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SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary

421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085February 3, 2004

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, actingupon instigation, command and direction of known andunknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati.Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP anddeclared their withdrawal of support for the government,demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary ofDefense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violationof Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue ofProclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, thePhilippines was declared under the State of Rebellion.

Negotiations took place and the officers went back to theirbarracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003,both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, andProclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State ofRebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1)SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec.18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require thedeclaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that

there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJSOfficers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumventionof the report requirement under the same Section 18, ArticleVII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congresswithin 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally,they contend that the presidential issuances cannot beconstrued as an exercise of emergency powers as Congresshas not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep.

Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and ExecutiveSecretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there wasusurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23(2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al,petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion

"opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation ofwarrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locusstandi to bring suit?

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No.427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18,

Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state orrebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-ChiefPowers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It isnot disputed that the President has full discretionary power tocall out the armed forces and to determine the necessity forthe exercise of such power. While the Court may examinewhether the power was exercised within constitutional limits orin a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of thepetitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their

assertion that the President acted without factual basis. Theissue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as therewas no indication that military tribunals have replaced civilcourts or that military authorities have taken over the functionsof Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative powerof the Congress is of no moment since the President, indeclaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armedforces, was merely exercising a wedding of her ChiefExecutive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely

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executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powerscontemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear onwarrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may besubject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a

crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as longas a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personaland substantial interest in the case such that the party hassustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of thegovernmental act that is being challenged. The gist of thequestion of standing is whether a party alleges "such personalstake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation ofIssue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult

constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitionersSanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legalstanding to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing tochallenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision inPhilippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extentthe powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of eachmember thereof, since his office confers a right to participatein the exercise of the powers of that institution.

OPLE V TORRES

Puno, J.

Facts:

On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V.RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitledADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZEDIDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM.

The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreignresidents to have a Population Reference Number (PRN)generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through theuse of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY .

The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the followinggrounds:

1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is anunconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of theCongress of the Philippines;

2. The appropriation of public funds for theimplementation of the said AO is unconstitutional sinceCongress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for

such expenditure; and

3. The AO violates the citizens right to privacyprotected by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.

Held:

1. The AO establishes a system of identification that isall-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of everyFilipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore, it issupposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it,

not by an Administrative Order issued by the President.Administrative Power, which is supposed to be exercised bythe President, is concerned with the work of applying policiesand enforcing orders as determined by proper governmentalorgans. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard ofadministrative efficiency and check the official conduct of hisagents. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts, AO 308involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an

Administrative Order. An administrative order is an ordinanceissued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the

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administrative operation of the government. It must be inharmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose ofimplementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of thePresident to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power.

2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since itsmain purpose is to provide a common reference number toestablish a linkage among concerned agencies through theuse of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the scienceof the application of statistical methods to biological facts; amathematical analysis of a biological data. It is theconfirmation of an individuals identity through a fingerprint,retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. Through thePRN, the government offices has the chance of building ahuge and formidable information base through the electroniclinkage of the files of every citizen. The data, however, may be

gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but theexistence of this vast reservoir of personal informationconstitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that maybe too great for some of our authorities to resist.

Further, the AO does not even tell us in clear and unequivocalterms how these information gathered shall be handled. Itdoes not provide who shall control and access the data andunder what circumstances and for what purpose. Thesefactors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty theintegrity of the information. The computer linkage gives othergovernment agencies access to the information. YET, THERE

ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OFINFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THECONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTERSYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OFSANCTION OR PENALTY, CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATAFOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE, MANIPULATETHE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM.

AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuringthat personal information gathered about our people will beused only for specified purposes thereby violating the citizensright to privacy

REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,Peti t ioner,

vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYEDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHEREDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L.NERI,Respondents.

CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR),PROFESSIONAL REVIEW AND TRAININGCENTER, INC. (PRTC), ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, INC.

(ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-ACE)

Petitioners-Intervenors.

PIMSAT COLLEGES,Respondent-Intervenor.

Carpio, 2009Facts:

- There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of2006 Nursing Board examination were circulated during theexamination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A.Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center.

The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions andanswers in two of the examinations five subjects, particularlyTests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-SurgicalNursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it totwo Board of Nursing members. Exam results came out butCourt of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with theoath-taking of the successful examinees.- President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issuedEO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the

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establishment and operation of all review centers and similarentities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approvedCHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006(Implementing Rules and Regulations).- Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an

organization of independent review centers, asked the CHEDto "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among otherthings, that giving permits to operate a review center to HigherEducation Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs andprofessional organizations will effectively abolish independentreview centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed thatsuspending the implementation of the IRR would beinconsistent with the mandate of EO 566.- A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place.Revised IRR was approved. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend

RIRR praying to exclude independent review center from thecoverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of therequirement for existing review centers to tie-up with HEIs; torevise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting theCHEDs coverage to public and private institutions of highereducation.- In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to thepetitioner that: to exclude the operation of independent reviewcenters from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradictthe intention of the said Executive Order No.566; As to therequest to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an

HEI, tie-up/be integrated simplymeans, to be in partner with anHEI.- Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamusbefore this Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR,the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and the prohibition againstCHED from implementing the RIRR.Motion to intervene filed by other organizations/institutionswere granted by the Court.

- On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum OrderNo. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) extending thedeadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existingindependent review centers to tie-upor be integrated withHEIs in accordance with the RIRR.

On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved to require theparties to observe the status quo prevailing before theissuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO 21, s. 2008.

Issues:1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by theExecutive of legislative power as it expands the CHEDs

jurisdiction [Yes, it expands CHEDs jurisdiction, henceunconsititutional]; and2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executivesrule-making power. [Yes, it is invalid.]

Held/Ratio:1. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand theCHEDs coverage under RA 7722.The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to publicand private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions.

EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for theregulation of review centers and similar entities.The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it

refers to one which offers "a program or course ofstudy that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledgeor competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in theformal school setting in preparation for the licensureexaminations" given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of theCHED. A review course is only intended to "refresh andenhance the knowledge or competencies and skills ofreviewees." Thus, programs given by review centerscould

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not be considered "programs x x x of higher learning" thatwould put them under the jurisdiction ofthe CHED.

"Higher education," is defined as "education beyond thesecondary level or "education provided by a college or

university."Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centersproviding "review or tutorial services" in areas not covered bylicensure examinations given by the PRC, which include,although not limited to, college entrance examinations,Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. Thesereview and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs ofhigher learning.

2. ) The exercise of the Presidents residual powers underSection 20, Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by the

OSG to justify GMAs action) requires legislation; as theprovision clearly states that the exercise of the Presidentsother powers and functions has to be "provided for under thelaw." There is no law granting the President the power toamend the functions of the CHED. The President has noinherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functionsof the CHED under RA 7722.The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is notindistinct.Legislative power is "the authority, under theConstitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."

The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in theCongress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to belegislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed byCongress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.The President has control over the executive department,bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assumedirectly the functions of the executive department, bureau andoffice, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to

the power of control , he is granted administrative power.Administrative power is concerned with the work of applyingpolicies and enforcing orders as determined by propergovernmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniformstandard of administrative efficiency and check the official

conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrativeorders, rules and regulations.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by thePresident which relates to specific aspects in theadministrative operation of government.It must be in harmony with the law and should be for thesole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out thelegislative policy.Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power,the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-

legislative power.Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of rules andregulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-makingpower within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722.But The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities.Other issues:

Re: issue judicial hierarchy, the alleged violation of theConstitution by the Executive Department when it issued EO566 justifies the exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdictionover the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing aside

technicalities and taking cognizance of an action due to itsimportance to the public.Re: police power, no delegation of police power exists underRA 7722 authorizing the President to regulate the operationsof non-degree granting review centers.Re: RA 8981 as the appropriate law, the PRC has the powerto adopt measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability oflicensure examinations. However, this power should properlybe interpreted to refer to the conduct of the examinations. The

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power to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensureexaminations should be read together with these functions.These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at all with theregulation of reviewcenter

Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.

Facts:Divinagracia, alleging to be the actual and beneficial owner of12% of Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc (CBS) andPeoples Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS), filed twocomplaints with the NTC against CBS and PBS praying for thecancellation of all the provisional authorities or Certificates ofPublic Convenience (CPCs) as well as the legislative franchiseissued to CBS (R.A. 7582) and PBS (R.A. 7477) on account of

the alleged violation of the conditions set therein, to wit: failureto comply with the mandated public offering of at least 30% oftheir common stocks. NTC dismissed the complaints. Whilepositing that it had full jurisdiction to revoke or cancel CPCs forviolations or infractions of the terms and conditions embodiedtherein, the complaints constitute collateral attacks on thelegislative franchise and that NTC is not competent to render

judgment on such issue.

Issue:WoN the NTC has the power to cancel the CPCs it has issued

to legislative franchisees.

Held:The Radio Control Act in 1931 requires broadcast stations toobtain a legislative franchise and such requirement was notrepealed by E.O. 546 which established the NTC, theadministrative agency which has regulatory jurisdiction overbroadcast stations. When the Congress grants a legislativefranchise, it is the legal obligation of the NTC to facilitate the

operation by the franchisee of its broadcast station and sincepublic administration of the airwaves is a highly technicalfunction, the Congress has delegated to the NTC the task ofadministration over the broadcast spectrum. The licensingpower of the NTC arises from the necessary delegation by

Congress of legislative power geared towards the orderlyexercise by franchisees of the rights granted them byCongress.

The life and authority of an administrative agency emanatessolely from an Act of Congress, and its faculties confinedwithin the parameters set by the legislative branch ofgovernment. Even as the NTC is vested with the power toissue CPCs to broadcast stations, it is not expressly vestedwith the power to cancel such CPCs, or otherwise preventbroadcast stations with duly issued franchises and CPCs from

operating radio and television stations. Although the RadioControl Act empowered the government through the thenSecretary of Public Works and Communications to suspend orrevoke issued licenses, the NTC did not retain such powerwhen it was established by E.O. 546 to replace the previousregulatory agencies. Said E.O. 546 promulgated by thenPresident F. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powerwithheld from it the authority to cancel licenses and CPCs.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V GPH

Facts:

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and theMILF were scheduled to sign a MOA-AD

1Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli

Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur. The following filed petitionsassailing the constitutionality of the MOA-AD and seeking to prohibit thesigning thereof:

1 Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain; Other aspects of

Tripoli Agreement are security and rehabilitation

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North Cotabato and Vice Governor Pino

City of Zamboanga, Mayor Lobregat, Rep. Climaco, and Rep.

Enrico Fabian

City of Iligan Province of Zamboanga del Norte, Gov. Yebes, Vice-Gov. Olvis,

Rep. Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Jalosjos, members of the Sanggu

Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte

Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel

The following parties moved to intervene: Sen. Roxas, formerSenate Pres. Franklin Drilon, Atty. Adel Tamano, City of Isabela, MayorSantos-Akbar, Province of Sultan Kudara, Gov. Suharto Mangdadatu,Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte, Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City,Bagogo Tribe, Sanggu Panlungsod member Ridao and businessman KisinBuxani of Cotabato City, lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat,Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmix of Palawan City, Muslim Legal Assistance

Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement forPeace and Development (MMMPD).

Issue: WON the petitioners/intervenors are the proper parties to the case

Held: YES

Ratio:

For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake

in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adversenesswhich sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largelydepends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that hehas been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he islawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens orpenalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. When the issueconcerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and hasan interest in the execution of the laws.

For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion thatpublic funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or thatthere is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid orunconstitutional law. The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a

taxpayer's suit.

