chairman of the CPLP Contact Group,

Jose Luis Jesus, played a leading role in harmonising the ECOWAS and CPLP

mediation efforts. He had argued ‘ ECOWAS plays a very important role in

intervening in conflicts in Africa and in the mediation in the Guinea-Bissau conflict.

Like ECOWAS we (CPLP) are guided by the desire to achieve peace as fast as

possible by facilitating the dialogue between the two parties’ (Press Agency IPS,

August 1998, cited in Mekenkamp 1999).

The Abuja Peace Agreement, ECOMOG III and The May 1999 Coup

When the CPLP-negotiated ceasefire fell apart with another outbreak of violence in

October 1998, Gambia resumed its mediation efforts, this time within the wider

ECOWAS framework. It succeeded in convening a series of meetings between Vieira

and Mane that led to the signing of the ECOWAS-brokered 1 November 1998 Abuja

Agreement.

The Abuja peace agreement called for a weapons’ amnesty for both sides; the

immediate formation of a unified government; elections set for not later than March

1999; the withdrawal of foreign troops; and the introduction of a buffer force of

27

ECOMOG peacekeepers. ECOWAS trumpeted the peace agreement as a sign that the

troubled West African region was on the way to stability after years of conflict. And

that the battle-hardened ECOMOG forces could stamp out the spiral of violence to

prove that ECOMOG was an able and responsible force in the region. As it turned out

countries like Ghana and Nigeria whose troops had seen action in Liberia and Sierra

Leone were not on duty in Guinea-Bissau (Ero 2000).

The ECOMOG operation was a largely by Francophone states (Benin, Niger, Mali and

Togo) and Gambia. With the absence of Nigeria and Ghana and the exclusion of

Senegal and Guinea, these were inexperienced and, worse still, small armies which

made contribution difficult. Not surprisingly, ECOMOG could only deploy less than

half the proposed 1500 peacekeepers; yet, they were expected to provide a strong

buffer to block rebel activities within the country and on the borders with Senegal.

The ECOMOG force in Guinea-Bissau was also ill-equipped and poorly trained for the

task. The country’s geography dictated the deployment of naval units with the

appropriate logistics to be able to stem the tide of conflict. But the troop-

contributors either had small-sized or no naval units at all (Ibid).

The operation was supported logistically and financially under the French

peacekeeping training initiative for African states, Reinforcement of African

Peacekeeping Capacity (RECAMP). Benin also trained under the US peacekeeping

training programme, Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and became the first of

troops trained under that initiative to be deployed in a peacekeeping operation

(Ibid).

The assistance provided through RECAMP and ACRI exposed the fact that beyond

Nigeria, many West African states were militarily weak and consequently unable to

provide a force necessary to quell the tide of conflicts. Given France’s interest in the

status quo, the suspicion of the junta forces would be transferred to the ECOMOG

forces. The outbreak of renewed violence demonstrated that ECOMOG could not

prevent conflicts when warring factions prefer war to peace. It also undermined the

28

credibility of ECOWAS claims that ECOMOG could provide security in the region

(Ero 2000).

Before ECOMOG could deploy violence had broken up again in January 1999. This

led to another round of talks in Lome on 17 February 1999 under ECOWAS’

auspices. Vieira and Mane agreed, in the spirit of national reconciliation, to work

together to guarantee peace in their country and resolved never again to resort to

violence to solve their problems. Francisco Fadul, later the same week, was

appointed Prime Minister of the government of national unity and it appeared Vieira

had saved his regime; but for how long? The elections scheduled for March 1999

had to be rescheduled to November owing to the delay in the arrival of ECOMOG and

the withdrawal of the Senegalese and Guinean troops as well as the January

hostilities (Mekenkamp 1999).

The final and decisive outbreak of violence occurred in May 1999. It had become

apparent that Vieira had used the period of respite to beef up his ground forces and

arsenal. And, Mane buoyed by his exoneration by the parliamentary committee

report and his overwhelming military superiority, together with ECOMOG’s

inability or refusal to disarm Vieira’s soldiers, , swept Vieira from the threadbare of

power he had been clinging to (Mekenkamp 1999). The ECOMOG force withdrew in

June 1999 after the coup and Vieira’s departure into exile. While it lasted, the

ECOMOG force was able to provide access for humanitarian agencies and the

number of conflict-related casualties that occurred during its deployment was

considerably lower (Quayat 1999)

In spite of its difficulties the ECOMOG force in Guinea-Bissau had some intriguing

dynamics of its own. While troop-contribution from mainly Francophone states was

a welcome relief from the dominance of the Anglophone in Liberia and Sierra Leone,

the limitations of the force drew attention to the need for a better coordinated

approach to troop contribution. And, the ECOMOG intervention also succeeded in

29

providing a reasonably dignified exit for the battered Senegalese and Guinean

troops (Massey 2004: 94).

The ever domineering presence of Nigeria was conspicuously absent in Guinea-

Bissau. The advantage was that ECOMOG this time could not be described as a tool

of in the hands of Nigeria. But the failure of the operation attested to the need for a

sub-regional hegemony to offer leadership and resources to ensure success. This is

clearly demonstrated by the desperate effort of president Vieira to get on board

without success (Khobe 2000: 111). In addition the absence also of Ghana which like

Nigeria had been active in the other two operations was an indication of peace

keeping fatigue.

A silver lining in an otherwise abortive operation was that for the first time,

ECOMOG was deployed after a comprehensive agreement between ECOWAS and

representatives of the two parties to the conflict. Also, that for the first time in

ECOMOG’s history, a party’s demands regarding force composition (i.e. the exclusion

of Guinea and Senegal) were heeded was a welcome departure (Berman & Sams

2000: 136).

