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Wed Mar 25, 2009 1330h FINAL VERSION

DR RUSSELL ONG China’s strategic convergence with Russia7525words

ABSTRACT: This article examines the basis for China’s strategic convergence with Russia in the current era as well as assesses the viability of this convergence in the longer term. It will be argued that the convergence primarily reflects both Chinese and Russian concerns about the lone superpower’s preponderance in the international system and its perceived intentions. These concerns relate to the military sphere as well as non-military considerations such as ideological differences. Ultimately, Sino-Russia strategic convergence exists as long as a huge capability gap between each partner and the US persists. In the short run at least, China and Russia will continue to balance against the US. (102 words)

IntroductionThe aim of this article is to examine the factors for China’s strategic

convergence with Russia in post-Cold War era. The first factor relates to China’s search for an effective partner to counter US preponderance in international politics as Beijing wants to promote a multipolar world, which would in turn give itself more room to manoeuvre. The second factor for China’s strategic convergence with Russia stems from the US export of liberal values across the world, which is viewed as indirectly undermining the Chinese political system over the longer term. This article focuses on China’s viewpoints although Russian perspectives are added insofar as they shed further light on the analysis. Certain assumptions are implicit here: the US continues to display assertiveness in international politics and on the whole still acts unilaterally on key international security issues.

At the same time, it will be noted that there are limitations to China’s strategic convergence with Russia: primarily, national interests may differ and traditional great power rivalry remains, testing the durability of this strategic convergence. It will be argued that as long as the perceived threat of a lone superpower looms larger, China and Russia will be more willing to support each other in the international system. Theoretically, this reinforces the Realist proposition that great powers will balance against a hegemon: to a certain extent, powerful structural forces compel China and Russia, irrespective of their histories and domestic conditions, to join together in temporary alliances.1 A vindication of this balancing behaviour is the twenty-year Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Co-operation of 2001, which arose following America’s enhanced geopolitical position after the ending of the Cold War.2 Following on from the 2001 Treaty, China created for the first time an intergovernmental consultation mechanism on security issues with another country – Russia – in 2005. The undertaking arose also because of a common perspective on a wide range of international issues, which are often different from the US’s. Today, the Chinese and Russian prime ministers have a regular meeting mechanism with three major components - a regular meeting committee for the prime ministers, a humanistic co-operation committee, and meetings for energy representatives. In many ways, this consultation mechanism has one of the widest-ranging in scope in China's foreign relations and serves to enhance the Sino-Russian strategic partnership.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is buttressed by two additional factors, which does not relate directly to the US. The first

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is the resolution of territorial disputes that persisted over 300 years. In 2004, after 40 years of negotiations, China and Russia – the two largest powers on the Eurasian continent - signed an agreement on their 4300km long border.3 The second factor that buttresses China’s strategic convergence with Russia lies in Beijing’s quest for economic security, or more specifically energy security. Russia is a key energy supplier and China needs oil to fuel its economic growth, which would in turn provide the basis to achieve truly global power status. The volume of Sino-Russian trade has also increased nearly 10 times during the decade between 1998 and 2007, and was expected to reach US$50billon in 2008 from US$48billion in 2007; both states have set a target of US$60-80bn in bilateral trade by 2010. In particular, transborder co-operation can reinvigorate the old industrial bases in China's northeastern provinces and the development of the Russian Far East so both parties have much to gain. We can now turn to the main factors for China’s strategic convergence with Russia and these relate to perceptions of the lone superpower in the post-Cold War era.

Countering US preponderance Firstly, China’s strategic convergence with Russia lies in Beijing’s need to meet

the challenges posed by the lone superpower. From the Chinese perspective, the defeat of communism across the world has in general meant a global re-assertion of US power and values since the early 1990s; this was epitomised by a “new world order” proclaimed by America after the demise of the Soviet Union. Nowadays, the war on terror provides the US with further impetus to reinforce its global leadership as American military might preserves international security through, among other means, defeating terrorists. In terms of waging the war on terror, the US strategy of pre-emption (xianfa zhiren) that entails using force to respond to an imminent threat is seen as particularly threatening.4 This strategy is perhaps the most controversial of all US military doctrines simply because its entails encroaching on the sovereignty of other states in the name of self-defence against terrorism.5 As one of the ardent advocates of sovereignty, China has elicited grave concerns about US actions that may justify intervention in the affairs of another state. Overall, a 1 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), p. 127; Stephen Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia”, InternationalOrganization, vol. 42, no.2 (1988), pp.275-316; Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back”, International Security, vol.19, no.1 (1994), pp.72-107.