In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of theExecutive that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative butnonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. Amember of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolatethe prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in hisoffice.

An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of itsmembers, but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines orany member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of lawdoes not suffice to clothe it with standing.

As regards a local government unit(LGU), it can seek relief in order toprotect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.

Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing offacts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention, such

as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of theparties.

In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicalityon locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in thecase ofDavid v. Macapagal-Arroyo, where technicalities of procedure werebrushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount publicinterest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Courtin view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The Court's

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forbearing stance on locus standion issues involving constitutional issueshas for its purpose the protection of fundamental rights.

In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North, Province of

Zamboanga del Norte, City of Iligan and City of Zamboanga and petitioners-in-interventionProvince of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality ofLinamon have locus standiin view of the direct and substantial injury thatthey, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part,are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitionersallege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would beexpanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyonddoubt.

Petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino PimentelIII would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure tospecify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would bewastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, anincumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro,respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of thetranscendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grantsthem standing.

Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standingas taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for theconduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJEterritory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Theirallegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable

transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for theirpersonality to intervene in these petitions.

With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on hisbeing a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance byrespondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in thesuccess or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisitestanding as an intervenor.

With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressmanof the 3

rddistrict of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo

tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter,citizens and taxpayers;Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of

the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, astaxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the presentpetitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax theprocedural technicality on locus standigiven the paramount public interest inthe issues at hand.

Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peaceand Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment ofpeace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal AssistanceFoundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allegethat they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in theresolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denialof the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices toclothe them with standing.

Banda v. Ermita

April 20, 2010

FACTS:

President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia,removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National

Printing Office) over the printing services requirements ofgovernment agencies and instrumentalities.Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agenciesand instrumentalities are allowed to source their printingservices from the private sector through competitive bidding,subject to the condition that the services offered by the privatesupplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared towhat was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 alsolimited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Actto its income.

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Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to theirsecurity of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners nowchallenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyondthe executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal

Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquinowhen the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2)Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security oftenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition ofthe NPO.

ISSUE:

Whether EO 378 is constitutional.

HELD

: YES

J. Leonardo-de Castro

. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the Presidenthas the power toreorganize the offices and agencies in the executivedepartment in line with the Presidents constitutionallygranted power of control over executive offices and by virtue ofprevious delegation of the legislative powerto reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987

gives the President continuing authority to reorganize andredefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit:The President , subject to the policy in the Executive Officeand in orderto achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall havecontinuing authority to reorganize the administrativestructure of the Office of the President.

It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of theOffice of the Press Secretary (which in various times has beenan agency directly attached to the Office of the PressSecretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information

Agency), is part of the Office of the President.

To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganizepertains only to the Office of the President and thedepartments, offices and agencies of the executive branch anddoes not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or theconstitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it mustbe stressed that the exercise by the President of the power toreorganize the executive department must be in accordancewith the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing

jurisprudence.J. Carpio:RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all

the procurement activities of the government including theacquisition of items, supplies, materials, and general supportservices x x x which may be needed in the transaction of thepublic businesses or in the pursuit of any government x x xactivity save for limited transactions. By openinggovernments procurement of standard and accountable formsto competitive bidding (except for documents crucial to theconduct of clean elections which has to be printed solely bygovernment), EO 378 merely implements RA 9184s principleof promoting competitiveness by extending equal opportunityto enable private contracting parties who are eligible and

qualified to participate in public bidding

UNITED CLAIMANTS V NEADoctrine:Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel,consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason ofeconomy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the lossof one's position through removal or abolition of an office.

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However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy orto make the bureaucracy more efficientto be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it isvoid ab initio.

Facts:NEA is a GOCC created in accordance with PD 269 wherein itstates that the NEA Board is empowered to organize or re-organize NEAs staffing structure. When The Electric PowerIndustry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law) was thereafterenacted to restructure the electric power industry, including theprivatization of the assets of the National Power Corp. (NPC),it imposed upon NEA additional mandates in relation to thepromotion of the role of rural electric cooperatives to achievenational electrification. Its Implementing Rules andRegulations provides that all NEA employees shall be

considered legally terminated with the implementation of areorganization program pursuant to a law enacted byCongress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through whichthe reorganization was carried out.

Issue:

Whether the NEA Board has the power to terminate all theNEA employees

Held:

Yes. Pursuant to PD 269, the termination of all the employees

of NEA was within the NEA Board's powers and may notsuccessfully be impugned absent proof of bad faith to whichthe petitioners have clearly failed to establish. It is undisputedthat NPC was in financial distress and the solution found byCongress was to pursue a policy towards its privatization. Theprivatization of NPC necessarily demanded the restructuring ofits operations. The privatization and restructuring of the NPCwas, therefore, done in good faith as its primary purpose wasfor economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient

QUARTO V MARCELODoctrine:

Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of

a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the respondent. Inmatters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion,mandamusmay only be resorted to, to compel the respondent to takeaction; it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particularway discretionis to be exercised

Facts:

The DPWH Secretary created a committee to investigatealleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or

purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles with theDPWH Internal Audit Service to conduct the actualinvestigation. The DPWH-IAS discovered that from March toDecember 2001, several emergencyrepairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWHservice vehicles, which were approved and paid by thegovernment, did not actually take place, resulting ingovernment losses of approximately P143 million for this ten-month period alone. The committee then filed before the Officeof the Ombudsman complaints charging the petitioner, therespondents, who are officials and employees of the DPWH,

and other private individuals who purportedly benefitted fromthe anomalous transactions.The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan severalinformation charging the said DPWH officials and employeeswith plunder, estafa through falsification of official/commercialdocuments and violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On theother hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents' requestfor immunity in

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exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in theprosecution of the cases filed.