Post-Conflict Governance and Regional Response

According to BBC (10 May 1999), Vieira’s deposition did not trigger any major

popular reaction against the unconstitutional measures; instead some groups

expressed their relief and discussed the possibility of putting Vieira on trial for

corruption. But more significantly, it also effectively ended the war, pushing the

country, its immediate neighbours and ECOWAS into the more arduous of managing

the post-conflict transition.

From the May 1999 to the November 1999 Elections

Apparently there were flashes of constitutionalism following the 1999 coup. The

Speaker of Parliament Malam Bachi Sanha was appointed, according to the

30

provisions of the constitution as interim President in place of Vieira until the next

elections. The transitional Prime Minister Fadul appointed under the Abuja peace

agreement in February was also allowed to continue in office. In addition, a political

transition pact was signed between parliament, the fourteen legally-constituted

political parties, the transitional government and the military junta. The pact was

the legal framework for returning the country to constitutional normalcy. The

November election date fixed by the previous government was retained (IRIN News

25 October 2004; Rudebeck 2001: 33-34)

But there was no doubt that the authority of the state was nakedly dependent on the

military might of the victorious Military Junta which ran concurrently with

transitional government. While the explicitly stated purpose of the political

transition pact was to secure the return to constitutional normalcy, that same

document had given the leader of the junta, Mane, a key governmental decision-

making role. It was therefore not surprising that Mane and Fadul had frequently

pulled in different directions. The months that followed were marked by a

precarious balancing act between the civilian interim government’s efforts to

establish its authority and the intimidating presence of the military. The latter had

made its return to the barracks contingent upon better pay and conditions of service

and had gone on demonstration twice in the interim for that purpose.

As a sign of worse things to come, Mane reportedly fledged his muscles at the

congress of the PAIGC, ironically, ‘as a common party member’ not only to stop the

nomination of a candidate that was considered close to Vieira , but also got several

of them disqualified. That paved the way for interim president Sanha to become the

PAIGC’s presidential candidate (Rudebeck 2001: 34-35).

The shallowness of Mane’s democratic engagement became more manifest two

weeks before the elections in November 1999 when the Junta prepared a ‘Magna

Carta’ detailing the role it hoped to play after the elections and wanted the political

parties to endorse beforehand. The document gave the Junta authority over ten

31

years (two constitutional terms) to dissolve the government without consulting

Parliament any time it felt there was a political crisis (Ostheimer 2001). Other

aspects of the proposal were equally objectionable. The president over the next two

terms was to appoint or dismiss the chief of staff of the armed forces on the

recommendation of the Junta which also was to have a say in the appointment of the

Attorney General (IRIN 23 November 2000). Though the publication of the Magna

Carta which provoked outcry was rejected by the political parties and consequently

withdrawn, Mane in the one year before his death behaved along the lines of that

document ( as detailed below).

The elections however went on as scheduled. In the parliamentary poll, the PAIGC

came third with its 62-seat majority in the previous era slashed to 24. The former

largest opposition party Resistance Guinea-Bissau (RGB-MB) which began as

Movement Bafata (MB) in the 1980s, retained its second position with 29 seats. The

PRS exchanged positions with the PAIGC and became the majority party with 38

seats, while the remaining 11 seats went to five minor parties. With a total of 102

seats, no party won a workable majority and a coalition was eventually formed

between the first two leaving PAIGC as the official opposition

The first round of the presidential election was also interesting. While RGB-MB had

not presented a candidate, Interim President Sanha was on the PAIGC ticket, and the

losing presidential candidate of 1994, Kumba Yala stood again for the PRS. Yala had

34%, Sanha had 20%, the next three, all independent candidates, shared among

them 19%; while the remaining five had an aggregate of 15% (Rudebeck 2001:47).

That prompted the run-off of 16 January 2000 which Yala won with a whooping

72% to Sanha’s 28% (Ibid: 64).

Smarting under the failure of the ECOMOG operation, ECOWAS, as it were, ‘washed

its hands off’ Guinea-Bissau. It did not play any significant role in the electoral

process even though it was largely part of the implementation of its initiated Abuja

agreement.

32

The Kumba Yala Administration (Feb. 2000- Sept. 2003): Era of Erratic

Governance

The January 2000 presidential run-off results were intriguing in a few respects and

raised hopes of a smooth transition. But these were soon dashed by two major

factors- the intransigence of Mane and his Junta and Yala’s own whimsical

governance style.

Yala’s 72% mandate cut across ethnic, religious, partisan and regional boundaries

in elections widely considered free and fair. Even more intriguing was the fact that

he defeated Malam Sanha, the head of the transitional government on the ticket of

the once-powerful the PAIGC (CPJ AFRICA, 2000). But such an overwhelming and

authoritative mandate was soon squandered on the altar of erratic governance.

In his inaugural address, Yala had promised to be the “President of all Guineans”

with “total respect for the constitution and principles of democracy” (Rudebeck

2001: 65). But even before his inauguration he had shown a glimpse of what would

become the hallmark of his rule-an aversion for constitutionalism. The Guinea-

Bissau constitution provided that the president appoints the prime minister in

consultation with the parties represented in parliament. Yala, in a false start,

ignored this and appointed Caetano N’Tchama, a close relation, as his Prime

Minister only in consultation with his PRS. Three months later he arrested two

journalists of the state-owned TV station and defeated presidential candidate

Fernando Gomes were jailed for criticisms of the government and were only

released after strong public agitation from journalists and politicians(Ibid: 70).

This maverick behaviour would continue throughout his term, but perhaps a bigger

problem in the first year of the Yala administration was how to tame Mane and his

cohorts. The Military Junta had refused to disband after the elections and continued

to act as a parallel government. It repeatedly defined the authority of the civilian

government and anny overtures Yala made backfired one way or the other. Indeed,

33

there were clear indications that the military was intent on implementing the

withdrawn ‘Magna Carta’.

