Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs.EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

SECOND DIVISION

[G. R. No. 102377. July 5, 1996]

ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA SAJONAS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO A. PILARES, SHERIFF ROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TORRES, JR., J.:

A word or group of words conveys intentions. When used truncatedly, its meaning disappears and breeds conflict. Thus, it is written - By thy words shalt thou be justified, and by thy words shalt thou be condemned. (Matthew, 12:37)

Construing the new words of a statute separately is the raison detre of this appeal.Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate of Title

covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde and Lucita Jarin, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case.

The facts are not disputed, and are hereby reproduced as follows:

On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985.

Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed Civil Case No. Q-28850 for collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25, 1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation to Domingo Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two years from June 25, 1980. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in the compromise agreement, defendant-appellant Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement, which the court granted in its order dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City where the civil case was pending. Pursuant to the order of execution dated August 3, 1982, a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.

When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4 1984 was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was ssued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. On October 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence the auction sale of the subject property did not push through as scheduled.

On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon defendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer, Atty. Melchor Flores. Despite said demand, defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation. In view thereof, plaintiffs-appellees filed this complaint dated January 11, 1986 on February 5, 1986.[1]

The Sajonases filed their complaint[2] in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 71, against Domingo Pilares, the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The relevant portion of the complaint alleges:

7. That at the time the notice of levy was annotated by the defendant, the Uychocde spouses, debtors of the defendant, have already transferred, conveyed and assigned all their title, rights and interests to the plaintiffs and there was no more title, rights or interests therein which the defendant could levy upon;

8. That the annotation of the levy on execution which was carried over to the title of said plaintiffs is illegal and invalid and was made in utter bad faith, in view of the existence of the Adverse Claim annotated by the plaintiffs on the corresponding title of the Uychocde spouses;

9. That a demand was made by the plaintiffs upon the defendant Domingo A. Pilares, to cause the cancellation of the said notice of levy but the latter, without justifiable reason and with the sole purpose of harassing and embarrassing the plaintiffs ignored and refused plaintiffs demand;

10. That in view of the neglect, failure and refusal of the defendant to cause the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution, the plaintiffs were compelled to litigate and engage the services of the undersigned counsel, to protect their rights and interests, for which they agreed to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000 and appearance fees of P500 per day in court.[3]

Pilares filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim[4] on March 8, 1986, raising special and affirmative defenses, the relevant portions of which are as follows:

10. Plaintiff has no cause of action against herein defendants;

11. Assuming, without however admitting that they filed an adverse claim against the property covered by TCT No. 79073 registered under the name of spouses Ernesto Uychocde on August 27, 1984, the same ceases to have any legal force and effect (30) days thereafter pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529;

12. The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 being effected pursuant to the Writ of Execution dated August 31, 1982, duly issued by the CFI (now RTC) of Quezon City proceeding from a decision rendered in Civil Case No. 28859 in favor of herein defendant against Ernesto Uychocde, is undoubtedly proper and appropriate because the property is registered in the name of the judgment debtor and is not among those exempted from execution;

13. Assuming without admitting that the property subject matter of this case was in fact sold by the registered owner in favor of the herein plaintiffs, the sale is the null and void (sic) and without any legal force and effect because it was done in fraud of a judgment creditor, the defendant Pilares.[5]

Pilares likewise sought moral and exemplary damages in a counterclaim against the Sajonas spouses. The parties appeared at pre-trial proceedings on January 21, 1987,[6] after which, trial on the merits ensued.

The trial court rendered its decision on February 15, 1989.[7] It found in favor of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.

The court a quo stated, thus:

After going over the evidence presented by the parties, the court finds that although the title of the subject matter of the Notice of Levy on Execution was still in the name of the Spouses Uychocde when the same was annotated on the said title, an earlier Affidavit of Adverse Claim was annotated on the same title by the plaintiffs who earlier bought said property from the Uychocdes.

It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction (Guidote vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442) that actual notice of an adverse claim is equivalent to registration and the subsequent registration of the Notice of Levy could not have any legal effect in any respect on account of prior inscription of the adverse claim annotated on the title of the Uychocdes.

xxx xxx xxx

On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs are buyers in good faith of the property of the spouses Uychocde even notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that said sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors, the Court finds that the evidence in this instance is bare of any indication that said plaintiffs as purchasers had notice beforehand of the claim of the defendant over said property or that the same is involved in a litigation between said spouses and the defendant. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and bad faith, and the existence of any bad faith must be established by competent proof.[8] (Cai vs. Henson, 51 Phil 606)

xxx xxx xxx

In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Pilares, as follows:

1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy on Execution annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.

2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000 as attorneys fees.

3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by said defendant.

Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs.

Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the Court of Appeals[9], assigning errors on the part of the lower court. The appellate court reversed the lower courts decision, and upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated February 15, 1989 is reversed and set aside and this complaint is dismissed.

Costs against the plaintiffs-appellees."[10]

The Sajonas couple are now before us, on a Petition for Review on Certiorari[11], praying inter alia to set aside the Court of Appeals decision, and to reinstate that of the Regional Trial Court.

Private respondent filed his Comment[12] on March 5, 1992, after which, the parties were ordered to file their respective Memoranda. Private respondent complied thereto on April 27, 1994[13], while petitioners were able to submit their Memorandum on September 29, 1992.[14]

Petitioner assigns the following as errors of the appellate court, to wit:I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULE ON THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR ADVERSE CLAIM UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS IT FAILED TO READ OR CONSTRUE THE PROVISION IN ITS ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE PROVISION IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT AS A WHOLE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IN SUCH WISE ON THE GROUND THAT IT VIOLATES PETITIONERS SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

Primarily, we are being asked to ascertain who among the parties in suit has a better right over the property in question. The petitioners derive their claim from the right of ownership arising from a perfected contract of absolute sale between them and the registered owners of the property, such right being attested to by the notice of adverse claim [15] annotated on TCT No. N-79073 as early as August 27, 1984. Private respondent on the other hand, claims the right to levy on the property, and have it sold on execution to satisfy his judgment credit, arising from Civil Case No. Q-28850[16] against the Uychocdes, from whose title, petitioners derived their own.

Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered owner thereof.  Such notice is registered by filing a sworn statement with the Register of Deeds of the province where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the claimed right together with other dates pertinent thereto.[17]

The registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529.*

Noting the changes made in the terminology of the provisions of the law, private respondent interpreted this to mean that a Notice of Adverse Claim remains effective only for a period of 30 days from its annotation, and does not automatically lose its force afterwards. Private respondent further maintains that the notice of adverse claim was annotated on August 27, 1984, hence, it will be effective only up to September 26, 1984, after which it will no longer have any binding force and effect pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the sale in favor of the petitioners by the Uychocdes was made in order to defraud their creditor (Pilares), as the same was executed subsequent to their having defaulted in the payment of their obligation based on a compromise agreement. [18]

The respondent appellate court upheld private respondents theory when it ruled:

The above stated conclusion of the lower court is based on the premise that the adverse claim filed by plaintiffs-appellees is still effective despite the lapse of 30 days from the date of registration. However, under the provisions of Section 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of 30 days from the date of its registration. The provision of this Decree is clear and specific.

xxx xxx xxx

It should be noted that the adverse claim provision in Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) does not provide for a period of effectivity of the annotation of an adverse claim. P.D. No. 1529, however, now specifically provides for only 30 days. If the intention of the law was for the adverse claim to remain effective until cancelled by petition of the interested party, then the aforecited provision in P.D. No. 1529 stating the period of effectivity would not have been inserted in the law.

Since the adverse claim was annotated On August 27, 1984, it was effective only until September 26, 1984. Hence, when the defendant sheriff annotated the notice of levy on execution on February 12, 1985, said adverse claim was already ineffective. It cannot be said that actual or prior knowledge of the existence of the adverse claim on the Uychocdes title is equivalent to registration inasmuch as the adverse claim was already ineffective when the notice of levy on execution was annotated. Thus, the act of defendant sheriff in annotating the notice of levy on execution was proper and justified.

The appellate court relied on the rule of statutory construction that Section 70 is specific and unambiguous and hence, needs no interpretation nor construction.[19] Perforce, the appellate court stated, the provision was clear enough to warrant immediate enforcement, and no interpretation was needed to give it force and effect. A fortiori, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of its registration, after which it shall be without force and effect.  Continuing, the court further stated;

. . . clearly, the issue now has been reduced to one of preference- which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985.

In the case of Landig vs. U.S. Commercial Co., 89 Phil 638 it was held that where a sale is recorded later than an attachment, although the former is of an earlier date, the sale must give way to the attachment on the ground that the act of registration is the operative act to affect the land. A similar ruling was restated in Campillo vs. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 513).

xxx xxx xxx

The reason for these rulings may be found in Section 51 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides as follows:

Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by the registered owner.- An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land in so far as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under the Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. (Italics supplied by the lower court.)

Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.  A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property.  He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title. [20]

Although we have relied on the foregoing rule, in many cases coming before us, the same, however, does not fit in the case at bar. While it is the act of registration which is the operative act which conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned, it is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale. [21] While it is true that under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree, deeds of conveyance of property registered under the system, or any interest therein only take effect as a conveyance to bind the land upon its registration, and that a purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto, nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. Thus, one who buys from the registered owner need not have to look behind the certificate of title, he is, nevertheless, bound by the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon.One who buys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.[22]

In PNB vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the subsequent sale of the property to the De Castro spouses cannot prevail over the adverse claim of Perez, which was inscribed on the banks certificate of title on October 6, 1958.  That should have put said spouses on notice, and they can claim no better legal right over and above that of Perez. The TCT issued in the spouses names on July, 1959 also carried the said annotation of adverse claim. Consequently, they are not entitled to any interest on the price they paid for the property.[23]

Then again, in Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, we said that the statement of respondent court in its resolution of reversal that until the validity of an adverse claim is determined judicially, it cannot be considered a flaw in the vendors title contradicts the very object of adverse claims. As stated earlier, the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or has a better right than the registered owner thereof.  A subsequent sale cannot prevail over the adverse claim which was previously annotated in the certificate of title over the property.[24]

The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 still in force when private respondent caused the notice of levy on execution to be registered and annotated in the said title, considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed since it was annotated? This is a decisive factor in the resolution of this instant case.

If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents are charged with knowledge of pre-existing interest over the subject property, and thus, petitioners are entitled to the cancellation of the notice of levy attached to the certificate of title.

For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to the law itself. Section 110 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act reads:

Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered lands adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting

forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. The statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case, the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble the costs in its discretion.

The validity of the above-mentioned rules on adverse claims has to be reexamined in the light of the changes introduced by P.D. 1529, which provides:

Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.

Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. (Italics ours)

In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole.[25] For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. [26] In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety.  Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:

The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration.

At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads:

After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.

If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule.  For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.

A statutes clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in its relation to the statutes totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize it with the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The printed pages of the published Act, its history, origin, and its purposes may be examined by the courts in their construction.[27] An eminent authority on the subject matter states the rule candidly:

A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections, and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine its intention to the one section construed. It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide it by a process of etymological dissection, into separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated from the context, some particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase usually to be ascertained from the context.[28]

Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property.  For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.[29]

It should be noted that the law employs the phrase may be cancelled, which obviously indicates, as inherent in its decision making power, that the court may or may not order the cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of registration. The court cannot be bound by such period as it would be inconsistent with the very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim which is the principal issue to be decided in the court hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the court to determine whether it will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not. [30]

To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.[31]

The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the propriety of his claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the existence of any encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse claim. This is in line with the provision immediately following:

Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim shall be registered by the same claimant.

Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the property, the adverse claimant will be precluded from registering a second adverse claim based on the same ground.

It was held that validity or efficaciousness of the claim may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protecting the interest of the adverse claimant and giving notice and warning to third parties.[32]

In sum, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 was still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners.This can be deduced from the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 16. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons- The levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the judgment creditor over the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to liens or encumbrances then existing. (Italics supplied)

To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their property, who waited a long time to complete payments on their property, convinced that their interest was amply protected by the inscribed adverse claim.

As lucidly observed by the trial court in the challenged decision:

True, the foregoing section provides that an adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. Does this mean however, that the plaintiffs thereby lost their right over the property in question? Stated in another, did the lapse of the thirty day period automatically nullify the contract to sell between the plaintiffs and the Uychocdes thereby depriving the former of their vested right over the property?

It is respectfully submitted that it did not.[33]

As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith of the subject property, the same should be made to rest on the findings of the trial court. As pointedly observed by the appellate court, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellees were not aware of the pending case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at the time of the sale of the property by the latter in their favor. This was clearly elicited from the testimony of Conchita Sajonas, wife of plaintiff, during cross-examination on April 21, 1988.[34]

ATTY. REYESQ - Madam Witness, when Engr. Uychocde and his wife offered to you and your husband the property subject matter of this

case, they showed you the owners transfer certificate, is it not?A - Yes, sir.Q - That was shown to you the very first time that this lot was offered to you for sale?A - Yes.Q - After you were shown a copy of the title and after you were informed that they are desirous in selling the same, did you

and your husband decide to buy the same?A - No, we did not decide right after seeing the title. Of course, we visited...Q - No, you just answer my question. You did not immediately decide?A - Yes.Q - When did you finally decide to buy the same?

A - After seeing the site and after verifying from the Register of Deeds in Marikina that it is free from encumbrances, that was the time we decided.

Q - How soon after you were offered this lot did you verify the exact location and the genuineness of the title, as soon after this was offered to you?

A - I think its one week after they were offered.[35]

A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.[36] Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another.[37] Thus, the claim of the private respondent that the sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors has no basis in fact, there being no evidence that the petitioners had any knowledge or notice of the debt of the Uychocdes in favor of the private respondents, nor of any claim by the latter over the Uychocdes properties or that the same was involved in any litigation between said spouses and the private respondent. While it may be stated that good faith is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be established by competent proof by the party alleging the same.  Sans such proof, the petitioners are deemed to be purchasers in good faith, and their interest in the subject property must not be disturbed.

At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of registered land in good faith that they can take and hold the same free from any and all prior claims, liens and encumbrances except those set forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly mentioned in the ACT as having been preserved against it.  Otherwise, the efficacy of the conclusiveness of the Certificate of Title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would be futile and nugatory. [38]

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 17, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court dated February 15, 1989 finding for the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby REINSTATED.

The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is hereby CANCELLED.Costs against private respondent.SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 111722. May 27, 1997]

ALPHA INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY AGENCY, INC. (AISA), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THIRD DIVISION, and WILLIAM GALIMBA, NESTOR LOLOQUISEN, NESTOR IBUYAT, CARLITO CASTRO, JOSE PERDIDO, FELIPE TOLENTINO, LEONARDO IBUYAT, FELINO CULANNAY, RONIE NINO, ROMAN NALUNDASAN, JAIME FONTANILLA, WILFRED BUTAY, JOSE ACIO, EDISON VALDEZ, CRESENCIO AGRES, RODRIGO LUIS, MARIO SUGUI, BENEDICTO SUGUI, ROGER RAMBAUD, respondents.

D E C I S I O NROMERO, J.:

May the principal of a security service agreement be held jointly and severally liable with the contractor for non-payment of the minimum wage?

The facts are undisputed.Petitioner Alpha Investigation and Agency, Inc. (AISA) is a private corporation engaged in the business of providing security

services to its clients, one of whom is the Don Mariano Marcos State University (DMMSU).Private respondents were hired as security guards by AISA on February 16, 1990. Five months later, 43 security guards filed

before the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint against AISA for non-compliance with the current minimum wage order. After 24 of the original complainants filed a motion for exclusion from the case, the remaining 19 security guards filed their individual amended complaints impleading DMMSU as party-respondent.

Private respondents have been receiving a monthly salary of P900.00 although the security service agreement between AISA and DMMSU[1] provided a monthly pay of P1,200.00 for each security guard. AISA made representations with DMMSU for an increase in the contract rates of the security guards to enable them to pay the mandated minimum wage rates without compromising its administrative and operational expenses. DMMSU, however, replied that, being a government corporation, it cannot grant said request due to budgetary constraints.

On August 17, 1992, Labor Arbiter Emiliano T. de Asis rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:"RESPONSIVE TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Ordering the respondent Alpha Investigation and Security Agency and Mariano Marcos State University to pay each complainant the amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY NINE PESOS AND FIFTY ONE CENTAVOS (P41,459.51) representing salary differential for the period from February 16, 1990 to September 30, 1991, or the total amount of P787,730.69 as follows:1. Nestor Loloquisen P41,459.51

2. Nestor Ibuyat 41,459.513. Jose Acio 41,459.514. Cresencio Agres 41,459.515. Wilfred Butay 41,459.516. Carlito Castro 41,459.517. Federico Calunnay 41,459.518. Jaime Fontanilla 41,459.519. William Galimba 41,459.5110. Leonardo Ibuyat 41,459.5111. Rodrigo Luis 41,459.5112. Roman Nalundasan 41,459.5113. Ronnie Nino 41,459.5114. Jose Perdido 41,459.5115. Roger Rambaud 41,459.5116. Benedicto Sugui 41,459.5117. Mario Sugui 41,459.5118. Felipe Tolentino 41,459.5119. Edison Valdez 41,459.51P787,730.69

b) Dismissing the claims for 13th month pay for failure to substantiate the same.c) Claims of complainants who filed their motion for reconsideration are hereby dismissed.SO ORDERED."[2]

AISA and DMMSU interposed separate appeals. The NLRC, on May 7, 1993, rendered a decision affirming the solidary liability of AISA and DMMSU and remanding the records of the case to the arbitration branch of origin for computation of the salary differential awarded by the Labor Arbiter.

