Capstone2015 arashkamiar

The Impact of Three Strike Laws on Crime Rates, Imprisonment Rates and Average

Time Served

Public Policy Institute

2015 Capstone Project

Arash Kamiar

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes 29 states that implemented three-strike laws (TSL) between the years

of 1994-1996 and compares the imprisonment rate, crime rates and length of prison terms

to 19 states that have not implemented TSLs, in order to determine the efficacy of this

type of habitual offender law. Calculations were made on the crime and imprisonment

rate Pre-1994, 1978–1993, and then again in Post-1996, 1997-2012, for both groups. The

percent change for each crime category and imprisonment rate was calculated and

compared to determine if TSLs had a brought about a distinguishable impact on crime.

For all crime categories, except one, non-TSL states seem to outperform TSL states in

reducing crime. Both groups experienced increases in their imprisonment rate. Non-TSL

states had a higher rate of increase. This would seem to indicate that TSLs are not

necessarily the cause of increased imprisonment rates. When reviewing the average

length of time served, TSL and non-TSL states have similar prison terms for property and

violent crimes. This similarity is seen for both groups before implementation of TSLs as

well as after implementation of TSLs.

The Impact of Three Strike Laws on Crime Rates, Imprisonment Rates and Average Time Served

Introduction The purpose of this study is to contribute to the literature an analysis of what are

commonly referred to as three strike laws (TSL), a type of habitual offender law. This study

looks at the 29 states that have implemented TSLs and compares the imprisonment rate, crime

rates and length of prison terms to 19 states that have not implemented TSLs to determine the

efficacy of such laws.

Despite 45 years of unprecedented growth in the American imprisonment rate there was a

fixed period of time when the imprisonment rate was mostly static. From 1925 to 1972 the

number of prisoners fluctuated around 110 to 137 for every 100,000 citizens (National Research

Council, 2014). As of 2012, the United States has more people in jail by percentage and total

numbers than any other nation in the world. State and federal policies have led to a 266 percent

increase in the imprisonment rate from 131 prisoners in 1978 to 480 state and federal prisoners in

2012. The International Centre of Prison Studies, a partner of the University of Essex, pegs the

number of all incarcerated people in the United States at 737 for every 100,000 citizens in 2012.

The nation with the next highest imprisonment rate is Russia at 615 for every 100,000

citizens in 2012. The American prison epidemic when compared to other “westernized”

European regions/nations becomes even more apparent. By Comparison, the United States has

over 400 percent more people in prison for every 100,000 than the next highest, England/Wales,

where 148 out of 100,000 citizens are imprisoned (See Table 2).

From 1978 to 1993, crime rates increased but not with as much magnitude as the

imprisonment rate. For instance, violent crime grew by 34 percent and the imprisonment rate

grew by 63 percent from 1978-1993. In 1994-2012, the violent crime rate had fallen by nearly 85

percent and the property crime rate had fallen by 63 percent but the imprisonment rate still


increased by nearly 19 percent (see Table 1). Uniform Crime Statistics defines “violent crime”

as any crime of murder, rape, robbery or aggravated assault. “Property crime” includes crimes of

burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft.

Table 1: Comparing violent crime and property crime rates to the imprisonment rate.

Year Violent Crime Rate

Percent Change Property Crime Rate

Percent Change Imprisonment Rate

Percent Change

1978-1993 34.30% 5.33% 63.61% 1994-2012 -84.44% -62.99% 18.62% 1978-2012 -28.66% -62.37% 72.29%


Table 2: Nations with the highest prison population and imprisonment rate as of 2012.

"WESTERN" NATIONS RANKED BY PRISON POPULATION RATE

Country Total Population Population per 100,00

UNITED STATES 2,193,798 737 ENGLAND/WALES 80,002 148 SPAIN 63,991 144 SCOTLAND 6,872 134 NETHERLANDS 21,013 128 PORTUGAL 12,765 120 AUSTRIA 8,766 105

RANKED BY PRISON POPULATION RATE


UNITED STATES 2,193,798 737 RUSSIA 874,161 615 UKRAINE 162,602 350 SOUTH AFRICA 158,501 334 POLAND 89,546 235 MEXICO 214,450 196 BRAZIL 371,482 193

RANKED BY TOTAL PRISON POPULATION


UNITED STATES 2,193,798 737 CHINA 1,548,498 118 RUSSIA 874,161 615 BRAZIL 371,482 193 INDIA 332,112 30 MEXICO 214,450 196 UKRAINE 162,602 350 Source: Source: International Centre of Prison Studies.


History and Overview of Three Strike Laws in America

Habitual offender laws are not new. Increasing punishments for repeat criminals has

been a part of the American criminal justice paradigm for much of the 20th century (Zimring,

Hawkins and Kamin, 2001). What is unique about TSLs is the greater potential for a

consequence that is disproportional to the crime committed, which deals with the criminal justice

issue of proportionality (Kovandzic, 2002). TSLs have the potential to make a crime that most

would consider “not a big deal” equal to crimes that many would consider heinous.

Stories in which individuals are sent to prison for long periods of time for petty crimes

are not uncommon. For example, Curtis Wilkerson was sentenced to 25 years in prison in 1995

for stealing $2.50 white tube socks (Taibbi, 2013). As of 2013, Wilkerson has spent 18 years in

prison, costing California taxpayers $846,000. Leandro Andrade was sentenced to 50 years in

1995 for stealing $153.00 worth of children’s videotapes from K-mart. He had stolen the tapes

from two different K-marts, which meant he was prosecuted for two third-strike offenses (25

years in prison per third-strike conviction) (Jaffe, 2009).

The average prison sentence for murder is under 21 years in jail according the Federal

Bureau of Justice Statistics. If either Wilkerson or Andrade had committed murder they would

have received punishments similar to the ones they received for theft. It is possible that Andrade

would have received a lighter sentence if he had committed murder, as he would have been

convicted under only one third-strike for murder.

There are multiple systemic and policy changes that occurred throughout the United

States over the last three decades that are potential causes for the increase in the imprisonment

rate. The longer prison terms is one factor for the increase. The average prisoner released in

2012 spends 36 percent more time (nine months more) in prison than the average prisoner


released in 1990 (Pew, 2012).

“Get tough on crime”, is a political mantra that embodied a reigning perspective in the

1980s and 1990s that meant the harsher the punishments the more likely it was for crime rates to

drop and for recidivism rates to decrease (Greene, 2002). As attempts were made to mitigate

judicial discretion various types of legislation were passed that mandated prison terms. TSL’s

along with other sentencing laws such as “truth in sentencing” and mandatory minimum laws

moved the United States from an indeterminate sentencing system, which provided judges with

flexibility to decide punishments; to a system leaning towards determinate sentencing, which

lessened a judge’s flexibility to determine sentencing as they saw fit (Walsh, 2007).

Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri and Texas had implemented TSLs within their states

prior to the mid-1990s; However, Washington was the first of 29 states to implement a TSL

between 1994 and 1996. Zimring, Hawkins and Kamin have referred to the adaptation of these

laws as a “populist preemption of criminal justice policy-making” (15). Stories of individuals

committing more crimes after being released from prison, combined with political rhetoric

insisting on policies that “get tough on crime” led to wide spread support of sentencing policy

changes. For example, in Washington, the TSL measure was approved by 75 percent of voters.

California’s TSL referendum was approved by 71 percent of voters.


Table 3: States that implemented TSLs between 1994–1996.

States Year State Year Alaska 1996 New Jersey 1995 Arizona 1996 New Mexico 1994 Arkansas 1995 North Carolina 1994 California 1994 North Dakota 1995 Colorado 1994 Pennsylvania 1995 Connecticut 1994 South Carolina 1996 Delaware 1994 Tennessee 1994 Florida 1995 Utah 1995 Georgia 1995 Vermont 1995 Illinois 1994 Virginia 1994 Indiana 1994 Washington 1994 Louisiana 1994 Wisconsin 1994 Maryland 1994

Montana 1996 Nevada 1995

Figure 1: Three Strike Law States. Green indicates states with three strike policies. The figures show the imprisonment rate as of 2012.


Impact of Three Strike Laws The intended purpose of TSLs is to remove repeat offenders from society and to

discourage potential (and current) offenders from committing new crimes thereby creating safer

environments. TSLs are intended to keep the most severe of criminals behind bars. Not all TSLs

are the same. Although each state has similar attributes there are variances. The similarities

revolve around violent offences, which are universally considered strike worthy. There is a bit of

a crime potpourri in the delineation of TSLs throughout the nation. Some states, like Indiana and

Louisiana include drug sales as a strikeable offense; Washington includes treason in their TSL

measure; Florida includes prison escape and South Carolina includes embezzlement (Obeta 32).

Of the 31 states that have some iteration of a TSL California’s three-strike law is the

most consistently applied (Chen, 2008). A 2004 study by the Justice Policy Institute showed

that California’s TSL had little impact on violent crime but cost taxpayers $8 billion from 1994

to 2004 to imprison tens of thousands of individuals for nonviolent offenses (Schiraldi, 2004).

In 2012, the result of a study titled “Worse Policy After Bad: How and Why California's 'Three-

strikes' is a Complete Failure as Crime and Economic Policy, and What to Do About Either”

was released that demonstrated California’s higher imprisonment rate and harsher penalties did

not lower the crime rate (Parker, 2012).

The debate over the effectiveness of TSLs on a national level is a continuous one. A study

conducted by Radha Iyengar regarding California’s TSL concluded that participation in criminal

activity was reduced by 20 percent for second-strike offenders and declined by 28 percent for

third-strike eligible offenders. In the same report Iyengar demonstrates that third-strike eligible

criminals were more likely to commit violent crimes because punishment levels were the same

as lesser crimes. Further, criminals that were second or third-strike eligible were more likely to

migrate to surrounding states to commit crimes (Iyengar, 2008).


In contrast, a report published in 2000, Three Strikes and You’re Out: The

Implementation and Impact of Strike Laws states in regards to TSL’s “that this form of

legislation was carefully crafted to be largely symbolic.” According to Austin et al, TSL’s have

not impacted crime rates and virtually all states already had some form of habitual offender

statute:

From a national perspective the “three strikes and you’re out” movement was largely symbolic. It was not designed to have a significant impact on the criminal justice system. The laws were crafted so that in order to be “struck out” an offender would have to be convicted two or more, often three times for very serious, but rarely committed crimes. Most states knew that very few offenders have more than two prior convictions for these types of crimes. More significantly, all of the states had existing provisions which allowed the courts to sentence these types of offenders for very lengthy prison terms. Consequently, the vast majority of the targeted offender population was already serving long prison terms for these types of crimes. From this perspective the three strikes law movement is much to ado about nothing-and is having virtually no impact on current sentencing practices (emphasis added) (Austin et al, 2000).

A 2011 doctoral dissertation by Ngozi Anadi Obeta demonstrated that TSL’s have an

“overall statistically insignificant positive relationship with crime rates.” His analysis controlled

for demographic and economic variables such as unemployment rate, poverty rate and household

incomes (Obeta, 2011).

One reason TSL’s seem to show an insignificant impact on the crime rate may relate to

prosecutorial discretion. Even if TSLs could have been effective, the impact of the law may be

unseen as a result of prosecutorial circumvention. Aside from California and Alabama very few

states are applying TSLs on a grand scale. This is largely a result of a prosecutor’s authority to

charge bargain, fact bargain and ultimately drop charges if they so desire (Worral and Nugent-

Borakove, 2008).


TSL policy expanded the powers of a prosecutor, which was already fairly significant, by

allowing a more threatening starting point in the negotiation process. In a sense, prosecutors play

the role of a judge. They can decide if the required punishment fits the crime. If they do not

agree with a sentencing policy they are usually within their legal limits to reduce charges in order

to apply a more fitting consequence. Still, TSLs, provide prosecuting attorneys a more powerful

starting negotiating point with defendants.

Shichor and Sechrest (1996) echo this claim by asserting that charge bargaining is a

common occurrence in the negotiation stages between the prosecuting attorney and the

defendant. Prosecuting attorneys will bargain with strikes. This way a defendant is more likely to

take a plea deal rather than face a trial, especially when a second or third-strike could mandate a

much longer prison sentence if the defendant is found guilty.

Several studies claim TSLs actually increase crime severity. Kovandzic et al, analyzed

188 cities between 1980-1999 attempting to determine the “homicide promoting effects to three-

strike laws”. They found that cities in TSL states experienced a 13 to 14 percent increase in the

short-term homicide rate and an increase of 16 to 24 percent over the long-term compared to

cities without TSL (399-424).

The Kovandzic et al research, expanded upon a study conducted by Marvel and Moody in

2001, which described how criminals facing a third-strike were more inclined to “reduce the

chances of being caught” by killing individuals that could potentially implicate them. They

describe how, as a result of a TSL statute, a criminal is more inclined to escalate a crime to

ensure they are not apprehended because the consequences of crimes are the same whether it is a

“little” crime or a “big” crime.


Research Methodology

This study required multiple types of data sets. The following data were used to develop this

study and to evaluate the impact of TSL on the crime rate, imprisonment rate and prison term

length.

1. Imprisonment rates of all states from 1978 – 2012, provided by Bureau of Justice

Statistics.

2. Crime rates of all states from 1978 – 2012, provided by Uniform Crime Reporting

Statistics.

3. Average prison terms pre and post TSL implementation, provided by the Pew Center on

the States.

4. Identifying the TSL statute for each TSL state and the year of implementation.

A total of 31 states were identified as having a TSL. For the purpose of this study;

however, only 27 states were included in the TSL group, as these were the states that had

implemented a TSL between 1994 and 1996. The purpose for this delineation was to ensure that

an equitable analysis was conducted between TSL and non-TSL states.