In February, Mane had rejected his appointment as presidential assessor on defence

and security which was of ministerial rank. In March, Yala appointed the entire 16-

member leadership of the military junta as members of government as a way of

soothing their egos. But when later Chief of Navy Lamine Sanha refused to quit after

he was sacked by Yala for indiscretion, his military colleagues supported him(Ibid:

68-69). Before his eventual demise, Mane had intervened in several actions of the

constitutional head of state. For instance, he had prevented Yala from a state visit to

Senegal and had accompanied the president on a visit to Nigeria. (IRIN, 23

November 2000; Ostheimer 2001).

Mane’s intransigence came to a head in November 2000 when he revoked

presidential promotions in the military which had made Mane himself a four-star

General, the highest in the country. Instead, he put the Chief of Staff and his Deputy

under house arrest and proclaimed himself the Supreme Commander of the Armed

Force, pointedly, a title reserved for the head of state. It was in the resultant

violence from this provocation that Mane was killed. His death at best reduced, but

definitely did not eliminate, the threat of the military to the civilian regime. Several

ambitious soldiers openly flaunted their political ambitions and their collective

desire to continue as a parallel government for the next ten years. Worse still, the

military itself reflected the divisions and confusion in the country’s political system.

It was split along political lines, ethnic cleavages, as well as between the younger

military professionals and the older liberation war veterans. All that made any

prediction of military actions a fruitless endeavour yet it continued to perceive itself

as the guardian of democracy. The government’s hand was further weakened by its

inability to fulfil its promise of raising the salary of soldiers by 30% and the

incomplete demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants about 20,000 some

veterans from the colonial struggle (Ostheimer 2001; ISS Fact File)

34

On the civilian plane, speculations that the exit of Mane would allow the politicians

to forge ahead with unity of purpose proved immature. First, a number of

opposition politicians were arrested on grounds of their alleged involvement in

Mane’s foiled coup (Rudebeck 2001: 98) Secondly, left off the hook, Yala behaved in

a more dictatorial and disconcerted manner. Indeed his actions increasingly showed

a lasting shift towards an authoritarian and non-democratic mode of governance

(Ostheimer 2001). What follows represents only a selection from the thick

catalogue of Yala’s omissions and commissions over his three and half years in

office.

Yala’s relation with the coalition government led by Prime Minister Caetano

Ntchama was one of lack of consultation. This led to serious division in the

PRS/RGB-MB government on issues of appointment of ambassadors, distribution of

resources as well as development issues. This came to a peak when Yala in

September 2000 sacked the five RGB-MB ministers only to reinstate them after a

week. These erratic actions created a sense of instability and provided the

opposition PAIGC an opportunity to make political capital; becoming overtly critical

of the government ((Ostheimer 2001; Rudebeck 2001: 98).

Apparently ironical, but quite in line with Yala’s maverick style, there were serious

rumours of secret alliance between Yala and Vieira. In November 2000 there had

been demonstrations calling for Ntchama’s resignation, and significantly, Vieira’s

return (Ostheimer 2001). As Yala became increasingly isolated even within his own

party he used his position to weaken his opponents and sought support for his

power through ethnic networks, patrimonial relationships and the security forces.

Increasingly politics became more ethnic than before as Yala and N’tchama were

seen as favouring their own non-Moslems Balanta at the expense of Moslems and

among them the Mandinga, Mane’s own ethnic group ( Ostheimer 2001; Rudebeck

2001; 98).

Yala adopted an eccentric and whimsical approach towards the interpretation of the

country’s constitution especially with regard to the independence of the judiciary.

35

The Supreme Court President Emil dos Reis and his Vice Venancio Martins were

detained in November 2001 after their dismissal. The arrest of the judges was part

of the strategy to undermine authority of the judiciary and the rule of law. They had

been dismissed by a presidential decree on 7 September 2001 after the president

the month before accused the Court as corrupt, mediocre and threatened to

‘overthrow all judges in the courts.’ The dismissal of the judges violated Articles 120

and 123 of the Constitution. Article 120 limited the presidential powers to swearing

in judges after they have been appointed by the Higher Council of Magistrates, and

by virtue of Article 123, only that Council had authority to appoint, dismiss, transfer

or promote judges (IRIN 16 November 2001). By the time of his overthrow, the

sacked judges had not been replaced.

Yala’s continued unilateral style of leadership eventually led to the February 2001

withdrawal of the RGB-MB from government leaving the PRS a minority

government against the relatively better-organized and stronger PAIGC opposition.

The RGB-MB withdrawal also meant that fundamental changes would be hard to

achieve and patronage became the order of the day in cobbling together voting

blocs. It further implied a reduction in the competence within government as the

RGB-MB was a stronger and more experienced partner, the PRS being little more

than a support base for Yala.( IRIN 13 June 2003; ISS Fact File)

In October 2001 Parliament passed a motion of no confidence in Yala after he

threatened to fire half of the country’s civil servants for corruption. He was also

accused of dismissing people in order to promote people of his ethnic group or party

and of showing little regard for the provisions of the constitution (ISS Fact File)

Two months later, Alamara Nhasse, then Minister of Interior (and later Prime

Minister), following an alleged coup attempt failed to convince Parliament which

demanded hard evidence. The National Assembly had described the Minister’s

statement as reminiscent of using coup plots to gain international support and to

clamp on its internal opponents (IRIN, 6 Dec 2001).

36

Fernando Gomes, a party leader, was detained in February 2002 after being accused

of misappropriating a donation of $44,000 while he headed the country’s Human

Rights League. But this was seen more as political persecution of his Social Alliance

of Guinea Bissau party (IRIN, 11 Feb 2002). In mid-August 2002, Yala dismissed

several ministers including the Minister of Fisheries who doubled as the Secretary-

General of the PRS and that led to tension between him and Prime Minister Alamara

Nhasse (IRIN, 28 August 2002).

