Bergin-OSS and Free Thai-13Jan

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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011) 11

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the

author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US govern-

ment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

War of a Different Kind

OSS and Free Thai Operations in World War II

Bob Bergin

The Thai proved to bemasters at manipulatingthe Japanese occupiersand adept at collecting

intelligence.

The situ at ion in Si am

was diff erent fr om an y

tha t had ever confronted

OSS i n an enemy-occu-

pi ed coun tr y. In stead of a

r esistan ce movement ,

such as was encoun tered

in Eu r opean countr i es,

there existed in Si amwh at m ight best be

descr i bed as a patr ioti c

gover nm ent al conspi r acy

agai nst th e Japan ese i n

wh i ch m ost of the key fig-

u res of t he sta te were

in volved. T he regent hi m-

self, the m i ni ster a nd chi ef

of poli ce, the mi ni ster of

in ter ior, the mi ni ster of

forei gn affai rs, seni or offi-

cer s of th e armed ser vi ce,and m any other r anki ng

officia l s bel onged t o it.1

Kermit Roosevelt

The U S Office of Str at egic

Services (OSS ) esta blished a

base in B a ngkok in early 1945.

At least 7,000 of the 60,000

J a pan ese troops wh o occupied

the country were based in

Ba ngkok , many wi thin a few

hundred meters of the OSS

base. The base w a s esta blished

a fter more than a yea r of frus-

tra t ing a t tempts to infi lt r a t e

Free Tha i officers into B an g-

kok from Ch ina a nd from Cey-

lon. Success came wh en OSS -

tr a ined Free Tha i officers ma deconta ct with the Tha i under-

ground t ha t h a d formed inside

the countr ya fact unknown t o

th e allies un til April 1943.

The Tha i proved to be ma s-

ters a t ma nipula t ing the J apa-

nese occupiers and a dept at

collectin g int elligence. OSS offi-

cers enga ged in Tha i opera -

tionsboth inside th e country

an d outside ithad t o dealwith s i tuat ions dif ferent from

anywhere else. Concerns about

B rita ins postwa r int entions

a nd Ch inese regional a mbi-

tions ha d to be fa ctored into

intelligence opera tions. OSS

officers ha d to wa lk a fine line,

to ha ve good working rela tions

wit h the fr iendly Brit ish and

Ch inese services, while play-

ing a lone han d, a nd w orking

1 Kermit Roosevelt, Introduction to the 1976 edition, Th e Overseas Tar gets, War Report of

the OSS, Volume II (Wa shingt on, DC : Ca rrollton P ress I nc., 1976). The origina l version of

War Report of th e OSSwa s published in 1949 by the G overnment P rinting Office, but it

wa s classified Top Secret. The book wa s par tia lly declassified in 1976 an d reprint ed com-

mercially. Tha iland w as n am ed Siam until 1939. At t he time the War Report of th e OSS

wa s origina lly writt en, the countrys name had r everted to Siam for a brief period

(194649).


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OSS in Siam

12 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011)

around th em. In the midst of

th is, the J apa nese occupiers of

Tha iland largely missed wh at

wa s ha ppening to them. The

Tha i may ha ve been adept, but

J apan ese a t t i tudes towa rd the

Tha i w ere a big factor: They

apparently could not bring

th emselves t o believe the

friendly, ea sygoing Tha i, a mong

wh om th ey lived, could be capa -

ble of skilful subversion.

Wa r Beg i n s

When the J a panese invadedTha ila nd on 8 D ecember 1941,

th e Tha i government u nder

P rime Minister P hibun Songkh-

ram a ligned i tself with the J ap-

an ese an d declared wa r on

Br i ta in and the Uni ted S ta t es.

B rita in reciprocat ed by declar-

ing wa r on Tha ilan d; Wa shing-

ton ignored th e Tha ideclara tion a nd looked on Tha i-

lan d as a n occupied nat ion.

These reactions reflected the

difference of interest s th e tw o

allies ha d in Asia, differences

th a t w ould be reflected in th e

rivalry between B rita ins Spe-

cia l Operat ions Executive

(SOE ) a nd OSS in Asia, pa rtic-

ular ly in Tha iland.

When t he Tha i government

declared w a r on th e allies, Tha i

students abroad volunteered t o

join t he resista nce movement,

calling th emselves th e Free

Thai. 2Volunt eers in E ngla nd

were tra ined by th e SOE; in

America by th e OSS. Inside

Tha ila nd, an a nti-J a panese

underground was formed under

th e lea dership of P rime Minis-

ter P hibuns political riva l,

P r idi Ph an omyong, the Rector

of Tha mma sat U niversi ty and

regent to the 17-year-old King

Ana n Ma hidon.

Ea rly indicat ions tha t a r esis-

ta nce movement inside Tha i-

lan d existed could not be

confirm ed by t he a llies. The

underground inside Tha ilan d

sent envoys to China to estab-

lish conta ct with the a l lies , but

th e envoys w ere intercepted byTa i Li, th e Chinese Nat iona list

intelligence a nd securit y chief,

wh o ha d no int ention of permit-

ting America n or Brit ish intelli-

gence operat ions inside

Tha ila nd. I t wa s not unt i l April

1943 th a t t he allies lea rned

tha t a Free Tha i movement

indeed existed inside Tha iland. 3

I n f i l t r a t i on f r om C h i n a

In ea r ly 1944, both SOE an d

OSS s ta r ted their a t tempts to

infiltra te F ree Tha i officers int oThailand from China. Major

Nicol Smit h, former tra vel-

w riter a nd one of Donovans

persona l recruits, wa s in cha rge

of the OSS Free Tha i opera-

tions. B eca use of prior agr ee-

ments , the f irs t OSS

infiltra tions ha d to be coordi-

na ted wit h Tai Li , w hose assis-

ta nce seemed to result in

nothing but delays . In t ime,

Smith s ta r t ed to th ink tha t theChinese might not wa nt a n

intelligence mission t o enter

Siam. 4

Meanw hile, the Brit ish SOE

appeared to be more success-

ful. Tea ms of S OE -t ra ined Tha i

para chuted int o North Tha i-

land; others were landed by

subma rine. But n one of th ese

SOE agents esta blished radio

conta ct a f ter their arr ival .