2 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, 2001 Jul 16 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm) (accessed on 1 Feb 2009)3 China and Russia had signed border agreements in 1991 and 1994 delimiting respectively the eastern and western sections of their boundary lines, leaving only two parcels of land in the eastern section to be resolved. In 2004, it was agreed that Russia will return half of Heixiazi Island (Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island) and the entire adjoining Yinlong Island (Tarabarov Island) at the confluence of Heilongjiang (Amur River) and Wusulijiang (Ussuri River) to China; see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China and Russia Issue a Joint Statement, Declaring the Trend of the Boundary Line between the Two Countries Has Been Completely Determined, 14 October 2004 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t165266.htm) (accessed 9 Jan 2007). Subsequently. China and Russia signed an additional border survey protocol on the eastern part of borders they share. See “China, Russia complete border survey,” Xinhua news agency, 21 Jul 08.

4 Su Ge, “An assessment of US national security strategy adjustment,” Guoji wenti yanjiu, vol. 2, 2003, pp. 15-16.5 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Mar 2006, pp. 8-13 and The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Sep 2002, p. iv.

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consensus exists between China and Russia that the US use of military force, at times in circumvention of the UN Charter and Security Council, undermines the basic principles of international law.

In reality, China knows that military supremacy has enabled the US projection of its power across the globe and maintains its forward presence in various parts of the globe. This serves to protect as well as enhance US national interests in the international system, which may at times be conflicting with China’s. Essentially, China now shares with Russia similar concerns over the US projection its military power too close to its borders. Geopolitically, the US is viewed by China as limiting Russia’s strategic space; in recent years, the eastern enlargement of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the deployment of US anti-missile bases in Eastern Europe are cases in point.6

In terms of actual military power, China lags behind the US. In the nuclear field, the superiority of US in strategic forces remains unchallenged.7 In 2002, the US’s unilateral withdrawal from the bilateral Anti-ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty with Russia alarmed China, which had joined forces with Russia earlier to oppose any revisions of the Treaty, mainly on the grounds that this would allow the deployment of new missile defense systems. Basically, China holds the view that US plans to establish global missile systems is detrimental to maintaining international strategic balance and stability, arguing that they would not be conducive to promoting mutual trust between the big countries and regional security, and may even trigger new proliferation. 8

Accordingly, both China and Russia have to various degrees opposed the lone superpower’s proposals to create global missile defence systems, namely a National Missile Defence (NMD) scheme to protect itself from missile attacks together with plans for deployment of a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) in the western Pacific.9 Such systems would deprive countries hostile to the US of the main missile and nuclear weapons, either by a pre-emptive strike or destroying the remaining ones using those missile defence systems. At present, China has only about 20 strategic missiles capable of reaching the US mainland so even a limited NMD system would be concern in Beijing’s long run quest for parity.10 At the same time, although the NMD represents a greater strategic challenge, China is more vocal in its opposition to

6 The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999, followed by the former Soviet Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia in 2004. Croatia and Albania are scheduled to join NATO in 2009. Of course, Russia is particularly about US plans to install a missile-defense shield in Eastern Europe. See, for example, “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defence in Europe”, Congressional Research Service, 24 July 2008, (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/109545.pdf) (accessed 5 Jan 2009).7 Chinese scholars have discussed the US’s quest for “nuclear hegemony”: Liu Qingcai and Wang Haibin, “Russia-US strategic contest and its impacts on China,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, no. 2 (2008), pp. 35-36. Also, it is worth noting that Russia has even proposed, under the claim of strategic openness, collective counteraction to potential missile threats in Europe and globalising the regime of its 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) with the US. See President of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 12 July 2008 (http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml). (accessed 3 Sep 2008)

8 “China says global missile defence systems detrimental to strategic balance,” Xinhua news agency, 6 Nov 2008; “Chinese commentary on US missile defence deployment in eastern Europe,” Xinhua news agency, 7 Jun 2007.

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the TMD system, largely because traditional regional rival Japan is an integral part of this system. Importantly, Beijing has received support from Russia on this issue.

The Chinese concern over US military supremacy is extended to the realm of outer space. This was evident when China and Russia submitted a joint proposal for an international treaty to ban the deployment of weapons in outer space in 2008.11 Even with the launch of Shenzhou VII spacecraft, China knows that it is still far behind the US and even Russia in the field of spaceflight.12 Here China's mastery of nuclear bomb technology vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the US in the past is instructive. The point is that like the acquisition of the nuclear bomb in 1964, space exploration by any country is in essence a symbol of the country's defence strength and hence its overall national strength. As the third country to master manned spaceflight technology, China aims to consolidate its position in the three-way rivalry in space exploration against the US and Russia. In general, China’s concerns on US perfecting its missile defense systems and spaced-based weapons platforms relate to overall American military might in the long run and how this gives the US the means to act unilaterally in international politics.

