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"Beckett is a Chicano": RadicalUniversality and Anti-Humanism inChicano/a Literature

Introduction

In her 2006 Presidential Address to the Modern Languages Association,Marjorie Perloff begins by mentioning an interesting, if not strange andunusual, literary-cultural convergence. In describing the "global" nature andinfluence of Samuel Beckett's work, Perloff refers to an entry by MichaelSedaño in the Los Angeles Chicano/a blog. La Bloga (653). AlthoughPerloffs reference is meant to highlight the "disconnect between what writ-ers and scholars at home and abroad seem to be doing and the availability ofteaching positions in MLA-related departments" (654), I find her cross-cul-tural citation to be much more suggestive than its intended purpose. Of con-siderable significance is the pairing of a "global" writer like Beckett with thecultural particularity or difference represented by a Chicano blogger likeSedaño. After all, Sedano's blog entry is mostly a response to his own won-derfully bizarre question, "What in the world is a Chicano critic doing writ-ing about Samuel Beckett?" Whereas Sedano's response to this questionconsists of personal preference ("I like Samuel Beckett") and the celebra-tions surrounding the Beckett Centennial ("Samuel Beckett is coming totown"), I find this convergence of genres, cultures, and languages to be sug-gestive of a politico-philosophical vision that remains largely unexamined intoday's discussions concerning the humanities and issues of social justice.

This claim depends, of course, upon one's understanding of what such aconvergence entails. Perloff, for example, associates Beckett with La Blogastrictly to underscore the divide that exists between the interests ofpublic/popular intellectuals and the institutionalized, in many cases non-liter-ary, work of academics in literature departments. Thus, for Perloff, this"convergence" is no more than a useful analogy with which to prove her the-sis regarding the current state of academia, and, as such, cannot be justifiedas visionary. Moreover, if this convergence is understood as a type ofalliance (Chicano-Irish, Latin American-European, Spanish-Fiench-English,etc.), then the politico-philosophical vision in question does not emerge asunique or recent, but is instead traceable to the alliance-building strategiespresent in movements like transatlantic modernism. Third World Feminism,multiculturalism, or even today's European Union. Conversely, such a con-vergence may also be taken to symbolize not alliance-building per se, butrather a complex and somewhat ambiguous literary-cultural synthesis. In

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this case, it is not the separate-but-equal mentality of alliance-building whichdictates, but rather one of confused commingling, reminiscent of mestizaje.The convergence effect, in this latter scenario, can thus be understood interms of heterogeneity, where the blending of differences takes precedenceover the aligning of common interests. The two become indistinguishable inthe hybridity of the one, very much like a Hegelian synthesis, which differsfrom the joining that occurs in an alliance, where two separate but equal ele-ments align in common interest, join as one, but remain autonomous.

Thus, if we confine our thinking about such a convergence to the tradi-tional models of alliance and synthesis, Perloffs reference is not very reveal-ing. However, the alternative that I am proposing does not rely on these tra-ditional modes of thinking. In fact, Perloff herself alludes to this alternativein quoting one of the comments posted in response to Sedano's blog entry:"Beckett is a Chicano!" (653), The logic that guides such a statement is notfounded on conjunction (the alliance between Beckett and Chicanos) orambiguity (the synthesis of Beckett-Chicano), but rather on equivalence(Beckett is a Chicano), We must first clarify the fact that this equivalence isnot meant existentially. That is, to state that "Beckett is a Chicano" is not toassume that the existentiality of the individual Samuel Beckett is describablein terms used to define the Mexican-American or Chicano/a community inthe United States. This would be factually and historically incorrect.However, if we interpret the signifiers "Beckett" and "Chicano" as referringto existential-cultural localities that signify a particular understanding ofhuman experience (that is, there is a "Beckettian" mode of being human or ofunderstanding humanity, just as there is a Chicano mode), then the equiva-lence in the statement "Beckett is a Chicano" can be understood at the levelof perspective or understanding: Beckett understands the world in a Chicanomanner, just as Chicano/as understand the world in a Beckettian way. Evenso, how can such an assertion, which many literary critics will no doubtjudge outrageous, if not absurd, be legitimated? How can Beckett be justifi-ably defined as Chicano?