Issue:

Whether the Ombudsman has the authority to grant immunity

from prosecution to witnesses

Held:Yes. RA No. 6770 specifically empowers the Ombudsman togrant immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding beingconducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in theperformance or in thefurtherance of its constitutional functions and statutoryobjectives."In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers,he enjoys the same latitude of discretion in determining what

constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probablecause and the degree of participation of those involved or thelack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters arenot ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when hegravely abuses his discretion, which the petitioner has failed toestablish in this case

PICHAY VS DEPUTY ES

Executive Order No. 13 which abolishes the Presidential Anti-

Graft Commission and transfers its functions to theInvestigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of theDeputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, is constitutionalpursuant to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganizethe administrative structure of the Office of the President inorder to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.

In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued ExecutiveOrder No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft

Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to theInvestigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of theDeputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA).Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima later on filed before theIAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct

against Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay), Chairman of theBoard of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration(LWUA) for the purchase by the LWUA of shares of stock ofExpress Savings Bank, Inc. In defense, Pichay filed a Motionto Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a caseinvolving the same transaction is already pending before theOffice of the Ombudsman. Alleging that no other plain, speedyand adequate remedy is available, Pichay has resorted to theinstant petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing theconstitutionality of E.O. 13.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not E.O. 13 is constitutional2. Whether or not there is usurpation of legislative power toappropriate public funds in view of such reorganization3. Whether or not the IAD-ODESLA encroaches upon thepowers andduties of the Ombudsman4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 violates Pichaysright to due process and the equal protection of the laws

HELD:

E.O. 13 is constitutionalSection 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwiseknown as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in thePresident the continuing authority to reorganize the officesunder him to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.

The Office of the President must, in order to remain effectiveand efficient, be capable of being shaped and reshaped by thePresident in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives

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and policies.Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of itsfunctions to a division specially created within the ODESLA isproperly within the prerogative of the President under hiscontinuing delegated legislative authority to reorganize his own

office. Since both of these offices belong to the Office of thePresident Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing thePAGC and transferring its functions to the IAD-ODESLA isallowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriatepublic fundsThere is an express recognition under Section 78 of Republic

Act No. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of thePresidents authority to direct changes in the organizationalunits or key positions in any department or agency. Thisrecognizes the extent of the Presidents power to reorganize

the executive offices and agencies under him, which is, evento the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for thatpurpose. Thus, while there may be no specific amountearmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amountappropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Officeof the President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLAmay be properly sourced from the Presidents own officebudget without committing any illegal appropriation. After all,the President simply allocates the existing funds previouslyappropriated by Congress for his office.The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and

duties of the OmbudsmanThe primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate andprosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only inthe exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsmanmay, at any time, take over the investigation being conductedby another investigatory agency. Since the case filed beforethe IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case forgrave misconduct, Pichay may not invoke the primary

jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLAfrom proceeding with its investigation. In any event, theOmbudsmans authority to investigate both elective andappointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be,is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly

authorized government agencies.ust law law review, vol lvii, no. 1, november 2012136 recent jurisprudenceMoreover, as the function of the Ombudsman goes into thedetermination of the existence of probable cause and theadjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, theinvestigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to that ofa fact-finding investigator whose determinations andrecommendations remain so until acted upon by the President.

As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsmansconstitutional duties.

Executive Order No. 13 does not violate Pichays right to dueprocess and the equal protection of the lawsPichays right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaintagainst him. In administrative proceedings, the filing ofcharges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person socharged to answer the accusations against him constitute theminimum requirements of due process, which simply meanshaving the opportunity to explain ones side. Hence, as long asPichay was given the opportunity to explain his side andpresent evidence, the requirements of due process are

satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is anabsolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

Also, Pichay is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, hecomes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, whois well within his right to order an investigation into matters thatrequire his informed decision. There are substantialdistinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupyingupper-level positions in government from non-presidential

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appointees and those that occupy the lower positions ingovernment.

MACALINTAL V PET

LONZANIDA V COMELECFacts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served twoconsecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio,Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambalesand was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office anddischarged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 wascontested by his opponent who filed an election protest. Thecourt rendered a judgment declaring the results of the saidelection last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground thatthere was a failure of election.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed hiscertificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and wasproclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timelyfiled a petition to disqualify him from running on the groundthat he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.

The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office byvirtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was laterunseated before the expiration of the term, should be countedas service for one full term in computing the three term limitunder the Constitution and the Local Government Code.Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition fordisqualification

Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELECresolutions maintaining that he was duly elected mayor foronly two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purposeof applying the three term limit for local government officials,

because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio inthe May 1995 elections.

The private respondent maintains that the petitionersassumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service

of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor foralmost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few monthsbefore the next mayoral elections.

Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of SanAntonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be consideredas service of one full term for the purpose of applying thethree-term limit for elective local government officials.

Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that,

the term of office of elective local officials, except barangayofficials, which shall be determined by law shall be three yearsand no such officials shall serve for more than threeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for anylength of time shall not be considered as an interruption in thecontinuity of his service for the full term for which he waselected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)restates the same rule, that: No local elective official shallserve for more than three consecutive terms in the same

position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length oftime shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuityof service for the full term for which the elective officialconcerned was elected.

The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his postbefore the expiration of the term.

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Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntaryrenunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term inthe computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntaryseverance from office for any length of time short of the fullterm provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity

of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months beforethe next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but incompliance with the legal process of writ of execution issuedby the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severancefrom office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus,the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

LEGARDA V DE CASTROP.E.T. Case No. 003, 18 January 2008, PresidentialElectoral Tribunal, (Quisumbing, J. )

We are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming theoffice of Senator and discharging her duties as such, whichfact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively abandonedor withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination toprotect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter ofwho is the real choice of the electorate.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner Loren B. Legarda filed before the PresidentialElectoral Tribunal a petition to annul the proclamation of

Respodent Noli L. De Castro as the Vice-President of thePhilippines. The protest filed by Legarda consisted of twoaspects. The First Aspect covers the alleged erroneous,manipulated and/or falsified results of the election. While theSecond pertains to the revision of the ballots of the precinctsspecified in the protest. The Second Aspect was earlierdismissed by the Supreme Court for the failure of Legarda topay the required deposit for the expenses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner clearly and convincingly proved thepresence of manipulation or falsification of election results

HELD:

Petition DISMISSED.

