Chemical Security and Global Efforts Against Terrorism€¦ · counterterrorism conventions *...

Chemical Security and Global Efforts Against Terrorism:

Can the Nuclear Sector Act as the Role Model?by

Dr. Igor KhripunovApril 2011

© Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia.

Content

• Common threats

• Probability and scenarios of nuclear and chemical terrorism

• Definitions of security and terrorism

• Nuclear and chemical nonproliferation regimes: synergies and interdependence of individual clusters inside them

• Evolution of the legal framework for nuclear security and counterterrorism: flexible and diverse responses to emerging threats

• IAEA and OPCW in search of mandate expansion

• IAEA experience and its applicability to OPCW

• Final observations


Threats

Nuclear• Theft of nuclear weapons

• Theft of nuclear material to build an improvised nuclear devices (IND)

• Acts of sabotage against nuclear power infrastructure, research facilities, and transport

• Use of radioactive substances for malicious purposes – “dirty bombs”

Chemical• Theft of chemical weapons

(CW)

• Acquisition of precursors and/or chemicals to build improvised CWs

• Acts of sabotage against production facilities, storage and transport

• Use of toxic chemicals for malicious purposes

It is estimated that there are well in excess of 100,000 Category 1 and 2 sources and the number of Category 3 sources exceed 1,000,000: cobalt‐60, cesium‐137, iridium‐192, strontium‐90, americium‐

242, californium‐252 and others

US DHS released in November 2007 a 16 page long list of “chemicals of interest” which may pose

security issues


Three Common Tiers of Threat

Use of Weapons or Weapon‐Usable Material

Threats to the Integrity of Facilities and Transport

Use of Hazardous and Toxic Material


Terrorism

Nuclear•As of December 31, 2007, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database contained 1340 confirmed incidents reported by participating states. Of the 1340 confirmed incidents, 303 involved unauthorized possession and related criminal activity, 390 involved theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive materials, and 570 involved other unauthorized activities

http://www‐ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp

Chemical•From 1970 to 2008, a total of 249 acts of chemical terrorism have been committed in over 30 countries with the number of fatalities and injured in some cases reaching 200 persons (Uganda) and 5,500 persons (Japan) respectively

(Global Terrorism Database‐GTD)


Probability of Unconventional Terrorism

A survey of over 100 U.S. security experts rated the following probabilities:

(Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for American Progress, June 2006)


Scenarios of Nuclear TerrorismOPTIONS PROBABILITY EFFECT RISK

PhysiologicalEnvironmental/

EconomicPsychological

Consequence–weighted risk

Nuclear weapon Low Catastrophic CatastrophicShocking and Overwhelming

High

Improvised Nuclear Device

(IND)Low to Medium

High to Catastrophic

High to Catastrophic

Shocking and Overwhelming

High

Radiation Dispersal Device

(RDD)“Dirty Bomb”

Medium to High Limited Medium Highly Traumatic Medium to High

Radiation Emitting Device (RED)

High Limited Low to Medium Medium Low to Medium

Significant damage to NPP

LowMedium to

HighHigh to

CatastrophicShocking and Overwhelming

High

Significant damage to radioactive

waste and spent fuel site

MediumMedium to

HighHigh to

CatastrophicShocking and Overwhelming

High


Consequence‐Weighted Risk

Consequence‐Weighted Risk (R) = PA * [1 – (PI * PN)] * C

• Probability of Interruption (PI)

• Probability of Neutralization (PN)

(PI * PN) Called System Effectiveness

• Consequence Value (C)

• Probability of Adversary Attack (PA)

Because consequences of chemical terrorism are recognized as less serious than in the nuclear domain, risk is estimated much lowerand justifies less vigorous security arrangements across‐the‐board.


Definition and Scope: Nuclear Security

“The prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated

facilities.”

