Chapter2 - Introduction

8/15/2019 Chapter2 - Introduction

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Historical Background

In 1918 Great Britain emerged victorious from the First World

War. She had reached the zenith of her imperial power and global

influence not only through the acquisition of the Mandated Territories, but

also through the disappearance from the world stage of her German,

Russian and American rivals. However, this strength was illusory. The

Empire had become far too large, even before 1914 British statesmen had

realised that the extent of their world-wide commitments was too much.

After 1918, Britain had a larger Empire to defend with even fewer

resources. The only post-war difference was that internal collapse, rather

than from external pressure seemed to be the biggest threat. The

Dominions of Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand,

conscious of the role they had played in the war, became more determined

to assert their autonomy from London by refusing to ‘blindly’ follow it

into the next European conflict. Nationalist tension from Ireland to India,

Egypt to Mesopotamia threatened trouble that would demand serious

military intervention. After four long years of war, it would do nothing to

help Britain restore her civilian economy back to the prosperity of the

pre-war years.

Four years of war had done more than drain Britain of her

international economic power. The horrors of the Western Front had left

an indelible psychological imprint both upon the minds of the politiciansand the public. “Never Again” was the response to the idea of another

continental commitment. As Michael Howard has written “Unfortunately,

it was to be more than an epitaph; it was to be a policy - and one which

was to have disastrous results”.1 So quick were politicians to bend to

1 M. Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British

Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars (The Ford Lectures in the

University of Oxford, 1971), (Harmondsworth, 1972), pp.74-75

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domestic pressure for cutting back taxation and military spending, there

was no attempt to remember the painful lessons that Britain had learnt in

the early stages of the war due to her unpreparedness. The necessary civil

and military administrative measures for a rapid and sustainable

expansion of the national war effort were forgotten overnight, something

which would have a significant bearing upon the foreign policies of

British Governments in the 1930s.2 The ‘Ten Year Rule’ formulated that

all three branches of the Armed Forces had to calculate their defence

requirements on the assumption that there would be no major war for the

next ten years. Defence spending was slashed, creating the appearance

that almost nothing was spent, though considering the balance of power in

the immediate post-war world, there were no real heavyweight powers

threatening the security of Britain and her Empire. In effect Britain was

thoroughly disarmed in the 1920s, not only in terms of actual weapon

stockpiles, but also in the lack of an adequately funded institutional

structure that each branch of the Armed Forces needed to function

properly. The ‘Ten Year Rule’ was only dropped in 1932 because the

Japanese attack upon Manchuria had revealed just how precarious

Britain's world-wide position had become after years of chronic

under-funding.3 This did not mean the beginning of rearmament. On the

contrary, British policy was still to maintain a course away from playing a

military role in international affairs if she could help it, but by droppingthe restrictions she indicated that she would not be an easy target for

aggression.

On 30 July 1934 Stanley Baldwin rose in the House of Commons

to defend his five year expansion programme for the RAF. In his defence

2 B. Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford,

1980), p.63 COS 310 “Imperial Defence Policy”, October 1933, CAB 53/23




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he stated that Britain had tried to set an example to the world by spending

very little on military requirements and, thereby, preserve peace. This

policy had failed. Other nations were returning to rearmament, especially

in regard to strategic air power which was symptomatic of a “general

trend towards the adoption of a definite air strategy, in which aircraft is

contemplated as the primary offensive arm”.4 Even Germany, which was

formally forbidden under the Versailles Settlement to have a military

airforce, was probably rearming, though secrecy was making this difficult

to assess. What Britain could be sure of was that when Germany felt free

to rearm she would pay great attention to strategic air power.

“There is [Baldwin continued] a situation of potential gravity ... which it

would be foolish to ignore ... If armaments are to be of any value in collective

security, the forces must be properly equipped. Shop window defence forces

will deceive nobody in Europe to-day”.5

Only serious rearmament will deter those who want to disturb the

international equilibrium to achieve their aims. Aerial rearmament had to

start now because it would take many years before the results were

noticeable. The longer Britain hesitated the longer she would need to

make good the difference: the longer Britain would be vulnerable. “There

is no defence. The truth is that the bomber will always get through”,6 but,

Baldwin asserted, only the creation of a credible deterrent will prevent

this from occurring. That was Britain's policy.

“Since the day of the air, the old frontiers are gone. When you think of the

defence of England you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover, you think

of the Rhine”.7

4 Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, Volume 292, col.23295 Ibid., col.2329-23306 Ibid., col.23367 Ibid., col.2339




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The speech was a clear warning to Nazi Germany that if she unilaterally

renounced the air disarmament clauses of Versailles Britain would not sit

idly by and be threatened with the destructive consequences from the

application of a strategic bombing campaign.

Strategic Bombing: A Definition, its Origins and the

Response to

The official history of the RAF’s strategic bombing campaign in

the Second World War defined such an offensive as:

“a means of direct attack upon the enemy state with the object of depriving it

of the means or the will to continue the war”.8

The “theory” of strategic bombing evolved out of the attempts to avoid

(and understand) the four years of carnage and strategic impasse that had

characterised the Western Front. The war had done much to confirm the

pre-war beliefs that the Great Powers had developed the industrial staying

power to withstand continuous military onslaughts. War had ceased to be

a conflict between armies, and had begun to assume aspects of a leviathan

struggle between the economies and societies of opposing states. Victory,

therefore, did not lie on the battlefield: rather it was to be found in the air

space over factories, industrial complexes, and residential areas.9 The

disruption and perceived public hysteria that accompanied the punitive

British and German air raids in the war were taken as proof that the

technological determinism of airpower was all-conquering. If airforces

were to increase the size of their bomber fleets, their power of destruction

8 Sir C. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against

Germany, 1939-1945: Volume I: Preparation (London, 1961), p.69 M. Smith, The Allied Air Offensive, Journal of Strategic Studies (March-i),

Volume 13, 1990, pp.68-69; U. Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air

Attack and British Politics (London, 1980), p.2




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would rise in direct proportion. Strategic airpower was to be “the

strategic stiletto which would pierce the tough and complex armour which

sustained advanced industrial nations in war”.10

“Such ideas, nevertheless, were aberrations inspired by excessive

optimism or excessive depression”,11 and “they gave rise to a

disproportionate sense of terror”.12 It was not known at the time, but the

impact of airpower in the First World War had been greatly exaggerated.

It simply did not possess the organisational framework, the financial

resources, nor the technological or strategic capabilities to make a

difference. It was an immature weapon, and there were no empirical

studies comparable to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (after

the Second World War) to measure the effectiveness of campaigns.

Strategic theory was far outstripping the pace of technological reality.

Giulio Douhet’s The Command of the Air , first published in 1921, did

most to foster these illusions. Douhet's work - often cited, little read, and

understood even less - took this runaway technological determinism to its

ultimate, if not illogical, limits by advancing the idea that airpower (in the

shape of the bomber) would dictate the development of future wars.13

“Suddenly, it appeared, airpower had made all conventional attitudes to

strategic thought completely out of date ... airpower would, indeed, bring

about nothing less than a cataclysmic change in the nature of war ... the

bomber appeared to have heralded an epoch in which the fate of nations could

be decided by one quick, decisive strike”.14

10 Ibid., p.6911 Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive, p.1012 U. Bialer, “Elite Opinion and Defence Policy: Air Power Advocacy and

British Rearmament during the 1930s”, British Journal of International Studies

(April-i), Volume 6, 1980, p.36; Bialer, Shadow of the Bomber, pp.12-16, 46-4713 C.G. Segre, “Giulio Douhet: Strategist, Theorist, Prophet?” Journal of

Strategic Studies (September-iii), Volume 15, 1992, p.35514 Bialer, Shadow of the Bomber , p.37; R.J. Young, “The Use and Abuse of

Fear: France and the Air Menace in the 1930s”, Intelligence and National Security

(October-iv), Volume 2, 1987




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Many hoped that a weapon of so terrible a potential would in fact act as a

deterrent,15 yet the fear of “a national heart-attack as a result of massive

surprise air bombardment” retained its hegemonic grip.16 It was

commonly believed that immediately after the declaration of war a huge

armada of bombers would suddenly appear over the enemy capital to

deliver a decisive air strike of high explosives, incendiaries, and chemical

weapons, in particular gas. It was hoped (as well as feared) the

psychological shock of this “promiscuous massacre” of civilians would

provoke, through the collapse of national morale, the “catastrophic

eventuality” of capitulation, defeat and revolution. There was no defence

except possession of superior airpower.

