Buczek Habeas Corpus Petition 54 & 121 & 141

And when I look at the totality of the circumstances in these three indictments, I am rapidly coming to the conclusion without making a formal legal finding that Mr. Bruce is bent on a path of vindictiveness and retaliation against this defendant. He reminds me and my memory doesn't serve me well enough to pull up the name -- but he is the inspector fromLes Miserables who would spend 20 years chasing the man who stole a loaf of bread because he was starving. (Page 22 line 21-25 and page 23 line 1-3) QUOTE Judge KENNETH SCHROEDER, JR August 20,2009 1:47 PM

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BUFFALO DIVISION SHANE CHRISTOPHER BUCZEK C shane-christopher: buczek, C third party intervener as Grantor / C Beneficiary of said C Cestui Que Trust C C this brief is copyrighted C © 2010 Petitioner C C v. C C.A.No. _________________ C Ref 1:08-cr-0054 C Ref 1:09-cr-00121 C Ref 1:09-cr-00141 UNITED STATES MARSHALS C UNITED STATES PROBATION C UNITED STATES OF AMERICA C verified Respondent C affidavit

PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO

THE ORIGINAL HABEAS CORPUS AS PRESENTED IN RULE 17 THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR 28 USC § 2241 AND CHALLENGE TO

JURISDICTION AND REQUEST TO DISMISS OF ALL INDICTMENT’S AND CONVICTION WITHIN THE NEXT 3 DAYS, AS THIS IS AN

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO

28 USC § 2241 AND CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION AND REQUEST TO STAY SENTENCING PENDING JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW

FOR AND ON THE RECORD OF the honorable court of record: False Arrest with no jurdiction. This court is now under the constitutional law only.This complaint has failed to produce evidence of an injured party. This complaint has failed to produce an affidavit of verified complaint, or the existence of a complaining party. This complaint has failed to produce an injured party. This complaint has failed to produce and to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This complaint has failed to produce an honorable ruling, therefore the court could rule only by an undisclosed presumption of an assumed intention This complaint – and this court – has now lost all jurisdiction by its denial of due process not only have no claim, but also no accusatory instrument or Valid Indictment with any real party which none exists. See title 4 Sec.72 All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law. See title Title 18 Sec. 4001 (a) § 4001. Limitation on detention; control of prisons

And when I look at the totality of the circumstances in these three indictments, I am rapidly coming to the conclusion without making a formal legal finding that Mr. Bruce is bent on a path of vindictiveness and retaliation against this defendant. He reminds me and my memory doesn't serve me well enough to pull up the name -- but he is the inspector fromLes Miserables who would spend 20 years chasing the man who stole a loaf of bread because he was starving. (2 line 21-25 and page 23 line 1-3) QUOTE Judge KENNETH SCHROEDER, JR August 20,2009 1:47 PM

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(a) No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress. (b) (1) The control and management of Federal penal and correctional institutions, except military or naval institutions, shall be vested in the Attorney General, who shall promulgate rules for the government thereof, and appoint all necessary officers and employees in accordance with the civil-service laws, the Classification Act, as amended, and the applicable regulations. (2) The Attorney General may establish and conduct industries, farms, and other activities and classify the inmates; and provide for their proper government, discipline, treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformation.

Remedy demanded:

1. TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 21 > SUBCHAPTER I > Sec. 1988. 2. Obliterated Instrument fines……………. 3. Process server's fees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Waived 4. Other (specify): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,000,000.00 Per color of law violation Enter default of defendant CORPORA FICTA Employee(s); ET AL Respondents, (Estate of Macias v. Lopez, 42 F. Supp.2d 957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Per Defendant, Violation of Constitutional rights by custom & policy. 5. TOTAL 1-40 defendant’s times violations is the sum of $ 600 million, reserving the right to add defendants as they become known. 6. Time spent falsely arrested. $1000.00 USD per minute 1,134,720,000 minutes held illegally; in a case in which the city was accused of failing to properly train its officers, the Tenth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals (West) upheld an award of $100,000 against the city and $2,100 against the police officers. As a result of a 23 minute improper stop of a motorist, the Eleventh Circuit Federal court of Appeals (South East) upheld a jury award of $25,000. Trezevant v. City of Tampa, 741 F.2d 336 (llth Cir. 1984). 6. Time spent falsely arrested. $1000 per minute 1,134,720,000 minutes held illegally for minutes; Amount $1,134,720,000,000.00 USD In a case in which the city was accused of failing to properly train its officers, the Tenth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals (West) upheld an award of $100,000 against the city and $2,100 against the police officers. As a result of a 23 minute improper stop of a motorist, the Eleventh Circuit Federal court of Appeals (South East) upheld a jury award of $25,000. Trezevant v. City of Tampa, 741 F.2d 336 (llth Cir. 1984). Number of CORPORA FICTA Employee(s); 40 multiplied by 15 million = 600,000,000.00 million Number of minutes held without a warrant 1,134,720,000 minutes minutes, multiplied by $1000.00 = 1,134,720,000,000.00 USD Billion and $600,000,000.00 Million Grand Total for False arrest under color of law is payable only in Gold & Silver, is 1,135,320,000.00 billion.

I. PRAYER FOR RELIEF This great writ called habeas corpus is filled since the court lacked jurisdiction

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which is a mistake and it never had subject matter jurisdiction, is not a Article III court,

and violated Due Process and its ministerial duty by falling to make specific findings of

fact 1st, 5th, 6th, and 8th amendments to the constitution, and is violation of the

prohibitions against peonage and slavery. The government concealed evidence pursuant

to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violated the Classified Information Procedures

Act, 18 USC App. III, and violated the Informers Privilege pursuant to Rovario v. United

States, 353 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1957).“Once jurisdiction is challenged, all proceedings must

cease. See Appendices “9” William-Edwin: Diehl DENIED witness to put INTO

evidence in false arrest case 09-cr-00121.Affidavit The government of the United States

may, therefore, exercise all, but no more than all the judicial power provided for it by the

Constitution.” Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 29 U.S. 210 (1840). All proceedings

should cease and the government must prove its jurisdiction on the record and the court

also made money from the conviction, in violation of the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 8th amendments

to the constitution, and in violation of the prohibitions against peonage and slavery. The

government concealed evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

violated the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 USC App. III, and violated the

Informers Privilege pursuant to Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1957).

When Due Process is violated, jurisdiction ceases. No procedural bar exists on a

challenge to jurisdiction. The court should take judicial notice that in Orr v. United

States, No. 2:09-cv-00950-TS, District of Utah, Salt Lake City Division, the

government judicially noticed on the record that that judge, and by definition, this judge,

is not an Article III judge but an Article II judge, making the judge an administrative

judge and part of the Department of Justice and without authority to sentence. Therefore,


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the sentence in this case is illegal on its face and must be thrown out as the court had no

jurisdiction ab initio. It should be noted that the court is faced with a Hobson’s choice

related to the validity of Public Law 80-772, Title 18 of the criminal code. Several

rulings have been issued by judges who have been interested in upholding their

convictions and protecting their bonuses even though those rulings are in violation of

the Judge’s oath of office, the Constitution, and Supreme Court precedent. One

example is the Risquet case in the Eastern District of Philadelphia, in which the judge

ruled that if he did not have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 USC section 3231, then he must

surely have jurisdiction under the prior statute, a statute that was repealed in the 80th

Congress and no longer existed. The government and court can follow the Constitution of

the United States, the Supreme Law of the land, the contract between the government and

its people, in which case Petitioner is entitled to relief, or they can ignore the Constitution

and Supreme Court precedent, in which case Petitioner is entitled to relief because the

court is engaged in a conspiracy to defraud. If the court and government continues to

ignore the Constitution of the United States which establishes according to the

Quorum clause that the House never voted on Public Law 80-772, then a prima facie

case exists that the courts listed and this court are not Constitutional courts, but

rather administrative courts, and have no authority to sentence, itself a

Constitutional violation requiring relief, and are engaged in peonage and slavery.

Petitioner requests this Court issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus declaring

unconstitutional and void ab initio: (1) Public Law 80-772 which purported to enact Title

18, United States Code, Act of June 25, 1948, Chapter 645, 62 Stat. 683 et seq., and (2)

more specifically, Section 3231 thereof, 62 Stat. 826, which purported to confer upon


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“the district courts of the United States … original jurisdiction … of all offenses against

the laws of the United States.” These legislative Acts violated the Quorum, Bicameral

and/or Presentment Clauses mandated respectively by Article I, § 5, Cl. 1, and Article I, §

7, Cls. 2 and 3, of the Constitution of the United States. The federal district court which

ordered commitment of this Petitioner, under Section 3231, lacked jurisdiction and,

therefore, any judgment and commitment order is void ab initio. To imprison and detain

a Petitioner and cause him future harm under a void commitment order is unconstitutional

and unlawful. Therefore, Petitioner must be discharged from any present illegal

incarceration and his indictment or information, plea, and any judgment must be declared

void immediately to prevent future harm. The Supreme Court has declared in Glover v.

United States that even one additional day in prison without authority has Constitutional

significance. 531 U.S. 198 (2001).

One bill was passed by the House of Representatives in 1947, the first session of

the 80th Congress. A second, distinct, amended, and entirely different bill was passed by

the Senate in the second session of Congress in 1948. The first bill, the House bill, was

truly enrolled. The second bill, the Senate bill, not passed by the House, was signed by

the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate on June 23, 1948, after Congress

was fully and completely adjourned and disbanded, not in session.

The bill signed into law by President Truman on June 25, 1948, the amended

Senate bill not passed by the House, not the House bill which was truly enrolled, and was

signed by Congress after Congress was fully and completely adjourned and therefore is a

political law and not a statute authorized by Congress.

The bill signed into law as Public Law 80-772 was not published in the Federal


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Register as required by the Federal Register Act, 44 USC § 1501, et seq. (1935) and

therefore its enactment is in violation of Due Process.

The court should also dismiss all the indictment’s and release Petitioner because

no criminal complaint supported by proper probable cause affidavit was filed in this case

as required by F.R.Crim.P. 3 (violation of Due Process according to Amendment IV and

V of the Constitution); the judge in this case is not an Article 3 judge (violation of Article

III of the Constitution); the court in this case is selling conviction bonds as an

incorporated for profit entity in violation of various Constitutional rights against peonage,

slavery, and cruel and unusual punishment. Since Petitioner presents these claims by

affidavit under the penalty of perjury, the court should issue a request for the government

to show cause why this case should not be dismissed and the sentencing cancelled. The

court should also dismiss the indictment and conviction on the bogus bank fraud case

because F.R.Crim.P. 6, which allows the prosecutor to hold the grand jury records, is

unconstitutional on its face and in violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine.1

The court should demand in their show cause order that the government refrain

from retaliating against Petitioner. Any attempts at retaliation would be prima facie case

of retaliation as per the Supreme Court precedent in Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 434 US 357

(1978).

The

waiver of indictment constituted a fraud in these proceedings, aided by the government’s

attempt to manipulate Petitioner’s Constitutional right to a grand jury. See U.S. v.

Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992).

IA. REASONS THE GOVERNMENT CAN NOT WIN THIS 1 There are two parties to this case, Plaintiff and Defendant. If the court, which is supposedly independent, allows the Plaintiff to hold court records, it could just as easily allow the defendant to hold court records.


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DISAGREEMENT AND THE COURT CAN NOT DECLARE THE ARGUMENT FRIVOLOUS The district court obtained its jurisdiction over Petitioner pursuant to a grant issued by Congress by Public Law 80-772, Title 18 of the criminal code. That law contained a jurisdictional section, 18 USC § 3231, which gave the district court authority to prosecute Petitioner. A district court obtains its authority through acts of Congress. Without an act of Congress, i.e., without the validity of 18 USC § 3231, the court has no authority to prosecute Petitioner and its actions are ultra vires. See, e.g., the prior jurisdictional statute, 18 USC § 546 (1940), which only gave the district court’s jurisdiction to prosecute pursuant to Title 18 as listed at that time. Since Petitioner establishes as a matter of law that Public Law 80-772 was never enacted, then the court has no authority pursuant to 18 USC § 32312

(i.e., jurisdiction ceased from its inception) and Petitioner is currently detained on ankle bracelet for committing no crime and I am suffering great financial harm by not being allowed to have the ability to work and make my own living, to my commercial detriment. I have gainful employment working for and with my family in the local area. As such, I hereby make this petition to the court for immediate release reserving all rights and waiving none. (Crimes can only be prosecuted by statute, i.e., no law, no crime).I is the real party not an entity. TITLE 28 App. > RULES > IV. > Rule 17

Rule 17. Parties Plaintiff and Defendant; Capacity (a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person’s own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. (b) Capacity to Sue or Be Sued. The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the individual’s domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the applicable state, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorporated association, which has no capacity by the law of its state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the

2 That section was necessary to establish jurisdiction, because the Senate declared it necessary: As the Senate stated in Senate Report No. 1620, Calendar No. 1675, Revision of Title 18, United States Code, June 14, 1948, Mr. Wiley, from the Committee of the Judiciary Submitted the following Report to accompany H.R. 3190: “……. This report is necessary to preserve the provisions of section 371(1) of title 28 United States Code, 1940 edition, giving the district court of the United States original jurisdiction of all offenses against the laws of the United States, exclusive of the State courts.” App. Pg. 104.

