C:\Documents And Settings\James Loerch\My Documents\Ew\Ew\20081216 Presentatie Schmidt[1]

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The Trajectory of Terrorism 1990- The Trajectory of Terrorism 1990- 2030 2030 Presentation by Alex P. Schmid, Director Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’, Prinses Juliana Kazerne Conference ‘Challenging Uncertainties: The Future of the Netherlands’ Armed Forces’ 16 th - 17 th December 2008

Transcript of C:\Documents And Settings\James Loerch\My Documents\Ew\Ew\20081216 Presentatie Schmidt[1]

The Trajectory of Terrorism 1990-2030 The Trajectory of Terrorism 1990-2030

Presentation by Alex P. Schmid, Director Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV),

Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’, Prinses Juliana Kazerne

Conference‘Challenging Uncertainties: The Future of the Netherlands’ Armed Forces’

16th - 17th December 2008

1. The Economy of the Developed World is on Path to Grow for at least the next five years;

2. Militant Islam continues to spread and gain power3. The World’s population is on course to reach 9.2 billion by 2050.4. Technology increasingly dominates both the economy and society.5. Privacy, once a defining right for Americans, is dying quickly6. The global economy is growing more integrated7. Urbanization, arguably the world’s oldest trend, continues rapidly8. The internet continues to grow, but at a slower pace.9. Advanced communication technologies are changing the way we work and live10. The United States is ceding its scientific and technical leadership to other

countries.

Table 1: Ten Most Important Trends for the Table 1: Ten Most Important Trends for the Future of Terrorism according to Future of Terrorism according to Proteus Think Tank (February 2008)Proteus Think Tank (February 2008)

Source: Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies. 55. Trends Now Shaping the Future of Terrorism. The Proteus Trend Series, Vol. 1, Issue 2, February 2008

A. de Borchgrave:”it is just a matter of time. My assumption is it will be a weapon of mass destruction”;

M. Cetron: “If they want to do a bioweapons attack they would be in a perfect position to do that”;

W. Phares: “…the next few months are crucial as they precede the presidential campaign year of 2008”;

P.L. Williams: “…[bin Laden] is planning to conduct an attack on seven to ten cities simultaneously”.

Table 2: Sample of “Expert” Predictions from Table 2: Sample of “Expert” Predictions from July 2007 for 2007/08July 2007 for 2007/08

Source: Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR), No. 289, 26 July 2007

1. Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of  fear-generating, coercive political violence  and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties;

2. Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts: (i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as a illicit tactic of irregular warfare  employed by state- and non-state actors.

Source: A.P. Schmid, Handbook of Terrorism Research, London, Routledge, forthcoming 2009.

Table 3: Revised Academic Consensus Definition Table 3: Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorismof Terrorism

• Blockade/Public property damage/ looting/arson/sabotage• Violent demonstration/Mob violence/rioting• Raid//Banditry/Brigandry/ warlordism• Torture/mutilation/mass rape• Summary extra-judicial execution/massacre• Disappearances (= kidnapping + torture/maiming + murder)• Ethnic cleansing/ purge/pogrom• Rebellion/Revolt/Peasant uprising/ Urban insurrection/National liberation• struggle/Guerrilla warfare• Resistance to invasion/occupation by Partisan warfare• (Elite) coup d'etat/(mass) revolution• Civil war/armed intra-state conflict with, or without, state participation• Ethnocide/Politicide/Genocide/Democide

Source:    A.P. Schmid. Handbook of Terrorism Research. London, Routledge, forthcoming 2009.