There were, and still are, two problems with Douhet’s ideas.

Firstly, it was neither a strategy nor a theory. Secondly, it was not based

on any empirical evidence.17 Douhet’s The Command of the Air was an

attempt to intuitively grasp future trends in the development of warfare -

not ‘scientifically’ predict them.18 Yet, despite this fact, “politicians had

no other benchmarks to measure atrocity and devastation than science

fiction and gloomy military prognosis”.19 The image Douhet had helped to

conjure up and popularise to politicians and public alike was a strong one:

biblical wrath.20

15 R.J. Overy, “Airpower and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939”,

Journal of Strategic Studies (March-i), Volume 15, 1992, esp. pp.74-8016 M. Smith, “ ‘A Matter of Faith’: British Strategic Air Doctrine before

1939”, Journal of Contemporary History (July-iii), Volume 15, 1980, p.425;

Williamson Murray, “The Luftwaffe before the Second World War: A Misson, A

Strategy?”, Journal of Strategic Studies (September-iii), Volume 4, 198117 Segre, “Giulio Douhet: Strategist, Theorist, Prophet?”, pp. 355, 356;

Bialer, Shadow of the Bomber , p.318 Ibid., p.35819 Overy, “Airpower and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939”,

p.8820 Segre, “Giulio Douhet: Strategist, Theorist, Prophet?”, pp.358-359




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What is Intelligence?

Intelligence is information concerning foreign powers that is

collected by clandestine or non-clandestine means, and is then analysed.

These means encompass a variety of methods from the highly

sophisticated world of code breaking and interception of radio traffic and

satellite communications and photo-reconnaissance; to the popularly held

conception of the recruitment of spies and fifth columnists, as well as

employing one’s own; to the more mundane areas of carefully reading the

foreign press and specialist journals, to questioning businessmen who visit

foreign factories, and merely being observant when travelling abroad.21 In

short, intelligence is information that is not freely ‘given away’ by

governments because of its potentially damaging nature. But what is its

purpose? Michael Handel sees the function of intelligence to illuminate

the decision making process:

“The proper use of accurate, timely intelligence can significantly reduce

uncertainty, thereby enabling political and military leaders to improve thequality of the decisions, develop more effective strategies, or conduct more

successful military operations. The information provided by intelligence is thus

only a means to an end”.22

The Organisational Framework of British Intelligence

(a) The Foreign Office

Although it was nominally in charge of the SIS and GC&CS, the

FO had no intelligence department of its own, and did little to concern

itself with the running of its two “dependants”. The FO did not consider

21 S. Gazit., “Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker”, Intelligence

and National Security (July-iii), Volume 3, 1988, p.261; W. Laqueur, World of

Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York, 1985), p.vii; Morton to

Ryan, 5 November 1937, CAB 47/122 M.I. Handel, “Leaders and Intelligence”, Intelligence and National

Security (July-iii), Volume 3, 1988, pp.3, 10; R.K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and,

Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable”, World Politics (i), Volume 31,

1978, p.65




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intelligence to be a distinct activity, but then it did not think that about its

advisory or executive functions either. The vast amount of information it

received from its embassies was never considered to be intelligence, and

therefore was never examined by specialist analysts. The FO had no

arrangements of any sort to share its information or conclusions with any

other ministry: it had no inclination to.23 This stemmed from two factors.

Firstly, it had the largest and most continuous supply of information; and

secondly, it had no rivals because of their inability to do this. All service

attaches were posted in the embassies. They had to send their reports via

the embassy, to the FO, which then passed them on to the ministry

concerned. It never commented upon reports unless asked, but it did form

opinions on them. If opinions differed to those of the Service ministries,

as will be seen, it often acted without permission from the relevant

ministry because “it assumed the right and duty to do so”.24

(b) The War OfficeThis office did possess its own intelligence department, yet before

1914, and after 1918, intelligence was subordinated to operations.25 This

should have allowed greater use of intelligence in decision making, but in

practice it meant that the views of intelligence did not reach a wider

audience in the WO, which meant that decisions were often taken without

consideration of the intelligence perspective. It also meant thatintelligence in the WO was working in isolation from the other services. It

was only in September 1936 that this situation was resolved with the

creation of a separate Deputy Director of Intelligence.26

23 F.H. Hinsley, et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its

Influence on Strategy and Operations: Volume I (London, 1979), p.624 Ibid., p.725 Ibid., p.926 Ibid., p.11




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(c) The Air Ministry

When the Air Staff was set up in 1918 it also subordinated its

intelligence department to operations, and therefore faced the same

problems as that in the WO.27 This was ended in 1935 when the head of

the AID was promoted to Deputy Director of Intelligence. This placed on

an equal footing with the Deputy Director of Operations in the combined

Directorate of Operations and Intelligence.28 It was also at this time when

the Treasury finally began to give money to the Air Ministry for

intelligence purposes.29

(d) The Special Intelligence Service

The SIS was not made responsible for all overseas espionage until

1921. It was funded by the Foreign Office’s “Secret Vote”, and supplied

information to all ministries that had overseas interests. Although it was

under FO control, it had internal liaison departments with the Services. It

supplied political intelligence to the FO only: the FO did not want the

Service ministries to encroach on its area of responsibility.30 This meant

that the Services had to waste time and money collecting their own

political intelligence. The SIS was allowed to receive orders from the

Service ministries and report straight to them. Yet the fact that the FO

was only nominally in control meant that the SIS was not strong enough

to resist demands for tasks that were beyond its resources, nor decidewhich requests had priority.31 It was not efficient enough for the Service

ministries who relied largely on their own intelligence services.32 Conflict

27 C. Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence

Community (Sevenoaks, 1987)28 Ibid., p.1229 Ibid., p.485; AIR 2/168830 Andrew, Secret Service, p.1731 Ibid., p.1832 Ibid.; P. Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: The Spy as Bureaucrat,




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of users’ interests had prevented its incorporation with the other

intelligence services into a unified and independent body.33

(e) The Government Code and Cipher School

Like the SIS, the GC&CS was a product of the immediate

post-First World War world. Its functions were to advise Britain on the

security of her codes and ciphers, and to attack those of foreign states. It

was also “controlled” by the FO, but was funded by its non-secret vote.34

As with the SIS, the FO took little interest in the running of the GC&CS:

it was the “adopted child” of the FO, and the ‘poor relation’ of the SIS.35

(f) The Industrial Intelligence Centre

The Service ministries and the FO came to realise that after World

War One economic intelligence was necessary to broaden the horizons of

their assessments. In 1925 the CID set up the ATB Committee to organise

the administrative measures necessary for placing economic pressure

upon an enemy. It soon became involved in economic intelligence. In

May 1933 it set up the EP sub-committee for additional reporting upon

economic intelligence for the CID.

In 1929 the secretaries for state for the WO and the Air Ministry

demanded the creation of a body to study economic mobilisation in

foreign countries. The CID created the FCI sub-committee, butunfortunately this new organisation, and the two which preceded it, had

no research staff at all. This led to the creation of the IIC.36

Partiot, Fantasist, and Whore (London, 1986), p.9533 Hinsley, British Intelligence, pp.18-1934 Ibid., p.2035 A.G. Denniston, “The Government Code and Cipher School between the

Wars”, Intelligence and National Security (January-i), Volume 1, 1986, p.5036 Hinsley, British Intelligence, p.25




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The IIC was to collect, interpret, and distribute industrial

intelligence, and then pass it on to the Service ministries and the

aforementioned sub-committees.37 The IIC was to receive any industrial

intelligence they collected. From 1937 onwards the IIC was the sole

authority on economic intelligence, and did most of the work for the ATB

and the FCI.38

(g) The Committee of Imperial Defence

It was created in the early twentieth century to ensure that the

appreciations of foreign policy and of strategy were more fully integrated.

