CHAPTER TWO

mEGRATION OF GOA

The liberation of Goa in 1961 provides one of the best examples of the impact

of popular aspirations of a particular region in the making of India's foreign

policy. For it was intense pressure of the people of Goa and the adjacent areas

that forced the Indian Government to use force to evict the Portuguese which

in tum ultimately led India to abandon its fourteen years of patient diplomatic

endeavour to persuade Portugal to vacate its sub-continental colonial enclaves

and decide to use force in December 1961 to evict the Portuguese from Goa.

The present chapter, therefore, proposes to study how special provincial

interests, especially of Goa and adjacent Maharashtra (then the Bombay

province) gradually forced India's then Prime Minister, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru's

hands to abandon the policy of peaceful methods and resort to the use of force

to liberate Goa.

THE FREEDOM AND AFTER

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 *anted lndia independence from the

British Raj. After securing independence from Britain and in order to do away

with the remaining vestiges of colonial power, Prime Minister Jawaharlal

Nehru fmt concentrated on liberating the French occupied colonies in lndia

and therefore decided not to put any tangible pressure on the Portuguese to

their territories in the fond hope that the Portuguese will follow the

same on their own once France left,'

Accordingly, India began discussions with France soon after her

independence in 1947. Despite some initial hesitation, the Fnnch

Government, after withdrawing from Indo-China, agreed to withdraw from

India as well. In October 1954, the French settlements were transferred de

facto to India. By 1956, an agreement was signed giving India complete

control over the French possessions in India. The treaty vindicated Nehru's

policy of pursuance of peaceful methods for the settlements of disputes. He

said, "This is what I call a real solution, and if you proceed along with right

methods, they may be tedious and slow at times, but ultimately in order to

solve a problem fully and completely that path is the quicke~t."~

However, it soon dawned upon Nehru that Portugal was not going to

follow the French path. Lisbon refused to negotiate sovereignty over territory

and held them to be an integral part of Portugal- a claim not even made by the

British with regard to their own territories in India. This rigid stance served to

' At the time of India's independence in August 1947, the possessions in the hands of Portugal, acquired since 1510, w m Goa (1510), Diu (1531-32), Daman (1558), Dadara (1621) and Nagar Haveli (1630), while those under France, acquired since 1674 were Pondichcrry (1674), Chandernagorc (1 690), Mahe (1 721), Yanam (1 723) and Karikal (1738-39). It was natural for independent India to think of France and Pomgal to follow the British example and m f e r the tnritories under their possession.

2 Jawaharlal Nehnr, The Ooa Question (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1956), p.20.

infuriate ~ndians? in general, and the people of Goa in particular leading them

to force New Delhi to use force for liberating Goa. But before discussing this

issue, a brief discussion of the origin of India's dispute with Portugal is called

for.

Origin of the Dispute

Sailing around Africa's Cape of Good Hope in search of commercial profits in

the late fifteenth Century, Portuguese navigators like Vasco da Gama traded

on the Malabar Coast of Western India. The Portuguese who followed them

embarked on a bitter struggle to wrest commercial advantage from the

Muslims who dominated the area's trade. Their most famous explorer,

Alfonso de Albuquerque erected forts at the site of spice factories he

established.

By 1954, about 1,500 square miles of India with a population of

6,38,000 remained under the Portuguese control. These Portuguese territories

were divided into three main districts 40% Daman and ~ i u . ~ Goa was

originally conquered from the Bijapur sultanate in 1510. New territories were

added in the general scramble on the sub-continent in 1782-1791. Located on

India's west coast, two hundred fifty miles South-Southeast of Bombay, it

contained an area of 1,301 square miles with a population of 5,48,000. Daman

3 Hindustan Oversas Times (New Delhi), 2 September 1954.

' R. H. Parker, "The French and the Portuguese Settlements in India", Political Quarterly (New Delhi), vol. 26, October- December 1955, pp. 389-90.

was captured by the Portuguese in 1559 and contained three parts in Gujarat

state, One hundred miles north of Bombay. Besides Daman proper, it included

two small enclaves, Nagar Haveli and Dadara in its two hundred fourteen

square miles. T h w enclaves w m separated from Daman by a narrow strip of

Indian Tmitory five to seven miles wide. The total population was about

69,000 with 40,500 of these residing in the two enclaves. Diu is an island of

twenty square miles located fourteen miles off the coast of the Kathiawar

peninsula north of Daman with a population of 21,000. Conquered in 1546, it

was once a prosperous town of over fifty thousand persons. Collectively these

tenitones were called Goa.

The problem may be said to have arisen with the Indian independence

itself. There were little doubts in Indian minds that the Portuguese possessions

were as much a part of the Indian Union as the British ones. Nehru opined that

"the interests of the people living in Goa are.. . similar or even identical to the

interests of this great country of ~ndia".' The fact that the Portuguese occupied

Goa for four hundred and fi@ years made the task of its unification with India

all the more urgent. India could not be bound by agreements made by the

British before she attained her freedom. Nehru told Parliament on 1 October

195 1, "Whatever justification such islands of foreign authority had.. . when

India herself was a subject country, has disappeared with the coming of

' Nehru, n. 2, p. 12.

indepmden~ to ~ndia".~ He yain declared, "The movement for freedom in

India was not confined to any part of the country; its objective was fieedom of

the country from every kind of foreign domination"? Differences in the

colonial rulers did not alter the fact that both Goa and the main part of the

continent w e n originally Indian territories. Gandhi too wrote:

It is ridiculous to write to Portugal as the mother of Indians in Goa. Their mother country is as much India as mine. Goa is outside British India but it is within geographical India as a whole. And then is very little, if anything, in common between the Portuguese and the Indians of ~ o a . '

By 1928, the Goa National Congress had been organised to carry the

movement for independence fiom the British into the Portuguese territorial

possessions. The Congress Party, in its Working Committee resolution, drawn

at Wardha in August 1946, drew attention to conditions in Goa and declared:

Goa has always been and must inevitably continue to be a part of India. It must share in the freedom of the Indian people. What its future position and status will be in a free India can only be determined in consultation with the people of Goa and not by any external authority?

' N e w York Times, 2 October 1951, p.5.

