CODESRIA’S MULTINATIONAL WORKING GROUP ONCITIZENSHIP AND

IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA, 2005-2006

PROJECT REPORT

THE SETTLER FACTOR IN THE ELECTORAL POLITICS OF GHANA’S FOURTH

REPUBLIC: A STUDY OF FIVE CONSTITUENCIES IN ASHANTI AND EASTERN

REGIONS1

ALEXANDER K. D. FREMPONG

kaadupong2002@yahoo.co.uk

1.0: INTRODUCTION

In December 2004, Ghanaians witnessed the fourth in an unbroken chain of general

elections since 1992. Governments formed after elections, since the overthrow of

Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party (CPP) regime in 1966 had also been

overthrown half way through their first terms followed by long spells of military rule

(1981-1992).

Until 1992, two main political traditions – the Nkrumahist and the Danquah-Busiaist -

had dominated Ghanaian politics. The Nkrumahist under President Nkrumah led the

country to independence and ruled for nine years. Thirteen years after it was

overthrown (1966), the Nkrumahist came back to power in 1979 in the Third Republic

under banner of President Hilla Limann’s People’s National Party (PNP). The Danquah-

Busia tradition, named after two of its stalwarts, Joseph B. Danquah and Kofi A. Busia,

1 Ejura Sekyedumase and New Edubiase constituencies in Ashanti Region; Fanteakwa and Afram Plains North and South constituencies, in the Eastern Region.

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stayed in opposition throughout the Nkrumah era. The group assumed power in the

Second Republic (1969-1972) under the Progress Party with Busia as Prime Minister.

At the start of the Fourth Republic (1992), a third tradition, the Rawlings tradition in the

form of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), had emerged. This group won the

1992 and 1996 elections. The Danquah-Busiaists regrouped in 1992 under the banner of

the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and contested the 1992 and 1996 elections but only

succeeded in capturing power in 2000, a mandate that was renewed in 2004. But the

Nkrumahists split into several weak political parties that have persistently controlled

less than five percent of parliamentary seats.

1.1: The Problematic

The voting pattern in the 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections brings to the fore a

number of issues related to the question of citizenship and identity in contemporary

Africa:

At the national level there has been increasing polarization of the electorate

along the dominant (in terms of numbers) Akan-speaking and Non-Akan-

speaking divide.

In the cosmopolitan Greater Accra Region, not only has there been persistent

calls on political parties to field indigenous Ga (Accra) candidates, but the

regional voting pattern reveals a struggle for power between natives/indigenes

and residents/settlers.

More significant for our purposes here, a number of constituencies with

significant settler populations, particularly in the Ashanti and Eastern regions

have persistently voted against the regional pattern. Apparently, this is an

extension of the increasing parochial politics of settlers and indigenes but they

may also represent the protest vote of groups that may define themselves as the

victims of long term exclusion.2

2 (CODESRIA 2004).

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The most serious threat to Ghana’s fledgling democracy is the fact is that the two

dominant political parties in the country, the ruling NPP and the opposition NDC have

been associated with two dominant ethnic groups, Ashanti and Ewe respectively. And

apparently, electoral issues have been viewed through those lenses with other ethnic

groups taking sides along those lines. On the whole, the Akan-speaking regions of

Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern and Western have in most cases voted NPP while

the non-Akan Volta, Northern, Upper East and Upper West, the NDC.

The choice of the five constituencies for this study– New Edubiase, Ejura Sekyedumase,

Fanteakwa, Afram Plains North and South is deliberate. They are all rural with

considerable settler components and lie within the ruling NPP strongholds of Ashanti

and Eastern regions but they have persistently voted for the NDC. The voting patterns in

these five constituencies are instructive of the increasing significance of the settler

factor in electoral politics in the Fourth Republic. In the 1969 and 1979 elections, these

areas had supported the Danquah-Busiaists, like most other areas in Ashanti and

Eastern Regions, but since 1992 the support base has shifted to the emergent Rawlings

tradition, the NDC.

Against this background, to what extent does social identity impact on elections? How

does the interplay of ethnicity and the indigenous-settler rivalry affect the manner

competing candidates and parties attempt to outbid one another? And what

implications do they have for democratic consolidation? This work is based on the

premise that the settler factor has been the most significant determinant of electoral

outcomes in the five constituencies in the Fourth Republic. However, we also accept the

general Conflict Analysis thesis that there are usually multiple causes and factors that

underlie all kinds of conflicts, violent as well as non-violent. This calls for a systematic

study of the history, actors and dynamics of electoral politics in the selected case

studies. The study, therefore, delves into issues like the electoral history of the

respective constituencies; the depth of indigenous-settler rivalry and its interplay with

other factors and electoral strategies of competing parties.

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The study involves the following:

1. A review of literature on citizenship, social identities and electoral politics.

2. A sketch of the electoral history of Ghana with special emphasis on the case studies

3. An examination of the population components of the five constituencies in the

broader context of the ethnic structure of Ghana.

4. An analysis of the underlying factors and dynamics of electoral behaviour with focus

on the indigenous-settler relationship.

5. A review of the electoral campaign strategies of competing parties and electoral

outcomes.

6. An outline of the implications for Ghana’s democratic consolidation

1.2: Methodology

This work involved archival research and a field study. There was intense internet and

archival searches to beef up the theoretical foundations of the study. The fieldwork

entailed informal interviews with the major stakeholders – Members of Parliament (past

and present), party executives, District Assembly officials, traditional authorities of both

indigenous and settler groups, local media, as well as randomly selected residents within

each constituency to sample their views on various aspects of social identity and

electoral politics.

The data analysis is largely qualitative and the thematic approach has been adopted for

the write-up. There is comparative analysis among the five constituencies and with their

respective regions.

1.3: Significance of Study

Issues of citizenship, identity and xenophobia have become important political

questions in contemporary Africa in terms of multi-party democracy and the general

stability of the continent. In the Ghanaian context, it is apparent that the expansion of

the democratic space has led to intense ethnicization of electoral politics, which in turn,

threatens the very foundations of the democratic process. This work then focuses on

one aspect of the impact of ethnicity on democracy. The outcome of this study

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therefore, apart from being academically educative, serves as a useful basis for policy

dialogue and advocacy for reform. Lessons learnt can strengthen the participation of

minorities, settlers and other marginalized groups in the effort to influence policy

through elections (Hughes 2005).

2.0: CITIZENSHIP, SOCIAL IDENTITY AND ELECTORAL POLITICS: A REVIEW OF THE

LITERATURE

The study has its theoretical underpinnings in citizenship, social identity and electoral

politics. Citizenship, according to J. M. Barbalet, defines the members (and implicitly

non-members) of a common society. It directly addresses the rights and obligations

involved in the relationship between the individual and the community and the ways

the relationship impacts political participation. Citizenship reflects a set of expectations

that the community and its members have of one another.3 On his part, Said Adejumobi

says “citizenship in its ordinary usage is about the rights, benefits, privileges and duties

of an individual as a member of a political community, usually the state”.4 To him,

citizenship is an instrument of political exclusion and social closure through which a

state seeks to create a common identity for itself and denies such to others. In the

context of the nation-state, citizenship is about creating a convergence of diversity of

ethnic, religious, political spatial and social differences by ensuring a regime of equal

rights, privileges and obligation as the bound of national identity5. Ultimately citizenship

relates to the broader issues of democracy, rule of law, social justice, equity, and

fairness in the management of state affairs. It relates to the social character of state

construction on how the state will benefit not just a group, a few or social class but will

distribute its social values in a way to alleviate fears and insecurity by individuals and

groups in the political community.6 That is why when a social group is thoroughly

marginalized and its social existence threatened in a political context it may resort to

arms to fight for citizenship rights or mainstream itself into the political process.7

3 (Barbalet 1988).4 (Adejumobi 2004: 5). 5 (Ibid)6 (Adejumobi 2004:8)7 (Ibid: 7).

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The political liberalization process from the early 1990s has provided a new framework

for the articulation of this relationship between citizenship and identity. The advent of

multiparty democracy in Africa has heightened the political significance of this game of

distinguishing “citizens” from “non-citizens”, which is often played to the advantage of

the indigene. Perhaps the unintended impact of this (and crucial for our purposes here)

is the fact that such discourses and actions tend to arouse the identity consciousness of

settler or migrant communities. Where the settler community forms a significant

proportion of the population, it could, by bloc voting, become the ‘king-makers’ in

elections. Equally, the deepening of poverty, social inequalities and declining social

welfare under globalization, especially in developing countries, has pushed many

individuals into sectarian identities, reinforce their potency in society and made them

alternative sites of political struggles fuelling tension and conflict in many countries.8

The situation in Ghana is not different from other parts of Africa where the return to

multiparty electoral politics has heightened ethnic identity, particularly its differences.

Increasingly, since the return to democratic rule in 1992, ethnic groups are fighting for

their own place in government and share of the “national cake”. And since electoral

success depends on numbers, political parties in Ghana have tended to appeal to

difference ethnic groups to be able to rule. On the other hand, ethnic groups have

tended to identify themselves with parties they think will protect their interest.

In the localities, there is usually a clear distinction between the ‘natives’ or ‘indigenes’ of

those areas who are considered as the ‘local citizens’ and the ‘immigrants’ or ‘settlers’

who are considered as ‘non-citizens’, in spite of the fact that they are all nationals of the

same country.9 Interestingly, ‘settlers’ and ‘natives’ belong together; we cannot have

one without the other, for it is the relationship between them that makes one a settler

and the other a native.10

8 (Adejumobi 2005: 20.)9 (Adejumobi 2005: 27)10 (Mamdani 2000:223).