It included members of the Cabinet and the COS under the Prime

Minister, together with a permanent secretariat to ensure that the meetings

were fully prepared for, and issues raised were followed up. Yet upto

1939, its existence, like that of the JIC, did little to prompt active

inter-service/departmental collaboration. The Services put little faith in

peace-time intelligence, and were therefore disinclined to collaborate. The

FO reserved the right to comment on military intelligence of political

significance, and believed its opinions to be sound. The Services ignored

the military aspects of political developments, and of information from the

FO as it did not want to be accused of doing the FO’s job.39

(h) The Joint Intelligence sub-CommitteeIts function was to assist the JPS by acting as a clearing-house for

intelligence matters that were not the preserve of one service. Unlike its

37 R.J. Young, “Spokesmen for Economic Warfare: The Industrial

Intelligence Centre in the 1930s”, European Studies Review (October-iv), Volume 6,

1976, pp.473, 476, 477; D.C. Watt, “British Intelligence and the Coming of the

Second World War in Europe”, in E. May (ed.) Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence

Assessments before the Two World Wars (Princeton, N.J., 1984), pp.244-24538 Hinsley, British Intelligence, pp.31-3239 Ibid., p.8




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premature predecessor, the Inter-Service Intelligence Committee, the JIC

could enlist the help of the IIC. In fact, even the FO and MI5 consulted

the JIC.40 Despite its contacts and frequent meetings, the JIC remained a

peripheral body as much of the intelligence work was done by the

Services own intelligence departments, and the FCI and IIC. The JIC was

asked its opinion only on routine matters, or on subjects in which

intelligence was hard to come by. It never offered its opinions voluntarily

as this practice was not appreciated. However, its existence showed that

greater amounts of intelligence and better inter-service co-operation were

needed.41 The latter did not happen as the Services produced their own

intelligence estimates for the JPS, which then “knitted them together”.

The JIC was considered to be a time-wasting diversion even though the

Services had called for its creation.42

40 Ibid., p.3641 Ibid., p.3742 Ibid., p.38




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“The rise of Adolf Hitler and the beginning of German rearmament

together caused greater government interest in intelligence than at any time

since the breach of Anglo-Soviet relations in 1927”.1 The identification of

Germany as the prime target did not do much to satisfy this need for

information on her rearmament programme. It was known that Germany had

done much to evade the de-militarization clauses of Versailles.2 It was also

well known to Britain that she had done much to organise her munitions

industry in the 1920s for an emergency,3 and that her engineering industry, if

sufficiently organised, had the potential capacity to produce a great supply of

armaments.4 The fact remained that in 1933 Germany’s plans for rearmament

were largely on paper, and even so, were camouflaged by great secrecy. As

Wesley Wark correctly points out, British intelligence would not have an

easy task in assessing the growth of Germany’s aerial rearmament when it

started ab initio and had access to almost unlimited financial backing and to

one of the world’s most powerful economies.5

The Intelligence Picture on the Luftwaffe , 1933

The first AID paper of 1933 argued that, in the light of evidence on

Germany’s aerial rearmament that had come to their attention since March

1 C. Andrew, Secret Intelligence and British Foreign Policy, 1900-1939, in C.

Andrew and J. Noakes (eds.), Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945

(Exeter, 1987), p.22

2 COS 310 “Imperial Defence Policy”, October 1933, CAB 4/22; CP184(33)

“Indications of Germany's Disregardment of Part V of Versailles”, Annex II, July 1933,

AIR 2/1353

3 CID 1106-B “Foreign Armaments Industries: Note by Chairman, Principal

Supply Officers Committee”, 27 March 1933, CAB 4/22

4 ATB(EP)8 “Some Notes on German Industry and Industrial Capacity”, 1 April

1933, CAB 47/8; IIC Memo., 9 June 1935, C4687/4687/18, FO 371/18882

5 W. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany,

1933-1939 (London, 1985), p.37




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1932, German “plans for the formation of airforces in Germany were almost

complete”.6 For this they cited the number of aircraft believed to exist (at

least 127), their non-civilian (i.e. military) specifications, their location at

government controlled training schools, the number of pilots trained therein

(far in excess of civilian needs), the placing of orders for airframes and

engines by the German Ministry of Defence, and the fact that an aviation

ministry was about to be created. The AA in Berlin expected that Germany

would have established 7 reconnaissance and 21 fighter squadrons by the

end of that year. The AI4’s review paper in May further added to this picture

when it reported that the rise in the industrial budget of rearmament had risen

from 15 million Reichsmarks to 57 million, and commented that it was

“phenomenal” as only 11 million Reichsmarks had been allocated in

1932-1933.7 The scale of illegal subsidies was believed to be considerable.8

The basis of these reports and the fact that the German Defence Ministry,

and Göring, a leading Nazi chosen for the post of Reichskommisar for

aviation, were closely co-ordinating all aspects of aviation in Germany led

the Air Ministry to state that “every facility would appear to exist for the

accommodation of airforce of considerable size”.9 Although it was only a

few months later, the AI4 section of the AID stated that there were no plans

6. AI4 “Preparations for the establishment of a German Air Arm” (1), 18

February 1933, ibid.; MI3b “Recent Evidence Regarding the Accelaration of German

Rearmament and Organization”, 23 February 1933, WO 190/174

7 AI4 “Preparations for the establishment of a German Air Arm” (2), 4 May

1933, ibid.

8. Annex I of CP184(33), AIR 2/1353; French paper “Principle Breaches of the

Military and Air Clauses of Versailles and Subsequent Agreements”, August 1933,

C6942/254/18, AIR 2/1354

9 “Infrigements of the air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles”, 5 July 1933, AIR

2/1353




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existed for wartime mass production methods to be implemented as of yet. It

believed that only 400 planes of all types would exist by the end of 1933.10

It was not until 1934 that intelligence on the emergent Luftwaffe was

digested by anyone outside the Air Ministry. This was because that although

the machinery for intelligence had become mobilised in early 1933 it still had

to pick up pace, and had to do its best against the excessive secrecy that the

Nazis covered their rearmament programme with.


The first paper presented to the CID on German aircraft production

noted that since Hitler and the Nazi Party had come to power in Germany,

the aircraft industry had expanded by 50% in one year, and that this

expansion was “in no sense a natural industrial development. Its justification

lies solely in orders placed on behalf of the Reich, or Nazi organisations ... in

direct defiance of the [Versailles] Treaty”.11 It argued that once production

measures were fully utilised “Germany’s capacity to construct military

aircraft will reach formidable proportions”, but concluded that the factor

limiting the creation of an airforce would be the lack of trained personnel,

staff and leaders, not output.12

This mirror-imaging of values did not solely extend to the strategy of

the Luftwaffe, and nor was the Air Ministry the only culprit. The civilian

consumers of air intelligence also viewed the organisational build-up and

framework of the Luftwaffe from the RAF perspective of the 1920s. Maurice

Hankey wrote:

10 AI4 Memo., 28 November 1933, AIR 2/1355

11 CID 1134-B “German Industrial Measures for Rearmament and Aircraft

Production”, 22 March 1934, CAB 4/2212 Ibid.