In terms of conventional forces, China is modernising its armed forces in the bid to close gap with the US. In this regard, Russia has helped by providing military hardware to China. Between 1992 and 2006, when total Russian arms exports amounted to US$58.4 billion, China took delivery of about US$26 billion worth of military equipment and weapons.13 At the same time, China is aware that the actual transfer of military technology from Russia remains limited due to issues such as intellectual property rights. It also seems that Russia is unwilling to move China into India’s category and become eligible for more advanced weapons and technology. Hence, China needs to find a way out of the current impasse in which it has essentially purchased almost all major weapon systems that Russia is willing to sell. Upgrading its conventional forces through the acquisition of advanced technology remains a key goal for Beijing in the era of information warfare as the Chinese military is still far behind its US counterpart in this area.14

From a wider perspective, upgrading the military forces – conventional and nuclear – increases China’s “comprehensive national strength” and this is viewed by China often in comparison with the lone superpower. 15 From China’s perspective, its grand strategy in the twenty-first century revolves around the need to achieve 9 While National Missile Defence (NMD) is intended to defend against inter-continental ballistic missiles capable of striking North America, Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) will need to defend against a variety of long-, medium-, and short-range missiles.10 This is according to the latest estimates from the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/icbm/index.html) (accessed 9 Feb 2009); also Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The end of MAD? The nuclear dimension of U.S. primacy," International Security, vol. 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006), pp.7-44.11 Both states came up with the Draft Treaty on Preventing an Arms Race in the Outer Space to the plenary session of the United Nations (UN)-sponsored Conference on Disarmament (CD) talks in Geneva. China and Russia Jointly Submit a Draft Treaty on Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space, 12 Feb 2008 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t409610.htm) (accessed 3 Feb 2009)12 “Shenzhou-7 mission brings subtle change to China-US-Russia relations,” Zhongguo Tongxun She, 27 Sep 08. 13 “China Lays Down Russian Arms”, Kommersant, 7 May 2007. (http://www.kommersant.com/p763776/r_529/military-technical_cooperation_China/) (accessed 4 Feb 2009).14 Accordingly, China has put emphasis on the “Revolution in Military Affairs”. The Information Office of the State Council, China's National Defence in 2008 (Beijing: 20 Jan 2009); David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002).

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comprehensive security, with the emphasis on achieving rapid modernisation and driving to truly global power status in the long run.16 In this sense, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 means that the US now serves as a comparison and benchmark for China. Both China and the US have divergent worldviews and conflicts are bound to surface, notwithstanding deepening economic integration between the two great powers.17 Therefore, an element of strategic competition persists in China’s relations with the US and Russia appears a useful counterweight against the lone superpower.

In general, despite the advent of globalisation, it can be discerned that a Realist strand remains in China’s security thinking whereby great power competition is deemed as central and inevitable. To a certain extent, the US is seen as taking steps to prevent another powerful foe, like the Soviet Union had once been, from challenging American hegemony.18 Pertinently, the US has evinced the tendency to pursue its national security goals on its own accord, at times without consultation with allies or authorisation from international organisations such as the United Nations. In recent times, this unilateralist trend has drawn concerns from China as well as Russia. Basically, China desires a multipolar world where the US should be just one of several poles of power. For China, an international system tending towards unipolarity means that there is little or no room to manoeuvre; the current distribution of power and influence within the international system is overly in the US’s favour and this is seen as undesirable. Basically, China now has to face the US on its own in the absence of a strategic triangle, where it had been able to play one superpower off the other to enhance its security during the 1970s and 1980s.In the quest for multipolarity in the international system, China has sought out strategic partners and Russia has fitted in at the appropriate time.

In addition to Russia, China’s advocacy of multipolarity in the international system is extended to pursuing close ties with emerging states such as India and Brazil. China-India-Russia trilateralism was largely a brainchild of former Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov and subsequent efforts led to meetings among China, Russia and India. 19 From China’s perspective, such moves are partly aimed at coping with US predominance in international affairs. In this vein, Russia has shown support by stating that it continues to “seek the strengthening of principles of multilateralism in international affairs.”20 A further step taken by China to achieve multilateralism – as opposed to US unilateralism - is evident in the United Nations (UN) ministerial meetings between Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). The

15 This is a term widely used by Chinese strategic planners, analysts and scholars. It covers the military, economic and political dimensions of security thinking. See, for instance, Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin, “A comparative study of the soft power of China and the US,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, no. 1, 2008, pp. 24-27.16 Comprehensive security essentially covers the military, political and economic dimensions. This would then translate into a country’s comprehensive national strength. See Russell Ong, China’s Security Interests in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2007).