Only AISA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the NLRC on July 1, 1993, for lack of merit.The judgment against DMMSU, finding it jointly and severally liable with AISA for the payment of increase in wages, became

final and executory after it failed to file a petition forcertiorari with this Court within a reasonable time. "Although Rule 65 does not specify any period for the filing of a petition for certiorari and mandamus, it must, nevertheless, be filed within a reasonable time. In certiorari cases, the definitive rule now is that such reasonable time is within three months from the commission of the complained act."[3]

In this petition, AISA alleges that payment of the wage increases under the current minimum wage order should be borne exclusively by DMMSU, pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act 6727 (RA 6727)[4] which reads as follows:"Sec. 6. In the case of contracts for construction projects and for security, janitorial and similar services, the prescribed increases in the wage rates of the workers shall be borne by the principals or clients of the construction/service contractors and the contract shall be deemed amended accordingly. In the event, however, that the principal or client fails to pay the prescribed wage rates, the construction/service contractor shall be jointly and severally liable with his principal or client."

It further contends that Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code generally refer to the failure of the contractor or sub-contractor to pay wages in accordance with the Labor Code with a mandate that failure to pay such wages would make the employer and contractor jointly and severally liable for such payment. AISA insists that the matter involved in the case at bar hinges on wage differentials or wages increases, as prescribed in the aforequoted Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general, as provided by the Labor Code.

This interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. [5] In fact, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or aparticular provision alone.[6]

AISA's solidary liability for the amounts due the security guards finds support in Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code, to wit:"ART. 106. Contractor or Sub-Contractor. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's sub-contractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this code.

In the event that the contractor or sub-contractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or sub-contractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him. xxxART. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership association or corporation which, nor being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.ART. 109. Solidary Liability. The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or sub-contractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under the Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers."

The joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including the statutory minimum wage.[7] The contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer, while the principal becomes the indirect employer of the former's employees for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the contractor to pay them. This gives the workers ample protection consonant with the labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution.[8]

In the case at bar, it is not disputed that private respondents are the employees of AISA. Neither is there any question that they were assigned to guard the premises of DMMSU pursuant to the latter's security service agreement with AISA and that these two entities paid their wage increases.

It is to be borne in mind that wages orders, being statutory and mandatory, cannot be waived. AISA cannot escape liability since the law provides for the joint and solidary liability of the principal and the contractor to protect the laborers. [9] Thus, the Court held in the Eagle Security v. NLRC:[10]

"The solidary liability of PTSI and EAGLE, however, does not preclude the right of reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid (See Article 1217, Civil Code). It is with respect to this right of reimbursement that petitioners can find support in the aforecited contractual stipulation and Wage Order provision.The Wage Orders are explicit that payment of the increases are 'to be borne' by the principal or client. 'To be borne', however, does not mean that the principal, PTSI in this case, would directly pay the security guards the wage and allowance increases because there is no privity of contract between them. The security guards' contractual relationship is with their immediate employer, EAGLE. As an employer, EAGLE is tasked, among others, with the payment of their wages. (See Article VII Sec. 3 of the Contract for Security Services, supra and Bautista v. Inciong, G.R. No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 556).Premises considered, the security guards' immediate recourse for the payment of the increases is with their direct employer, EAGLE. However, in order for the security agency to comply with the new wage and allowance rates it has to pay the security guards, the Wage Order made specific provision to amend existing contracts for security services by allowing the adjustments of the consideration paid by the principal to the security agency concerned. What the Wage Orders require, therefore, is the amendment of the contract as to the consideration to cover the service contractor's payment of the increases mandated. In the end, therefore, ultimate liability for the payment of the increases rests with the principal." (Underscoring supplied)

Section 6 of RA 6727 merely provides that in case of wage increases resulting in a salary differential, the liability of the principal and the contractor shall be joint and several. The same liability attaches under Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code, which refer to the prevailing standard minimum wage.

The Court finds that the NLRC acted correctly in holding petitioner jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of the wage increases to private respondents. Accordingly, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the NLRC in arriving at the impugned decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed resolution is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-51370 August 31, 1981

AMADO IZON and JIMMY MILLA petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

 

DE CASTRO*, J.:

Petitioners were charged, together with Pedro Divino, in the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Olongapo City, with Robbery with Violence Against Person, under an information reading as follows:

That on or about the 8th day of September, 1977, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another and by means of violence and intimidation applied upon the person of Reynaldo Togorio committed by the accused Jimmy Milla y Castillo and Pedro Divino y Batero who were armed with bladed weapon which they pointed to one Reynaldo Togorio and used in stabbing him and the accused Amado Izon y Bartulo who helped in mauling him thereby inflicting upon said Reynaldo Togorio the following physical injuries, to wit:

Incised wound 2 cm. long and 2 cm. deep lateral aspect upper third arm right. Incised wound 2 inches long between thumb and index finger left Abrasion sternoclavicular function along 6 rib left. Linear abrasion 3 cm. long level of 7th rib, anterior axillary line right

which injuries shall require medical attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days, barring complications, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) motorized tricycle with motor No. B100-25-648 with Chasis No. B120-05589 and Plate No. MCH Q4102 or with a total value of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency belonging to Reynaldo Togorio to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount of Pll,000.00. However, the motorized tricycle Zukurmi 120, Motor No. B1OO-25-648 with Chasis No.B-120-05589 was recovered. 1

Pleading guilty upon arraignment, petitioners were sentenced to the penalty provided in Republic Act No. 6539 known as Anti-Car-napping Act of 1972 which defines motor vehicle as follows:

Motor vehicle is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails or tracks, and tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating. 2 (Emphasis supplied).

Contending that the court a quo erred in imposing the penalty prescribed in the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 instead of that prescribed in the Revised Penal Code for simple robbery with violence, because the information did not allege that the motorized tricycle stolen was using the public highway, so as to make it a motor vehicle as the term is defined in the carnapping law, and therefore failed to inform them that they were being charged under the cited statute, in violation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against the petitioners came to this Court with the instant petition for review.

The principal issue thus raised is whether a motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the definition given to the term by the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.

As a consequence of their contention that the motorized tricycle is not a motor vehicle under the definition of the aforecited Act, petitioners also claim that they are not properly informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against them in violation of their constitutional right.

Petitioners maintain that the tricycle in question is not a "motor vehicle" as the anti-carnapping law defines the term because it is not licensed to operate on the "public highways." The Solicitor General contends otherwise with the following argument:

The word "public" means "common to all or many; general; open to common use" (Black's Law Dictionary 1393 [Revised 4th Ed.]. On the other hand, 'highway' refers to a 'free and public road way, or street; one which every person has the right to use (idem. at p. 862). lt is clear that a street within a town is a public highway if it is used by the public. To limit the words "public highways" to a national road connecting the various towns, as petitioners' suggest (Reply dated January 25, 1980) would create a distinction which the statute itself does not make. Under petitioners' proposition, a distinction should be made between motor vehicles operating within a town like the motorized tricycle involved herein, and those using roads connecting towns. This, however, goes against the well known maxim that where the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be made (Robles vs. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., 104 PhiL 688). It is also to be pointed out that to limit the application of the Act to motor vehicles travelling between different towns, may lead to absurd results. For example, privately owned motorcycle used by its owner in travelling from one province to another would be covered by the law. Upon the other hand, a motorized tricycle (with sidecar) which is more expensive than the former but operated within towns would not be protected by the law. No unreasonable intendment should be read into a statute so that an injustice may be worked or an absurb result produced (In re Moore's Estate, N.Y.S. 2nd 281, 165 Misc. 683). It can be concluded, therefore, that the motorized tricycle involves in this case is a 'motor vehicle' within the ambit of section 2 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. The lower court correctly imposed the penalty for violation of said Act on herein petitioners. 3

We perceive no reason not to accord full validity of the Solicitor General's argument, not even on the petitioner's submission that a motorized tricycle, not having licensed to use a public highway, is not a motor, vehicle under the provision of the anti-carnapping act.

From the definition cited by the Government which petitioners admit as authoritative, highways are always public, free for the use of every person. There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to make the vehicle a "motor vehicle" within the definition given the anti-carnapping law. If a vehicle uses the streets with or without the required license, same comes within the protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is not to be measured by what kind of streets or highway the same is used; but by the very nature of the vehicle itself and the use to which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still unlicensed or unregistered as when they have just beet bought from the company, or only on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anti-carnapping statute, but only as simple robbery punishable under the provision of the Revised Penal Code. This obviously, could not have been the intention of the anti-carnapping law.

Going over the enumerations of excepted vehicle, it would readily be noted that any vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public, not exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of motor vehicle. A tricycle which is not included in the exception, is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as defined in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction.

In any event, it is a matter of judicial notice that motorized tricycles are running in droves along highways admittedly public, as those going to the north like Baguio City. Those motorized tricycles certainly come within the definition of the law, even under the restricted construction that petitioners would want given to it. If these tricycles are "motor vehicles" then, there is no cogent reason to treat the tricycle in question differently.

With the foregoing discussion, it would logically follow that the petitioners complaint of not having been informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and for which they were convicted upon their plea of guilty, is unfounded, legally and factually.

Again, on tills point, We find the observation of the Solicitor General valid, We have no other course than to sustain it. Thus —

A perusal of the information (Annex 1 of respondent People's Comment dated November 16, 1979) readily shows that petitioners were not thereby informed that they were being accused for violation of the Revised Penal Code. The charge merely designated the offense as one for: "ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST PERSON." The facts alleged in the information make out a case of "carnapping". This offense is defined in section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539 as 'the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things The information clearly specified that what was taken and carried away was "one (1) motorized tricycle." Herein petitioners cannot claim that they were misled by the information into pleading guilty. It is not necessary for the protection of the substantial right of the accused, nor the effective preparation of his defense, that he be informed of the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. He must look to the facts alleged (People vs. Cosare, 95 PhiL 656; U.S. vs. Lim San 17 Phil. 275).

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs. 4

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 117818. April 18, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMAN DERILO, ISIDORO BALDIMO y QUILLO, alias Sido, LUCAS DOOS, ALEJANDRO COFUENTES, and JOHN DOE, accused. ISIDORO BALDIMO y QUILLO, alias Sido, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doos, Alejandro Cofuentes and one John Doe were charged with the so-called crime of murder committed by a band before the First Branch of the former Court of First Instance of Borongan, Eastern Samar. [1] The information filed therefor alleges -

That on January 1, 1982 at about 6:00 oclock P.M. at sitio Palaspas, Taft, Eastern Samar, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill, with the use of firearm and bolos, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there shot (sic) and stabbed (sic) one Perpetua Adalim thus inflicting injuries which caused her death.CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was apprehended and brought within the trial courts jurisdiction. At his arraignment on March 18, 1985, and after the information was translated in the Waray dialect with which he is well versed, appellant pleaded not guilty.[3] Trial on the merits was conducted thereafter.

However, by the time the People had formally finished presenting its evidence on August 6, 1986, appellant, through his counsel de parte, manifested to the court a quo that he wanted to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and substitute the same with one of guilty. Consequently, a re-arraignment was ordered by the lower court and, this time, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder.[4]

A series of questions was then propounded by the trial court to test appellants voluntariness and comprehension of the consequences in making his new plea of guilty. Satisfied with the answers of appellant, the trial court convicted him of the crime of murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[5]

A detailed account of the killing was furnished by prosecution eyewitness Cresencio Lupido. [6] According to him, Perpetua C. Adalim went to his house at Sitio Palaspas, Barangay Polangi in Taft, Eastern Samar in the early evening of January 1, 1982 to look for farmlands willing and desiring to work in her ricefields. Lupido was an agricultural tenant of Perpetua and lived on one of the properties owned by the latter. Upon her arrival, Perpetua instructed Lupidos wife to get food from her house in the poblacion as she had decided to spend the night at Sitio Palaspas.

While Perpetua was waiting and standing in the yard of the house, five armed men arrived and confronted Perpetua.  Lupido recognized two of the men as Roman Derilo and appellant Isidoro Baldimo, as these two frequently passed by his house at Sitio Palaspas. He did not know the other three men but he claimed that he could identity them if brought before him.

Roman Derilo talked momentarily with Perpetua. Then, without any warning, Derilo shot Perpetua three times with the pistol he was carrying. After she fell to the ground, appellant, who was standing at the right side of Derilo, approached Perpetua and stabbed her several times with a knife that looked like either a Batangas knife or a bolo known locally as depang. A third member of the group, with a short and stout physique, followed suit in stabbing Perpetua. After the repeated stabbings, the gang walked around the yard for some time and left, walking in the direction of the mountains. All of them carried long firearms.

As soon as the group had left the scene of the crime, Lupido hurriedly went to Perpetuas house in the poblacion of Taft where he informed the family of the deceased about the incident.[7]

I

Appellant does not deny his participation in the commission of the crime. Rather, in his brief pitifully consisting of two pages, he merely asks for the modification of the death penalty imposed by the lower court to life imprisonment. [8] Although appellant is aware that he has made his plea of guilty after the prosecution had presented its evidence, thus foreclosing the application of paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,[9] he contends that his untimely acknowledgment of culpability may still be treated by analogy as a mitigating circumstance under paragraph 10 of the same article, invoking therefor the aforesaid case of Coronel.[10]

Unfortunately, that decision relied upon by appellant is inapplicable to his case. The death penalty in People vs. Coronel, et al.[11] was modified to life imprisonment not in consideration of paragraph 10, Article 13 of the code but because the number of votes then required to affirm a sentence of death imposed by a lower court [12] was not secured by this Court in its automatic review of the judgment. Apparently, the required number for concurrence was not obtained because some members of the Court treated the belated confession of the accused therein as an indication on his part to reform, and they felt that he should only suffer the same penalty imposed on some of his co-conspirators.

The late plea of guilty entered by herein appellant cannot be considered mitigating because the plea made is not of a similar nature and analogous to the plea of guilty contemplated in paragraph 7 of Article 13. A plea of guilty is considered mitigating on the rationale that an accused spontaneously and willingly admits his guilt at the first opportunity as an act of repentance.  An accused should not be allowed to speculate on the outcome of the proceedings by pleading not guilty on arraignment, only to later substitute the same with a plea of guilty after discovering that the People has a strong case against him. Withal, all is not lost for appellant.

The killing of the victim, Perpetua C. Adalim, was found by the lower court to have been qualified to murder by treachery. Although not alleged in the information, the circumstances of superior strength and cuadrilla were taken note of by the

court a quo based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, but the same were correctly regarded by said court as absorbed in alevosia. However, it found that the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation likewise attended the commission of the crime. Hence, with no mitigating circumstance to offset this aggravating circumstance, the trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify and pay damages to the heirs of the victim.

It will be observed from a reading of the lower courts decision[13] that its judgment was obviously based not only on the evidence presented by the prosecution but also on appellants belated admission of guilt, together with some inconclusive pronouncements of this Court on conspiracy. The former apparently proved the circumstances of treachery, superior strength and cuadrilla, while the latter supposedly supplied the ground for the finding of evident premeditation.

We agree with the finding of the court below that appellant participated in the treacherous killing of Perpetua C. Adalim. Appellants presence in the locus criminis and his identification were positively supplied by the prosecutions eyewitness. The unwavering and unequivocal testimony of Lupido, corroborated by that of Dr. Eduardo S. Evardone who conducted thepostmortem examination on the corpse of the victim[14] and submitted his corresponding autopsy report,[15] indubitably show the deliberate employment by the accused of a reliable and unfailing means to ensure the killing without giving the victim an opportunity to defend herself.

However, we cannot give the same stamp of approval to the finding on premeditacion conocida declared by the trial court. The disturbing conclusions of said court thereon need to be clarified to obviate misconceptions that may affect the stability of our present rules on evidence and criminal procedure. Said the lower court on this aspect:

The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is likewise present in the commission of the offense of murder as the existence of the conspiracy among the accused Baldimo and his co-accused having been duly proven also beyond peradventure of doubt, presupposes evident premeditation (People vs. Belen, L-13895, Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 39) which the said accused himself supplied the evidence on this score by virtue of his plea of guilty, which circumstance is not the least disproven by the evidence on record. Thus, its appreciation as an aggravating circumstance in this case.A plea of guilty constitute(s) an admission of all material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances alleged, although the offense charged be capital. (People vs. Boyles, L-15308, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 88; People vs. Mongado, L-24877, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 642; People vs. Tilos, L-27151, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 734).A plea of guilty is mitigating and at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital. Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pinedas plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less require his presence in court. (People vs.Jose, 37 SCRA 450; People vs. Estebia, 40 SCRA 90).[16]

The trial court should not have concluded that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime of murder on the bases of its findings regarding the admission of guilt by appellant and the existence of conspiracy with his co-accused.  As earlier stated, appellant entered his plea of guilty after the prosecution had presented its evidence. Thereafter, no further evidence whatsoever was adduced by it to prove the supposed evident premeditation. The records and the transcripts of stenographic notes are barren of any proof tending to show any prior reflection on, followed after some time by persistence in, the criminal resolution of the five accused.