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“In a few years time Germany might have as many first-line aeroplanes and pilots

as we have; but pilots and airplanes do not make an airforce. It takes years of

intensive effort and training to build up an airforce to a state of efficiency with the

RAF ... The Germans are efficient people, but they are not supermen”.13

The DCAS wrote that only one German air division would be

established by 1 October 1935, and that only two more would be established

by 1939. “That appears to me to be more than Germany would probably

attempt to do if she were aiming at efficiency”.14 An Air Staff memo a week

later reiterated this plan of slow and efficient expansion by Germany when it

said:

“This must be regarded as the maximum rate since it must not be assumed that a

nation so admittedly thorough as Germany will be content with a mere window

dressing of aircraft and pilots ... we can assume that they will go to great lengths

to realise their plans at the earliest possible moment. But they cannot achieve the

impossible”.15

Germany would be unlikely to surpass the first line strength of 820

planes. The AID was so dismissive of Germany’s plans for expansion that,

although she had 1000 planes of all types, she did not yet have the

organisational framework to make these planes truly efficient. The AID

claimed, therefore, that no “real” German units existed,16 despite the

Secretary of State for Air admitting that British information on German

rearmament was “very incomplete”.17

13 Hankey to Vansittart, 5 March 1934, CAB 21/434

14 DCAS to CAS, 22 May 1934, AIR 9/69

15 Air Staff Memo “Estimate of the Requirements for the Security of Great

Britain against air attack from Germany”, 29 May 1934, original emphasis

16 “Answer by AI to CAS instructions. re: German air strength”, November 1934,

AIR 9/24

17 DC(M)(32)115, Note by Secretary of State for Air, 29 May 1934, CAB

16/111




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Despite being accused by the FO of minimising the danger,18 the

picture of efficiency governing the growth of the Luftwaffe continued. The

CID’s “Imperial Defence Policy” paper estimated that, by 1 October 1935,

the total strength of the Luftwaffe would be 504 planes of all types.19 It

claimed that the ultimate intention of the Luftwaffe was to form three, or

possibly four, air divisions. The CID paper said that evidence in support of

this came from a Luftwaffe war-game staff exercise which envisaged such a

line-up at the outbreak of war. At best, such a conclusion for intelligence

purposes is dubious because the scenarios of war-games are hypothetical and

in no way necessarily correspond to the aims, intentions and strategic

appreciations of a military leadership. Yet the further comment of this paper

shows again the uncritical attitude of intelligence consumers at this early

stage:

“Further assumptions leading to this conclusion are that the first air division in

process of formation is numbered the First Air Division, thereby disclosing an

apparent intention to create others; and, in addition, to the fact that the German

plans are to deal in multiples of three”.20

This was reaffirmed by a AID memo presented as a CID paper.21 This

CID paper, which commented upon the expansion of the German aircraft

industry, said that its picture of expansion last March had been confirmed by

intelligence since received. It noted that reserves were being accumulated,

and although the exact level was not known, the important fact to note was

that German productive capability was enough to supply reserves as well as

front-line craft. Output was believed to have risen by at least 50% since the

start of 1934, although the estimated potential capacity of the industry was

18 Vansittart Minute, 19 June 1934, C3511/31/18, FO 371/17712

19 CID 1148-B "Imperial Defence Policy," 23 October 1934, CAB 4/23

20 Ibid.21 CID 1150-B "German Rearmament," November 1934, CAB 4/23




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not believed to have risen since the last AID-IIC paper.22 The paper

concluded by stating that Germany, by December 1935, planned to have

900-1000 planes of all types, and that these plans appeared to be in the

process of fulfilment. Two days later, the MA in Paris reported that Germany

was aiming for 1300 front-line planes by October 1936.23

The second AID/IIC paper reaffirmed this picture of expansion. It

stated that although recent evidence was conflicting in detail, the wider view

of the German aircraft industry “leaves little doubt that considerable

expansion of output and capacity has taken place since the beginning of last

year and is continuing”.24 It was estimated that employment figures had risen

by 90% since December 1933, and that although “estimates vary

considerably” output of engines was believed to be 210-250 per month, and

frames, 140-175. If these figures were correct, then in the ten months from

January to October of 1934, Germany had built 850 planes of all types. This,

therefore, pushed Germany’s figures to 2300, though it was believed that

only 550 were pure military types, with 250 civil-military convertibles. This

was only 100 planes above the French intelligence estimate of 450 purely

military types.25 The General Staff felt that they were “not in a position to

comment on the facts of this paper”.26 The CID was told at the discussion

that, due to information received in the last four weeks, output “showed a

substantial increase”. The figures for frames had to be revised upwards to

160-180, and for engines, 250-300.27 The MA and AA in Berlin were still

warning about the “impenetrable cloak of secrecy in Germany”.28

22 Ibid.; Vide supra, note 11

23 MA Paris Dispatch, 24 October 1934, AIR 2/1355

24 CID 1151-B "German Aircraft Industry," 5 November 1934, CAB 4/23

25 AA Paris Dispatch, 15 November 1934, FO 371/17713

26 WO 190/275

27 CID 266th meeting, 22 November 1934, CAB 2/628 German Rearmament, 26 November 1934, C8126/20/18, AIR 2/1355




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A forecast on the expansion of the Luftwaffe shortly appeared on the

basis of these CID papers, the contents of which were deemed to be upto

date and reliable in the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on German

Rearmament,29 and it was used as a supplement to the AID memo.30 The

AID memo had said that the ultimate aim of Germany was to possess three

to four air divisions, which would roughly equal a first-line strength of 1500

planes. Information received since its compilation indicated that a second

stage of aerial expansion was underway. By 1 October 1936, Germany, it

was estimated, would possess a front-line strength of 1368 planes, 1296

reserves, 400 trainers and 200 reserve trainers: in short, 3264 planes of all

types.31 The WO had “no information on which to criticise these

forecasts”;32 the CID merely took note of its existence.33


In late March 1935 Hitler announced to Sir John Simon and Sir

Antony Eden that the front-line strength of the Luftwaffe was equal to that of

the RAF. Confusion initially reigned as to what Hitler had actually said and

what he had meant by this statement of front-line parity. The AA in Berlin

knew that Hitler’s figures for the RAF, as well as those for the Luftwaffe

were exaggerated.34 After a conversation with Wenninger of the RLM, the

AA concluded that Hitler’s statement “was not an exact or carefully prepared

announcement but a more or less loose statement with no very close

29 GR(34) Minutes of 1st meeting of Cabinet Committee of German

Rearmament, CAB 27/572

30 Vide supra, note 21

31 CID 1159-B “Position of German Air Rearmament, 20 November 1934”, 30

November 1934, CAB 4/23

32 “Position of German Rearmament”, 18 February 1935, WO 190/300

33 CID 268th meeting, 25 February 1935, CAB 2/634 AA Berlin to Courtney (DCAS), 28 March 1935, AIR 2/2708




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relationship to actual figures”.35 The Air Staff, once again mirror-imaging

their values, said:

“If this claim is interpreted as meaning that Germany has already created an

airforce of that size [800-850 planes] consisting of fully organised, trained andequipped front-line squadrons ... it is a serious overstatement of her present

position”.36

Unimpressed, Cresswell wrote:

“The Air Ministry shirk the issue of front-line strength. This is no doubt because

they do not know the figure exactly ... it seems to me that [the] Air Ministry

should be asked to provide at once a clear, brief categorical statement of what

they think the state of German armaments to be”.37

In an effort to find out the truth, the AA in Berlin, had a conversation

with Milch, the German State Secretary of Aviation. Milch confirmed that

Hitler had been referring to the front-line strength of the RAF and the

Luftwaffe. Parity with the RAF was merely a stage on the way to achieving

parity with French land and air forces. Germany, therefore, was aiming for a

front-line strength of 2000 planes.38 Sir John Simon wrote a day later, saying

that “I can see no likely motive for the German Air Ministry to deliberately

exaggerate to our AA the figure of their present air armaments”.39

The first AID-IIC paper to follow this estimated that on 1 April 1935,

the German aircraft industry employed 28,000 workers (an 83% increase),

and an output of 200 frames and 500 engines per month. The Luftwaffe possessed a total of 3000 airplanes of all types, of which 1320 were