The TSL states that were not included in the analyses were Alabama, implemented TSL

in 1977; Mississippi, implemented TSL in 1977; Missouri, implemented TSL in 1982; And,

Texas, implemented TSL in 1982.

The imprisonment rate and crime rates were analyzed by treating TSL states as one group

and non-TSL states as another group. Calculations were conducted on the crime and

imprisonment rate Pre-1994, 1978–1993, and then again Post-1996, 1997 – 2012, for both

groups. The percent change for each crime category and imprisonment rate was calculated and

compared to determine if TSLs had a distinguishable impact on crime rates, imprisonment rates


and prison terms.

The years 1994, 1995 and 1996 were not included in the analyses. These years were in

flux as the legislation passed and implementation occurred throughout TSL states. By 1997, all

TSLs were implemented. Additionally, by setting clear and consistent time periods non-TSL

states were able to undergo the same analysis as TSL states.

Table 4

States Organized for Crime and Imprisonment Comparisons

TSL States Non-TSL States Alaska Hawaii Arizona Idaho Arkansas Iowa California Kansas Colorado Kentucky Connecticut Maine Delaware Massachusetts Florida Michigan Georgia Minnesota Illinois Nebraska Indiana New Hampshire Louisiana New York Maryland Ohio Montana Oklahoma Nevada Oregon New Jersey Rhode Island New Mexico South Dakota North Carolina West Virginia North Dakota Wyoming Pennsylvania

South Carolina Tennessee Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Wisconsin


By utilizing a smaller subset of TSL and non-TSL states analysis was made comparing

average prison terms of TSL and non-TSL states. In 2012, The Pew Center on the States, a

division of the Pew Charitable Trust, conducted a study in which they calculated the

average time served in prison for 35 states. They calculated the average length of stay

(LOS) for prisoners released in 1990 and in 2009.

Pew organized crimes in three different categories to determine LOS by crime

type: 1) Violent Crimes 2) Property Crimes and 3) Drug Crimes. Their data were derived

from National Corrections Reporting Program, U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of

Justice Statistics (Time Served, 2012).

Of the 35 states in the Pew report 31 were utilized and separated into two different

groups as TSL States and non-TSL States. Only the violent crimes and property crimes

categories were used to compare if LOS between TSL states and non-TSL states were

impacted by TSLs.


Table 5

States Organized for Average Length of Imprisonment Comparisons

TSL States Non-TSL States Arkansas Hawaii California Iowa Colorado Kentucky Florida Michigan Georgia Minnesota Illinois Nebraska Louisiana New Hampshire Nevada New York New Jersey Oklahoma North Carolina Oregon North Dakota South Dakota Pennsylvania West Virginia South Carolina

Tennessee Utah Virginia Washington Wisconsin

RESULTS TSL states, as a group, have a higher imprisonment and higher crime rates when

compared to non-TSL states. As shown in Table 6, the rates are consistently higher and this

remains evident when looking at the two time periods that are of interest to this report, 1978–

1993 and 1997-2012. The actual rate was not a determinate of results. Instead, what was

considered and compared was the rate of growth, or lack thereof, of the imprisonment and crime

rates between TSL and Non-TSL states (Appendix A).


Table 6: TSL states, as a whole, have a higher imprisonment and crime rates.

Imprisonment and Violent Crime Rates of TSL and Non-TSL States

1978 - 1993 Imprisonment

Rate

Total Violent Crime

Murder and nonnegligent

Manslaughter Rate Forcible

Rape Rate Robbery

Rate Aggravated Assault Rate

TSL States 206.57 517.80 8.01 37.86 159.45 312.49 Non-TSL 149.20 375.53 5.22 29.58 118.49 222.24 Difference 57.37 142.27 2.79 8.28 40.96 90.25

1997 -

2012 Imprisonment Rate

Total Violent Crime


Manslaughter Rate Forcible

Rape Rate Robbery

Rate Aggravated Assault Rate

TSL States 406.90 468.48 5.63 34.44 123.90 304.52 Non-TSL 323.06 319.63 3.34 33.37 74.59 208.32 Difference 83.84 148.85 2.29 1.07 49.31 96.20 Table 7

Property Crime Rates of TSL and Non-TSL States 1978 - 1993 Total Property Crime Rate Burglary Rate Larceny-Theft Rate Motor Vehicle Theft Rate

TSL States 4,778.98 1,260.04 3,115.18 403.52 Non-TSL 4,164.99 1,072.09 2,714.05 378.85

Difference 613.99 187.95 401.13 24.67

1997 - 2012 Total Property Crime Rate Burglary Rate Larceny-Theft Rate Motor Vehicle Theft Rate

TSL States 3,562.53 760.68 2,448.99 352.87 Non-TSL 3,032.32 628.57 2,147.25 256.50

Difference 530.21 132.11 301.74 96.37

Figures 2 and 3 show the imprisonment and crime rates from 1978-1993 to 1997-2012 for

TSL states. Figures 4 and 5 show the same categories but for non-TSL states. Figure 6 and Table

8 compares the percent change from 1978-1993 to 1997-2012 of TSL and non-TSL states. Non-

TSL states seem to outperform TSL states in terms of lowering crime rates over the course of the

last 32 years, which is an indication that TSLs may not have been effective in lowering crime.


Figure 2

Figure 3

Imprisonment Rate

Violent Crime

Murder and

nonnegligent

Manslaughter Rate

Forcible Rape Rate

Robbery Rate

Aggravated

Assault Rate

1978 -‐ 1993 206.57 517.80 8.01 37.86 159.45 312.49 1997 -‐ 2012 406.90 468.48 5.63 34.44 123.90 304.52 Percent Change 49.23% -‐10.53% -‐42.27% -‐9.93% -‐28.69% -‐2.62%

0.00 100.00 200.00 300.00 400.00 500.00

Violent Crime Rate per 100,000 TSL States: Change in Violent Crime

Imprisonment Rate

Property Crime Rate

Burglary Rate

Larceny-‐Theft Rate

Motor Vehicle Theft Rate

1978 -‐ 1993 206.57 4778.98 1260.04 3115.18 403.52 1997 -‐ 2012 406.90 3562.53 760.68 2448.99 352.87 Percent Change 49.23% -‐34.15% -‐65.65% -‐27.20% -‐14.35%

0.00

1000.00

2000.00

3000.00

4000.00

5000.00

Property Crime Rate per 100,000 TSL States: Change in Property Crime


Figure 4

Figure 5

Imprisonment Rate

Violent Crime

Murder and

nonnegligent

Manslaughter Rate

Forcible Rape Rate

Robbery Rate

Aggravated

Assault Rate

1978-‐1993 149.20 375.53 5.22 29.58 118.49 222.24 1997-‐2012 323.06 319.63 3.34 33.37 74.59 208.32 Percent Change 53.82% -‐17.49% -‐56.20% 11.38% -‐58.85% -‐6.68%

0.00

100.00

200.00

300.00

400.00

Violent Crime Rate per 100,000

Non-‐TSL States: Change in Violent Crime Rate

Imprisonment Rate

Property Crime Rate

Burglary Rate

Larceny-‐Theft Rate


1978-‐1993 149.20 4164.99 1072.09 2714.05 378.85 1997-‐2012 323.06 3032.32 628.57 2147.25 256.50 Percent Change 53.82% -‐37.35% -‐70.56% -‐26.40% -‐47.70%

0.00

1000.00

2000.00

3000.00

4000.00

5000.00

Property Crime Rate per 100,000 Non-‐TSL: Change in Property Crime Rates


Figure 6: Comparing the percent change in crime rates and imprisonment rate of TSL and non-‐TSL states.