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purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of the United States to sue or be sued in a court of the United States is governed by Title 28, U.S.C., Sections 754 and 959 (a). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(a) Take JUDICIAL NOTICE that the above listed corporations are in violation of Rule 17(a) in their

civil action against the Real Party in Interest, shane-christopher family of buczek, in the first

judicial district of tens. It is a fact that no Real Party In Interest for said corporations have issued

a personal claim against Defendant; Black's Law 8th

Edition gives definition that: "A Corporation

is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law ... '.' An

artificial being cannot bring a claim against a flesh and blood man. I hereby object and reject

these corporate entities' civil action for lack of ratification of commencement."

OBJECTION & REJECTION OF THIRD PARTY DEBT COLLECTORS FOR LACK OF

AUTHENTICATION OF CAPACITY & STANDING & LACK OF FIRST-HAND

KNOWLEDGE.

Take JUDICIAL NOTICE that I object to and reject the statements to alleged facts,

pleadings, general actions of the third Party Debt Collectors: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

its employee, Assistant United States Attorney, Anthony Bruce. He has no first-hand knowledge

of the accounts payable fraud that has been committed against Defendant and has not shown

authentication of capacity of plaintiff and standing to appear for or represent the alleged

plaintiff(s); it is a fact of record that no Real Party of Interest from the above listed corporations

have signed any document validating their claim that lawful money was loaned, or issued to

defendant, and a true debt is owed; it is a fact that none of the listed Libellants have a lawful

claim against the Defendant. Thus, the SUPREME LAW of God declares in His 8th

Commandment that "thou shalt not steal" and in His 9th

Commandment, "Thou shalt not bear

false witness against your neighbor,” Thus, there is no lawful claim and this Court is compelled

to dismiss this case.


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INVOKED UNALIENABLE RIGHTS

In the first judicial district of tens, the Real Party In Interest, invoke my Rights allegedly

protected by the state Constitution to be secure in my person, my effects and my private property

and justice to be administered in due course of Law; I further invoke protection in the nature of

the Declaration of Independence as “rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness” and the

alleged Constitution for the United States of America as it applies to plaintiff which was

established "by the people" and "for the people" to keep the federal Government and its Courts

within the bounds of written law. Said Constitution does not operate upon me, in the first judicial

district of tens, but does operate upon and restrict agents and officers of plaintiff/Libellants.

Let this Court take Notice that "All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null

and void." Chief Justice Marshall, Marbury v, "Madison 5 US (lCranch) 137, 174. 176, (1803);

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or legislation

which would abrogate them." Miranda v. New York 384 US 436; 'The duty of the court is to

insure the Constitution is construed in favor of the citizen." Byars vs. US., 273 US 28; "The Court

is to protect constitutionally secured rights." Boyd v. U.S., 116 US 616.

IMPORTANT NOTICE: It is a fact that the distinction and declaration of 'sovereign'

State authority has been openly declared by the majority of the States since Barack Obama has

taken office of the Presidency on January 20, 2009. Below is a list of the States who have

declared 'Sovereignty' with a clear and distinct separation of authority and jurisdiction.

2009: Arkansas -9th Amendment, 10th Amendment, Funding Issues

2009: New York - 9th Amendment, 10th Amendment

1994: California -10th Amendment

1995/96: Georgia -10th Amendment

2009: Georgia -10th Amendment

2009: Kansas -10th Amendment


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2009: Kentucky -10th Amendment

1997/98: Louisiana -Sovereignty Constitutional Amendment

2009: Michigan -10th Amendment

2009: Minnesota -10th Amendment

2009: Missouri -Freedom of Choice Act (Abortion), 10th Amendment

2009: Montana -9th Amendment, 10th Amendment, 2nd Amendment 2009: New Hampshire -9th

Amendment, 10th Amendment, Federal Reserve, Taxes, Martial Law, 2nd Amendment,

Draft/War, Patriot Act, Labor Camps, 1st Amendment

2008: Oklahoma -10th Amendment, (Other Legislation: No Child Left Behind, Real ID Act)

2009: Oklahoma -9th Amendment, 10th Amendment, Funding Issues

2009: South Carolina -9th Amendment, 10 Amendment, Martial Law and Related, 1st

Amendment, 2nd Amendment

2009: Tennessee -10th Amendment

2009: Texas -9th Amendment, 10th Amendment, Funding Issues

1995: Utah [Number: HJR003, Session: 1995] -10th Amendment

2009: Utah -Real ID Act

2009: Washington -10th Amendment

• Proposed: Alabama -9th Amendment, 10th Amendment

• Proposed: Alaska

• 1994: Colorado -10th Amendment

• 1995: Florida -10th Amendment

• Proposed [HJM RS 18517]: Idaho -10th Amendment

• Proposed: Indiana -10th Amendment

• Proposed: Iowa -10th Amendment

• Proposed: Maine

• Proposed: Nevada

• Proposed: Ohio -10th Amendment

• Proposed: Pennsylvania -10th Amendment

• Proposed: Virginia -10th Amendment

• Proposed: West Virginia -Same As New Hampshire

• Republic of Lakotah -Full Independence

• Hawaii -Full Independence


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• Oregon, South Dakota, New Mexico, and Michigan also have new bills proposed.

These above listed States have introduced or proposed bills and resolutions to remind President

Obama that the 10th

Amendment protects the rights of the States and the rights of the people, by

limiting the power of the federal government. I suggest that all parties who may come in contact

with this Mandatory Judicial Notice review the bills that are being passed by State governments

to see a clear picture that “sovereign people”, “the general public” are aware of and fully awake

to the corruption of the over-reaching hand of the Federal Government, it's corrupted Courts,

corrupted Judges, the corrupted Banks & Corporations, and yes, the corrupted Attorneys who

bind up and twist the law to be used against the "sovereign people". It would do well that the third

party debt collectors engaged in this matter take heed the words of KING Yahshua, "Woe unto

you also, ye lawyers! for ye lade me with burdens grievous to be borne, and ye yourselves touch

not the burdens with one of your fingers ... for ye have taken away the key of knowledge: ye

entered not in yourselves, and them that were entering in ye hindered. “KJV the Holy Scriptures

(Bible) -Luke 11:46, 52. The above referenced States that are initiating bills and resolutions have

ordered the Federal Government to cease & desist from its reckless government expansion and

they have been informed that federal laws and regulations implemented in violation of the 10th

Amendment will be nullified by the States. The sovereign Citizens of the fifty (50) States have

the supreme Right under the authority of Almighty God and their State government laws to reject

the mandates of the federal government and the rulings of the federal Courts.

Again for reiteration, so that all parties have a clear understanding of Sovereignty Hierarchy: First

and Foremost, the highest SUPREME SOVEREIGN is ALMIGHTY GOD, our CREATOR and

His name is "Yahweh"; His son's name is, "Yahshua" which is the KING of the Universe! One

can choose to believe it or not but THEY are in charge and their angel’s record all the affairs of

men and will bring every man & woman's actions into judgment. Indeed, KING, "Yahshua" is the


12

SUPREME JUDGE of the Universe and no Bank CEO or Corporate Executive, Judge or

Attorney is above His LAW. Secondly, it is the "people" and/or "We the People" which are

absolute Sovereigns, the created of Almighty God, The Lawmakers and the Rulers of instituted

governments. Thirdly, the Constitution for each Sovereign State and the Constitution for the

United States of America, which was created by the "Sovereigns" as the Supreme Law of the

land, which gives government and its courts limited power over the "people". It is worthy to note,

that the 2nd President

, John Adams, reminds the "people" of the following: "You have rights

antecedent to all earthly governments; rights that cannot be repealed or restrained by human

laws; rights derived from the Great Legislator of the Universe."

Our forefathers created a nation where all free men were equal to a King, meaning each

was Sovereign, with no power over him except that of Almighty God and conscience. They

further declared the only purpose of government for the Constitutional Republic was to protect

the rights of the governed, such as Liberty, Freedom and Independence. The American

Constitution states in Article IV clause 4 that:

"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of

Government... "; it must be noted that the Courts in the past have upheld this foundation of law in

such cases as Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 US 253 (1967): "In the United States the people are

sovereign and the government cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking away their

citizenship." See Hancock vs. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co. 530 S.W. 2d 710 Ky which states:

"Under the democratic form of government now prevailing the People are King so the Attorney

General's duties are to that of the Sovereign rather than to the machinery of government" See

The People vs. Herkimer 15 Am Dec 379, 4 Cowen (N.Y. 345, 348 (1845) which states: "The

People, or the Sovereign, are not bound by general word ... in statutes, restrictive of prerogative

right, title or interest, unless expressly named Acts of limitation do not bind the King nor the

People. The People have been ceded all the Rights of the King, the former Sovereign ... It is a


13

maxim of the common law that when an act of parliament is made for the public good, the

advancement of religion and justice, and to prevent injury and wrong, the King shall be bound by

such an act, though not named; but when statute is general, and may prerogative right, title or

interest would be divested or taken from the King (or the People) in such case he shall not be

bound" See the Supreme Court decision Hale vs. Henkle 201 U.S. 43 at 74 which states: "The

individual may stand upon his Constitutional rights as a Citizen. He is entitled to carryon his

private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State

or to his neighbors to divulge his business or to open his doors to investigation ... He owes no

duty to the State, since he receives nothing there from, beyond the protection of his life and

property. His rights are such as existed by the Law of the Land, long antecedent to the

organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of the law and in

accordance with the Constitution. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass

upon their rights. “This Supreme Court ruling has never been overturned! --See lulliard vs.

Greenman 110 U.S. 421 which states: "There is no such thing as a power of inherent Sovereignty

in the government of the United States. In this country sovereignty resides in the People, and

Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution entrusted to it: All

else is withheld. "See Chisholm v. State of Georgia 2 US 419 (DALL.) 471 which states: "In the

United States, Sovereignty resides in the people, who act through the organs established by the

Constitution.” See Yick WO vs. Hopkins and Woo Lee vs. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356. (S. Ct.) which

states: "Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law for it is the author and source of law.”

THUS, the "King" and/or known as the "Sovereign" cannot be sued in his own court without his

consent. See Siren vs. U.S. 74 U.S. 152 which states: "It is the doctrine of the common law, that

the Sovereign cannot be sued in his own court without his consent.”

In the first judicial district of tens, the Real Party In Interest, will not engage in debate or provide

memorandum of opinion in this foreign jurisdiction using court cases that pertain to corporations


14

such as the United States Fifth Circuit case Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 145

F.3d 320 (5th

Cir. 1998) and Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535

US 826, 122 S. Ct. 1889 (2002).

COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)

Dismissal of this case from this Court is mandatory pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b), wherein Defendant declares the following objections of this Court's authority:

1) Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; 2) Lack of personal jurisdiction; 3) Improper venue;

2. Dismissal is mandatory under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) due to the fact that

this Court does not have Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over the DEFENDANT or the Third Party

Defendant, the Real Party In Interest in accord with the Constitution for the United States, Article

1 Section 8 Clause 17, which established Territorial courts called United States District Courts to

function in 'federal zones / areas' only; under Title 4 United States Code 11O(e) the jurisdiction of

the U.S. District Courts have no authority within the 50 States of the Union. The Supreme Court

stated in Downs v. Bidwell (1901), "The laws of Congress in respect to those matters [outside of

Constitutionally delegated powers] do not extend into the territorial limits of the states [50 States

of the Union], but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government" [Emphasis added).

TITLE 4 U.S. CODES 110:

*(e) The term "Federal area" means any lands or premises held or acquired by or for the use of

the United States or any department, establishment, or agency, of the United States; and any

Federal area, or any part thereof, which is located within the exterior boundaries of any State,

shall be deemed to be a Federal area located within such State.

Article 3, Section 1 of the Constitution describes the jurisdictional authority for the District

Courts of the United States, "Judicial power of the 'United States' is vested in the Supreme Court

and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” As


15

such, Congress can change their structure because Congress has the Constitutional authority to do

so. Congress made such a change in the structure of the Judiciary Branch of the government in

1976; Congress passed Public Law 94-381 changing the jurisdiction of the Federal District

Courts; all United States District Courts are now Administrative Courts under the Executive

Branch of the federal government and as such have no legal authority to hear or consider the law

(see further explanation in Senate Report 94-204). The fact is, the United States District Judges

take an Oath of Office that applies only to the 'Territorial office' they hold. The only

Constitutional Judicial Courts able to hear Constitutional questions arising from an Act of

Congress resides outside the 'jurisdiction J of the Congress and these are State Courts and the

Court of International Trade located in New York City. As a result, all United States District

Courts are 'At Law courts J and are not 'In Law Courts J and as such the Federal District Courts

are only courts of consent; therefore, DEFENDANT, Third Party Defendant, shane-christopher

family buczek, in the first judicial district of tens, the Real Party In Interest hereby firmly invokes

his Right not to consent to the ruling of this ‘At Law Court’.

LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION F.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (2)

Dismissal is mandatory under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), due to the fact that

shane-christopher family of buczek, in the first judicial district of tens is a private 'American'

who makes his local habitation on the county at large, erie, new york republic, which is without

the jurisdiction of the United States; the "United States" as defined in 8 U.S.C. 12 § 1101(a)(38)

and IRC § 7701 (a) (definitions) (9), is a federal corporation and is without the jurisdiction of the

United States of America.

The Real Party In Interest, shane the real living man, in the first judicial district of tens declares

under the penalty of perjury by his below signature the fact that he is an 'American' who makes

his local habitation on the county at large,erie, New York state and is not a 14th Amendment

'u.s.citizen' subject to the jurisdiction of the 'United States', a corporation established by the


16

Congressional "Act of 1871". Hidden Adhesion Contract Cancellation Notice: if there is an

assumption of jurisdiction or personal liability by the court in case number 08-CR-054, 09-CR-

121 and 09-CR-141 ET. al., let this record reflect that I hereby revoke, rescind, refute and cancel

my signature from all adhesion contracts, including, but not limited to, unilateral contracts, made

by Me, or made for Me by accommodation, or made by presumption, by PERSONS acting for

Me as My guardian without providing Me with full disclosure of said contracts. If any parties of

said corporations as listed herein have assumed power of attorney through such hidden adhesion

contracts through lack of full disclosure, these documents, including the fraudulent mortgage

contracts are now cancelled and made null and void.

Personal Jurisdiction and subject of Citizenship status is a" follows:

a) If a man or woman is born in Washington, D.C. or any of the U.S. Territories or Possessions of

the 'UNITED STATES', you are a 'U.S. citizen' since the Act of 1871; a 'Citizen of the United

States' is clearly defined in 26 CFR 31.3121 (e) (b) to be "a citizen of the Commonwealth of

Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, and, effective January 1, 1961, a citizen of Guam or American

Samoa.”

b) If you were born in one of the fifty (50) States of the Union [The Republic] you are an

'American citizen' and one of the people you have never been subject to the exclusive jurisdiction

of the 'UNITED STATES' [federal government or federal corporation]; the 50 States of the Union,

as found in the Constitution for the United States of America, Article IV, Section 4 states, "The

United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republic form of government...

“American people live in the independent, sovereign State, under a Republic form of government

where all God-given Rights are protected under common law. FURTHERMORE, the 10th

Amendment of the Constitution for the United States of America states: "The powers not

delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved

to the States respectively, or to the people. "


17

c) The term 'United States' geographically defined, in the Internal Revenue

Code, relates only to the Federal Government and the exclusive [sovereign] jurisdiction thereof.

d) The term 'United States of America' geographically defined refers to the fifty

(50) States of the Union in which the federal government has very limited jurisdiction.

e) 'States' in regard to the Federal Zone are considered to be: Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands

and American Samoa and the land ceded over to the Federal Government that are within the areas

of the 50 States.

f) 'States' in regard to The Republic are the States of the Union such as: New York, Washington,

California, Mississippi, Texas, Wyoming, etc.

Dismissal is mandatory under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) (3), a) The DEFENDANT

and the Third Party Defendant, shane-christopher family buczek, in the first judicial district of

tens does not reside within the jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BUFFALO DIVISION which is without the

jurisdiction of the "United States of America".

The "UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT" is a foreign corporation with respect to the fifty

States which is affirmed by U.S. v. Perkins, 16 S. Ct. 1073, 163 U.S. 625.41 L Ed. 287;

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6) Dismissal is mandatory under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

whereby the Petitioner has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; it is a fact

pursuant to House Joint Resolution 192, 73rd

Congress, Session 1, Ch. 48, June 1933 that our

financial system is strictly a credit system with no lawful constitutional money in circulation to

pay a debt; all the "people" can do is discharge a debt with the issuance of one's credit as a

"promise to pay" and/or a "promissory note" and this was accomplished by the Defendant.


18

IMPROPER VENUE F.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (3) Rule 17 a See Appendices “3”

As Petitioner establishes, Public Law 80-772, introduced as H.R. 3190, was

passed by the House in the first session of Congress in June 19473

3 In fact, there was no quorum in Congress when the bill was passed by the House: “The speaker. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Walter). The question was taken; and the Speaker being in doubt, the House divided, and there were-ayes 38, noes 6. So the amendment was agreed to. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third

, sent to the Senate in

June 1947, but not voted on. Congress then adjourned twice in 1947, was reconvened by

the President twice in 1947 (according to British law when Congress is called back into

session all prior legislation is terminated), then adjourned by a declared sine die

adjournment in December 1947. In the second session of Congress, in June of 1948, the

same bill, H.R. 3190, not a new bill as would be required by British law, surfaced in the

Senate, and the Senate materially amended it. The House then was asked to concur in the

amendments, but never asked to vote on the amended bill. (A letter from Jeff Trandahl,

dated in 2000), available to the court, and verified by the House library as valid, confirms

the error) and Harley G. Lappin Sent Monday,July 27,2009 3:17 PM Director, Federal

Bureau of Prisons NO QUORUM never passed by Congress required by Article 1,Sec. 5,

Clause 1 of the Constitution. See Appendices “1” “Harley G. Lappin July 27,2009”

HONORABLE H. KENNETH SCHROEDER,JR. January 16,2009 9:54 a.m. transcripts

page 2 line 18-20 ,page 3 line 10-18,page 5 line 24-25,page 6 line 2-7,page 7 line 23-25,

page 8 line 17-20,page 9 line 1-2, AND QUOTE MAGISTRATE JUDGE SCHROEDER

page 11 line 9-10 The Constitution of the United States is the highest law in the land,

page 11 line 11-25 and page 15 line 15-25,page 16 line 1-16 See Appendices “2” Show’s


19

NO CRIMINAL INTENT AND The United States Constitution of the United States is

the highest law in the land. See Appendices “4” NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND

RECORDS ADMINSTRATION BY ALOHA SOUTH FEB.21,2007 TITLE

ASSISTANT BRANCH CHIEF, NWCTB NATIONAL ARCHIVES and RECORDS

ADMINISTRATION 700 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW WASHINGTON, DC

20408 Certified Copy of the Constitution 1787 September 17th

Thus the House passed one bill in 1947, the Senate passed a different bill in 1948.

After the passage, Congress fully adjourned sine die on June 20, 1948 at 7 AM. The bill

was then truly enrolled. But which bill was enrolled as the bill passed? It was the House

bill, which passed the House in 1947, but not the Senate.Big Mistake; Constitutional

Mistake.So the House passed Title 18 in 1947, but the Senate did not. The Senate

amended the bill in the second session in 1948, but did not vote on it. After Congress

was completely and fully adjourned, and the members were disbanded, the President pro

tempore and the Speaker of the House signed the bill into law on June 23, 1948. At that

time Congress was disbanded and completely and fully adjourned. Another Big Mistake,

Constitutional Mistake. But which bill was signed into law? The truly enrolled bill? No.

It was the bill passed by the Senate, but not the House. Huge mistake, Constitutional

mistake. Then the Senate bill, never passed by the House, was ‘signed into law' by the

President on June 25, 1948, while Congress was disbanded and not in session.Bigger

mistake, Error of Constitutional and Bill of Rights Proportions. Then, to compound the

errors, the bill was never placed in the Federal Register as was required by the Federal

time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.” May 12, 1947, Congressional Record, House. App. 46. App. Pg. 46.


20

Register Act, 44 USC § 1501, et seq. (1935). Another error of Constitutional proportions.

It was bad enough that the President was a democrat and the Speaker of the House and

President pro tempore of the Senate were Republicans, and openly ridiculed each other

and hated each other. However, that is no excuse to ignore the Constitution they all had

taken an oath to uphold. Thus, a political bill, not a Constitutional bill passed by

Congress, is being used as the basis to imprison Petitioner, in direct violation of the

Constitution of the United States. These actions amount to nothing less than peonage and

slavery, acts never condoned by our founding fathers.

It should be noted that no appellate court has made proper findings of fact and law

on the issues presented. See 5 USC 557 (c)(3) Findings of Facts and Conclusion of law

required for all decisions which was never given in all three case 08-cr-054,09-cr-121 and

09-cr-141.See Appendices “5” Judge William M. Skretny It should also be noted that no

district court case has precedent value, and that for a district court to even hear the issue

and avoid it, ignore it, or make an improper ruling (as some district court judges have

done), is a violation of 28 USC § 455, 18 USC sections 241 and 242, and a prima facie

case of bias and structural error and possible grounds for the impeachment of the judge

for committing treason against the Constitution (the Supreme Court has determined that

jurisdiction is a threshold issue, which must be determined first and that district courts of

the United States are presumed to know the law).

Such lower court bias and Due Process violations are clearly Appendicesed in the

lower court proceedings to date, when the court continued with the proceedings without

jurisdiction.

It should also be noted that for the government to attempt to use non-precedent


21

cases that made no proper findings and were made by a judge who had a prima facie case

of bias and conflict, and was trying to protect his/her own liability for acting without

jurisdiction, would probably amount to sanctionable conduct. The government's typical

arguments also would not work and should require sanctions. 1) For the government to

argue sine die would amount to a smoke and mirrors deflection and sanctionable conduct,

because although sine die is a valid argument, Petitioner is not raising that issue here. 2)

For the government to argue Field & Co’s enrolled bill rule would also amount to smoke

and mirrors and sanctionable conduct, because the Constitutional quorum issue is

precluded from Field & Co.’s enrolled bill rule by its own terms, i.e. ‘[the] signing…in

open session, of an enrolled bill,’ 143 U.S. at 672, which in any case only applies in ‘the

absence of a Constitutional requirement binding Congress.’ United States v. Munoz-

Flores, 495 U.S. at 391, n.4. 3) If the government makes the bogus argument that the

court can claim jurisdiction pursuant to the prior statute, that would also amount to smoke

and mirrors and sanctionable conduct, because P.L. 80-773, June 25, 1948, Ch. 646, § 1,

62 Stat. 869, positively repealed the former criminal jurisdiction granted to the district

courts under the prior statute. Even if it had not, Petitioner was not charged under the

prior statute, which carries different penalties and terms, and the attempt to nunc pro

tunc the prior statute would be a violation of the Fair Warning Doctrine, and fraud by the

government or court, whichever attempted to raise the bogus argument.

Furthermore, neither the court nor the government can declare the argument

frivolous. That would amount to nothing more than a smokescreen, an attempt to deflect

the truth, which the courts are required to find as part of their function as arbitrator of the

truth: The typical definition in United States law (frivolous) is very different from its

And when I look at the totality of the circumstances in these three indictments, I am rapidly coming to the conclusion without making a formal legal finding that Mr. Bruce is bent on a path of vindictiveness and retaliation against this defendant. He reminds me and my memory doesn't serve me well enough to pull up the name -- but he is the inspector fromLes Miserables who would spend 20 years chasing the man who stole a loaf of bread because he was starving. ( line 21-25 and page 23 line 1-3) QUOTE Judge KENNETH SCHROEDER, JR August 20,2009 1:47 PM

22

colloquial or political meaning. United States courts usually define "frivolous litigation"

as a legal claim or defense presented even though the party and the party's legal counsel

had reason to know that the claim or defense had no merit. A claim or defense may be

frivolous because it had no underlying justification in fact, or because it was not

presented with an argument for a reasonable extension or reinterpretation of the law,

(Wikepedia) or because laws are in place unequivocally prohibiting such a claim (see

Good Samaritan law).

In the United States, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state rules require that an attorney perform a due diligence investigation concerning the factual basis for any claim or defense. Jurisdictions differ on whether a claim or defense can be frivolous if the attorney acted in good faith. Because such a defense or claim wastes the court's and the other parties' time, resources and legal fees, sanctions may be imposed by a court upon the party or the lawyer who presents the frivolous defense or claim. The law firm may also be sanctioned, or even held in contempt.

Lawyer Daniel B. Evans writes:

“ [W]hen a judge calls an argument "ridiculous" or "frivolous," it is absolutely the worst thing the judge could say. It means that the person arguing the position has absolutely no idea of what he is doing, and has completely wasted everyone's time. It doesn't mean that the case wasn't well argued, or that judge simply decided for the other side, it means that there was no other side. The argument was absolutely, positively, incompetent. The judge is not telling you that you were "wrong." The judge is telling you that you are out of your mind. Wikepedia.

Frivolous litigation is the practice of starting or carrying on law suits that have little to no chance of winning. There are both legal and colloquial definitions of the term. In popular usage, lay persons typically call a lawsuit "frivolous" if they personally find a claim to be absurd, regardless of its legal standing. But in official usage, as by the judiciary of the United States, "frivolous litigation" is considered to consist of a legal claim or defense presented even though the party or the party's legal counsel had reason to know that the claim or defense was manifestly insufficient or futile, that is to say, had no legal merit. The remainder of this article discusses the usage of the term within the legal profession.