35 Don to DAI, 3 April 1935, AIR 2/1356; Bullock to the FO, 5 April 1935, AIR

2/2708

36 “German Air Expansion and its effects on the Security of this Country”, April

1935, AIR 9/24

37 Cresswell, C2881/55/18, FO 371/ibid.

38 AA Berlin to Courtney (DCAS), 9 April 1935, AIR 2/135639 Simon to MacDonald, 10 April 1935, C3087/55/18, FO 371/18835




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front-line types.40 The Air Ministry believed that the Luftwaffe had reserves

of 550 planes, and that from the 220 produced every month, 90 were military

types. By spring 1936 output was thought likely to increase to 1300 per

month of all types, “although any estimate of German first-line strength

beyond the Spring of 1936 is pure guess-work, the Air Ministry see no

reason why Germany should not have 2000 first-line machines by 1939 if she

wished”.41 It was said at the first meeting of the Air Parity Sub-Committee

that unless information was received to the contrary Hitler's statement of

parity would have to be accepted, even though the German squadrons could

in no way be as efficient as those of the RAF.42 One week later this was

reaffirmed when the Sub-Committee said “to what extent these aircraft have,

in point of fact, been organised into squadrons is a matter of speculation”.43

It argued that:

“from the profession point of view it would be unsound to allot as much as 850

[of the 1425 planes of all types in existence] to the squadrons and to keep only

125 in reserve, but it is quite possible that the Germans have actually taken this

step”.44

The Air Ministry was reported as doing all in its power to obtain accurate

information, yet as the report further stated:

“On the important question of intelligence ... the Air Ministry have informed us

that a larger provision of money will be required for the purpose of its collection,

failing which it will be difficult to acquire information in any increased degree. We

40 CID 1172-B “German Aircraft Industry” 11 April 1935, CAB 4/23;

Londonderry to PM, 17 April 1935, AIR 8/186

41 “Comparative Strengths of Air Forces in Germany, France and the UK”, 14

April 1935, AIR 8/186

42 Minutes of Air Parity Sub-Committee (1st Meeting), 1 May 1935, CAB

27/518

43 DC(M)(32)141 “Report by Sub-Committee on Air Parity for Ministerial

Committee on Defence Requirements”, 8 May 1935, ibid.44 Ibid.




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are of the opinion that an enlarged provision should be made for this highly

necessary work”.45

This appears not to have been acknowledged by the sub-committee,

nor any other body. An earlier request to increase the SIS budget had beenrefused.46

Preconceptions about efficiency continued into June when the Air

Staff reported upon the AA’s conversation with Göring. An overview of the

interview led the Air Staff to conclude that the principles of efficiency which

were observed in Britain, were not in Germany. For example, Göring said

that entire squadrons were trained in one go, so they can be transferred to

aerodromes in toto, where the AA commented, they appeared to undergo

further training. “In other words, a proportion of the first-line strength, exists

only on paper”.47 Göring said that in the event of war he would cut into his

own flying schools to mobilise aircraft. The AA said:

“On his own admission, therefore, General Göring is forced to admit that he

would today have to cut into his own training establishments in order to provide

for his own service units. This can only indicate that personnel for some of these

units at any rate do not exist”.

Göring also claimed that some of the pilots who immediately graduated

became instructors. Summing up, the AA wrote:

“these statements and explanations by General Goring during the interview leave

little doubt that the original assertion that Germany possessed 800-850 first-lineaircraft had been forced upon the German Air Ministry by political circumstances

... Whilst Germany is undoubtedly making every effort to expand as quickly as

possible and is making remarkable progress, there is considerable doubt whether

she has yet attained the actual first-line strength claimed by her in March”.

45 Ibid.

46 CP100(35), 13 May 1935, CAB 24/255

47 CID 1180-B “Air Staff Appreciation of the Position in June 1935”, 14 June

1935, CAB 4/23




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The Air Staff argued that Germany could possess 2000 first-line

aircraft at the end of the year, but it would be at the cost of having to

sacrifice her reserves, and therefore, she would still have no real first-line

strength as defined by Britain in terms of reserves, back-up and

organisation.48 The IIC said that by April 1937 Germany could well have

1500 front-line planes, but if her rate of expansion maintained the same

speed as it had done in the last six months, it could well be 2000.49 The Air

Ministry confirmed the IIC’s first figure of 1500 by April 1937 one month

later to the CID.50 Two months later, in September, the AID estimated that

Germany possessed 1730 military types together with 200 civil-military

convertibles.51 Output had now risen to about 225 frames and about 560

engines a month; employment was 35,000.

In view of these events the DRC’s Third Report had called for more

spending on the SIS. It wanted £500,000 a year to prevent Britain from being

seriously disadvantaged on the intelligence picture of Germany.52 It was not

agreed upon until February 1936, and then in principle only. The SIS only

received the sum of £500,000 in 1939.53


48 Ibid.

49 IIC Memo., 9 June 1935, C4687/4687/18, FO 371/18882

50 DRC 23 “Summary of the latest information available regarding the expansion

of the German and Japanese Forces”, Air Ministry letter to the Secretary of the CID, 16

July 1935, CAB 16/112

51 CID 1186-B “German Aircraft Industry”, 9 September 1935, CAB 4/23

52 DRC 37 “Programmes of the Defence Services: Third Report: Volume I”,


53 DPR(DP)9 “Programmes of the Defence Services”, 12 February 1936, CAB

24/259; Cf: Appendix A




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In early 1936 the Air Ministry received intelligence from a secret

source in Germany. This intelligence is of particular interest to the historian

for two reasons. Firstly, it is one of the few intelligence reports from a secret

source (who came to be known as ‘X’) in the Air Ministry files which was

sent in its original form, i.e. that it was not summarised by any assessor.

Secondly, and far more importantly, the whole episode of the X documents

helps to reveal how the Air Ministry worked when assessing reports.

The first paper was received in February 1936. It argued that between

1 April 1933 and 1 April 1936 German had built 9800 planes, of which 4132

were trainers. This, therefore, left 5688 pure military types, if those, X

argued, built in or in existence in 1933 were excluded from consideration. X

further said that if Britain wished to calculate Germany's first-line strength on

1 April 1936 they should ignore the 1933 figures and also deduct 30%, from

the 5688, to allow for wastage. If this was done the first-line strength was

3780. X further stated that Germany had planned to build 11800 planes

between 1 April 1933 and 31 December 1938, and that of this total, 6132

military types remained to be built. German productive capacity, he stated,

was to be 6000 types per annum on a three shift basis.54

The CAS wrote to the Air Minister saying that these figures were not

supported by the evidence the Air Ministry possessed. For example, 9800

planes built in three years equalled a monthly output of 270 planes. The

Germans were believed not to have reached this figure and would not to be

able to do so by 1 April 1936. X’s figure of 9132 planes to be built from this

date to 31 December 1938 again equalled an output of 270. The CAS

argued that X appeared to be assuming that output on 1 April 1933 was

already 270 a month was it was not.55

54 X Doc. “Present Strength and Future Development of the German Air Force as

Revised in December 1935”, AIR 40/210255 CAS to Air Minister (Minute no.2), 13 February 1936, ibid.




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Detailed questions were sent to X wanting him to specify his

contentions more clearly. The three most important questions were as

follows.

Firstly,“It is stated that 9800 aircraft have been built in the three years from 1 April

1933. This is equivalent to an average monthly output of slightly over 270 a

month. Is it contended that the aircraft industry was in a position to produce this

output as early as 1933?”

Secondly,“A considered [RAF] estimate of the output of the aircraft industry on 1 April

1933 was about 50 a month. If this is correct, and the industry has expandedsteadily since then, and in order to achieve a total of 9800 aircraft by 1 April

1936, the monthly output must have been approximately 490. Is it suggested that

this is the correct figure?”

Lastly,“How do you calculate the 33% wastage factor between 1 April 1933 and 1

April 1936?”56

X replied as follows. Firstly, “No: it is not so contended”. Secondly,

he said that there were no exact figures for monthly output available, and the

(RAF) estimate for 1 April 1933 was “considerably below the mark”. Many

built were small trainers, about 40% of the figure by 1 April 1936. These

were built quicker, and therefore, boosted the output figures faster than

military types. Lastly, he considered the 33% figure for wastage to be ample.