Table 8

Comparing Violent Crime and Imprisonment Rates

TSL States Imprisonment

Rate

Total Violent Crime


Manslaughter Rate

Forcible Rape Rate

Robbery Rate

Aggravated Assault Rate

1978 - 1993 206.57 517.80 8.01 37.86 159.45 312.49 1997 - 2012 406.90 468.48 5.63 34.44 123.90 304.52

Percent Change 49.23% -10.53% -42.27% -9.93% -28.69% -2.62%

Non-TSL States

Imprisonment Rate

Total Violent Crime


Manslaughter Rate

Forcible Rape Rate

Robbery Rate


1978 - 1993 149.20 375.53 5.22 29.58 118.49 222.24 1997 - 2012 323.06 319.63 3.34 33.37 74.59 208.32

Percent Change 53.82% -17.49% -56.20% 11.38% -58.85% -6.68% Table 9

Comparing Property Crime Rate

TSL States Total Property Crime

Rate Burglary Rate Larceny-Theft Rate Motor Vehicle

Theft Rate 1978 - 1993 4778.98 1260.04 3115.18 403.52 1997 - 2012 3562.53 760.68 2448.99 352.87 Percent Change -34.15% -65.65% -27.20% -14.35%

Non-TSL States Total Property Crime

Rate Burglary Rate Larceny-Theft Rate Motor Vehicle

Theft Rate 1978 - 1993 4164.99 1072.09 2714.05 378.85 1997 - 2012 3032.32 628.57 2147.25 256.50 Percent Change -37.35% -70.56% -26.40% -47.70%

Imprisonment+Rate+ Violent+Crime++

Murder+and+nonnegligent+Manslaughte

r+Rate+

Forcible+Rape+Rate+ Robbery+Rate+ Aggravated+

Assault+Rate+Property+Crime+Rate+ Burglary+Rate+ Larceny?TheA+Rate+

Motor+Vehicle+TheA+

Rate+

TSL+STATES+ 49.23%+ ?10.53%+ ?42.27%+ ?9.93%+ ?28.69%+ ?2.62%+ ?34.15%+ ?65.65%+ ?27.20%+ ?14.35%+NON?TSL+STATES+ 53.82%+ ?17.49%+ ?56.20%+ 11.38%+ ?58.85%+ ?6.68%+ ?37.35%+ ?70.56%+ ?26.40%+ ?47.70%+

?80.00%+

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?40.00%+

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0.00%+

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60.00%+

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PERC

ENTA

GE)CHA

NGE

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Percent)Change)of)Crime)Rates)of)TSL)and)Non;TSL)states))Comparing)1978;1993)TO)1997;2012)

)


The crime rate decreases are generally greater in non-TSL states. This is true for all crime

categories except for the crime category of “forcible rape”. It cannont be shown that TSL’s are

responsible for the large increases in the imprisonment rate. The rate of increase between TSL

and non-TSL states are similar. Both groups increased their imprisonment rate by approximately

50 percent. TSL states increased imprisonment by 49 percent and non-TSL states increased by

54 percent. If TSLs were responsible for increased rates of imprisonment the analysis may have

indicated a larger percentage of increase among TSL states. Instead, non-TSL states had a higher

rate of increase.

The results demonstrate that TSLs do not seem to have a measurable impact on the crime

rates or the imprisonment rate. This becomes more evident when crime and imprisonment trends

are compared over the last 32 years between TSL and non-TSL states. As Figures 7-9 show,

although TSL states have higher crime and imprisonment rates, the increases and decreases seem

to move in parallel with non-TSL states (Appendix B).


Figure 7

Figure 8

0.00

100.00

200.00

300.00

400.00

500.00

600.00

700.00

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Violent Crime Rate of TSL and Non-TSL States. From 1978-2012.

TSL States Non-TSL States

0.00

1,000.00

2,000.00

3,000.00

4,000.00

5,000.00

6,000.00

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Property Crime Rate of TSL and Non-TSL States. From 1978-2012.

TSL States Non-‐TSL States


Figure 9

Both TSL and Non-TSL states experienced an increase in the average length of stay

(LOS) from 1990 to 2009. Figures 10 and 11 show the LOS remains consistent between both

groups for both crime categories in 1990, before TSL implementation, and in 2009, after TSL

implementation. The results demonstrate that TSLs may not have had a measurable impact on

LOS. In fact, non-TSL states have longer prison terms for property crimes in 2009 (Appendix C).

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Imprisonment Rate of TSL and Non-TSL States. From 1978-2012.

TSL States Non-‐TSL States


Figure 10

Figure 11

1990 2009 Percent Change TSL States 3.51 4.71 25.48% Non-‐TSL States 3.59 4.58 21.62%

0 0.5 1

1.5 2

2.5 3

3.5 4

4.5 5

YEARS

Violent Crimes Average Length of Stay

1990 2009 TSL States 1.87 2.18 14.22% Non-‐TSL States 2.01 2.33 13.73%

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

YEARS

Property Crimes Average Length of Stay


Conclusion

For all of the categories that this study looked at, none could demonstrate clearly that

TSLs have had any type of significant impact. For all crime categories, except one, non-TSL

states seem to outperform TSL states in reducing crime. This may indicate that the threat of a

harsher punishment via a TSL is not necessary to experience a reduction in crime. Both groups

experienced increases in their imprisonment rate. Non-TSL states actually had a higher rate of

increase at 53 percent, while TSL states rate increased by 49 percent. This would seem to

indicate that TSLs are not necessarily the cause of the increased imprisonment rates.

As shown in Figures 15-17, this was seen when the crime rates and imprisonment rate of

TSL and non-TSL states are looked at over the course of 32 years. The violent crime rates,

property crime rates and imprisonment rate of TSL and non-TSL states look to parallel each

other prior to TSL implementation and after TSL implementation.