Frivolous litigation may be based on absurd legal theories, may involve a superabundance or repetition of motions or additional suits, may be uncivil or harassing to the court, or may claim extreme remedies. A claim or defense may be frivolous because it had no underlying justification in fact, or because it was not presented with an argument for a reasonable extension or reinterpretation of the law. A claim may be deemed frivolous because existing laws unequivocally prohibit such a claim (see Good Samaritan law).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_suit�

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motion_(legal)�

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_remedy�

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument�

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law�

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_Samaritan_law�


23

In the United States, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state rules require that an attorney perform a due diligence investigation concerning the factual basis for any claim or defense. Jurisdictions differ on whether a claim or defense can be frivolous if the attorney acted in good faith. Because such a defense or claim wastes the court's and the other parties' time, resources and legal fees, sanctions may be imposed by a court upon the party or the lawyer who presents the frivolous defense or claim. The law firm may also be sanctioned, or even held in contempt.

Frivolous litigation, as used in colloquial and political terms in the United States, refers to lawsuits that are based on a theory that seems absurd, or where the claim results in damages that greatly exceed what one would expect from reading a brief summary of the case. Awards for medical malpractice are sometimes derided as frivolous (in this sense of meaning "excessive").

If a jury and a judge decided in favor of the plaintiff in such cases, the plaintiff's claim was not technically frivolous in legal terms, though it might be considered frivolous colloquially. Because of the ambiguity in the term, calling these lawsuits "frivolous" can lead to confusion because opposite sides of the tort reform debate can both say they oppose "frivolous" suits, with the tort reform supporters referring to the colloquial understanding, and tort reform opponents referring to the narrower technical definition.

The typical definition in United States law is very different from its colloquial or political meaning. United States courts usually define "frivolous litigation" as a legal claim or defense presented even though the party and the party's legal counsel had reason to know that the claim or defense had no merit. A claim or defense may be frivolous because it had no underlying justification in fact, or because it was not presented with an argument for a reasonable extension or reinterpretation of the law, or because laws are in place unequivocally prohibiting such a claim (see Good Samaritan law).

In the United States, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state rules require that an attorney perform a due diligence investigation concerning the factual basis for any claim or defense. Jurisdictions differ on whether a claim or defense can be frivolous if the attorney acted in good faith. Because a frivolous defense or claim wastes the court's and the other parties' time, resources and legal fees, sanctions may be imposed by a court upon the party or the lawyer who presents the frivolous defense or claim. The law firm may also be sanctioned, or even held in contempt.

See Appendices “10” Profile of Daniel B. Evans from Philadelphia

A statement of frivolous requires findings of fact and law related to the claim.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States�

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Rules_of_Civil_Procedure�

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attorney_at_law_(United_States)�

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Due_diligence�

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_faith�

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanctions_(law)�

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contempt_of_court�


24

Since neither the government nor the court can dispute the facts and law related to the

invalidity of Title 18, Petitioner requests that the court adopt Petitioner s findings of fact

and law as those of the court.

Since the Supreme Court has declared that all actions cease once jurisdiction is

challenged, and that jurisdiction is a threshold issue that must be resolved prior to any

future actions by the court or government, and since the facts and law clearly establish in

this habeas that the claim is valid and has merit, and that the court has no jurisdiction, any

argument to the contrary without making specific findings of fact and law would be an

attempt to circumvent the Constitution of the United States by the government, the court,

or both, and thus, sanction able conduct. Note: The United States Supreme Court has

repeatedly held that any judge who acts without jurisdiction is engaged in an act of

treason.U.S. v. Will 499 US 200, 216, S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed 2d 392,406 (1980); Cohens v.

Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 404, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821). And 22 USC 611 “Foreign

Agents” of Foreign Principals”

II. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE ORDER

This court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition pursuant to 28 USC § 2241(a) and

28 USC § 1651, the All Writs Act. 28 USC § 2241(a) states that ‘Writs of habeas corpus

may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any

circuit judge within their respective jurisdiction. The order of a circuit judge shall be

entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained

of is had.’ 28 USC § 2241(c )(3) states that ‘The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to

a prisoner unless – He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of


25

the United States…’. 28 USC § 2243 states: ‘A court, justice or judge entertaining an

application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order

directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it

appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the

person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional

time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed. The person to whom the writ or order is

directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention. When the writ or

order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return

unless for good cause additional time is allowed.’

Petitioner requests the court to take judicial notice that 28 USC section 2241, et

seq. is still valid law and has not been overturned and is the only extraordinary remedy

available for illegal confinement. Since Petitioner is restrained by ankle bracelet and

liberties authorized by the Constitution, and is about to be further constrained, 28 USC

section 2241, et seq. is the proper remedy.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article I, § 1, commands and declares that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted

shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and

House of Representatives.”

Article I, § 5, Cl. 1, commands, in relevant part, that “a Majority of each [House

of Congress] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business,” excepting therefrom permission

to “adjourn from day to day” and “to compel Attendance of its Members, in such

Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.”


26

Article I, § 7, Cl. 2, commands, in relevant part, that “[e]very Bill which shall

have passed both Houses, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of

the United States.”

Article I, § 7, Cl. 3, commands, in relevant part, that “[e]very … Resolution … to

which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary …

shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take

Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two

thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations

prescribed in the case of a Bill.”

Title 1, United States Code, Section 106, Act of July 30, 1947, Chapter 388, Title

I, Ch. 2, § 106, 61 Stat. 634, Pub.L. 80-278, provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen [a]

bill … shall have passed both Houses, it shall be printed and shall then be called the

enrolled bill … and shall be signed by the presiding officers of both Houses and sent to

the President of the United States.”

Amendment I to the Constitution of the United States commands: “Congress

shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise

thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”

Amendment Five to the Constitution of the United States commands: “No person

shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a

presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval

forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall

any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor


27

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be

taken for public use, without just compensation.”

28 USC § 455 commands: (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; (2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it; (3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy; (4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. (c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household. (d) For the purposes of this section the following words or


28

phrases shall have the meaning indicated: (1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation; (2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system; (3) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian; (4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that: (i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund; (ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities held by the organization; (iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest; (iv) Ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities. (e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification. (f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, judge, magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or


29

herself of the interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification.

F.R.Crim.P. 3 commands:

The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense

charged. It must be made under oath before a magistrate judge or, if none is reasonably

available, before a state or local judicial officer.

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution commands:

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishment.

The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution commands:

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime

whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or

any place subject to their jurisdiction.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

In one unbelievable day, March 7,2008, an Bogus INDICTMENT 08-cr-054 was given to me by Judge Spero in the Northern District of California I told him I do not consent and this is not my name. The Indictment had no injury party which is now a false arrest and further Judge Spero directed the living man to appear in Buffalo,New York March 14,2008 based on a false indictment by AUSA Anthony Bruce. Than on March 14,2008 AUSA Anthony Bruce asked for a cash bail of $ 25,000.00 and a total bail of $ 50,000.00 See line 21-23,and than another Bogus Indictment 09-cr-121 May 6,2009 and than againt May 7,2009 See Appendices “7” Transcripts 03/14/2008,05/06/2009 and 05/07/2009 against Petitioner, all initial appearance where Hon.H. Kenneth Schroeder entered, a NOT GUILTY plea and OBJECTION was noted .Where was the investigation of the case and the requirement to protect Petitioner’s rights by the court? Where is the really party of interest? Or the injury party that is not INSOLVENT?

V. ISSUE ONE: SINCE NO VALID PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT WAS ISSUED, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WAS VIOLATED AND


30

JURISDICTION CEASED AT THAT POINT

The court should take notice that the Constitution of the United States is the

Supreme Law of the Land, and is the contract between the people of the United States

and its government. Each officer of the court took an oath of office to uphold the

Constitution.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution requires: 'The right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated, and not Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be seized.'

F.R.Crim.P. 3 requires: 'The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts

constituting the offense charged. It must be made under oath before a magistrate judge

or, if none is reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer.'

F.R.Crim.P. 4(a) requires: If the complaint or one or more affidavits filed with

the complaint establish probable cause to believe that an officense has been committed

and that the defendant committed it, the judge must issue an arrest warrant to an officer

authorized to execute it. At the request of an attorney for the government, the judge must

issue a summons, instead of a warrant, to a person authorized to serve it........

An affidavit is a formal sworn statement of fact, signed by the declarant (who is

called the affiant or deponent) and witnessed (as to the veracity of the affiant's signature)

by a taker of oaths, such as a notary public. The name is Medieval Latin for he has

declared upon oath. In American jurisprudence, under the rules for hearsay, admission of

an unsupported affidavit as evidence is unusual (especially if the affiant is not available


31

for cross-examination) with regard to material facts which may be dispositive of the

matter at bar. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affidavit.

An affidavit is required to provide that the person filing the affidavit is over the

age of the majority, has personal knowledge of the facts stated, and if fully competent to

testify to those facts.

The defendants docket sheet shows no valid criminal complaint or probable cause

affidavit.

In Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958), the Supreme Court

determined, that with no indictment on his complaint, a federal officer obtained a

warrant for petitioner’s arrest, but obtained no search warrant. His complaint was not

based on his personal knowledge, did not indicate the source of his belief that

petitioner had committed a crime, and set forth no other sufficient basis for a finding

of probable cause. With this warrant, he arrested petitioner and seized narcotics in his

possession. The arrest and seizure were not challenged at petitioner’s arraignment,

but a motion to suppress the use of the narcotics in evidence was made and denied

before his trial. They were admitted in evidence at his trial in a federal district court,

and he was convicted.

The Supreme Court held that the arrest and seizure were illegal, the narcotics

should not have been admitted in evidence, and petitioner’s conviction must be set

aside. Id. Pg. 481-488.

1. By waiving preliminary examination before the Commissioner, petitioner did

not surrender his right to contest in court the validity of the warrant on the


32

grounds here asserted. Id., pg. 483-484.

2. Under Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, read in the

light of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause was not shown by the

complaint, and the warrant for arrest was issued illegally. Id., pg. 484-487.

3. Having relief entirely in the courts below on the validity of the warrant, the

Government cannot contend in the Supreme Court that the arrest was justified

apart from the warrant, because the arresting officer had probable cause to

believe that petitioner had committed a felony; nor should the case be sent

back to the district court for a special hearing on probable cause. Id., pg. 487-

488.

The defendants docket sheet shows no valid criminal complaint or probable cause

affidavit.

As per the 4th Amendment and Giordenello, infra, without a valid complaint,

jurisdiction ceases and the case must be dismissed. The actions of the government are a

violation of F.R.Crim.P. 3, United States Constitution Article IV and V, and the oath of

office of the government officials involved. Jurisdiction ceased at the first Due Process

violation and all proceedings from that point forward are nullities.

VI: ISSUE TWO: THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO PROSECUTE PURSUANT TO TITLE 18 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE Petitioner requests this Court dismiss the information and judgment with

prejudice and issue an order rendering Defendants information and conviction void, or

alternatively, due to the courts lack of jurisdiction and their conflict of interest pursuant

to 28 USC § 455, forward this Petition to the Supreme Court with instructions to declare


33

unconstitutional and void ab initio: (1) Public Law 80-772 which purported to enact Title

18, United States Code, Act of June 25, 1948, Chapter 645, 62 Stat. 683 et seq., and (2)

more specifically, Section 3231 thereof, 62 Stat. 826, which purported to confer upon

“the district courts of the United States … original jurisdiction … of all offenses against

the laws of the United States.” These legislative Acts violated the Quorum, Bicameral

and/or Presentment Clauses mandated respectively by Article I, § 5, Cl. 1, and Article I,

§ 7, Cls. 2 and 3, of the Constitution of the United States. The federal district court

which rendered judgment and ordered commitment of this Petitioner, under Section 3231,

lacked jurisdiction and, therefore, the judgment and commitment order is void ab initio.

To imprison and detain a Petitioner under a void judgment and commitment order is

unconstitutional and unlawful. Therefore, Petitioner must be discharged from any

present confinements and his judgment must be declared void immediately to prevent

ongoing or future harm. Further structural error occurred in the passage of Title 18 of the

criminal code because the statute violates the Federal Register Act, 44 USC §1501, et

seq. (1935) as no notice was served on the public as required by the act.

“The[se] facts set forth by petitioner must be accepted as true,” and Petitioner is

“entitled to a hearing to establish the truth of those allegations.” Reynolds v. Cochran,

365 U.S. 525, 528, 533 (1961). Failure to hold a hearing is a violation of the Reynolds v.

Cochran standard. Furthermore, the failure to allow Petitioner to be heard before trial or

sentencing would violate Due Process (5th Amendment), the “pro se rule”, the “Do No

Harm Rule”, and would establish that the District Court was not independent pursuant to

these proceedings.