Ma jor S mith looked for

a nother approach a nd found a

Chinese Catholic priest who

knew t he land rout es to Tha i-

lan d. He offered the priest

$1,000 to lead th e Free Tha i to

th e border. In Ma y 1944, 11

Free Tha i officers, in t hree

independent gr oups, set off

overla nd t o Ba ngkok. This time

2 One Free Tha i member recalled tha t th e Free French movement est ablished in Engla nd soon after G erman occupation of Fra nce

inspired his gr oups na me. See Wimon Wiriya wit , Fr ee Th ai: Personal Recoll ections and Off icial Document s(Ba ngkok: White Lotus Pr ess,

1997).3 While US and UK officials m ay n ot ha ve been a ble to confirm t he existence of a resistan ce movement inside Tha iland, citizens there

would have known of the existan ce of the external Free Tha i Movement an d ha d a good idea of wha t wa s going on in the United St at es

an d Engla nd becaus e, start ing as early a s mid-December 1941, Thaila nd w as r eceiving regular C oordina tor of Informat ion, then OSS,

propaganda broadcasts, as well as news from BBC, All India Radio, and other broadcast information.4 Nicol Smith and Bla ke Clark , In to Siam , Underground Ki ngdom(India na polis: The B obbs-Merrill C ompan y, 1946), 20.

When the Japanese invaded Thailand on 8 December 1941,the Thai government under Prime Minister Phibun Songkhramaligned itself with the Japanese and declared war on Britainand the United States.


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OSS in Siam


they w ere dispatched without

Ta i Lis a ssist a nce.

Oper a t i o n H OTFOOT :

Ra c i n g t h e B r i t i sh

At a bout t ha t sa me time,

an other OSS inf i l tra t ion plan

wa s being put into action in

Cey lon. Tw o Free Tha i officers,

Wimon Wiriyawit an d B unma k

Desabut, completed tra ining at

the OS S faci li ty a t Trincoma -

lee, Ceylon, a nd w ere to be infil-

tra ted into southern Tha ila nd

by a British submarine. They

set out on 8 Augus t 1944, butwhen t he submarine reached

th e Tha i coast, t hey w ere not

landed. The captain ha d

received la st-minut e orders t o

proceed on a nother mission to

th e vicinity of Singa pore. After

a series of delay s, ca used by

wea ther a nd mecha nical prob-

lems, Wimon and Bunmak

found t hemselves back in Trin-

coma lee in ear ly Septem-

berjust in t ime to part icipat e

in Oper a tion H OTFOOT.

There w a s concern, both in

Wa shingt on and in t he field,

tha t once SOE established con-

ta ct inside Tha iland, the B rit-

ish would try t o freeze OSS out

of Tha i opera tions. By August

1944 OSS h ad not yet hea rd

from the Free Tha i dispat ched

from China in Ma y. Then S OE

revealed a new plan t o para -

chute i ts agents into an ar eanear B an gkok, from w here they

would at tempt t o contact Fr ee

Tha i lea der P ridi.

Colonel Richard P.Heppner,chief of OSS Det a chment 404 in

Ceylon, saw dan ger in this . He

reported to OSS hea dqua rters

tha t the SOE plan shows tha t

the B rit ish are in dangerous

competi t ion w ith t he U nited

Sta tes in Thai land and th a t the

futu re relat ions of our govern-

ment w ith Tha iland depend to a

lar ge extent upon the a ctions of

our organ ization in tha t coun-

try. H e suggested ma inta ining

outw ar d forms of cooperat ion,

with t he Brit ish, but to play

more or less a lone ha nd. He

mentioned preparing several

operations which have a good

cha nce t o succeed.5The

response from OSS headqua r-

ters noted tha t OSS C hief Don-

ovan feels tha t since th e

Br i t i sh want to make an inde-

pendent sh ow of the [Pridi] mis-

sion t ha t gives us license to

ta ke the same a pproach.6

Heppner went to American

thea ter comma nder Lt. Gen.

J oseph S ti lwell and secured his

support for Opera tion H OT-

FOOT, wh ich would preempt

the B rit ish by gett ing OSS

a gents into Tha ila nd a s quickly

a s possible. Wimon a nd B un-

ma k would para chute in, esta b-

lish conta ct wit h th e Free Tha i

leaders , and prepare the wa yfor an OSS presence in count ry.

H OTFOOT would notbe coordi-

na t ed with t he Br i t i sh .

A minor pr oblem, Wimon a ndBunma k had no para chute

training, was quickly rectified

wi th a t r a ining manual and

practice jumps from stacked oil

drums. On th e night of 9 Sep-

tember 1944, after tw o drops

were aborted by bad wea ther

over t he drop zone, th e tw o

Tha i agent s jumped from a B -

24 bomber, 2,000 ft over Tha i-

lands Phrae Province.

W imon W i r i yaw i t s

Adven t u r e s

Wimon landed in a ta ll tree,

a nd spent t he night n earby. The

next morning h e found n o sign

of B unma k, and set of f to make

his wa y out of the dense jungle.

After five days he came t o a vil-

lage, where he encount ered a

group of arm ed men. They t old

him they ha d ear l ier a rrested

a ma n dressed as a para -

trooper, but he h a d escaped.

Wimon ha d buried his un iform

and wa s wear ing ord inary

clot hes, shorts a nd a T-shir t,

but the men now sta r ted to

question him.