17 For a debate on the nature of China’s relationship with the US, see Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Oct 2005), pp, 7-45. Also Lin Limin and Chang Shanshan, “Strategic reflection on China becoming the world’s second largest economy,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, no. 10, 2008, p. 32-41.

18

? The US has to meet to challenges of Islamic extremism as well as being overtaken by other great power, see Yang Jiemian “Strategies and moves of China and the US to deal with the international system restructuring,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, no. 3, 2007, p. 23; Liu Zhenmin, “Current international order and China’s road of peaceful development,” Guoji wenti yanjiu, no. 1, 2005, p.7.

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BRIC group is still in the stage of development but it could have a bigger voice in international relations in the long run.

At a regional level in Central Asia, the call for multilateralism is also evident when one examines China’s emphasis on regional institutions, namely the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), as the US advances in this energy-rich region.21 China needs vast energy resources to fue1 its growing economy and has already invested heavily in procuring oil supplies from the region. It sees the US as a strategic competitor in Central Asia: the US has used the war on terror as a pretext to establish and then enhance its military and economic presence in Central Asia.22 In this regard, US military presence in Central Asia is seen as part of a wider plot to control energy resources in the Central Asian and Caspian Sea regions. In reality, the US does seek alternative oil sources to reduce its import dependence on Persian Gulf supplies, with the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that circumvented hostile states such as Iran - as well as Russia - being a case in point.23 Through the SCO, China has developed a partnership with Russia the aim of countering US advancement in Central Asia. As long as the US looms as the bigger threat in Central Asia, the region’s traditional overlord Russia seems content to align with China in the near term. As for the relatively young states of Central Asia – Kazakhastan, Kirghizstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – resisting great power influence is difficult hence a realistic policy would be to maintain cordial relations with China, Russia and US simultaneously.24

For China itself, the US has moved too close to its western front in Central Asia (which includes Afghanistan) since the events of September 11, 2001. Moreover, the US war on terror in Afghanistan could have an indirect effect of stifling China’s access to the energy resources of Central Asia in the longer run. Essentially, it must be noted that the US has an interest in supporting its business interests and investments in Central Asia while supporting economic and

19 Primakov was the Russian foreign minister from 1996-98. China’s first three meetings with Russia and India were held in Vladivostock on June 2 2005, Delhi on Feb 14 2007 and Harbin Oct 24 2007. Joint Communiqué on the results of the trilateral meeting of the Foreign Minister of India, Russia and China, 14 February 2007 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t299991.htm) (accessed 17 Dec 2008); Joint Communique of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of The People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation and The Republic of India, 24 October 2007 (http://www.rusembassy.in/eng/?menu=pol_menu&page=pol2) 20(accessed 16 Dec 2008)? President of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 12 July 2008 ( http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml) (accessed 3 Aug 2008)

21 Zhao Huasheng, “China’s Central Asian diplomacy: theory and practice,” Guoji wenti yanjiu, no. 4, 2007, pp. 23-24.22 Xuetang Guo, “The energy security in Central Eurasia: the geopolitical implications of China’s energy strategy”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol.4, no.4, 2006, pp.117-137; Russell Ong, “China and the US war on terror”, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 18, no. 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 95-116.23 “Bush, Abraham Hail Benefits of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline”, 18 Sep 2002 (http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2002/September/20020918170627jthomas@pd.state.gov0.751034.html) (accessed 6 Oct 2005)24 Some Chinese analysts view the overall relationship between China, Russia and the US in Central Asia as more co-operative than competitive, see Yu Zheng (ed.), Zhongemei Zai Zhongya: Hezuo Yu Jingzheng 1991-2007 (China, Russia and US in Central Asia: Co-operation and Competition (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2007.

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political independence as well as democracy building, free market policies, human rights, and regional economic integration.25 For Russia, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia are still regarded as part of its strategic sphere. Hence, American intrusion into this region under the pretext of eliminating terrorists, most prominently in neighbouring Afghanistan, has elicited shared concerns from China and Russia.