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In general, indigenes exhibit negative attitudes towards settlers. Settlers are often

socially resented, given negative stereotypes, and sometimes threatened, openly or

veiled. UNDP (2000) confirms this view that settlers, like other minority groups, are

often discriminated against in a number of ways. These include regulations and actions

that target the migrant group, imposition of social practices of the indigenes, economic

exploitation and threats of, actual, or forced re-location. Competition and a sense of

insecurity, therefore, become important factors in inter-group relations; accentuating

group differences, and hardening attitudes and creating a vicious cycle of prejudice and

discrimination.11

The conventional wisdom therefore is that settler communities are at a disadvantage. In

the context of Ghana’s Fourth Republic, however, it is apparent that settlers are

increasingly turning their initial disadvantage into electoral brinksmanship. Particularly,

the rural folks have come to realize that sticking together could enhance their political

influence.

A number of factors have proved favourable to the settlers in this context. Increasingly

the demography has changed over the years in favour of the settlers. The often better-

educated indigenes move out to the urban centres to take up jobs and do not return to

register and vote back home. The net effect is that settler-voters most of whom may be

farmers may outnumber the indigenes. But the settlers need not be dominant in

absolute terms (or be in a majority) to make electoral impact. Conscious of their social

identity and disadvantageous circumstances, settlers are often more likely to vote

together in support of the party they perceive can protect their interests. Indeed, to

them mobilization of communal identity becomes the driving force to make their claims

heard.12 In the case of the five constituencies in our study, it has become fashionable for

the two dominant parties, NPP and NDC, to court the settler votes and in a sense, the

settler groups have achieved greater voice through the electoral channel.

11 (Nukunya 2003: 221). 12 (Murithi 1998).

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More significantly, this potential strength of settler communities tends to impact on the

campaign style and message of candidates and parties during elections. Dickson and

Scheve intimate that social identity can be an important factor in motivating behavior.13

And if voters care about social identity, politicians find it in their interest to make group-

based appeals and social identity concerns affect the platform or campaign manifesto of

party candidates. Simply put, social identity has a striking impact on the strategic

conduct of election campaigns. Competing candidates must decide not only what

policies they would announce but also the level of group rhetoric to employ.14 And, in

the Ghanaian context, the settler factor has affected the choice of candidates as well

(Frempong 2001a: 155).15

The main thrust of this study then is to examine how this complex web of positive and

negative aspects of identity-based electoral politics plays out in the five constituencies.

SECTION 3

THE ETHNIC STRUCTURE AND ELECTORAL POLITICS IN GHANA

In Ghana, it is estimated that there are about ninety ethnic groups, but these are often

reduced to a few large groups. According to the 2000 census data, the prominent

groups are the Akan (49.1%), the Mole Dagbani (16.5%), the Ewe (12.7%), the Ga-

Adangbe (8.0%), the Guan (4.4%), the Gurma (3.9%), the Grusi (2.8%), and the Mande–

Busanga (1.1%) (Ghana Statistical Services, 2002).

While these broad groups are seemingly culturally and linguistically homogeneous,

variations exist among them and their geographical spread further complicates to the

extent that it is sometimes difficult to say whether ethnicity or regionalism is at play

(Frempong 2001: 143-144). To illustrate:

13 (Dickson & Scheve 2004).14 (Ibid).15 In 2000, the NPP in an effort to reverse previous defeats in New Edubiase (Ashanti) and Fanteakwa (Eastern) fielded candidates of settler backgrounds And in 2004, the NDC countered the looming challenge from the ruling NPP in Ejura-Sekyedumase in Ashanti with the choice of a Northerner.

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Akan is a potpourri of about a dozen smaller ethnic groups spread across five

regions of the country.16 Significant among the Akans (for our purposes here)

are Asante17, Akyem18 and Kwahu.19 Each of these groups has developed its own

territorial identity, political consciousness and dialect and they have their petty

jealousies to the extent that it has often been difficult to have the Akans voting

en bloc.

The Mole- Dagbani20 and the Gurma21 are spread in the three northern regions22

and generally referred to as ‘Northerners’ as if the populace in those regions

form a single ethnic group even though most of the languages are not

intelligible to one another.

The Krobos form one group within the Ga-Adangbes23 but whereas the other

sub-groups are found in the Greater Accra Region, the Krobos are found in the

Eastern Region where they share boundary with the Akim Abuakwas.

The Ewes form the largest ethnic group in the Volta Region, but while there are

several other ethnic groups like Krachi and Nchumuru, there is often the

misconception that the Volta region is made up of Ewes.

This weird mix of ethnicity with regionalism has allowed cultural entrepreneurs to

equivocate to suit their purposes.24

Another aspect of the ethnic structure in Ghana are significant: while there is a rough

coincidence of ethnicity and administrative regions, each region also serves as home to

a sizable number of “strangers” and others who might have migrated from their “home”

regions. Several Ewes are scattered in several parts of the Akan regions. They form

15.9% of the population in the Eastern Region, 5.9% in Western, 4.7% in Central and 16 The Akan Regions are Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern and Western.17 Asante, anglicized as Ashanti, constitutes 14.8 per cent of all Ghanaians by birth, and 30.1 per cent of the total Akan population in the country. 18 The Akyem, also called Akim has three sub-groups – Abuakwa, Bosome and Kotoku19 Other Akan groups include: Fante, Brong, Akwapim, Kwahu, Assin, Agona, Aowin Denkyira, Wassaw, Nzema.20 Mole-Dagbani comprises Dagbomba, Frafra, Mamprusi, Nanumba, Gonja.21 The Gurma includes Kokombas, Kyambas, Basare.22 The three northern regions are Northern, Upper East and Upper West.23 Other Ga-Dangbe sub-groups include Ga, Ada, Osudoku, Shai.24 For instance, an individual may be described as an ethnic Akan or ethnic Asante under varying scenarios.

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3.1% in Ashanti. Similarly, 15.7% of the population in Brong Ahafo, 7.7% in Ashanti, and

4.7% in Western are of Mole-Dagbani descent (Frempong 2006: 161). Thus certain

ethnic groups have become substantial minorities but the conditions and terms of

migration have ensured that they have not been integrated into their new homes. Land

relations have been at the heart of the dichotomy between strangers (settlers) and

natives. Often the steep terms of tenancies and related labour relations and the social

vulnerability and stigmatization of the strangers have worked to keep the two groups

separate (Tsikata 2004: 16-17). It is these stranger groups that have increasingly gained

electoral voice in the constituencies under study.

Section 3(a) - Ethnicity and Electoral History of Ghana

Ethnic identity and its interface with electoral politics in Ghana is an old one, dating

particularly to the emergence of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) in 1954 to

challenge the dominance of Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP).

The NLM was a largely Ashanti-based movement which according to its founder, Baffour

Osei Akoto, was an attempt by Ashanti to safeguard its national identity and reverse the

trend which threatened its traditional institutions with extinction. In its effort to capture

power at national level the NLM sought alliances with other ethnic/regionalist parties-

the Northern People’s Party in the North and the Anlo Youth Organization (AYO) in

Trans-Volta (Boahen 1975). Thus the Anlos (Ewes) who in the pre-colonial era were

allies the Ashantis renewed their alliance before independence (Nugent 1999: 307). The

relations between the two groups got a major boost following the passage of the

Avoidance of Discrimination Act by the Nkrumah government in 1957. The law banned

all organizations, parties and societies that were confined to particular tribal, racial and

religious groups which were used for political purposes. Consequently, the existing

opposition parties and associations including the two regional parties, NLM in Ashanti

and AYO in Volta, came together to form the United Party (UP) in 1957 under the

leadership of K. A. Busia (Akan).

But this unity did not live long after the 1966 coup which incidentally was led by an Ewe,

Col. E. K. Kotoka and an Ashanti, Major A. A. Afrifa. The event which crystallized the

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Akan –Ewe rivalry was the 1967 abortive coup. Since then most conflict laden ethnic

cleavage in contemporary Ghana has been between the Akans (particularly Ashantis)

and the Ewes. Though not motivated by ethnic considerations, the killing of Kotoka and

two other Ewe officers by junior Akan officers in the 1967 coup attempt served to

promote the view among Ewes that there was an Akan plot against them and at the

same time gave credence to the perception by the Akans that there was an ‘Ewe

offensive’ to be contained (Brown 1982: 57). By mid 1968 individual NLC leaders had

sought alliance with politicians from their own ethnic communities. There was

widespread public knowledge of Afrifa’s campaign against the Ewe, K. A. Gbedemah

( and his National Alliance of Liberals [NAL]) and his support for K. A. Busia, the Akan

(and his Progress Party[PP] ; and of Harlley’s support for Gbedemah.25 The NLC thus

became directly involved in the promotion of ethnic alliances as the dominant basis for

the 1969 election (Ibid).

Furthermore, the 1969 elections and subsequent events exacerbated the Asante-Ewe

cleavage. The underlying factor of the 1969 electoral campaign, particularly in southern

Ghana, was a confrontation between the ‘Ewe party’ (NAL) and the ‘Akan party’ (PP)

and the mobilization of these ethnic identities which provided the backcloth to the

various constituency campaigns. In Ewe areas NAL activists campaigned on the basis

that Gbedemah could not deceive his fellow Ewes, while the Progress Party in the Akan

areas repeatedly referred to the ‘Ewe menace’ image of Gbedemah and his party

(Brown 1982: 58). Not surprisingly 83.5% of Ewe voters supported Gbedemah while

Busia got 77.7% of the in the predominant Akan regions of Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and

Central.