Wimon had devised a cover

story. He t old the men t ha t h e

wa s an a ide to Adun Dejar at ,

th e director genera l (DG ) of the

Tha i Nat iona l Police an d wa son a secret m ission for him. H e

took a cha nce an d gave his true

na meinstead of using an al ias

5 E. B ruce Reynolds, Thai land s Secret War: OSS, SOE, and t he Free Thai Un dergr ound dur ing World War I I (Cam bridge , UK: Ca m-

bridge U niversit y P ress, 2005), 223.6 Reynolds, 235.

There was concern, both in Washington and in the field, thatonce SOE established contact inside Thailand, the Britishwould try to freeze OSS out of Thai operations.


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OSS in Siam


as he ha d been t ra ined to do.

Adun, know n t o be one of the

tw o riva l leaders of the inter-

na l Free Tha i, wa s reputed to

know t he na me of every Tha i

student in the United Sta tes . I f

Adun recognized Wimons

na me, he would know t ha t

Wimons retu rn h a d a political

purpose.

The cover st ory w orked.

Wimon wa s ha nded off to pro-

vincia l officials w ho wired t he

DG, who quickly telegraphedback. He asked th a t Wimon be

sent t o B an gkok secretly, with

a n escort of plain cloth es police-

men.

On his a rriva l in the city,

Wimon wa s t a ken to P olice Spe-

cia l Bran ch headqua rters ,

where he spent th e night in a

cell. The n ext mornin g, 22 Sep-

tember, he wa s ta ken t o

an other Special Br an ch insta l-la tion, and there he found

seven of Nicol Sm ith s Free

Tha i agents w ho had wa lked in

from China a nd eight SOE

agents w ho had been inf il-

tra ted by para chute or subma-

rine. All were in Special B ra nch

custody. 7The myst ery of why

none of these a gents h ad con-

tac ted their headquar t ers was

now solved. Wimon wa s t hen

told tha t D G Adun would meet

wi th h im tha t evening.

Wimons m eeting w ith Adun

took place amidst great precau-

tions. The tw o met a t nigh tfa ll

in th e middle of a bridge, a nd

Adun w a lked Wimon to a black

seda n parked in a small lane.

They t alked w hile being dr iven

through B an gkoks da rk s treets .

By Wimons account, he told

Adun tha t he wa s a messengerf rom OSS a nd tha t t he Uni ted

St at es would support the Free

Tha i, but only if the t wo ma jor

playersAdun and Pridi

would w ork togeth er. La ter

th a t n ight, Adun t ook Wimon to

a meet ing wi th P r idi , and

Wimon repeated t he messa ge

he ha d given Adun. 8

Regular ra dio conta ct betw een

B an gkok and OSS wa s soon in

place, and t he Free Tha i sta rted

to operate. The wa y w as now

open for OSS to esta blish its

presence in B an gkok. OSS h ad

won i ts race with the B rit ish.

H OTFOOT I I : OSS a r r i v es

i n B a n g k o k

In J an uar y 1945, the f irs t tw o

OSS off icers a rr ived in B an g-kok. Richa rd G reenlee a nd

Ma jor J ohn Wester ha d been

brought in by two PBY Ca t-

a l ina f lying boats tha t landed in

the G ulf of Siam in t he ea r ly

a f ternoon of 25 J an ua ry. 9They

were met by a Tha i Customs

Depar tment launch tha t t r a ns-

ported th em to B an gkok to

sta r t t he process that would

give OSS a base in Ba ngkok in

the midst of the J apa nese.

Richard Greenlee was a civil-

ian, a former New York ta x law-

yer who wa s Chief of the

Specia l Opera tions (SO) Bra nch

a t OSS Deta chment 404 in Cey-

lon. H e ha d no previous experi-

ence in Asia. J ohn Wester ha d

been employed by an in terna -

tiona l engineering firm before

the wa r an d ha d l ived in Tha i-

land for 18 years . OSS h ad sent

him to China, a nd th en Ceylon,

t o prepare F ree Tha i officers for

infiltra tion missions, including

opera t ion HOTFOOT.

The tw o were housed in a

compound nea r Wa jira wu t Col-

lege, wh ere they w ere joined by

some of th e Free Tha i wh o had

been infiltrated. Pridi came to

discuss his war plan, which

7 All the infiltra tors ha d been ar rested almost a s soon a s they entered Thaila nd. Two of the OSS Free Tha i who had w alked from China

were killed by the Tha i police, appa rent ly for gold they were car rying. Nicol Smith s misgivings a bout Ta i Li were well founded. According

to a March 1945 OSS intelligence report, the Thai police had a complete photographic record of the China group with correct names

an d ra nks of each, the lat ter ba sed on intelligence provided by Ta i Lis organ iza tion. Reynolds, 186.8 There was speculation why Adun and P ridi met with Wimon when they would not meet the Free Thai w ho had infiltra ted from China .

China itself ma y be the answ er. Wimon had been dispatched via India , Southeast Asia Comma nd headq uar ters, and th us wa s free of an y

ta int of association with Tai Lis orga nizat ion. In addit ion, the Free Tha i China groups ar rests w ere known w ithin t he Thai govern-

ment, while Wimons unusua l arriva l in Ba ngkok ha d kept him under th e rada r.9 Ironically, the Cat alina s tha t f lew OSS missions betw een Ka ndy, Ceylon, and th e Gulf of Siam w ere provided and f lown by the British

Royal Air Force (RAF).

The way was now open for OSS to establish its presence in

Bangkok. OSS had won its race with the British.


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OSS in Siam


called for coordinating Ameri-

can lan dings along the G ulf of

Siam wit h a Tha i upris ing.