Overall, China watches the evolution of Russia’s foreign policy towards the US closely. It is important to note that the impact of domestic factors on Russia’s foreign policy. In post-Soviet era, there exist groups that advocate close ties with the West and those who emphasised Russian national interests, albeit to various degrees.26 During the Boris Yeltsin era, on the whole, joining Western institutions and having good relations with the US was central. However, throughout most of the 2000s, the pragmatic nationalists’ agenda was the norm and combating US hegemony through alliances with other great power such as China was deemed as an important task. Basically, the decline of Russia’s international status since the ending of Cold War was a major factor behind its decision to seek a strategic partnership with China. Given that the US is seen as the bigger threat, Russia naturally draws closer to China.

To a large extent, the US’s recent policy towards Russia is also studied closely by China. It may be argued that the US formulates its Russian policy on two assumptions. One was that Russia is innately aggressive and that the end of the Cold War could not possibly change this hence expanding the US military alliance up to Russia’s borders is an appropriate strategy. The other premise was that Russia would always be too weak to endanger any new North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members, so the US might never need to commit troops to defend them. These assumptions have proved to be inaccurate as a resurgent Russia can provide a stiffer challenge to the US. An example was the Georgian crisis in August 2008, which illustrated that Russia’s sense of being a great power remains important to the conception of its role in international system. For a significant portion of the Russian elite, it has been noted that the fear of US preponderance is often mixed with wounded pride and resentment.27 Nowadays, Russia may be able to respond more effectively to an assertive US and one of Moscow’s key objectives is to demonstrate that it is still a great power that cannot be entirely ignored in key security issues. If that is the case, China’s strategic convergence with Russia is likely to endure for some years to come.

Countering US liberal valuesSecondly, the basis for China’s strategic partnership with Russia lies in countering

the US global export of liberal values. This relates to the non-military subjects of regime types, ideologies and values such as human rights in international relations. Today, the US desires to spread liberal values across the globe on ideological grounds as well as the belief that a higher number of liberal regimes in the international system enhances international security. A core assumption is that the US will find it easier to “pursue its interests, reduce security threats in its environment, and foster a stable political order when other states – 25 Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service, 5 June 2006 (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/68821.pdf)26 For instance, there was a distinction between pragmatic nationalists and orthodox nationalists. See Robert H Donaldson & Joseph L Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, EnduringInterests (Armonk, NY: M E Sharpe 2002. 2nd ed.), pp. 125-133.27 See, for instance, Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

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particularly the major great powers – are democracies rather than non-democracies”. 28 Evidently, the conceptual basis for this position comes from the democratic peace theory.29

From China’s perspective, the US promotion of liberal values comes across as a challenge to its political security. Basically, political security relates to the organisation and process of government, and the ideology that gives the rulers of a particular country legitimacy. Today, China is concerned by the US attempts to induce political changes in other countries. Accordingly, Beijing has emphasised that it will continue to promote reform of its political system based on its “own national conditions.” 30 The corollary is that its political system must not be undermined by another country and that its sovereignty must not be encroached.31 The impact of history has shaped Chinese security thinking, as suffering a “century of humiliation” (bainian guochi) from the 1840s to the 1940s at the hands of Western powers and Japan led to China’s whole-hearted embrace of the concept of sovereignty and the concomitant tenet of non-intervention in its domestic affairs.32 It is obvious that to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), preservation of the political system that was established in 1949 is paramount. Till this day, a Leninist strand persists in the Chinese political system, as articulated in the Four Cardinal Principles, whereby the overriding role of the CCP and its ideologies are emphasised.33 In this regard, the survival of the communist political system in China has been linked to the perceived Western strategy of peaceful evolution (heping yanbian) since the onset of the Cold War.34 Basically, this strategy seeks to undermine the values of socialism through the political, economic, cultural penetration of Communist states. As a non-military strategy, its roots are often traced by the Chinese to former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the 1950s during the Korean War.

Hence, countering foreign subversive influence and outside interference in internal affairs, exemplified by the US advocacy of human rights and liberal democracy today, is an important task. In this regard, China has found a willing ally as Russia also sees the US as meddling in its internal affairs by when it was told how it should govern.35 Concerned about the US promotion of liberal values, Russia has highlighted the need to “preventing double

28 John Ikenberry, “America’s liberal grand strategy: democracy and national security in the Post-War era,” in Michael Cox, John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 103.