In November 2002, Yala dissolved the National Assembly and declared a

government by presidential decree. Parliamentary elections originally scheduled for

23 February 2003, was rescheduled to 20 April, the to 6 July and then to 12 October.

It was the attempt to postponed the last one that led to the 14 September 2003 coup

(IRIN, 14 Sep. 2003). Throughout 2003, very little was done to update the electoral

roll in spite of $500,000 from the UNDP. Instead the voters register was used as the

excuse for the rampant postponement of legislative election (IRIN 13 June 2003)

Yala arrested his Defence Minister on 30 April 2003 on charges of plotting a coup

and publicly protested about several coup plots against him during his three years’

stay in office. But the general perception was still among the opposition and in

diplomatic circles was that most of them were fictitious, invented to glean sympathy

abroad and to provide a pretext for clamping down on his opponents at home.(IRIN

14 Sep. 2003).

He was unable to retain ministers for long; he had four prime ministers in three

years. Unregulated ministerial sacking became the norm. For instance, he had

sacked his last Information Minister a week before the coup after he had been in

office for only two months. These constant changes exacerbated donors who could

not have lasting relationship with key ministers. (IRIN 14 Sep. 2003).

37

Under Yala, the government became so cash-strapped that it was sometimes forced

to pay its workers with bags of rice instead of money. As part of the CFA zone it

could not print money on its own. (IRIN 14 June. 2003).

Clearly, the Yala administration was a tragedy of a president who promised to be a

unifier and a healer but ended up at war with his own party, every other party, his

cabinet, the legislature, the judiciary, military, media, labour, society and indeed

with himself. Given the long chain of accusations, the surprise was how his regime

plodded on for so long.

In June 2003 the UN expressed concern about Guinea Bissau’s backslide into

economic and political chaos since Yala was elected president. Secretary General

Kofi Annan in his quarterly report in June 2003 said:

The situation in Guinea Bissau has worsened… There is now consensus that Guinea

Bissau, which seemed so promising following the end of the 1998-99 conflict and

the holding of free and fair elections, is now once more embarked on a downward

course (Cited in IRIN 13 June. 2003).

Yala’s maverick style also showed in his relations with his neighbours: while he

cooperated with the Senegalese authorities over Casamance, he was at ‘war’ with

Gambia. When in April 2000, there was upsurge in rebel activity in Senegal’s

Cassamance region spilling over to villages on the Bissau side of the border the Yala

government indicated its willingness to provide support to Senegal to solve the

conflict. By September, joint initiatives were put in place to increase border security

and to stop armed groups from raiding villages along their common borders. Then

in March 2001, Bissau forces launched a military offensive to drive the MFDC rebels

back to Senegal with some success. The operation was spearheaded by General

Waie, a future Chief of Staff (ISS Fact File). Relations between Guinea Bissau and

Gambia deteriorated in mid-2002 when Yala threatened ‘to crush Gambia in two

minutes’ if the latter did not stop supporting alleged coup plotters based there.

Specifically, Yala accused Gambia over the December 2001 and May 2002 alleged

38

coup plots. UN Secretary General Annan had to meet the two leaders at the 2002

OAU summit and to send former Ghanaian foreign minister Victor Gbeho as his

envoy to defuse the tension (IRIN 11 June 2002). Banjul in its denial referred to its

mediatory role during the civil war and the fact that it was the Coordinator of the

Friends of Guinea Bissau at the UN which mobilizes support for the reconstruction

of Guinea Bissau. Yala was internally criticized for his accusations of Gambia (IRIN

19 June 2002).

Under the circumstances, ECOWAS’ stone silence over Mane’s intransigence and the

excesses of Yala was rather surprising. After expending so much of its limited

resources to broker peace in Guinea-Bissau and even to deploy a peacekeeping force

was it not necessary for ECOWAS to monitor events there? Why for example was it

the UN rather than ECOWAS that appointed an envoy to resolve the fracas between

Bissau and Dakar? Why did ECOWAS wait until after the September 2003 coup

before scrambling to find a settlement?

The situation was particularly worrying because there are several ECOWAS

documents, as illustrated below, which make it incumbent on member-states to

pursue good governance and for ECOWAS to ensure that those principles are

observed.

The ECOWAS Declaration of Political Principles adopted in July 1991 sets out

members states’ commitment to uphold human rights, democracy an the

rule of law.

The 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty had among its fundamental principles in

Article Four recognition, promotion and protection of human rights as well

as the promotion and consolidation of democratic governance in each

member states.

The 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism identifies good governance, the rule of law

and sustainable development as essential for peace and conflict prevention;

(Preamble) and the Community undertakes to assist member states

adversely affected by conflicts to consolidate peace (Article 44)

39

The 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance reaffirms

the observance of the principles enshrined in the preceding document.

Apparently, post intervention ‘neglect’ had become ECOWAS’ stock in trade. In 1997

it did very little to restrain Charles Taylor when he rejected ECOMOG’s involvement

in the restructuring of the armed forces. And in 1998, the Kabbah government was

left to its own devices, after it had been reinstated.

Another Coup, A Second Transition

On 12 September 2003, the National Electoral Commission announced that the

voters list would not be ready for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 12

October the same year. Those elections had been postponed for the fourth time

since the last parliament was controversially dissolved late 2002. And two days

later the military led by the Chief of Staff General Verisimo Seabra deposed Yala in a

bloodless coup. Seabra recounted Yala’s well-known ‘sins’ - his government’s

inability to resolve the country’s profound economic problems and to find a way out

of its political crisis. He indicated that efforts to alert the authorities of the dangers

ahead and the closeness the country was to civil war went unheeded. Instead Prime

Minister Pires sought to inflame passions further when he said at a campaign rally

that it wasa vote for the opposition that would rather cause a fresh war. Seabra

further accused Yala of arbitrary arrests, fomenting divisions in the country,

disregarding the constitution and plotting to rig the elections (IRIN 14 & 15

September 2003).