The 1969 voting pattern produced a situation in which the labels of ‘Government’ and

‘Opposition’ effectively denoted the Akan and Ewe ethnic groups respectively

(Goldsworthy 1973: 12-13). The emergence of NAL as the main opposition group, it also

furthered the myth of the Ewes as an oppositionist threat to national unity; a myth

25 By the election year in 1969 Afrifa had become the NLC chairman and J.W.K. Harlley, an Ewe, his Deputy.

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which the Akan-based government proceeded to utilize (Brown 1982: 58). Opposition

leader, Gbedemah who could have been a moderating influence was disqualified from

parliamentary membership, ‘not at the government’s direct instigation but certainly

with its connivance’ (Goldsworthy 1973: 13).26 Ewes were also excluded from all cabinet

and junior ministerial positions and they fared badly in appointments and promotions in

the upper echelons of the police, the armed forces and the civil service; the Volta

Region lagged behind in regional resource allocation (Brown 1982: 58). The dismissal of

568 public servants by the Busia government was perceived by the Ewes as a tribalist

reprisal against their people and NAL sympathizers (Frempong 2001: 146).27 But ethnic

rivalry of the Second Republic came to a head in June 1970 when G. K. Agama, the NAL

opposition leader, in a motion in the national Assembly described the Prime Minister

and his government as tribalist. Victor Owusu in reaction had attacked the NAL

leadership as representing a community ‘notorious for its inward looking tribalism’

(Brown 1982:58).

During the 1979 election Ashanti-Ewe rivalry emerged again. Even though, there was no

Ewe presidential candidate, Ewes voted massively against the Popular Front Party (PFP)

Victor Owusu’s presidential bid. The PFP was largely based on the defunct Progress

Party with its continuing image of Ashanti/Brong Ahafo dominance and favouritism. In

the first round presidential poll, Victor Owusu won in 18 of the 22 Ashanti

constituencies and 11 out of the 13 in Brong Ahafo but none at all in the Volta Region

where he only got a paltry 12.12% of the votes cast. The picture was no different in the

run-off; while Owusu had 57.69% and 61.7% in Ashanti and Brong Ahafo respectively,

Volta Region gave him only 14.43%. His rejection in the Volta Region clearly resulted

from his perceived personal antipathy towards Ewe and the fact that his leadership of

the PFP accentuated its Ashanti image (Jeffries 1980: 402, 414).

26 Gbedemah was disqualified from Parliament following a court suit by his PP opponent in the Keta Constituency, E.B. Awoonor-Williams , also an Ewe, on the basis of Article 71 of the 1969 which banned people against whom adverse findings by a commission of enquiry were barred from holding public office.27 The dismissal of the civil servants (Apollo 568) was ostensibly under the Transitional Provisions of the 1969 Constitution, which had restricted the dismissals to only appointments made by the NLC.

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During the PNDC era (1981-1992) ethnic rivalry was further strengthened by Kofi

Awoonor (1984), an Ewe and a leading member of the PNDC regime.28 Awoonor has

asserted that “…no government can govern in Ghana without Ewe participation, he

explained:

This should be ascribed to the fact that Ewes the second largest ethnic group in

the country, see themselves in opposition to all governments in Ghana

which inevitably became Akan (Ashanti) dominated…as it were, the contest for

power is reduced in simple terms to a fierce contest between the Akan

(Ashanti) and the Ewes. The large Ewe presence in the civil service, military

and institutions of learning is seen as an effective check on Ashanti effort at

hegemony (Awoonor 1984: 57).

Throughout the decade of PNDC rule there were serious allegations of Ewe domination

of government and all its agencies and ethnic and regional discontent ran high though

muted owing to the culture of silence imposed by that regime (Benning 1999:342). Not

surprisingly, some Ashantis contemplated Ashanti secession or at least a return to the

federal dream of the NLM days (Ibid: 363).

The path towards the return to constitutional rule in the Fourth Republic was strewn

with a replay of Ashanti-Ewe rivalry, a la, the Second Republic (Frempong 2001: 146).

The presidential candidates of the two leading political parties that emerged during the

1992 elections; Jerry Rawlings of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and Adu

Boahen of the New Patriotic Party were half-Ewe and half-Ashanti respectively and by

extension the parties came to be associated with the two ethnic groups.

The results of the 1992 presidential elections were instructive as far as the home regions

of the two candidates were concerned. Rawlings won a whopping 93.2% in the Volta

28 Kofi Awoonor had published a book, The Ghanaian Revolution, in which he elaborated the dynamics of the Akan (Ashanti)-Ewe rivalry.

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Region and 32.9% in Ashanti Region; while for Adu Boahen it was 60.5% in Ashanti and a

mere 3.6% in Volta Region (Ibid: 147). The 1996 lection followed a similarly pattern.

Since 2000 however, what initially was initially an Ashanti-Ewe rivalry has increasingly

assumed broader dimensions along the Akan/Non-Akan divide. In the 2000 and 2004

elections the NPP succeeded in pulling the various Akan groups in its support, while the

NDC has retained its dominance in the Non-Akan regions. In 2004, the NPP at the

secured between 51% and 75% of the presidential vote and 100 out of the 129

parliamentary seats in the Akan regions of Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern and

Western. But in fourth Non-Akan regions of Volta, Northern, Upper East and Upper

West, NPP had less than 30% of the presidential vote and only 12 parliamentary seats.

On the other hand, NDC won between 56% and 84% of presidential votes in those four

regions with 54 out of the 90 parliamentary seats. The only exception to this rule is the

cosmopolitan Greater Accra Region. Significantly, the Akan form about 40% of the

regions population (Frempong 2006a: 176-178). It is against this background that the

pockets of Non-Akan ‘resistance’ in Ashanti and Eastern Regions become intriguing.

Section 3 (b) - The Electoral System

Ghana’s 1992 Constitution goes to great lengths in avoiding discrimination. Article 17(2)

for example, says ‘A person shall not be discriminated against on grounds of gender,

race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status.’ Article 35(5)

prohibits ‘discrimination and prejudice on grounds of place of origin, circumstances of

birth, ethnic origin, gender or religion, creed or other beliefs.’ And in Article 35 (6) ‘the

State is to take appropriate steps to foster a spirit of loyalty to Ghana that overrides

sectional, ethnic and other loyalties (emphasis mine).

With reference to the legislature the Constitution does not discriminate between

natives and settlers. Article 94(b) requires a parliamentary candidate to be resident in

the constituency for which he stands or has resided there for a total period of not less

than five years out of the ten immediately preceding the election or he hails from the

constituency. In practice, however there is the tendency for settlers to be discriminated

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against by the native. That is the more reason why the selection of settlers as candidates

in our case studies assumes greater significance.

SECTION 4 - CASE STUDIES

SECTION 4 (a) - SOCIO-POLTICAL PROFILE OF REGIONS AND CONSTITUENCIES

Our case studies fall under two regions – the Ashanti and Eastern regions. The two

regions exhibit similarities as well as differences. The Ashanti Region which is centrally

located in the middle belt of Ghana is 24,389 square kilometers in geographical size,

(10.2% of the total land mass) and the third largest in the country. 29 In terms of

population, Ashanti is the most populous with 19.1% of the total population30 and has

21 districts and 39 constituencies. On its part, the Eastern Region with an area of 19,323

square kilometers, occupies 8.1 per cent of the total land area of Ghana, and is the sixth

largest region of the country.31 With 11.1% of the total population, Eastern is the third

most populous32 and has 17 districts and 28 constituencies. The two regions lie within

forest and savanna woodland vegetation zones and are rich in minerals like gold and

diamonds, cash crops like timber, cocoa and coffee and many food crops; which have

made them attractive migrant destination.

Ethnically speaking, both regions are Akan-dominated (77.9%) in Ashanti and 52.1% in

Eastern), but they differ in their details. In Ashanti, 78.9% of the Akan population is

Asante while in Eastern, the Akan population33 is unevenly distributed among the Akim,

Akwapim, Kwahu and Asante (New Juaben) sub-groups. Again, in Ashanti the Non-Akan

population comprising mainly the Mole- Dagbani (9.0%), the Ewe (3.2%), the Grusi

(2.4%), the Mande-Busanga (1.8%) and the Ga-Dangme (1.4%) are all settlers who have

migrated from their respective traditional areas outside the region. But in the Eastern

29 Ashanti shares boundaries with four regions, Brong-Ahafo in the north, Eastern region in the east, Central region in the south and Western region in the south-west.

30 (2000 Population Census)31Eastern shares boundaries with five regions, Ashanti to the west and north-west, Brong Ahafo to north-east, Volta to the east, Greater Accra to the south and south-east and Central to the south and south-west 32 (2000 Population Census)33 The Akan predominates in 11 of the 17 districts, with variation from 68 to 80 per cent of the population.

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Region the Non-Akan Ga-Adangbe (mainly Krobos)34 (18.9%) and Guans (7.2%) also have

their traditional homes within the region, together with settler (non-indigenous) Ewes

who form 15.9% of the regions population and scattered in several constituencies.35

The differing patterns of ethnic distribution in the two regions have impacted differently

on the electoral fortunes of the Danquah-Busia tradition (previously against the

Nkrumah, and currently, the Rawlings tradition). While in the Ashanti Region the Akan-

linked Danquah-Busia has persistently dominated, in the Eastern Region, it has struggled

to maintain control of the Akan areas and fared badly in the Non-Akan areas.