34

1. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT TO HEAR THIS WRIT

The court has jurisdiction to hear this habeas, however the district court has a

direct conflict of interest in ruling on its own jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC § 455, since

the district court judge is civilly liable for acting without jurisdiction. This direct conflict

of interest almost mandates that all proceedings be stayed and the district court forward

the issue directly to the Supreme Court for a ruling.

It should also be noted that the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Iowa has agreed to hear the argument in U.S. v. Russell James Hodge and that

case is currently pending. For this district court to proceed to confinement while this

issue is currently pending in the Eighth Circuit would raise serious questions as to the

bias of this court and the independence of this court in its proceedings.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article I, § 1, commands and declares that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” Article I, § 5, Cl. 1, commands, in relevant part, that “a Majority of each [House of Congress] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business,” excepting therefrom permission to “adjourn from day to day” and “to compel Attendance of its Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.” Article I, § 7, Cl. 2, commands, in relevant part, that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed both Houses, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States.” Article I, § 7, Cl. 3, commands, in relevant part, that “[e]very … Resolution … to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary … shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the case of a Bill.” Title 1, United States Code, Section 106, Act of July 30, 1947, Chapter 388, Title


35

I, Ch. 2, § 106, 61 Stat. 634, Pub.L. 80-278, provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen [a] bill … shall have passed both Houses, it shall be printed and shall then be called the enrolled bill … and shall be signed by the presiding officers of both Houses and sent to the President of the United States.” Amendment V to the Constitution commands that “No person shall be held for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in active service in time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject to the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without Due Process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 28 USC § 455 (a) states: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 3. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner is being committed into Executive custody by order of the United

States District Court, acting pursuant to the grant of original jurisdiction purportedly

created by Public Law 80-772, Title 18, United States Code, Section 3231. By virtue of

the commitment order, Petitioner is committed into the custody of the Attorney General

and into the custody of the United States Marshals. See 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a) (repealed)

and § 3621(a) (enacted Oct. 12, 1984, and effective Nov. 1, 1987).

The text of the bill, H.R. 3190 as amended, which became Public Law 80-772

(enacting Title 18, United States Code, and especially Section 3231), was passed only by

the Senate and never passed by the House of Representatives. Moreover, that bill was

never certified as enrolled, and was surreptitiously signed by the Speaker of the House

and President pro tempore of the Senate under purported authority of a concurrent

resolution agreed to by a Congress denounced by President Truman as a “’body

dominated by men with a dangerous lust for power and privilege,’” 27 Encyclopedia


36

Americana 175 (2005), without quorums of the respective Houses sitting. Finally, that

bill was mistakenly signed by the President of the United States after it was

misrepresented to him by solitary Officers as a bill passed by both Houses, which was

impossible, since no Congress was in session.

For those reasons, Public Law 80-772 which purportedly enacted Title 18, United

States Code, Act of June 25, 1948, Chapter 645, 62 Stat. 683 et seq. and Section 3231

thereof, 62 Stat. 826, purporting to confer upon “the district courts of the United States …

original jurisdiction … of all offenses against the laws of the United States” violates

Article I, § 5, Cl. 1, and Article I, § 7, Cls. 2 and 3, and is therefore unconstitutional and

void ab initio. The district court, which acted against Petitioner, did so without

jurisdiction and Petitioner’s indictment and commitment order is void ab initio, and any

imprisonment and confinement thereunder is fundamentally unconstitutional and

unlawful.

4. H.R. 3190 In The First Session Of The 80th Congress

H.R. 3190 was introduced and committed to the Committee of the entire House of

Representatives on the State of the Union of the First Session of the 80th Congress

entitled “Crimes and Criminal Procedure.” See House Report No. 304 (April 24, 1947),

p. 1 (App. 67). See also 94 Cong. Rec. D556-D557 (Daily Digest) (charting H.R. 3190)

(App. 65-66). H.R. 3190 differed from “five … bills which … preceded it … [because]

it constitute[d] a revision, as well as a codification, of the Federal laws relating to crimes

and criminal procedure.” 93 Cong. Rec. 5048-5049 (May 12, 1947) (App. 45-46). The

bill was intended (1) to revise and compile all of the criminal law, (2) to “restate[]” and

“consolidate[]” “existing statutes,” (3) to “repeal” “obsolete, superseded, redundant and


37

repetitious statutes,” (4) to coordinate the Criminal Code with the “Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure” formerly enacted, and (5) to “clarify and harmonize” penalties of

the “many acts” passed by Congress which were found to be “almost identical.” (Id.)

“The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read a third time, and

passed” the House on May 12, 1947, id.; Journal of the House of Representatives

(“House Journal”), May 12, 1947, pp. 343-344 (App. 4-5); 94 Cong. Rec. D556-D557

(showing H.R. 3190’s only passage by the House of Rep. on May 12, 1947), sent to the

Senate and there “referred … to the Committee on the Judiciary.” 93 Cong. Rec. 5121,

May 13, 1947 (App. 47); Journal of the Senate (“Senate Journal”), May 13, 1947, p. 252

(App. 10).

As passed and enrolled by the House of Representatives H.R. 3190 included at

section 3231, Subtitled “District Courts,” the following text:

Offenses against the United States shall be cognizable in the district courts of the United States, but nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several states under the laws thereof.

H.R. 3190 as passed by the H. of Rep., p. 367, § 3231 (App. 110). See United States v.

Sasscer, 558 F. Supp. 33, 34 (D.MD. 1982).

On July 27, 1947, Congress adjourned without the Senate passing H.R. 3190. See

93 Cong. Rec. 10439, 10522 (July 26, 1947) (App. 48-49). On November 17, 1947,

Congress reconvened pursuant to a Presidential proclamation. Yet, Congress again

“adjourned sine die on December 19, 1947,” without the Senate passing H.R. 3190.

Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 444 Appendix n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

5. H.R. 3190 In Second Session Of The 80th Congress


38

The Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported amendments to H.R. 3190 on

June 14, 1948, under Sen. Rep. No. 1620. 94 Cong. Rec. 8075 (June 14, 1948) (App.

50); Senate Journal, June 14, 1948, p. 452 (App. 34). Sen. Rep. No. 1620 contained “a

large volume of amendments” and “the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [were]

keyed to the bill and [were] reflected in part II of [the new proposed] title 18.” Heralding

that, upon passage of the amended bill, “[u]ncertainty will be ended,” the Senate wanted

“the amendments adopted en bloc,” including a new jurisdictional section for Title 18.

94 Cong. Rec. 8721 (App. 51). The report contained only the proposed amendments.

See Sen. Rep. No. 1620, pp. 1 & 4 (App. 103-104).

“[T]he amendments were considered and agreed to en bloc” and then “ordered to

be engrossed.” 94 Cong. Rec. 8721-8722 (June 18, 1948) (App. 51-52), Senate Journal,

June 18, 1948, p. 506 (H.R. 3190, “as amended,” passed the Senate) (App. 37). It was

moved that “the Senate insist upon its amendments” by the House (94 Cong. Rec. at

8722); and “[o]rdered that the Secretary request the concurrence of the House of

Representatives in the amendments.” Senate Journal, supra, p. 506; House Journal, June

18, 1948, p. 688 (App. 16).

The House received the proposed amendments. The Clerk “read the Senate

amendments” collectively into the record with which the House concurred. 94 Cong.

Rec. 8864-8865 (June 18, 1948) (App. 53-54); House Journal, June 18, 1948, p. 704 (the

“said Senate amendments were concurred in”) (App. 17). Although “[t]he House agreed

to the amendments to … H.R. 3190,” Senate Journal, June 18, 1948, p. 510 (App. 38), no

action was taken on H.R. 3190 as amended. The Journal of the House of Representatives

is devoid of any vote on H.R. 3190 itself on June 18, 1948, and thereafter through


39

adjournment on June 20, 1948. Moreover, the official historical chart of H.R. 3190

clearly shows the only passage by the House of Representatives occurring on May 12,

1947, and specifically references volume 93, page 5048 of the Congressional Record as

the recorded date the House passed the bill. 94 Cong. Rec. D556-D557 (Daily Digest).

6.Congress Agreed By Resolution To Continue Legislative Business By A Single Officer Of Each House During Adjournment

On June 19, 1948, the House submitted and agreed to concurrent resolutions

H.Con.Res. 218 and 219 and requested concurrence by the Senate. House Journal, June

19, 1948, pp. 771-772 (App. 19-20); Senate Journal, June 18, 1948, p. 577 (App. 39).

“[T]he Senate [then] passed without amendment these concurrent resolutions of the

House.” 94 Cong. Rec. 9349 (App. 57). H.Con.Res. 218 “provid[ed] adjournment of the

two Houses of Congress until December 31, 1948,” id.; see Concurrent Resolutions,

Second Session, Eightieth Cong., H.Con.Res. 218, June 20, 1948, 62 Stat. 1435-1436

(App. 105-106). H.Con.Res. 219 “authorize[ed] the signing of enrolled bills following

adjournment,” 94 Cong. Rec. 9349, specifically resolving:

That notwithstanding the adjournment of the two Houses until December 31, 1948, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate be, and they are hereby, authorized to sign enrolled bills and joint resolutions duly passed by the two Houses and found truly enrolled.

See Concurrent Resolutions, supra, H.Con.Res. 219, June 20, 1948, 62 Stat. 1436.

Congress adjourned on June 20, 1948, pursuant to H.Con.Res. 218. 94 Cong.

Rec. 9348, 9169 (App. 56, 55); House Journal, June 20, 1948, p. 775; Senate Journal,

June 20, 1948, p. 578 (App. 40). Both Houses reconvened on July 26, 1948, pursuant to

a proclamation of President Truman. Senate Journal, July 26, 1948, p. 593 (showing


40

reconvention); House Journal, July 26, 1948, pp. 792-793 (same).

7. Post-Adjournment Signing Of H.R. 3190 By Single Officers Of The Houses, Presentment To & Approval Thereof By The President Pursuant To H.Con.Res. 219

With both Houses adjourned, with no quorum, disassembled and dispersed, Mr.

LeCompte, the Chairman of the Committee on House Administration reported that that

committee had found H.R. 3190 “truly enrolled.” House Journal, legislative day of June

19, 1948, p. 776 (recorded under heading “BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

ENROLLED SUBSEQUENT TO ADJOURNMENT”) (App. 22). He attached his

certificate of enrollment to the original H.R. 3190 passed by the House on May 12, 1947.

See H.R. 3190, certified after adjournment as “truly enrolled” (as certified by Richard H.

Hunt, Director, Center for Legislative Archives, The National Archives, Washington,

D.C.) (App. 107-113). Although never certified as truly enrolled, the Speaker and

President pro tempore respectively signed the Senate’s amended H.R. 3190 on June 22

and 23, 1948. 94 Cong. Rec. 9353-9354 (App. 58-59); House Journal, legislative day

June 19, 1948, p. 777 (App. 23); Senate Journal, legislative day June 18, 1948, pp. 578-

579 (App. 40-41). National Archives & Records Adm. Cert., H.R. 3190 signed by House

and Senate officers and President Truman (App. 114-117). The Senate’s amended H.R.

3190 was presented by the Committee on House Administration to Pres. Truman, June

23, 1948, who signed it June 25, 1948, 12:23 P.M. E.D.T., 94 Cong. Rec. 9364-9367

(App. 61-64); House Journal, legislative day June 19, 1948, pp. 778, 780-782 (App. 24,

25-27); Senate Journal, legislative day of June 18, 1948, pp. 579, 583 (App. 41, 43).

Natl. Archives & Records Adm. Cert., H.R. 3190, supra; 94 Cong. Rec. D557 (Daily

Digest).


41

8. The Signatories Of H.R. 3190 Knew the Enacting Clause Was False When Signed

Public Law 80-772 stated that the enactment proceeded “by the Senate and House

of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.” See

National Archives & Records Adm. Cert., H.R. 3190 as signed into P.L. 80-772, supra.

Each signatory knew that neither “House” legislatively existed at that time, and the

legislative process had ceased within the terms of Article I, §§ 5 and 7 on June 20, 1948.

9. Public Law 80-772 Is Unconstitutional And Void Because H.R. 3190 Never Passed Both Houses As Required By Article I, Section 7, Clause 2

a. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

This case presents the “profoundly important issue,” of the constitutionality of an

act of Congress – matters “’of such public importance as to justify deviation from normal

appellate practice and to require immediate determination by this Court.’” Clinton, 524

U.S. at 455 (Scalia, J., and O’Conner, J., joining in part and dissenting in part) (adopting

language directly from Sup. Ct. R. 11).

Although “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of

the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,” (Art.

I, § 1, U.S. Constitution), “when [Congress] exercises its legislative power, it must follow

the ‘single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedures’ specified in Article

I.” Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft

Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 274 (1991) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951). Article

I establishes “just how those powers are to be exercised.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at

945.