Table 4: Forms of Political Violence Table 4: Forms of Political Violence other than Terrorismother than Terrorism

Table 5: Historical Evolution of TechnologyTable 5: Historical Evolution of Technology

1. Fire/Arson: Spanish Inquisition2. Dagger/Blade: Sicarii, Assassins, French Revolution3. Bombing: Gunpowder plot, Anarchists and many others4. Handgun: Anarchists, Russian People’s Will5. Hijacking: Cuban, Palestinians and many others(1960s)6. Hostage Taking: Japanese Embassy in Peru 1996/19977. Vehicle Bombings: Hezbollah (1980s)8. Suicide Bombing: LTTE, Hamas et al (1980s)9. Chemical: Aum Shinrikyo (1995)10.Biological: Anthrax Letters (2001)

% of all events % of all casualties

Bombs 53.4 70.1Guns 19.9 23.0

Arson 9.8 2.7Remote control bombs 1.9 4.7Knives & other blades 1.3 2.1Chemical 0.2 0.59Biological 0.08 0.02Other 13.3 8.1

Total 100.0 100.0

Source: p.49.Kenneth T. Bogen and Edwin D. Jones. Risks of Mortality and Morbidity from Worldwide Terrorism: 1968-2004. Risk Analysis Vol. 26, No.1, 2006. – Data utilized are from RAND-MIPT. Incidents until 1997 include only international terrorism.

Table 6: Terrorist Tactics, based on 25,303 Table 6: Terrorist Tactics, based on 25,303 terrorist events, 1968-2004terrorist events, 1968-2004

Table 7: Terrorist Incidents Worldwide

Year Incidents Fatalities Injured

1998 1286 2172 8202

1999 1172 847 2534

2000 1151 783 2570

2001 1732 4571 6403

2002 2648 2763 7349

2003 1899 2346 6200

2004 2647 5066 10860

2005 4976 8192 15269

2006 6660 12071 20991

2007 3479 8763 18694

Total 27669 47596 99072

Source: MIPT (domestic and international) – It should be noted that MIPT does not count civilians killed by governments.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, since 1990 4,000,000Sudan since 1983 2,000,000Afghanistan since 1978 1,500,000Uganda since 1987 500,000Somalia since 1988 400,000Sudan/Darfur since 2003 400,000Burundi since 1993 300,000Algeria since 1992 200,000Colombia since 1964 200,000Philippines since 1971 150,000Israel/Palestine since 1948 120,000Sri Lanka since 1948 100,000

Source: Mitchell Beazley. Where We Are Now. London, Octopus Publ. Group, 2008, p.103.

Table 8: Death in Current Armed ConflictsTable 8: Death in Current Armed Conflicts

Table 9: Terrorist Incidents Worldwide in 2005 and 2006 according to US National Counter Terrorism Center

2005 2006

Incidents of terrorism worldwide 11.153 14.338

Incidents of terrorism in Iraq 3.468 6.630

Incidents of terrorism in Afghanistan 491 749

Incidents worldwide, excl. Iraq and Afghanistan 7.194 6.959

Source: US National Counter Terrorism Centre as quoted in US Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism and Patterns of Global Terrorism. Washington, DC, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 21 March 2007, p.3; available at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82739.htm, consulted on 04/05/2007

Table 10: Terrorist Logistical Success: 1968-2007Table 10: Terrorist Logistical Success: 1968-2007  

  Source: ITERATE, calculated by Peter Flemming

Terrorist Logistical Success Frequency Percent

Aborted by terrorists before initiation 16 .1

Incident stopped by authorities at planning stage 421 3.2

Incident stopped by authorities at scene/way to scene

654 5.0

Aborted by terrorists during event 328 2.5

Unsuccessful owing to faults or error by terrorists 277 2.1

Stopped by authorities at the scene after initiation 734 5.6

Apparently completed as planned 10,411 79.6

Unknown 246 1.9

Total number of incidents 13,087 100.0

Palestinian extremists sabotage and hijack airliners Urban guerrillas in Latin America regularly kidnap

foreign diplomats, demanding the release of their imprisoned comrades, first in Latin America, then in Europe and the Middle East;

First terrorist groups appeared in Europe and Japan Terrorist bombings became increasingly common