We are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming theoffice of Senator and discharging her duties as such, whichfact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively abandonedor withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination toprotect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter ofwho is the real choice of the electorate. The most relevantprecedent on this issue is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, a

decision rendered by this Tribunal, which held that:The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995election is six years, the first three of which coincides with thelast three years of the term of the President elected in the 11May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would beProtestant Santiagos term if she would succeed in proving inthe instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, theProtestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn thisprotest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja,abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public

interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of theelectorate. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates torender moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of thisprotest would serve public interest as it would dissipate theaura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidentialelection, thereby enhancing the all-[too] crucial politicalstability of the nation during this period of national recovery.It must also be stressed that under the Rules of thePresidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be

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summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy andpublic interest implications thereof, on the following grounds:(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules14 and 15 hereof;

(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for inthese Rules;(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is notpaid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filedwith the Tribunal are not clearly legible.Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided inthe Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, maylikewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer.

After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold apreliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if an election

protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it mustbe, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot dueto its abandonment by the Protestant.

In the case at bar, protestants tenure in the Senate coincideswith the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010, that is thesubject of her protest.

On the matter of the alleged spurious ER copies, we agreewith the protestee that the protestant had not adequately andconvincingly rebutted the presumption that as public

documents, the Congress-retrieved ER copies, used for theproclamation of the protestee by the NBC, are authentic andduly executed in the regular course of official business. Theevidence adduced by protestee to show that the supposedsecurity features and markings in the Congress-retrieved ERsand the COMELEC/NAMFRELs copies are different, did notcategorically establish that the Congress-retrieved ERs arefake and spurious. To overcome the presumption of regularity,there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than

merely preponderant. Absent such convincing evidence, thepresumption must be upheld. In fact, the records show thateven the witnesses presented by the protestant testified thatthey were able to discern security features and markings in theCongress-retrieved ERs. The records also show that

witnesses were not made to examine all Congress-retrievedERs in making observations relative to security features andmarkings, but only a sample set thereof was utilized, resultingin grave insufficiency in the evidence presented by protestant.

As to the alleged break-in in Congress, which allegedlyfacilitated the switching of ERs, no conclusive evidence hasbeen given. One of the protestants own witnesses, Atty.

Artemio Adasa, Deputy General for Legislative Operations ofthe House of Representatives, categorically denied that abreak-in and a switching of ERs had occurred in Congress.

At any rate, as pointed out by protestee, even assuming

arguendo that all the votes in the 497 precincts included in thepilot areas for the First Aspect with approximately 99,400votes are considered in favor of protestant, still the protestantwould not be able to overcome the lead of the protestee. Themargin in favor of protestee adds up to a total of 881,722votes, and it would take much more than a hundred thousandvotes to overcome this lead. This is what the protestant hadset out to do in her protest before the Tribunal, butunfortunately she failed to make out her case. In fact, Tarakaand Balindong, the only two municipalities on which protestantanchors her arguments for the First Aspect, would only yield

an additional 9,931 votes (4,912 votes for Taraka and 5,019votes for Balindong), a mere fraction of the lead of protesteeover protestant. To say that she could have shown that suchfraudulent machination was replicated in several othermunicipalities of Lanao del Sur and other provinces, such asBasilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat andLanao del Sur if she had enough time, is mere conjecture andcan not be considered convincing by this Tribunal. It is theprotestant herself who admits that she was able to adduce

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evidence only in Taraka and Balindong, for lack of time. Butthis Tribunal has been liberal in granting her plea for timeextension. To say that the protestant had shown enoughevidence to prove that the whole or even half (440,862) of thelead of the protestee over the protestant is spurious, would go

against the grain of the evidence on hand. One cannot saythat half a million votes were illegally obtained based onunclear evidence of cheating in less than ten thousand. Theprotestant has been afforded ample opportunity to adduceevidence in her behalf for the First Aspect of the protest butthe evidence presented is simply insufficient to convince theTribunal to render invalid all or even half of the 881,722 votesthat protestee had over her in the last elections for Vice-President.

FUNA V ERMITA

Public officials; multiple office. The prohibition againstholding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable toposts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein,without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity asprovided by law and as required by the primary functions ofsaid office. The reason is that these posts do not compriseany other office within the contemplation of the constitutionalprohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties

and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertionthat respondent Bautista did not receive any compensationwhen she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed todemonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was inan ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions ofher office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.

Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration ofthe MARINA, we are hardly persuaded by respondents

submission that respondent Bautistas designation as OIC ofMARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties relatedto her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for MaritimeTransport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary forMaritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime

Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary asChairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, andthe following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of thePresident), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager,Department of National Defense Secretary, DevelopmentBank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Departmentof Trade and Industry Secretary.

It must be stressed though that while the designation was inthe nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the wordshold the office were employed. Such holding of office

pertains to both appointment and designation because theappointee or designate performs the duties and functions ofthe office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multipleoffices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding ofthe office, and not to the nature of the appointment ordesignation, words which were not even found in Section 13,

Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To holdan office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be inpossession and administration, which implies nothing lessthan the actual discharge of the functions and duties of theoffice.