29 Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.; Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1995); also Thomas S. Szayna et al, The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis (Rand Corporation, 2001), appendix C.30 “Chinese president’s speech on Sino-US relations”, Xinhua News agency, 21 Apr 2006.31 Chinese analysts have stated that “no country shall meddle in the internal affairs of another country” and “the superpowers should not be allowed to order other countries about, pursue power politics and impose their values on others.” Li Qinggong and Wei Wei, “The world need a news security concept,” Jiefangjun Bao, 24 Dec 97, p. 5. 32 This point is emphasized by Chinese scholars. See, for instance, Chu Shulong and Guo Yuli, “Strategy and mode of China’s peaceful rise,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, no. 2 (2008), pp. 1-9.33 The Four Cardinal Principles are as follows: keeping to the socialist road, upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat, upholding the leadership of the CCP, and upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. 34 See Russell Ong, China’s Security Interests in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2007), chapter 2.

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standards, respecting national and historic peculiarities of each state in the process of democratic transformations without imposing borrowed value systems on anyone.”36

A key point is that the Russian notion of governance, and more pertinently, conception and practice of political security, is much close to China’s than the US’s.37 From one perspective, Russia has implicitly adopted the “Asian values” agenda favoured by China, where democracy and human rights are subordinated to developmental needs of the state and where in terms of organising society, priority is granted to order and discipline rather to individual liberty and expression.38 While Russia had to acknowledge the initial triumph of Western values over Communist ones in the early 1990s, it noted that that nowadays “global competition is acquiring a civilizational dimension which suggests competition between different value systems and development models within the framework of universal democratic and market economy principles.”39 It is clear the China counts Russia as an ally in the tussle between its own value systems and those championed by America. The point is that Russian thinking on value systems fits with China’s thinking on political stability and more directly with the aim of the Chinese Communist Party to maintain its hold on power.

Hence, both China and Russia have shared concerns over the spread of western values in Eurasia in the form of “colour revolutions”, which draws at least a modicum of support from the US. For China, it witnessed the 2003 "Rose Revolution" in Georgia and the 2004 "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine but the anti-authoritarian wave that swept Kirghizstan during "Tulip Revolution" in 2005 was perhaps most worrying due to geographical proximity.40 The concerns over democratic change its northwestern front has led China, together with Russia and with other Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) member states, to declare that “differences in cultural traditions, political and social systems, values and model of development formed in the course of history should not be taken as pretexts to interfere in other countries' internal affairs” and that a specific “model of social development should not be ‘exported’".

41 Overall, China’s resentment of the US export of liberal values resonates

35 See, for instance, “Bush criticizes Putin on democracy's slide,” China Daily, 25 Feb 2005, (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/25/content_419378.htm) (accessed 3 Mar 2006); In recent years, it is worth noting that Russia’s answer to US promotion of liberal democracy was to come up with the notion of “sovereign democracy.” Andrei Okara, “Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or a PR Project?” Russia in Global Affairs ", no. 2 (July-   September   2007 ) (http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1124.html); Tomas Janeliūnas, “Sovereign Democracy, yet another attempt to define Russia's regime”, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, issue 18 (2006), pp. 117-132.

36 President of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 12 July 2008 ( http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml) (accessed 3 Aug 2008)

37 Yu Sui, “On the Sino-Russia strategic cooperative partnership,” Guoji wenti yanjiu, vol. 3, 2007, pp. 4-7.38 For a discussion, see Theodore de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).39 President of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 12 July 2008 ( http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml) (accessed 3 Aug 2008)

40 “Chinese agency notes Russia usually cautious on Kirghizstan crisis”, Xinhua news agency, 26 Mar 2005. 41 Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, Shanghai, 15 Jun 2005 (http://english.scosummit2006.org/en_zxbb/2006-06/15/content_755.htm) (accessed 3 Sep 2008)

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with Russia, and the fears of both Beijing and Moscow over this political security threat have converged sharply in Central Asia.

Closely related to US efforts to promote liberal democracy regime is the notion of regime change, which worries China. This notion entails the removal of a government hostile to or considered illegitimate by the US and its replacement with a new one, possibly by military means and mostly according to the ideologies, values and interests of the lone superpower.42 The US advocacy of “regime change” actually started with the Iraq Liberation Act. The Act stated that “it should be the policy of the US to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime”.43 In the post-Cold War world, it seems that the US has emerged as the final arbiter of which regime has failed to remain accountable to its masses as well as to conform to the norms and standards of the international community; the corollary is that such a regime would then have to be removed, by force if necessary. In this case, analysing the US’s norms and motivations point to that fact that certain domestic values form a core consensus to define norms for legitimate use of force against other states in the international system.44

Basically, China challenges the fact that the US can impose political change in other states unilaterally and importantly, Russia shares this concern. In fact, Moscow has argued that the “unilateral action strategy” of the US destabilises the international system and “fuels tensions in intercivilizational relations”.45 At the same time, it must be said that regime change works mainly on middle powers and would be less applicable to great powers like China and Russia. It would be fair to argue that the Communist leaders in China have actually conflated regime change with regime survival in the face of continuing pressures for political liberalisation from abroad, especially from America. Nevertheless, from China’s perspective, countering the uncontrolled spread of liberal democracy remains a factor in its relations with Russia.