Greenlee deferred consider-

at ion of any m ilita ry a ction t oWashingt on a nd ra ised OSS

interest s in Tha ilan d, includ-

ing black propaga nda opera-

tions, th e insertion of more

tra ined agents , an d supply of

th e Tha i underground on a n

ever increasing scale. 10

G reenlee sta yed f ive days , wa s

exfi ltra ted t o Kan dy, a nd f lown

to Wa shingt on. He carried mes-

sages from P ridi for P resident

Roosevelt and General Dono-

van a nd gifts, a s olid gold ciga -

rette case for the president and

a silver one for D onovan .

Wester sta yed behind as t he

chief of the OSS mission in

Bangkok.

Wha t G r een l ee and Wester

Accomp l i shed

The OSS War Report focused

on th e long t erm politicalaspects of what G reenlee an d

Wester had accomplished:

Th e OSS offi cer s underes-

t im ated w hat w as real l y

th e most signi fi can t el e-

ment i n th e sit uat ion: the

fact th at t hey were not

deal i ng wit h the usual

un der ground gr oups, but

wi th th e r esponsibl e and

offi cial heads of a sover-ei gn state By send in g

tw o Am er i can offi cer s to

di scuss pol icy on t he high -

est l evel w i th th e Regent

hi mself, OSS forced him

to comm it hi mself to a

cou r se of acti on.

The best OSS politica l card

was to hold out hope of official

American support t o Sia m in

her s truggle to maint ain h er

terr i tor ia l integri ty a gainst sus-

pected B ritish designs. This

wa s delicat e, a s i t wa s also

necessar y to avoid stirring up

the S iamese aga ins t the Br i t-

ish. Mili tar y

considerations

required that

Siam cooperate

wi th the Br i t-

ish clandestine

services a s w ell

as the

OS S . 11

Over the long

term, thisw orked in

Americas

favor: What

OSS a ccom-

plished th rough

its su pport of

th e Free Tha i

a nd short ten-

ure in Ba ng-

kok would

serve the U S

governmentwell in the

years leading

up to and

through the era

of the Vietna m Wa r a nd in w ays

the w riters of the War Repor t

could not ha ve ant icipated. B ut

OSS officers on t he ground ha d

more immedia te concerns a nd,

a s th e Wa r Report notes:

Whi l e th e OSS offi cer s

pr obably di d n ot reali ze

the ful l im pl i cat ions of

th ei r success, th ey

shr ewd l y dia gnosed th e

pecul i ar char acter of th e

10 Reynolds, 278.11 OSS War Repor t: The Overseas Targets, 410.

As it became clear that no American military operation wouldbe carried out in Thailand, OSS shifted its emphasis from special operations to intelligence collection.

A graphic from the OSS War Report showin g distr i but ion of psonnel an d t otal n umber of di str ibuted i ntell i gence reports.


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OSS in Siam


si tuat i on i n Siam and

developed an oper ati onal

plan to meet i t. 12

This w ould become evident in

coming mont hs. Although t he

Tha i cont inued t o organize

guerrilla groups upcount ry, a nd

the OSS supported them, as i t

beca me clear th a t no America n

milita ry opera tion would be

carried out in Tha iland , OSS

shifted its empha sis from spe-

cia l operat ions to in telligencecollection.

L i v i n g i n t h e B a n g k o k

Bu l l s Eye

G reenlee retur ned to Tha i-

land in April. He brought with

him OSS Ca pta in Howard

Pa lmer, a gradua t e of Ha rvard

law school wh o had been born

in Tha iland a nd spent his child-

hood th ere. They found tha t t heOSS one-man-Bangkok-show,

J ohn Wester, ha d developed

serious medical problems. Left

to him self, Wester grew con-

scious of being t he only Ameri-

can in J a pan ese-occupied

B an gkok, never knowing a t

wha t moment he might be

betrayed or discovered, he lived

in almost unbeara ble ten-

sion. 13There w ere 60,000 J a p-

a nese in th e coun tr y, 7,000 ofthem in B angkok , many w i thin

100 m of the OS S ba se. For t wo

months Wester had spent day

an d night locked in a small

da rk room, wh ere he ma in-

ta ined t he ra dio l ink between

the Free Tha i and OS S hea d-

qua rters in Ceylon.

When Westers condition dete-

riorat edhe became violent

an d ha d to be restra inedthe

Tha i decided tha t t he lack of

female companionship was at

least pa rtly responsible:

They figur ed th at tw o

month s of soli tar y con-f in ement i n th at r oom

woul d u pset an yone com-

pl etely. Th ey evacua ted an

ent i r e r esidenti al secti on

of th e cit y, r ent ed a h ouse,

stocked i t w it h eight

youn g lad ies wh o were

expected to cur e wha tever

ai l ed J ohn and at the

same tim e pr ovid e an

ounce of pr otection for

Di ck a nd me. Th ey evendetai l ed extr a poli cemen

to the neighbor hood to

i nsu r e compl ete secur i ty.

G reenlee and P almer begged

off , an d missed a part y tha t

cost t he Tha i something like a

thousand dollars ! 14

It was decided that Wester

would ha ve to be eva cua ted.

Pa lmer would become the a ct-

ing chief of the OSS B a ngkokstation.

Ex -f i l t r a t i o n of a F l y i n g

T i g er P i l o t

The release a nd ex-filtra tion

of an AVG F lying Tiger P ilotheld as a P OW in B an gkok is

a n excellent illustr at ion of how

th e Free Tha i operat ed under

the noses of the J apa nese an d

how Thai operational thinking

obscured th e J a pan ese view of

events a nd ensured th e secu-

ri ty of Free Tha i an d OSS activ-

ities in B a ngkok. This opera tion

coincided wit h t he plan to evac-

ua te J ohn Wester.