The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII isaimed at preventing the concentration of powers in theExecutive Department officials, specifically the President,Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputiesand assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of thetimes and the conditions under which the Constitution wasframed, and construed the Constitution consistent with theobject sought to be accomplished by adoption of such

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provision, and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. Werecalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of designatingmembers of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants asmembers of the governing bodies or boards of variousgovernment agencies and instrumentalities, including

government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice ofholding multiple offices or positions in the government led toabuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantageof this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatantbetrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causesof discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quiteinevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentimentof the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission woulddraft into the proposed Constitution the provisions underconsideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct,the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental

offices and employment

DAVID V ARROYO

1. "Take Care" Power of the President2. Powers of the Chief Executive3. The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature

FACTS:

These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017(declaring a state of national emergency) and General OrderNo. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While thecases are pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021,declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased toexist, thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon thePresident the power to enact laws and decrees

2. If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 areunconstitutional

HELD:

Take-Care Power

This refers to the power of the President to ensure that thelaws be faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17, Art. VII: ThePresident shall have control of all the executive departments,bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfullyexecuted.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the

primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as wellas to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. Hesees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials andemployees of his department. Before assuming office, he isrequired to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that asPresident of the Philippines, he will, among others, execute itslaws. In the exercise of such function, the President, ifneeded, may employ the powers attached to his office as theCommander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,including the Philippine National Police under the Departmentof Interior and Local Government.

The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enablingclause: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to alldecrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personallyor upon my direction.

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgatedecrees?

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The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2,Book III of E.O. 292. President Arroyos ordinance power islimited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoingprovision. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued byFormer President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential

Decrees are laws which are of the same category and bindingforce as statutes because they were issued by the President inthe exercise of his legislative power during the period ofMartial Law under the 1973 Constitution.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutionalinsofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority topromulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within theprovince of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically statesthat the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress ofthe Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of

Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a stateof rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President

Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees andlaws through the military?

As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authorityto enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, shecannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws,

such as customs laws, laws governing family and propertyrelations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. Shecan only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce lawspertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

KILOSBAYAN V ERMITAFacts:Kilosbayan and Bantay Katarungan filed a Petition forCertiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing Executive

Secretary Eduardo Ermitas appointment of Justice GregoryOng as a member of the Supreme Court, in view of his allegedChinese citizenship. Kilosbayan contended that Ongs fatherwas naturalized eleven years after Ongs birth; as such thesame did not make Ong a natural-born Filipino which was a

requirement for membership in the Supreme Court. Kilosbayanalso argued that Ongs birth certificate shows that he is aChinese citizen.

Ong maintained that his mother was a Filipina at the time ofher marriage to Ongs father, who was a Chinese citizen priorto his naturalization. He also presented a certification from theBureau of Immigration showing that he is indeed a natural-born Filipino citizen, since his mother was a Filipina at the timeof his birth.

Issues:1. Whether petitioners have standing (Proper Party)2. Whether Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen

(Appointments, Qualifications)

Held:1. Petitioners have standing.2. Ong is not a natural-born Filipino, but rather a

naturalized Filipino.

Ratio:

1. Petitioners have standing to file the suit as peoplesorganizations and taxpayers. The matter involves anissue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutionalimportance, namely the citizenship a person to beappointed a member of the Supreme Court.

2. Ong is a naturalized Filipino and thus cannot be amember of the Supreme Court. His Petition to beadmitted to the Philippine Bar stated that he is aFilipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han

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Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 whenhe, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years, andby virtue of his fathers naturalization, he, too, becamea Filipino citizen. The trial court then granted thepetition. Given these, Ong is not a natural-born Filipino

citizen, having acquired Filipino citizenship onlybecause of his fathers naturalization. The allegedsubsequent recognition of his natural-born status bythe Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amendthe final decision of the trial court stating that Ong andhis mother were naturalized along with his father.Moreover, his birth certificate, which showed that he isChinese by birth, can only be amended in a judicialproceeding.

RUBRICO V ARROYOPARTIES:

4. PETITIONERS: LOURDES RUBRICO, JEANRUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICOCARBONEL

5. RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIAMACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENESESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ.DARWIN SY, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO,CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, P/SUPT. EDGARROQUERO, ARSENIO GOMEZ, JONATHAN, and

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMANNATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari of CA decisionPROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

3. Supreme Court: Original Action for a Petition for theWrit of Amparo

4. Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court,the Court of Appeals summarily heard the Original

Action for Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of

Appeals issued a partial judgment which is the subjectof the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

FACTS:On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ngMaralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was abducted by armed men

belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron(AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa inDasmarinas, Cavite. She was brought to and detained at theair base without charges. She was released a week afterrelentless interrogation, but only after she signed a statementthat she would be a military asset. Despite her release, shewas tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed acomplaint with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminalcomplaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and gravemisconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan,but nothing has happened. She likewise reported the threats

and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas municipal andCavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resultedfrom their investigation.Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted aninvestigation which indicated that men belonging to the ArmedForces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes.Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writof amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October 2007,praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performingany threatening act against the security of petitioners and forthe Ombudsman to immediately file an information for

kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance ofgender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed fordamages and for respondents to produce documentssubmitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referredthe petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for summary hearingand appropriate action. At the hearing conducted on 20November 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that thepetition and writ be served on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana,

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Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate resolution, theCA dropped the President as respondent in the case.On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered itspartial judgment, dismissing the petition with respect toEsperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman.

Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorariwith the Supreme Court.

PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of commandresponsibility is applicable in an amparo petition.

ANSWER: No.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY and THEWRIT OF AMPARO

Doctr in e of Command Respo nsib i l i ty has l i t t le, i f at al l ,bear ing in amparo proceedings[C]ommand responsibility,as a concept defined, developed, and applied underinternational law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparoproceedings.The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds itscontext in the development of laws of war and armed combats.