Table 11: Non-State Terrorism in 1970: Table 11: Non-State Terrorism in 1970: Types of IncidentsTypes of Incidents

Source: Brian Michael Jenkins. Unconquerable Nation. Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves. St. Monica, RAND, 2006, p. 6. 10

Attack on Olympic games 1972 Embassy party taken hostage in Lima Bombs on trains and subways in Paris, Moscow, Madrid, Manila, London Nerve gas attack in Tokyo’s subways Truck bomb explosions in centre of London and Oklahoma Suicide bombers walking into restaurants, shopping malls, buses, hotel

lobbies Trucks full of explosives driven into embassies, synagogues and mosques Jumbo jets blown from the sky; surface-to-air missiles fired at civilian

airliners Hijacked planes flown into skyscrapers.

Table 12: Non-State Terrorism since 1970: Table 12: Non-State Terrorism since 1970: Types of IncidentsTypes of Incidents

Source: Brian Michael Jenkins. Unconquerable Nation. Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves. St. Monica, RAND, 2006, p. 6. 10

1.Attempts to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction2.Religious Fanaticism3.Catastrophic Terrorism4.Border Porosity5.Global Communication6.Diaspora Bridgeheads (Portable conflicts)7.Kamikaze Suicide Terrorism8.Expansion of Range of Targets (Tourists, ICRC, UN)9.Links with Organized Crime10.New Sources of Financing11. Failed and weak states as de facto safe havens12.New types of weapons (e.g. MANPADs)

Table 13: ‘New’ Elements in ‘ New Terrorism’Table 13: ‘New’ Elements in ‘ New Terrorism’

Before 9/11 After 9/11

Armed Attacks + 644 6185Arson Events + 315 563Assassinations + 492 1260Barricades/Hostage Takings - 41 26Bombings + 3236 11,409Hijackings - 28 14 (inc. 9/11)

Kidnappings + 373 1268By other means + 99 561

Source: Source: Mitchell Beazley. Where We Are Now. London, Octopus Publ. Group, 2008, p.115 based mainly on MIPT : Terrorism Knowledge Base.

Table 14: Terrorist Incidents before & after 9/11Table 14: Terrorist Incidents before & after 9/11

1990 – 1994: 1,365

1995-1999: 4,328

2000- 2004: 15,532

2005 – 2008 (incomplete): 27,191

Total: 48,416

Source: Source: Mitchell Beazley. Where We Are Now. London, Octopus Publ. Group, 2008, p.115 based mainly on MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.

Table 15: Civilian Deaths from Terrorist Table 15: Civilian Deaths from Terrorist Attacks, 1990 – 2007Attacks, 1990 – 2007

Table 16: Incidents by Region: 1998 - Table 16: Incidents by Region: 1998 - 03/03/2008  03/03/2008 

RegionIncidents Injuries Fatalities

Africa 572 8639 2694

East & Central Asia 128 393 164

Eastern Europe 1455 5127 2010

Latin America & the Caribbean

1834 2648 1688

Middle East / Persian Gulf

13865 54707 28248

North America 120 2408 2996

South Asia 4881 17953 7744

Southeast Asia & Oceania 1738 5552 1748

Western Europe 3087 1787 401

TOTAL 27680 99214 47693 Source: MIPT, at http://www.tkb.org, as of 03/03/2008

Symbolic targets: biblical sites; Pope; White House; Statue of Liberty.

Major events: soccer stadium, apartment buildings.Common people: American school; soccer stadia; tourist places;

“Westerners”.Government: United Nations; FBI & CIA headquarters; Capitol.Transport: New York Subway; airports; US navy ship.Business: banks.Infrastructure: NY tunnels ;UK Tower bridge; pipelines; oil refinery;

nuclear power plant.