In 1992, the NPP and other opposition parties had boycotted the December

parliamentary election, claiming the November presidential poll had been rigged. As a

result, the NDC had won all the 33 parliamentary seats in Ashanti Region and all but

four36 of the 26 seats in the Eastern Region. All the five constituencies under review

were controlled by the NDC in the first parliament of the Fourth Republic (1993-1997).

The focus of this section therefore is on the three elections since transition election

1992 (i.e.1996, 2000 and 2004).

In 1996, the NPP succeeded in capturing, at both parliamentary and presidential levels,

28 out of the 33 seats in Ashanti. The remaining five included Ejura Sekyedumase and

New Edubiase.37 In the Eastern Region, the NPP captured nine parliamentary seats and

won in eleven constituencies at the presidential level. Fanteakwa and Afram Plains

however remained tightly under NDC control. By the end of the 2000 elections, the NPP

34 The Yilo Krobo and Manya Krobo Districts have the largest concentration of the Ga-Dangbes , who constitute 70.0 per cent of the inhabitants of these two districts; but in Fanteakwa which shares boundaries with the two districts the Krobos are settlers on Akim Abuakwa lands.

35 The Ewes are found mainly in the Asuogyaman (39.1%) and the Afram Plains (50.8%) Districts, while the Guan inhabit the Akwapim North (34.5%), the Suhum-Kraboa- Coaltar (17.0%) and Asuogyaman, (14.1%) Districts.

36 Three of the four seats- Abetifi, Birim, North and New Juaben North- had gone to the National Convention Party (NCP), while the Abuakwa seat was the only seat nationwide that the Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE) party won. NCP and EGLE were in alliance with the NDC and fielded a single presidential ticket in 1992. 37 The three others were Adansi Asokwa and Ahafo Ano North and Asokwa East. In the latter two cases, the NDC won the parliamentary but not the presidential. Thus it was only in Adansi Asokwa, Ejura Sekyedumase and New Edubiase were the only ones that the NDC won at both levels.

16

controlled all the seats in Ashanti at both levels except our two case studies; and in the

Eastern Region, NPP’s parliamentary seats had doubled to 18 and it controlled 20 at the

presidential level.

For the 2004 elections, the NPP had hoped to capture all the 39 seats (including 6 newly

created ones) in Ashanti; to capture all the Akan seats in the Eastern Region and make

in-roads in the Non-Akan/settler areas. As it turned out, NPP lost three seats in Ashanti

and six in Eastern which included four of our five case studies.

In this section we examine the demography, electoral history and new voting patterns in

each of the five constituencies.

Ejura-Sekyedumase

Demography

The Ejura-Sekyedumase District which doubles as a constituency (Ejura-Sekyedumase) is

in the northern part of Ashanti Region and was carved out of the then Sekyere and

Offinso Districts in November 1988. The Constituency has a population of 81,115, out of

which 51.7 percent are males and 48.2 are females38. The people in Ejura-Sekyedumase

District form 2.2% of the region’s population. Using the 5,000 population yardstick, Ejura

(constituency capital) and Sekyedumase are the only two urban centres and together

possess 48.8% of the constituency population (Ibid).39

The ethnic composition of the Constituency is heterogeneous with about fifteen

identifiable groups. Forty-eight (48) percent of the populations are native Asante. The

other Akan sub-groups are Fante and Brong who form 4.2%. Eleven ethnic groups of

Northern descent40 forming a significant 44.8% also live in the constituency. Added to

this is 1% Ewes.

38 (2000 Population and Housing Census Report)39 According to the 2000 Population and Housing Census, Ejura has 29,478 people and Sekyedumase, 10,085. A few settlements which may be classified as semi-urban include Anyinasu (4,707), Dromankuma (2,292), Frante (2,043), Kasei (1,836), Hiawoanwu (1,823) and Aframso (1,336) which serve as service centres to the numerous rural ares scattered throughout the constituency.40 These include Dagbomba, Dagarti, Frafra, Konkomba, Chokosi, Gonja, Grumah, Mamprusi and Busanga. In addition are a total of about 4 percent settlers of Nigerian (Hausa) and Togolese (Kotokoli) decsent.

17

The social system and settlement arrangement of the migrant/settler communities in

Ejura-Sekyedumase is unique. The settler groups, particularly the Northerners live along

‘tribal’ lines with their own chiefs and the localities are named after them-e.g- Dagomba

line for Dogmas and Frafra line, for Frafras’, etc ( Asante 2006: 234) . With regard to

religion, Moslems constitute about 60% of the population and are concentrated in the

‘Zongo’ (Moslem/strangers’ quarters) and the surrounding villages. Christians constitute

about 38% and others 2%.41

The main sources of income of the inhabitants of Ejura-Sekyedumase are from

agriculture. About 60% of the labor force, especially the migrant/settlers are farmers,

followed by trade and commerce (32%) and industry (8%). The major farming activities

include cultivation of maize, yams, cowpea, vegetables and cassava and plantain,

sorghum, poultry and livestock rearing. The capital, Ejura, is also an important market

centre that links southern Ghana with the north (Ibid).

Electoral History

Until it became a constituency in 1992, Ejura Sekyedumase had been part of the

Mampong North Constituency and had been overshadowed in terms of nomination for

parliamentary representation by Mampong. For this reason, Ejura had had the tendency

to align with parties other than the dominant Danquah-Busiaists parties in the region. In

1969, for example, the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL)42 courted Ejura by locating its

constituency headquarters in, and electing its constituency chairman, secretary, and half

of its executives from, Ejura. Though the NAL did not win the Mampong North seat, it

obtained impressive results in the area in the Ejura section of the constituency.43 In

1979, the Mampong North seat had gone to the United National Convention (UNC) but

it was significant that the People’s National Party (PNP) candidate, a Northerner,

defeated the Popular Front Party (PFP) candidate to third place, in a region which the 41 Ejura-Sekyedumase District Assembly Profile 2006.

42 NAL was led by K. A. Gbedemah, an Ewe and the party had strong support in Volta Region and in the Non-Akan areas of the Eastern Region, but failed to win any seat in Ashanti.43 R. R. Amponsah won the Mampong seat for the Progress Party with 8,728, but the 1941 votes for the NAL candidate were by regional standards, very significant.

18

PFP won 19 out of the 22 seats.44 At the presidential level, the constituency voted the

UNC in the first round, but in the second round it supported the PNP. In both instances,

the constituency voted against the dominant PFP.45

New Voting Pattern

In the Ejura Sekyedumase Constituency, the two major parties, NDC and NPP, have kept

changing their candidates for every election since 1996. In the 1996 elections, two

Akans contested as frontrunners-incumbent Peter Boakye-Ansah for NDC and Andrew

Danso for NPP. The three other contestants were from PCP, PNC and NCP whose

combined efforts yielded 6.5%. The NDC won convincingly with 62% leaving the NPP

with 31.5%. In the presidential poll, the NDC defeated NPP 66.4%-31.2%.

In 2000 Sampson Attakora replaced Boakye-Ansah for NDC and the NPP chose Elizabeth

Owusu, in an eight-candidate race which included two independent candidates. The

aggregate vote of the other six candidates was an impressive 26.8%. The NPP retained

the 1996 level with 31.2% but could not defeat the NDC that had a reduced majority of

42%. Once again, the NPP was defeated at the presidential level by 42.7%-49.8%. That

however represented 11.5% improvement for the NPP and 16.6% reduction for the

NDC. Not surprisingly, the NPP had its first ever victory in the constituency in the 2000

presidential run-off by 52.2%- 47.8%.

Defeated candidate, Elizabeth Owusu, became the District Chief Executive (DCE) in 2001

perhaps hoping for a second attempt but, a new comer, Richard Ofori Dwamena

eventually became the NPP candidate for 2004. The NDC conscious of the threat of

incumbency and NPP’s “Operation 39”46 in the region played its trump card by going for

a non-indigene, Issifu Mohammed Pungabu, who hails from Bawku in the Upper East

Region. The strategy worked for the NDC once more; it defeated NPP by 47.2%-37.6%. It

is also significant of the increasing dominance of the settler factor that three of the five

44 A.A. Afrifah, a former military head of state and son of the area was elected on the UNC ticket with 9292 votes, Ustazu Francis (PNP), 3989; J. E. K. Osafo (PFP), 2046 (Daily Graphic 20 June 1979, p.8).45 The Legon Observer, 27 July 1979 p242.46 The NPP has projected that it was going to win all the 39 seats in the Ashanti Region.

19

parliamentary candidates were of northern descent. In addition to the winner were

Raymond Abuska of PNC and Matthias Naala of CPP. The NDC topped that up with a

53.4%- 44.8% presidential victory. An interesting dynamic in this constituency is that the

NDC’s performance at the presidential polls has generally been twice as high as its

regional average while for the NPP, it has often performed only half as much as the

regional average.

New Edubiase

Demography

The New Edubiase Constituency covers a landmass of 1,338 square kilometers, about

5.4% of the total land area of the region. It lies in the south-eastern part of the region

and shares borders to the north and northeast by Adansi North and Amansie East

respectively (both in Ashanti); to the south by Assin North in the Central Region, and to

the east by Birim North and Birim South in the Eastern Region.47 According to the 2000

Population and Housing Census, the constituency has a population of 129,308 with a

rural-urban ratio of 92.5%-7.5%. The male-female ratio is 50.6%: 49.4%. The

constituency capital, New Edubiase, with a population of 9,664, is the only urban centre.