In lat e 1944, w hen Nicol

Smith s ta r ted his a t tempt to

infiltra te Free Tha i agent s from

Ch ina w ithout Tai Lis assis-

ta nce, he ca lled on the U S Four-

teent h Air Force Comma nder

Claire Lee Chenna ult for help

in establishing a ra dio s ta tion

and jumping-off point for the

agents . Chennault had just

built a n a ir s tr ip at Szemao on

China s border with Laos a nd

a greed tha t S mith could set up

his ra dio s ta tion there. Because

the area w as remote and i t

would eat up much time if

horse caravans were used to

move th e required heavy equ ip-

ment a nd supplies there, Chen-

na ult offered aircra ft to fly it in.

In re turn, he told Smith tha t

once Tha i a gents w ere success-

fully placed into Tha iland , he

would have a favor to ask.

In ea rly 1945, aft er th e Free

Tha i agent s were esta blished in

B an gkok a nd communicating,

12 Ibid.13 Smith a nd Clark , 22514 Ibid. , 22728. Smith q uotes Howa rd P almer.

In return, Chennault told Smith that once Thai agents were suc-cessfully placed into Thailand, he would have a favor to ask.


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OSS in Siam


Smith reported back to Chen-

naul t . Chennaul t showed him a

ma p of nort h Tha iland w here

one of his AVG pilots, William

Black Mac McG arry ha d para-chuted into heavy jungle th ree

year ea r l ier. McG arr y ha d been

th e pilot of one of six AVG P -40s

tha t ha d a t t a c ked the J a pa -

nese Air Force a t C hia ng Ma i

on 24 March 1942. His a ircraft

wa s dama ged by ground fire

and McGarry ha d to abandon i t

before he could reach the

B urma border. Other AVG

pilots had seen McG arry land

safely on t he ground, a nd Chen-

na ult thought there was a good

chance tha t McGa rry wa s now

a P OW. He asked Smit h if the

Free Tha i underground might

be able to loca te h im.

Chennaul t had his an swer

four days la t er. McG arr y wa s a

P OW. He wa s being held in a

compound on t he grounds of

Tha mma sat Un iversi ty. His

gua rds w ere Tha i, supervised

by the J apa nese, but underFree Tha i cont rol.15Chennaul t

a sked if Sm ith could find out

from McGa rry if possible,

wh ether h e is in condition to

leave and w ill ing to att empt an

escape. 16Word from Bangkok

came back quickly: McGarry

wa s f it for an esca pe at tempt.

The Free Tha i ha d devised a

plan: McGarry would feign ill-ness a nd be moved from one

hospital t o another unt i l he just

disappeared. If his disappear-

a nce beca me an issue wit h t he

J a pan ese, it w ould be explained

tha t McGa rry had d ied and

been crema ted in t he custom-

a ry ma nner. McG arry would be

ta ken by Customs Depart ment

boat to the G ulf of Siam w here

he would be picked up by a C a t-

alina dispatched from Ceylon.

(In t he end, tw o RAF Ca t-

a linas were used for the exfil-

tra tion, which a lso would ta ke

Wester a nd four Tha i Air Force

officers t o Ceylon.)

There wa s some concern w ith

this plan among t he senior Free

Tha i. McG a rry h a d become too

well known; his a bsence would

surely be noted by the J apa -

nese on one of th eir periodic

visits. Tha t w ould mea n tr ou-ble. The da y before McG a rry

wa s t o be moved from the com-

pound, Police Director G eneral

Adun a nnounced a bett er plan.

He had ar ranged a fakerelease

order t ha t purportedly came

from him . The order dir ected

th e Tha i chief of the int ern-

ment camp to turn McGa rry

over to t he police officer w ho

brought the order. I f the J a pa-nese later noted McGarrys

a bsencea s wa s most likely

th e Ca mp chief would explain

tha t he had turned McGa rry

over a t t he request of the direc-

tor general and then produce

th e relea se order to prove it.

When the J apa nese then came

to DG Adun to find out w ha t

wa s going on, Adun w ould show

them tha t th e relea se order wa s

a forgery a nd th at i t could not

possibly have come from him. 17

On 14 April 1945, P ridi

arr ived at the OSS safe house

a t a bout 8:30; Adun a bout 30

minutes la ter, with McGa rry in

tow. McG ar ry wa s s tunned. He

had no idea of wha t wa s hap-

pening to him unti l he wa s sud-

denly introduced to the OSS

officers. H e did not seem over-

joyed, Pa lmer wrote. Und er-

sta ndably, he did not ha ve twowords to sa y a ll evening.

Wimon Wiriyaw it, w ho ha d

been put in char ge of the exfil-

tra tion, described th e run to the

gulf. 18McG arr y and t he others

boarded a Thai Customs

Depar t ment boa t tha t ha d been

docked on the Cha o Phra ya

15 McGa rry w and ered the northern Thai hills for three weeks before Tha i police found him. He wa s turn ed over to t he J apa nese Army,interrogat ed and brought to Ba ngkok. Pridi convinced the J apa nese tha t as t he Thai ha d captured him, McGa rry should remain a Tha i

prisoner, albeit under J apa nese supervision. The compound in which McGar ry wa s held wa s on the grounds of Tham ma sat Un iversity

an d in line of sight from Pr idis off ice as the university rector. From the earliest da ys, Pridi w as convinced tha t t he J apa nese could not

win t he wa r. He believed that a show of good will toward an American P OW would pay dividends wh en the wa r ended. Author interview

with Free Thai P iya Cha kkaphak .16 Smith and Clark, 191.17 There is no record of Ja panese reaction a fter McGa rrys successful exfiltrat ion. According to Wimon, the J apa nese were outra ged when

they found McGa rry m issing. They knew t hey ha d been tricked, but w ere not q uite sure how or by w hom. Author interview w ith Wimon

Wiriyawit.18 Ibid.

When Major Nicol Smith was secretly flown into Thailand inJuly 1944, he found Howard Palmer had things well in hand


8/12

OSS in Siam


River behin d t he house. To min-

imize the possibility of encoun-

ters with the J apa nese, the boa t

crossed the Chao P hra ya r iver

an d entered the netw ork of

klongs or canals that criss-

crossed the a rea a nd led south

towar d the Gulf of Siam.