According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in itssimplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders forcrimes committed by subordinate members of the armedforces or other persons subject to their control in international

wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, commandresponsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. TheHague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of commandresponsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept ofholding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed byhis subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of controlover them. As then formulated, command responsibility is anomission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the

superior is made responsible for crimes committed by hissubordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.There is no Phi l ippine law that provides for cr iminal

l iabi li ty und er the Doct r ine of Comm and Responsibi l i ty

While there are several pending bills on command

responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides forcriminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly becontended that command responsibility, as legal basis to holdmilitary/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings,enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicableto this jurisdiction on the theory that the commandresponsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle ofinternational law or customary international law in accordancewith the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it wouldbe inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine ofcommand responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a

form of criminal complicity through omission, for individualrespondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond thereach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule insuch proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even ifincidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rulemay have been committed.Reluctance of the amparo pet i t ioners or thei r wi tnesses to

cooperate ought no t to pose a hindrance to the pol ice in

pursuing, on i ts own ini t iat ive, the invest igat ion in

quest ion to i ts natural end [T]he right to security ofpersons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the

government. And this protection includes conducting effectiveinvestigations of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances,or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of aninvestigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, inwhich the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced:[The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a seriousmanner and not as a mere formality preordained to beineffective. An investigation must have an objective and beassumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken

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by private interests that depends upon the initiative of thevictim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effectivesearch for the truth by the government.The remedy of amparo ought to be resor ted to and

granted judic iouslyThe privilege of the writ of amparo is

envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life,liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threatsthat vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writconceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to theprevalence of extra-legal killings and enforceddisappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resortedto and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the AmparoRule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing ofamparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secureamparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis ofunsubstantiated allegations.

DISPOSITIVE:The Supreme Court partially granted the petition for review. Itissued a decision as follows:

1. Affirming the dropping of former President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo from the petition;

2. Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as againstGen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. AvelinoRazon, insofar as it tended, under the commandresponsibility principle, to attach accountability andresponsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff andthen PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced

disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuingharassments allegedly committed against petitioners.The dismissal of the petition with respect to theOmbudsman is also affirmed for failure of the petitionto allege ultimate facts as to make out a case againstthat body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdesand the threats and harassment that followed; and

3. Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or hissuccessor, and the incumbent Director-General of the

PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigationsalready commenced by their respective units on thealleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the allegedharassments and threats she and her daughters weremade to endure are pursued with extraordinary

diligence as required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule.The Chief of Staff of the AFP and Director-General ofthe PNP are directed to order their subordinateofficials, in particular, to do the following:

(a) Determine based on records, past and present, theidentities and locations of respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a.Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. AngeloCuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit certifications of thisdetermination to the OMBUDSMAN with copy furnished topetitioners, the CA, and this Court;(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads

relating to Maj. Darwin Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle withPlate No. XRR 428; and(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/orwitnesses, cartographic sketches of respondents Maj.Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. AngeloCuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in positivelyidentifying and locating them.The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6)months from receipt of the Decision; and within thirty (30) daysafter completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the

AFP and the Director-General of the PNP are likewise directed

to submit a full report of the results of the investigations to theCourt, the CA, the OMB, and petitioners.The Supreme Court accordingly referred the case back to theCA for the purpose of monitoring the investigations and theactions of the AFP and the PNP.

ESTRADA V DESIERTO

FACTS:

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the same as Estrada v. DesiertoRound One

ISSUES:

did prejudicial publicity affect Estradas right to a fair trial? were there evidentiary issues with regard to the 2 March

decision? did the Court correctly interpret 22 Art. VII of theConstitution? did the Court disregard par. 7 3 Art. XI of the Constitution?

REASONING:ON PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY (AGAIN) in the 2 March decision, the SC used the totality test byreferring to and analyzing prior, contemporaneous andposterior events to arrive at the conclusion that Estrada hadresigned; these events were facts that were well-established

and irrefutable, within the judicial notice of the Court and thenews accounts only adding and buttressing them while there was pressure exerted on Estrada to resign, thisdidnt completely vitiate the voluntariness of his resignation

the three-part test for duress brought on by government action:1.whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms2.whether circumstances permitted no other alternative3.whether such circumstances were the result of coercive actsof theopposite side

factors to be considered when determining under the totality ofthecircumstances it appeared that the employers conducteffectively deprived the employee of choice in the matter:1.whether the employee was given some alternative toresignation2.whether the employee understood the nature of the choicehe or she was given

3.whether the employee was given a reasonable time in whichto choose4.whether he or she was permitted to select the effective dateof resignation

ON EVIDENTIARY ISSUES the Angara Diary was not an out of court statement, but partof the pleadings in the cases at barit wasnt covered by the hearsay ruleevidence is hearsay when its probative value depends inwhole or in part on the competency and credibility of somepersons other than the witness by whom it is sought toproduce it

hearsay evidence is usually excluded because:1.absence of cross-examination

2.absence of demeanor evidence3.absence of the oath

but hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to theirrelevance, trustworthiness and necessity

the rules of exclusion didnt cover admissions of a party suchas the Angara Diary; these admissions were admissible even ifthey were hearsay the Diary contained direct statements of Estrada which couldbe categorized as admissions of a party

also falls under the doctrine ofadoptive admission, where apartys reaction to a statement or action by another personwhen it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as anadmission of something stated or implied by the other persondidnt violate theres inter alios acta rule since it admitted theexception of admissions by a co-partner or agent (Angara wasthe Executive Secretary)

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ban on hearsay evidence didnt cover independently relevantstatements, which are relevant independent of whether theywere true or not; has two classes:1. statements which are the very facts in issue2. statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in

issue

ON TEMPORARY INABILITY Estrada himself made the submission that Congress hadultimate authority under the Constitution to determine if thePresident was capable of performing his functions; Arroyosrecognition as de jure President was made by Congressexercising its political judgment and could not be corrected bythe Court