Table 17: Targets of Planned, Foiled and Failed Table 17: Targets of Planned, Foiled and Failed Terrorist Attacks outside Europe, Terrorist Attacks outside Europe, 1993-20061993-2006

Symbolic targets: Eiffel Tower; church; synagogue.Major events: G-7 meeting; world soccer cup final.Common people: Christmas market, shopping centre; nightclub; funeral of Pope.Government: embassies, Ministry of Defense; house of

parliament, supreme court.Transport: airport; aircraft; trains; passenger ships; subway.Business: Trade centre.Infrastructure: nuclear power plant; air force base; computer

backup server centre.

Table 18: European Targets of 44 Planned, failed and Foiled Jihadist

Terrorist Attacks, 1994-2006

Killed Wounded8/7 1998: Attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salam 224 4,0009/11 2001: Attacks on US targets, incl. WTC, with four airplanes 2.998 6.291 10/12: Bomb attacks in Bali on Western Tourists 202 20911/15 2004 Two attacks in Istanbul on Jewish synagogues 25 300+11/20 2004: Attack on British consulate in Istanbul 27 450 3/11 2004: Ten bombs explode in four trains in Madrid 192 1.8007/7/2005: Attack on London underground and bus 52 70011/09 2005: Amman bombing 57 96

Source: Spiegel Jahrbuch 2003. Hamburg & Muenchen, Der Spiegel Verlag/ Deutscher TaschenbuchVerlag, 2003, pp. 538-543 ; Spiegel Spezial. Terror: der Krieg des 21. Jahrhunderts. Hamburg, Der Spiegel, 2/2004, pp. 55;Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2005. Frankfurt a. M., Fischer Verlag, 2004, p.434.

Table 19: Casualty Rates of Major Al Qaeda Table 19: Casualty Rates of Major Al Qaeda related/inspired Terrorist Attacksrelated/inspired Terrorist Attacks

Year Incidents Killed Wounded Total Casualties1995: 1 7 60 671996: 0 0 0 01997: 1 68 24 921998: 2 224 4077+ 4301+1999: 1 1 0 12000: 1 17 39 562001: 1 2998 6291 92892002: 6 31 112 1432003: 4 97 429+ 526+2004: 5 62 206 2682005: 5 46 89 1352006: 7 6 37 432007: 1 24 50+ 74+2008: 0 0 0 0Totals: 35 3581 11414+ 14995+

Source: Data calculated by B. McAllister, CSTPV

Table 20: Number of Incidents and Casualties of Table 20: Number of Incidents and Casualties of Major Al Qaeda Central AttacksMajor Al Qaeda Central Attacks

Year Location1998: Kenya, Tanzania1999: India2000: Yemen2001: United States2002: Pakistan, Tunisia, Yemen, Jordan, Kenya2003: Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Indonesia2004: Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Spain, Iraq2005: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, UK, Iraq2006: Algeria, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Iraq2007: Pakistan, Iraq

Source: Data calculated by B. McAllister, CSTPV

Table 21: Locations of al-Qaeda ‘Central’ Table 21: Locations of al-Qaeda ‘Central’ Attacks, 1998 - 2007Attacks, 1998 - 2007

Table 22: Al Qaeda’s Strategic Goals as of mid-Table 22: Al Qaeda’s Strategic Goals as of mid-2005 (Ayman al-Zawahiri)2005 (Ayman al-Zawahiri)

Stage 1: Expel the Americans from IraqStage 2: Establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of caliphateStage 3: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighbouring IraqStage 4: (maybe coinciding with what came before): the clash with Israel

Phase 1: (2001-2003): “The Awakening”: awake the Islamic nation from its state of hibernation by causing United States to "act chaotically”.

Phase 2: (20032006): “Eye-Opening”: turn Iraq into a recruiting ground for young men eager to attack America; conduct “electronic jihad”

Phase 3 (2007-2010): “Arising and Standing Up” Al Qaeda focus of struggle on Syria and Turkey, also begin of confrontation with Israel

Phase 4 (2011-2013): Al Qaeda to bring about demise of Arab governments, continued attacks on oil industry, electronic attacks to undermine U.S. economy, bringing about the collapse of the dollar by promoting gold as exchange medium

Phase 5 (2014-2016): “declaration of Islamic caliphate” leading to change of int. balance of power by seeking new economic allies such as China

Phase 6 (2017-2020): “total confrontation”: the now established caliphate’s Islamic Army will achieve “definitive victory”.