Adding t o the difficulty of the

journey was Westers illness. In

his delirium he w ould often

shout out in E nglish. When-

ever a J apa nese pat rol boat

came into sight , one of the FreeTha i officers w ould get u p on

deck and da nce a ra mwong, a

tr adit iona l style of Tha i dan ce

in wh ich t he enthusia stic sing-

ing and musical accompani-

ment of th e boa ts crew w ould

drown put th e sick ma ns

shout s. Below decks, Wimon

an d McG a rry crouched with

subma chine guns ready, just in

case t he J apa nese becam e curi-

ous a nd d ecided t o comeaboard.

The boat entered th e Gu lf of

Siam a nd headed south t o the

vicinity of Pra chua b Kir i Kha n,

where it lay hidden to aw ait

nightfa l l an d the arr iva l of the

Ca ta l ina s . The two aircraf t

ar rived, a bit behind schedule,

but t he boarding of personnel

an d offload ing of equipment

wa s otherw ise unevent ful. The

two Ca ta l inas re turned to Cey-

lon, where McGa rry wa s t r a ns-

ferred to a B -24 a nd flown over

the H ump to Kunming, where

Chenna ult a nd t wo of his for-

mer AVG comra des met h im on

the runw ay. 19

A H a r d L i f e i n t h e Pa l a c e

of R oses

When Ma jor Nicol Smit h w a s

secretly flown int o Tha iland in

J uly 1944, he found H owar d

Pa lmer ha d things well in hand;

Pa lmer ha d ga ined 15 pounds

living behind enemy lines an d

the OSS base had been

ensconced in Wa ng S ua n Ku lap,

the Rose G arden P ala ce, or Pa l-

ace of Roses, a property belong-

ing to the royal family tha t

previously had been occupied

by t he deposed prime m inister.

There were six ra dio tr an smit-

ters in t he former P Ms bed-

room now, a nd his s tudy wa s

occupied by six Fr ee Tha i w ho

coded messages for tra nsmis-

sion to OSS in C eylon. Sm ith

later wrote: I am sure tha t nosecret a gents t rying to deliver a

country from oppression ever

enjoyed such pala tia l qua rters ,

as w e of the OSS l iving in

Sia ms P ala ce of Roses. 20

Pa lmer and t he Free Tha i

were very a ctive collecting

informa tion, an d Smith met

some of the agents. One, a colo-

nel in Tha i int elligence,

lunched w ith J a pan ese officersalmost every day an d wrote up

everyth ing they t old him. P unc-

tua lly, at 5 p.m. he would st op

by for a dr ink with P almer. He

brought in so much informa -

tion, Pa lmer said , tha t t wo Free

Tha i ra dio men were kept busy

sending i t out.

In a ddition t o intelligence col-

lection, th e OSS a nd Fr ee Tha i

enga ged in other kinds of oper-

a tions. One of them, Operat ion

SU ITOR, on J une 18, 1945, wa s

quit e specta cular.

Oper a t i on Su i t o r : A Com i c

Ope r a

Bangkoks hospitals had been

suffering from a serious short-a ge of medica l supplies an d

OSS a rra nged a par achute drop

to a lleviat e it. As the drop zone,

Pa lmer selected the Pra man

G round in front of the Royal

Palace, where all grand ceremo-

nies were held. He caut ioned

the Tha i tha t mea sures would

ha ve to be ta ken to assure tha t

th e supplies did not fa ll int o the

wrong hands.

On 18 J une 1945, the da y cho-

sen for the a ir drop, tw o compa-

nies of Tha i soldiers were

deta iled to put on a show of

fan cy drill . Word ha d gone out,

a nd t he Tha i public ca me to the

P rama n Ground in grea t num-

bers to w at ch. The Fr ee Tha i

had t rucks s tand ing by and

men designated to retrieve the

containers.

At n oon, B a ngkoks air r a id

sirens sounded. Aircraft

engines were soon heard, a nd

nine P -38 fighters w ere spott ed

19 Author interview w ith AVG a nd Fourteenth Air Force pilot Edwa rd Rector, who had been McGarr ys wing ma n on the Chia ng Mai ra id.

The other former AVG pilot wa iting w ith Rector wa s Ch ar les Older.20 Smit h and C lark, 236.

As the parachutes drifted down, the spectators and the drillteams ran to help themselves.


9/12

OSS in Siam


f lying low a long t he Cha o

P hra ya River. Minutes la t er, a

B -24 bomber a ppear ed over-

head a nd, a t a bout 300 feet ,

roared across the P ra ma nground, dropping eight para-

chut es of different colors. Then

a second B-24 w ent over and a

third , each dropping para -

chutes a s it pa ssed. An occa-

siona l burst of Ja panese

machine gun f ire was h eard.

Then the P-38s appeared.

Four put on a sh ow by buzzing

low over th e crowd, w hile the

five others went af t er a

machine gun posit ion th at ha d

fired on t hem. Their stra fing

killed four J apa nese soldiers

a nd five Tha i. At lea st one

round from a P -38 hit less tha n

10 ft from B riga dier Hector, a

British liaison officer, presum-

ably t he local SOE representa -

tive to th e Free Tha i, who ha d

come by t o wat ch. When t hey

met la ter, G reenlee assu red

Hector there wa s no malice

a foreth ought in th e sca re ourplanes ha d given him.21

As the parachutes drifted

down, t he specta tors and the

drill teams ra n t o help them-

selves. Fight ing broke out

am ong them. By t he t ime the

J apa nese arr ived, there wa s l it-

tle left for th em. It w a s a comic

opera, Pa lmer said , but a

hu gely su ccessful one. The med -icine ha d been delivered an d

over 10,000 Tha i ha d w it-

nessed the American drop. The

J apa nese had lost a lot of face.