Among the semi urban centres are Fumso, Adansi Anhwiaso, Asokwa and Appagya with

population ranging between 2,500 and 4,500.48

There are two broad groups of settlers in the constituency, Akans and Non-Akans. The

first group is mainly Fantes from the Central Region with which the constituency shares

borders, and form about 10%. The Non-Akan groups include Ewes, Ga-Dangbes (largely

Krobos) and Northerners who together form about 55% of the population. The Ewes,

the dominant group form about 70 percent of the settler population. Thus the native-

Adansis are no more than 35% of the entire population. The Ewes and Krobos were

attracted to the area mainly because of the attractive farming conditions while the

Northerners are a spill over from the mining labour force in neighbouring Obuasi. The

settler population is found in the rural areas engaged in farming while the natives are

47 Adansi East District Assembly Profile, 2004.48 2000 Population and Housing Census

20

mainly in the capital engaged mainly in commerce. This has contributed to the

dominance of the settler population in the area.

Electoral History

The New Edubiase Constituency up to the end of the Third Republic was part of the

Adansi Constituency.49 In 1969, like the rest of the Ashanti Region, it voted for the

Progress Party.50 In 1979, it was among the 19 out of 22 constituencies that elected the

PFP Members of Parliament,51 but foreshadowing things to come the PFP presidential

candidate was defeated by the People’s National Party (PNP).52 In the presidential run-

off, the margin of defeat was wider.53

New Voting patterns

A new voting pattern has emerged in the New Edubiase constituency since the return to

multiparty democracy in 1992. Since 1992, the electoral victory has shifted in favour of

the new tradition – the Rawlings tradition – the NDC. Several factors have accounted

for the new voting pattern in the New Edubiase Constituency. First, the boycott of the

1992 elections meant that the seat would go the NDC without struggle and establish it

as the leading party in the Constituency, and in subsequent elections. Two, the new

constituency represented a large population of settlers who were sympathetic towards

the NDC. Third, and relating to the point two above, is the settler factor. Thus in 1992,

the New Edubiase Constituency elected Mary Ghann of the NDC unopposed. A bye-

elections following a fatal motor accident involving the MP was also won by another

NDC candidate, Theresa Joyce Baffoe. She won 81.9% against her opponent, Samuel

Amoah, an independent candidate who managed to get on 18.1% of the votes. Baffoe

was challenged in her first re-election bid in December 1996 by two men and a lady-

George Boadu (NPP), Kwasi Adei-Aboagye (PNC) and Sophia Afrakoma Owusu (PCP). 49 The former Adansi Constituency is now made up of New Edubiase, Akrofuom and Fomena Constituencies.50 The PP won by 7,812 votes compared with NAL’s 2,292 (Daily Graphic, 1 September 1969, p. 10).51 With just 150 votes PFP’s Asante- Fosuhene defeated PNP’s I. B. K. Addo by 4,600 to 4,450; perhaps the narrowest margin in the region (The Legon Observer, 27 July 1979, p.250).52 The PFP presidential candidate, Victor Owusu had 4,487 votes as against Hilla Limann’s (PNP) 4607. Owusu was an Ashanti while Limann was a Sissala (Northerner).53 Liman (PNP) defeated Owusu (PFP) by 7,381 to 5,559 a margin of over 1,800 votes (The Legon Observer, 27July 1979, p.270).

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Baffoe defeated her closest rival of the NPP 69.9% to 21.2% (Ephson 2003: 113) In the

Presidential election, the NDC won by 73% as against NPP’s 26.1% (Ibid: 98).

In 2000 the NPP, in a strategic move, nominated an Ewe, Francis Dopenyoh, as its

candidate. Dorpenyoh hails from Afife in the Ketu District in the Volta Region.54 Given

the extent of Ashanti-Ewe rivalry in contemporary Ghanaian politics, that step showed

how desperate the NPP was to capture the seat. It was also significant that Dorpenyoh

was district coordinator of the National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO), a

body responsible for supplying relief to disaster-affected people and therefore very

close to the grassroots (Vieta 2006:10). In the seven-candidate parliamentary race,

Baffoe beat Dopenyoh by 52.8% to28.9% (Ephson 2003: 203). The fact is that though

Dorpenyoh increased the NPP’s performance by 6.7% and Baffoe lost a significant 17.1%

over her 1996 performance, she still maintained a 23.9% lead In the presidential poll,

NDC’s John Mills defeated NPP’s John Kufuor by 62.6% to 33.3% (Ibid: 158).55

When the NPP assumed power after the 2000 election, Dopenyoh was appointed

District Chief Executive (DCE) for Adansi East with an eye on the parliamentary seat in

2004. He was insistent that the development projects his administration had brought to

the district were going to be rewarded by the electorate in 2004. Again, when

incumbent Baffoe stepped aside, Dorpenyoh was apparently going to have better name

recognition than any candidate NDC could produce. The NDC tackled this imminent

threat to its dominance in New Edubiase from two angles. It selected an Ewe, Ernest

Kofi Yakah who also worked with NADMO. In this battle of ‘Ewe nerves in Ashanti’, the

NDC emerged victorious by a narrow 48.9%-44.8%. At the presidential level also

incumbent Kufour was beaten 41.8 %-58. 2%. The irony is that in a region where the

NDC has never won up to 35% in any presidential poll, it is significant that the NDC

presidential vote in New Edubiase has remained above 60%.

54 The two constituencies in the Ketu District (Ketu North and South) have been among the NDC’s safest seats nationwide.55 Though Mills is an ethnic Fante (Akan), his NDC has been identified with its founder, Rawlings, a half Ewe. On the other hand Kufuor is an ethnic Asante.

22

Fanteakwa Constituency

Demography

The Fanteakwa Constituency also serves as a District with Begoro as its capital. It shares

boundaries with five other districts in the region: to the north is Afram Plains; to the

north-west, Kwahu South; to the south and south-west, East Akim; to the south-east,

Yilo Krobo and to the northeast, Manya Krobo. This, perhaps, explains why most of the

settlers (over 13%) in the come from the Manya and Yilo Krobo districts.

The Districts currently has a population of 91,081 (2000 Population Census). Out of this

figure, 45,085 (49.5%) are males and 45,996 (50.5%) are females. The population

distribution in the district is uneven. There are few settlements with relatively high

population above three thousand (3000). Apart from Begoro (17,032), Osino (6,631),

and Bosuso (5,473) the rest of about 17 identified towns and village have population

less than 3000 per settlement. Basically, there are six (6) ethnic groups with the Akans

dominating (61.3%) followed by the Ga-Adangbes (Krobos) (13.1%). The next major

group is the Ewe (11.5 %) the Guan (4.7%), Dagarti (3.4%), and Frafra (2.5%). 56 As

regards religion, Christians dominate with 86.3% of the followed by Moslems who

constitute 11.2% and Traditionalists 2.5%.

Most of the people in the constituency, especially the settlers, are farmers due to the

availability of large track of fertile land. In Fanteakwa settlers and natives live together

in some settlements while on some others settlers and natives live apart. In some

settlements settlers could be between 70% and 100%. What is interesting in Fanteakwa

is the fact that the chief of every settlement is supposed to a native Akim, one source of

tension between the natives and settlers. However on settlements where the settlers

are in majority they have a headman beside the chief.

Electoral History

The Fanteakwa Constituency has historically been associated with the Danquah-Busia

tradition since it was created in 1969. During the 1969 elections, the then Begoro

56 Fanteakwa District Assembly Field Survey, 2002.

23

Constituency voted for the Progress Party of the Danquah-Busia tradition. The

constituency was represented by Jones Ofori-Atta57 who defeated the NAL candidate by

6047-1940 votes.58 In 1979, Ofori-Atta was again elected on the ticket of the Popular

Front Party (PFP),59 the main offshoot of the Danquah-Busia tradition at that election.60

Thus, until 1992, the Danquah-Busia tradition maintained its hold of the Fanteakwa

Constituency but even then there were indications that the Krobo settlers had, like their

brothers in neighbouring Manya and Yilo Krobo, supported parties which are opposed to

the Danquah-Busia tradition for which the Akims are most supportive. Until the

opposition boycotted the 1992 parliamentary poll, Ofori-Atta was the NPP

parliamentary candidate for the constituency. Could his candidacy have made the

difference?

New Voting Patterns

In the 1992 the NPP won the presidential election in Fanteakwa did not participate in

parliamentary elections due to the opposition boycott of the polls. In 1996, the NDC

won the presidential poll by 57.5% to NPP’s 41.7%. At the parliamentary level, the NDC

had to replace its stop-gap candidate with the incumbent DCE, Samuel Ofosu Ampofo to

challenge the NPP candidacy of Addo-Fening, a History Professor at the University of

Ghana. The Professor lost 40%- 59.8% and openly admits that the settler factor caused

his defeat. Ampofo had made the settler issue his trump card. The intervening four

years between 1992 and 1996 had witnessed intense anti-NPP propaganda, playing on

the fears of the settler Krobos that they would be driven away from the Akim lands

under an NPP government.

By 2000, the settler factor had become so big an issue that the NPP had to choose, like it

did in New Edubiase, a settler, Ofoe Ceasar, a Krobo, as its parliamentary candidate, as

a strategic counterpoint; but their opponents were not short of ‘politricks’. Prof. Addo-57 Dr. Jones Ofori-Attah, Economics lecturer at the University of Ghana became a deputy Finance Minister in the Progress Party government.58 Daily Graphic, 1 September 1969 p.11.59 Dr Ofori-Atta (PFP) had 4,292 while the closest rival Darko Mamphey (PNP) 2,271 and Dwamena (UNC) 1,905 (Daily Graphic, 20 June 1979, p.9).60 During the 1979 election, the Danquah-Busia front was divided between the Popular Front Party and the United National Convention (UNC).