It is elementary law that to establish evident premeditation, these must be proof of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warnings.[17]

The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. [18] When it is not shown as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. Evident premeditation must be based on external acts and must be evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning. Otherwise stated, there must be a demonstration by outward acts of a criminal intent that is notorious and manifest. [19]

As there is no proof, direct or circumstantial, offered by the prosecution to show when appellant and his co-accused meditated and reflected upon their decision to kill the victim and the intervening time that elapsed before this plan was carried out, the circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be presumed against appellant. As early as 1905, we laid down the rule that the circumstances specifying an offense or aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved as conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to establish their presence. No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the liability of the accused. [20]

It is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstance before being taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as that which establishes the commission of the act charged as the criminal offense.[21] It is not only the central fact of a killing that must be shown beyond reasonable doubt; every qualifying or aggravating circumstance alleged to have been present and to have attended such killing, must similarly be shown by the same degree of proof.[22]

II

The foregoing doctrines consequently point to the need of reconciling them with the old rule that a plea of guilty admits not only the crime but also its attendant circumstances which is relied upon and invoked by the lower court in this case to justify its conclusion of evident premeditation to aggravate the liability of appellant.

Over the years and through numerous cases, this Court has adopted an exception to the erstwhile rule enunciating that there is no need to prove the presence of aggravating circumstances alleged in an information or complaint when the accused pleads guilty to the charge. Our rulings regarding this principle were expressed more or less in this wise:

Having pleaded guilty to the information, these aggravating circumstances were deemed fully established, for the plea of guilty to the information covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime.[23]

We are not, however, concerned here merely with the doctrine itself but more specifically with the consequences thereof. Thus, in People vs. Rapirap,[24] it was formerly explained that the subject doctrine has the following effects:

A plea of guilty does not merely join the issues of the complaint or information, but amounts to an admission of guilt and of the material facts alleged in the complaint or information and in this sense takes the place of the trial itself. Such plea removes the necessity of presenting further evidence and for all intents and purposes the case is deemed tried on its merits and submitted for decision. It leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty prescribed by law.Then, in People vs. Lambino,[25] we prevented the accused in criminal actions from contradicting the outcome of his admission,

with our holding that by the plea of guilty, the accused admits all the facts alleged in the information and, by that plea, he is precluded from showing that he has not committed them.

People vs. Yamson, et al.[26] thereafter expanded the application of the doctrine to both capital and non-capital cases:A plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in the complaint or information. A plea of guilty when formally entered in arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense charged in the information, without the necessity of requiring additional evidence, since by so pleading, the defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof. It matters not even if the offense is capital for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances.Finally, People vs. Apduhan, Jr.[27] cited by some of the cases relied upon by the lower court, declared that -While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an admission of all material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstance therein recited. x x x The prosecution does not need to prove the three aggravating circumstances (all alleged in the second amended information) since the accused, by his plea of guilty, has supplied the requisite proof.With the foregoing presentation, the trial court must have believed that it had acted correctly in presuming the existence of

evident premeditation based on appellants plea of guilty without any proof being presented to establish such aggravating circumstance. However, the developmental growth of our procedural rules did not stop there. With the advent of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, a new rule, specifically mandating the course that trial courts should follow in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty, was introduced into our remedial law with this provision:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence - When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.[28]

We expounded on this in People vs. Camay[29] with this explanation:Under the new formulation, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the accused: 1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and 3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.The amended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the old rule and pertinent jurisprudence. We had several occasions to issue the caveat that even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the Court must still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant. This is the proper norm to be followed not only to satisfy the trial judge but also to aid the Court in determining whether or not the accused really and truly comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea.The presentation of evidence is required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the

Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalty. [30]

To emphasize its importance this Court held in People vs. Dayot[31] that the rule in Section 3, Rule 116 is mandatory, and issued the warning that any judge who fails to observe its command commits a grave abuse of discretion.

This Court has come a long way in adopting a mandatory rule with regard to the presentation of evidence in capital cases where the accused pleads guilty to the criminal charge. From granting trial courts in the earlier Rules of Court [32] sufficient discretion in requiring evidence whenever guilt is admitted by the accused, the Court has now made it mandatory on the part of the lower courts to compel the presentation of evidence and make sure that the accused fully comprehends the nature and consequences of his plea of guilty.

III

There is another reason why we have to reject the aforesaid conclusion reached by the lower court in this case. Under settled jurisprudence, the consequences of aggravating circumstances alleged in the information must be explained to the accused when he pleads guilty to a crime imputed against him.

A reading of the questions directed at appellant during his re-arraignment reveals a shortcoming on the part of the trial court to fully explain to appellant the consequences of his plea.[33]

COURT:All right, please come forward, Mr. Baldimo. Your lawyer, Atty. Camilo Libanan manifested to the court that you intimated to him your desire to withdraw your plea of not guilty when arraigned in this case and to substitute the

same with a plea of not guilty after the prosecution has already presented evidence and in fact closed its evidence this morning. What have you to say about the manifestation of your lawyer, Atty. Libanan?

ACCUSED:Yes, your honor.

COURT:All right, re-arraign the accused. Did you understand the information charging you with the crime of murder along with some other persons?

A Yes, your honor.Q All right, what will your plea be?ACCUSED:

Guilty.COURT:

When you withdraw your plea of not guilty to the information when arraigned the first time and substitute the same with a plea of guilty this morning, did you do so of your free and voluntary will?

A Yes, sir.Q Were you not forced, threatened, coerced or intimidated to change your plea of not guilty and substitute the same with

a plea of guilty?A I was not.Q Were you not under influence by any person or persons who exercises legal authority over you which may have been the

consideration why you are now pleading guilty to the offense charged?A None.Q Do you realize the consequences of a plea, of your plea of guilty?A Yes, your honor.Q You are therefore aware that by your plea of guilty you will be penalized by the court and ordered to indemnify your

victim as well as other accessory penalties provided for by law?A Yes, your honor.Q And this notwithstanding your realization of what a plea of guilty entail, will you still insist on your plea of guilty to the

information charging you with the crime of murder committed by a band?A Yes, your honor.Q Was it your realization that you actually committed the crime charged and the prodding of your conscience that you now

enter the plea of guilty?A Yes, your honor.Q Are you now repentant?A I am not repentant.Q You are not repentant for what you have done?A Yes, sir, I am repentant.Q In other words, you regret having committed the acts, having committed the crime charged?A Yes, your honor.COURT:

All right, promulgation is set on August 18.All right, September 1.

A plea of guilty is improvidently accepted where no effort was even made to explain to the accused that a plea of guilty to an information for a capital offense, attended by an aggravating circumstance, may result in the imposition of the death penalty.[34] We cannot declare with reasonable certainty that when appellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the information he knew that he was at the same time admitting the presence and serious effects of the aggravating circumstances alleged therein.  We are more inclined to believe, as a matter of judicial experience, that when he admitted his role in the killing of the deceased, he only intended to limit such admission to the crime charged and not to the aggravating circumstances.

The trial judge did not himself try to inform or advise appellant regarding the consequences of pleading guilty to having killed the victim with both circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. More particularly, the trial judge did not himself try to convey to appellant, in ordinary language that appellant would be assumed to understand, the meaning of evident premeditation and

treachery as circumstances that would qualify the killing to murder and to aggravate the penalty as to call for the maximum penalty of death.[35]

We quote from the old but instructive and still authoritative case of U.S. vs.  Jamad.[36]

If the accused does not clearly and fully understand the nature of the offense charged, if he is not advised as to the meaning and effect of the technical language so often used in formal complaints and informations in qualifying the acts constituting the offense, or if he does not clearly understand the consequences by way of a heavy and even a capital penalty flowing from his admission of his guilt of the crime in the precise technical manner and form in which it is charged, his plea of guilty should not be held to be sufficient to sustain a conviction.Our experience has taught us that it not infrequently happens that, upon arraignment, accused persons plead guilty to the commission of the gravest offenses, qualified by marked aggravating circumstances, when in truth and in fact they intend merely to admit that they committed the act or acts charged in the complaint, and have no thought of admitting the technical charges of aggravating circumstances. It not infrequently happens that after a formal plea of guilty it develops under the probe of the trial judge, or in the course of the statement of the accused made at the time of the entry of his plea, or upon the witness stand, that the accused, while admitting the commission of the acts charged in the information, believes or pretends to believe that these acts were committed under such circumstances as to exempt him in whole or in part from criminal liability. Clearly, a formal plea of guilty entered under such circumstances is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of the aggravated crime charged in the information.In People vs. Alamada,[37] this Court found the trial court to have failed in observing that quantum of care which it had

prescribed for the valid admission of a plea of guilty by an accused, especially in capital cases, when it did not explain to the accused the nature of the charges against him, particularly the allegations regarding conspiracy, treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, which are terms so technical that the layman, especially an unschooled one like the accused in the said case, cannot possibly understand without proper elucidation.

It is neither just nor reasonable to assume that an uneducated person understands the allegation that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and premeditation were present in the commission of the crime, inasmuch as treachery and premeditation are highly technical terms the juridical meaning of which is beyond the understanding not of the illiterates alone but even of those who, being educated, are not lawyers.[38]

If many members of the Bar are unable to call to mind the technical requisites of treachery and evident premeditation as qualifying and aggravating circumstances, there is no reason for supposing that the accused, who is a farmer by occupation, understood such elements and requisites after a few minutes of whispered advice from a counsel de oficio in open court.[39]

Another reason why we cannot agree with the lower courts posture on this issue is the consistent holding in several cases that a plea of guilty to an information alleging aggravating circumstances will not be considered an admission of such circumstances if the evidence presented by the prosecution fails to establish them.

Even the case of People vs. Boyles[40] cited by the trial court disallowed the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of nighttime when the Supreme Court found out that other than the time of the commission of the crime, nothing else suggested the circumstance of nocturnidad as understood in criminal law, to wit:

Not one of the prosecution evidence, oral or documentary, makes the slightest indication that the protection of the nights darkness was deliberately availed of by the appellants. In view of this deficiency in the case for the Government, we are constrained to disallow the said circumstance even as, technically, it may have been accepted by them when they pleaded guilty on arraignment.On the same ratiocination, although herein appellant pleaded guilty to the charge as alleged in the information, evident

premeditation may not be taken against him since the evidence presented by the People does not adequately disclose the existence of the same.[41] Where the aggravating circumstances listed in the information were not supported by the evidence adduced, a plea of guilty to a capital offense cannot constitute an admission of the aggravating circumstances set forth in the information. [42]

The above rulings drew from People vs. Corachea[43] which, in turn, reiterated the dictum in People vs. Galapia[44] that even under the old rule on judicial confession of guilt, to be appreciated the aggravating circumstances must further be duly proved.

The rule is that a judicial confession of guilt admits all the material facts alleged in the information including the aggravating circumstances listed therein. But, where such circumstances are disproven by the evidence, it should be disallowed in the judgment. Thus, in People vs. Gungab (64 Phil. 779), the Court ruled that when an accused, who lacks instruction, pleads guilty to the crime of parricide described in the information as having been committed with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and his testimony given under oath before the trial court, upon his petition fails to show the existence of such aggravating circumstances, his plea of guilty shall be understood as being limited to the admission of having committed the crime of parricide, not having done so with treachery and evident premeditation.In view of the present requirement of Section 3, Rule 116 for the presentation of evidence but with due explanation to appellant

of the significance of the aggravating circumstances alleged in an information, and considering the insufficiency of the Peoples evidence showing evident premeditation in this case, we cannot consider appellants plea of guilty as an admission of the existence of that aggravating circumstance.

As the pertinent principle lays down a rule of procedure, the plea of guilty of an accused cannot stand in place of the evidence that must be presented and is called for by said Section 3 of Rule 116. Trial courts should no longer assume that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the attending circumstances alleged in the information as they are now required to demand that the prosecution should prove the exact liability of the accused. The requirements of Section 3 would become idle and fruitless if we were to allow conclusions of criminal liability and aggravating circumstances on the dubious strength of a presumptive rule.

While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilty when re-arraigned, we find no need, however, to remand the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence. As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory

judgment. However, where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged.[45]

Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he may still be convicted if there is adequate evidence on record on which to predicate his conviction.[46] As already observed, the prosecution had already rested when appellant decided to change his plea. The prosecution then had all the opportunity to verify the material allegations in the information.Despite such opportunity, it only successfully established treachery but failed to present any evidence tending to prove evident premeditation.

We also doubt the applicability to the case at bar of People vs. Belen,[47] cited by the lower court, to the effect that conspiracy presupposes evident premeditation. A reading of People vs. Timbang, et al.[48] upon which Belen is based, does not state, either categorically or impliedly, that evident premeditation exists where conspiracy is proven.

There is no doubt that conspiracy was shown in the instant case from the concerted actions of the accused.  The existence of this mode in the commission of a felony can be inferred from the sudden shooting of the victim by Derilo and the successive stabbing of her person by appellant and his unidentified companion.

However, to claim that evident premeditation can be inferred from conspiracy violates the fundamental principle that aggravating circumstances should also be proved beyond reasonable doubt as the crime alleged to have been committed.  While the court below did not equate conspiracy with evident premeditation, the latter cannot be deduced from the former as the elements of conspiracy and evident premeditation are completely different.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement, the agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and the execution of the felony is decided upon. However, unlike evident premeditation, where a sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and for the perpetrator to deliberate on the consequences on his intended deed, conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once this assent is established, each and everyone of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime committed by anyone of them.[49]

To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. [50] To end any doubt on this matter, we quote our ruling in People vs. Rizal:[51]

There is no proof, aside from conspiracy, that the accused and his companions had sufficient time to plan the killing, reflect on it and after reflection decided to commit the evil deed. Under ordinary circumstances where conspiracy is present with proof of attendant deliberation and selection of the method, times and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident premeditation is taken for granted. But when conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the accused and his companions in the perpetration of the crime and there is no showing that characterizes evident premeditation, such aggravating circumstance cannot be taken for granted but must be proved like any other of its kind. (Emphasis supplied).It can thus be said that evident premeditation can only be deduced from conspiracy if in the course of directly proving

conspiracy, the elements of evident premeditation were likewise presented and proven. But then, in such a case, evident premeditation would not merely be presumed but actually established. Hence, it follows that there is really a need for the presentation of evidence indicating the existence of premeditacion conocida, which was not done in this case.

IV

We could stop at this juncture, with the vital points against the death penalty having been made, but there are certain facets of this case which necessitate elucidation. Indeed, the peculiar antecedents and chronological milieu of the instant case confront us now with what appear to be the problematical application of two penal laws.

At the time of the commission of the crime on January 1, 1982 and the conviction of the accused on October 12, 1986, the substantive law in force dealing with the crime of murder was Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which took effect way back on January 1, 1932. Said provision provided that any person guilty of murder shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.

Then on February 2, 1987, a new Constitution came into force after its ratification on that date by the people. The 1987 Constitution, regarded by some as progressive since it contains new provisions not covered by our earlier two Constitutions, proscribed in Section 19, Article III (Bill of Rights) thereof the imposition of the death penalty, as follows:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Italics supplied).

x x xResponding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being committed in the country, Congress passed a law imposing the

death penalty on certain heinous offenses and further amending for that purpose the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws. Said law was officially enacted as Republic Act No. 7659 and took effect on December 31, 1993.  This is now the governing penal law at the time of this review of the case at bar.

Although the elements and circumstances which qualify a killing to murder were maintained, Republic Act No. 7659 amended Article 248 of the Code by imposing a heavier penalty for murder than that originally prescribed, the new penalty provided in Section 6 of said amendatory statute being reclusion perpetua to death.

Being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may not be applied to the crime of murder committed in 1982 by appellant, based on the principle of prospectivity of penal laws. Further, the presumption is that laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied. [52] In every case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.[53] Nor can the prospective application of Republic Act No. 7659 be doubted just because of the constitutional provision leaving to Congress the matter of the death penalty in cases of heinous crimes, since Congress did not otherwise provide.

The interpellations in the Constitutional Commission tasked to draw up the present Constitution is enlightening in our determination of the non-retroactivity of said law, thus:

MR. BENGZON. And then, supposing Congress passes a law imposing the death penalty on those very same crimes committed by those that were convicted of the death penalty which penalty has been commuted to reclusion perpetua, will they go back?