X also stated that all squadrons have 15 front-line planes. Therefore, on 31

December 1938 the Luftwaffe would possess 2970 planes. He stated that

“This is entirely correct according to the official German methods of

calculating”.57

56 “Questions arising out of a Secret Document, ‘Organization of the German Air

Force, December 1935’ ”, ibid.57 X replies, [n.d], ibid.




26/50

The Air Ministry responded. They disagreed with X on his methods of

counting planes in squadrons, i.e. he counted those held as reserves. Official

German statements and AA information said that each squadron had 12

planes: nine front-line and three immediate reserve. Only ‘X’ and the French

intelligence services counted 15: nine front-line, three immediate reserve,

and three non-squadron reserve.58 The Air Ministry also disagreed with X’s

information on the expansion of squadrons. He had originally said that the

Luftwaffe would possess 99 by 1 April 1936. The Air Ministry replied: “if

anything, Germany is behind this programme and not, as this document

suggests, six months ahead”.59 They reaffirmed this by arguing that it would

not be completed before 1 October 1936 even if Germany had only 9 planes

per squadron. They further disagreed upon the capacity of the German

aircraft industry. X’s replies were “unconvincing ... [and] we consider his

arguments are unsound” in view of the industry's small beginnings in

1932-1933. The German aircraft industry must have been built up steadily,

and had not been subject to a large expansion, then consolidation. Also, X’s

figures of 33% for wastage over three years were too small. The Air Ministry

considered it more likely that it was 33% per annum, therefore X’s figures

for front-line strength were still too high.60

X replied to these comments. He said that the Luftwaffe and the

RAF’s conceptions of front-line strength were different. The RAF calculated,

what X called , Frontstarke (front-line) figures - 9, whilst the Germans

calculated Flugzeuge erster Linie (first-line) figures - 15. He also stated that

Britain was also underestimating the speed of squadron fulfilment, and

reaffirmed his statement about the output of the aircraft industry.61

58 Notes on X’s replies, [n.d.], ibid.


60 Notes on X’s replies, op.cit.61 X’s replies to Notes on X’s replies, ibid.




27/50

The final Air Ministry reply was complacent considering the

interactive relationship that had sprung up. The Air Ministry refused to

accept any of X’s statements. They refused to accept X’s statement of

first-line strength by saying their definition had been confirmed too many

times. They also refused to accept his statement on the squadron expansion

to 193. The Air Ministry refused to accept X’s information on the squadron

programme, and his information on the output of the aircraft industry. “We

do not believe that Germany with her ability and her love of good

organisation would adopt the methods which X has stated ... We are

reasonably sure of the present rate of output”. The comments on X

concluded that the Air Ministry was having a “fruitless argument”.62 The Air

Ministry was satisfied with the quality of its information, but if X had new

information it would be accepted, but the Air Ministry would still maintain a

cautious distance as he has neither revealed his sources, nor his identity for

the purpose of verification.63

The first AID-IIC paper of 1936 wrote that whilst employment had

risen to almost 35,000 and monthly output of frames and engines was 270

and 640 respectively, Germany's rearmament programme per se was

beginning to enter into difficulties due to the faltering supply of raw

materials. Despite this acknowledged problem, the paper went on to state

that many factories were being forced to work only one shift a day, not

because of this problem, but in order to expand their existing plant, and

therefore increase production capacity. Visitors were reporting that factories

were being built and equipped in less than twelve months. Although a

slowing down in rearmament from the scarcity of raw materials, the biggest

stop on output was more likely to be the shortage of skilled labour in many

62 Replies, to above63 DDI to CAS, 25 March 1936, ibid.




28/50

areas of Germany.64 At the CID meeting Ramsay MacDonald asked if the

increases could be sustained, and Crowe (FCI) affirmed this by saying that

German rearmament was progressing in all spheres. There was no evidence

of raw material shortages affecting aerial expansion according to Swinton.65

In June of that year, the Air Staff received information from the

French intelligence services. The French had estimated the strength of the

Luftwaffe to be 1356 first-line planes and 950 (70%) reserves. They argued

that an estimate of 2000 by December 1936 would not be an exaggeration if

Germany continued to speed up the programme that had originally envisaged

2280 front-line planes, 1500 reserves, and 216 auxiliaries by December

1938. The Air Staff commented upon this document for the CID, as the Air

Staff believed it to be misleading. Firstly, the French calculated 12 front-line

craft per squadron, the RAF counted only the 9 front-line and ignored the 3

immediate reserve. Secondly, the AA in Berlin has visited 23 Luftwaffe

stations, whilst his French counter-part has visited none. When one

subtracted the 3 immediate reserve figures from each squadron, there is

actually little difference between the current French and RAF estimates: 920

and 870 respectively. As for the end of 1936 estimate the AA in Berlin had

informed the Air Staff that there was no speeding up of this programme,

especially that of putting two years expansion into seven months. Germany

was believed to be aiming for 1500 first-line planes by April 1937, but no

plans had been received suggesting the level for 1938.66

A similar instance occurred in July of that year with French

intelligence again. The AA in Paris reported that French Intelligence believed

the Luftwaffe to have 158 squadrons (even if they had not identified 24 of

64 CID 1218-B “German Aircraft Industry”, 11 March 1936, CAB 4/24

65 CID 275th meeting, 26 March 1936, CAB 2/666 CID 1238-B “German Air Strength” Annex I and II, 9 June 1936, CAB 4/24




29/50

them), and this was a first-line strength of 1500 planes.67 The FO minuted

that any comparison with the RAF must deduct the three immediate reserve,

and ignore the French inclusion of 17 trainer squadrons.68 The Air Ministry

replied to the FO’s minute by reassuring them that in no way was the French

information as good as Britain’s. The RAF had superior military and

industrial contacts.69 The AID-IIC paper of that month did not support the

French figures, as the paper showed only a small increase in output since the

last review.70 Skilled labour shortages, not those of raw materials, were once

again the bottle-necks.

On October 5 1936 two CID papers were circulated by the Air

Ministry. The first was a report on the level of the front-line strength of the

Luftwaffe. It comprised of two sets of figures. The first was the official

German claim of 88 squadrons, and the second was the Air Ministry estimate

of 90 derived from secret and non-secret information.71 The next paper was a

forecast of growth which did not go down so well. The paper estimated that

Germany would possess 1500 front-line aircraft by 1 April 1937. Signs for

this level of growth came from expansion of production, and of training.

However, information from public statements and private conversations

indicated that Germany eventually wanted aerial parity with the Soviet

Union, which, at that time, had the largest airforce in the world. Germany

claimed that it was 4000 planes, whilst the RAF estimated 3500. The Air

Ministry added that:

67 AA Paris Dispatch, 7 July 1936, C4949/3928/18, FO 371/19946

68 FO Minute, 9 July 1936, ibid.

69 Medhurst (Air Ministry) to Wigram (FO), 10 July 1936, C5083/3928/18, ibid.

70 CID 1250-B “German Aircraft Industry”, 24 July 1936, CAB 4/2471 CID 1264-B “Progress in German Rearmament”, 5 October 1936, CAB 4/25




30/50

“it would appear that Germany is intending to provide for the greatest possible

expansion and that the relation of this to Russia is a convenience rather than an

indication of military intention”.72

As regards this expansion, the Air Staff noted that many pupils were

sent to squadrons to train, as well as keeping the schools fully booked, which

was doing much to dilute the overall quality of squadrons. The war efficiency

of the Luftwaffe would suffer until this process was ended.