24

Fenning recounts how in the Krobo villages photo copies of his1996 campaign posters

were superimposed on Ofoe Ceasar’s implying the Krobo man was only a front for the

learned professor who would go to parliament if they voted for their Krobo brother.

Somehow, the NPP strategy worked but not quite. Ofoe Ceasar narrowed the 19.8%

deficit of 1996 to 4.4% but not big enough to defeat the incumbent who was returned

49.7%-45.3%. In the presidential race however NPP scored a narrow victory of 48.5%-

47.6%. This was confirmed with 57.2%-42.8% in the presidential run-off. Ofoe Ceasar

was also rewarded was the position of DCE in the hope that he would draw his people

more to the NPP to deliver the killer punch in 2004. But by the election year it appeared

Ofoe Ceasar had not endeared himself enough to his people and his party. He never

appeared as an aspirant and at the end of a long and acrimonious march to the primary

contest, Kwadjo Agyei Addo, the Presiding Member of Fanteakwa District Assembly

emerged the candidate to face a third term hopeful, Ofosu Ampofo. Addo won 56.6%-

42.5%. The NPP won the presidential election with 57.4%-41.5%, thus leaving the

Fanteakwa, the only one of our case studies that went to the NPP in 2004. How can that

are explained?

AFRAM PLAINS

The Afram Plains District, located at the northern past of the Eastern Region, shares

boundaries with Kwahu South, Fanteakwa, Manya Krobo and Asuogyaman.

Donkorkrom is the district capital as well as the constituency capital of Afram Plains

North. Two other semi-urban centres are Tease, the constituency capital of Afram Plains

South, and the two ferry ports-Ekye-Amanfrom and Amankwakrom.61

Prior to the creation of the Volta Lake, the Afram Plains District was mainly a hunting

reserve for the chiefdoms of the Kwahu Ridge in the Kwahu South District, with very low

population and few settlements. But things changed as a result of the resettlement

61 Afram Plains District Assembly Profile, 2006.

25

programme in the 1960s.62 From 1970 to 2000 (latest census) the population has almost

quintupled from 31,486 to 135, 928.

The population is composed of four main groups: Akans (particularly Kwahus, who

constitute the indigenous inhabitants of the area and others from neighbouring Ashanti

and Brong Ahafo Regions), Ewes who originated from the Volta Region and had been

resettled in the district as a result of the formation of the Volta Lake in 1964, other

Ghanaians particularly from the three Northern regions, and non-Ghanaian groups from

neighbouring states(Afram Plains District Assembly Profile, 2004).The Akans are now in

a minority comprising only 34% compared with 39% Ewes and 20% Northerners

(Frempong 2006b). It is also significant to note that on average about a fourth of the

electoral areas in the Afram Plains North and South Constituencies have Ewe names

(Ephson 2003).63

Afram Plains is one of the food baskets of the country with most of the people are

engaged in agriculture - crop production (principally maize, cassava, yams, groundnuts

and vegetables) in the interior and the lakeshore for cattle rearing and fishing. It is also a

significant destination for migrant labour.64

Electoral History

The Afram Plains became a constituency on its own – the Afram Constituency- during

the 1969 election. In that election, B. B. Ofori won the seat of the ticket of the Progress

Party (PP) at a time when the PP was identified with Akans and NAL with Ewes.65 In

1979, B. B. Ofori once again represented the Afram Constituency on the ticket of the

PFP, a successor to the PP.66 In the first round presidential ballot the PFP won in the

62 The building of the Akosombo Dam across the Volta River and the resultant Volta Lake led to the submergence of several settlements dotted along the river and the Government of Ghana had to resettle the affected people. Afram plains received a large number of Ewe settlers.63 Those in Afram Plains North include Chemfre-Agbodza, Edavokope, Nyakuikope and Zikpo; and in Afram Plains South we have among others, Mepe-Adatwi, Hlihadzi and Adzikakope.

64 Afram Plains District Assembly Profile, 2004.65 B. B. Ofori (PP) 6850; Stephen Anson Amoako 2,545 (Daily Graphic, 1 September 1969, p.11066 Ofori (PFP) had 4,606; J. K. A. Kumah (PNP) 3,776 and C.A. Asumadu (UNC) 1,476 (The Legon Observer, 27 July 1797, p. 257)

26

Afram Constituency, like the rest of Kwahu; but in the run-off, Afram threw its support

behind the PNP. Limann defeated Owusu by 5,937 to 5,412.67 While that election could

indicate the first step towards the shift away from the Danquah-Busia tradition, the fact

still remains that, at the time, the indigenous Kwahus outnumbered the settlers and the

rivalry between the them and the Ewes was not intense as strong as it would be by the

start of the Fourth Republic.

New Voting Patterns

The two constituencies in the Afram Plains District have remained tacitly with the NDC

throughout the Fourth Republic. In all the four presidential elections since 1992 in the

two constituencies the NDC has won by at least 70%. In 1996 for example, the NDC

polled 93.2% in Afram Plains North and 84.7% in Afram Plains South compared to the

NPP’s 6.3% and 14% respectively in the presidential poll. In 2000, the North voted 88.1%

for NDC and 9.2% for the NPP; and in the South, NDC had 69.4% and the NPP, 23.3%.

Even in the 2000 presidential run-off when the NPP was set to win, it had 12.7% in the

North and 31.7% in the South, compared to the NDC’s corresponding 87.3% and 68.3%.

The NDC retained its dominance of the two constituencies even in 2004, NPP

incumbency notwithstanding. In the North, NDC defeated NPP 80.9% -17.2% and in the

South, 69.8%-28.4%.

The situation is even more intriguing at the parliamentary level. In 1996 in Afram Plains

North, the NPP had conceded the seat to People’s Convention Party (PCP)68. That in

itself was NPP’s admission of its weakness in that constituency. The PCP candidate, even

with the support of the NPP, came last with 4.7%; while the NDC incumbent Krosby

Mensah retained his seat with 72.1%. Even more revealing was the fact that the

candidate for the Democratic People’s Party (DPP), a party that is virtually non existent

nationwide, came second with a respectable 16.7%. In 2000, Joseph Agbenu replaced

two-term MP Mensah in the NDC and won 80.1% against 10.5% for NPP candidate,

Joseph Plahar. The best that DCE Ben Anokye could get for the NPP in 2004 was 20.7% 67 The Legon Observer, 27 July 1979: 268.68 In 1996, the NPP and the PCP had gone into electoral alliance, the Great Alliance, and fielded a common presidential ticket and at the parliamentary level, fielded single candidates depending on each party’s perceived strength in each constituency.

27

compared to Agbenu’s 77%. It is also significant that the two NDC MPs for the

constituency so far have been Ewes.

In Afram Plains South, Kwakye Addo controlled the seat three terms for the NDC before

losing out in the primary to the 2004 winner, Kofi Ahaligah. As a further testimony of

NPP’s weak-hold on the constituency, independent candidates with NDC roots (Raphael

Kofi Ahaligah in 1996 and Anthony Adongo in 2000) had over 30% votes to secure the

second position, pushing the NPP with less than 15% on each occasion to a distant third

(Electoral Commission, 1996 & 2000).69 In 2004, NPP chose Adongo who had become

the Presiding Member of the Afram Plains District Assembly to face Ahaligah, but was

defeated 39.2%-58.8% by the latter. It must be emphasized that Adongo as the

candidate of the ruling party performed only a little better than as an independent

candidate in 2000.

It stands out that in all elections in the two constituencies the NDC had defeated the

NPP with a wider margin in the North than in the South; and is it a coincidence that

there is a greater proportion of settler population in the North?

It should be clear that up to the end of the Third Republic (1979-81) our case studies had

been generally supportive of the Danquah-Busia tradition. Though there were sizable

settler components with a potential to impact on elections, the native-settler rivalry was

not too much of an election issue then. But the eleven years of PNDC rule (1982-1993)

greatly affected the traditional political affiliations of many parts of Ghana and

sharpened the native-settler differences, particularly in the Akan regions. As it were, the

PNDC prepared the grounds for the successor NDC to mine avidly for votes among the

‘migrant’ communities or ‘stranger quarters’ in the towns and villages. (Gyimah-Boadi

1999:418).

SECTION 5-ANALYSIS OF FIELDWORK

69 Kofi Ahaligah and Anthony Adongo stood as independent in 1996 and 2000 respectively when they were denied party primary against the NDC incumbent. Ahaligah had 31.6% compared to NPP’s Daniel Adjepong’s 13.9%. In 2000, Adongo had 31.6% as against 13.7% for NPP’s John Amponsah Kwakye Addo retained the seat in 1996 with 53.2% and 46.15 in 2000.

28

The field work sought to answer the basic questions raised at the beginning of this study

– to what extent does social identity impact on elections? How do the interplay of

ethnicity and the indigenous-settler rivalry affect the manner competing candidates and

parties attempt to outbid one another? And what implications do they have for

democratic consolidation? Generally, the study confirms that the settler factor is a

crucial determinant of electoral politics in the five constituencies, but the manner in

which this factor manifests differ slightly in details. In this section, we analyze the

various aspects of the settler factor and also critically look at other factors that have also

impacted on elections in those areas in the Fourth Republic.