MR. MONSOD. No.MR. BENGZON. Not anymore?MR. MONSOD. Any new law passed by the National Assembly would be prospective in character.[54]

One of the universally accepted characteristics of a penal law is prospectivity. This general principle of criminal law is embodied in Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission, and was applied by the Supreme Court in two early cases to mean that no act or omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was committed.[55]

Besides, to give retroactive effect to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 7659 would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.[56] Among others, anex post facto law has been defined as one which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.[57]

It is settled that a penal law may have retroactive effect only when it is favorable to the accused. [58] Obviously, with a penalty more onerous than that provided by the Revised Penal Code for murder, the pertinent amendment thereof by Republic Act No. 7659 cannot fall within the exception to the general rule on prospectivity of penal laws.

Lastly, observance of juridical uniformity in the decisions of this Court requires that we refrain from applying Republic Act No. 7659 to the case at bar. The present case is not the first and only instance where the Court has had to review a sentence for death after this amendatory law came into force. To give retroactive effect to said law in this case will disturb the numerous decisions of the Court imposing reclusion perpetua on the accused who committed capital offenses prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution and were convicted after its effectivity but before that of Republic Act No. 7659, even though the penalty imposable would have been death.

Having eliminated the possibility of applying the death penalty under Republic Act No. 7659 in the present case, we now examine the applicability of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its aforesaid amendment.  On May 20, 1987, this Court issued Circular No. 9 regarding the imposition of the death penalty, under the circumstances therein defined.  In the said circular, all courts were enjoined to impose only the penalty of reclusion perpetua, even in those cases wherein our penal laws provide for the imposition of the death penalty, until Congress shall have provided by law for the definition of the heinous crimes contemplated in the 1987 Constitution.

Prior thereto, in an en banc resolution dated April 30, 1987 issued in Administrative Matter No. 87-5-3173-0, the Court took cognizance of the Cabinet Meeting held on April 8, 1987 wherein, among others, the President agreed to issue a statement officially commuting to life imprisonment the death sentence theretofore imposed on some convicts, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. However, a verification with the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, reveals that the projected presidential commutation never materialized.

It will further be noted that said circular referred only to those cases then under automatic review by the Court, and the aforestated resolution quoted therein likewise contemplated pending cases before the Court, that is, as of May 20, 1987. Those issuances could not therefore apply to the present case since, as hereinafter explained, the case at bar was brought on appeal to this Court only on July 20, 1994.

Be that as it may, however, whether or not evident premeditation was present in this case and regardless of the inapplicability thereto of the aforementioned circular and resolution, the Court is reasonably convinced that it cannot validly impose the capital punishment on appellant. The words of the Constitution are clear: Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Appellant, it will be recalled, was sentenced in 1986 to suffer the death penalty as then provided under the Revised Penal Code. With the ratification of the Constitution in 1987, that sentence should have been reduced to reclusion perpetua under such constitutional fiat.

The fact that this Court will have the opportunity to review appellants case only now does not detract from the force of such directive of the Constitution. Neither will the fact that Circular No. 9 was not yet issued when appellant was tried and convicted prevent the application to him of that Constitutional provision. It is not the action of the courts which, under the circumstances, convert his sentence of death to reclusion perpetua. Such reduction is directed and effected by the explicit words of the fundamental charter; the courts merely apply this express and self-executing provision of the Constitution when they impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua rather than the imposable penalty of death in appropriate cases.

Again, the following proceedings in the Constitutional Commission yield light on the foregoing proposition:MR. DE CASTRO. The proponents amendment is a comma (,) after inflicted on line 29 to be followed by the clause UNLESS

FOR COMPELLING REASONS INVOLVING HEINOUS CRIMES THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PROVIDES FOR THE DEATH PENALTY. In this proposed amendment, there will still be a need for the National Assembly to pass a law providing for the death penalty.Is this correct?

MR. MONSOD. Yes.MR. DE CASTRO. What happens to those awaiting execution, having already the death penalty on their heads, but there is

no law yet passed by the National Assembly?MR. MONSOD. Then the next sentence will apply: Death penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua.

[59]

It can be readily seen that the reduction of the penalty is not and was not made dependent on a law, decree, condition, or period before the aforementioned Section 19 can be applied by the courts. It cannot be inferred, either from the wordings of the subject provision or from the intention of the framers of the Constitution, that a death sentence should be brought to the Supreme Court for review within a certain time frame in order that it can be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves.[60] Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it.

The fact that no proclamation or grant of commutation was officially issued by the President will not prevent the implementation and operation of Section 19 to appellant. To argue otherwise would be subordinating the command of the Constitution to the will of the President. The framers of the Constitution never intended that the non-imposition or non-execution of the death sentence under those constitutional provisions would be dependent on the act or omission of the Chief Executive.

Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission will justify this conclusion:MR. REGALADO. May I ask Commissioner Monsod about this second sentence. Death penalty already imposed shall be

commuted to reclusion perpetua.

When we say commuted to reclusion perpetua, I think we refer to the power of the President to effect commutations because only the President can commute sentences already final and imposed by the courts. Is that correct?

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I am not the proponent of that sentence. Perhaps the Committee should answer that.MR. REGALADO. That was the answer of the Gentleman in response to the inquiry of Commissioner Bengzon.MR. MONSOD. My answer is reflective of what the Committee had answered before. And since that has not been changed, I

suppose the answer would be the same. But if the Committee would like to answer it in more detail, perhaps it should be the one to answer that.

FR. BERNAS. The intention of the provision here is, upon ratification of this Constitution, the death penalty already imposed is automatically - without need for any action by the President - commuted.

MR. REGALADO. Yes, because the wording here is: Death penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua. The power of commutation is a presidential prerogative.

FR. BERNAS. Or we can say ARE HEREBY commuted, if that is clearer. But that is the intention.MR. REGALADO. Does the Commission mean are hereby reduced?FR. BERNAS. Commuted to the death penalty.MR. REGALADO. It shall be REDUCED to reclusion perpetua?FR. BERNAS. To reclusion perpetua, yes.MR. REGALADO. Maybe the Commissioner should eliminate the word commute because we are invading the presidential

prerogative.THE PRESIDENT. Is the Gentleman proposing an amendment to the amendment?[61]

Although Commissioner Regalado was not able to formally propose an amendment because of an intervening question by another commissioner, his observation was correspondingly accepted by the Commission as shown by the use of the word reduced in the present provision of the Constitution, instead of commute as originally proposed. The fact is that he did not have to propose an amendment as Commissioner Bernas, who was representing the committee concerned, had already taken note thereof and acceded thereto.

Thus, in his work on the 1987 Constitution, Commissioner Bernas had this to say on the matter:x x x. But since commutation is technically an executive prerogative, the Commission, in order to make the effect automatic without having to wait for presidential action, deliberately avoided the use of the word commuted and, on the suggestion of Commissioner Regalado, used instead reduced. Thus the provision reads: Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.The phrase shall be reduced is not a description of some future act but a command that is immediately effective. (Nevertheless, President Aquino issued an Executive Order, perhaps ad cautelam,commuting death sentences already imposed.)[62]

From the foregoing, it is apparent that no presidential action is necessary in order that any accused sentenced to the death penalty under the same circumstances as herein appellant may avail of the benefit of Section 19. The accused, ipso jure, is entitled to a reduction of his sentence. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common use. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.[63] While to commute necessitates presidential initiative, to reduce does not.

Therefore, with or without an official executive issuance on commutation, the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposed on appellant by the lower court in 1986 cannot be carried out even though the case was brought to the Supreme Court only in 1994 after Republic Act No. 7659 had taken effect. Nor can this law be deemed to have revived the death penalty in the case of appellant, for reasons stated earlier. By February 2, 1987, that penalty had already been automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua, not by the grace of the President or of the courts, but by the mandate of the fundamental law of the land.

Before we end, we note the extremely protracted delay in bringing appellants conviction to the attention of this Court.  Although the judgment of the lower court was promulgated on October 12, 1986, the records of this case were elevated to this Court only on

July 20, 1994.[64] Even by this date, the records were not yet complete as some of the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were not included in the records forwarded to this Court.

We can only blame the court of origin for this improbable and unexplained delay of almost eight years.  It is the express and specific duty of the clerk thereof to transmit to this Court, within the periods allowed therefor, the complete records of the case where the death penalty is imposed for automatic review. Paragraph 5, Section L (Appeal), Chapter VI (Duties in Criminal Cases) of the Manual for Clerks of Court, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, provides:

5. Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty. -- In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.The Office of the Court Administrator is accordingly directed to investigate this matter and submit the corresponding evaluation,

report and recommendation to this Court within ninety (90) days from notice hereof.All clerks of court are hereby ordered to scrupulously comply with their duty and responsibility of seasonably transmitting to this

Court the complete records of cases where the death penalty was imposed, especially now that the trial courts have imposed the death penalty in many cases involving heinous crimes.

With respect to the case at bar, in justice to appellant this appellate proceeding shall be treated as an automatic review because there is no showing in the records that he was advised that the death penalty imposed upon him has been reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution; and that his case is no longer subject to automatic review, as provided and required in Circular No. 9 of this Court, hence a notice of appeal should have been filed.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and by virtue of the command of the 1987 Constitution, the judgment of the court a quo is accordingly MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 in consonance with our current case law and policy on death indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003]

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160262. November 10, 2003]

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160263. November 10, 2003]

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioners-in-intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160277. November 10, 2003]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160292. November 10, 2003]

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160295. November 10, 2003]

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160310. November 10, 2003]

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

[G.R. No. 160318. November 10, 2003]

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160342. November 10, 2003]

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160343. November 10, 2003]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.

TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160360. November 10, 2003]

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160365. November 10, 2003]

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

[G.R. No. 160370. November 10, 2003]

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160376. November 10, 2003]

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160392. November 10, 2003]

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160397. November 10, 2003]

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR.,petitioner.

[G.R. No. 160403. November 10, 2003]

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160405. November 10, 2003]

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nations history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,

treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the   exclusive   power to   initiate   all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No   impeachment proceedings   shall   be   initiated   against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment   to effectively carry out the purpose of this section . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12 th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules[1] approved by the 11th Congress. The relevantdistinctions between these two Congresses House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

 

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULESRULE II

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

 

 

 

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment.  Impeachment shall be initiated only by a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof or by a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House. 

 

 

RULE V

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

 

Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer,   impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official,   as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified

complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.

 

RULE V

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

 

Section 14. Scope of Bar. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within the period of one (1) year.

 

 

 

Section 17.   Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings . Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official . (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, [2] sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). [3]

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint [4] (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices [5] of this Court for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.[6] The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,[7] and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003[8] in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, [9] but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. [10] To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint [11] was filed with the Secretary General of the House[12] by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.[13]

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12 th Congress,[14] posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional;  (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG [15] and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,[16] prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as a class suit and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran[17] which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF).

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students, pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,[18] prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,[19] and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer.  Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.[20] In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)[21] and Comment, praying that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution. [22]

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a Petition for Leave to Intervene in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quoResolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a constitutional deadlock and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention.

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentels Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadras Petition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a)  locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) Houses exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senates sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.

This Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission[23] after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by

the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. [24] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this moderating power to determine the proper allocation of powers of the different branches of government and to direct the course of government along constitutional channels is inherent in all courts [25]   as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.[26]

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries.  To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison[27] that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.[28] (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.[29] And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,[30] the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. [32]  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. [33] To him, [j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation.[34]

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by any branch or instrumentalities of government, the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called expanded certiorari jurisdiction of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

x x x

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions.   It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it. The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x

x x x

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question . [35]  (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,[36] this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document   itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary[38] in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.[39] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue[40] where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.[41] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,[42] this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2,  they permitted, if not willed ,  that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its

terms,  not by itself alone ,  but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document .[43] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[44] this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.[45] (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available.  In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.[46] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.[47]

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senates sole power to try   impeachment cases [48]  (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senates power to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.[49]

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.[50] Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief. [51] Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents and intervenors reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senates sole power to try and decide impeachment cases, as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,[52] [i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs.[53] Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, [w]e have cut the umbilical cord.

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,[54] our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,[55] provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that whenever

possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride.[56]

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,[57] judicially discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez[58] and Alejandrino v. Quezon,[59] cited by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action.  Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,[60] this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,[61] in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,[62] this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,[63] it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,[64] it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,[65] it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,[66]  it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.[67] Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.[68] (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[69]

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest [70] and transcendental importance,[71] and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.[72] Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure[73] while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.[74] In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[75] to clarify what is meant by locus standiand to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

x x x

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.[76] (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. [77] In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,[78] the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[79] Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.[80]

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. [81] This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.[82] Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.[83]

While an association has legal personality to represent its members, [84] especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,[85] the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.[86] It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned[87] to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, [88] for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.[89] Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.[90] Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.[91] Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.  While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.[92]

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadras case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria,  et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful, this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilons. He alleges that submitting to this Courts jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Sorianos motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayers suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,[93] to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power, or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[94] (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,[95] this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture.[96] Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12 th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The deans position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution[97] and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,[98] Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term political question, viz:

[T]he term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.[99] (Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.[100] In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.[101] Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary[102] which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Courts power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the bodys indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it. The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but

also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as citizens assemblies or barangays. Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

x x x

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of political question was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.

x x x

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity.

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of

government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.[103] (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term judicial power but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression judicial power?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

x x x

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, judicial power includes and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.[104] (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with truly political questions. From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) truly political questions and (2) those which are not truly political questions.

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,[105] this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.[106] x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[107] through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, (t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation   mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.[108] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,[109] speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the   expanded   jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question .[110] x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr[111] attempts to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. [112]  (Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.  If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the

Constitution.II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an

unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12 th Congress are unconstitutional

for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More

importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.[113]

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.[114] Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,[115] this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.[116] [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[117] where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied.Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.[118] [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very  lis mota or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest.  In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.[119]

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution[120]calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.[121]

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Courts opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Courts ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,[122] viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against ones self.[123]

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment was not filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House. With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a Resolution of Endorsement. Intervenors point to the Verification of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x[124]

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin forthwith, is that the verified complaint be filed, not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives.Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives whosigned and verified   the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the  lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria,  et. al., adopting the latters arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Courts decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12 th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that [t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment.[125] But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.[126] Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution.  More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. [127] In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced.  To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty.

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.[128] On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.[129] After all, by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions.  For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office.[130]

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.[131] In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunals membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if

sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,[132]  it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.[133] (Italics in the original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.In Demetria v. Alba,[134] this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the seven pillars of limitations of the power of judicial

review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA[135] as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.

2. The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. . . . It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.

3. The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . InFairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing pillars of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power2. the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the

case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[136]

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary. They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.[137] Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioners prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes.Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows. [138]

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary[139] where this Court was split and in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondents claims,[140] the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:[141]

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought to protect and enforce it without fear or favor, resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.[142]

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedurefor Impeachment Proceedingsadopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term initiate does not mean to file; that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean to file because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term initiate. Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of initiate as to file, as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of initiating included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word initiate as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

Initiate of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means to perform or  facilitate the first action, which jibes with Justice Regalados position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment.   The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is deemed initiated when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say impeachment proceedings are initiated but rather are deemed initiated. The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

x x x

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure,  as I have pointed out earlier ,  was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it.   It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

x x x

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read:  to initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word resolution the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in impeachment and replace the word by with OF, so that the whole section will now read: A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned,  really starts from the filing of the verified complaint   and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of Impeachment are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment

will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.[143] (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.[144]

It is thus clear that the framers intended initiation to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that the obvious reason in deleting the phrase to initiate impeachment proceedings as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution.[145]

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word initiate as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word initiate, appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

x x x

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, impeachment case and impeachment proceeding.Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is to initiate. The object in the first sentence is

impeachment case. The object in the second sentence is impeachment proceeding. Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term cases must be distinguished from the term proceedings. An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be followed to arrive at a conclusion.  A proceeding must be initiated. To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House initiates an impeachment case. It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment case before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial.  Neither is the impeachment proceeding initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.   This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to  initiate impeachment proceedings, this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.[146] Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year, it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of to initiate which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment, This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating impeachment cases with impeachment proceeding.

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term to initiate refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the

Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.  Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House.  These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term initiate a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino[147] wherein this Court stated that their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Courts our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings. Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latters balanced perspectives and disinterestedness. [148]

Justice Gutierrezs statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

In Osmea v. Pendatun,[149] this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted disorderly behavior of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,[150] Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in  United States v. Smith,[151] declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,[152] quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[153] Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings,  it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:

x x x

The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings. It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.[154]

x x x

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.[155]

x x x

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.   Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.[156]

x x x

The provision defining judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of government.This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x

x x x

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with

timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.[157] (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun  is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives rely on Nixon v. US[158] as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment.  It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this sole power is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives.  This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that exclusive power is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term initiate a meaning different from filing.