Source: Lawrence Wright. The Master Plan. For the new theorists of jihad, Al Qaeda is just the beginning. The New Yorker , September 11, 2006, pp.7-8; at: http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2007/09/11/060911fa_fact3?cur..., as of 08/10/2008.

Table 23: Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Years’ Grand PlanTable 23: Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Years’ Grand Plan

Stay alive and active and show that jihad against Crusaders and Zionists is a feasible strategy

Transform Al Qaeda from a militant group into a political movement Portray the GWOT as a war on Islam Trap the United States in “bleeding wars” Overthrow the government of Pakistan Crusaders and Zionist armies to leave Muslim lands defeated after the collapse of

their economies. Attack with weapon of mass destruction to make USA isolationist. Provoke war between USA and Iran and Israel and Saudi Arabia Overthrow of all apostate rulers in Muslim countries Recover “every stolen Islamic land from Palestine to al-Andalus and other Islamic

lands that were lost” Reunite the Ummah and establishment of a Caliphate Introduction of Salafism and Sharia law everywhere.

Source: Various,;incl. Bruce Reidel. The Search for Al Qaeda. Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future. Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press, 2008, pp.34, 53,113, 121, 124.

Table 24: Progress of Al Qaeda on the Path to a Table 24: Progress of Al Qaeda on the Path to a CaliphateCaliphate

1. Terrorism is a tactic that can be employed by any adversary. Potential threats can come from unexpected as well as familiar directions.

2. Future of terrorism will depend, in large part, on use & accessibility of technology

3. Future of terrorism will be affected in part by the mobility of people.4. Future of terrorism will be shaped by our actions in defending against

terrorism5. Understanding the future of terrorism requires our understanding trends

and developments in a wide range of areas.6. The most significant terrorist threat to the homeland today stems from a global

movement, underpinned by a jihadist/Salafist ideology

Source: Homeland Security Advisory Council. Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force. Washington , DC, DHS, January 2007, pp. 3-5.

Table 25: Future of Terrorism according to US Table 25: Future of Terrorism according to US Homeland Security Advisory Council, January Homeland Security Advisory Council, January 2007 - Selected Findings2007 - Selected Findings

7.Core of al Qaeda is resilient and resurgent, remains a threat to USA.8. A more pressing threat will be the wider movement inspired by al Qaeda .9.While difficult to measure with precision, al Qaeda’s ideology is spreading10. Threat of state-sponsored terrorism will not disappear.11.Internet has become a major facilitator of terrorism, spreading jihadist ideology12.Alienation of Muslim populations in the West major component in spread of jihadist ideology.

Source: Homeland Security Advisory Council. Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force. Washington , DC, DHS, January 2007pp. 3-5.

Table 25a: Future of Terrorism according to US Table 25a: Future of Terrorism according to US Homeland Security Advisory Council, January Homeland Security Advisory Council, January 2007 - Selected Findings cont.2007 - Selected Findings cont.

• Al Qaeda will rely more on Western radicalized Muslims to assist in future attacks

Greatest threat to the United States in 2015 will be form groups operating out of Europe

Next decade may see an increase in technology –assisted terrorism

The United States should be prepared to see a surge of sleeper cells over the next ten years

Source: http://www.hklaw.com/content/maritime/mardocs/Workshop_2015.pdf

Table 26: Terrorism 2015 – US Dept. of Table 26: Terrorism 2015 – US Dept. of Homeland Security workshop – some Homeland Security workshop – some views expressedviews expressed

Radiological: trafficking in radio-isotopes but no incidents

Nuclear: trafficking in plutonium and highly enriched uranium – but no incidents with improvised, stolen or sold nuclear device

Chemical: Sarin attack in Tokyo’s subway system in April 1005: 12 killed, dozens wounded

Biological: Anthrax attack in USA 2001: 5 killed, 22 infected

Table 27: The CBRN Threat of Terrorism: Table 27: The CBRN Threat of Terrorism: Fact or Fiction?Fact or Fiction?