Manner of Settler Attraction

In all the cases under review the main source of attraction of the settlers was the

availability of arable lands for agricultural production. But differences exist in the

manner in which this and other push factors led the settlers to the respective locations.

In Afram Plains, the Ewe settlers lost their ancestral lands as a result of the creation of

the Volta Lake following the building of the Akosombo Dam. They were resettled in

Afram Plains under a national resettlement programme in 1964.70 With time their

number increased and they have spread to areas beyond the original four resettlements

and have given Ewe names to such settlements. The significant point here is that for

most of the Ewes in the Afram Plains, they have no hometowns elsewhere and the

manner of land acquisition has incensed the traditional landowners, the Kwahus. This is

unlike the Ewes in New Edubiase who are still attached to their roots in the Volta

Region, even if they were born and bred in Ashanti Region.71 Thus, while in New

Edubiase, the Ewe-settler support for the NDC is largely a reflection of the Akan

identification with the NPP and Ewe identification with NDC; in the Afram Plains, it is

more about the fundamental issue of land ownership.

70 Afram Plains District Assembly Profile, 2004.71 Equally, in Fanteakwa, where the Ewes formed about 11 percent of the population, they are said to be loosely attached to the constituency as most of them do not build permanent homes and transport their dead back home, as compared to other settlers groups.

29

On the other hand, in Fanteakwa, the settler-Krobos have their traditional homes on the

other side of the constituency border in Manya and Yilo. This coterminous relationship

between their settler and ancestral homes and the easy access to and from the two

areas introduce unique dynamics into the settler relationship. A typical example has

been the recurrent struggle between Akim Abuakwa and Manya Krobo paramountcies

over who has sovereign rights over the settler lands. In July 1981 for example, the then

president Limann had to convene a meeting between the paramount Chiefs of Akim-

Abuakwa and Manya Krobo to urge them to work towards peaceful co-existence72. This

clearly explains why the issue of land ownership has always been a major electoral issue

in Fanteakwa. The lingering fears of the Krobos in this area have always been that they

could be denied the ownership of their lands if a government favourable to the Akims

came to power.73 Since 1969 therefore, the Krobos have supported parties which are

opposed to the Danquah-Busia tradition for which the Akims are most supportive.

Mode of Settlement

The nature of the settler communities has had impact on the voting patterns as well. In

Ejura Sekyedumase the settler groups from the north live within the various settlements

along ethnic lines and localities are named according to the particular group that lives in

a particular area. For example, Dagombas are concentrated on Dagomba line, the

Frafras on Frafra line, etc.74 This has helped to maintain unity within and among the

settler groups, a very crucial matter in the electoral politics of the area. Equally in

Fanteakwa, the rural settlements are mostly inhabited by settlers. There are some

settlements where the settlers are more than 90%, and vice versa. There is the tendency

for setter-based settlements to vote en bloc during elections. This also happens in the

native-dominated towns. But in some of the urban areas the native and settlers live

together, with the native mostly in the majority. The same situation applies in New

Edubiase where due to farming activities the settlers remain largely in rural settlements.

72 (Bening 1999: 317)73 (Nukunya 2003: 241).74 (Asante 2006: 234).

30

Settler Factor

Increasingly, the settlers are assuming greater share of the population in the respective

constituencies and has become important factor in electoral outcomes and voting

patterns. It is only in Fanteakwa that the native Akims are still in the majority. The

natives form 48% in Ejura Sekyedumase; 35% in New Edubiase; and 34% in Afram Plains.

A major reason for this is the tendency for the natives to move out of the constituencies

to the urban centres like Kumasi, Accra, and Cape Coast to take up jobs. The situation is

further worsened by the fact that while the indigenes may not be under any pressure to

vote en bloc the settlers are often more conscious of their social identity and

disadvantage circumstances.

Relationship between native and settlers is characterized native-rivalry exists as well a

mutual co-existence. The native-settler relationship is most cordial in New Edubiase. The

research team interviewed varied groups including the traditional Adansi (Akan), Ewe,

Northern leaders, district assembly officials, political party executives and other natives

and settlers; they generally agreed that the relations between natives and settlers were

cordial. A major reason is that the dominant Ewe settlers maintain contact with their

ancestral home and do not make claims to ownership of land.

In Fanteakwa most of people our researchers spoke to, including traditional leaders,

said that both natives and settlers live in peace. They cited increasing inter-marriage 75

amongst them as an indication of peaceful co-existence. But a careful observation brings

out a different picture. For instance, the insistence of the Fanteakwa stool that chiefs of

all settlements should be natives is a source of tension. In one village it was revealed

that the native chief found it difficult mobilizing the settlers for development projects

due to disagreement over his leadership. Some National Service persons76 in the

constituency spoken to by our researchers said they had observed lack of trust and

75 Inter-marriages are common between the Akims and Krobos, but rare between the Akims and other settlers.76 Graduates from universities and other tertiary institutions undergo a compulsory one year National Service.

31

animosity between settlers and natives. This indeed does not augur well for democratic

consolidation and development.

In Afram Plains, the issue of land ownership is a very major issue. Indeed the persistent

call of Kwahu chiefs for the re-designation of Afram Plains District as Kwahu North

District has tended to be the rally call for settler support for the NDC which had no

intention of accepting the name change. The rivalry has also assumed political

undertones. The native Kwahus believed that the Rawling-led PNDC/NDC had

deliberately changed the name of the district to favour the Ewe settlers, while the Ewes

remain suspicious of the NPP, a party that has appointed the Okwumanhene, Daasebre

Akuamoah Boateng, the chief protagonist in the land dispute, as chairman of the Ghana

Cocoa Board.

The worst case scenario of native-settler relationships however is in Ejura Sekyedumase.

The following incident as outlined by the current DCE Joseph Ayarkwa is illustrative:

In the heat of the 2004 election campaign, youth of the Zongo community in Ejura,

reportedly barricaded a street ostensibly to prevent incumbent President Kufuor from

passing through the town on his campaign trail. In response, the Chief and Elders of

Ejura summoned the leaders of the Zongo community and insinuated to the effect that

they the natives were not ready for the northerners to come and lord it over them on

their own land. The NDC camp with its candidate, a northerner capitalized on and used

it as a campaign strategy against the NPP. 77 In the view of the DCE, that incident dealt a

serious blow to the ruling party and overshadowed whatever development the NPP

government had undertaken among the settlers. Not surprisingly, the NPP lost at both

the parliamentary and presidential level even though the party had won the 2000

presidential run-off. The situation became more volatile following the victory of Alhaji

Pungabu on the NDC ticket. There were well publicized reports of the chiefs harassing

the MP-elected for allegedly violating some traditional customs.

77 Interview with Dr Joseph Ayarkwa, Ejura Sekyedumase DCE, who also was the former PM of the District Assembly and a strong member of the NPP, 8 April 2006

32

Choice of Candidates and Campaign Strategies

The settler factor has been a crucial in the choice of parliamentary candidates and it is

used by the NDC and NPP as part of their campaign strategies. In Fanteakwa, after the

NPP failed to win with the History Professor in 1996, it opted in 2000 for Ofoe Caesar (a

settler) with the hope of winning the settler vote, but as earlier indicated, the NDC

cleverly painted Caesar as a front for the professor. The choice of Francis Dorponyoh in

New Edubiase in the same election was along similar lines, an attempt to attract the

dominant Ewe votes. In both cases the settler candidates succeeded in bridging the gap

but were unable to defeat the incumbent NDC MPs, Ofosu Ampofo and Theresa Baffoe

respectively.78 It is also apparent that, in power, the NDC was not worried about

selecting settler candidates in the five constituencies. In 2000 for example, the NDC had

Akan natives as candidates for all the constituencies under review, except Afram Plains

North.79 It is therefore significant that in 2004 the NDC in opposition selected settler

candidates in New Edubiase, Ejura Sekyedumase80 and Afram Plains South81 in addition

to Afram Plains North. Coincidentally the NDC lost only in Fanteakwa where it had a

native as a candidate. The NPP in 2004, retained Dorponyoh in New Edubiase but he

failed once more.

In addition to other factors, campaign strategies of parties have influenced election

outcomes in our case studies. Both the NDC and NPP officials interviewed attributed

their electoral success to efficient campaign strategies. For instance, the NPP

constituency organizer in Fanteakwa Constituency attributed the NPP’s inability to win

the previous elections to the party’s inability organize effective campaign especially

78 In 1996 in Fantekwa, Ofosu Ampofo (NDC) defeated Addo-Fening by 59.8%-40%; in 2000 Ampofo defeated Caesar by 49.7%- 45.3%. Similarly in New Edubiase in 1996 Theresa Baffoe (NDC) defeated George Boadu by 69.9%- 21.2%; but against Dorpenyoh in 2000, the margin was 52.8%-28.9%. It is however possible that the general yearning for change nationwide in 2000 contributed the reduced NDC performance.79Kwakye Addo (Afram Plains South)- a Kwahu, Ofosu Ampofo (Fanteakwa)-Akim , Theresa Baffoe (New Edubiase)- Ashanti, and Sampson Atakora (Ejura Sekyedumase)-Ashanti, are all Akans. Joseph Agbenu (Afram Plains North) is Ewe. 80 The NDC supporters in Ejura-Sekyedumase accused their incumbent MP, Sampson Atakora (an Ashanti) of non-performance and also of being sympathetic to the ruling NPP and therefore pressurized him to step-aside( Asante 2006: 245)81 Raphael Ahaligah (Ewe) for Afram Plains South Ernest Yakah (Ewe) for New Edubiase and Issifu Pungabu (Northerner) for Ejura Sekyere Odumase

33

among the settlers. Significantly, the NPP’s strategy included courting the support of the

settlers and therefore took steps to include them in the party’s leadership structure. In

his own words, “the party saw settlers as partners who must be given recognition”. In

2004 the NPP was able to increase its votes among the settlers from 20 percent to 40

percent. All these efforts were in sharp contrast with the 1996 election for example

when the settler communities were declared ‘no go’ areas by the NPP.