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.  Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved.  Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of lack of jurisdiction, non-justiciability, and judicial self-restraint aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land.  What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Courts jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of

decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison detre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions.  This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branchs official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the laws moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else.  The law is solicitous of every individuals rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.

SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

 

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent 1 and the main sponsor 2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention. 4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,  7Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.

(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that:

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.

(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.

As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.

In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.

(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.

(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.

On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:

(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. 19 Arevision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance. 20

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a people's initiativeunder Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.

On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition inIntervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signedby the required number of registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following arguments:

(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative to amend the Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of signatures.

(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or a constitutional convention. 22

On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.

4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.

5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.

After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.

On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.

Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.

For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.

I

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:

28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.

29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Courtcan save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure incases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28

A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the Constitution. 31

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.

First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the legislature?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?

MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.

FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on how this is to be carried out — is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?

MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the process of an initiative.

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.

MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's initiative?

MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND — not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas theprocess of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. 35

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO

THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment. 36

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?

MR. DAVIDE. It can.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.

MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.

MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.

MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be legislated?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment,

when the Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDEFOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July 1986.41 Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.

The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.

Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.

There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:

The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

with

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out." 46

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentionedin Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50and by the House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?"

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:

Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by

any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).

The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition forinitiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).

The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:

Sec. 3. Definition of terms —

xxx xxx xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 53

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).

(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments; thus:

Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .

and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and localinitiative and referendum.

Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:

Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;

(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.

There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

III

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

IV

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is theinitiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; 63(2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. 66

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.x--------------------------------------------------------xALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.x ------------------------------------------------------ xONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.x------------------------------------------------------ xATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.x--------------------------------------------------------xBAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.x--------------------------------------------------------xLORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,Intervenors.x--------------------------------------------------------xARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.x ------------------------------------------------------- xTRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.x---------------------------------------------------------xLUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.x ------------------------------------------------------- xPHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.

x ------------------------------------------------------- xRONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.x -------------------------------------------------------- xPHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.x -------------------------------------------------------- xSENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.x ------------------------------------------------------- xSULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.x ------------------------------------------------------- xJOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.x -------------------------------------------------------- xINTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.x --------------------------------------------------------xSENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.x -----------------------------------------------------xJOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.x -----------------------------------------------------xG.R. No. 174299             October 25, 2006MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:The Case

These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.

Antecedent FactsOn 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelveper centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.9

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative."Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.

The IssuesThe petitions raise the following issues:1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.

The Ruling of the CourtThere is no merit to the petition.The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them   and they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative petitions,the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus, inCapezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:

[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:

Province: City/Municipality: No. ofVerifiedSignatures:

 

Legislative District: Barangay:  

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.

Precinct Number

NameLast Name, First Name,

M.I.

Address BirthdateMM/DD/YY

Signature Verification

1            

2            

3            

4            

5            

6            

7            

8            

9            

10            

_________________Barangay Official

(Print Name and Sign)

_________________Witness

(Print Name and Sign)

__________________Witness

(Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:

I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:

RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONWHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;

WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)

ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative Commission24 arevastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:

After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:

[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed changeattached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assumingthe Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited copies of the petition.During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.

Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:

1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; 27

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28

These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:

Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:

Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.

Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:

Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)

Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:

Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.

After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House of Representatives to theexclusion of the present Senators.The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives.An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XVIIAMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or(2) A constitutional convention.Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x xx x x xMS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.x x x xMR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California ruled:

The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then

the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33

It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.To call it an amendment is a misnomer.Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x

Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution ― that a people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:

[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:

The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.x x x xWe conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition here.43 (Emphasis supplied)

The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department.In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:

99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions.100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)

The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:

Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution." x x x xIt then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x xAccordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.49

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be

amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries withunicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government ― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiagowill not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.51

Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative

In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling inSantiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

5. Conclusion

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally

prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast53 − approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 134340. November 25, 1999]

LININDING PANGANDAMAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LANAO DEL SUR, MAHED MUTILAN, ALEEM, AMERRODIN SARANGANI and NARRA ABDUL JABBAR JIALIL, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

Recently, this Court emphatically stated that [U]pholding the sovereignty of the people is what democracy is all about.  When the sovereignty of the people expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it is not enough for this Court to make a statement but it should do everything to have that sovereignty obeyed by all. Well done is always better than well said.[1] Corollarily, laws and statutes governing election contests especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.[2] These standards will be the legal matrix within which this controversy will be adjudged.

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is the Omnibus Order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc dated July 14, 1998,[3] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, special elections for the municipalities, namely

Butig Lumbayabague

Kapatagan Sultan Dumalondong

Maguing Sultan Gumander

Masiu Marawi City

Lumbabayabao

shall be held on 18 July 1998.

Special elections shall also be held on July 25, 1998 for the municipalities of

Ganassi Lumbatan

Malabang Pagayawan

Marantao Tubaran

There shall be machine counting and consolidation of votes for all municipalities except Maguing and those precincts where ballots for manual count will be used.

The Education and Information Department, the Acting PES of Lanao del Sur and the Election Officers in these municipalities are hereby directed to cause the immediate publication of this Omnibus Order in their respective municipality (sic).

Schedule for special elections in the municipalities of Madalum and Tugaya is temporarily withheld pending unresolved issues before the Commission.

Let the Executive Director for Operation[s] of the Commission execute this order with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

The COMELECs challenged Omnibus Order summarizes the relevant facts of the controversy thus:

The instant cases were filed by petitioners praying that the Commission declare [a] failure of elections in their respective municipalities and to hold special elections thereafter. The petitions were reinforced by reports received by the Commission from its field officers and deputies. A pre-trial for all cases in Lanao del Sur involving failure of elections was set and parties, their counsels, and the election officers of concerned municipalities appeared.

During the pre-trial of the above cases, it was shown and admitted by the parties that total failure of election[s] took place in the following municipalities:

1. Butig 7. Maguing

2. Kapatagan 8. Masiu

3. Lumbatan 9. Sultan Dumalondong

4. Lumba Bayabao 10. Sultan Gumander

5. Lumbayanague 11. Tubaran

6. Madalum 12. Tugaya

No precinct in the above towns was able to function on election day.

It was also shown and admitted by the parties that in the following municipalities, partial failure of election[s] took place as follows:

1. Ganassi

2. Malabang

3. Marantao

4. Pagayawan

5. Marawi City

TOTAL FAILURE OF ELECTIONS

It was found that the cause of failure of election[s] in the twelve municipalities where there was total failure of election[s] as follows :

1. BUTIG armed confrontation of opposing political groups and vehement disagreement on the clustering of precincts.

+ Acting election officer reported that all election paraphernalia are available except for 200 ballots for precinct 5A.

2. KAPATAGAN allegedly, Camad Benito, husband of mayoralty candidate Bailo Benito, terrorized the Acting Municipal Treasurer Okuo Macaumbas thus preventing the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia to the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs for brevity). Similarly, there were only twenty two (22) public school teachers who were available as BEIs and eighteen (18) of them were disqualified to act due to relationship to candidates within the prohibited degree.

In Election Case No. 571, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kapatagan, Lanao del Sur issued an order dated April 30, 1998 ordering the Election Officer of Kapatagan, Lanao del Sur to delete, erase, and cancel all Voters Registration Records with serial numbers 3676001 to 3676500 after finding that said VRRs were received only on December 15, 1998 by EA Camal Calandada from Atty. Muslemin Tahir.And yet, said VRRs appeared to be filled up, used and dated 14 December 1997. A copy of said order was received on 10 May 1998 by the Election Officer. The court having found by implication that said VRRs were irregularly/unlawfully issued, and its order having become final, this Commission in compliance with said court order hereby orders the Election Officer of Kapatagan to delete from the records said VRRs with serial nos. from 36767001 to 3676500.

Pursuant to said order, the Law Department is directed to conduct a joint investigation administrative and preliminary investigation for election offenses against Camal Calandada and Muslemin Tahir to determine their criminal and administrative liability and to submit to the Commission its findings and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Order.

The PNP, thru the Criminal Investigation Group in Region XII is similarly directed to initiate an investigation on the conduct of Camad Benito in contributing to the failure of election[s] in Kapatagan.

+ All election paraphernalia are available.

3. LUMBATAN all the members of the different Board of Inspectors are disqualified to act as such by reason of relationship either by consanguinity or affinity, within the prohibited degree.

+ All election paraphernalia for 39 precincts are intact and available.

4. LUMBABAYABAO candidates could not agree on the venue of the distribution of the election supplies and there was vehement disagreement on the clustering of precincts.

+ All election paraphernalia for fifty nine (59) precincts are available.

5. LUMBAYANAGUE there was non-completion of the composition of the BEIs in all precincts because almost all appointed members of [the] BEI are disqualified by reason of relationship either by affinity or consanguinity, within the prohibitive degree.

+ All election paraphernalia for the 35 precincts are available.

6 MADALUM the twenty (20) appointed teachers to act as members of the different BEIs did not arrive on election day.

The issue on the existence of alleged ghost barangays/precincts is not yet resolved by the Commission considering that the alleged ghost precincts are being investigated and an ocular inspection is being made by an investigating team. The issue being factual and the findings determinative of a clean, honest and credible elections, it is the desire of the Commission that the issue on ghost precincts be resolved first before a special election in Madalum shall be scheduled.

+ All election paraphernalia are available.

7. MAGUING no members of the different Boards of Election Inspectors arrived in all precincts.

+ There is a need to print new ballots for all forty-nine (49) precincts and other election forms due to the inadvertent non inclusion of a candidates name in the original ballots.

8. MASIU the Municipal Treasurer did not get the election paraphernalia from the Provincial Treasurer. Neither could the Municipal Treasurer be located on election day. Hence, there was nothing to distribute to the BEIs on election day. Similarly, the Acting Election Officer, EA Cayansalam Benaning, on her admission during the pre-trial hearing on June 25, 1998, arrived only at 7:00 A.M. of election day thus preventing the distribution of election paraphernalia from her office. Some parties claim in fact that she was only seen at noontime of election day while she was in the house of the incumbent mayor of Masiu.

+ All election paraphernalia for eighty (80) precincts are available.

9. SULTAN DUMALONDONG Municipal Treasurer did not appear on May 10 & 11, 1998 at the office of the Provincial Treasurer to receive the ballots and other election paraphernalia for distribution to the BEIs so there was no election supplies for distribution on election day.

+ All election paraphernalia for 16 precincts are available.

10. SULTAN GUMANDER no BEIs appeared on election day because most of them are disqualified by law to act as such; the remaining 12 who are not disqualified also did not appear; there was also disagreement on the venue of distribution of election supplies.

+ All election paraphernalia for 51 precincts are available.

11. TUBARAN non-appearance of all the members of the different BEIs due to intense rivalry among the opposing candidates.

+ All election supplies are intact and available.

12. TUGAYA widespread terrorism causing intimidation of the electorate to cast their vote. The order of inclusion by the Municipal Court of Tugaya, covering 4,075 voters, will be the subject of a petition to declare its nullity to be filed by the Law Department of the Commission before the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City. It is the desire of the Commission to put to rest the issue on the controversy surrounding the 4,075 voters to allow honest election in this municipality. After the controversy is put to rest, then the special election shall be scheduled.

PARTIAL FAILURE OF ELECTION

In the following municipalities and City of Marawi, there was partial failure of election in the specified precincts due to the following reasons:

1. GANASSI members of the BEIs for nine precincts as herein below enumerated did not appear thus election supplies were not distributed on election day for the following precincts:

Barangay Name Precinct No.

1. Poblacion 1A2

1A3/1A4

2. Baya 8A

3. Linuk 14A

14A1

14A2

4. Macaguiling 18A

18A1

18A2

There was also failure of election in precinct 1A1 and 17A1 due to ballot box snatching. The ballot box containing official ballots and other election paraphernalia for precinct 17A1, Brgy. Macabao whose polling place was at Ganassi Central Elementary School was snatched allegedly by the incumbent mayor of Ganassi, Maning Diangka and his armed escorts.

In precinct 2A in Brgy. Bagoingud, failure of election is declared and special election shall be held considering that the ballot box, official ballots and other election paraphernalia were illegally brought to a private dwelling in said barangay and voting irregularly took place therein despite the fact that the designated polling place was Gadungan Elementary School at Gadungan. This could not take place unless the BEIs assigned in Precinct 2A cooperated in these acts.

The acts complained of against Ex-Mayor Maning Diangka shall be referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur for possible prosecution. Similarly, the Election Officer of Ganassi is directed to inform the Commission of the identity of the BEIs for precinct 2A for possible prosecution.

Considering the charge of Maimona Diangka in SPA 98-404 that Baguio Macapodi, candidate for Vice Mayor of the Ompia Party and his cohort Bai Sa Ganassi terrorized registered voters in Precincts 32, 32A, 32A1, and 32A2 in Barangay Taliogan, Ganassi and that they were allegedly aided by the Barangay Chairman therein, said acts shall be referred immediately to the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur for investigation.

During the special election, the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ganassi are hereby directed to suspend the proclamation of Baguio Macapodi for vice mayor, if winning, until further orders from this Commission.

+ All election paraphernalia for the nine (9) precincts where there was non-appearance of BEIs are available. The Commission shall cause the printing of ballots and other election forms for precincts 1A1 (Poblacion), 17A1 (Brgy. Macabao), and 2A (Brgy. Bagoingud) for use in the special election since the snatched ballot box were not recovered.

2. MALABANG twenty three (23) precincts failed to function due to shooting incidents. Ballot boxes containing election paraphernalia for five precincts out of these 23 precincts were snatched and never recovered. The following are the precincts that failed to function on election day or whose ballot boxes were snatched:

Barangay Name Precinct No.

1. Banday 4A2

2. Betayan 5A/5A1

3. BPS Billage 7A2/7A3

4. Bunkhouse < 8A1

5. Calumbog 11A/11A1

6. Campo Muslim < 12A2

7. Chinatown 13A

8. - do - 13A4

9. Curahab 14A

10. Diamaru 15A

11. - do - 15A1

12. Matampay < 26A

13. Pasir < 29A

14. - do - 29A1

15. - do - 29A2

16. Sumbagarogong 33A

17. - do - 33A1

18. Tacub < 34A

19. Tiongcop 36A

20. - do - 36A1/36A2

21. Tubok 37A2

22. - do - 37A5

23. - do - 37A6

< ballot box snatched

+ All election paraphernalia for eighteen precincts are intact and available. The Commission will cause the printing of 1,000 ballots and other election forms for five precincts (8A1, 12A2, 26A, 34A).

3. MARANTAO thirty-five (35) precincts failed to function due to terrorism in the area. Out of these 35, eight (8) precincts lost to armed groups their ballot boxes, ballots and other election paraphernalia.These eight are:

Name of Barangay Precinct No.

1. Daana Ingud Proper 3A

2. - do - 3A1/3A2

3. Tuca Kialdan 7A

4. - do - 7A1

5. Banga Pantar 22A/22A-1

6. Inudaran Campong 29A

7. - do - 29A-2

8. Mapantao Goo 34A-2

Ballots are to be printed for these precincts by the Commission. Canvassing forms and other paraphernalia shall also be provided. In Precincts No. 12A, 24A and 24A-1, ballots were cast but were not yet counted due to complaints that their integrity had been violated. There being no proof that the integrity of the ballots had been violated in these precincts, the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Marantao are directed to include the same in the canvass.

4. PAGAYAWAN casting of votes was aborted due to widespread terrorism. Fifteen (15) precincts failed to function.

+ All election paraphernalia are available. However, in precinct 5A/5A1, some commotion took place. Eleven voters out of two hundred and sixty-eight (268) have already cast their votes at the time but only one ballot was found inside the ballot box after the commotion. The Commission deems it proper that the casting of votes by the eleven voters be annulled and a special election shall be conducted therein.

5. Marawi City there was partial failure of election in sixteen precincts (16), namely --

Name of Barangay Precinct No.

1. Brgy. Banggolo 6A2

2. - do - 6A3

3. Brgy. Lilod Madaya 42A-4

4. Brgy. South Madaya 85A

5. Brgy. Sangkai Dansalan 83A-3

6. Brgy. Raya Madaya I 74A-6

7. Brgy. Bacolod Chico 3A

8. - do - 3A-1

9. - do - 3A-2

10. Brgy. Raya Saduc 76A

11. Brgy. Guimba 38A

12. - do - 38A-1/38A-2

13. Brgy. Lolod Saduc 73A-5

14. Brgy. Bangco 5A-5A-1

15. Brgy. Timbangalan 88A

16. - do - 88A-1/88A-2

due to non-appearance of the BEIs. All election paraphernalia are in order and available except for one ballot box intended for Precinct 5A/5A-1 in Brgy. Banco which is missing or undelivered or without ballots contained therein.

The petition for declaration of failure of election in the municipality of Calanogas, Lanao del Sur will be covered by a different resolution.