For all crime categories, except one, non-TSL states seem to outperform TSL states in

reducing crime. This may indicate that the threat of a harsher punishment via a TSL is not

necessary to experience a reduction in crime. Both groups experienced increases in their

imprisonment rate. Non-TSL states actually had a higher rate of increase at 53 percent, while

TSL states rate increased by 49 percent. This would seem to indicate that TSLs are not

necessarily the cause of the increased imprisonment rates.

When reviewing the average length of time served, TSL and non-TSL states have very

similar prison terms for property and violent crimes. This similarity is seen for both groups

before implementation of TSLs as well as after implementation of TSLs.

Although TSLs may not be a direct cause of the increases in the imprisonment rate nor

the decreases in the crime rate they do have an impact. The impact is experienced on a personal

level. The stories of Curtis Wilkerson and Leandro Andrade, both sentenced to what are


effectively life-terms for petty theft are not unique. Tens of thousands of individuals are in prison

for non-violent offenses as a result of TSLs.

The states with TSL and other “get tough on crime” measures like mandatory minimum

and truth in sentencing laws may have unintentionally encouraged an environment where the

punishments measured out are not fitting to the crime. Also, TSL states have equated crimes of

violence with lesser crimes.

Continued research in the area of TSLs and other types of sentencing laws may want to

focus on sub-sets of states within the research topic. For instance, further dividing TSL states and

non-TSL states into sub-groups based on crime rates, demographics, economic trends or regions

of the United Stats may provide a more even comparison.

In the last few years states have begun to roll back some of their harsher sentencing laws.

California voters, for instance, passed Proposition 36, Three Strikes Reform Act in 2012, which

has resulted in the release of over 1,500 prisoners (Proposition 36 Progress Report, 2014).

Louisiana and Texas are working towards changing policies to encourage greater participation in

incarceration alternatives (Kaste, 2014).

There is value in pinpointing which specific sentencing policies caused an increase or

decrease in crime rate, imprisonment rate or prison term length. There is also value in the broad

overview of sentencing policies that make up national trends. In the case of the United States, the

greater question may be less about which policies have caused the prison rate to increase and

more about whether prison, as a consequence, is effective in reducing crime and creating a more

stable society in the first place.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Anadi, Ngozi Obeta. The Impact of Three Strike Laws on Crime Rates in the United States: A

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APPENDICIES

APPENDIX A

This table shows the average imprisonment and crime rates of all states within two different time periods. “Pre1994” includes the years 1978 – 1993. “Post1996” includes the years 1997 – 2012. The table also shows the percent change of the imprisonment and crimes rates from Pre1994 to Post1996.

States

Three-Strike State

Time Imprisonment Rate

Violent Crime


Manslaughter Rate

Forcible Rape Rate

Robbery Rate


Property Crime Rate

Burglary Rate

Larceny-Theft Rate


Alabama 1.00 Pre1994 280.64 560.96 10.99 29.50 123.47 397.03 3998.46 1202.78 2500.44 294.78

Post1996 596.05 453.49 7.47 33.15 132.51 280.32 3918.24 971.38 2658.09 288.83

Percent Change

52.92% -23.70% -47.11% 11.01% 6.82% -41.63% -2.05% -23.82% 5.93% -2.06%

Alaska 1.00 Pre1994 267.63 564.48 10.45 77.35 97.09 379.62 5187.42 1093.46 3528.36 559.20

Post1996 399.89 628.33 5.45 76.54 84.29 462.05 3456.69 562.41 2554.58 339.68

Percent Change

33.07% 10.16% -91.74% -1.05% -15.18% 17.84% -50.07% -94.42% -38.12% -64.62%

Arizona 1.00 Pre1994 276.28 605.69 8.26 41.61 156.54 399.28 6780.55 1773.14 4461.47 545.94

Post1996 534.92 508.64 7.29 33.40 142.11 325.85 4860.06 985.23 3120.29 754.49

Percent Change

48.35% -19.08% -13.38% -24.57% -10.16% -22.53% -39.52% -79.97% -42.98% 27.64%

Arkansas 1.00 Pre1994 219.41 415.36 8.93 32.32 90.61 283.48 3683.04 1064.51 2391.33 227.21

Post1996 480.17 489.08 6.40 39.99 89.31 353.40 3810.88 1023.67 2543.68 243.49

Percent Change

54.31% 15.07% -39.55% 19.19% -1.46% 19.78% 3.35% -3.99% 5.99% 6.69%

California 1.00 Pre1994 210.04 560.96 10.99 29.50 123.47 397.03 3998.46 1202.78 2500.44 295.26

Post1996 455.81 453.49 7.47 33.15 132.51 280.32 3918.24 971.38 2658.09 288.83

Percent Change

53.92% -23.70% -47.11% 11.01% 6.82% -41.63% -2.05% -23.82% 5.93% -2.23%

Colorado 1.00 Pre1994 151.70 509.77 6.07 44.46 127.41 331.83 6051.58 1546.55 4064.86 440.19

Post1996 420.54 351.28 3.63 43.55 74.92 229.18 3463.74 643.49 2437.91 382.34

Percent Change

63.93% -45.12% -67.13% -2.08% -70.07% -44.79% -74.71% -140.34%

-66.74% -15.13%

Connecticut 1.00 Pre1994 154.68 438.56 4.91 24.10 202.58 206.97 4737.26 1289.23 2843.83 604.19

Post1996 380.38 312.66 3.38 20.35 118.71 170.21 2671.81 491.79 1879.80 300.19

Percent Change

59.33% -40.27% -45.37% -18.43% -70.66% -21.60% -77.31% -162.15%

-51.28% -101.27%

Deleware 1.00 Pre1994 288.16 524.14 5.29 55.48 140.79 322.56 5010.23 1200.00 3442.72 367.51

Post1996 468.13 662.44 4.15 46.99 184.30 427.04 3632.94 753.19 2559.83 319.88

Percent Change

38.44% 20.88% -27.41% -18.06% 23.61% 24.47% -37.91% -59.32% -34.49% -14.89%

Florida 1.00 Pre1994 276.58 1013.16 11.49 51.91 336.33 613.42 7010.26 2101.30 4301.86 607.13

Post1996 493.78 727.07 5.73 37.68 188.24 495.41 4432.50 1041.46 2947.09 443.96

Percent Change

43.99% -39.35% -100.76% -37.77% -78.67% -23.82% -58.16% -101.77%

-45.97% -36.75%

Georgia 1.00 Pre1994 277.90 598.86 12.36 42.85 209.28 334.38 5104.33 1498.72 3148.17 457.43

Post1996 541.15 472.93 6.85 25.00 161.06 280.04 4118.14 941.54 2734.67 441.93

Percent Change

48.65% -26.63% -80.38% -71.40% -29.93% -19.40% -23.95% -59.18% -15.12% -3.51%

Hawaii 0.00 Pre1994 125.11 259.00 4.83 33.28 121.98 98.92 5972.43 1404.53 4142.97 424.93