‐ IAEA Advisory Group on Nuclear Security, 2004


Definition and Scope: Nuclear Security

• Physical protection as well as accounting and control measures

• Cargo inspection, customs and border security

• Export control and cooperation to identify and interdict shipments

• Personnel reliability screening and training

• Nuclear security culture


Definition and Scope: Nuclear Terrorism

1. Any person commits an offense within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally:

A. Possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device:

i. With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or

ii. With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or the environment;

B. Uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material:

i. With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or

ii. With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or the environment;

iii. With the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act.

2. In addition, this definition recognizes as an offense if any person threatens to commit 1 (B), demands unlawfully and intentionally radioactive material, attempts to commit an offense, participates as an accomplice and organizes and directs others.

(International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism)


Definition and Scope: Chemical Security and Counterterrorism

• Is there a need for formalized and universally recognized definitions?• International cooperation

• Prosecution of crimes

• Evaluation and coordination


Multi‐Tiered Architecture of Nuclear Security

Site Level

Security measures, protection of vulnerable material

International Framework

Conventions, agreements, guidelines, arrangements, international programs

Industry ResponsibilityImplementation, corporate ethnics, internal regulations, self‐assessment

State Responsibility

Legal and regulatory systems, allocation of responsibilities

Off‐site Level

Detecting illegal movement of materials, effective border control,

public event security

Supporting Level

Human resource development, technical support and R&D

Levels of Legal Hierarchy

•Constitutional

•Statutory

•Regulatory

•Non‐mandatory guidance


Synergies and InterdependenceNuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear Export Control

Nuclear Export Control

Nuclear Counter‐terrorism

Nuclear Counter‐terrorism

Nuclear SafetyNuclear SafetyNuclear SecurityNuclear Security

Nuclear Safeguards and Access to Nuclear

Energy

Nuclear Safeguards and Access to Nuclear

Energy


Synergies and InterdependenceCW Nonproliferation Regime

CW Prohibition

CW Prohibition

ChemicalExport Control

ChemicalExport Control

ChemicalCounter‐terrorism

ChemicalCounter‐terrorism

ChemicalSafety

ChemicalSafety

ChemicalSecurityChemicalSecurity

Economic &TechnologicalDevelopment

Economic &TechnologicalDevelopment


Legal Framework for Nuclear Security and Counterterrorism: Three Interacting Clusters


Legal Framework: Three Interacting Clusters

• Under IAEA auspices:• 1980 Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM)

• 2005 Amendment to CPPNM (not in force, 45 ratifications)

• 1986 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (other safety related instruments)

• Under UN General Assembly auspices:• 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing

• 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (12 others under UNGA and specialized agencies)

• Under UN Security Council auspices (Chapter VII)• UNSCR 1373 (2001)

• UNSCR 1456 (2003)

• UNSCR 1540 (2004)

Traditional binding instruments



• Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) (82 partners)

• Proliferation Security Initiative (98 states endorsed PSI)

• Nuclear Suppliers Group (47 members)

• G8 Global Partnership

• Communiqué and the Work Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit, April 2010 (47 participating states)

• Political declarations of national leaders in the uni‐ and multilateral contexts

• Others

Complementary nonbinding



• UN General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions

• 2006 UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy

• 2004 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (IAEA)

• 2005 Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources (IAEA)

• 1999 INFCIRC 225/Rev.4 (corr.), The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities (IAEA)

• Nuclear Security Series documents (IAEA): Fundamentals, Recommendations, Implementing Guides, Technical Guidance

Recommendatory nonbinding


Nuclear Security and Counterterrorism: Evolving Legal Architecture

Complementary

SOFT

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

*Unilateral Reductions of

Nuclear Weapons*

Nuclear Suppliers Group*

Proliferation Security Initiative*

G8 Global Partnership*

U.S.‐Russian Bratislava Statement

*Political Declarations of Top National Leaders in the uni‐and multilateral context

*Communiqué of the Nuclear Security Summit, April 2010,

Washington DC*

Others

Traditional

HARD

NPT and safeguards agreements

*Nuclear Terrorism Convention

*Physical Protection

Convention*

Twelve other universal counterterrorism conventions

*UN Security Council

Resolution 1540 (2004) and two others

*U.S. – Russia Agreements on Nuclear Weapons Reductions

*Regional Agreements(Nuclear Free Zones for

example)

Recommendatory

SOFT

UN Security Council Resolution 1887

*UN General Assembly

resolutions:‐ Global Counterterrorism

Strategy and Plan of Action (2006)

‐ 60/73 on radiological terrorism

‐ 60/78 on preventing terrorists from acquiring

WMD*

Resolutions, guidelines, standards and codes of

international organizations and UN

specialized agencies (e.g., the IAEA)

*Others

Programmatic Activity

Proprietary information. The model can be used and reproduced only with express permission of the author.