' Jawaharlal Nehm, Speches, 1953.1957, (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958), p. 372.

' Quoted in J. S. Bains, India's Infernational Disputes - A Legal Stu4 (Bombay: Asia Publishing H o w , 1962), p.203, from Haruan, vol. 10, 8 September 1946, p. 305.

N. V. Rajkumar, ed., The Background ofIndia's Foreign P o k y (New Delhi: Indian National Congress, 1952), p, 92,

After independence was achieved, the Congress, in a resolution at

Jaipur in 1948, continued to articulate this viewpoint thus:

With the establishment of independence in India, the continued existence of any foreign possession in India becomes anomalous and opposed to the conception of India's unity and freedom. Therefore it has become necessary for these possessions to be politically incorporated in India and no other solution can be stable or lasting or in conformity with the will of the people.'0

This position was reaffirmed two years later at Nasik and again in 1952

at ~alcutta." However, these assertions were not coupled with action. As

Joachim Alva, a Member of Parliament, said, "Our blunder was that in 1947,

we did not occupy Goa without any notice or without any ~ltimaturn".'~ Since

neither France nor Pormgal could possibly had maintained their enclaves in

India without British support, India should have made an attempt to come to a

general agreement bringing independence to all the foreign possessions at the

same time. But as stated earlier, Nehru believed that once the British drive

away from India, these other possessions will inevitably be set free by the

other two colonial masters, thus completing the Indian integration.

The Portuguese Prime Minister, Salazar, had, however something else

up his sleeves. According to him, there were three possible solutions to the

l o Ibid.

' I Ibid, p.105.

l2 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, second series, 24 November 1961, vol. 59, no.4, column 1 125. Alva claimed he d e d Sir Stafford Cripps, the English negotiator, what the attitude of Great Britain would be with regard to Goa after India attained independence. Cripps shnrgged his soldiers and said that it would have to be a matter for the future Government of India to deal with.

probkm. The fint was the rw of force by India, which he thought, in

to k m d l y embarrassing to Nefuu-- a cnwder of the pacific

settlment of disputes. Nor was it possible for India to follow the second

option and i g n m b altogether. Goa had too many affinities and

interlocking commercial interests with India for this alternative to be practical.

As this policy would prohibit mass meetings, marches and propaganda from

originating on the Indian side of the border, the people of Goa would be

constrained by such a course. So far as Dr. Salazar was concerned, the only

genuine solution of the problem was for India to practice its professed doctrine

of peaceful co-utistence. This alternative denied India its very goal of

incorporating ~ o a + "

The Nehruvian Dilemma and Diplomacy

The dilemma for Nehru was obvious. He was the head of the government of a

democratic couney that had gained independence through non-violent means

and this adherence to the Gandhian emphasis on means would mean his anti-

colonial revolution being left incomplete. He was a leader of the anti-

colonialist states and a strong believer in the justification of their cause. At the

same time, then was a moral and intellectual commitment to the theory of

pacific settlement of disputes. Any diplomatic problem that put these roles in

conflict was certain to k a continuing challenge as well as 8 provation. For

" Olivim W, "Gee and [he Indian Union: The Pomgue~ Vim," Foreign ABorrs (Nm York), vol. 34, April 1956, pp. 4 18-3 1.

faurt#n years, Goa prrsmted itself as such an issue; for the Pomguese

~mce, while rendering proof of Nehru's western admired commitment to

non-vioImce, pitted him against his own commitment to anti-colonialism and

promotion of national interest. Any attempt to m o v e the reluctant colonial

power through the use of force would render him susceptible to the charge of

being a hypocrite. Not surprisingly, the Portuguese exploited this situation.

Thus, even four years after independence h m the British colonialism,

Prime Minister Nehru said in Parliament on 28 March 1951:

India can not tolerate any footholds of foreign pou.ers in this counby. We arc anxious to give the people in these areas the opportunity to live their own life and the right to change their future. We do not wish to interfere with their ways of life. There arc only two ways of bringing this about---either through war or through diplomatic means. In pursuance of our ideals, we have ruled out war as a means of redress, unless we are forced into one. The only alternative we are left with is the diplomatic method and we are pursuing it."

Thus in order to pursue the maner diplomatically, a legation in Lisbon

vas opened in 1949 with the avowed aim of establishing contacts for a

negotiated settlement. In their first aide memoir to the Portuguese Foreign

Minister, presented on 27 February 1950, the Government of India suggested

that negotiations be opened and that, once the principle of reunion of these

possessions with India was accepted, "ways and means could be devised by

" Iawahlal Nehru, Speeches, 1949-1953 (New Dclhi: Publications Division, Minimy of lnformetion and Broadcarting, Government of India, 1967), p. 194.

friendly #nwhations ktw#n the governments of Portugal and lndian.'' On

14 August, Nehru announced that the Portuguese had rejected the proposal.'6

Sending another aid memoir to the Portuguese F o n i p Minister in January

1953, India pointed out that "political barrim artificially created by an

accident of history, for which no jurisdiction existed at present, can no longer

stem the rising tide of the national urge for unity". When Lisbon declared that

it could not discuss the proposal, and much less accept the solution suggested,

the N e h Government, while claiming that it had ceased to be of any practical

utility, closed India's legation in Lisbon on l l June 1953,"

People's Movement and an Ambivalent Government

The closure of the legation in Lisbon in a way meant that India was unable to

solve the Goan problem diplomatically. However, the Goans remained restless

and anxious towards seeing the problem of Goa solved. They were for the

repudiation of the foreign rule and the Foreign Policy of a country is dictated

not only by mere pious resolutions and the occupation of a moral high ground

but it has to take into account the wishes and aspirations of the people. Since

the wishes of the Goans were to get rid of the Portuguese rule and the

mandarins in the foreign policy office could hardly be oblivious to this fact.

'' ?''he Story of Gw (London: Information Service of India, n.d.1, p.20.

" New York Times, 15 August 1950, p.4.

" bid, 11 June 1953, p.3.