During the 2004 elections, in New Edubiase, the ruling NPP had hoped that with an Ewe

DCE, who had deliberately extended development projects to the settler communities,

as its candidate, it could break the jinx but the NDC cleverly selected an Ewe candidate

too and whipped up Ewe solidarity.

In Ejura-Sekyedumase the NDC continued to use the propaganda that if the NPP was re-

elected in the 2004 elections, there was the possibility that the Aliens Compliance Order

passed by the Busia government would be re-introduced. This propaganda had worked

previously for the NDC. But the NPP this time countered it with the establishment the

Zongo-based “Nassara” Clubs as a demonstration of its friendliness towards the settlers

of northern/foreign descent. But somehow the NPP was not able to wrestle the

parliamentary seat from the NDC .

In Afram Plains South, the NPP in 2004 selected Anthony Adongo as its candidate in part

because of his impressive performance as an independent candidate in 2000, but more

so in the hope that as a northerner he could divide the settler front. In an interview

before the election, Adongo had predicted a 75% victory, confident that he would have

the support of his fellow northerners as well as the Akans, at the expense of his Ewe

opponent.82 The NDC had countered this with a choice of an Ewe candidate while taking

steps to ensure that the defeat of the incumbent Akan MP at the party primary did not

divide the party’s front. The choice of DCE Ben Anokye, an Akan, as the NPP candidate

for Afram Plains North was on the basis that the developments undertaken during his

82 Department of Political Science, University of Ghana 2004 Pre-Election Survey, October 2004 by this researcher

34

tenure could swing votes in his favour. But he was up against an uphill task in a situation

where the NDC front was united behind incumbent Joseph Agbenu, whom the party had

agreed to give a second term like his predecessor, Kroby Mensah. Anokye lost his DCE

position after his defeat to Solomon Fordwour with a settler background.

Settlers in Positions

The significance of the settler element is also reflected in the number of settlers in top

political positions at the respective district levels. The appointment of settlers to

influential positions as District Chief Executives (DCEs)83and Presiding Members (PMs)84

is another indication that settlers have become influential in the affairs each of the

constituencies under consideration. In 2001, the NPP government had appointed its

failed parliamentary candidates in Fanteakwa and New Edubiase as DCEs and both have

been retained after 2004. According to the Fanteakwa NPP Constituency organizer,

making a settler DCE did dispelled the notion that the NPP was anti-settler and thus

contributed, among other factors, to the party’s victory in 2004 parliamentary elections.

In the same vein, in Afram Plains both the DCE and PM and in Ejura Sekyedumase, the

PM, are all also settlers.85

Intra-Party Unity

Another crucial determinant of the political fortunes of the NDC and the NPP in the

constituencies under review is intra-party unity or the lack of it. This is particularly true

of the NPP in Ejura-Sekyedumase. The appointment of the defeated NPP candidate,

Elizabeth Owusu, as DCE in 2001 apparently did not satisfy a faction within the

constituency executive who attempted to remove her, but for the support she got from

the then PM, Joseph Ayarkwah. In the 2004 NPP primary, the NPP executive rejected

Ayarkwah, a more credible candidate with broader appeal,86 to avenge his support for

83 The District Chief Executive (DCE) as the political head is appointed by the President with the approval of two thirds of the members of the District Assembly84 The Presiding Member (PM), elected by two thirds majority of all members of the Assembly, presides over the meeting of the Assembly85 Solomon Fordjour and Anthony Adongo (Afram Plains DCE and PM) is from Kete Krachi in the Volta Region and Bawku in the Upper East Region respectively; while Iddrisu Abdul Kadir (Ejura Sekyedumase PM) is from Salaga in the Northern Region. Dorpenyoh and Caesar were retained as DCEs in Adansi South and Fanteakwa respectively.86 Dr Ajarkwah a Building Technologist and a Lecturer and Dean of faculty at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) had been an Assembly member since 1993.

35

the DCE,87 for a lesser known candidate, Ofori Dwamena,88 who failed to win the seat.

The NDC too had had its fair share of lack of intra-party unity in Ejura in 2004 and Afram

Pains South in 1996 and 2000, where disaffected members had gone independent to

challenge the NDC incumbents. Yet in all those cases, the NDC emerged victorious. Thus

lack of intra-party unity has tended to weaken NPP more than the NDC in the areas

under review.

The Asawase Factor

In this section we briefly discuss the voting pattern in the Asawase Constituency, a

newly created constituency that introduces a new dimension to our analysis- the

extension of the settler electoral dominance into the Ashanti capital, Kumasi; from rural

constituencies to an urban constituency; from the peripheries of NPP regional support

to the very heart of that party’s stronghold.

The Asawase Constituency is in the Kumasi Metropolis, the Ashanti regional capital but

is dominated by northern settlers. Various areas of the city have historically been

allocated specific settler elements89 and this has increasingly assumed electoral

significance. In 2004, Asawase was the only one in the Kumasi Metropolis that the NPP

lost by 42.6%-49.2 to the NDC. Ironically, that was one constituency in which the NPP

parliamentary candidate waged a well-resourced campaign. Until the constituency re-

demarcation in 2003, Asawase was part of the Asokwa East Constituency.90 In 2000, the

NPP captured Asokwa East for the first time, largely as a result of the national yearning

for change. The major reason for NDC’s solitary feat in Asawase in 2004 was the large

number of northern settler elements. The re-demarcation exercise left Asawase clearly

dominated by the Northerners.91 As a confirmation of this state of affairs, with the 87 This was confirmed in separate interviews by both Dr. Ayarkwah and Elizabeth Owusu. Dr. Ayarkwa indicated that the party chairman manipulated the delegates and presented Dwamena at the congress. To him ‘the party lost the seat immediately after our congress’ Interview at the office of the DCE, Ejura-Sekyedumase, 8 April 2006.88 Dwamena, though a native returned from a long stay in Germany after the NPP’s victory in 2000 and appointed District NADMO Coordinator (Asante 2006: 244).89 For example Anloga for Ewes, Fanti New Town for Fantes90 In 1996 Asokwa East was also the only constituency in the Kumasi metropolis which the NDC had retained.91 The former Asokwa East and West constituencies were put together and carved into the Asokwa, Asawase and Oforikrom constituencies.

36

exception of the NPP parliamentary candidate, the other five including an independent,

were of northern descent.92 The settler dominance was confirmed in a bye-election in

April 2005, following the death of the newly elected MP, Adamu Gibril. The 2004 NPP

candidate, Patricia Appiagyei, declined to re-contest and the party had to recall the

ambassador for Guinea with Northern roots to contest.

Conclusion

Increasingly in Ghana, particularly under the Fourth Republic, social identity has become

an important factor in electoral politics. Social groups – ethnic groups – in the context of

this study, have began to assert themselves through their voting rights to decide who

their leaders should be, no matter which part of Ghana they find themselves. What

became clear in our study is the fact that there is a direct relationship between social

identity and elections in that ethnic identity was a strong factor in what party an

individual would vote for. For instance, in Fanteakwa group interest in land – the only

source of livelihood for the settlers – forms the basis of political choices.

The most important factor influencing voter behavior as this study revealed is native-

settlers rivalries which are rooted in the history of the people. Whilst some voters follow

their voting pattern pertaining in their home towns others vote for parties they perceive

will protect their interest in the new homes. Still some others vote in protest against

their landlords – the natives.

To be able to win elections in these constituencies, parties have had to adopt strategies

that take cognizance of local exigencies, most importantly, the settler populations.

Party executives in the constituencies, their choice of parliamentary candidates and

campaign messages are all influenced largely by the settler/ethnic question. Parties have

lost or won elections depending on how they handled the ethnic/settler question.

92 The NPP candidate was Patricia Appiagyei ( Ashanti). The rest all Northerners, were Adamu Gibril (NDC), Thomas Atigah (PNC, Hassan Abu-Bong (CPP), Adam Rahama (DPP) and abdul Alhassan (Independent).

37

In these constituencies settlers are seen by political parties as integral part of

communities in which they live and have adopted policies to make them feel part of

their second homes. Some of them are now MPs representing the settlers and natives

alike whilst others have been made DCEs, administrative managers of their districts.

Although it is clear, through this study, that democracy is gaining root in these

constituencies, the widespread practice of appealing to voters along ethnic lines with its

attendant social tension does not augur well for democratic consolidation. There is a

possibility of ethnic violence in future elections if this pattern is not halted through

dialogue between parties and the communities in which they operate. Since all the

constituencies are underdeveloped it will be useful if development issues become part

of the elections menu.

The study also falls into the broader context of the increasing division of electoral

politics in Ghana along the Akan/ Non-Akan lines. It produces a situation in which,

contrary to conventional wisdom, improvement in democratic governance in Ghana’s

Fourth Republic is being matched by increasing concerns about ethnic/sectional

rivalries. Perhaps, that paradox is a confirmation of the complex, indeed the Janus-faced

relationships that link citizenship, identity and democracy.

It should be clear from the foregoing analysis that while a number of other factors have

influenced voting patterns in the selected constituencies, the settler factor remained

paramount.

`

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