Post1996 313.08 260.10 2.26 28.37 87.76 141.70 4460.09 799.68 3143.68 516.68

Percent Change

60.04% 0.42% -114.13% -17.29% -38.98% 30.19% -33.91% -75.64% -31.79% 17.76%

Idaho 0.00 Pre1994 145.99 259.06 3.34 22.34 26.96 206.43 3832.08 939.01 2704.76 188.33

Post1996 442.31 244.31 2.19 35.24 17.21 189.64 2624.93 537.80 1934.44 152.69

Percent Change

66.99% -6.04% -52.57% 36.60% -56.64% -8.85% -45.99% -74.60% -39.82% -23.34%

Illinois 1.00 Pre1994 173.92 823.01 9.78 35.31 346.41 431.51 4,909.16 1,226.36 3,072.89 609.91

Post1996 356.34 580.16 6.79 31.62 193.43 348.31 3,236.71 645.21 2,269.79 321.65

Percent Change

51.19% -41.86% -44.01% -11.68% -79.09% -23.89% -51.67% -90.07% -35.38% -89.62%

Indiana 1.00 Pre1994 178.50 373.71 6.70 31.51 109.54 225.95 4003.21 1008.89 2609.77 384.54

Post1996 383.98 358.11 5.68 28.36 110.91 213.15 3380.89 729.41 2341.54 309.91

Percent Change

53.51% -4.36% -17.93% -11.08% 1.23% -6.01% -18.41% -38.32% -11.46% -24.08%

Iowa 0.00 Pre1994 111.06 231.71 2.09 14.91 43.57 171.14 3895.22 893.03 2818.46 183.73

Post1996 281.99 282.89 1.60 27.21 39.81 214.30 2789.81 598.93 2018.67 172.26

Percent Change

60.62% 18.09% -30.47% 45.22% -9.43% 20.14% -39.62% -49.11% -39.62% -6.66%

Kansas 0.00 Pre1994 182.58 415.36 8.93 32.32 90.61 283.48 3683.04 1064.51 2391.33 227.21

Post1996 318.07 489.08 6.40 39.99 89.31 353.40 3810.88 1023.67 2543.68 243.49

Percent Change

42.60% 15.07% -39.55% 19.19% -1.46% 19.78% 3.35% -3.99% 5.99% 6.69%

Kentucky 0.00 Pre1994 168.71 339.61 7.71 24.31 84.56 223.05 2918.92 863.09 1840.08 215.76

Post1996 430.31 272.32 4.74 30.66 84.96 151.95 2623.32 668.48 1753.76 201.08

Percent Change

60.79% -24.71% -62.80% 20.71% 0.47% -46.79% -11.27% -29.11% -4.92% -7.30%

Louisiana 1.00 Pre1994 333.91 755.80 15.01 40.07 220.52 480.20 5003.06 1393.53 3166.58 442.95

Post1996 814.28 665.96 12.27 32.61 153.00 468.04 4316.26 1040.59 2892.79 382.91

Percent Change

58.99% -13.49% -22.36% -22.86% -44.13% -2.60% -15.91% -33.92% -9.46% -15.68%

Maine 0.00 Pre1994 92.73 160.84 2.34 16.65 27.01 114.82 3595.06 944.94 2466.84 183.28

Post1996 141.53 115.89 1.70 25.80 24.53 63.93 2563.05 546.81 1913.62 102.60

Percent Change

34.48% -38.78% -37.87% 35.47% -10.09% -79.61% -40.27% -72.81% -28.91% -78.64%

Maryland 1.00 Pre1994 282.95 855.44 9.99 40.05 351.96 453.43 5017.70 1285.98 3186.46 545.25

Post1996 403.90 680.55 8.76 24.75 241.14 405.94 3679.09 714.63 2464.38 500.14

Percent Change

29.95% -25.70% -14.13% -61.82% -45.96% -11.70% -36.38% -79.95% -29.30% -9.02%

Massachusetts 0.00 Pre1994 96.91 619.11 3.73 29.49 199.25 386.65 4577.44 1250.93 2394.85 931.66

Post1996 157.34 488.74 2.46 26.98 108.26 351.01 2499.63 547.77 1640.38 311.47

Percent Change

38.41% -26.67% -51.27% -9.31% -84.04% -10.15% -83.12% -128.37%

-45.99% -199.12%

Michigan 0.00 Pre1994 252.65 720.64 10.33 62.26 254.65 393.39 5507.64 1442.88 3369.66 695.09

Post1996 475.43 531.00 6.59 49.73 128.10 346.57 3244.09 732.44 2056.03 455.62

Percent Change

46.86% -35.71% -56.59% -25.21% -98.79% -13.51% -69.77% -97.00% -63.89% -52.56%

Minnesota 0.00 Pre1994 61.88 262.96 2.49 30.95 95.36 134.15 4127.81 1023.18 2801.39 303.26

Post1996 159.36 273.16 2.24 40.48 81.58 148.87 3092.65 553.86 2290.10 248.72

Percent Change

61.17% 3.73% -10.86% 23.54% -16.89% 9.89% -33.47% -84.74% -22.33% -21.93%

Mississippi 1.00 Pre1994 243.65 323.41 11.76 31.64 81.66 198.34 3192.76 1139.64 1859.63 193.51

Post1996 673.26 323.49 8.52 35.95 102.70 176.29 3424.92 1002.44 2151.34 271.18

Percent Change

63.81% 0.02% -38.08% 12.00% 20.48% -12.51% 6.78% -13.69% 13.56% 28.64%

Missouri 1.00 Pre1994 207.33 581.82 9.41 30.61 194.79 347.00 4321.59 1239.68 2651.35 430.59

Post1996 503.83 510.48 6.55 26.39 125.25 352.25 3844.09 760.91 2677.79 405.36

Percent Change

58.85% -13.97% -43.70% -15.96% -55.52% 1.49% -12.42% -62.92% 0.99% -6.22%

Montana 1.00 Pre1994 137.23 188.44 3.76 20.22 26.86 137.61 4278.96 783.01 3241.14 254.80

Post1996 354.82 294.24 2.96 31.56 23.41 236.30 3096.02 405.13 2497.44 195.74

Percent Change

61.32% 35.96% -27.06% 35.94% -14.77% 41.77% -38.21% -93.28% -29.78% -30.17%

Nebraska 0.00 Pre1994 116.77 261.94 3.27 23.98 57.83 176.84 3752.91 767.88 2784.60 200.44

Post1996 232.54 322.03 3.09 30.88 66.28 221.82 3389.95 543.51 2552.75 293.69

Percent Change

49.79% 18.66% -5.87% 22.35% 12.76% 20.28% -10.71% -41.28% -9.08% 31.75%

Nevada 1.00 Pre1994 367.79 740.76 12.53 61.96 330.61 335.68 6286.39 1928.39 3764.28 593.72