A c d i l y , a Goa National Committee was fonned in 1953 in order

to co-ordinate activities of all the diverse Ooan Nationalist Parties. This

developmCllt initiated a period of greater intensification of the campaign to

bring Goa into the Indian Union. Plans were chalked out in 1954 for

~atyagaha d e m o ~ t i o n s by prominent Goan citizens. A leader and a noted

surgeon, P.S. Gaitonde, was jailed and later exiled. Nationalist demonstrations

mising the Indian flag were held on 18 June, the anniversary of the 1946

uprising. Over 20 participants were arrested by the local authorities. Sending a

strong note of protest and holding the Portuguese responsible for the

consequences of whatever followed, New Delhi warned Lisbon, "The Indian

Government could not continue to remain a silent spectator of the continuance

of the repressive policy hereto followed by the Portuguese authorities."

This note brought a jubilant reaction from the Goan nationalist circles

in Bombay.

For obvious reasons of territorial proximity and past association with

the struggle, the Maharashtra and Gujarat Praja Socialist Party (PSP) were

interested in doing something about Goa. P e i r efforts led in June 1954 to the

creation of the Goa Vimochn Sahayak Samiti. While the actual conduct of the

struggle was to be entirely organised and managed by the Goa National

Congress, the Samiti aimed at rendering propagandist and financial help to the

liberation struggle.

" Ibid, 27 June 1954, p.5.

A plan to launch a mass movement from August IS was sketched out

and it was nported that "the Congress workers inside Goa had advised the

office beam in Bombay that if five hundred satyugrahir a u l d m s s the Goa

border and synchronise their action with the uprising inside Goa, the

Portuguese Government would be pa~alysed.'~ While intensive preparations

were made inside and outside Goa and appeals were made for the enrolment of

the volunteers, the Portuguese Governmen6 fearing a repetition of what

happened in Dadara and Nagar Haveli, became unusually active.

Reportedly four to six thousand persons were supposed to take part

.The Portuguese reinforced Goa, Daman and Diu. Placing the colonies on a

war-footing, the troops were given orders to "shoot to kill". Rail and feny

services were mined; trenches were dug; all foreign newspapers and journals

were banned; schools were closed; and a night curfew was imposed.'"

Among the nationalists inside and outside Goa, there was a strong

belief that the Delhi Government was favourably inclined towards the

Satyagraho, However, contrary to the expectations, the Indian Government

discouraged it and Nehru declared that the marchers had to be composed

entirely of Goans. To reinforce these stipulations, Indian police prevented their

nationals from crossing the frontier and searched those Goans permitted across

l 9 Vinayak K u l W , Lotest Smgglc for Goo (Hydcrabad: Socialist Party, 1956), p p 3-4.

'O hlnv York Times, 8 August 1954, p. 14.

the b o r d ~ for mS2' On the Daman border alone, 1,200 non-Goan

satyupahb stopped. At other places, just forty-five Goan satyagrahis

e n t d Goa at three points-Kamar, Tcrekhol and Banda. At Terekhol, a

batch of fifteen satyagrahis straightaway entered the fort and hoisted the

Indian flag. A& M t y - f o u r hours, Portuguese anned forces recaptured the

fort. All the sa&agrahl were immediately amsted.

After these incidents, small batches of Goans continued to enter Goa at

intervals of a month, and simultaneously Goans inside Goa offmd

Saryagrah. The eleventh-hour ban on the entry of Indian satyagrahis into

Goa resulted in gloom and despair. However, it did not mean that the struggle

was over. The resistance was kept alive inside ~ o a . " Persistent efforts were

made by the Goa Virnochun Sahyak Sorniti, in co-operation with the Goa

National Congress to keep the struggle alive. After the 15 August 1954

Saryograh, several dates were chosen as special occasions to offer

Satyapaha Relatively large number of people participated in these

demonstrations.

Prime Minister, Nehru, defended his decisions before the Lok Sabha on

August 25. At the same time he assured that his policies would not abandon

"the cause of our compatriots under the Portuguese rule.""

I I Keesings Contemporary Archives 1955-1962, p. 14274.

Kulkami, n. 19, p. 4.

' Nehru, n. 7, p. 373.

The 1955 b v a g h

On 26 J a n ~ ~ l 9 5 5 , the anniversary of the Indian republic, the Scr@agraha

also entered a new phase. A group of satyograhis successfully held up traffic

between India and Goa by squatting on the railway track connecting Castle

~ o c k to Goa. Inside Goa, thm w e n demonstrations in several localities, most

notably in Panjim and Loliem, and consqumtly a large number of arrests.

Then on 17 February, which was named 'Gaitonde Day', there were

demonstrations all over Goa and those who took part were heated mercilessly.

By April 1955, the Portuguese repression in Ooa had nearly put an end to the

internal resistance movement, and thus the Goa National Congress tried to find

a way of instilling a new spirit in the movement. In consultation with the

Samiti, it decided to hold its ninth annual session in Goa itself. On 9 March,

Ms. Sudha Joshi was declared the President-elect.

Referring to the Goa problem and the arrested Saiyagrahis, Nehru said

in the Lok Sabha, "I want the Government of Pormgal to remember and realise

that they are there because we are patient and men of good will, because we

think ahead and we see the world situation as it is and we do not wish to do

something, even in a small way, indulging in violence, etc, which may have

bigger repercussions."

On 6 April 1955, Mrs. Joshi reached Mapuca (Goa) and succeeded in

reading out her Presidential speech for a few minutes. The usual round of

msts, beatings and searches followed soon. From the Goan point of view,

this event was highly significant. It also created enthusiasm in Maharashha,

and on 24 April 1955, the Samiti, in a resolution, asked the Indian

Government "to do some quick thinking and take effective steps to prevent the

Pomgucse Government from smothering the liberation movement by mthless

repression. Our anti-colonialism must now find expression in deed". The

Sumiti also announced that it was seriously considering the move for 'active

participation in the Goa liberation movement by sending batches of

volunteers.'

The Praja Socialist Party leader N.G. Goray, who was the then

Secretary of the Samiti, had by then announced his decision to offer

Satyagraha by the middle of May.

On 11 April, Delhi wamed Lisbon, "The Government of India reliably

learn that the Portuguese Government, after passing these harsh sentences, are

now considering deporting these Sa@ugrahis to penal settlements outside Goa,

as they have done in numerous instances in the past". On 4 May, Nehru made

a statement on the floor of the Rajya Sabha with regard to a considerable show

of force by the Portuguese Government in ~ r d e r to intimidate the Su~agrahis.