The reactions of the opposition parties, once again, were generally supportive of the

coup. For instance, Carol Gomes, leader of PAIGC said the military had saved

democracy, Francisco Fadul, PUSD leader, said it saved the country from

dictatorship. But RGB-MB party, despite its estranged relationship with former ally

of PRS, regretted that the coup had upset the constitutional order (IRIN 15 Sep.

2003).

40

While the coup was generally condemned by the international community - UN, AU,

ECOWAS, CPLP, Portugal and a host of African states, there was little sympathy for

the deposed Yala and no effort was made to reinstate him. The CPLP, for instance,

condemned the coup and appealed for the reestablishment of the constitutional rule

but called for a meeting of soldiers and civilians in the country ‘to obtain solutions to

the county’s problems through dialogue.’(Ibid). President of Cape Verde, Pedro

Pires, said his country was ‘ready to help Guinea Bissau adopt good and credible

democratic institutions.’ (IRIN 14 Sep. 2003). Mozambican President Joacquim

Chissano, the AU Chairman, urged the military leaders to hold immediate talks with

ECOWAS to find the best solution to restore constitutional order (Ibid). Nigerian

leader Obasanjo, beaming from the success of his intervention to restore

constitutional rule in Sao Tome in July 2003 said, together with ECOWAS his

government was determined to resist the unconstitutional change (Ibid).

Interestingly, Seabra and his men admittedly were not surprised at the international

reaction. According to him, they were clearly aware that the international

community would never have agreed to a coup detat under any circumstance, but

unfortunately ‘we did not have another option, another alternative’ (Ibid).

An interesting revelation about General Seabra with implications for conflict, peace

and security in West Africa was that he joined the PAIGC guerrilla war as a child

soldier of 16 years, and in September 2003 became the first of their kind to become

head of state, albeit temporarily. How many of West Africa’s current crop of child

soldiers would aspire to such heights? Seabra played a key role as director of media

communication during the 1980 Vieira coup; was on the side of Mane, indeed the

second in command, during the civil war and the May 1999 coup. But when in

November 2000, Mane attempted to strip him of his post as Chief of Staff, he

remained loyal to Yala. He topped his credentials as a master coup maker/stopper

with one in his own name in September 2003 (IRINnews.org, 17 Sep. 2003).

Seabra had further explained to the ECOWAS delegation two days after the coup that

the military on 14 September 2003 ‘acted to put right a confused intolerable

41

situation…. We were in a country with no constitution, no judiciary, no parliament, a

crazy country in other words.’(IRIN, 17Sep. 2003) In a swift move, very much unlike

ECOWAS, its delegation comprising ministers from neighbouring Cape Verde,

Gambia, Guinea and Senegal, as well as Ghana and Nigeria, succeeded in brokering a

compromise solution after forty eight hours of talks.

Yala was asked to formally announce his resignation in a broadcast to add a veneer

of constitutional legality to the fait accompli of his involuntary removal from office.

In a speech first approved by the ECOWAS delegation, Yala told the people he was

stepping aside for the sake of peaceful resolution to national problems and call on

them to support the formation of a government national unity, led by a Guinean

personality who commands national consensus and known for his patriotism,

competence ad integrity, that would lead to free elections. On the other hand, the

delegation prevailed upon Seabra and his 32-man junta to invite an ad hoc

commission of political and civic leaders and military officers chaired by the

Catholic Bishop of Bissau, Jose Camnate Bissing to appoint a civilian-led transitional

government. Thus, Seabra’s first public act as head of a 32-member military

Committee for Restoration of Constitutional Order and Democracy was to convene a

meeting of political, religious and civil society leaders to choose a new civilian-led

government that would be charged with organizing fresh elections.(IRIN 15 &17

Sep. 2003).

ECOWAS Chairman and Ghanaian President John Kufuor, President Obasanjo of

Nigeria and President Wade of Senegal lent their support to the process which led

to the choice of Henrique Rosa as interim President and Antonio Sanha as interim

Prime Minister with a day’s visit. The transitional pact mandated the new

government to hold elections in six months and presidential elections a year

thereafter.

This diplomatic pressure by ECOWAS, similar to the Nigerian initiative in Equatorial

Guinea in July 2003, was an improvement over what followed the Ivorian coup in

42

1999, which allowed Robert Guei to craft his own plan of self succession with

disastrous consequences not only for Cote d’ Ivoire but the entire sub-region. Thus,

ECOWAS having learnt a bitter lesson, this time did not allow itself to be deceived by

the nostalgia of ‘a good coup’

Interim President Henrique Rosa, himself the head of the National Electoral

Commission for the 1994 multi-party elections, and his government successfully

oversaw the 28 March 2004 legislative elections in which PAIGC won 45 out of the

102 parliamentary seats. The PAIGC with Carlos Gomes as Prime Minister eventually

negotiated a deal, a novel of a consensus, with the PRS in which the latter, the

second largest in parliament with 35 seats, did not take up ministerial posts in

government but assumed leadership of parliament in return for its legislative

support for the ruling. PAIGC’s initial effort to form a coalition with the United Social

Democrat Party (PUSD) with 17 parliamentary fell through. That this consensus

could be achieved after PRS’s initial protest of electoral irregularities had delayed

the inauguration made it remarkable all the more (IRINnews.org 7 May 2004). This

compromise, like the September 2003 and October 2004 agreements for the

military to return to the barracks, is one good feature of the political system that

needs to be nurtured for peace in Guinea-Bissau.

The transitional government represented an improvement over the Yala regime

with regard to rule of law, transparency and good governance. Nevertheless, the

process of democratization remained fragile. The UN Secretary-General’s Half Yearly

Report of June 2004 aptly captured the situation. It indicated that while the March

elections marked a major step towards restoration of the constitutional order, there

were critical challenges such as the ethnic imbalances in the armed forces, non-

payment of salary areas and the poor conditions of military barracks. At the time 20

people detained following the December 2002 attempt to oust Yala continued in

detention. The report described those issues as potentially destabilizing.