To avoid the risk of another failure of elections and to encourage public trust in the process and results of the special elections, the following changes shall be undertaken:

a. Only elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police who are assigned to the affected areas shall serve as members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs). The Acting Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Lanao del Sur, Atty. Suharto Ambolodto, shall ensure that said BEIs are given adequate briefing for this task;

Considering that under-aged persons succeeded in registering voters, a complaint that is common in many areas in Lanao del Sur, the BEIs are given explicit authority to prevent from voting all those registered voters who are visibly under-aged and shall reflect their names and VRR numbers in the Minutes of Voting for future prosecution.

For this purpose, all poll watchers are encouraged to provide themselves with camera and provide indubitable proof of under-aged voters.

b. Election officers from areas outside of Lanao del Sur shall be tapped to act as Election Officers, while the regular election officers in Lanao del Sur shall perform such duties as directed by the Acting PES;

c. The special election in the municipality of Madalum shall be scheduled only after the Investigating Team aforementioned has finished its investigation of alleged ghost precincts therein and the Commission has acted on their findings of facts and recommendation(s);

d. The special election in the municipality of Tugaya shall be scheduled after the controversy on the four thousand and seventy-five (4,075) voters shall have been settled;

e. Considering the complaints received by the Commission against certain actuations of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, the same shall be replaced with a new Provincial Board of Canvassers whose members shall be designated by the Commission;

f. The PNP, thru the Criminal Investigation Group in Region XII and the Prosecution Offices in Lanao del Sur shall actively help in the filing of criminal complaint for election offenses committed during the election period.

Petitioner asserts that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Omnibus Order

1.] By insisting on holding special elections on July 18 and 25, 1998 more than thirty (30) days after the failure to elect, in certain municipalities, in contravention of the clear and explicit provisions of Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code;

2.] By failing to declare a total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur and to certify the same to the President of the Philippines and Congress so that the necessary legislation may be enacted for the holding of a special election;

3.] By ordering only elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police who are not assigned to the affected areas as members of the Board of Election Inspectors, in contravention of Sections 166, 170, 175 and 176 of the Omnibus Election Code;

4.] By insisting on machine counting despite the proven unreliability and undependability of the counting of votes with use of computer machines.

In support of his cause, petitioner insists on a strict compliance with the holding of special elections not later than thirty (30) days after failure to elect pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that:

SEC. 6. Failure of elections.  If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Petitioner argues that the above-quoted provision is mandatory because of the word shall.  He further asserts that the prescribed time frame actually delimits COMELECs authority to call for a special election and that instead, the power to call for a special election after the 30th day now resides in Congress.

The provision invoked can not be construed in the manner as argued by petitioner for it would defeat the purpose and spirit for which the law was enacted.

It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.[4] Thus, a too literal interpretation of the law that would lead to absurdity prompted this Court to

[a]dmonish against a tooliteral reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth xxx[5]

Section 2 (1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.  There can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

Pursuant to this intent, this Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of the COMELECs powers in conducting elections. As stated in the old but nevertheless still very much applicable case ofSumulong v. COMELEC:[6]

Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions xxx. There are no ready made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of election xxx we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections that initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.

More pointedly, this Court recently stated in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC, et al.,[7] that [O]ur elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters.  In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances.

The purpose of the governing statutes on the conduct of elections

[i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.[8]

Guided by the above-quoted pronouncement, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy.[9]

In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.] it should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect; and, 2.] it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in the failure to elect. The first involves a question of fact.  The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. [10] Thus, the holding of elections within the next few

months from the cessation of the cause of the postponement, suspension or failure to elect may still be considered reasonably close to the date of the election not held.[11]

In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for tardiness. The dates set for the special elections were actually the nearest dates from the time total/partial failure of elections was determined, which date fell on July 14, 1998, the date of promulgation of the challenged Omnibus Order. Needless to state, July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by the COMELEC for the holding of special elections were only a few days away from the time a total/partial failure of elections was declared and, thus, these were dates reasonably close thereto, given the prevailing facts herein. Furthermore, it bears stressing that in the exercise of the plenitude of its powers to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC should not and must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of its discretion to resolve election disputes.[12]

Petitioners argument that respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion by failing to declare a total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur and to certify the same to the President and Congress so that the necessary legislation may be enacted for the holding of a special election, likewise fails to persuade.

No less than petitioner himself concedes that there was total failure of elections in twelve (12) municipalities and partial failure in eleven (11). Yet he now insists a total failure of elections should have been declared in the entire province of Lanao del Sur. Suffice it to state that the propriety of declaring whether or not there has been a total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del Sur is a factual issue which this Court will not delve into considering that the COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field, is in the best position to assess the actual conditions prevailing in that area. Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the findings of fact of the COMELEC or any administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on the Court.[13] There is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule in this case.

The insistence of petitioner that the COMELEC violated Sections 166, 170, 175 and 176 of the Omnibus Election Code when it ordered elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) who are not assigned to the affected areas as members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs) is likewise unconvincing vis--vis the underlying reason of the public respondent to have an effective and impartial military presence to avoid the risk of another failure of elections.

So too must fall the argument that machine counting being allegedly undependable and unreliable should not be resorted to as the reasoning of petitioner, by itself, invokes the answer. If the COMELEC saw it fit to order a machine counting of votes in the municipalities enumerated, it could only mean that the decree of R.A. No. 8436 could be implemented without the interference of the claimed unreliability, inaccuracy and undependability of the computer sets. The absence of any satisfactory proof to support petitioners allegations to the contrary reduces them to mere self-serving claims.

Be that as it may, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petition has been rendered moot by supervening events. For one, it seeks to enjoin the holding of special elections scheduled for July 18 and 25, 1998. However, petitioner himself admits that special elections were conducted on a staggered basis on July 4, 18 and 25, 1998. [14] For another, the petition questions the membership of the Board of Election Inspectors for being composed of elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as well as the machine counting of the votes when these events have been superseded by the recent issuance of the Certificates Of Canvass Of Votes And Proclamation Of The Winning Candidates For Provincial Offices dated August 7, 1998. [15] In face of these supervening events, the arguments proffered by the petitioner to seek the annulment of the challenged Omnibus Order rings hollow. Verily

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections; literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.[16]

Indeed, to embark upon the costly electoral exercise insisted upon by petitioner in terms of time and taxpayers money is an unwarranted imposition on the people of the affected areas and is an unacceptable option to the judicial conscience.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

 LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD,Petitioners,     - versus -     COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondent.

G.R. No. 162759 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J.,PUNO,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CARPIO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,CARPIO-MORALES,CALLEJO, SR.,AZCUNA,TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO,GARCIA, andVELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated:  August 4, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

D E C I S I O N  GARCIA, J.:  

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others

who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act

of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under theOverseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003[1] (R.A.

9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee

voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189. 

The facts: 

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the

right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and

certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC

letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003[2], they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their

lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine

posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually

affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. 

Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs. COMELEC [3] on the residency

requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response: 

Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality , it is the Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. [4]

 

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the

National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., [5] filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus. 

A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment,[6] therein praying for the

denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections. 

On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that all qualified

overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so , observing, however, that the

conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.[7]

 

The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as

petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the

petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing duals to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains

unresolved.

 Observing the petitioners and the COMELECs respective formulations of the issues, the same may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition. 

In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on the right of suffrage is, therefore, indicated.

We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows: 

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippinesfor at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. xxx. SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

  

In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a  non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote. In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL[8] - identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who cannot, as follows:

 Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act: (a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws; (b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country; (c) Those who have [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, .; (d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her

registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. 

(e)                Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority . (Words in bracket added.)

  

Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the

enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the

disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional challenge on the ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it - 

violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. [The challenger] cites Caasi vs. Court of Appeals [9] to support his claim [where] the Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the [US] is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines. [The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.[10] (Words in bracket added.)  

As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly on the strength of the following

premises: As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that allcitizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting. Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise. [11]

  

Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which

reads: 

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: 

xxx xxx xxx 

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. 

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: 

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship ; 3) xxx xxx xxx. (4) xxx xxx xxx; (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: 

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.  

After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke

their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof. 

Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to the same Section 5 (1) providing that duals can

enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,

R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush is the clashing provisions of the aforecited provision of the

Constitution, which, to repeat, requires residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a Filipino non-

resident absentee voting rights,[12] COMELEC argues: 

4. DUALS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES 

4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225 is logical.  The duals, upon renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having subsequently acquired a second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, duals must, for purposes of voting, first of all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile through positive acts; [13]

  

The Court disagrees. 

As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and

physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit

acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an

absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to  enfranchise as much as possible all

overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to

vote. Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal: It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, , the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual

residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus: 

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact. Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution . 

xxx xxx xxx 

Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided in the Philippines. They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any effect on this? Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of residence is synonymous with domicile. As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent to return to one's home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law. This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we that Congress must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos. If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President. Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it reads: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In other words, anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot vote. And residents (sic) is a qualification. xxx xxx xxx Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office. I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . We are separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution is. . As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to vote. 

xxx xxx xxx 

Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember. The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence residency has been interpreted as synonymous with domicile. But the third more practical reason, is, if we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this

exercise to enfranchise them and empower them to vote. [14] (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations omitted)  

Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act expanded the

coverage of overseas absentee voting.According to the poll body: 

1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225; [15]

  

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of  R.A.

9225, the irresistible conclusion is that"duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and

as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise: Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;  

While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what

might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in

R.A. 9225 which reads: 

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.  

It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in the

Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of"duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political

rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day  "duals,"

provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of

suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation. 

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.SO ORDERED.

EN BANC 

 

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TA„ADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI,              ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG,

                                               Petitioners,

 

- versus -

 

 

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,                  AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,

                                               Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------------x

  G.R. No. 171396

 

  Present:

 

  PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

 *PUNO,  QUISUMBING,

  YNARES-SANTIAGO,

  SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

  CARPIO,

  AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

  CORONA,

  CARPIO MORALES,

  CALLEJO, SR.,

  G.R. No. 171409

NI„EZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC.,

                                           Petitioners,

 

 

- versus -

 

 

HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, 

                                           Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171485

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG,

                                               Petitioners,

 

- versus -

 

 

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP,

                                           Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171483

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS Ð KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN,

                                                                                           Petitioners,

 

 

 

  AZCUNA,

  TINGA,

  CHICO-NAZARIO,

  GARCIA, and

  VELASCO,  JJ.

 

  Promulgated:

 

  May 3, 2006

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- versus -

 

 

 

 

HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO,

                                           Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------------x

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG),

                                                Petitioner,

- versus -  

 

 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO,          

                                           Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------------x

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP),

                                               Petitioners,

 

- versus -

 

 

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF,

                                           Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------------x

LOREN B. LEGARDA,

                                       Petitioner,

 

 

- versus -

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

G.R. No. 171400

 

 

 

 

 

 

 G.R. No. 171489

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

G.R. No. 171424

 

                             

 

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

                                           Respondents.

 

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

 

 

 

DECISION 

 

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

 

 

All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary. [1]   Superior strength Ð the

use of force Ð cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights of

the citizens, specifically their liberty.

 

Chief Justice Artemio V. PanganibanÕs philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant.   He said: ÒIn cases involving liberty,

the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the

marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.Ó  Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts Òwith a

heavy presumption against their constitutional validity.Ó[2]

         These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP

1017)  and  General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.  Petitioners

contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are

actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution.  Hence, such issuances are void for being

unconstitutional.

 

 

         Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem.  How does the Constitution of a free people

combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes license?[3]

         On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP

1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

 

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: ÒThe President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,Ó and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

 

She cited the following facts as bases:

 

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists Ð the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State Ð who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;

 

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;

 

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

 

WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State Ð by obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peopleÕs confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country;

 

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

 

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

 

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;

 

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

 

 

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:

 

         WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State Ð and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a

concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004;

            WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;

 

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

 

WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peopleÕs confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country;

 

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

 

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

 

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;

 

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

 

WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency;

 

NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;

 

            I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.

 

        

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had

been filed, the President lifted PP 1017.   She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency;

 

            WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary;

 

            WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion;

 

            NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

 

 

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the

executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New PeopleÕs Army (NPA), and some

members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. [4] They considered the aim to oust or

assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017

and            G.O. No. 5.   Significantly, there was no refutation from petitionersÕ counsels.

The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in

determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces.   He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was

without factual bases.  While he explained that it is not respondentsÕ task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation,

however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.

On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and                    First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and

Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio,

Taguig City.   In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs.   They called upon the people to

Òshow and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest,

but also by wearing red bands on our left arms.Ó [5]

 

On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled ÒOplan Hackle I Ó which detailed plans for bombings

and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City.   The plot was to assassinate selected targets

including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself.[6]   Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to

attend the Alumni Homecoming.  The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade

ground.

On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province.    Found in his

possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National

PeopleÕs Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents. [7]   Prior to his

arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the ÒMagdaloÕs D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of

Edsa I.Ó

On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force

were planning to defect.   Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to ÒdisavowÓ any defection.

The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement:  ÒAll SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and

trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty.Ó

On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory AquinoÕs brother, businessmen

and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration.  Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported

that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his groupÕs plans if President Arroyo is

ousted.  Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the ArmyÕs elite

Scout Ranger.  Lim said Òit was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo.Ó[8]

B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component

to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005.   According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they could

possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the

President.  However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command.   He immediately

took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.

Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police

establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials.   NPA spokesman Gregorio ÒKa RogerÓ Rosal declared:

ÒThe Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of

accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not

take much longer to end it.Ó[9]

On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly

announced: ÒAnti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by

the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field.Ó  He claimed that with

the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have

been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the PresidentÕs ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.

Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also

considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.   So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet

resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers.   And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front

organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.[10]

By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to assess the

gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation.   She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure

that the chain of command remains solid and undivided.   To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break

loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region.  

For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the

20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments.

Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the PresidentÕs mind were organized for purposes of

destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that Òwarrantless arrests and take-over of

facilities, including media, can already be implemented.Ó[11] 

Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members

of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts

of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine.   Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently

dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police.   The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons,

and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action was used

against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA.    That same evening,

hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City. [12] 

According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.

During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at

the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-

list Akbayan.

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group

(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila.   The raiding team confiscated

news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.  Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City

were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were

stationed outside the building.[13]       

A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-

opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor,  is Òmeant to show a Ôstrong presence,Õ to tell media

outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government.Ó    The PNP warned that it would

take over any media organization that would not follow Òstandards set by the government during the state of national

emergency.Ó    Director General Lomibao stated that Òif they do not follow the standards Ð and the standards are - if they would

contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 Ð we will

recommend a Ôtakeover.ÕÓ  National TelecommunicationsÕ Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks

to ÒcooperateÓ with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency.    He asked for Òbalanced reportingÓ from

broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government.   He warned that his agency will not

hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is

threatened.[14]

Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and

Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan.    The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated

1985. BeltranÕs lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos

regime, had long been quashed.   Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions.

When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because

of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.   Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by the police.

Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo

Hotel in Quezon City.   But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody.

Retired Major General Ramon Monta–o, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and

golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmari–as, Cavite.

Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan

Muna Representative Teodoro Casi–o and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza.   Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested

at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City.  Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the ÒBatasan

5Ó decided to stay indefinitely.      

Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo,  et al., are

not being raised in these petitions.

 On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court

against the above-named respondents.  Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.

         In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the

emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law;

and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.

         In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDGÕs act of raiding

the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of ÒcensorshipÓ or Òprior restraint.Ó   They also claimed that the term ÒemergencyÓ refers

only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is Òabsolutely no emergencyÓ that warrants the issuance

of PP 1017. 

   In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members

of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casi–o, Liza Maza, and Josel

Virador.     They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute Òusurpation of legislative powersÓ; Òviolation of freedom of

expressionÓ and Òa declaration of martial law.Ó   They alleged that President Arroyo Ògravely abused her discretion in calling out

the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity

to do so.Ó

      In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are

unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was

without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their

grievances.

In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional

because they violate  (a)  Section 4[15] of Article II, (b) Sections 1,[16] 2,[17] and 4[18]  of Article III, (c) Section 23[19] of Article

VI,  and  (d)  Section 17[20] of Article XII of the Constitution. 

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an Òarbitrary and unlawful exercise by

the President of her Martial Law powers.Ó  And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued

that Òit amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval.Ó  In addition, petitioners

asserted that PP 1017 Ògoes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code.Ó

And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are Òunconstitutional

for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to

information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.Ó  In this regard, she

stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal.

         In respondentsÕ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for

being             moot; second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI),  171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.)

and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing;  third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as

respondent;  fourth,  PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the peopleÕs right to free

expression and redress of grievances.

         On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which may be

summarized as follows:

                    A.    PROCEDURAL:

1)    Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.

2)    Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et

al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.

                  B.      SUBSTANTIVE:

1)    Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.

2)    Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

a. Facial Challenge

b. Constitutional Basis

c. As Applied Challenge

 

A.            PROCEDURAL

 

         First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.