The m s t s and the reports of ill-treatment of the Savagrahis led to

increased strain in May 1955, when Indian volunteers began crossing the

border without interference from the Government. When the Government

failed to announce active support to the demonstraton, the Praja Socialist

Party, Mazdoor Kiss,, Hindu Mahasabha and the Communist parties

announced their intention of organisig the mmhers. An All-Party

parli~m~ntary Commi#ee for Goa was formed on May 5 with the aim of

mobilising Indian opinion on the question. In response to their drive, thousand

of Saryagrahis, including several members of Parliament entered Goa in small

groups.24 On 18 May, N.G. Goray, an influential member of the Praja Socialist

P m , entmd Goa followed by other prominent politicians including the

members of Parliament Tridip Chowdhari and V.G. Deshpande (a Hindu

Mahasabha leader). Groups of between 5 and 100 volunteers entered Goa on

18 and 27 May and 4, 12 and 18 June. According to the Portuguese

authorities, 479 Safyagrahis entmd Goa in June alone. The authorities

arrested the Satyagrahis, but sent most of them back to India. The leaders,

however, were taken into custody.

But the movement was gaining momentum and there was continuous

pressure on the Government to act effectively. Several batches of Satyagrahis

had crossed the Goa frontier and many distinguished politicians were advising

'police action'. On 9 July 1955, fifty-two volunteers, drawn from different

Political Parties and led by Tridip Chowdhari crossed into Goa. TWO days

later, all the Satyagrahis, except Chowdhari were sent back to India. On 16,17

and 18 July, further small batches of volunteers entered Goa. According to the

figures released by the National Congress (Goa), the Pomrguese authorities

24 Keesings Contemporaty Archives, n.20, pp. 14275-6.

4 2,567 pasau in Goa bewen Frbnrry 1954 and April 1955 for

&ng part in the k d a m moment.

Mass meetings wen held all o v a lndia and the Smith ofiice came to

be flooded by money ordaJ and rquc~tli for permission to offer Satyagnh.

T ~ W , the movemat which had s tand in Goa, spread to Maharashtra,

Kafnalaka and Gujarat. On 20 July, the Somiti decided to launch a mass

movement on 15 August 1955 and demanded the support of all political

parties in India. On 23 July, an all Party Convention of the memben of

Parliament and State Legislatures adopted a unanimous resolution urging the

G o v m e n t of lndia to make a final effort to settle the Goa issue through

peaceful negotiations. Should the negotiations fail, the Government should

'enforce suitable sanctions to eliminate once and for all h e remnants of

colonialism in ~ n d i a ' . ~

It was a most anbarnwing situation for the Indian National Congress

as well the Indian Government .For the first time; they appeared to have

lost the initiative in Indian politics. The Opposition was demanding police

action or at least a peaceful invasion. Even the Executive Committee of the

Congress Party favoured this policy although officially it went along with the

Prime ~inister. '~

2s R. P . RAO, Portugwse Rule in Goo (Bombay: Asia Publishing How, 1%3), p. 80.

16 New York Times, 13 July 1955.

But Nehru fEnnly n W to officially smctioa the S o ~ h a

mpaign. At a press conference in Dclhi on 3 1 May 1955, the Rime Minister,

justifying his posi t im claimed, "We an afraid of doing something which does

not fit in with our larger basic policy and objectives. We attach p a t

importance to OW basic principle.'"

With this in mind, he wanted the Goans to spearhead the movement for

their own liberation. As far as Nehru was concerned, individual Indians could

march into Go& but not in large n~tnbcn. Such a mass approach, as

contemplated by the Opposition, in his opinion, could only lead to violence.

It was Nehru's expressed belief that Sun,agraha was a technique

employed only by a people to bring pressure on their Government. Hence, he

announced that any demonstration by Indians in Goa would be regarded as

directed not against the Portuguese, but his own administration." Sotya~raha.

he held, could not be performed by any Government against another. To do so,

he told the Lok Sabha on July 26, was a misapplication of the rn~thod. '~

However with the onset of summer, the Prime Minister seemed to be

modifying his position. Even if he had not pledged governmental suppon, he

assured Congressmen who desired to participate that he would not interfere

'' Hindusran Overseas Times, 2 June 1 955, p. l

11 Ibid, 9 June 1955, p. 2. Nehru war repodly afraid that Satyagraha dcrnonstrations would k w d against him in the Punjab and Rajasthan. New York Times, 13 July 1955, p.13.

witb h e pIOPOSCd IDdtpcndQlcc Day So- rr he h.d done a ycu

~ l i a . When the Raja Socialist Party took the lead in q a n i s i n g muches into

Goa N e b had ken quoted as saying, "I admire the courage of those who

want to go them.& h Inditioh thac w m other indications of tacit support

by the unbivdmt Prime Minister. At the very time when he was urging

maain t in Puliamcnf addition81 sanctions w m k i n g exercised against Goa.

It was announced that all n i l traffic was k i n g suspended k c a u x of the

'mines planted under the tracks'." F u r t h m o n , Nehm ordered the Portuguese

to close their legalion in Delhi by August 8. He claimed to be taking this

drastic step to prove that the Congress Parry was as much against the

Pormgucse rule in Goa as any other group in lndia." Yet he refrained from

breaking the relations completely.

The Demand for Police Action

All the Samiti's members, except perhaps for the Praja Socialist Party

representative, used to say in Committee meetings that their S a p g r a h a was

also against the Government of lndia in as much as thq wanted the

Government to take police action . . . in their individual capacity, they and their

parties openly pleaded for police action"'. The Parliamentarian V. 0,

>o Hindusran Overseas Times, 9 June 1955, p. 4.

" Nw York Times, 26 July 1955, p. 16. I2 bid, pp. 1,3.

" KuIk8mj n.19, p.7.

m d e , who led the fifth batch of Sa&ngrahis on 18 June, said publicly

that 'police action was the only solution to the Goan problem Bbrrlyo Jano

bngha too demanded police action. In June, the Central Committee of the

Communist Party called upon the Government of India to take direct action in

Goa. Even Acharya Kriplani a highly respected Praja Socialist Pany member,

said in the Lok Sabha on 26 July that the country had a strong and efficient

army which had been used in Hyderabad and Kashmir. He advocated that the

only alternative to mass Salyagraha was a limited war with conventional

weapons. In his view, even Gandhiji considered such a war to be nearest to

suryugraha.