Chemical Security and Global Efforts Against Terrorism: Evolving Legal Architecture

Complementary

SOFT

Australia Group*

Proliferation Security Initiative*

G8 Global Partnership*

Political declarations of top national leaders in the

unilateral and multilateral context

Traditional

HARD

Chemical Weapons Convention

(Art VI – protection of sched‐uled chemicals; Art VII –

national legislation; Art IX –investigation of chemical

terrorism; Art X – cooperation and assistance

*UNSCR 1373, 1456, 1540

*Thirteen universal

counterterrorism conventions*

Regional arrangements (e.g. European Union: Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction

of Chemicals – REACH)

Recommendatory

SOFT

UN Security Council Resolution 1887

and others*

UN General Assembly resolutions

*Resolutions, guidelines,

standards and codes of

international organizations and UN specialized

agencies and OPCW

Special Contributions of the Industry and its Organizations


Security and Counterterrorism:Mission Limitations

IAEA•Serve as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation

•Assist in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for various peaceful purposes

•Develop nuclear safety standards and promote the achievement and maintenance of high levels of safety in applications of nuclear energy

•Verify through its inspection system that states comply with their commitments, under the Nonproliferation Treaty and other nonproliferation agreements, to use nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful purposes

OPCW•Ensure a credible and transparent regime for verifying the destruction of chemical weapons and to prevent their re‐emergence

•Provide protection and assistance against chemical weapons

•Encourage international cooperation in peaceful uses of chemistry

•Bring about universal membership of OPCW


Evolution of IAEA Involvement• From the early 1970s, IAEA has been demonstrating interest in nuclear security and in

1975 issued its “Recommendations for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material”(INFCIRC/225 which is now INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4) as guidance for its members

• The increased trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material made it necessary to remove in 2002 the Office of Nuclear Security from the Department of Safeguards, upgrade it and relocate to the newly created Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

• The Office of Nuclear Security manages the Triennial Nuclear Security Action Plans initiated in 2002 and now extended for 2010‐2013 (before 2002: ad hoc activities < $1 million)

BUT:

• IAEA guidance in nuclear security is still provided only upon request as it does not have the authority to verify the physical protection in states

• IAEA has not been able to establish a baseline global security standard to be complied by all state parties

• IAEA security activity relies almost exclusively on extra‐budgetary contributions to the voluntary Nuclear Security Fund (≈ $27 million per year)


Efforts to Expand the Scope

• “Reaffirm the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the international nuclear security framework and will work to ensure that it continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities in accordance with its statute, relevant General Conference Resolutions and its Nuclear Security Plans”

Communiqué of the 2010 Washington

Summit on Nuclear Security

• “…pursuit of the objectives of this Work Plan will not be interpreted so as to alter the mandate or responsibilities of the IAEA.”

Work Plan of the 2010 Washington Summit

on Nuclear Security

IAEA


Efforts to Expand the Scope

• The Second Review Conference:• Reaffirmed concerns at the First Review Conference that chemical facilities may

become subject to attacks or other incidents that could lead to the release or theft of toxic chemicals

• Welcomed the fact that some state parties had taken measures to minimize such risks and encouraged them to exchange experiences

• Noted the role of the OPCW as a forum for consultation and cooperation

• Recognized the need for a close cooperation with other relevant international organizations and agencies active in this field

• OPCW Director‐General, Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu: • The Table Top Exercise on Preparedness to Prevent Terrorist Attacks held in Poland

in November 2010 is “the beginning of a sustained initiative to promote the OPCW as a platform for consultation and cooperation on ways to prevent terrorists from acquiring and/or using CWs and to promote chemical security”

• A model environment will be developed for “planning and implementing activities to prepare for, prevent, and respond to a release of toxic chemicals by a malicious act.”

