CALIFORNIA NATURAL GAS PIPELINE SYSTEM

LT SEZGIN OZCANLT MEHMET BUHUR

AGENDA Back-story

Node decisions How many? Where?

Model the Natural Gas Pipelines of California

Which lines would be best to attack? How bad would California be hurt? How many pipes to attack to break the system?

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CALIFORNIA'S SUPPLIES OF NATURAL GAS

BACK-STORY

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BACK-STORY

3

Why to attack a pipeline?

4

THIMUR

Why to attack a pipeline?

4

source

sink

20-30‘’

SOURCE

30-40 ‘’

0-20 ‘’

CONSUMPTION

arizona

San Fransisco

oregon

PIPELINE

WHAT’S THE FLOW ON AN ARC ?

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NETWORK GOAL: MAXIMUM GAS FLOW

TOTAL FLOW WITHOUT INTERDICTION: 5378.5

TOTAL POPULATION : 4.043.988

NUMBER OF NODES : 23

NUMBER OF ARCS: 50

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source

WHERE TO ATTACK

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source

attack

San Jose 1.056.000 people affected

1 ATTACK

20-30‘’

SOURCE

30-40 ‘’

0-20 ‘’

CONSUMPTION

10

source

attack

3.243.988 people affected%73 system down

2 ATTACKattack

20-30‘’

SOURCE

30-40 ‘’

0-20 ‘’

CONSUMPTION

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0 1 2 30

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

2500000

3000000

3500000

4000000

4500000

Resilience CurveSan Jose-sink

RESILIENCE CURVEPOPULATION

# ATTACKS

Source-ArizonaSource-Oregon

Source-ArizonaSource-Oregon

Source-San Francisco

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source

Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors

20-30‘’

SOURCE

30-40 ‘’

0-20 ‘’

CONSUMPTION

CONCERNS OF THIMURPIPELINES NOT CLOSE TO SURFACEMAY NEED MORE EXPLOSIVESSPARSELY POPULATED

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source

Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors 1 ATTACK

attack

20-30‘’

SOURCE

30-40 ‘’

0-20 ‘’

CONSUMPTION

408 572 PEOPLE AFFECTED

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source

Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors 2 ATTACKS

attack

20-30‘’

SOURCE

30-40 ‘’

0-20 ‘’

CONSUMPTION

attack

768 648 PEOPLE AFFECTED

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source

Only Allowed to Attack Blue and Green Colors 3 ATTACKS

attack

20-30‘’

SOURCE

30-40 ‘’

0-20 ‘’

CONSUMPTION

attack

attack

1 021 580 PEOPLE AFFECTED

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 130

200000

400000

600000

800000

1000000

1200000

Resilience CurvePOPULATION

# ATTACKS

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CONCLUSION

The system is not resilient. Only with one attack system performance drops down to % 45 affecting over 1 million people.

Other than one example, all other attacks are nested.

The effect of a pipeline disruption may vary according to the place it happens. Large diameter pipeline may cause the system to break down whereas a smaller pipeline in highly populated area can cause causality and terror.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 130

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

Resilience Curve

Resilience Curve

# ATTACKS

% GAS SHORTAGE

CONCLUSION

Future work

• We did not include the storage facilities in the system. These facilities can back up the disrupted pipelines.

• Expected causality rate of a pipeline explosion may be modeled with respect to population and diameter.

191

QUESTIONS?

Flow on a pipeline

Z=Total flow-∑( xbar(i,j)*Y(i,j)*p(i,j))

p(i,j) = Diameter 40 = 1Diameter 30 = 2Diameter 20 = 10