I understand this equivalence to be unique in that it does not presume anoriginal differentiation that needs reconciling either through alliance or syn-thesis. In other words, there is no presumed difference between the subjectpositions "Beckett" and "Chicano" that requires the suturing of alliance orthe blending of synthesis. Instead, I read the two elements as somehowequated through an absent standard that renders them generic and inter-changeable. Equivalence, in this case, distinguishes itself as unique in itsradical foundationalism—not two joining as one (alliance) or combining intoone (synthesis), but, as Alain Badiou terms it, one dividing into two.' In thiscase, the statement "Beckett is a Chicano" is not the linking of two elementsinto one, but rather the formal division of one into two, or the subtraction of

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two from the one. In other words, the equivalence suggests a preexistingfoundation that allows for both "Beckett" and "Chicano" even to be consid-ered as possible subject positions. What foundation allows for such radicalequivalence? Badiou's views on ontology and humanism, particularly hisnotions of subtraction and the void, are useful in answering this question.

Void Is the Proper Name of Being: A Foundation of Nothingness

Those familiar with Badiou's philosophy will note that one of the centralaxioms of his system is the adamant rejection of a presumed Oneness, ForBadiou, everything begins with the premise that the One is not, best capturedin Nietzsche's famous declaration "God is dead," Any ontology that beginswith the One is in effect a theology, a system where everything is reducibleto the essentiality of the One, Instead of the One, Badiou's ontology isfounded on the notion of inconsistent or infinite multiplicity. However,rather than being a multiplicity composed of singularities or individual units(like atoms), Badiou's multiplicity is radically pure in that it does not giveway to notions of "between-ness" or "difference," In fact, the purity of suchmultiplicity is founded on its irreducibility or limitlessness, and the only wayto achieve a limitless multiplicity is to establish nothingness or the void asboth beginning and end. Being nothingness, the void can function neither aslimit nor origin. It is a foundation without essence, without time, and there-fore the "proper name of being" (Being and Event 52), From this void wesubtract units or elements that we then count-as-one—that is, define as dif-ferent and individual, Badiou's ontology is therefore subtractive in that itdoes not posit an original Oneness from which beings are produced, butrather a pure multiplicity founded on nothingness, from which beings aresubtracted.

Returning to the problem of equivalence in the example "Beckett is aChicano," we can begin to see that the Oneness that substantiates this equiv-alence is in essence a not-One, a foundational nothingness. To describe thisequivalence in terms of a "one that divides into two" is therefore misleading.It is more accurate to describe the equivalence in terms of a two that is sub-tracted from a multiple composed of nothing. In this case, it is the ontologi-cal trait of nothingness that permits equivalence between the subject posi-tions "Beckett" and "Chicano," The ontological foundation of nothingnessrenders the potential differences between these two positions irrelevant, mak-ing them generically the same, Beckett can thus be Chicano because to beboth Beckett and Chicano is essentially to be the same nothing. And, thoughthis equivalence may appear to be a cheap philosophical parlor trick usingthe smoke and mirrors provided by Badiou's ontology —which seems toallow for outrageous cross-cultural equivalences, like "Beckett is a

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Chicano," or, for that matter, "Beckett is a Christian fundamentalist"—I findthat the ontological denominator of nothingness works uniquely in this case.At the level of pure being, it can be said that the equivalence is pointlesssince the statement "Beckett is a Chicano" only communicates the fact that"Beckett" and "Chicano" both are in the sense of be-ing. However, at thelevel of human being or what Heidegger terms Dasein, the foundation ofnothingness takes on a different importance. Not all human beings relate tonothingness in the same way, though all being can be traced to the ontologi-cal foundationalism of the void. In other words, though we come from noth-ing, this does not necessarily entail an understanding of ourselves as beingnothing, or that we live accordingly. In fact, the predominant mode of being-in-the-world, one would have to say, has very much been in accordance withthe logic of Oneness, whether through religion, nationalism, or any otherform of identity thinking. This is why the statement "Beckett is a Christianfundamentalist" does not work in the same way as "Beckett is a Chicano."The former statement does not carry any justification for equivalence outsideof the general, and thus useless, ontological observation that both subjectpositions are. After that, the basis for similarity begins to fall apart, espe-cially in regard to the tensions between nothingness and Oneness. ABeckettian mode of understanding centralizes the role of nothingness inhuman experience, while a Christian fundamentalist, by definition, prioritizesthe mandates of the One, in this case the law of God, Everything that fol-lows will be governed by the logic of such Oneness,