1. Detonation of a 10 kiloton nuclear device by terrorists;2. a biological attack with aerosolized anthrax;3. an outbreak of pneumonic plague;4. a flu pandemic originating in South Asia;5. the release of a chemical agent over a football stadium;6. an attack on an oil refinery;7. the explosion of a chlorine tank8. three cesium-137 dirty bombs detonated in three different cities9. the explosion of improvised explosive devices in sports arenas and

emergency rooms;10. the contamination of ground beef by liquid anthrax.

Cit. Philip Bobbitt.. Terror and Consent. The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. London, Allen Lane, 2008, p. 234

Table 28: Terroristic Catastrophe Scenarios of Table 28: Terroristic Catastrophe Scenarios of US Department of Homeland SecurityUS Department of Homeland Security

1. Nuclear Detonation Can vary widely2. Biological Attack 13,000 fatalities

& injuries3.Biological Disease Outbreak (Pandemic Flu) 87,0000

fatalities, 300,000 hospitalized

4.Biological Attack – Plague 2,500 fatalities;7,000 injuries

5. Chemical Attack – Blister Agent 150 fatalities; 70,000 hospitalized

6.Chemical Attack –Toxic Indust. Chemicals 350 fatalities;1,000 hospitalizations

7.Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent 6,000 fatalities; 350 injuries

8. Chem. Attack –Chlorine Tank Explosion 17,500 fatalities; 10,000 injuries

9. Radiological Attach – RDD 180 fatalities;20,000 contaminations

10. Explosive Attack IED Bombing 100 fatalities; 450 hospitalizations

11. Biological attack – Food Contamination 300 fatalities; 400 hospitalizations

Table 29 : Homeland Security Planning Table 29 : Homeland Security Planning Scenarios 2004Scenarios 2004

Table 30: Table 30: Seven Key Drivers of Global Change Seven Key Drivers of Global Change (from Global Trends 2015)(from Global Trends 2015)

Source: Robert L. Hutchings, Chairman of the [US] National Intelligence council in introduction to National Intelligence Council. Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council ‘s 2020 Project. Washington, D.C., NIC, 2005, .p 2

1. Demographics2. Natural resources and the environment3. Science and technology4. The global economy and globalization5. National and international governance6. Future conflict7. The role the United States

Globalization Demography Rise of New Powers Decay of International Institutions Climate Change Geopolitics of Energy

Source: [US] National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2025. A Transformed World Washington, D.C. , GPO, November 2008 (NIC 2008-003).

Table 31: Key Drivers of ‘Global Trends 2025: Table 31: Key Drivers of ‘Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World’A Transformed World’

• Mass communication and propaganda Western responses to radicalisation Governance in target countries Western dominance (both real and perceived) State-to-state tensions Religion (and its relationship to politics) Government responsiveness (civil society) Immigration and demographics “Us- vs. -Them” identity politics New ideologies Resources (scarcities, conflicts over ~) Violence (associated with extremism)

Global Futures Forum. Radical Worlds of 2020. Imagining the Futures of Radicalisation. The Hague, 12-14 December 2007, pp. 54.

Table 32: Key Drivers of Radicalisation, Table 32: Key Drivers of Radicalisation, according to Global Futures Forumaccording to Global Futures Forum

Resilience and longevity of the international jihadist networks

unipolar exclusionist and interventionist world order weak transitional states non-state actors in global politics globalisation of organized crime Middle East oil dependence Migration and ethnic heterogenisation of Western societies Growing information interconnectedness Proliferation of deadly technologies Out-of-area spill-over from ongoing armed conflicts

Source:Brynjar Lia. Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism. Patterns and Predictions. London, Routledge, 2005, pp. 187-188.