Peter Alvares, the then President of the National Congress (Goa), told

the Samiti members many times that the Extemal Affairs Ministry had given

him to understand that the Government of India was in need of some excuse to

strike the final blow, and this Satyagraha, if carried on steadfastly for

sometime, would provide such an excuse to the Government. R. K. Nehru and

othm of the External Affairs Ministry had also given the impression to him in

their talks that N e h ' s declaration of no police action was primarily meant for

international consumption. AfIer interviewing Pandit Pant, the General

Secretary of the Samiti said in July, "They are serious about the matter. They

are serious this time."34

n e B ~ d a Border Muucre

But dKn came the massacre at the Banda border on 15 August 1955. The one

hundred and sixty mile long Indian- Goan border had been tense. Dozens of

Satyapha camps had been set up W e e n Sawantwadi and Majali, and

similar activities w e n reported near Daman and Diu. The Satyugrahb,

numbering about 3,000 w e n drawn from different walks of life. According to

the figures given by the Rime Minister in Partiamen6 1,711 volunteers

cntmd Goa, of whom 1,691 were turned back. Some were detained or sent to

hospital and some had probably been killed. 1,249 entered Daman and all but

five, one of whom was known to be dead, wen pushed back into India.

Eighty-one passive resistm entered Diu. Nothing came to be known of what

happened to them.

In a number of instances, the Portuguese police opened fire on the

excuse that the Sotyagrahis had ignored orders to stop and continued to march.

The final casualty figures, according to Indian officials, were twenty-two shot

dead and two hundred and twenty-five wounded thirty-eight of them seriously.

At Patradevi, on the Banda border, thirty five out of six hundred Sawgrahis

had hardly moved twenty yards into Goan territory when the police fired

several rounds. When V.D. Chitale, the leader of the group was hit, Mrs.

Subhadra Bai Sagar of West Bengal took the national flag from him and

marched fonvard. She was also hit by a shot fired from a point-blank range

and fell to the ground wounded. Kamal Singh of Punjab, who tried to save

m. Sa&u wrr abot at &om a short m g e and killd. Yet another volunt t~~,

bfdhuku Cbowduri of Madhya Pradesh, tried to cay the flag forward, but

he too was shot dead.

The next day in Parliament, Nehru denounced the Portuguese behaviour

b t a l and uncivilised. Both the Houses adjourned for half an hour in the

memory of those killed. But the people responded in another fashion. Hartals

or sympathy riots and protest strikes took place in the principal Indian cities.

In Bombay, crowds attacked the Portuguese Consulate and offices of the

British Deputy High Commissioner and the Pakistan Assistant High

Commissioner. In Calcutta, a day of mourning was declared as the Portuguese

consulate was assaulted by students who hoisted the Indian flag. Strikes also

took place in elh hi."

The Nehru Government came under heavy attack for its refusal to give

official backing to the Sa@agrahis. The critics accused him of being

responsible for the death of the civilians. The New Age claimed:

As the ruling Party and a leading party in the country, the people expected the Congress to give the lead in taking effective steps to liberate Goa. But the Congress maintained that it was for the Goans to fight for liberation though, no doubt, such an approach falsified the understanding that Goans were Indians and Goa was a part of India. When Kashrnir was attacked it was not left to the Kashmiris to defend themse~ves.'~

" Kecsings Contemporary Archives, p. 14402.

New Agc (New Dclhi), 28 August 1955, p. 1.

'The marcha and the ensuing riots h d occumd because there existed

no recognised means for reflecting and giving effect to the popular wishes. As

Nehru and the governing Congress had refused to adopt the majority policy,

those dissatisfied took the initiative and expressed themselves in a more direct

and less respectable manner. ?'he Economic Weekly described the

Government's difficulty thus:

With the best of motives and the most thoughtful of policies, the Government today finds itself in a position when instead of fighting alien intruders, it has to resist and even fight the rising popular feeling in the country both against the atrocities of the Portuguese and the hesitant policy of India's own Government. This is most embarrassing to be sure, but it is embarrassment for which the Government has to thank itself. And it is this Government that has to find a way out of it."

But Nehru did not decide to invade in retaliation for the Portuguese

shootings. On the contrary, he declared that his Government did not intend to

have its foreign policy "directed from the marketplace."3s Even though he was

by now "almost single-handedly"" resisting the demand for invasion, he

proved his control o v a the Congress Party and hence the Government by

persuading them to forbid any demonstrators - even non-violent individuals - from entering the Portuguese territories.

11 "Time for Actioh" Economic Weekly (New Delhi), 20 August 1955, p.988.

II Keesings Contemporary Archives, p. 14402.

'' Accolding to Ambassador B. K. N e w "Goa", Address before the Harvard and Radcliff Clubs of Washington, D. C., 24 January 1962, p.7.

H o w = , the Go8 issue was not completely closed. Every

I n d e p m W Day, a protest demonstration became an assured thing. This

forced New Delhi to break off diplomatic tics completely with ~o r tu~a l . "

From time to time, other measures wen also taken against Portugal to show

the keenness of the Government of India's commitment to liberate Goa.

A number of measum were taken to win the support of the Goan

people as well. Travel restrictions w m abolished," and telegraph service

which had been cut since September 1955 was restored." On February 28

1961, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs, Sadeth

Ali Khan, told the Lok Sabha that the Govcmment had decided to permit

limited trade with Goa as of April 1 .'" When questioned about the matter, the

Prime Minister explained it was part of his "policy of liberalisation,'"

designed to assist the poorer classes in the Portuguese colonies. Later that

autumn, he announced that money order remittances had been resumed since

15 October 1955.~'

New York Times, 20 August 1955.

bid, 4 April 1958.

'' bid, 7 June 1958.

41 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, second series, 28 Febnwy 1961, vol. 51, no. 11, column 2080.

44 Ibid, 1 April 1961, vol. 53, no. 34, column 8474.

45 bid, 20 November 1961, vol. 59, no, I, column 103.