Post1996 487.40 648.91 7.65 42.78 230.57 367.85 3788.06 942.13 2120.24 725.68

Percent Change

24.54% -14.15% -63.81% -44.82% -43.39% 8.75% -65.95% -104.68%

-77.54% 18.18%

New Hampshire 0.00 Pre1994 81.38 139.38 2.28 24.12 28.51 84.48 3481.46 850.01 2397.51 233.96

Post1996 196.59 153.16 1.23 33.06 32.28 86.39 2174.05 373.29 1680.56 120.16

Percent Change

58.60% 9.00% -85.71% 27.05% 11.69% 2.21% -60.14% -127.71%

-42.66% -94.71%

New Jersey 1.00 Pre1994 177.01 577.05 5.63 30.48 271.89 269.04 4811.06 1216.84 2846.17 748.07

Post1996 317.99 361.96 4.20 14.67 156.05 187.06 2530.11 511.77 1692.16 326.18

Percent Change

44.33% -59.43% -34.08% -107.80% -74.23% -43.82% -90.15% -137.77%

-68.20% -129.34%

New Mexico 1.00 Pre1994 153.71 713.12 10.37 48.28 123.07 531.39 5614.91 1629.93 3637.57 347.42

Post1996 303.07 704.07 7.89 51.33 117.23 527.65 4300.11 1116.48 2768.77 414.89

Percent Change

49.28% -1.29% -31.46% 5.94% -4.99% -0.71% -30.58% -45.99% -31.38% 16.26%

New York 0.00 Pre1994 219.06 1023.05 11.97 29.99 564.47 416.61 5082.66 1388.57 2904.39 789.70

Post1996 331.87 478.74 4.63 17.51 190.36 266.27 2276.75 405.73 1658.52 212.49

Percent Change

33.99% -113.70%

-158.43% -71.33% -196.53%

-56.46% -123.24% -242.24%

-75.12% -271.63%

North Carolina 1.00 Pre1994 254.74 505.13 9.52 26.63 109.86 359.14 4259.54 1368.01 2661.22 230.32

Post1996 355.69 464.81 6.35 25.88 141.47 291.08 4131.44 1197.23 2649.88 284.29

Percent Change

28.38% -8.67% -49.90% -2.87% 22.35% -23.38% -3.10% -14.26% -0.43% 18.99%

North Dakota 1.00 Pre1994 51.13 62.57 1.35 12.81 9.03 39.37 2679.28 424.68 2118.01 136.60

Post1996 185.47 148.86 1.76 33.03 10.81 103.29 2147.38 347.56 1641.28 158.53

Percent Change

72.43% 57.97% 23.40% 61.20% 16.47% 61.89% -24.77% -22.19% -29.05% 13.83%

Ohio 0.00 Pre1994 218.77 457.96 6.33 38.99 180.16 232.50 4286.30 1119.76 2752.49 414.02

Post1996 421.43 343.41 4.39 38.31 149.17 151.54 3593.56 866.00 2420.87 306.71

Percent Change

48.09% -33.36% -44.10% -1.76% -20.78% -53.42% -19.28% -29.30% -13.70% -34.99%

Oklahoma 0.00 Pre1994 288.22 466.88 8.17 39.45 115.43 303.84 4802.92 1533.33 2761.56 508.03

Post1996 652.19 505.19 5.78 42.16 89.03 368.24 3939.28 1007.41 2579.89 351.99

Percent Change

55.81% 7.58% -41.30% 6.43% -29.65% 17.49% -21.92% -52.20% -7.04% -44.33%

Oregon 0.00 Pre1994 167.28 513.43 4.83 45.84 163.04 299.73 5875.39 1598.09 3853.06 424.24

Post1996 343.30 307.38 2.41 34.45 77.68 192.86 4142.24 710.84 3025.48 405.93

Percent Change

51.27% -67.03% -100.52% -33.07% -109.90%

-55.41% -41.84% -124.82%

-27.35% -4.51%

Pennsylvania 1.00 Pre1994 130.47 369.96 5.86 23.99 163.16 176.91 2964.14 789.18 1779.48 395.48

Post1996 345.87 404.89 5.39 27.86 146.89 224.79 2459.64 461.42 1759.73 238.48

Percent Change

62.28% 8.63% -8.70% 13.87% -11.08% 21.30% -20.51% -71.03% -1.12% -65.84%

Rhode Island 0.00 Pre1994 109.48 385.73 3.83 22.68 113.12 246.09 4787.37 1322.09 2689.16 776.10

Post1996 199.06 270.78 2.90 32.91 75.87 159.13 2923.19 581.13 1987.73 354.35

Percent Change

45.00% -42.45% -31.90% 31.07% -49.10% -54.65% -63.77% -127.50%

-35.29% -119.02%

South Carolina 1.00 Pre1994 343.46 751.25 10.28 43.48 125.54 571.94 4605.50 1410.73 2892.54 302.21

Post1996 521.13 768.18 7.31 41.41 136.38 583.09 4366.80 1038.70 2958.20 367.70

Percent Change

34.09% 2.20% -40.63% -4.98% 7.95% 1.91% -5.47% -35.82% 2.22% 17.81%

South Dakota 0.00 Pre1994 143.19 143.68 2.04 24.86 15.91 100.86 2666.13 562.21 1983.99 119.91

Post1996 390.24 211.90 2.41 51.63 17.19 140.69 2056.23 392.31 1554.13 109.83

Percent Change

63.31% 32.20% 15.06% 51.85% 7.42% 28.31% -29.66% -43.31% -27.66% -9.19%

Tennessee 1.00 Pre1994 179.97 529.58 9.69 41.80 184.06 294.04 3968.58 1273.72 2230.41 464.44

Post1996 415.89 705.26 7.01 38.17 163.13 496.96 4102.04 1024.01 2686.32 391.79

Percent Change

56.73% 24.91% -38.27% -9.51% -12.83% 40.83% 3.25% -24.39% 16.97% -18.54%

Texas 1.00 Pre1994 257.68 621.33 14.00 47.91 217.96 341.44 6172.51 1807.09 3686.18 679.26

Post1996 690.42 521.13 5.81 35.74 150.18 329.39 4233.30 941.49 2893.79 398.09

Percent Change

62.68% -19.23% -141.12% -34.07% -45.14% -3.66% -45.81% -91.94% -27.38% -70.63%

Utah 1.00 Pre1994 104.58 274.49 3.26 29.48 63.61 178.14 5172.91 995.43 3922.30 255.18

Post1996 236.65 240.42 2.04 37.25 50.48 150.66 3909.33 615.11 2990.06 304.11

Percent Change

55.81% -14.17% -59.63% 20.87% -26.03% -18.24% -32.32% -61.83% -31.18% 16.09%

Vermont 1.00 Pre1994 95.64 139.88 2.59 26.61 19.92 90.73 4115.82 1136.08 2775.61 204.12