OPCW


IAEA Record to Be Considered by OPCW

1. Nuclear Security Plan (current 2010‐2013)• Objective:

Contribute to global efforts to achieve worldwide, effective security wherever nuclear or other radioactive material is in use, storage and/or transport, and of associated facilities, by supporting States, upon request, in their efforts to establish and maintain effective nuclear security through assistance in capacity building, guidance, human resource development, sustainability and risk reduction

• Four Elements:

- Needs assessment, information collation and analysis

- Contributing to the enhancement of a global nuclear security framework

- Providing nuclear security services

- Risk reduction and security improvement

• Annual budget: ≈ $36 million



2. Nuclear Security Series Documents• Categories

a. Fundamentals contain objectives, concepts and principles of nuclear security and provide the basis for security recommendations

b. Recommendations present best practices in the application of the fundamentals

c. Implementing Guides provide further elaboration of the recommendations

d. Technical Guidance: reference manuals, training guides and service guides

• Fifteen publications have been released since 2006

• Open‐ended meetings are held by the Secretariat for categories a, b and c. The Secretariat submits draft texts to all member states for a formal 120 day long review. Category d publications are developed in close consultation with international experts.



3. Incident and Emergency Center (IEC)• In 2005, the IAEA established an integrated center – the Incident and

Emergency Center (IEC) – to serve as global focal point for preparedness, event reporting, information sharing and response to nuclear andradiological incidents and emergencies irrespective of their cause

• IEC provides a 24‐hour contact point for notification and request for assistance

• IEC coordinates the response with other organizations, such as the FAO, WHO, WMO and others

• IEC reports directly to the Deputy Director of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security.



4. Nuclear Security Culture• “We will work with the industry to ensure the necessary priority of

physical protection, material accountancy and security culture”

Communiqué of the April 2010 Nuclear Security

Summit in Washington D.C.

• The IAEA project to develop the concept of nuclear security culture was launched in 2003 and culminated in the publication of “Nuclear Security Culture: Implementing Guide” in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 7 (2008)

• Definition: “The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals, organizations and institutions, which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security”

• IAEA Regional Workshops have been held in several countries, including Zambia, South Africa, Hungary, Kazakhstan, China and France



4. Nuclear Security Culture (continued)



5. Stakeholders: World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS)

• WINS was established in 2008 as an informal channel for nuclear custodians in government, industry and academia to learn from each other and share best practices in nuclear security

• In 2010 WINS published eleven Best Practice Guides (e.g. Nuclear Security Culture, Security Equipment Maintenance, Managing Internal Threats, Threat Assessment, Security Governance and others) and held nineInternational Workshops (e.g. Security by Design – Vienna, Austria; Corporate Governance and Security Leadership – Tokyo, Japan; Guard Force Recruitment, Training, Deployment and Exercises – Blue Mountain, Ontario, Canada and others)

• WINS developed its website and publishes Best Practice Guides in seven languages

• WINS is funded by governments, foundations and nuclear companies and closely works with the IAEA


Final Observations• Despite its shortcomings , gaps and some inconsistencies, the nuclear

security framework can provide useful lessons of flexibility and quick response to emerging threats.

• Chemical security regime will necessarily be less robust than its nuclear counterpart because the relevant material, technologies and knowledge are much wider spread and diverse.

• Efforts to streamline and perhaps expand the international legal framework for chemical security would be helpful to achieve sustainability, consistency and coordination in meeting chemical‐related threats.

• UNSCR 1540 provides a unique opportunity and largely untapped (so far) resource for OPCW to deal with its security and counterterrorism mission limitations.

• OPCW and IAEA may consider an option of establishing a joint mechanism of regular consultations and best practice sharing regarding security and counterterrorism.

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