ON THE IMPEACHMENT AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Estrada could not invoke double jeopardy, which onlyattaches:1. upon a valid complaint2. before a competent court3. after arraignment4. when a valid plea has been entered5. when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the casewas dismissed or otherwise terminated without the expressconsent of the accusedEstradas case did not satisfy the fifth requirement since hewasnt

convicted/acquitted/had his case dismissed by theimpeachment courta failure to prosecute, which happens when the accused isntgiven a speedy trial, means failure of the prosecution to proveits case; dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on themerits of the caseciting Esmea v. Pogoy: if the defendant wants to exercise hisconstitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask for the trialof the case, not its dismissal; only when the fiscal cannot

produce evidence can the court dismiss the case, whichamounts to acquittalEstrada didnt move to have the impeachment case againsthim dismissed; only unjustified postponements which prolongthe trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the

right of the accused to speedy trial; the case wasnt terminatedwithouthis express consent, since the impeachment court was functusofficio after he resigned the rule on res ipsa loquitur cant be applied to allegedprejudicial publicity; the right to a fair trial not incompatible withthe free press

RULING:petitions denied for lack of merit

BURGOS V ARROYOPARTIES:PETITIONER: EDITA BURGOSRESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-

ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN.ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ,MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT.COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERALOSCAR CALDERON

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:Court of Appeals: Petitionfor the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

FACTS:At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, JonasJoseph T. Burgos a farmer advocate and a member ofKilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan was forcibly taken and

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abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from theextension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at theground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue,Quezon City.

On April 30, 2007, the petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a pressconference and announced that her son Jonas was missing.That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from theguard if the person abducted was her son Jonas. In asubsequent police investigation and Land TransportationOffice (LTO) verification, it was discovered that plate numberTAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle ownedby a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The said vehicle was seizedand impounded on June 24, 2006 for transporting timberwithout permit. However, in May 2007, right after Jonas

abduction was made public, it was discovered that platenumber TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing,and the engine and other spare parts were cannibalized. Thepolice was likewise able to generate cartographic sketches oftwo of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview ofeyewitnesses.

On August 29, 2007, the Philippine National Police-CriminalInvestigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) presentedEmerito Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka Cris, Marlon D. Manuel a.k.a.Ka Carlo, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes a.k.a. Ka Lisa/Ramil

to support the theory that elements of the New Peoples Army(NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas.

In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA)dismissed the petition for the Issuance of the Writ of HabeasCorpus, denied the petitioners motion to declare therespondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege ofthe Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner. Essentially, theCA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed toestablish her claimed direct connection between the abductors

of Jonas and the military. It also found that the Armed Forcesof the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert theireffort in the conduct of investigation. The CA ruled that the

AFP has the burden of connecting certain loose endsregarding the identity of Ka Ramon and the allegation that Ka

Ramon is indeed Jonas in the Order of Battle. As for thePNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as rathershallow and conducted haphazardly.

PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the PNPand AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningfulinvestigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in theperformance of their duties is a fatal to the grant of theprivilege of the Writ of Amparo.

ANSWER: Yes.

ON PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPAROEf fect of the fai lure of the PNP and AFP to condu ct an

exhaust ive and meaningful invest igat ion and to exerc ise

ext raordinary di l igence in th e per formance of th ei r dut ies

Considering the findings of the CA and our review of therecords of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the

AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive andmeaningful investigation into the disappearance of JonasBurgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in theperformance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of

Amparo requires. Because of these investigativeshortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a moremeaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, isundertaken.

DISPOSITIVE:In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued thefollowing directives:5. DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct

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appropriate investigative proceedings, including fieldinvestigations acting as the Courts directlycommissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on theWrit of Amparo

6. REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines and the Philippine National Police to makeavailable and to provide copies, to the Commission onHuman Rights, of all documents and records in theirpossession and as the Commission on Human Rightsmay require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T.Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations consistentwith the Constitution and existing laws;

7. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief tosubmit to the Commission on Human Rights therecords and results of the investigation the PNP-CIDGclaimed to have forwarded to the Department of

Justice, which were not included in their previoussubmissions to the Commission on Human Rights,including such records as the Commission on HumanRights may require, pursuant to the authority grantedunder this Resolution;

8. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigativeassistance to the Commission on Human Rights as itmay require, pursuant to the authority granted underthis Resolution;

9. AUTHORIZED the Commission on Human Rights toconduct a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation

that extends to all aspects of the case (not limited tothe specific directives as outlined above), as theextraordinary measures the case may require underthe Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and

10. REQUIRED the Commission on Human Rights tosubmit to this Court a Report with itsrecommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, theincumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90) days

from receipt of the Resolution.In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano andthe reassignment of the other respondents who have all beenimpleaded in their official capacities, all subsequentresolutions and actions from the Supreme Court were served

on, and directly enforceable by, the incumbents of theimpleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. Thepresent respondents shall continue to be personally impleadedfor purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities theymay have incurred during their incumbencies.

The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of thepetitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a W

RODRIGUEZ V ARROYO

Doctrine:

The presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrencewith the presidents incumbency but not beyond.

Facts:Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa DagitiMannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organizationaffiliated withKilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that themilitary tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan

Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicialkillings and enforced disappearances.Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was torturedrepeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership inthe NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of

Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data withPrayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, andProduction of Documents andPersonal Properties. The petition was filed against formerPres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped

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Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued inany case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

Issue:

Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent

on the basis of presidential immunity from suit

Held:No. As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit,even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that courtsshould look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege ofimmunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth orimpairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of theConstitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of theframers is clear that

presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with histenure and not his term. Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannotuse such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny thatwould assess whether, within the context of amparoproceedings, she was responsible or accountable for theabduction of Rodriguez

SAEZ V ARROYO

SENATE V ERMITA

Facts:

Executive Order No. 464 issued by the president last September 28, 2005 isargued by petitioners to be unconstitutional.

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a wholeissued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them toappear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing onthe railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the ChinaNational Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator JuanPonce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing andother unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.

Requests for postponement of the investigation were sent by member of theexecutive branch, including the President, in order to "afford said officialsample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues sothat they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigationand also until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the c