A Shift in Goveruma~t Pow Towarb the Use of F o m

Thus for fourteen Nehru resisted pleas for a more drastic action.

As late as December 1960, he said that he could not fix a date when the

Portuguese will be out of ~ o a . "

But in March 1961, Prime Minister Nehru, in a major policy decision,

decided to send 3,000 troops to Congo as part of United Nations Peace

Keeping Operations. As the year prognssed, it became increasingly more

difficult to justify employment of military in Africa while there was inaction

in Goa.

And as manifestos w m issued for India's third General Elections

scheduled for J a n u q 1962-an election which Defence Minister Menon was

contesting bom the heavily Goan electoral district of North Bombay, every

Party except the pro-Western Swatanha had a Goa plank, and all were

considerably more militant than that proposed by the Congress,

However, it \\as not until August that Nehru indicated a shiA in his

tactics towards Goa. In the Rajya Sabha on August 16, during a discussion on

the bill to integrate Dadara and Nagar Haveli, Nehru, while defending his

policy of not permitting Suryagrahis to enter Goa, indicated that when the time

came, he would send the m y and not unarmed people. However, he claimed

the situation was not yet appropriate for India to use its armed forces. The

" 'Prime Minister's Statement Initiating Rajya Sabha Debates', Foreign Affairs Record (New Dclhi), 6 Decmber 1960, p.434.

Prime Minista made a point that Indii's current pacific cowe had made a

remarkable impression and conhibution all over the world. Nevertheless, he

further clarified that India's Goa policy 'can not be considered a close one'

and promised to give a good deal of thought 'as to whether we should vary our

previous policy, and if so, in what way'." When pressed by the Communist

leader, Bhupcsh Gupta, Nehru acknowledged that his remarks constituted a

change of policy. Clarifying his position, the Prime Minister mlcd out a

sabotage campaign by stating that when the time came to send in the Indian

&my, 'it will be an open effort of ours and not a secret or fbnive one'."

Concluding his remarks the aging leader indicated his own deep sense of

frustration over the incompleteness of his own revolution by saying, "1 have

no intention of passing away before Goa is libe~ated."~ Reassuring further the

overjoyed Indians and giving alarm bells to the Pomguese ears by hammering

the point that he meant business, Nchru outlined his new approach in the Lok

Sabha the very next day:

The question of Goa as far as I can see, can only be dealt with either on a completely peaceful basis or on a fully armed basis. Time may come when you decide to deal with it on an armed basis. We will do so then ... If I am akked at the present moment to give any kind of assurance that we shall not use armed forces in regard to Goa, I am not prepared to give it. I do not know what we may do at any time, but we can not at present, in regard to the

47 India, Rajya Sabhq Debates, 16 August 1961, vol. 35, no. 2, column 386.

devclopmab of evcnts everywhere, rule out the question of using ~ n e d forces in regard to ~ o a . "

Therafter, a four-day seminar on Portuguese colonialism organised by

the lndian Council for Africa from 20 October 1961 illustrated clearly the

transformed Indian thinking. At the opening session in Delhi, Nchru enthused

his listeners by the promise that 'if some other steps' were necessary for its

security, lndia would take them.51 He assured his listeners, "We are not in any

sense tied down absolutely to pursuing the policy, which we have thus far

pursued in the interest of the removal of colonialism. If we have to take some

other action, we shall take it. We shall keep an open mind"."

And when the session of the Seminar shifted to Bombay, the difference

in attitude on the Indian side was quite discernible. The Chairman of the

reception committee, Y.B. Chavan, the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra,

noted the change in the Indian mood when he said, "I do not know how long

even the Government of India will be able to resist the pressure of popular

opinion and stand strictly by their principles.""

And then came the famous Chowpany beach speech by the Prime

Minister. Addressing a public rally, Nehru frankly admitted that the policy

50 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, 17 August 1961, vol. 66, no. 8, columns 2774-75.

" The Hindu (Madras), 2 1 October 1961, pp. l ,3 .

s2 Jawaharlal N e b Speeches, 1957.1963 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of lndia, 1964), 367-8.

" Y .B. Chavan, "Forces of Liberation," Vital Speeches and Documents ofthe Day, 1 1 (1 N o v m k r 1%1), pp.62-62.

pursued by the Govcmmat of India towards Portugal had been a failure. He

announced that since Goa was a part of India, nothing could prevent the

completion of Indcpmdmce. Nehru said that mvnt events in Goa, such as

caxs of torcurr and a wave of taror, had compelled the Government to do

some f i s h thinking and consider the problem a W . Amidst a thunderous

ovation, he went on to explain, YWha I say I think afresh I mean that we have

been forced into thinking afresh by the Porhlguese to adopt other methods to

solve the problem. When and how, I can not say now. But I have no doubt that

we will do

This Chowpatty beach speech triggered increased accounts of terror and

tomre by the Portuguese authorities in Goa. Two incidents on November 17

and 24, 1961, had heightened the Indo-Portuguese tensions. A shot fired from

the Portuguese occupied island of Anjadev allegedly wounded a crew member

of the S. S. Subormati. In the second incident, a f i shman was said to have

been killed in the same area of the coast of Kanvar. In response an

independent Member of Parliament called for an ultimatum telling the

Pomtguese to leave Goa by January 26 1962, or face the prospect of being

thrown out of India. Prime Minister Nehru, while acknowledging the incident

as being a "wy important matter", argued against this course of action.

The Hindu, 24 October 1961.

C-tcrising the situation as "developing," he prefaed to see what

The Hindu reported Goa to be an armed camp of 12,000

when roads were mined and bridges guarded. The very next day it reported

that the Radio Goa had threatened to bomb Indian cities. The External Affairs

Ministry asserted that Portuguese troops raided a village inside the Indian

border." The weekly, L i d , claimed that the Portuguese had hind foreign

mercenaries 'with experience in methods of torture in Hitler's concentration

camps.. .to work as guards and use their knowledge on Goan nationalists.''' A

week later, it described condition inside Goa thus:

The Goan Governor General has declared a state of emergency. Dusk-to-dawn curfew has been clamped on most of the towns and bigger villages. Troop movements on the border have intensified. Inhabitants of almost all the border villages have been hurriedly packed off into the interior and the villages have been occupied by the troops. Such a large-scale movement of popula~ion on shon notice has been accompanied by mass arrests, flogging and locking up of people unable to comply with army

Not only did the Government circulate stories about the alleged

atrocities in Goa, it also made information available about Indian troop

movements. In the Indian cabinet, Defence Minister, V.K. Menon, the leading

" Ibid, 25 November 1961, p. I .