From a longer term perspective, the fact is that ideological convergence helped seal China’s formal military alliance with the Soviet Union in 1950. Although national security was as paramount, the unity of communism cemented the alliance between China and Russia, with Marxist-Leninist doctrines dictating confrontation with the capitalist bloc. At the same time, it must be noted that ideology can produce complex relationships for communist states. Ideological differences, in particular over how to translate Marxism into practice, did contribute to the Sino-Soviet schism in the 1960s. Today, given that Marxism has been formally forsaken in Russia, ideology can no longer be a source of conflict between Beijing and Moscow. From China’s viewpoint, Russia can never seek to dominate itself again through some form of ideological leadership. In essence, ideological differences can no longer impinge on the current Sino-Russian strategic partnership so both states can focus their efforts on

42 For further discussions, see Russell Ong, “Peaceful evolution, regime change and China’s political security”, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 16, no. 53 (November 2007), pp. 717-727.

43 Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (31 October 1998) (http://www.warchronicle.com/iraq/news/Iraq%20Liberation%20Act%201998.htm)44 Essentially, Henry Nau merges Realist assumptions with Constructivist concerns for identity and norms by focusing on national identity. Henry Nau, At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).45 President of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 12 July 2008 (http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml) (accessed 3 Sep 2008)

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countering the US promotion of liberal values worldwide. We can now examine the limitations to the Sino-Russian strategic partnership.

Limitations to the partnershipOne of the key limitations to the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is the

divergence of national interests. China’s national interest may not always coincide with Russia’s, especially when the US is a factor in the equation. Differing policies towards the US partly contributed to the Sino-Soviet schism in the 1960s and comparisons can be made to the triangular relationship between China, Russia and the US today. In particular, the Georgian crisis of August 2008 is instructive because to a certain extent, it tests the limits of China’s strategic partnership with Russia. Essentially, China expressed neutrality on a multilateral platform on the Georgia case: at the SCO Summit in 2008, the member states “expressed deep concern over the recent tension triggered by the South Ossetia issue, and urge the relevant parties to resolve the existing problems peacefully through dialogue, and to make efforts for reconciliation and negotiations.”46 Concerned over the escalating tensions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia at that time, China urged the relevant sides - Russia and US-backed Georgia - to resolve their dispute peacefully through dialogue. Basically, China wants to maintain good relations with Russia but it also does not want to jeopardize its relations with the US.

In the final analysis, China pursued a policy of being on good terms will all three players in the crisis - Russia, US and Georgia - and does not want to formally take sides. Doing so may please one side but inevitably at the expense of China’s relations with the others. To a certain extent, Russia must have recognised the complexity of its ties with China and the US hence it would not expect China’s unequivocal support the Georgian issue. From Russia’s perspective, the root cause of the crisis was America’s relentless effort to squeeze its security sphere, at a time when it has largely recovered from its difficult transition from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Above all, Russia aims to regain its status as great power in the international system.47 However, US-led policies such as promoting North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion, “colour revolutions” in Central Asia and global missile defence systems have created a degree of resentment in Moscow. South Ossetia was, therefore, Russia’s strategic counter-move. For China, a key implication is that in order to deepen its strategic partnership with Russia, it needs to pay more attention and better understand Russia’s security concerns relating to Transcaucasia and the wider Eastern Europe.

From a longer term perspective, Chinese neutrality towards the Georgia-Russian crisis can be traced back to patterns in Beijing’s diplomatic strategies since the early 1980s when it pushed for an independent foreign policy equidistant from the two superpowers. In almost all international crises, it is fair to argue that China has opted for dialogue and compromise, rather than direct confrontation or taking sides.48 In general, China prefers a more pragmatic, independent, and case-by-case approach, primarily to ensure its national security interests are not being compromised during international crises. In this sense, the Georgian-Russian conflict simply provided another chance for China its independent foreign policy. It confirms that national interest comes first for China over its partnership with Russia. 46 “Dushanbe declaration of the SCO member nations’ heads of state”, Xinhua news agency, 28 Aug, 2008.47 This is also noted by Chinese scholars, see Shi feng, “Russia’s rise and Russia-US relations,” Guoji wenti yanjiu, vol. 5, 2007, pp. 31-34.48 For instance, the same operational principle has been applied to difficult issues such Hong Kong, for which China negotiated with Britain for the formal ending of colonial rule in the 1980s.