Th e Wa r End s

One morning in August 1945,

OSS officers Alec MacDonald

a nd J im Thompson a nd t heir

Free Tha i tea ms w ere on board

a C-47 flying over Thailand,preparing to para chute int o

U bon P rovince.22They w ere

part of an OSS operat ion t o

infiltra te 214 Americans a nd

56 Fr ee Tha i to tr a in 12 guer-

rilla ba tt alions of 500 men

each. 23The pilot su ddenly

entered th e ca bin, shout ing,

his arms waving. Its over, he

wa s yelling. The goddamn wa r

is over! The news triggered

more shoutin g, ba ck-slapping

a nd even sobbing am ong the

Tha i. Then ca me t he Tha i

cheer: Cha i Yo! Chai Yo!

The C-47 returned to Ran-

goon. The next da y Ma cDonald

a nd Thompson in a nother C-47

landed at B an gkoks Don

Muan g airport , which was

pat rolled by scores of ar med

Japanese soldiers. 24I t w a s

decidedly eerie. We stared atthem; they s t ared a t us . They

did not bother us. The wa r

would not be over unt il the for-

ma l surrender on 2 September

1945.

MacD onald a nd Thompson

were ta ken t o the Pa lace of

Roses to meet H owar d Pa lmer.

Pa lmer wa s a short-timer and

lef t for the Unit ed Sta tes within

th e w eek, leaving Thompson, a

US Army ma jor, as the B an g-

kok OSS chief. The OSS sta -

tion w a s t o become the official

US a f fa irs establishment unti l

St at e Department off icers

arr ived in Ba ngkok, a lmost a

year la ter. In t he meant ime,

Thompson a nd Ma cDonald

would be ama teur diplomat s ,

dealing with the prime minis-

ter, the Tha i Foreign Office, and

a ll allied emba ssies.

Then Thompson decided to

leave for th e United St at es. He

would be discha rged and return

to Ba ngkok as a civil ian . Mac-

Donald then becam e the OSS

sta tion chief. As a US na val

reserve l ieutena nt, MacDonald

beca me the ra nking America n

officer in Tha ila nd. As such, he

21 Brigadier Hector a pparent ly wa s a code name for Br igadier Vic tor J acques, who ha d w orked in Ba ngkok a s a lawyer be fore the wa r a ndha d returned in early 1945 as the SOE representa tive.22 MacDona ld, a journa list in Honolulu when the J apa nese att acked Pearl Ha rbor on 7 December 1941, organized OSS bla ck propaga nda

broadcast s from Ceylon and lat er was a ssigned to OSS D etachment 101 in Burm a t o run B urmese agents through J apa nese lines. When

the J apa nese were pushed out of Burma , he volunteered to work w ith t he Free Thai. Thompson was a New York a rchitect w ho joined the

OSS an d worked wit h th e Free French in North Africa a nd in Fra nce after D-day. As the w ar in Europe wound down, he volunteered for

duty in t he Pa cif ic. The tw o became friends during their tr aining in C eylon. Both w ould achieve a degree of fame in B angkok aft er the

wa r: Thompson a s the Thai S ilk King who disappeared under myst erious circumsta nces on Ea ster da y 1967; MacDona ld as founder of

the Ba ngkok Post, one Asias most prestigious newspapers.23 Alec MacDonald, A Wand eri ng Spy Was I(Kear ney, NE: Morris P ublishing, 1997), 26.24 Ibid., 29.

The Japanese suspected there was a Thai underground andthat it had links to the outside.


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OSS in Siam

20Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (December 2011)

wa s the US representat ive at

the forma l surrender of the J ap-

a nese forces in Tha ila nd. Tw o

weeks later, MacDonald again

represented the OSS at a f inal

militar y review, wh ere the Free

Tha i were formally disba nded.

MacDonald decided it wa s

time for him to return to civil-

ian life. B a ngkoks only prewar

English-language daily newspa-per wa s gone, and Ma cDona ld

saw fertile ground to grow a

new E nglish-lan guage pa per.

He w rote his own orders t o the

nearest US na val base, at Subic

B ay in t he Philippines, w here

he signed the forms tha t ended

his four a nd one half year na vy

career, w hich he lar gely spent

with the OSS. The four enlisted

men of the B angkok OSS sta ff

were sent to join the U S lega -tion. It wa s, by coincidence, a t

just this juncture tha t ba ck in

Wa shington P resident Ha rry

Truma n a bruptly ruled the U S

Office of Str a tegic Services out

of exist ence. 25The OSS mis-

sion in B a ngkok was over.

Wha t d i d t h e Ja pan ese

k n ow a bou t t h e F r ee Tha i

an d t h e OSS Pr esen ce?

The J a panese suspected t here

wa s a Tha i underground a nd

tha t it ha d links to the outside.

Over time they ha d ca ptured

OSS agents being infil t ra ted

a nd suspected others ha d been

successful. They reported

upcountry a ir drops to P ridi

and suggested that as regent he

ta ke ca re of th is problem, so

th ey w ould not ha ve to. The

J apa nese apparent ly had no

str ong suspicion of P ridis Fr ee

Tha i role and never uncovered

the B an gkok OSS presence.

When OSS first st a rted t o oper-

a te in the P a lace of Roses, the

J apa nese were told that the

Tha i police Crimina l In vestiga-

tion Division (CID) wa s setting

up a radio tra nsmission sta t ion

in th e pala ce. If t heir direction-

finding equ ipment picked up

OSS tra nsmissions, the Ja pa-

nese would think it wa s Tha i

CID.