I- Moot and Academic Principle

         One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated

in Marbury v. Madison.[21] This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation --

         The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.[22]

 

         But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a Òself-starting capacity.Ó [23]  Courts may exercise such power

only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a

question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of

the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.[24] 

Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.   It is

Òdefinite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal    interest;Ó a real and substantial controversy

admitting of specific relief.[25]  The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the

present petitions were rendered Òmoot and academicÓ by President ArroyoÕs issuance of PP 1021.

Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, [26] so that

a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.[27]  Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case[28] or dismiss it on

ground of mootness.[29]  

The Court holds that President ArroyoÕs issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and

academic.   During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts

in implementing it.  Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid?  Do they justify these alleged illegal acts?   These

are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions.  It must be stressed that Òan unconstitutional act is not a law,

it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.Ó[30]

The Òmoot and academicÓ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a

case.  Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:  first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;[31] second, the

exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; [32] third,when constitutional issue raised requires

formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; [33] and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet

evading review.[34]

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this CourtÕs assumption of jurisdiction over the instant

petitions.  Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution.  There is no question that the

issues being raised affect the publicÕs interest, involving as they do the peopleÕs basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly

and of the press.   Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules.  It

has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions,  the military and the police, on the

extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees.[35]  And lastly, respondentsÕ contested actions are capable of

repetition.  Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial    review.

In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. PanganibanÕs

Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.[36]   However, they failed to take into account the Chief JusticeÕs very statement

that an otherwise ÒmootÓ case may still be decided Òprovided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be

prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance.Ó   The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule

pointed out by the Chief Justice.

II- Legal Standing

In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more than

passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi.

 

              Locus standi is defined as Òa right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.Ó [37]   In private suits, standing is

governed by the Òreal-parties-in interestÓ rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It

provides that Òevery action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest .Ó  Accordingly, the

Òreal-party-in interestÓ is Òthe party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party

entitled to the avails of the suit.Ó[38] Succinctly put, the plaintiffÕs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

 

 

         The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.         Here, the plaintiff who asserts a Òpublic rightÓ in assailing

an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public.   He may be a person who is affected no

differently from any other person.  He could be suing as a Òstranger,Ó or in the category of a Òcitizen,Ó or Ôtaxpayer.Ó  In either

case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection.   In other words, he has to make out a sufficient

interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a ÒcitizenÓ or Òtaxpayer.

         Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both ÒcitizenÓ and ÒtaxpayerÓ standing in public actions.    The distinction was first

laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,[39]  where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayerÕs suit is in a different category from the plaintiff

in a citizenÕs suit.  In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but

the mere instrument of the public concern.   As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:[40]   ÒIn

matter of mere public right, howeverÉthe people are the real partiesÉIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every

citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be

remedied.Ó   With respect to taxpayerÕs suits, Terr v. Jordan[41]  held that Òthe right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain

an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.Ó

         However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he

disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court

laid down the more stringent Òdirect injuryÓ test in Ex Parte Levitt,[42] later reaffirmed inTileston v. Ullman.[43]   The same Court

ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action,  he must

show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general

interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the Òdirect injuryÓ test in our jurisdiction.   In People v. Vera,[44]  it held that the person who impugns

the validity of a statute must have Òa personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will

sustain direct injury as a result.Ó  The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,[45] Manila Race Horse TrainersÕ Association v. De la Fuente,[46]  Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works[47] and Anti-Chinese League of

the Philippines v. Felix.[48]

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise

of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,[49] where the Òtranscendental

importanceÓ of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally.   Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental.   In Aquino v.

Comelec,[50]  this  Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the Òfar-reaching implicationsÓ of the petition

notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit.   Indeed, there is a chain of cases

where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute

actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.[51] 

         Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to

sue under the principle of Òtranscendental importance.Ó Pertinent are the following cases:(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[52] where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the

constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with locus standi;

 

(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[53]   wherein the Court held that Ògiven the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial reviewÓ of the Visiting Forces Agreement;

 

(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,[54]  while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that ÒBalikatan 02-01Ó involves the exercise of CongressÕ taxing or spending powers, it               reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[55]   that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed.

 

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the  cases decided by this Court.   Taxpayers, voters, concerned

citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1)                   the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2)                   for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is

unconstitutional;

(3)                   for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4)                   for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance

which must be settled early; and

(5)                    for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives

as legislators.

Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the CourtÕs attitude toward legal standing.  

         In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,[56] the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a peopleÕs organization does not give it the

requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of

constitutionality.  Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as

a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.

         In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,[57]  the Court reiterated the Òdirect injuryÓ

test with respect to concerned citizensÕ cases involving constitutional issues.   It held that Òthere must be a showing that the citizen

personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act.Ó

In Lacson v. Perez,[58] the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-

in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.  

In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[59] the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing

to sue, as they claim that the PresidentÕs declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of

Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society,

the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson. 

Now,  the application of the above principles to the present petitions.

The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt.   The same holds true

with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc.  They alleged Òdirect injuryÓ resulting from

Òillegal arrestÓ and Òunlawful searchÓ committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.  Rightly so, the Solicitor General does

not question their legal standing.

         In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers.   They also raised the

issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are

used.   Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to

the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.

         In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60] Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa

Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,[61] Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[62] Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[63] and Ta–ada v. Tuvera,[64]  that when the issue concerns a public right,

it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.

In G.R. No. 171483,  KMUÕs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed

sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members.[65]    We

take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public

assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no

legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a

consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5.  In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[66]   the Court held that the

mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe

it with standing in this case.   This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.   However, in

view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.

In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations

of illegal disbursement of public funds.   The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence.   She can no longer sue as a

legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.     Her claim that she

is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her

from pursuing her occupation.  Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is

likewise of no relevance.  She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case.   But

considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.

It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of

judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the Òliberality doctrineÓ on legal standing.   It cannot be doubted that the validity

of PP No. 1017 and G.O.  No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people.   To paraphrase Justice

Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions

thus call for the application of the Òtranscendental importanceÓ doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the

petitioners in the ÒPP 1017 cases.Ó  

 

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

 

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.  Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his

tenure of office or actual incumbency,[67] may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the

Constitution or law.  It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court

litigations while serving as such.   Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction

to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.  Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only

one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important

duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.  However, this does not mean that

the President is not accountable to anyone.  Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people[68] but he may be removed

from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.[69]

 

B.  SUBSTANTIVE

I. Review of Factual Bases     

 

Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis.   Hence, it was not ÒnecessaryÓ for President Arroyo to issue such

Proclamation.  

The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the PresidentÕs exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power

has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker[70]                                                       and Montenegro v.

Castaneda[71] to the volatile era of Lansang v.                      Garcia,[72] Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,[73] and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.[74]   The tug-of-

war always cuts across the line defining Òpolitical questions,Ó particularly those questions Òin regard to which full discretionary

authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.Ó[75]  Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison

in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is final

and conclusive on the courts.  Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the

conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional

sufficiency.  From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances,

Òunder which the President is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic

Law, and             the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested            in the Judicial

Department,which in this respect, is, in                                 turn, constitutionally supreme.Ó[76]  In 1973, the unanimous

Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.[77]   There, the Court was                      almost evenly divided on the issue of whether

the validity of the                         imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question. [78]    Then came Garcia-Padilla v.

Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang.  It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that Òin times of

war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the

government is in great peril.  The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God.Ó[79] 

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora[80] -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle

similar to Lansang.  While the Court considered the PresidentÕs Òcalling-outÓ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his

wisdom, it stressed that Òthis does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible

constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion .Ó    This ruling is

mainly a result of the CourtÕs reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to

determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.    Under the new definition of judicial power,

the courts are authorized not only Òto settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,Ó

but also Òto determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.Ó   The latter part of the authority represents a

broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory,    to wit, the discretion of

the political departments of the government.[81]   It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.[82] 

        

As to how the Court may inquire into the PresidentÕs exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that Òjudicial inquiry

can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the PresidentÕs decision is correct,Ó but that Òthe President did not

act arbitrarily.Ó Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. [83]  In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court

further ruled that Òit is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the PresidentÕs decision is totally bereft of factual

basisÓ and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then Òthis Court cannot undertake an independent

investigation beyond the pleadings.Ó

 

Petitioners failed to show that President ArroyoÕs exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of

factual basis.  A reading of the Solicitor GeneralÕs Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events

leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.   Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo

Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the

reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the

Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.   Petitioners presented nothing to refute such

events.  Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for

military aid. 

 

 

Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing

to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.   However, the exercise of such power or duty

must not stifle liberty.

 

II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

 

Doctrines of Several Political Theorists

on the Power of the President

in Times of Emergency

 

 

This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of emergency.    A glimpse at the various

political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.  

John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the

problem of emergency.   In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal

obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe.  In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative Òpower

to act according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and sometimes even against

it.Ó[84]  But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative powers.   Who shall judge the

need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided?  Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting

that Òthe people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal

to Heaven.Ó[85]    

Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of government in time of

emergency.  According to him:

The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the StateÉ

 It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to suspend

their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse... If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the

method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the peopleÕs first intention is that the State shall not perish.[86]

  

Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or Òsupreme magistracyÓ as he termed it.  For him, it

would more likely be cheapened by Òindiscreet use.Ó   He was unwilling to rely upon an Òappeal to heaven.Ó  Instead, he relied

upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship.[87]

 

 

John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: ÒI am far from condemning, in cases of

extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.Ó[88] 

 

Nicollo MachiavelliÕs view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited government, furnished an

ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative.   He recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political

theory,  thus:

            Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra Ðconstitutional measures; for although they may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for applying it.[89] 

 

 

         Machiavelli Ð in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill Ð sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of

standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national danger.  He attempted forthrightly to

meet the problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with

effective constitutional restraints.[90]

        

Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency by constitutional

democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.[91] Frederick M. Watkins saw Òno reason why absolutism

should not be used as a means for the defense of liberal institutions,Ó provided it Òserves to protect established

institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt

return to the previous forms of political life.Ó[92]   He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of emergency

governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of the executive, while at the same

time Òimposing limitation upon that power.Ó[93]   Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship.  These

are the conditions of success of such a dictatorship:  ÒThe period of dictatorship must be relatively shortÉDictatorship

should always be strictly legitimate in characterÉFinal authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given

case must never rest with the dictator himselfÉÓ[94] and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be Òstrict

political conservatism.Ó 

 

Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins.[95]   ÒIt is a problem of concentrating power Ð in a

government where power has consciously been divided Ð to cope withÉ situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity.   There

must be a broad grant of powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how long, and

to what end.Ó[96]  Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers, to wit: ÒThe

emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means Ð i.e., he must be legitimate; he should not enjoy

power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency powers should be exercised under a strict time

limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be the defense of the constitutional order.Ó[97] 

 

Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar,

Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of Òconstitutional dictatorshipÓ as solution to the vexing

problems presented by emergency.[98]   Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of  the  Òconstitutional

dictatorship,Ó thus:

1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the State and its constitutional orderÉ

 

2)   Éthe decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictatorÉ

 

3)   No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provisions for its terminationÉ

 

4)   Éall uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government should be effected in pursuit  of constitutional or legal requirementsÉ

 

5)   É no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . .

 

6)   The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in character or effectÉ

 

7)   The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order. . .

 

8)   Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional dictatorship. . .

 

9)   The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator. . .

 

10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was institutedÉ

 

11) Éthe termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorshipÉ[99] 

        

 

Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins.   He would secure

to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency, and he places great faith in the

effectiveness of congressional investigating committees.[100]

         Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were one in saying that, Òthe

suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to

the nation is not based upon sound constitutional theory.Ó To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional

dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis.  It matters not whether the term ÒdictatorÓ is used in

its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief executives administering emergency powers.

However used, Òconstitutional dictatorshipÓ cannot be divorced from the implication of suspension of the processes of

constitutionalism.   Thus, they favored instead the Òconcept of constitutionalismÓ articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:

 

A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which is consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose adequate power in government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping government responsible.  He refused to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on governmental power. He found that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening of government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there is a great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism with ÒlimitedÓ as distinguished from ÒweakÓ government, McIlwain  meant government limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of government to the governed.[101]

 

In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists Ð- from LockÕs Òtheory of

prerogative,Ó to WatkinsÕ doctrine of Òconstitutional dictatorshipÓ and, eventually, to McIlwainÕs Òprinciple of constitutionalismÓ

---  ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary

power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility

and under effective limitations and checks. 

 

Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem.  Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice JacksonÕs Òbalanced

power structure.Ó[102]  Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme

Court, respectively.  Each is supreme within its own sphere.  But none has the monopoly of power in times of

emergency.  Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the

other.  This  system  does  not  weaken  the President,  it  just  limits  his  power, using the language of McIlwain.  In other words,

in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and

wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural

limitations. 

 

a. ÒFacial ChallengeÓ

 

 

Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its Òoverbreadth.Ó They claim that its enforcement

encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a Òchilling effectÓ to the

citizens. 

 

A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.

 

 

  First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing Òon their facesÓ statutes in free

speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.[103]

 

 

A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct.   It is actually a

call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.  In United States v. Salerno,[104] the US Supreme Court held

that Òwe have not recognized an ÔoverbreadthÕ doctrine outside the limited context of the First AmendmentÓ

(freedom of speech). 

 

 

Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that Òreflects legitimate state interest in

maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.Ó Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection

and rebellion are considered ÒharmfulÓ and Òconstitutionally unprotected conduct.Ó In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[105] it was held:

 

It remains a Ômatter of no little difficultyÕ to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when Ôsuch summary actionÕ is inappropriate. But the plain  import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from Ôpure speechÕ toward conduct and that conduct Ðeven if expressive Ð falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.

 

 

         Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only

Òspoken wordsÓ and again, that Òoverbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against

ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.Ó[106]   Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that

PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. 

 

 

         Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as Òmanifestly strong medicine,Ó to be used Òsparingly and only as a

last resort,Ó and  is Ògenerally disfavored;Ó[107]  The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing

constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the

ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court.[108]  A writer

and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:

 

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation.  Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.  Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests.  In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute Òon its face,Ó not merely Òas applied forÓ so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly.  The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the Òchilling;Ó deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit.  The Court assumes that an overbroad lawÕs Òvery existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.Ó  An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.

  

 

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its

flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence

may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.  In Younger v. Harris,[109] it

was held that:

 

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

 

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the

challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid.  Here, petitioners did not even

attempt to show whether this situation exists.

 

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness.    This, too, is unwarranted.

 

  Related to the ÒoverbreadthÓ doctrine is the Òvoid for vagueness doctrineÓ which holds that Òa law is facially invalid if

men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.Ó[110] It is subject to the

same principles governing overbreadth doctrine.  For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing Òon their facesÓ statutes in free

speech cases.  And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its

possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They

also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.  

b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017

 

 

Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.

 

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

 

First provision:

  

 Òby virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII É do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellionÓ

 

Second provision:

 

  Òand to enforce obedience to all the laws  and  to  all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;Ó

 

Third provision:

 Òas provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National

Emergency.Ó

 

 First Provision:  Calling-out Power

 

        

The first provision pertains to the PresidentÕs calling-out power.  In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[111]  this Court, through

Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows: 

 

            Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

 

                                    The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

 

            The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

 

            A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

 

                                    The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

 

                                    During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

 

 

grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ÒsequenceÓ of graduated powers.  From the most to the least benign, these are: the

calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial

Law.   Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[112]  the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out

power is that Òwhenever it becomes necessary,Ó the President may call the armed forces Òto prevent or suppress lawless

violence, invasion or rebellion.Ó  Are these conditions present in the instant cases?  As stated earlier, considering the

circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017.   Owing to her OfficeÕs vast intelligence

network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.

 

         Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence,

invasion and rebellion.  This involves ordinary police action.  But every act that goes beyond the PresidentÕs calling-out power is

considered illegal or ultra vires.  For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers.   He cannot invoke a

greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power.  There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the

greater are the limitations.

 

         It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the PresidentÕs authority to declare a Òstate of rebellionÓ

(in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency.  While President ArroyoÕs authority to declare a Òstate of

rebellionÓ emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited inSanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of

the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

 

         SEC. 4. Ð Proclamations. Ð Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

 

 

         President ArroyoÕs declaration of a Òstate of rebellionÓ was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or

interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above.  Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal

significance, and deemed not written.  In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that.  In declaring a state of national emergency,

President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress

lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.  She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the StateÕs extraordinary power to

take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest.   Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of

an awesome power.  Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the

case of Sanlakas.

 

         Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law.  It is no so.  What defines the

character of PP 1017 are its wordings.  It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.

 

         The declaration of Martial Law is a Òwarn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist

in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not

commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law.Ó[113]

        

In his  ÒStatement before the Senate Committee on JusticeÓ on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, [114] an

authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial

Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties.  It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly.  It cannot be used

to stifle or persecute critics of the government.  It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure

the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms.  In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:

 

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

 

 

         Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law.   It is no more than a call by the President to the

armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.   As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of

Martial Law can be done.   Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its

command is ultra vires.  