42

An act of Congress “does not become a law unless it follows each and every

procedural step chartered in Article I, § 7, cl. 2, of the Constitution.” Landgraf v. USI

Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 263 (1994) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-951

(emphasis added)); Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448 (noting requisite “steps” taken before bill

may “’become a law’” and holding that a procedurally defective enactment cannot

“’become a law’ pursuant to the procedures designed by the Framers of Article I, § 7, of

the Constitution”).

The Constitution requires “three procedural steps”: (1) a bill containing its exact

text was approved by a majority of the Members of the House of Representatives; (2) the

Senate approved precisely the same text; and (3) that text was signed into law by the

President. “If one paragraph of that text had been omitted at any one of those three

stages, [the] law [in question] would not have been validly enacted.” Clinton, 524 U.S.

at 448 (emphasis added). Between the second and third “procedural steps,” the bill “…

shall … be presented to the President…” Article I, § 7, Cl. 2.

The text of H.R. 3190 passed by the House of Representatives was the text as it

existed on the date of passage – i.e., May 12, 1947. Whereas, the text of the bill passed

by the Senate on June 18, 1948, was H.R. 3190 “as amended.” Senate Journal, June 18,

1948, p. 506. Thus, the text of the bills passed by the respective Houses was grossly

different and neither bill ever “became a law.” Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448.

10. Permitting Post-Adjournment Legislative Business Pursuant To H.Con.Res. 219 Violated The Quorum, Bicameral And Presentment Requirements Of Article I Of The Constitution

After Congress adjourned on June 20, 1948, pursuant to H.Con.Res. 219, a single

officer of each House of Congress signed a bill purporting to be H.R. 3190 on June 22-


43

23, 1948, 94 Cong. Rec. 9354; House Journal, legislative day of June 19, 1948, p. 777;

Senate Journal, legislative day of June 18, 1948, pp. 578-579, and presented that bill to

the President, who signed it on June 25, 1948. 94 Cong. Rec. 9365-9367. Thus, the post-

adjournment signature “provision [of H.Con.Res. 219] was an important part of the

legislative scheme,” leading to the enactment of Public Law 80-772, without which it

would never have “become a Law.” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 728 (1986). Public

Law 80-772 falsely stated it was “enacted” while both Houses were “in Congress

assembled,” when in fact Congress was not in session. See National Archives & Records

Adm. Cert., H.R. 3190 as signed into P.L. 80-772.

The bill signed was the Senate’s amended H.R. 3190 – a bill never certified as

“truly enrolled,” compare Pub.L. 80-772, Enactment Clause & signature pages with H.R.

3190, certified as “truly enrolled,” supra, and H.Con.Res. 219 never authorized the

signing of unenrolled bills after adjournment. See H.Con.Res. 219, supra, 62 Stat. 1436.

Article I, § 5, Clause 1 mandates a quorum of both Houses of Congress “to do

Business.” This constitutional requirement has been enforced by practice, Rules of the

Houses, custom, Supreme Court holdings and duly enacted statutes.

1 U.S.C. § 101 requires every “enacting clause of all Acts of Congress” to state:

“’Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of

America in Congress assembled.’” Although the bill after passage by “both Houses”

must be “enrolled” following which it “shall be signed by the presiding officers of both

Houses and sent to the President of the United States,” 1 U.S.C. § 106, the actual

procedure is regulated by House rules and established practice. Following passage the

“chairman of the Committee on House Administration … affixes to the bills examined a


44

certificate that the bill has been found truly enrolled,” House Doc. No. 769, supra, Stages

of a Bill, § 983, No. 16, p. [483] (App. 79), after which the “enrolled bill is first laid

before the House of Representatives and signed by the Speaker … after which it is

transmitted to the Senate and signed by the President of that body.” Id., No. 17, p. [484]

(App. 80).

The Supreme Court in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892),

defined the essence of this procedure:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.

143 U.S. at 672 (emphasis added). 1 U.S.C. § 106 codified this implicit constitutional

requirement. Reading 1 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 106 together requires that all acts must occur

at least through presentment to the President while Congress is in session. That the

enrolled bill must be “layed before the House” prior to signing by the Speaker and then

“transmitted to the Senate” before the signing by the President of that body concludes

that the respective Houses must be in session during this transaction.

An “adjournment terminates the legislative existence of Congress.” Pocket Veto

Case, 279 U.S. at 681. “’Th[e] expression, a “house,” or “each house,” [when] employed

… with reference to the faculties and powers of the two chambers … always means …

the constitutional quorum, assembled for the transaction of business, and capable of


45

transacting business.’” 279 U.S. at 683, quoting I Curtis’ Constitutional History of the

United States, 486 n. 1. Moreover, the term “’House’” means “the House in session,”

279 U.S. at 682, and “’as organized and entitled to exert legislative power,’ that is, the

legislative bodies ‘organized conformably to law for the purpose of enacting

legislation.’” Id. (quoting Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276, 281

(1919)). See also House Doc. No. 355, supra, Hinds’ Precedents, § 2939, p. 87 (“’The

House is not a House without a quorum’”) (App. 87).

No “attestation” or “declaration by the two houses … to the President,” Field &

Co., 143 U.S. at 672, that H.R. 3190 had “passed” Congress during the adjournment was

possible because no such “houses” constitutionally existed. See also United States

National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, 508 U.S. 439,

455 n. 7 (1993) (noting that the rule established in Field & Co., 143 U.S. at 672, made

statutory by 1 U.S.C. § 106 turned upon “the ‘enrolled bill,’ signed in open session by the

Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate”). Longstanding

precedence of the House affirms this. House Doc. No. 355, supra, Hinds’ Precedents,

Vol. IV, § 2951, pp. 90-91 (upon “disclos[ure] … that there is not a quorum .., [t]he

House thereby becomes constitutionally disqualified to do further business”) (excepting

from disqualification the exceptions stated in Art. I, § 5, Cl. 1) (emphasis added) (App.

88-89); id., § 3458, p. 322 (“The Speaker may not sign an enrolled bill in the absence of a

quorum.”) (App. 93); id. at § 3486, pp. 332-333 (recognizing enrollment and

presentment to the President to be legislative business required to be completed before

adjournment) (App. 95-96); id. at § 3487, p. 333 n. 3 (presentment to the President is

legislative “business” which must be completed before adjournment) (App. 96); id. at §


46

4788, p. 1026 (“The presentation of enrolled bills” to the President of the United States is

a “transact[ion]” of “business” of the “House.”) (App. 100).

Once a bill has passed the House of Representatives it must be printed as an

“engrossed bill” which then “shall be signed by the Clerk of the House … sent to the

other House, and in that form shall be dealt with by that House and its officers, and, if

passed, returned signed by said Clerk.” 1 U.S.C. § 106. In the immediate case H.R. 3190

was passed by the House of Representatives on May 12, 1947, engrossed and sent to the

Senate and there referred to the Senate’s Committee on the Judiciary. See 93 Cong. Rec.

5048-5049, 5121; Senate Journal, May 13, 1947, p. 252. However, it was not dealt with

nor passed “in that form.”

Instead, amendments were proposed which were “agreed to en bloc,” read into the

record and “ordered to be engrossed,” 94 Cong. Rec. 8721-8722. Then, “the [amended]

bill was read the third time and passed.” 94 Cong. Rec. 8722; Senate Journal, June 18,

1948, p. 506. The House then concurred in the amendments en bloc. 94 Cong. Rec.

8864-8865; House Journal, June 18, 1948, p. 704.

“The House in which a bill originates enrolls it,” House Doc. No. 769, supra,

Stages of a Bill, No. 15, p. [483] (App. 79), and, in the case of House bills, the “chairman

of the Committee on House Administration … affixes to the bills examined a certificate

that the bill has been found truly enrolled,” Id., No. 16, p. [483], after which it is “laid

before the House … signed by the Speaker [then] transmitted to the Senate and signed by

the President of that body.” Id., No. 17, p. [484]. Unequivocally, “[t]he Speaker may not

sign an enrolled bill in the absence of a quorum.” House Doc. No. 355, supra, Hinds’

Precedents, § 3458, p. 322. Cf., id., § 2939, p. 87 (“The House is not a House without a


47

quorum.”).

The constitutional “quorum” issue is precluded from the Field & Co.’s “enrolled

bill rule” by its terms – i.e., “[t]he signing … in open session, of an enrolled bill,” 143

U.S. at 672 (emphasis added), which in any case only applies in “the absence of [a]

constitutional requirement binding Congress.” United States v. Munoz-Flores, supra, 495

U.S. at 391 n. 4. Moreover, just as “§ 7 gives effect to all of its Clauses in determining

what procedures the Legislative and Executive branches must follow to enact a law,” id.,

495 U.S. 386 (emphasis by Court), so too does Article I, § 5, Cl. 1 “provid[e] that no law

could take effect without the concurrence of the prescribed majority of the Members of

both Houses,” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 949-950, as to all legislative “Business.” Cf.

United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1892) (to determine whether constitutionally

mandated quorum was present for legislative action the Court “assume[s]” the Journals of

the Houses are to be considered to decide the issue).

The bill signed by the Officers of the Houses, presented to and signed by the

President of the United States, was the Senate’s amended bill, which never passed the

House. H.Con.Res. 219 only “authorized [the] sign[ing] [of] enrolled bills … duly

passed by the two Houses and found truly enrolled,” H.Con.Res. 219, supra, 62 Stat.

1436, voiding the signatures on the amended bill.

Having not been enrolled, certified as truly enrolled, or signed by the Speaker of

the House with a quorum present, the bill was rendered constitutionally void. House

Doc. No. 769, supra, Constitution of the United States, § 55, p. [19] (“[w]hen action

requiring a quorum was taken in the ascertained absence of a quorum … the action was

null and void”) (App. 74); House Doc. No. 355, supra, Hinds’ Precedents, §§ 3497 &


48

3498, pp. 344-345 (such a bill is “not in force” and is “not a valid statute”) (App. 97-98).

Cf., id., Hinds’ Precedents, § 2962, p. 94 (to vacate legislative act “the absence of a

quorum should appear from the Journal”) (App. 90).

Art. I, § 7, mandates that a bill that has passed both Houses “’shall before it

becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States …,’” Art. I, § 7, Cl. 2;

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945, which “can only contemplate a presentment by the

Congress in some manner, [because] … [a]t that point the bill is necessarily in the hands

of the Congress.” United States v. Kapsalis, 214 F.2d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 1954), cert.

denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955) (emphasis added). Thus, presentment is clearly part of the

legislative procedure required as essential to enactment of a bill as law. INS v. Chadha,

462 U.S. at 945, 947, 951; La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 454

(1899) (“After a bill has been presented to the President, no further action is required

by Congress in respect of that bill, unless it be disapproved by him. …”) (emphasis

added). See House Doc. No. 355, supra, Hinds’ Precedents, Vol. IV, § 4788, p. 1026

(recognizing that “the presentation of enrolled bills” to the President is a “transact[ion]”

of “business” of “the House”); id., § 3486, p. 332 (recognizing presentment required prior

to adjournment); id., § 3487, p. 333 note 3 (when bill is enrolled or signed by presiding

officers “too late to be presented to the President before adjournment” signing and

presentment must continue at next session as a “resumption of [legislative] business”).

Clearly presentment is part of the constitutionally mandated “Business,” Art. I, § 5, Cl. 1,

to be “exercised in accord with [the] single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,

procedure” “prescri[bed] … in Art. I, §§ 1, 7.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.

The “draftsmen” of the Constitution “took special pains to assure these


49

[legislative] requirements could not be circumvented. During the final debates on Art. I,

§ 7, Cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern that it might easily be evaded by the simple

expedient of calling a proposal a ‘resolution’ or ‘vote’ rather than a ‘bill.’ As a

consequence, Art. I, § 7, Cl. 3, … was added.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947 (citing 2

Farrand, supra, 301-302, 304-305).

Whether actions authorized under a resolution are “an exercise of legislative

powers depends not on their form but upon ‘whether they contain matter which is

properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect.’” INS v. Chadha, 462

U.S. at 952 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897)). “If the power is

legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and

presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7.” Metropolitan, 501 U.S. at 276. See also

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 756 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“It is settled, however, that

if a resolution is intended to make policy that will bind the Nation, and thus is ‘legislative

in its character and effect,’ S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897) – then the

full Article I requirements must be observed. For ‘the nature or substance of the

resolution, and not its form, controls the question of its disposition.’ Ibid.”).

“’Congress,’” of course, “’cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does

not possess.’” Metropolitan, 501 U.S. at 275 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at

726). Congress does not possess the “’capab[ility] of transacting business’” and is not

“’entitled to exert legislative power,’” when its “legislative existence” has been

“terminate[d]” by an “adjournment.” Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 681-683 (citations

omitted). “The limitation of the power of less than a quorum is absolute,” House Doc.

No. 355, supra, Hinds’ Precedents, Vol. V, Ch. CXL, § 6686, p. 851 (App. 102), and


50

includes the signing of an enrolled bill by the Speaker of the House, id., Vol. IV, Ch.

