Biodiversity conservation in the context of poverty, greed and weak institutions

– lessons learned from IBESo research programme, Indio Maíz, El Castillo, Nicaragua

Helle Munk Ravnborg, DIIS, October 2006

Biological Reserve Indio Maíz (RBIM) as part of the Biosphere Reserve Río San Juan

decree 527 (1990)

decree 66-99 (1999)

decree 66-99 and UNESCO recognition (2003)

Biodiversity and ecosystems of RBIM 3,157 km2 (an area the size of Fyn) protected as IUCN category I - biological reserve recognized for its good state of conservation

high biological diversity high ecosystem diversity

yet diversity is insufficiently documented two expeditions undertaken by FUNDAR (NGO)

(2002 y 2004) – both in the RBIM itself

IBESo themes and teams

1aPreliminary inventory of flora in RBIM and buffer zone

Nelson Toval

Ricardo Rueda

Elvira Cotton

1bUseful plants and local knowledge in the buffer zone of RBIM

Alvaro Noguera

Henrik Balslev

2Environmental governance in El Castillo between 1999-2004

Mariana Barrios

José Luís Rocha

Rikke Broegaard

3Social capital and its importance for strengthening local organization

Ligia Gómez

Helle Munk Ravnborg

4Incentives for stimulating sustainable natural resource management

Alfredo Ruíz

Preliminary inventory of flora in RBIM and its buffer zoneObjectives: contribute to the knowledge of the biological

diversity existing in RBIM and its buffer zone design a participatory method to allow the local

population appreciate the biological values present in the zone

create economic benefits at the local level based upon the biological richness

Method: train and supervise local ‘para-taxonomist’

Some results

254 254

763

425

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Zona de amortiguamiento RBIM

Núm

ero

de e

spec

ies

Encontradas en ZA y RBIM Encontradas solamente en ZA/RBIM

Note: FUNDAR documented 436 species from the RBIM

8 new species for Nicaragua

Generation of an average monthly income of US$ 50 for the para-taxonomists

A total of 1,442 species

4 of these were collected in populated parts of the buffer zone

Implications

the exclusive focus on the RBIM in biological research undertaken in support of the development the management plan for RBIM and its buffer zone is mistaken the management category for the RBIM is already

defined the buffer zone possess much biological value

But El Castillo is much more than a biological reserve an area of cheap and ‘free’ land 13% of the population has stayed less than 5 years

in the zone, 35% less than 10 years an area rich in forest resources in 1999-2000, it was estimated: 4 planes de

manejo21%

1493 permisos domiciliares

27%planes

operativos anuales sin respaldo en

plan de manejo4%

tala clandistino48%

Fuente: Paniagua (2003)

incentives for illegal timber cutting and for sale of illegal timber

Three options for protecting the RBIM and its buffer zone provide economic incentives favouring

conservation (theme IV) stimulate and facilitate participation of the

local population in the protection and control (theme III)

support the control undertaken by the government institutions (theme IV)

Economic incentives favouring sustainable use of natural resources in the RBIM buffer zone sustainable production systems (e.g. of

cocoa) payment for environmental service schemes

(like the direct conservation payments or payments in return for Lapa Verde nests)

Typology of producers in El CastilloLivestock farmers

at the agricultural frontier

Peasants at the agricultural frontier

Poor agricultural

frontier peasants

Landless peasants and newcomers

Local timber dealers

60–100 acres of land

40–75 heads of cattle

donkeys hire labourers

(50% of needed labour force)

provide land for newcomers in order to secure labour force

60–70% of their area in pastures

30–40% of their area in forest

40–100 acres of land

6–15 heads of cattle horses (no donkeys) family labour force

(90% of needed labour force)

take part in labour exchange relations

occasionally sell their own labour

10–30% of their area in pastures

40–60% of their area in forest

20–40% of their area under crops

none or a maximum of 2 heads of cattle

small-stock engage in

temporal migration to Costa Rica

50–60% of their area in forest

recently arrived in the area

get access to rented or borrowed land or get permission to stay at livestock farmers’ land

offer labour to livestock farmers

50–200 acres of land

buy and sell timber

major part of their land in forest

Implications

experiences with payments for environmental services are incipient – monitoring of the agreements constitutes an important challenge

what constitutes an economic incentive to some, will not appear as such to others – a payment of USD 20 per acre of conserved forest is probably not attractive to livestock farmers e.g. unlikely that organic production of cocoa represents an

attractive alternative to the livestock farmers to effectively change the natural resource use of the

livestock farmers, a combination of incentives, taxes and regulations has to be applied

Importance of social capital for the local organizationObjectives: characterize existing social networks and

analyze who form part and how they are constituted

Methods: ‘affinity’ ranking supplemented by

conversational interviews and focal group discussions

Some results

a high level of unfamiliarity among local inhabitants – particularly among men – within the communities (in non-agricultural frontier communities, the level of unfamiliarity is generally around 5%)

men – social networks among men as overlapping circles overlaid by hierarchical relations

women – social networks as non-overlapping circles very limited experience and willingness to execute social control

with respect to environmental issues

Hombres - El Padilla

0

5

10

15

20

25

I* II III IV

Conglomerados

Núm

ero

de p

ers

onas

no miembros de comité local miembros de comité local

Mujeres - Las Maravillas

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

I II* III

Conglomerados

Núm

ero

de p

erso

nas

no miembros de comité local miembros de comité local

* unknown to all interviewed informants

Implications

communities do not function as entities but function by sectors

environmental and legal institutions should actively back attempts to execute social environmental control made by local inhabitants

in some communities, participating in local committees is correlated with belonging to certain social networks

Dilemmas of frontline workers from environmental governance institutionsObjectives: understand the dilemmas which frontline

environmental workers face

Methods: interviews with environmental workers, local

inhabitants and archival studies

Some results forest governance is limited to issuing permits and there is hardly

any control of forest exploitation each forest guard is responsible for patrolling 8 km of forest

border and an area of 70 km2 and lacks equipment very limited legal basis for environmental governance in the

buffer zone as long as no management plan has been elaborated forest guards (55) constitute 77% of SERBSEN’s personnel and

receive 23% of the salary budget (USD 47 000) (corresponding to USD 16/month) – the cost of elaborating the management plan for the Biosphere Reserve Río San Juan is estimated at USD 75 000

lack of feed-back and institutional support with respect to environmental cases reported by forest guards

Implications

to be efficient, the level of control undertaken by forest guards needs to be increased (number of forest guards, equipment to facilitate the patrolling and to document infractions)

improve the institutional support to forest guards (feed back on reported cases, transparent procedures, management plan)

apply forest control as a means to increase the costs of illegal timber

Three conclusions for conservation and development efforts Avoid partial coverage

efforts to generate local support for conservation through development initiatives tend to reach only part of the population – this limits support for conservation

Don’t overlook external actors ICD initiatives tend to address development needs and

environmental awareness of local people. Interests related to timber and agricultural frontier land tend to be held by powerful external actors – these actors tend to be overlooked when adopting the ICD lens

Recognize the limits of social control many protected areas are located in ‘agricultural frontier’ areas with

lack of generalized social networks, trust and security. Here, local people are unlikely to exert social control to ensure conservation and sustainable use of natural resources if not consistently backed by environmental and legal institutions

Samaria - 2005

RBIM - 2005

Samaria - 2005

- an illegal community inside

RBIMPublications available from www.diis.dk/ibeso