Table 33: Factors Facilitating Future Terrorism, Table 33: Factors Facilitating Future Terrorism, according to Brynar Lia (2005)according to Brynar Lia (2005)

“Terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could diminish if economic growth continues and youth unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East. Economic opportunities for youth and greater political pluralism probably would dissuade some from joining terrorists’ ranks, but others – motivated by a variety of factors, such as a desire for revenge or to become ‘martyrs’ – will continue to turn to violence to purpose their objectives”.

“Terrorist and insurgent groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long-established groups – that inherit organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks – and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized. (…)Future radicalism could be fuelled by global communications and mass media. Increasing interconnectedness will enable individuals to coalesce around common causes across national boundaries, creating new cohorts of the angry, downtrodden, and disenfranchised”.

US] National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2025. A Transformed World Washington, D.C. , GPO, November 2008 (NIC 2008-003), p. 68 [emphasis added, AS].

Table 34 : Terrorism in 2025 (US National Table 34 : Terrorism in 2025 (US National Intelligence Estimate)Intelligence Estimate)

1st Wave: 1879- World War I: Anarchist Wave

2nd Wave: 1920s to 1960s: Anti-Colonial Wave

3rd Wave: 1960s – early 1980s: New Left Wave

4th Wave: 1979- today: Religious Wave

5th Wave: Today – 2030s?: The New Tribalism?

Source: David C. Rapoport. The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11. Anthropoetics 8, no. 1 (Spring / Summer 2002); Jeffrey Kaplan. The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism? Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19, No.4, 2007, pp.545-570.

Table 35: Rapoport’s four Waves TheoryTable 35: Rapoport’s four Waves Theory

Radical quest for purity – racial, tribal, ecological, etc. Belief in human perfectibility and chiliastic utopia in this

lifetime Children are the vanguard of the fifth wave as they are the

least contaminated by the old society Rape is the signature tactic of the fifth wave Fifth wave groups are localistic and particularistic…. Authoritarian in nature with charismatic leadership patterns Chiliastic in nature…millenarian dream to be realized

through a campaign of apocalyptic violence.

Source:Jeffrey Kaplan. The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism? Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19, No.4, 2007, p.548.

Table 36: Fifth Wave of Terrorism - Tribal? Table 36: Fifth Wave of Terrorism - Tribal? Key Features, according to J. Kaplan.Key Features, according to J. Kaplan.

Increasing Importance of Information The Evolution of Irregular Warfare Capabilities The Prominence of the Non-military Aspects of

Warfare The Expansion and Escalation of Conflict beyond the

Traditional Battlefield

US] National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2025. A Transformed World Washington, D.C. , GPO, November 2008 (NIC 2008-003), p. 71.

Table 37: Key Drivers in Armed ConflictTable 37: Key Drivers in Armed Conflict

1.Command and Control2 .Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Assessment

3 .Intelligence Support4 .Education, Training and Exercise

5 .NBC Defense6 .Special Operations7 .Electronic Warfare

8 .Interdiction9 .Logistics

10 .Power Projection11 .Combined Joint Operations

12 .Land Operations13 .Air Operations

14 .Maritime Operations.

Source: Alex P. Schmid. Comparative Analysis of Six Dutch Scenarios and Twenty Nato ‘Planning Situations’. Leiden, PIOOM, March 1998, p.6.

Table 38: Major Elements of overall military Table 38: Major Elements of overall military capability for NATO Armed Forcescapability for NATO Armed Forces

• commando operations for hostage liberation•intelligence-led precision strikes on terrorist training facilities•target hardening (protection critical infrastructures)

•assistance to police• perimeter control after a terrorist attack• major role when terrorism turns into insurgency

Table 39: Roles of the Military in Counter-Terr.Table 39: Roles of the Military in Counter-Terr.