Post1996 229.50 124.23 1.88 22.79 14.22 85.31 2509.43 566.14 1835.71 107.57

Percent Change

58.33% -12.60% -37.87% -16.79% -40.09% -6.34% -64.01% -100.67%

-51.20% -89.76%

Virginia 1.00 Pre1994 223.38 318.24 8.08 27.43 116.78 165.97 3880.17 878.09 2752.66 249.44

Post1996 457.54 270.86 5.29 23.16 91.68 150.74 2698.64 428.83 2061.87 207.97

Percent Change

51.18% -17.49% -52.72% -18.46% -27.38% -10.10% -43.78% -104.77%

-33.50% -19.94%

Washington 1.00 Pre1994 147.60 453.09 4.94 55.03 131.35 261.75 6018.68 1624.50 4017.06 377.11

Post1996 260.56 350.81 3.08 42.89 97.26 207.56 4472.84 910.93 2994.71 567.13

Percent Change

43.35% -29.15% -60.77% -28.30% -35.05% -26.11% -34.56% -78.34% -34.14% 33.51%

West Virginia 0.00 Pre1994 80.72 170.95 5.76 18.19 42.21 104.76 2247.95 654.99 1419.58 173.39

Post1996 282.33 282.01 3.81 19.94 42.74 215.49 2388.36 589.38 1619.71 179.27

Percent Change

71.41% 39.38% -51.15% 8.77% 1.24% 51.39% 5.88% -11.13% 12.36% 3.28%

Wisconsin 1.00 Pre1994 118.94 318.24 8.08 27.43 116.78 165.97 3880.17 878.09 2752.66 249.44

Post1996 381.52 270.86 5.29 23.16 91.68 150.74 2698.64 428.83 2061.87 207.97

Percent Change

68.82% -17.49% -52.72% -18.46% -27.38% -10.10% -43.78% -104.77%

-33.50% -19.94%

Wyoming 0.00 Pre1994 172.29 303.76 4.99 27.33 26.68 244.78 4042.18 746.76 3090.36 205.08

Post1996 369.15 240.84 2.71 28.79 15.11 194.24 3022.10 463.79 2423.78 134.51

Percent Change

53.33% -26.12% -84.10% 5.10% -76.58% -26.02% -33.75% -61.01% -27.50% -52.46%

APPENDIX B

This table shows the average violent crime rate, average property crime rate and average imprisonment rate for TSL and Non-TSL states from1978-2012.

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

TSL States Violent Crime Rate 432.96 474.92 496.05 496.97 484.76 447.24 452.96 469.32 504.69 483.64 510.45 531.06

Property Crime Rate 4586.89 4985.49 5244.61 5197.11 4935.09 4550.20 4420.69 4612.90 4790.04 4863.48 4904.85 4915.49

Imprisonment Rate 126.00 130.00 136.00 152.00 170.00 179.00 187.00 198.00 209.00 221.00 231.00 255.00

Non-TSL States Violent Crime Rate 318.41 351.96 370.05 367.43 348.18 336.11 336.02 346.55 365.12 364.62 379.82 389.88



1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 TSL States Violent Crime Rate 593.54 624.44 627.93 639.61 626.14 613.95 582.31 569.72 534.01 495.89 479.00 482.35



Non-TSL States Violent Crime Rate 422.27 435.21 438.06 438.75 425.58 410.51 376.81 371.87 358.83 334.60 326.89 317.88



2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

TSL States Violent Crime Rate 473.78 461.61 455.82 458.57 483.47 479.16 463.91 438.80 408.25 394.09 390.45

Property Crime Rate 3832.17 3791.01 3710.06 3635.33 3521.64 3444.21 3367.40 3174.57 3066.00 3045.27 2996.49

Imprisonment Rate 431.00 435.00 437.00 437.00 446.00 450.00 449.00 445.00 442.00 435.00 425.00 Non_TSL States Violent Crime Rate 315.31 309.39 307.89 314.32 325.01 319.59 318.02 306.74 301.76 292.33 293.63

Property Crime Rate 3259.24 3166.43 3108.42 3035.79 2932.64 2839.29 2756.43 2674.08 2608.79 2623.85 2596.83

Imprisonment Rate 316.00 319.62 324.99 338.32 341.76 346.51 342.45 337.86 334.68 335.64 337.85

APPENDIX C

This table shows the average length of a prison term for TSL and Non-TSL states in 1990 and in 2009.

TSL States Violent Crimes: Average Time

Served Property Crime: Average Time

Served State 1990 2009

State 1990 2009

ARKANSAS 3.6 5.1

ARKANSAS 1.7 2.5 CALIFORNIA 2.8 4.6

CALIFORNIA 1.9 2.2

COLORADO 3.1 4.6

COLORADO 2.2 2.6 FLORIDA 2.1 5

FLORIDA 0.9 2.7

GEORGIA 4 5.6

GEORGIA 1.5 2.5 ILLINOIS 3.8 3.8

ILLINOIS 1.9 1.4

LOUISIANA 5.4 5.3

LOUISIANA 2.2 2.1 NEVADA 5.8 4.4

NEVADA 2.6 1.9

NEW JERSEY 3.5 4.7

NEW JERSEY 2.1 1.9 N. CAROLINA 3 4.6

N. CAROLINA 1.4 1.7

N. DAKOTA 2.1 3

N. DAKOTA 1.1 1.6 PENNSYLVANIA 4.1 5.9

PENNSYLVANIA 2.5 2.9

S. CAROLINA 3.3 4

S. CAROLINA 1.6 1.9 TENNESSEE 2.6 3.7

TENNESSEE 2.4 1.3

UTAH 4.2 5.5

UTAH 2.1 2.3 VIRGINIA 3.6 6

VIRGINIA 1.6 2.7

WASHINGTON 2.6 4.2

WASHINGTON 1.7 1.9 WISCONSIN 3.5 4.8

WISCONSIN 2.3 3.2

Non- TSL States Violent Crimes: Average Time Served Property Crime: Average Time Served

State 1990 2009

State 1990 2009 HAWAII 5.5 6.2

HAWAII 3.10 3.30

IOWA 3.5 3.9

IOWA 2.00 2.30 KENTUCKY 2.5 3.6

KENTUCKY 1.20 1.50

MICHIGAN 3.9 7.6

MICHIGAN 2.10 2.90 MINNESOTA 2.4 3.2

MINNESOTA 1.40 1.60

NEBRASKA 3.9 3.3

NEBRASKA 1.70 1.70 NEW Hampshire 3.1 4.4

NEW Hampshire 2.50 2.60

NEW YORK 4.9 6

NEW YORK 3.00 2.70 OKLAHOMA 3.4 4.5

OKLAHOMA 1.50 2.90

OREGON 3.8 5

OREGON 2.20 1.90 S. DAKOTA 3.2 2.5

S. DAKOTA 1.70 1.30

WEST VIRGINIA 3 4.7

WEST VIRGINIA 1.70 3.20 Source: Pew Center on the States, 2012

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