B efore the move to the Pa lace

of Roses, the base had moved

severa l t imes for security rea-

sons. The reloca tion t o the pa l-a ce had been precipita ted by a

fruit vendor near the former

base, who had casua lly com-

mented to his customers tha t

those America ns sure ea t a lot

of ban a na s. Pa lmer described

how he m oved to a nother house

on the Cha o Phra ya River while

Greenlee and Wester were still

there. They borrowed a car a nd

a driver fr om the Tha i Army. As

they drove through crowd ed

city streets, the cars horn

sta rted blowing. B y one

a ccount , i t wa s a helpful Ja pa-

nese soldier w ho fina lly discon-

nected a wire t o stop it

without ever noticing the

OSS officers in the ba ck seat .

When former Free Tha i w ere

a sked how they ma naged to get

awa y wi th a s much as they d id

in dealing with th e Ja panese

25 Ibid., 36

Because of their feelings of superiority and their attitudes to-ward the Thai, the Japanese could never believe that thefriendly Thai among whom they lived could be capable of suchskillful subversion.

This photo of a group of Free Tha i members a nd U S officers wa s one of ma ny show n

in a C IA Museum exhibit in 2000 entit led Historic Photographs a nd Memorabiliaof Tha ilands OSS H eroes. The photos and m an y of the art ifacts hav e been tra ns-

ferred to the Thai government.


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OSS in Siam


during t he occupation, th eir

an swers were usually s imilar t o

Free Tha i veteran P iya Ch a k-

kaph a ks: B eca use of their feel-

ings of superiority a nd t heir

at t i tudes toward t he Tha i , theJ a pan ese could never believe

tha t t he fr iendly Tha i among

wh om they lived could be capa -

ble of such skillful su bver-

sion. 26

Th e L egacy o f th e OSS

Ban g k ok Exper i en c e

The OS S experien ce in Tha i-

lan d wa s one of th e most com-

plex situa tions a n int elligenceorgan ization fa ced during

World Wa r II . The J a pa nese

enemy was n ot the biggest

obstacle to operational success.

Post-wa r int erests of the C hi-

nese an d Brit ish al l ies ha d to

be factored into operat ional

plann ing. The importa nce of

unila tera l intelligence opera-

tions qu ickly beca me evident.

The B ritish were our closest

a l lies during the w ar , and

American feelings a gainst B ri t-

ish colonialism a nd its possible

revival a f ter th e war a re now

lar gely forgott en. SEAC, the

joint , Anglo-America n S outh -east Asia C ommand under

Admiral Louis Mountba tt en,

often becam e to America ns

fighting in th e theater Sa ve

En gla nds Asiat ic Colonies.

The Ch inese represented a sim-

ilar problem, but, const ra ined

by geogra phy, th ey were easier

to deal w ith.

On t he other han d, the s ignif i-

cance of dealing closely a nd

openly with a n a l lyin this

case t he Free Tha ishowed

how effective joint operations

could be run . As the OSS War

Reportpoints out, the OSS w as

not just run ning int elligence

a gents who were part of a resis-

ta nce movement, but dea ling

w ith t he key figures of the

sta te on ma tt ers of grea t

importa nce. Perha ps a unique

situa tion in World Wa r II , but a

prepara tion for wha t C IA would

face in th e world t o come.

The Bangkok experience

underlined th e import a nce of

diagnosingth e peculiar char-acter of a s i tua tion, and devel-

oping an operational plan to

meet it. This is as funda men-

ta l as i t get for a n intel l igence

service. It requires a services

a bility to be open a nd flexible,

to accept a s i tuat ion for wh at i t

isnot a s one would like it to

bean d to work within th at

context.

The grea test legacy of the

OSS-Free Thai experience wasthe relat ionship betw een t he

two na t ions tha t w as formed

from it. Thailand became one of

Americas st au nchest a llies in

Asia , from World Wa r II s end

through th e era of the Vietna m

Wa r. And t he biggest benefi-

ciary of th is relat ionship wa s

th e OSS successor, t he C IA.

26 Author in terview wi th P iya C hakkaphak .

Bibliography

Read i n g s

Alsop, St ewa rt a nd Thomas B ra den, Sub-Rosa: The OSS and Amer ican E spionage. New York: Reyna l &

H itchcock, 1946.

Ma cDonald, Alec, A Wanderi ng Spy Was I. Kearney, NE: Morris Publishing 1997.

Piya Chakkaphak, My Role in the Free Thai Movement, 17 March 1997.Reynolds, E. Bruce, Thai land s Secret War: OSS, SOE, and the Free Thai U ndergr ound dur in g Worl d War I I.

Ca mbridge: Cam bridge University P ress, 2005.

Th e Overseas Tar gets: War Repor t of th e OSS, Vol um e 2. Was hingt on, D.C.: Ca rrollton P ress In c., 1976.

Smith , R. Ha rris , OSS: Th e Secret H istory of Am er icas Fir st Cent r al I nt ell igence Agency. Los Angeles: U niver

sity of California Press, 1972.

Smit h, Nicol and B lake Clark, In to Siam, Un derground K ingdom. Ind ia na polis: The B obbs-Merrill C ompany,

1946.


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22 St di i I t lli V l 55 N 4 (E t t D b 2011)

Wa keman , Frederick, J r., Spymaster: D ai L i and th e Chi nese Secret Ser vice. Los Angeles: Un iversity of Ca li-

fornia P ress, 2003.

Wimon Wiriya w it, Fr ee Thai : Personal Recollecti ons and Offi cial Docum ent s. B angkok: White Lotus P ress,

1997.

I n t e r v i ews

P isoot Pete S udasa na , B an gkok, October, 2003.

Piya Chakkaphak, Bangkok, February 2005.

Wimon Wiriyaw it , B angkok, J an uar y 1994,

Krongthong Chut ima, B an gkok, Februa ry 2004.

Elizabeth P. Ma cIntosh, Virginia, 2005

Ed wa rd Rector, Wa shingt on, Ju ne, 2000

Bergin-OSS and Free Thai-13Jan

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