'6 bid, 5 December 196 1.

" New York Times, 1 1 December 1961.

" Link, (New Delhi), 'Goa Liberation", 3 Decemkr 1961.

" Ibid, "Provocation in Goa", 10 December 1961.

pponen t of the use of militaty force, claimed he decided not to impose p m s

secrecy to give the Portuguese an opportunity to know the consequences of

their actions? The ncwspapm w m filled with reports that o v a one hundred

passenger trains w e n cancelled in anas such as Punjab, Delhi and Bombay to

move mops to the border?'

The Government acknowledged that some measures wen being taken

concerning Goa but refused to reveal exactly what they were. While the

Defence Ministry said that it was "dealing with the matter on the basis of a

national the Ministry of Extmal Affairs claimed it necessary

"as a precautionary measure, to move certain armed forces to the areas

threatened by the aggressive manoeuvres.'d3

In the meanwhile, Prime Minister Nehru sent a tri-service force under

popular pressure. Once there, the army could not turn back without a serious

loss of morale by the soldiers and a corresponding loss of confidence by the

public. The result was that for nearly two weeks, an atmosphere of militant

anticipation prevailed. The Portuguese had expected an attack as early as

November 2 ~ . ~ Each day of delay added ,to the embarrassment of the Indian

60 me Hindu, 11 December 1961.

6' bid, 5 December 1961.

'' bid.

" bid, 6 Decsmba 196 1.

" New York Times, 27 November 1961.

~ o v ~ n m c n t ~ ' h e longer the Indian m y remained illcrctive, the more Rime

Minister Nehru invited criticism 6om domestic quarters. me New Age asked,

"when is Prime Minister N e h going to act? Will he remain a heto of empty

words or act for Goan liberation and the unity of the mothaland 'p

Even as late as on 7 and 8 December, during the foreign affairs debate

in the Lot Sobha and on December 11 in the Rajyo Sabha, Nehru remained

non-committal and refused to be pinned down to any definite course of action.

He declared that as the situation was a developing one, the government was

'preparing for any contingency that may arise', But he did not outline the

'precise steps to be taken.'67

Thus, to the v a y end, Nehru remained ambivalent about whether he

would use force. Although he told the R a j p Sabha, "Our patience is certainly

exhausted"," the Prime Minister promised the Lok Sabha that he had not

closed the door to the peaceful settlement of disputes by saying, "I do not bar

out any steps. But I will repeat what 1 have often said before that to the end

65 hrne J. Kavic, India's Casefor Securiiy (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1967), p. 100. Prof. Kavic suggests that poor military planning and difficulties in moving mops to the frontline were responsible for at least some of the delay.

66 New Age, 19 Novemkr 1961.

67 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, vol. 60, no. IS, 7 December 1961, column 3863.

61 India, Rajya Sabha, Debates, vol. 36,1! December 1961, col. 1776.

whenever the end may come. we shall always hope to settle every problem

like this or any other by p~X%ful methods of negotiation^."^

However the chances of the use of force by India in order to integrate

Goa were becoming more obvious by then. A Cabinet meeting took place on

December 6 to discuss the crisis and on 14 December, the Chief of the Staff of

m y and the Air Force held a top-level conference of military officers at

Belgaum.

Finally, Operation Vijay was launched at the midnight of December 17,

1961. Thirty thousand Indian soldiers under the overall command of

Lieutenant-General J. N. Choudhuri, and under the field direction of Major-

General Kenneth Candeth, poured into Goa, Daman and Diu. General Thapar,

the Chief of the Army Staff, told his troops, "You are not going into Goa as

conquerors but as protectors."70 Despite previous utterances pledging to fight

to the last man, the Portuguese virtually offered no resistance in most areas

and within thirty-six hours all opposition was overcome.

After the Armed Action

After the invasion, while N e h lamented the fact that India derived no

satisfaction from taking armed action, he reminded that the Portuguese left no

69 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, vol. 60, no.16,8 December 1961, column 4364.

70 The Hindu, 18 December 196 1.

other viable option o p a to hi?' He anphasiscd the personal struggle of

conscience that he went through before consenting to the invasion, for he

believed military action to be Contrary to his grain.n Hence, at its subsequent

Pama meeting, the Con- ~ e d to reassure the world that "developments

with regard to Goa ... can not be regarded as a departure from this basic

(Indian) policy of the pacific settlement of international disputes!'73 In New

york, Defence Minister, Menon, explained, "We have not violated the spirit of

the United Nations Charter, because we have not violated anyone's

sovereignty."" On the other hand, he went on to state that India took arms in

defence for %e consider colonialism permanent aggression."" At a press

conference on December 28, Prime Minister, N e h , reviewed the events of

he past several months. Despite his previous reluctance to use force in Goa, - he made clear he would take responsibility for it, now that military force had

been used.76

In India, the forceful incorporation of Goa into the Union was hailed

almost everywhere. Almost all Political parties and major newspapers

" New York Times, 19 December 196 1, '

" Ibid, 20 December 1961.

Congress Bulletin, nos. 1-3, January-March 1962, p.24.

74 New York Times, 21 December 1961.

'' Ibid.

76 NehnZ IL 52, p. 35.

endorsed the C k w m e n t move. The Hindustan Tim saluted the

Government for the swiftness of the occupation as well as the small loss of

lifean Among the major political parties, only the pro-western Swatantra Party

led by Chakmvarti Rajgopalachari criticised the Oovemment action in a series

of articles published in the party journal, Swarajyo. Meanwhile the military

operation in the Pomguese colonies served to provide a great swge of

renewed popular support for the regime's foreign policy. A public opinion poll

revealed that only three percent of the population felt that military action

should not have been employed to integrate Goa into the

SUMMING UP

Several conclusions may be drawn as to why India chose to abandon her

image of a strict adherent to the policy of pacific settlement of disputes and

prefer the use of force at last, albeit painstakingly, to integrate Goa into the

Indian Union. It must be borne in mind that commitment to non-violence was

not the only tenet of India's foreign policy. Equally forceful was its

commitment towards the promotion of national interest. By taking this action

and thereby removing the last vestiges df colonialism from the Indian soil

Nehru removed one of the most serious challenges towards his foreign policy

after independence.