(IRINnews.org 11 June 2004) On hindsight, the report proved prophetic with the

events of October 6.

43

Recurrent Relapse

When the chips were down after a two-day mutiny, on 6-7 October 2004, military

Chief of Staff, General Seabra and military spokesman Colonel Domingos de Barros

had been killed and other high ranking officers had sought refuge in Western

embassies in Bissau. The 600 or so mutineers were UN peacekeepers returning from

a nine-month duty tour in Liberia and did not spread to the rest of the military. They

were insistent they were only demanding payment of salary arrears and improved

conditions of service in the barracks, as well as protesting against corruption in the

military hierarchy without any political motive. Another intriguing aspect was that

the revolt was launched on the day that 8 officers were due for trial for their alleged

involvement in a December 2001 coup attempt against Yalah (ICG Crisis Watch

No.15, 1 November 2004; IRINnew.org 11 October 2004).

ECOWAS and CPLP, once again, were very active is demonstrating solidarity and

providing assistance to the government of Guinea-Bissau. Not only did they send

delegations to express support for the civilian authorities and condemned

unreservedly the events that occurred, but also offered material and technical

assistance. ECOWAS presented a cash donation of about $500,000 towards payment

of part of the military. The CPLP on its part dispatched a sensitization and good

offices mission to Bissau on 15 November to assist the civil and military authorities

to find lasting peace and unity (Annan 2004 par.11). The UN agreed also to pay up

the arrears to mutineers (ICG November 2004).

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed on 10 October 2004 between the

government and the mutineers allowed their immediate return to barracks, army

reform and a possible amnesty after parliamentary approval, and the choice of the

new military leadership by the mutineers. On 28 October 2004, a new military

leadership was appointed for the interim period before the 2005 presidential

election, with General Tangme Na Waie as the Chief of Staff. Other officers who were

appointed with him on the say-so of the military were Brigadier Armindo Gomes as

44

Army Chief, Brigadier Antonio Gomes as Air Force Chief and Captain Jose Nachotto

for the Navy (IRINnews.org 28 Oct. 2004).

It was somewhat ironical that General Seabra who, after ousting the authoritarian

Yala regime, allowed the on-going transition to democracy to continue, met such a fate.

But given his track record as a master coup maker/stopper, perhaps his end could

be viewed as the proverbial ‘he who lives by the sword ….’ Also, in spite of the

mutineers’ persistent denial of political motives, the consequences of their action

had serious political implications that virtually wiped off the gains under Rosa’s

watch(Annan 2004 par. 5-20):

The signs of progress and promise in Guinea-Bissau’s political situation

following the successful conduct of the March 2004 legislative elections, and

the vigorous effort of interim President Henrique Rosa and the new

government were undertaking towards restoring constitutional rule and

institutional stability were rudely interrupted by the events of October 2004.

The mutineers’ insistence on their choice of new military authorities (the

chief of staff and service heads) smacked of impunity. It was perceived as

caving in on the part of the civilian authorities to military pressures and a

sign of further erosion of the authority of the largely- elected government

and its institutions.

The month between the mutiny and the swearing in of the new military

authorities represented a worrying and potentially explosive vacuum in

military leadership

Even worse was the proviso, in the memorandum of understanding (MOU)

signed between the government and the mutineers, of a potential blanket

amnesty for those involved in military interventions since 1980. This has

since been ratified into practice by a legislative act.

The mutiny also increased the danger of polarization of Guinean society

along ethnic lines especially given the widespread perception that the revolt

45

was instigated by Balanta elements in the military, intent on assuming

control of the military establishment.

It interrupted the technical support and resources that UNOBGISS was

providing the government in the area of a preparatory commission to initiate

military reform and reconciliation of the various factions. Even before

October 6 there were difficulties engaging the military in the work of the

commission.

In the socioeconomic sphere, a poverty reduction strategy programme which

was being finalized with the international financial institutions (IFIs) was

postponed indefinitely.

The mutiny also induced donor fatigue. At a donors’ conference in Lisbon in

February 2005 donors were emphatic that they were awaiting the outcome

of the presidential poll, re-scheduled from March toJune 2005, before firming

up pledges to help Guinea-Bissau’s its $84 million (CFA42billion) budget

deficit for 2005.(IRIN 14 February 2005).

The events of October 6-7 2004, therefore, aggravated the complex and multi-

sectoral challenges facing Guinea-Bissau. But on the positive side:

The MOU acknowledged corruption in the upper echelons of the armed

forces (IRINnews.org, 11 Oct. 2004)

October 6-7 drew greater and urgent attention of the civilian authorities

and the international community towards military reform in the country.

It also led to ECOWAS and CPLP to consider having an enhanced and

more permanent presence in the country.

ECOWAS’ widow’s mite of half a million dollars towards the settlement of

the arrears was a practical demonstration of commitment, coming as it

were, from an impoverished organization.

Chief of Staff General Waie, a liberation war veteran, from the majority Balante

ethnic group emerged as a consensus figure. The regional implication of

appointment was that because in 2001 he spearheaded the campaign to flush out

46

MFDC bases inside Guinea-Bissau his appointment would be favourable to Senegal.

But he had little formal education and reportedly he did not speak formal

Portuguese only the corrupted Creole version (IRINnews.org, 28 Oct. 2004). On

assumption of office, he promised to restore unity and harmony in the military, keep

it in the barracks and out of politics provided the politicians would keep off military

affairs.

General Waie first action was to order the reintegration of 65 senior officers who

were purged from the ranks following the civil war and various military uprisings

and changes of governments over the last seven or so years. Among those made a

come back were associates of both Mane and Vieira. For example, Brigadier

Humberto Gomes, one time chief of staff under Vieira, and from the same Papel

ethnic group as Seabra, returned as Waie’s principal military adviser. Commandore

Mohamed Lamine Lanha, former head of navy and close associate of Mane, a fellow

ethnic Madingo became Waie’s naval adviser (IRINnews.org, 2 Dec. 2004). While

apparently these appointments provided a more ethnic and political balance in the

upper echelons of the armed forces, the bigger question, to me, was whether what

Guinea-Bissau needed to restore stability was the recycling of aged war veterans?