XCI, § 3458, p. 322, and presentment to the President of the United States. id., Ch. XCII,

§§ 3486, 3487 & 3497, pp. 332, 333 note 3, 344 & 345 (App. 95-98). Wright v. United

States, 302 U.S. 583, 600 (1938) (Stone, J., concurring) (“The houses of Congress, being

collective bodies, transacting their routine business by majority action are capable of

acting only when in session and by formal action recorded in their respective journals, or

by recognition, through such action, of an established practice.”) Thus, “Congress,” as

defined by the Constitution and Supreme Court, never “presented” any version of H.R.

3190 to the President of the United States.

Whether the action taken under H.Con.Res. 219 was an “exercise of legislative

power” depends upon whether it was essentially “legislative in purpose and effect.” INS

v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. “In short, when Congress ‘[takes] action that ha[s] the

purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons … outside

the Legislative Branch,’ it must take that action by the procedures authorized in the

Constitution.” Metropolitan, 501 U.S. at 276, quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952-

955. “If Congress chooses to use a [] resolution … as a means of expediting action, it

may do so, if it acts by both houses and presents the resolution to the President,”

Consumer Energy Council of America v. F.E.R.C., 673 F.2d 425, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1982),

aff’d mem. sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of

America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).

The inescapable conclusion as to the “purpose and effect” of H.Con.Res. 219 was

to enact a bill the text of which at the time of adjournment on June 20, 1948, had not

been passed by both Houses, enrolled, certified as “truly enrolled,” or signed by the


51

officers of the Houses or presented to the President of the United States with quorums

sitting. In other words, H.Con.Res. 219 unconstitutionally permitted post-adjournment

legislative business to proceed without Congress and upon an unpassed bill. Congress

did not follow the procedures mandated by Art. I, § 7, Cl. 2 and attempted to supersede

the quorum requirements of Art. I, § 5, Cl. 1 via a concurrent resolution to carry forth

legislative business with no legislature. The 80th Congress surreptitiously provided a

bill, the text of which had never passed either House “’mask[ed] under … [the] indirect

measure,’” Metropolitan, supra, 501 U.S. at 277 (quoting Madison, The Federalist No.

48, p. 334 (J. Cooke 1961 ed.)), of a resolution purporting to authorize continuing

legislative action during adjournment with no quorum and no Congress of an extra-

congressional bill. Public Law 80-772 did not “become a Law” as required by the

constitutional procedures mandated under Article I, § 5, Cl. 1, and Article I, § 7, Cls. 2

and 3, and is unconstitutional and void ab initio.

“[W]hen action requiring a quorum was taken in the ascertained absence of a

quorum … the action [is] null and void,” House Doc. No. 769, supra, Constitution of the

United States, § 55, p. [19] (citing Hinds’ Precedents, Vol. IV, § 2964), and “a bill … not

actually passed [although] signed by the President [is to be] disregarded [requiring] a new

bill [to be] passed.” House Doc. No. 769, § 103, p. [34] (citing Hinds’ Precedents, Vol.

IV, § 3498) (App. 75).

11. The District Court Order Committing Petitioner To Executive Custody Pursuant To § 3231 (Of The Unconstitutional Public Law 80-772) Was Issued Ultra Vires, Is Unconstitutional And Coram Non Judice, And his Imprisonment and Confinement Is Unlawful

“The challenge in this case goes to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the [district]


52

court and hence [its] power to issue the order,” United States Catholic Conference v.

Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 77 (1988), committing Petitioner to

imprisonment in Executive custody. Thus, the “question is, whether … [the district

court’s] action is judicial or extra-judicial, with or without the authority of law to render

[the] judgment,” Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 718 (1838), and

to issue the commitment order.

Subject-matter jurisdiction means “’the courts’ statutory or constitutional power

to adjudicate the case,’” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002), quoting Steel

Co. v. Citizens For A Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Rhode Island v.

Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 718 (“Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine

the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any

judicial power over them.”); Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 268 (1891)

(“Jurisdiction may be defined to be the right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter

in a given case.”). “Subject-matter limitations on federal jurisdiction serve institutional

interests by keeping the federal courts within the bounds the Constitution and Congress

have prescribed.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999).

“’Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause … and when it

ceases to exist, the only function of the court is that of announcing the fact and

dismissing the cause.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens, 523 U.S. at 94, quoting Ex parte McCardle,

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992)

(“lack of subject-matter jurisdiction … precludes further adjudication”). The Supreme

Court has asserted over and over that “[t]he requirement that jurisdiction be established

as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the


53

United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95,

quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); See also

Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 456 U.S. at 702.

Because subject-matter jurisdiction “involves a court’s power to hear a case, [and

thus] can never be forfeited or waived … correction [is mandatory] whether the error was

raised in district court” or not. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630 (citation

omitted); Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95 (citing cases). When a district court did “not have

subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying action … [its] process[es] [are] void and

an order of [punishment] based [thereupon] … must be reversed.” United States Catholic

Conf., 487 U.S. at 77; Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. at 139 (“[T]he [punishment] order

itself should fall with a showing that the court was without authority to enter the

decree.”); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 718 (1885) (“When … a court of the United

States undertakes, by its process … to punish a man … [respecting] an order which that

court had no authority to make, the order itself, being without jurisdiction, is void, and

the order punishing … is equally void.”)

Habeas corpus review “is limited to the examination of the jurisdiction of the

court whose judgment of conviction is challenged.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 311-

314 (2001); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 23 (1939). A “court ‘has jurisdiction to

render a particular judgment only when the offense charged is within the class of offenses

placed by the law under its jurisdiction.’” 306 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added). If it is found

that the court lacked jurisdiction to try petitioner, the commitment and imprisonment is

void, any judgment is void and the prisoner must be discharged. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110

U.S. 651, 654 (1884).


54

Petitioner has established that the text of H.R. 3190 signed by respective House

officers and the President of the United States: (1) failed to pass the House of

Representatives, and (2) that the legislative process continued after Congress adjourned

by single officers of each House acting pursuant to H.Con.Res. 219 without quorums in

either House, all of which violated Article I, Section 5, Clause 1; Article I, Section 7,

Clause 2, and/or Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 – and any of which rendered Public Law

80-772 unconstitutional and void ab initio. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803)

(“a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and … courts, as well as other departments,

are bound by that instrument”). Therefore, because “the offense[s] charged … [were]

placed by the law under [the] jurisdiction,” of the district court below pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3231 of Public Law 80-772, which is unconstitutional, and “void, the court was

without jurisdiction and the prisoner must be discharged.” Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 654.

Since Public Law 80-772 has never been enacted as required by Article I, Section 5,

Clause 1, and Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3 thereof, rendering void ab initio the

jurisdiction by which the district court acted to charge and to imprison Petitioner, to enter

any judgment, and order Petitioner imprisoned in Executive custody, the district court’s

actions were “’ultra vires,’” Ruhrgas AG, 526 U.S. at 583 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at

101-102), and “coram non judice.” Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at

720.

The charge and imprisonment and any judgment thereupon “being without

jurisdiction, is void, and the order punishing … is equally void.” Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S.

at 718; United States Cath. Conf., 487 U.S. at 77; Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. at

139. This is precisely the office and function of habeas corpus – i.e., to “examin[e] …


55

the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment of conviction is challenged,” Bowen v.

Johnston, 306 U.S. at 23, and where, as here, the court was clearly “without jurisdiction

… the prisoner … must be discharged.” Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 654. See also

Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 166 (1874).

That section was necessary to establish jurisdiction, because the Senate declared it necessary: As the Senate stated in Senate Report No. 1620, Calendar No. 1675, Revision of Title 18, United States Code, June 14, 1948, Mr. Wiley, from the Committee of the Judiciary Submitted the following Report to accompany H.R. 3190: “……. This report is necessary to preserve the provisions of section 371(1) of title 28 United States Code, 1940 edition, giving the district court of the United States original jurisdiction of all offenses against the laws of the United States, exclusive of the State courts.” App. Pg. 104. In fact, there was no quorum in Congress when the bill was passed by the House: “The speaker. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Walter). The question was taken; and the Speaker being in doubt, the House divided, and there were-ayes 38, noes 6. So the amendment was agreed to. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.” May 12, 1947, Congressional Record, House. App. Pg. 46. Petitioner requests the court to take judicial notice that no quorum was present for the passage of Public Law 80-772 in the House of Representatives on May 12, 1947. In fact, the House did not pass Title 18 in May of 1947 as no quorum was present. See Appendix

1, judicially noticed on the record.

VII. ISSUE THREE: THE ACTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT JUDGE VIOLATE 28 USC §455

Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and a ruling that Public Law 80-772 is

unconstitutional will arguably render every federal district court judge civilly liable for

every exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 358-359 (1978). Judges of courts of limited jurisdiction have been held civilly

liable upon void jurisdiction. Even Circuit Court and Supreme Court Justices arguably

have the same potential conflict, but for the reasons stated below Supreme Court justices

must be excepted from the prohibitions of 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Due Process of Law.


56

“[T]he sensitivity of the issues” requires “address[ing] the applicability of [28

U.S.C.] § 455 with the same degree of care and attention … employ[ed] [upon an]

assert[ion] that the District Court[s] lacked jurisdiction or that § 455 mandates

disqualification of all [district] judges … without exception.” United States v. Will, 449

U.S. 200, 217 (1980) (brackets supplying immediate circumstances). The purpose “of §

455 is to guarantee litigants a fair forum,” Id., “to promote public confidence in the

integrity of the judicial process,” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486

U.S. 847, 860 (1988) (citing S. Rep. No. 93-417, p. 5 (1973); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, p.

5 (1973)), and to provide “positive disqualification by reason of … the appearance of

possible bias.” Will, 449 U.S. at 216; Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 n. 2

(1994) (same); Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 859-860 & n. 8 (same).

“[A]rgu[ably] … a [district] judge will feel the motivation to vindicate a prior

conclusion,” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 562, thereby creating an appearance of impropriety due

to partiality. The “integrity of a fellow member,” 486 U.S. at 865-866 n. 12, of a district

court hearing these claims “is unlikely to quell the concerns of the public,” id., and such

“suspicions and doubts” shadow these proceedings. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. 865-866 & n. 12.

“People … are too often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the

integrity of judges.” Id.

Due process of law “demarks the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications,”

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986), requiring fairness in fact and

“’the appearance of justice.’” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt

v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). This Court is “not required to decide whether

in fact” all district judges suffer such conflict, “but only whether sitting on the case …


57

’“would offer a possible temptation to the average … [district] judge to … lead him not

to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”’” Aetna, 475 U.S. at 825 (citations omitted).

To permit district court judges to hear this petition would be “a plain violation of the

statute [§ 455],” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 861, and could never “’satisfy the appearance of

justice.’” Murchison, 349 at 146. At a minimum, it would raise constitutional questions

which should be avoided. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 830

(1999); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989).

“Although it is clear that the District Judge[s] and all Justices of this Court have

a[] [probable] interest in the outcome in [this] case[], there is no doubt whatever as to this

Court’s jurisdiction or that of the District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § [2241 (a)].” Will,

449 U.S. at 210-211 (bracketing jurisdictional statute in this case). Unlike the parties in

Will, the district court should disqualified itself to hear this petition.. Id. Will held the

“Rule of Necessity” required the District Judge and the Justices to hear the case

regardless of interests as no substitute district judge was available. 449 U.S. at 212.

The Justices of the Supreme Court are furthest from the operation of Section 3231

and have no peer pressures. Thus, “’[t]he biasing influence … [is] too remote and

insubstantial to violate constitutional constraints.’” Aetna, 475 U.S. at 826 (quoting

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243 (1980)). Cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,

531 (1927) (citing Cooley, Const. Limitations 594 (7th ed. 1903)) (qualifying remoteness

of interest). The Supreme Court Justices can not realistically be held liable by private

parties, if, for no other reason, because the Supreme Court is essential to the tripartite

Government established by Article III of the Constitution, whereas, district courts and

appellate courts are created at Congress’ discretion. Whether district judges and


58

appellate judges will ultimately be held liable must await its own day in court. It suffices

that they could be. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1872).

To insure exhaustion, Petitioner first presents the petition to the District Court. If

the District Court hears the petition and does not forward it to the Supreme Court for

hearing, it will have violated 28 USC § 455. The refusal of the District Court to make

findings of fact and law and to rule on the claims presented would be violations of FR

Civ P 52(a) and 54(b) and Due Process. Vague and conclusory rulings are also violations

of Due Process. The failure to hold a hearing, Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525, 528,

533 (1961) on the verified claims is likewise a violation of Due Process. Arguably, the

District Court has already violated 28 USC section 455, et al, by acting pursuant to a right

lacking jurisiction.

The “Rule of Necessity” requires some court hear these constitutional challenges.

Will, supra. Another aspect of that Rule requires in a case of choice selection of the

“lesser of two evils.” United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (construing Rule

“in the context of a prison escape”). Under these exceptional circumstances, the Court

should proceed promptly to hear this petition acting as an independent and unbiased

court and to resolve with speed and finality the significant questions herein, or if it can

not act without potential conflict, refer the case for hearing to the Supreme Court.

The actions without jurisdiction, when the court is presumed to know the law,

constitutes structural error.