77 Htndurtan Times (New Delhi), 19 December 1 % 1.

78 Indian Institute of Public Opinion (New Delhi), Monthly PubMc Opinion Suntey, October-November 1962, p. 58.

Not only was Goa an uuunple of a residue of colonialism and India's

unfulfilled nationalism, another factor of no mean importance was that it

would have in all probability been a perpetual source of protests and

demonshations by the Ooans, the Maharashtrians, the Gujaratis and d l those

s~mpathising with the Goan cause. In spite of the fact that such activities were

forbidden ever since 1955, they nevertheless took place. Therefore, it may be

reasonably argued that border crossings and consequent shootings may have

occurred, for the longer the government remained oblivious to the domestic

pressure, the more apparent the need for resort to extra-legal methods.

Government inaction was gradually leading to the passing of the movement

into the hands of more radical groups, such as the Communists. So the

prospects of increased violence were there. Under these circumstances, any

attempt to prevent the Sapagrahis from entering Goa would have required

Indian troops to open fire on their own nationals. Thus, an invasion, with a

greater prospect of fewer casualties, was definitely a better option.

Another reason, a more practical one, for invading Goa, may be said to

be the forthcoming 1962 General Elections in which Defence Minister,

Menon, was contesting firom the North Bombay constituency, w h m the

Opposition had got united behind the estranged Congress leader, Acharya

Kriplani, to defeat Menon. The constituency had a sizeable presence of Goan

Crnigrkes. Mmon's supporters made it a point to highlight the major role

played by him in the use of force leading to the integration of Goa. Even

Nehru himself campaigned vigorously in the Bombay district. Owing to this,

the election was termed a "khaki election" by the Opposition. Though an

indignant Nehru tamed it as "little short of a crime for any responsible

individual to play about with his country's future and present condition in this

way",'9 there is no denying the fact that it made a good secondary obje~tive,'~

Not only did the Goan invasion help Mmon win handsomely," it also

deprived the Opposition of its principal foreign policy grievance in the

campaign.

And lastly, a few words about Maharashtra's special interest in the

Goan liberation issue. As Goa was contiguous to Maharashtra and the largest

concentration of the Goans outside Goa being that in Maharashin, it was but

natural for Maharashtra to take the lead in educating public opinion on this

issue and organising the agitation that clearly had its impact on the foreign

policy of the Indian Government with regard to Goa. In addition, the

Maharashtrians might have thought of Goa being merged into Maharashtra in

due course of time once Goan integration was achieved- a hope belied by

l9 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, vol. 60, no. 15,7 December 1961, column 3983.

Michael Brecher, India and World Politics (London: Oxford University PESS, 1968), p. 133. Menon denies the election was a factor in the decision to invade Goa. With all due respect to both of these gentlemen, persons closely connected with defence matters and Congress politics have told me the decision to invade Goa in 1961 was influenced by the impding General Elections. According to thm the thk ing was that military action in Goa would benefit the entire ticket - not just Menon's campaign.

81 Notman D. Palmer, "The 1962 Elections in North Bombay," Pacific ADtrs, vol.

36, summer 1963, p. 129.

later on develo~m*la when Go& h u g h a 'opinion poll' held on 16 January

1967, chose to remain aa a Union Territory. The formation of an "Action

committee" in Bombay and the All Party Goa YSmochan Sahoyak Samiti in

pune and the leading of the ftnt batch of Satyagrahis by a Maharashtra leader

of the Praja Socialist Party, N.G. Goray--all this go on to show Maharashtds

mple interest and active participation in tho Goan integration smggle.

Moreover, it was again a Maharashtrim leader, V.G. Deshpande, who said as

early as on June 22, 1955 that from his "personal experience, he had come to

the conclusion that the problem of Ooa's liberation could not be solved

without police action by the Government of ~ndia."'~ Recourse to the same by

the Indian Government ultimately goes on to vindicate his point. And when

the Government of India as well as the Indian National Congress was in

favour of stopping the 1955 Satyrgraha, the All Party Goa Liberation

Committee of Maharashtra stated in unambiguous terms that there was no

moral or political justification for stopping the Satyagraha which would be

detrimental to the Goan interest. It went to the extent of terming it as a

'bekayal of people.'83 It further announced that a batch of Sabagrahis would

be sent to offer Satyugraha in Goa on 2 October1955 and another batch on

26 January 1956. Evm after that, the Committee remained active till the Goan

liberation in 1961.

82 Hindustan Times, 3 August 1955.

83 bid, 26 September 1955.

The liberation of Goa thus goes on to establish that a country's foreign

~olicy is not m m l y founded on a high moral pedestal based solely on high

sounding principles, but grounded in indigenous soils. It would be utmost

difficult to ignore the salience of this domestic element for any Government,

which can do so only at its own peril. A Oovernment can delay, but it can not

discard. India's abandonment of her largely self created image of a pursuer of

the doctrine of peaceful settlement of disputes can largely be explained by

positing it in the Context of the raising of the voice by the people of Goa, ably

supported by those in Maharashtra and elsewhere in India, in favour of

emancipation. The mandarins in the foreign policy ofice could not ignore

these voices emanating from the domestic quarters. Besides, electoral political

considerations, particularly those in Maharashtra, also played a part leading to

subtle influences towards a shift in India's foreign policy. And thus the use of

force by India ultimately to integrate Goa into the Indian Union.

But it is not only Goa that has influenced a change in the realm of

foreign policy. Some other states have also done so over a period of time. The

next chapter deals with one such state. It studies and analyses the role of West

Bengal in influencing India's involvement in the liberation of Bangladesh in

1971. It also discusses the crucial role played by the West Bengal Government

in the signing of the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty on the sharing of Ganga waters.