Lessons

The vicious cycle of war and peace in Guinea Bissau and ECOWAS’ involvement

provide several lessons for both country and regional body.

Internally, Guinea-Bissau is a test case of the futility of a politicized military trying to

midwife democratic governance. Secondly, lack of adequate internal resources for

the security sector has become a source of instability. The inability of the Guinean

government to pay the salaries and improve the conditions in the barracks has been

a constant refrain in that country’s recurrent destabilization. Thirdly, for a country

of far below 2million people, a military force of 10,000 and 25 military bases across

the country was not acceptable. There was therefore the urgent need for downsizing

of personnel and closure of about half of the bases.

47

On the positive side, however, the manner in which the Guineans resorted to

dialogue to resolve their differences soon after threats of violence in 2003 and 2004

was an important resource that could be tapped into in helping to bring sustainable

peace in Guinea-Bissau. It was an opportunity for ECOWAS to utilize its Council of

Elders to mediate between political factions and defuse tensions on more consistent

basis than the ‘rescue operations’ that it had often resorted to.

On the regional plane:

Vieira’s ouster despite ECOMOG’s presence brought back embarrassing

memories of Samuel Doe’s capture in Monrovia in 1990 and together the two

incidents represent two major low points in ECOWAS efforts at maintaining

regional stability.

Nigeria’s inability or unwillingness to be in Guinea-Bissau or to play a leading

role, on the one hand, demonstrated its limitations as a regional hegemon but

on the other, the failure of ECOMOG in its absence emphasised Nigeria’s

importance for effective regional conflict management. Guinea-Bissau,

particularly in1998-99, proved beyond doubt that to a large extent the

success of conflict management in the sub-region depended on how Nigeria

balanced its use of aggressive force with building partnership with its

regional neighbours through a more institutional approach. Other ECOWAS

member states should recognise the ‘big brother’ role of Nigeria as a virtue to

be cherished rather than a vice to be despised. Other regions in Africa had

not had the fortune of a regional hegemon with Nigeria’s notable zeal in

steering ECOWAS affairs.

ECOWAS’ virtual withdrawal and stone silence after it had salvaged each

crisis is not good enough. Its continued (over-)reverence for the sovereignty

of member states in spite of changed circumstances has also not been helpful.

It should not have left Guinea-Bissau to its own devices particularly when

Yala assumed office. Various ECOWAS documents, as earlier outlined, make it

48

incumbent on the Community not to turn a blind eye on violations of good

governance and human rights. It is my submission, therefore, that ECOWAS

should see sovereignty more in terms of responsibility and insist on good

governance from all its members.

The initial rivalry between ECOWAS and CPLP in which they were as at odds

as the combatants and their subsequent cooperation thereafter

demonstrated the ugly and the good faces of multi-party negotiation. It was

therefore gratifying that both groups after the October mutiny pledged to

establish a more enhanced and permanent presence in Guinea-Bissau but it

would be more beneficial for them to have a joint coordinating mechanism

with the African Union (AU) and UN to ensure synergy and complementarity

and avoid duplication of efforts.

The swift manner in which ECOWAS leaders brokered a negotiated

settlement in September 2003 was commendable and even infectious. It was

indeed an innovate addition to ECOWAS’ conflict management toolkit

sourced from the traditional African practice where elders got up at dawn to

settle disputes in the family But the events of October 2004 proved that such

‘rescue operations’ were inadequate.

The 2004 mutiny in also demonstrated how ECOWAS peacekeepers could

easily degenerate from agents of stability in war-torn states into sources of

instability in their respective countries. Like the 1994 Gambian coup a

decade earlier the October 2004 mutiny was organised by returning

peacekeepers

Conclusion

There is no doubt about need for political dialogue among the local actors in Guinea-

Bissau to ensure the continuation and completion of the transition and the

maintenance post transition stability. As well, there must be a more constructive

civil-military relations aimed at ensuring that the military strictly observes the

principle of subordinating to civilian political authorities. All groups, particularly

the military leaders should rise above their partisan interest and ambitions and help

49

to preserve and consolidate peace and stability during the transition and beyond. It

should be clear to all those concerned that only Guineans in the final analysis can

maintain the peace in their society and that the international community cannot and

will not continue to come to ‘rescue’ them ad infinitum. A more professional military

in Guinea-Bissau could contribute to, rather than detract from, regional stability.

And, for me, the recent recycling of aged, politically tainted officers is not the way to

go.

The state-focused approach that ECOWAS has adopted in Guinea-Bissau without

taking into account the regional dimensions of the conflict has been counter-

productive. Neither has the extra regional rivalry over that country been given due

recognition. The fact is that there was no way that the crisis in Guinea-Bissau could

be effectively resolve without putting it in the broader regional context. The

Casamance conflict, for example, has remained intertwined with the Guinean one

and the one cannot be resolved by turning a blind eye to the other. ECOWAS also

needs to work more in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase in those countries it

intervenes to avoid the recurrence of such crisis as the Guinea-Bissau situation

amply proves. ECOWAS needs to examine the pace set by the UN in Liberia (UNOL)

and Guinea-Bissau.

Admittedly, the problems of Guinea-Bissau are the capacities and capabilities

beyond that country and the regional body alone. Their activities should be

coordinated with and supported by the international community. In this direction,

given Guinea-Bissau’s chronic revenue deficiency, the UN Emergency Economy

Management Fund and other donor partners must remained engaged beyond the

transition in order to sustain the peace.