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From a Realist perspective, great powers align with each other against a hegemon – the lone superpower today - but such alignments are not fixed and must respond to changes in the structure of international system. Rather than moving towards a formal military alliance with Russia, policy coordination is perhaps what China aims to achieve with Russia in areas of common vital interests such as preventing the deployment of US missile defence systems and space weaponisation. In essence, the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is best regarded as a normal relationship without the mutually binding commitment found in a formal military alliance. It is largely a pragmatic approach adopted by both China and Russia to conduct strategic coordination without formal defence obligations as well as maintain a close relationship without excessive dependence on each other. In this sense, managing disagreements and longer term competition with Russia is a more important task for China. From a longer chronological perspective, the Sino-Russian strategic relationship is the result of a long and sometimes painful learning experience in the second half of the 20th century for China. During that period, China’s relations with Russia oscillated between excessive dependence and almost zero interaction when both sides fell out in the late 1960s.

In the long run, traditional great power rivalry also tests the durability of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. This extends to regional rivalry, most notably in Central Asia. Historically, the region is the territory of the Soviet Union. At present, a united stance to check US expansion has overridden any intense Sino-Russian competition. With the US intrusion into Central Asia under the pretext of waging a war on terror, China and Russia seem focused on working together to check further US advance there. In this sense, China’s leading role in the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) is tolerated by Russia insofar as the US, the bigger threat, is kept out of this regional institution. At the same time, the common goal to defeat Islamic extremists in Central Asia has united China, Russia and the US to some extent. For China, it wants tighter control over the predominantly Muslim northwestern region of Xinjiang so joining the US war on terror in principle makes sense from the perspective of enhancing political security.49 However, if the US presence is subsequently reduced in Central Asia, China would have to compete more directly with traditional overlord Russia for influence in that region.

ConclusionThis article has argued that the basis for China’s strategic convergence with

Russia in post-Cold War era lies largely in meeting the challenges posed by the lone superpower. Firstly, China needs an effective partner to counter US preponderance in the international system as it wants to cultivate a multipolar world, which would in turn give itself more room to manoeuvre. In the current era, Russia - previously a superpower itself - fulfils the role of being China’s top strategic partner. In the bid to oppose US unilateralism in international politics, China and Russia have accordingly advocated resolving key security issues through international and regional institutions.

Secondly, China’s strategic convergence with Russia stems from the US export of liberal values across world, which is seen as indirectly undermining the Chinese political system over the longer term. In the final analysis, China has linked the US export of liberal values to the Westphalian concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention in another state’s domestic affairs. Beijing has found Moscow to be a useful ally on this issue.

49 Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, East Turkistan’s Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity (Beijing: 21 January 2002).

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At the same time, the durability of China’s strategic convergence with Russia can be questioned. Although ideology no longer poses as an obstacle to the continuing Sino-Russian partnership, divergence in national interests may become more apparent over time. The degree of China’s support to Russia in the international system varies. As the Georgian crisis shows, strategic ambiguity, if not outright neutrality, represented a rational choice for China because the US has been a strong supporter of Georgia in recent times. For China, its own security interests would be better served in a more harmonious relationship with the West in general and America in particular - primarily to better secure a stable environment for pursuing economic growth - so support for Russia on certain security issues will at times be limited. In sum, it must be stressed that Moscow and Beijing do not perceive every single international issue through the same lens.

From Russia’s perspective, its relative decline compared with the Cold War era was a major factor behind its decision to seek a strategic partnership with China. Given that US is seen as the bigger threat, Russia naturally draws closer to China. However, a resurgent Russia may now be able to respond better to an assertive US and one of Moscow’s key objectives is to demonstrate that it is still a great power that cannot be entirely ignored on key security issues. Obviously, China watches Russia’s relations with the US closely and it is uncertain how confrontational Russia would be in its relations the US in future, over issues such as NATO expansion and American global missile defence systems. At present, it is probably not in Russia’s interests to begin a new confrontation with the US. For now, as long as the threat of the lone superpower looms larger, China and Russia will in general be willing to support each other in the international system. If US preponderance persists, then China’s strategic convergence with Russia is likely to endure for some years to come.