This forecast of parity with the Soviet Union, indicating the large scale

expansion of the Luftwaffe, was in part due to the X documents finally

making an impact on Air Ministry thinking. The figure of a German

expansion to at least 3500 front-line planes did not please the FO. Wigram

minuted: “The cat seems to be out of the bag at last, the Germans are going

to have the biggest airforce they can irrespective of Russia”.73 The FO, so

upset by the apparent inability of the Air Ministry to make any forecast about

the Luftwaffe last with any certainty, prepared their own paper to shame the

Air Ministry.74 The FO paper stated that the latest Air Ministry estimates

(CID 1264-B and 1265-B) said that Germany possessed about 1100 planes

and would, by 1 April 1937, possess 1500. This was to compared to an Air

Ministry forecast of November 1934 which, although forecasting 1296

planes by October 1936, forecast 1500 for January 1939. The Air Ministry

had now said that this would be reached almost two years earlier, and that

the ultimate aim of Germany was now three times this figure: 4500. The Air

Ministry did not respond.The last AID-IIC paper for 1936 was presented in late November. The

monthly output of frames and engines was now believed to be 320 and 850

respectively, with employment now at 57,500. The paper noted that the real

72 CID 1265-B “Future of German Rearmament”, 5 October 1936, CAB 4/25

73 Wigram Minute, 9 October 1936, C7044/3928/18, FO 371/19947

74 FO Memo “Air Ministry Estimates of German Air Strength, 1933-1936”, 27

October 1936, C7640/3928/, FO 371/19947




31/50

increase in capacity and output was continuing to rise. If the bottle-necks in

the supply of raw materials and skilled labour were removed Germany could

go for twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week output, and produce 1000

planes a month. In reality, however, it was unlikely that they could be

removed as the skilled labour did not exist unless the rearmament

programmes for the other services were scaled down to release the labour.75

75 CID 1284-B “German Aircraft Industry”, 28 November 1936, CAB 4/25




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“The rise of Adolf Hitler and the beginning of German rearmament

together caused greater government interest in intelligence than at any time

since the breach of Anglo-Soviet relations in 1927”.1 The identification of

Germany as the prime target did not do much to satisfy this need for

information on her rearmament programme. It was known that Germany had

done much to evade the de-militarization clauses of Versailles.2 It was also

well known to Britain that she had done much to organise her munitions

industry in the 1920s for an emergency,3 and that her engineering industry, if

sufficiently organised, had the potential capacity to produce a great supply of

armaments.4 The fact remained that in 1933 Germany’s plans for rearmament

were largely on paper, and even so, were camouflaged by great secrecy. As

Wesley Wark correctly points out, British intelligence would not have an

easy task in assessing the growth of Germany’s aerial rearmament when it

started ab initio and had access to almost unlimited financial backing and to

one of the world’s most powerful economies.5


The first AID paper of 1933 argued that, in the light of evidence on

Germany’s aerial rearmament that had come to their attention since March

1 C. Andrew, Secret Intelligence and British Foreign Policy, 1900-1939, in C.

Andrew and J. Noakes (eds.), Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945

(Exeter, 1987), p.22

2 COS 310 “Imperial Defence Policy”, October 1933, CAB 4/22; CP184(33)

“Indications of Germany's Disregardment of Part V of Versailles”, Annex II, July 1933,

AIR 2/1353

3 CID 1106-B “Foreign Armaments Industries: Note by Chairman, Principal

Supply Officers Committee”, 27 March 1933, CAB 4/22

4 ATB(EP)8 “Some Notes on German Industry and Industrial Capacity”, 1 April

1933, CAB 47/8; IIC Memo., 9 June 1935, C4687/4687/18, FO 371/18882

5 W. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany,

1933-1939 (London, 1985), p.37




33/50

1932, German “plans for the formation of airforces in Germany were almost

complete”.6 For this they cited the number of aircraft believed to exist (at

least 127), their non-civilian (i.e. military) specifications, their location at

government controlled training schools, the number of pilots trained therein

(far in excess of civilian needs), the placing of orders for airframes and

engines by the German Ministry of Defence, and the fact that an aviation

ministry was about to be created. The AA in Berlin expected that Germany

would have established 7 reconnaissance and 21 fighter squadrons by the

end of that year. The AI4’s review paper in May further added to this picture

when it reported that the rise in the industrial budget of rearmament had risen

from 15 million Reichsmarks to 57 million, and commented that it was

“phenomenal” as only 11 million Reichsmarks had been allocated in

1932-1933.7 The scale of illegal subsidies was believed to be considerable.8

The basis of these reports and the fact that the German Defence Ministry,

and Göring, a leading Nazi chosen for the post of Reichskommisar for

aviation, were closely co-ordinating all aspects of aviation in Germany led

the Air Ministry to state that “every facility would appear to exist for the

accommodation of airforce of considerable size”.9 Although it was only a

few months later, the AI4 section of the AID stated that there were no plans

6. AI4 “Preparations for the establishment of a German Air Arm” (1), 18

February 1933, ibid.; MI3b “Recent Evidence Regarding the Accelaration of German

Rearmament and Organization”, 23 February 1933, WO 190/174

7 AI4 “Preparations for the establishment of a German Air Arm” (2), 4 May

1933, ibid.

8. Annex I of CP184(33), AIR 2/1353; French paper “Principle Breaches of the

Military and Air Clauses of Versailles and Subsequent Agreements”, August 1933,

C6942/254/18, AIR 2/1354

9 “Infrigements of the air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles”, 5 July 1933, AIR

2/1353




34/50

existed for wartime mass production methods to be implemented as of yet. It

believed that only 400 planes of all types would exist by the end of 1933.10

It was not until 1934 that intelligence on the emergent Luftwaffe was

digested by anyone outside the Air Ministry. This was because that although

the machinery for intelligence had become mobilised in early 1933 it still had

to pick up pace, and had to do its best against the excessive secrecy that the

Nazis covered their rearmament programme with.


The first paper presented to the CID on German aircraft production

noted that since Hitler and the Nazi Party had come to power in Germany,

the aircraft industry had expanded by 50% in one year, and that this

expansion was “in no sense a natural industrial development. Its justification

lies solely in orders placed on behalf of the Reich, or Nazi organisations ... in

direct defiance of the [Versailles] Treaty”.11 It argued that once production

measures were fully utilised “Germany’s capacity to construct military

aircraft will reach formidable proportions”, but concluded that the factor

limiting the creation of an airforce would be the lack of trained personnel,

staff and leaders, not output.12

This mirror-imaging of values did not solely extend to the strategy of

the Luftwaffe, and nor was the Air Ministry the only culprit. The civilian

consumers of air intelligence also viewed the organisational build-up and

framework of the Luftwaffe from the RAF perspective of the 1920s. Maurice

Hankey wrote:

10 AI4 Memo., 28 November 1933, AIR 2/1355

11 CID 1134-B “German Industrial Measures for Rearmament and Aircraft

Production”, 22 March 1934, CAB 4/2212 Ibid.




35/50

“In a few years time Germany might have as many first-line aeroplanes and pilots

as we have; but pilots and airplanes do not make an airforce. It takes years of

intensive effort and training to build up an airforce to a state of efficiency with the

RAF ... The Germans are efficient people, but they are not supermen”.13

The DCAS wrote that only one German air division would be

established by 1 October 1935, and that only two more would be established

by 1939. “That appears to me to be more than Germany would probably

attempt to do if she were aiming at efficiency”.14 An Air Staff memo a week

later reiterated this plan of slow and efficient expansion by Germany when it

said:

“This must be regarded as the maximum rate since it must not be assumed that a

nation so admittedly thorough as Germany will be content with a mere window

dressing of aircraft and pilots ... we can assume that they will go to great lengths

to realise their plans at the earliest possible moment. But they cannot achieve the

impossible”.15

Germany would be unlikely to surpass the first line strength of 820

planes. The AID was so dismissive of Germany’s plans for expansion that,

although she had 1000 planes of all types, she did not yet have the

organisational framework to make these planes truly efficient. The AID

claimed, therefore, that no “real” German units existed,16 despite the

Secretary of State for Air admitting that British information on German

rearmament was “very incomplete”.17

13 Hankey to Vansittart, 5 March 1934, CAB 21/434

14 DCAS to CAS, 22 May 1934, AIR 9/69

15 Air Staff Memo “Estimate of the Requirements for the Security of Great

Britain against air attack from Germany”, 29 May 1934, original emphasis

16 “Answer by AI to CAS instructions. re: German air strength”, November 1934,

AIR 9/24

17 DC(M)(32)115, Note by Secretary of State for Air, 29 May 1934, CAB

16/111




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Despite being accused by the FO of minimising the danger,18 the

picture of efficiency governing the growth of the Luftwaffe continued. The

CID’s “Imperial Defence Policy” paper estimated that, by 1 October 1935,

the total strength of the Luftwaffe would be 504 planes of all types.19 It

claimed that the ultimate intention of the Luftwaffe was to form three, or

possibly four, air divisions. The CID paper said that evidence in support of

this came from a Luftwaffe war-game staff exercise which envisaged such a

line-up at the outbreak of war. At best, such a conclusion for intelligence

purposes is dubious because the scenarios of war-games are hypothetical and

in no way necessarily correspond to the aims, intentions and strategic

appreciations of a military leadership. Yet the further comment of this paper

shows again the uncritical attitude of intelligence consumers at this early

stage:

“Further assumptions leading to this conclusion are that the first air division in

process of formation is numbered the First Air Division, thereby disclosing an

apparent intention to create others; and, in addition, to the fact that the German

plans are to deal in multiples of three”.20

This was reaffirmed by a AID memo presented as a CID paper.21 This

CID paper, which commented upon the expansion of the German aircraft

industry, said that its picture of expansion last March had been confirmed by

intelligence since received. It noted that reserves were being accumulated,

and although the exact level was not known, the important fact to note was

that German productive capability was enough to supply reserves as well as

front-line craft. Output was believed to have risen by at least 50% since the

start of 1934, although the estimated potential capacity of the industry was

18 Vansittart Minute, 19 June 1934, C3511/31/18, FO 371/17712

19 CID 1148-B "Imperial Defence Policy," 23 October 1934, CAB 4/23

20 Ibid.21 CID 1150-B "German Rearmament," November 1934, CAB 4/23




37/50

not believed to have risen since the last AID-IIC paper.22 The paper

concluded by stating that Germany, by December 1935, planned to have

900-1000 planes of all types, and that these plans appeared to be in the

process of fulfilment. Two days later, the MA in Paris reported that Germany

was aiming for 1300 front-line planes by October 1936.23

The second AID/IIC paper reaffirmed this picture of expansion. It

stated that although recent evidence was conflicting in detail, the wider view

of the German aircraft industry “leaves little doubt that considerable

expansion of output and capacity has taken place since the beginning of last

year and is continuing”.24 It was estimated that employment figures had risen

by 90% since December 1933, and that although “estimates vary

considerably” output of engines was believed to be 210-250 per month, and

frames, 140-175. If these figures were correct, then in the ten months from

January to October of 1934, Germany had built 850 planes of all types. This,

therefore, pushed Germany’s figures to 2300, though it was believed that

only 550 were pure military types, with 250 civil-military convertibles. This

was only 100 planes above the French intelligence estimate of 450 purely

military types.25 The General Staff felt that they were “not in a position to

comment on the facts of this paper”.26 The CID was told at the discussion

that, due to information received in the last four weeks, output “showed a

substantial increase”. The figures for frames had to be revised upwards to

160-180, and for engines, 250-300.27 The MA and AA in Berlin were still

warning about the “impenetrable cloak of secrecy in Germany”.28

22 Ibid.; Vide supra, note 11

23 MA Paris Dispatch, 24 October 1934, AIR 2/1355

24 CID 1151-B "German Aircraft Industry," 5 November 1934, CAB 4/23

25 AA Paris Dispatch, 15 November 1934, FO 371/17713

26 WO 190/275

27 CID 266th meeting, 22 November 1934, CAB 2/628 German Rearmament, 26 November 1934, C8126/20/18, AIR 2/1355




38/50

A forecast on the expansion of the Luftwaffe shortly appeared on the

basis of these CID papers, the contents of which were deemed to be upto

date and reliable in the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on German

Rearmament,29 and it was used as a supplement to the AID memo.30 The

AID memo had said that the ultimate aim of Germany was to possess three

to four air divisions, which would roughly equal a first-line strength of 1500

planes. Information received since its compilation indicated that a second

stage of aerial expansion was underway. By 1 October 1936, Germany, it

was estimated, would possess a front-line strength of 1368 planes, 1296

reserves, 400 trainers and 200 reserve trainers: in short, 3264 planes of all

types.31 The WO had “no information on which to criticise these

forecasts”;32 the CID merely took note of its existence.33


In late March 1935 Hitler announced to Sir John Simon and Sir

Antony Eden that the front-line strength of the Luftwaffe was equal to that of

the RAF. Confusion initially reigned as to what Hitler had actually said and

what he had meant by this statement of front-line parity. The AA in Berlin

knew that Hitler’s figures for the RAF, as well as those for the Luftwaffe

were exaggerated.34 After a conversation with Wenninger of the RLM, the

AA concluded that Hitler’s statement “was not an exact or carefully prepared

announcement but a more or less loose statement with no very close

29 GR(34) Minutes of 1st meeting of Cabinet Committee of German

Rearmament, CAB 27/572


31 CID 1159-B “Position of German Air Rearmament, 20 November 1934”, 30


32 “Position of German Rearmament”, 18 February 1935, WO 190/300

33 CID 268th meeting, 25 February 1935, CAB 2/634 AA Berlin to Courtney (DCAS), 28 March 1935, AIR 2/2708




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relationship to actual figures”.35 The Air Staff, once again mirror-imaging

their values, said:

“If this claim is interpreted as meaning that Germany has already created an

airforce of that size [800-850 planes] consisting of fully organised, trained andequipped front-line squadrons ... it is a serious overstatement of her present

position”.36

Unimpressed, Cresswell wrote:

“The Air Ministry shirk the issue of front-line strength. This is no doubt because

they do not know the figure exactly ... it seems to me that [the] Air Ministry

should be asked to provide at once a clear, brief categorical statement of what

they think the state of German armaments to be”.37

In an effort to find out the truth, the AA in Berlin, had a conversation

with Milch, the German State Secretary of Aviation. Milch confirmed that

Hitler had been referring to the front-line strength of the RAF and the

Luftwaffe. Parity with the RAF was merely a stage on the way to achieving

parity with French land and air forces. Germany, therefore, was aiming for a

front-line strength of 2000 planes.38 Sir John Simon wrote a day later, saying

that “I can see no likely motive for the German Air Ministry to deliberately

exaggerate to our AA the figure of their present air armaments”.39

The first AID-IIC paper to follow this estimated that on 1 April 1935,

the German aircraft industry employed 28,000 workers (an 83% increase),

and an output of 200 frames and 500 engines per month. The Luftwaffe possessed a total of 3000 airplanes of all types, of which 1320 were

35 Don to DAI, 3 April 1935, AIR 2/1356; Bullock to the FO, 5 April 1935, AIR

2/2708

36 “German Air Expansion and its effects on the Security of this Country”, April

1935, AIR 9/24

37 Cresswell, C2881/55/18, FO 371/ibid.

38 AA Berlin to Courtney (DCAS), 9 April 1935, AIR 2/135639 Simon to MacDonald, 10 April 1935, C3087/55/18, FO 371/18835




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front-line types.40 The Air Ministry believed that the Luftwaffe had reserves

of 550 planes, and that from the 220 produced every month, 90 were military

types. By spring 1936 output was thought likely to increase to 1300 per

month of all types, “although any estimate of German first-line strength

beyond the Spring of 1936 is pure guess-work, the Air Ministry see no

reason why Germany should not have 2000 first-line machines by 1939 if she

wished”.41 It was said at the first meeting of the Air Parity Sub-Committee

that unless information was received to the contrary Hitler's statement of

parity would have to be accepted, even though the German squadrons could

in no way be as efficient as those of the RAF.42 One week later this was

reaffirmed when the Sub-Committee said “to what extent these aircraft have,

in point of fact, been organised into squadrons is a matter of speculation”.43

It argued that:

“from the profession point of view it would be unsound to allot as much as 850

[of the 1425 planes of all types in existence] to the squadrons and to keep only

125 in reserve, but it is quite possible that the Germans have actually taken this

step”.44

The Air Ministry was reported as doing all in its power to obta

Chapter2 - Introduction

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