 

         Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies;

(c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be

exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ

of habeas corpus. 

 

Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law.  It is merely an exercise of

President ArroyoÕs calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

 

Second Provision:  ÒTake CareÓ Power

 

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.   This is based on

Section 17, Article VII which reads:

 

 

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

 

 As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,[115] the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as

well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws.  He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of

his department.  Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines,

he will, among others, Òexecute its laws.Ó[116]  In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers

attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,[117] including the Philippine National

Police[118] under the Department of Interior and Local Government.[119] 

 

 

Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casi–o, Liza

Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and

decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress.   They assail the

clause Òto enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally

or upon my direction.Ó

  

PetitionersÕ contention is understandable.  A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted[120] from Former

President MarcosÕ Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:  

 

 

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or

rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. 

 

 

 

We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power.  Its enabling clause states:  Òto enforce

obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my

direction.Ó  Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the

laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.Ó

 

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate ÒdecreesÓ? 

 

PP  1017  states in part:   Òto  enforce  obedience  to  all  the  laws  and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or

upon my direction.Ó  

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of

1987).  She may issue any of the following: Sec. 2.  Executive Orders. Ñ Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character

in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.Sec. 3.  Administrative Orders. Ñ Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental

operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.Sec. 4.  Proclamations. Ñ Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public

moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

Sec. 5.  Memorandum Orders. Ñ Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.

Sec. 6.  Memorandum Circulars. Ñ Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.

Sec. 7.  General or Special Orders. Ñ Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders. 

 

 

 President ArroyoÕs ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued

by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.  Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as

statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the

1973 Constitution.[121] 

 

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the

authority to promulgate Òdecrees.Ó  Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.  Section 1, Article VI

categorically states that Ò[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of

a Senate and a House of Representatives.Ó  To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can

justify President ArroyoÕs exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.  

 

         Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?

 

 

         As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,

therefore, cannot be enforced.  With respect to Òlaws,Ó she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as

customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like.   She can only order the

military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

 

Third Provision:  Power to Take Over

 

 

The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:

 

x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution  do hereby declare a state of national emergency.

 

 

The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the

military not only to enforce obedience Òto all the laws and to all decrees x x xÓ but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section

17, Article XII which reads:

 

         Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

 

 

 

What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?

 

The answer is simple.  During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President,

without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or

business affected with public interest.

 

This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the Òmartial lawÓ thinking of the 1971

Constitutional Convention.[122]  In effect at the time of its approval was President MarcosÕ Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September

22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over Òthe  management, control and operation of the Manila Electric

Company, the Philippine   Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and  Sewerage Authority, the Philippine

National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the

Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national emergency.Ó

 

         Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President ArroyoÕs inclusion of Section 17,

Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatureÕs emergency powers.

 

         This is an area that needs delineation.

 

         A distinction must be drawn between the PresidentÕs authority to declare Òa state of national emergencyÓ

and          to exercise emergency powers.  To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such

power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised.  But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

 

          Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:   

SEC. 23.  (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

 

         It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to Òother national

emergency.Ó  If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a Òstate

of national emergencyÓ pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the

existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so.  Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first

authorize the President before he can declare a Òstate of national emergency.Ó  The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo

could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. 

        

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with

public interest, is a different matter.    This requires a delegation from Congress. 

 

Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together.  Otherwise stated,

different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and

considered in the light of each other.[123]  Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted,

relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.

 

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers.  This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI

authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.  Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon

it.  However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its

powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to

certain conditions, thus:

 

 

(1)   There must be a war or other emergency.

 

(2)   The delegation must be for a limited period only.

 

(3)  The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4)  The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.[124]

 

 

 

         Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause.  The taking over of private business

affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.   Thus, when Section 17

states that the Òthe State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take

over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest ,Ó  it refers to

Congress, not the President.  Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may

delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.   Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,

[125] held:

 

It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution.  And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President.  The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution.  Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that ÒThe executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . .;Ó that Òhe shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed;Ó and that he Òshall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

 

The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the PresidentÕs military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.  The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war.  Such cases need not concern us here.  Even though Òtheater of warÓ be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production.  This is a job for the nationÕs lawmakers, not for its military authorities.

 

Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President.  In the framework of our Constitution, the PresidentÕs power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.   The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.  And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.  The first section of the first article says that ÒAll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. . .Ó[126]

 

 

 

Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term ÒemergencyÓ under Section 17, Article XII refers to Òtsunami,Ó

Òtyphoon,Ó    ÒhurricaneÓ and Òsimilar occurrences.Ó   This is a limited view of Òemergency.Ó

 

 

 

Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to

life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal.   Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and

perception.[127]   Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a

wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic,[128] b) natural disaster,[129] and c) national

security.[130]

 

 

 

 

 

ÒEmergency,Ó as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth.  It may include rebellion, economic crisis,

pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. [131]  This is evident in the

Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus:

 

MR. GASCON. Yes.  What is the CommitteeÕs definition of Ònational emergencyÓ which appears in Section 13, page 5?  It reads:

 

When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

MR. VILLEGAS.  What I mean is threat from external aggression, for example, calamities or natural disasters.

MR. GASCON.   There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes.  What about strikes and riots?

MR. VILLEGAS.  Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term Ònational emergency.Ó

MR. BENGZON.  Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government service.[132]

x    x    x                                                                             x    x    x

MR. TINGSON.  May I ask the committee if Ònational emergencyÓ refers to military national emergency or could this be economic emergency?Ó

MR. VILLEGAS.  Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.

MR. TINGSON.  Thank you very much.[133]

 

         It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore, unable to

delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

 

         In Araneta v. Dinglasan,[134] this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised,

remains in Congress even in times of crisis.

 

         Òx x x

 

            After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men.   The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal.  The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious.  Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department Ð unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances Ôthe various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial,Õ given the ability to act, are called  upon Ôto perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively.Ó

 

 

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that

such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately

owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. 

 

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a   state of national emergency, however, without

legislation, he has no     power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected     with public interest. The President

cannot decide whether exceptional      circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned           public utility or

business affected with public interest.  Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.  Likewise, without

legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken

over.   In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the

absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. 

 

 

c. ÒAS APPLIED CHALLENGEÓ

 

One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity and the

guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible.   Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are

curtailed and trampled upon.  Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless

arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the

greatest blow.

 

Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate Òdirect injury.Ó 

 

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants

on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20thAnniversary of People Power I.     The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the

arrest.  

 

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006, the

CIDG operatives Òraided and ransacked without warrantÓ their office.  Three policemen were assigned to guard their office as a

possible Òsource of destabilization.Ó  Again, the basis was PP 1017.

 

And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were Òturned away and

dispersedÓ when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I.

                           A perusal of the Òdirect injuriesÓ allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from

the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of  PP 1017. 

 

Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts?  In general, does the

illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?

 Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and

misabused[135] and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.[136]  The validity of a statute or

ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired,  not from its effects in a

particular case.[137]  PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the PresidentÕs calling-out power.  Its general purpose is to command the

AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.   It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President

Arroyo to issue PP 1021.  But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search

or violate the citizensÕ constitutional rights.

 

Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal

acts?   The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the

exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.[138] This is logical.  Just imagine the absurdity of

situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily.   If this

were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the

Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago. 

 

President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017.  General orders are Òacts and commands of

the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.Ó They are internal rules issued by the

executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficientadministration of law.  Such rules and regulations

create no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who receives them. [139]  They are based on and are the

product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object. [140]  For these reasons, one requirement for

these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.

 

G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the Ònecessary and appropriate actions and

measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.Ó

 

Unlike the term Òlawless violenceÓ which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and which is invariably

associated with Òinvasion, insurrection or rebellion,Ó the phrase Òacts of terrorismÓ is still an amorphous and vague

concept.  Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism.

 In fact, this Òdefinitional predicamentÓ or the Òabsence of an agreed definition of terrorismÓ confronts not only our

country, but the international community as well.  The following observations are quite apropos:

 

In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the Òfight against terrorismÓ has become one of the basic slogans when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and against groups operating internationally.  Lists of states Òsponsoring terrorismÓ and of terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being updated according to criteria that are not always known to the public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests.

 

The basic problem underlying all these military actions Ð or threats of the use of force as the most recent by the United States against Iraq Ð consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.

 

Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by armed groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.

 

The dilemma can by summarized in the saying ÒOne countryÕs terrorist is another countryÕs freedom fighter.Ó  The apparent contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term ÒterrorismÓ may further be demonstrated by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the time, but later became internationally respected statesmen.

 

What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts Ð the  differentia specifica distinguishing those acts from eventually legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?

 

Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on the basic issue of definition.  The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gap between those who associate ÒterrorismÓ with any violent act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is concerned.

 

The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting categorization of organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Ð which is a terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims Ð the Kashmiri resistance groups Ð who are terrorists in the perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan Ð the earlier Contras in Nicaragua Ð freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for the Socialist camp Ð or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union.   One could go on and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any way Ð because of opposing political interests that are at the roots of those perceptions.

 

How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the same group and its actions be explained?  In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of states.  Depending on whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the definition of terrorism will ÒfluctuateÓ accordingly.  A state may eventually see itself as protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a Òliberation struggle,Ó not of ÒterrorismÓ when acts of violence by this group are concerned, and vice-versa.

 

The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly because of these conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy.  A Òpolicy of double standardsÓ on this vital issue of international affairs has been the unavoidable consequence.

 

This Òdefinitional predicamentÓ of an organization consisting of sovereign states Ð and not of peoples, in spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! Ð has become even more serious in the present global power constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security Council, former great powers of the Cold War era as well as medium powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States.[141]

 

The absence of a law defining Òacts of terrorismÓ may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or

military.   An illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree.   Yet the military or the police may

consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5.   Obviously, this is abuse and oppression

on their part.  It must be remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such and

imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.

 

So far, the word ÒterrorismÓ appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted

by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime.  This decree is entitled ÒCodifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and

Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive Organizations.Ó  The word ÒterrorismÓ is mentioned in the following

provision:  ÒThat one who conspires with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x x

by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by reclusion temporal x x x.Ó

 

P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President

Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985.  These two (2) laws, however, do not define Òacts of terrorism.Ó   Since there is no law defining

Òacts of terrorism,Ó it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute

terrorism.  Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions.  Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without

warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and

gatherings unfriendly to the administration.  All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5.  These acts go far beyond the

calling-out power of the President.  Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution.  Thus, this Court declares that

the Òacts of terrorismÓ portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

 

Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary

and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order.  Otherwise,

such acts are considered illegal.  

 

         We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)

 

The Constitution provides that Òthe right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against

unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of

arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation

of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things

to be seized.Ó[142]   The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests

are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental

protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with

power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.[143]

 

         In the Brief Account[144] submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without

warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the  basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City

where he was  fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth, he was treated brusquely by policemen who

Òheld his head and tried to push himÓ inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa

Bilang         No. 880[145]and Inciting to Sedition; sixth,   he was  detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh, he was  eventually

released for insufficiency of evidence. 

 

 

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

 

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

 

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

 

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

 

x     x     x.

 

 

Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner DavidÕs  warrantless  arrest.  During the inquest for

the charges of inciting to sedition   andviolation of BP 880,  all  that  the  arresting  officers  could  invoke was  their

observation  that  some  rallyists  were  wearing  t-shirts with the invective ÒOust Gloria NowÓand  their  erroneous  assumption that

petitioner David was the leader of the rally.[146]   Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground

of insufficiency of evidence.  He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such

fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.  Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge

of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.[147]

 But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated,

but also their right to peaceably assemble.

 Section 4 of Article III guarantees:

 

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

 

ÒAssemblyÓ means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs.  It is a

necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech.  As in the case of freedom of expression,

this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that

Congress has a right to prevent.  In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not

subject to previous restraint or censorship.   It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the

government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place,

and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.

 

The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful

assembly.   They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the

limitation of that right.   As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to seditionand violation of BP 880 were

mere afterthought.  Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officersÕ conduct.   In De Jonge

v. Oregon,[148] it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, thus:

 

Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.  If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.

 

 

On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R.

No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malaca–angÕs directive canceling all permits

previously issued by local government units.  This is arbitrary.  The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard

of the principle that Òfreedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and

present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.Ó[149]  Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the

exception.  Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizensÕ right to

exercise it.  Indeed, respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence,

invasion or rebellion.   With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was

eliminated.

 

 Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units.   They

have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of

clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits. [150]  The first time

they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal.  Such absence of notice is a fatal defect.  When a personÕs right is restricted by

government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to

procedure.

 

 G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the

press.  PetitionersÕ narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily

TribuneÕs offices were searched without warrant; second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the

search was conducted at about 1:00 oÕ clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the absence

of any official of theDaily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity

of the Daily Tribune offices.

 

         Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as

saying that such raid was Òmeant to show a Ôstrong presence,Õ to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that

would help the rebels in bringing down this government.Ó   Director General Lomibao further stated that Òif they do not

follow the standards Ðand the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do

not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 Ð we will recommend a Ôtakeover.ÕÓ  National

Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to ÒcooperateÓ with the government for the

duration of the state of national emergency.   He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any

broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national security is threatened .

[151]

 The search is illegal.  Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure.  Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.  Section 8  mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupantthereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion  residing in the same locality.  And Section 9 states that  the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night.  All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

 Not only that, the search violated petitionersÕ freedom of the press.   The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff[152]   this Court held that -- 

 As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We ForumÓ newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

 

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

 

While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the ÒMetropolitan MailÓ and ÒWe ForumÓ

newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties.   The search and

seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant

warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship.  It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells

the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of

punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.[153]  Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions

because of its anti-government sentiments.   This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it

involves the most defiant of our citizens.   Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative

democracy.  It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy

encroachments thereon.  The motto should always be obsta principiis.[154]

 

 

Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the TribuneÕs offices and the

seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible Òfor any purpose,Ó thus:

 

JUSTICE CALLEJO:

 

            You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the purpose of gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to get the clippings.  Is that not in admission of the admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the Tribune?

 

SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

 

            Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your Honor, and these are inadmissible for any purpose.[155]

 

x x x                 x x x                 x x x

 

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

 

            These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those past issues.  So why do you have to go there at 1 oÕclock in the morning and without any search warrant?  Did they become suddenly part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?

 

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

 

            Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor.  Not upon my instructions.

 

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

 

            Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based on Proclamation 1017.

 

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

 

            It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which says that the police could go and inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.

 

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

 

            Is it based on any law?

 

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

 

            As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.

 

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

 

            So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?

 

  

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

 

            Maybe so, Your Honor.  Maybe so, that is why I said, I donÕt know if it is premature to say this, we do not condone this.  If the people who have been injured by this would want to sue them, they can sue and there are remedies for this.[156]

 Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the Solicitor General, illegal and

cannot be condoned, thus: 

 

CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

 

There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.

                       

SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

 

            I donÕt know whether this will clarify.  The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on the occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be condoned.  You cannot blame the President for, as you said, a misapplication of the law.  These are acts of the police officers, that is their responsibility.[157]

 

The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and Òshould result in no

constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter.Ó

 The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances.  Its ratiocination has been exhaustively presented.  At

this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress

lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.  When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police

committed acts which violate the citizensÕ rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and

illegal.

 In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. PanganibanÕs concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral part

of this ponencia.

 

S U M M A T I O N

 

In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 Ð a supervening event Ð would have normally rendered this

case moot and academic.  However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance

thereof.  Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued.   Already, there have been media

reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed Òif the May 1 ralliesÓ become Òunruly and

violent.Ó  Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be Òevaded;Ó they must now be resolved to

prevent future constitutional aberration.

 

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to

prevent or suppress lawless violence.  The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant

jurisprudence discussed earlier.  However, PP 1017Õs extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to

issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees

promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are  ultra

vires and unconstitutional.  The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence

of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.

 

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid.  It is an Order issued by the President Ð acting as Commander-in-Chief Ð

addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.  Significantly, it also provides a valid standard Ð that the

military and the police should take only the Ònecessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent

acts of lawless violence.Ó   But the words Òacts of terrorismÓ found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made

punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O.   While ÒterrorismÓ has been denounced generally in

media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPÕs authority in

carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.

 

 

 

On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of

petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU

members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of

the Tribune   offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the

Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.   Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

 

Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the

individual police officers concerned.  They have not been individually identified and given their day in court.  The civil complaints or

causes of action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court.   Elementary due process bars this

Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities.

 

It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in

themselves.  How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling

individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state .   During emergency, governmental action may

vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our peopleÕs liberty. 

 

Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies is

that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of

constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to

the governed.[158]

 

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted.  The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes

a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.  However, the provisions of PP

1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.   In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17,  Article VII of

the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public

utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. 

 

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.

whatever is Ònecessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless

violence.Ó  Considering that Òacts of terrorismÓ have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of

G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.  

 

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-

KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence,

invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as

the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

 

No costs.

 

SO ORDERED.