Table 40: Classic Tenets of Counterinsurgency

• ‘Unity of Effort’ – integrated employment of political, military, economic, social and psychological countermeasures

• Win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population• Gain greater credibility than the insurgent. Legitimacy is the main objective• Deny insurgents sanctuary• Police primacy• Focus on intelligence• Selective and discriminate use of force• Avoid overreaction to insurgent violence• Separate insurgents from support base• Use clear and hold, ‘oil spot’ tactics to gradually sanitise areas of insurgents• Secure (host-)nation borders• Protect key infrastructure

10%

7%

40%

43%

Victory of Group

Defeated by Military

Defeated by Policing

Political Solution: Groupjoined political process

Table 41: How Terrorist Campaigns Came to an Table 41: How Terrorist Campaigns Came to an end (n=268)end (n=268)

Source: Seth Jones. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida. ST Monica, RAND, 2008, p.19

Tactical victory such as winning either a specific battle or, as a result of the cumulative effect of many such battlefield triumphs, a war;

Political-military victory (based on a sufficient number of tactical victories), entailing a state’s achieving some of its political and military goals; and

Grand Strategy victory or the strategic successes that occur through the destruction of a society, its military, economy, and institutions of governance when the winning side imposes a strategic change in the international system by destroying the ideological and moral values of a society and then re-establishing the foundations of the enemy state, including its government, economy and military power.

Source: cit. William C. Martel. Victory in War. Foundations of Modern Military Policy. Cambridge, University Press, 2007, pp. 9-10, 96-98.

Table 42: Definition of Levels of Victory in War Table 42: Definition of Levels of Victory in War (W.C. Martel, 2008)(W.C. Martel, 2008)

Thank you for your attention.

Questions?

Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence

School of International Relations,

University of St. Andrews

Instruments of International Legal Regime Instruments of International Legal Regime against Int. Terrorismagainst Int. Terrorism

1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft 183

1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 183

1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation

186

1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents

169

1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 165

1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 135

1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation

165

1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

150

1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf

138

% Ratification

Instruments of International Legal Regime Instruments of International Legal Regime against Int. Terrorism Cont.against Int. Terrorism Cont.

1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 138

1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 158

1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 163

2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 40

2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 17

2005 Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation

6

2005 Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf

4

1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 138

1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 158

% Ratification

Table : Elements and Dimensions of ScenariosTable : Elements and Dimensions of Scenarios

1. What are the driving forces? (logic of the story based on predetermined forces)

2. What are the critical uncertainties?3. What is inevitable?4. Which chains of events will lead to this or that scenario?5. Who are likely to be the winners and losers?6. What will be the challenges and responses?7. What is evolutionary, what is revolutionary (unbroken and

broken lines into future)8. What are the specific indicators for each scenario (current

weak or strong signals pointing to one or another possible future)?

Source: Alex P. Schmid. Comparative Analysis of Six Dutch Scenarios and Twenty Nato ‘Planning Situations’. Leiden, PIOOM, March 1998, p.6.

Table 29: Possible Scale of Terrorist Attacks Table 29: Possible Scale of Terrorist Attacks (1993 Estimates)(1993 Estimates)

Type of Attack Possible Fatalities

Estimated Likelihood

Efficient biological attack 1,000,000 Very low

Atomic bomb detonated in major US city 100,000 Very low

Successful attack on nuclear or toxic chemical plant

10,000 Very low

Simple, relatively inefficient biological or chemical attack in one skyscraper or stadium

1,000 Low

Conventional attack on a single train or airplane

250 Low

Suicide attack with explosives or firearms in a mall or crowded street

50-100 Modest

Source: Office of Technology Assessment. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks. U.S. Congress, 1993; cit. Michael E. O’ Hanlon et al. Protecting the American Homeland. A Preliminary Analysis. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2002, p.6.