In conducting harmless error analysis of constitutional violations in direct appeal

and habeas corpus cases, the Court repeatedly has reaffirmed that “[s]ome constitutional

violations ….by their very nature cast so much doubt on the fairness of the trial process


59

that, as a matter of law, they can never be considered harmless.” Satterwhite v. Texas,

486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988); accord Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (“[W]e

have recognized a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors that ‘defy analysis by

“harmless error” standards’…Errors of this type are so intrinsically harmful as to require

automatic reversal (i.e., ‘affect substantial rights’) without regard to their effect on the

outcome.”); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (“Although most

constitutional errors have been held to harmless-error analysis, some will always

invalidate the conviction.” (citations omitted)); id at 283 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring);

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78

(1986) (“some constitutional errors require reversal without regard to the evidence in the

particular case…[because they] render a trial fundamentally unfair”); Vasquez v. Hillary,

474 U.S. 254, 263-264 (1986); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (“there are

some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated

as harmless error”).

Included in the definition of structural errors, is the right to an impartial judge,

i.e., the right to a judge who follows the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent and

upholds the oath of office. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at 8 (“biased

trial judge” is ‘structural [error],’ and thus [is] subject to automatic reversal”); Edwards v.

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647 (1997) (“A criminal defendant tried by a partial judge is

entitled to have his conviction set aside, no matter how strong the evidence against

him.”); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,469 (1997); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508

U.S. at 279; Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986); Tunney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,

523 (1927).


60

The actions of the district court create a prima facie basis for bias and structural

error, requiring automatic reversal of the case.

VIII. ISSUE FOUR: THE JUDGE TRYING THIS CASE IS NOT AN ARTICLE III JUDGE AND THEREFORE CAN NOT SENTENCE

Petitioner has a right to be tried and, if found guilty, sentenced by an Article III

judge.

1. The Judicial Officers Violated the Judicial Code

The magistrate and judge violated the Code of Conduct for United States Judges,

Canon 1, Canon 2, and Canon 3 by acting outside of their authority and in excess of their

jurisdiction. The magistrate and judge of this case indicted and confined Petitioner when

as a matter of law he committed no crime, and the court had no jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the judge of this case is believed to be a former prosecutor and is now an

employee of the Department of Justice, a direct conflict of interest to the court’s

impartiality and Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Judicial Code. Any reports or orders by the

Magistrate Judge act as nothing more than a disguised order of the judge, since the judge

adopted the magistrates recommendations without question or comment, failing to make

findings of fact and law on all issues presented.

Are the judge and magistrate bound by the judicial code or code for judicial

employees? Neither a district court judge nor a magistrate can create law, but may

interpret law. No such authority was ever conceived by the Framers to allow judges to

create law. If the magistrate and judge of the court are bound by the judicial code and

code for judicial employees then they must comply with that (those) codes, which means


61

they must dismiss the information and conviction.

First, the judge has taken a Form 61 Commissioners Oath of Office. Second, the

courts were transferred into the Department of Justice by Executive Order during the

bankruptcy of the United States in the 1930s and act as administrative courts, in violation

of the Separation of Powers Doctrine. Third, to be a Constitutional judge, the judge must

meet 3 criteria: First, he must be appointed by the President; Second, he/she must be in

good behavior; Third, his/her pay can never be diminished. The judge may meet the first

criteria, but can never meet the second and third criteria (the second criteria can not be

met when the judge violates Petitioner’s Constitutional rights; the third criteria violation

is supported by Supreme Court precedent) and therefore, this judge could not preside

over the proceedings and could not enter sentencing.

With no Article III judge on the case, sentencing was illegal and requires

immediate reversal.

X. ISSUE FIVE: THE SALE OF CONVICTION BONDS RENDERS THE PROCEEDINGS VOID

The sale of bonds based on Petitioners conviction by the court creates a

financial conflict of interest and is a violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine,

rendering the conviction void. The district court is a corporation listed in Dun &

Bradstreet. It sells bonds based on Petitioners conviction. To find the bonds cusip

number you go to

http://adtivequote.fidelity.com/mmnet/Symblookup.phtml/Symlookup.phtml

Search for: Mutual Fund by: Fund Number

CUSIP Number:


62

http://fixedincome.fidelity.com/fi/FIFrameset.do?page=FISearchIndividualBonds.do enter case number as follows: For example, if your listed case number If your listed case number is 1:05-cr-30039-AA and 1:05-cr-30039-AA-1.

Put in 30039-AA and 30039-AA-1 and the CUSIP number was the same for this

case.

The fact that the court makes money from convictions is a violation of numerous

Constitutional provisions, including slavery and peonage as well as the Separation of

Powers Doctrine. 18 USC Sec. 514 “FICTITIOUS OBLIGATION” prohibited

See Appendices “6”

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner was charged and convicted of alleged Bank Fraud other bogus federal crime

because we have no real banks and no real party of interest with any witnesses. Also THE

GOVERNMENT OR US INC. never had 1st handknowlege of anything. This was a trick or

scheme, improper jurisdiction, Illegal search and seizure, false Imprisonment and involuntary

servitude. The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the

courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States. Nothing in this title shall

be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws

thereof. Because Petitioner is actually innocent of the alleged crimes, the Petitioner has exhausted

all remedies necessary to file a habeas petition as a matter of law.

Petitioner requests discovery related to the courts and AUSA WDNY conflict

of interest. See case 09-cv-1129, 08-cr-054,09-cr-00121 and 09-cr-00141 BUCZEK V.

ANTHONY BRUCE d/b/a The Petitioners and others have made many visits sent letters


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to the Judiciary Committee to address the corruption of The Buffalo City Courts in

Upstate New York and of our Administrative and Legislative branches of the government

in Erie County. AND THEY ARE A MESS.

See Appendices”11” DOUBLE JEOPARDY 08-CR-054 and Docket No.05f-18516 and

Appeal No. 2007-APP-082

Buffalo city Court case another false arrest Docket No.05f-18516 and Appeal

No. 2007-APP-082 No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise

infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases

arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War

or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;

nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

The Petitioners have placed Court records of Due Process violation and judicial

Misconduct before Congress. As one of the people have brought claims into the Courts to

have our cases dismissed under 12(b) (1), 12(b) (2) and the 11th amendment. If the

courts have no Judicial power in the United States in any suit in Law or Equity, then the

question arises, under what authority are the People being charged, if it’s not in Law or

Equity? This brings us back to the matter of the Gold Fringe Flag and Title 50, State of

Emergency and ENEMY OF THE STATE.

The petitioners now place this complaint of misconduct before this Administrative

Hearing Panel to hear the as one of the American people complaint. Even under Military


64

Law, the Court is required to uphold the rights of its own personnel and give them a fair

hearing.

How are “The People” an Enemy of their own Country, but on the first Tuesday of

November, We the American People are supposedly “free” to elect these same people

into office under the Constitution who then make us Enemy of the State the other 363

days of the year? These questions need to be answered.

The Petitioners have brought to your attention conflicts in Law, Ethics, and

Administrative Conflicts in behavior as well as policy conflicts. The duty of the

Administrative Hearing Court is to resolve such matters and correct the conflict within

the administration. This was the intent of the 1946 Administrative Procedures Act under

60 stat 237 S.7. The Petition also has this Congressional document which shows its

intent. The Petitioners request you to give your intent regarding this case. This

Administrative Hearing has as much to lose as the American People. This hearing is of

National importance to all Americans, as well as to the National defense of this Country.

If those who are in our legislatures are controlled by outside influence, then this is the

time and place to bring it out into the public. Where is the Republic?

Our Military has been misused as a means of killing off or disabling able-body

Americans who could instead defend this country in this type of takeover, and then the

veterans are being denied their benefits when they come home. The Military health care

and retirement comes out of the same funds as that of the American People. Those who

are elected into public office and who then hire their own staff or have been forced to

take lawyer staff members come under a different plan for health care and retirement

plans. This comes out of slush fund created by those placed in public offices.


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The Petitioners now have placed their second document of administrative violations

before this Hearing Panel. The Petitioners request in writing what action this

Administration intends to take in this case.

The Petitioners will place into the record Eric Holder’s reply to this matter. (See

Attachment: Department of Justice) SF-95 FORM TORT CLAIM

CONCLUSION For these reasons, Petitioner Requests that a Writ of Habeas Corpus be issued,

Petitioner’s information and conviction be reversed, these proceedings be declared void,

specific findings of fact and law be issued, Title 18 be declared unconstitutional, the

District Court’s actions pursuant to Petitioner be declared ultra vires, the District Court’s

actions be declared in violation of Due Process and 28 USC § 455, and the conviction be

declared void. 09-cr-00121 The issues related to Title 18 herein has never been decided

by a court of precedent based on findings of fact and law, are jurisdictional, and carry no

procedural default. That issue requires the government to prove on the record its

jurisdiction. It can not. Failure to follow the Supreme Court mandate to require the

government to prove on the record its jurisdiction, would amount to proof of judicial bias

and structural error.

Petitioner declares under penalties of perjury that the facts stated or alleged herein

are true and correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746.

An affidavit renders the facts presented as true unless it is rebutted by affidavit

and fact. The court is presumed to know the law and can pull the cases.


66

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant submits this WRIT by

Affidavit and respectfully prays this Honorable Court to:

A. Issue a writ of habeas corpus declaring Petitioner’s constraints illegal and the

court without jurisdiction and in violation of Due Process;

B. Declare Public Law 80-772 unconstitutional;

C. Declare Petitioner actually innocent of any alleged crimes charged;

D. Grant such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED TO AMEND WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT

CERTIFICATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY

I certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct under the penalty of perjury as

provided by 28 USC section 1746, that I am over the age of 18, and that I have personal

knowledge of the facts stated herein.

__________________________ In Trust, _____________________________ shane-christopher : buczeck, as third party intervener and

Grantor / Beneficiary for: SHANE C. BUCZEK a US TRUST All rights reserved Without prejudice Without recourse Shane-Christopher UCC 1-308


67

Appendices “1” HARLEY G. LAPPIN “DIRECTOR,FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS Appendices “2” Transcripts January 16,2009 9:54 AM Judge Shroeder,Jr. and March 14,2008 Appendices “3” WWW.NATIONALREPUBLICREGISTRY.COM RECORDINGS with DOS & DOJ Real Party Rule 17 Appendices “4”NATIONAL ARCHIVES RECORDS “Constitution” Certify from Library Appendices “5” Judge William M. Skretny Chief Judge U.S.D.C. ORDER’S Appendices “6” GSA STANDARD FORM “24”BID BOND, GSA SF-25 PERFORMANCE BOND, SF 25( a)PAYMENT BOND, SF 273,274,AND 275 Appendices “7” Transcripts from May 6, 7, and 15, 2009 Judge Schroeder showing no Criminal Intent many, many, many times Appendices “8” State of mind on All Federal Indictments by Dan Meador Appendices “9” VOILATION OF DUE PROCESS CASE 09-CR-121 William-Edwin:Diehl on Pre Paid Tresury Account Pursuant to PUBLIC POLICY AND HJR 192 June 5th, 1933 and Transcripts With Judge Skretny March3,2010 Vol.II page 1 and 97 Showing willfulness, good faith and belief system Appendices “10” Attorney Daniel B. Evans from Philadelphia phone 215.233.0988 email [email protected] Appendices “11” BUFFALO NEWS ARTICLE January 29,2006 U.S. District Judge Richard Arcara refused the Liberty Dollar case from Buffalo City Court and Shane ambassador for Christ which show’s case 08-cr-054 is Double Jeopardy Appendices “12”FALSE ARREST CASE FROM BUFFALO CITY COURT Pre trial and Trial transcripts showing Double Jeopardy Done By ED COTTER BUFFALO POLICE DEPARTMENT and Case file: Docket 2005ER 18515F Appendices “13” TAKE NO PRISONERS Host(s): Dr. Sam Kennedy One full Hour April4th,2010 on Promissory Notes and DTCC 55 Water Street, New York, New York and the bank’s Steal the money out of are Pre Paid U.S Treasury Account Show Time: Sundays, 7:00 PM – 9:00 PM CST http://republicbroadcasting.org/

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this the _______________ day of _____________, 2010, a true and correct copy of this PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO THE ORIGINAL HABEAS CORPUS AS PRESENTED IN

THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR 28 USC § 2241 AND/OR 28 USC § 2255 AND CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION AND REQUEST TO DISMISS OF ALL INDICTMENT’S AND CONVICTION WITHIN THE NEXT 3 DAYS, AS THIS IS AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 USC § 2241 AND CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION AND REQUEST TO STAY SENTENCING PENDING JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW was served on the US attorney threw the

Clerk’s Office in the WDNY Buffalo, New York for the opposition in this case.

Shane-Christopher

UCC 1-308

All Rights Reserved

Buczek Habeas Corpus Petition 54 & 121 & 141

Documents

Transcript of Buczek Habeas Corpus Petition 54 & 121 & 141