50

In sum, all stakeholders should be more proactive in addressing the root causes of

conflict, namely, absence of safeguards against human rights abuses, lack of effective

participation and marginalisation of civil society. Not only is good governance the

best guarantee of security, but it is after all more profitable to resolve conflict

peacefully than to invoke peace after violent conflict.

ADDENDUM

Much has happened in Guinea-Bissau since this paper was presented in 2005. Vieira

had staged a miraculous comeback when he won the 2005 presidential election as an

independent candidate, but stability in Guinea Bissau never improved. Vieira, after

surviving previous attempts on his life, was assassinated in 2009.

Bibliography

Amnesty International Report 1999

Kofi Annan (2004) Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in Guinea-Bissau

on Activities of the UN peacebuilding Support office (UNOGBISS), 15 December,

S/2004/996

S.G. Amoo(1993), “Role of the OAU: Past, present and Future”, David R Smock, ed,

Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa, Washington D. C.,

USIP.

E.G. Berman, and K. E Sams (2000), Peacekeeping in Africa: culpabilities and

Culpabilities, Geneva/Pretoria: UNIDIR/ISS

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (BDHRL), Country Reports on

Human Rights Practices- Guinea Bissau, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 & 2004

Patrick Chabal (1983) Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadrship and People’s War,

London: Hurst

CPJ Africa (2000) “Guinea-Bissau” Country Report 2000,

http://www.cpj.org/attacks00/africa/Guinea-Bissau.html

51

Chester Crocker, Fen O. Hampson and Pamela, eds. (1999), Herding Cats: Multiparty

Mediation in a Complex World, Washing D.C: USIP Press

Chester Crocker, Fen O. Hampson and Pamela, ed. (2001), Turbulent Peace: The

Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Washing D.C: USIP Press

Basil Davidson (1981) No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky: The Liberation of

Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, London/New Jersey: Zed Press

ECOWAS (1998)Agreement Between the Government of Guinea Bissau and the Self-

Proclaimed Military Junta, Abuja, 1 November 1998

ECOWAS (1999) Final Communique of ECOWAS Ministers Meeting, Lome, 24-25

May

ECOWAS Declaration of Political Principles,1991

ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict, Management, Resolution,

Peace-Keeping and Security, 1999

ECOWAS Revised Treaty 1993.

Comfort Ero (2000) “ECOMOG: A, Model for Africa.” ISS MONOGRAPH SERIES, No.46

February, pp.97-120.

Alexander K. D. Frempong (1999), a Sub-Regional Approach to Conflict Resolution in

Africa: The Case of ECOWAS and the Liberian Peace Process, (1990-1997) , M. Phil

Thesis, Dept. of Political Science, University of Ghana.

Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (2002) Guinea-Bissau Fact File,

http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/GuineaBissau/guineabis1 .html

Karim Hussein & Donata Gnisci (2003) Report on Seminar on “Conflict and

Development Policy in the Mano River Region and Cote d’Ivoire: The Regional Stakes

to Stability and Reconstruction” Paris, 13-14 May 2003

M. M Khobe.(2000), “The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG in West Africa.” ISS

MONOGRAPH SERIES, No. 46, February, pp.97-120.

Terhi Lehtinen, The Military-Civilian Crisis in Guinea Bissau,

http://www.conflicttransform.net.pdf, pp120-131

52

Simon Massey (2004) “Multi-faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau War”

http://academic.sun.ac.za/mil/scientia_militaria/Internet%20vol%2032(1)massey-

2004pdf

Simon Massey (2004) “Multi-faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau War”

http://academic.sun.ac.za/mil/scientia_militaria/Internet%20vol%2032(1)massey-

2004pdf

Monique Mekenkamp (1999) “Giunea-Bissau:Democracy Restored by a Military

Coup?” Searching for Peace in Africa,

http://www.enconflict.org/dev/ECCP/ELCPSurveys_v0_10.nsf/0/DB470-

c3EFE6DC1256B2700317DE2?opendocument

David B Meyers., (1974), “ Intra-regional Conflict Management by the OAU.”

International Organisation, No.3, Summer, pp345-373.

Northedge, F. S. and N. D. Donelan, (1971), International Disputes: The Political

Aspects, London: Europa Publications.

Andrea E. Ostheimer (2001) “the Structural Crisis in Guinea Bissau’s Political

System.” African Security Review Vol.10 No.4

http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/10No4?Ostheimer.html

David Quayat (1999) “The United Nations and Regional Organizations: A New

Paradigm for Peace?” Conference of Defence Association Institute, Second Annual

Student Symponium, 12-13November 1999,

http://www.cda-cdai.cdsymposia/1999/quat99.htm

Alan Rake (1998) “Will Peace Hold?” New Africa, No.366 September

Lars Rudebeck (2001) On Democracy’s Sustainability: Transition in Guinea-Bissau,

Sida Studies No.4

Severine M. Rugumamu (2002) Conflict Management in Africa: Diagnosis of Current

Practices and Future Prospects, Addis Abba

Mohamed Sahnoun (1996) “Managing Conflicts in the Post Cold War Era” in

Managing Conflict in the Post Cold War World: the Role of Intervention, Report of

53

Aspen Institute Conference August 2-6 1995, (Aspen Colorado: Aspen Institute,

pp.89-96

Salim, Salim A. (1990), “Preventive Diplomacy Among African States”

DISARMAMENT, Vol.XIII, No 3, pp. 175-190.

Bruno Sonko (2004) “The Casamance Conflict: A Forgotten Civil War?” CODESRIA

Bulletin Nos. 3&4, pp.30-33.

John Stedman, (1997), “International Intervention and Internal Wars, World

Politics, Vol. 49, No.4, July

Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org

Gary Wilson (2003), “UN Authorized Enforcement: Regional Organizations versus

Coalitions of the Willing”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 10 (2), Summer, pp.89-

106

World Guide 2001/2002, “Cape Verde”

I. William Zartman (1995) Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil War,

Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institute

54