The ontological foundation that allows for the generic equivalencebetween Beckett and Chicano is therefore nothingness. However, thoughBeckett scholars may agree that nothingness plays a major role in his aesthet-ic (the minimalist props, the use of darkness, and the centrality of silence allbeing prominent, formal examples in his theatrical work), critics ofChicano/a literature may object to defining "Chicano" as somehow foundedon nothingness. After all, the identity politics characteristic of the civilrights movement in large part focused on the recognition and just treatmentof traditionally marginalized, culturally specific identities, such asChicano/as and African-Americans, but definitely not the recognition ofnothingness. Nothingness is hardly a defining characteristic of identity poli-tics or minority literatures. In fact, it is usually associated with the invisibili-ty that accompanies marginal existence, and is thus a condition one usuallydesires to escape, not embrace. Yet, even within Chicano/a studies, there arecritics who perceive a potentiality in nothingness that transcends the popularstereotype of alienation, and who thereby defend the unpopular view ofChicano as necessarily indefinable, essentially a nothingness.

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The Nothingness of Chicanola Subjectivity:Revisiting Bruce-Novoa thru Anzaldúa

In addition to his influential literary scholarship, Juan Bruce-Novoa isalso known as one of the first Chicano critics to call for more flexibility indefining the parameters of Chicano/a literature and, perhaps more important-ly, for the necessary indeñnability of the term Chicano, As early as 1974,Bruce-Novoa was already challenging the restrictive prescriptions ofChicano nationalism, rejecting the then popular tendency of reducingChicano/a literature to nationalist propaganda:

From the start Chicano literature has suffered imposed defini-tions, mostly from people seeking to use literature for non-literaryends, expurgating anything (or anyone) not amenable to their dic-tates, , , , In 1974 I again decried such extraliterary shackles anddrew the comparison with the word Chicano, with its many trun-cating definitions. To repeat, I propose that Chicano remainundefined; that it, and thus the literature, is nothing , , , a nothingin no way negative, one which may manifest itself in manyfacets, but which perversely resists final definition, maintainingthe ability to reformulate its totality from within, in spite of thebest—worst—efforts to ossify it for whatever reason, (Bruce-Novoa 1990, 94)

Anchoring his theoretical approach in the French tradition of GeorgesBataille and Maurice Blanchot, with their respective philosophies of excessand nothingness, Bruce-Novoa's views on the ineffability of Chicano beingcontinue to be far from popular. This is mostly due, I believe, to the centrali-ty of what has become an identity-politics discourse. As Bruce-Novoa sug-gests, the extraliterary concerns of the civil rights movement conflated thesocio-political needs of the Chicano/a community with cultural production.The resulting literature helped give a voice and a sense of identity to a previ-ously marginalized community, but it also lent itself to oversimplifiedaccounts of the Chicano/a experience, and even worse, it initiated an on-going battle over the defining characteristics that make one Chicano/a,

This identity-definition debate was considerably affected by the work ofChicana feminists and writers during the 1980s, particularly the highly influ-ential notion of the new Mestiza posited by Gloria Anzaldúa, In contrast tothe patriarchal, nationalistic, and homophobic discourse underlying popularnotions of Chicano subjectivity during the 1960s and 1970s —a discoursethat proved to replicate internally the same alienation and marginalization itattributed to mainstream institutions outside the Chicano community —Anzaldúa's theory of the new Mestiza seeks to overcome the restrictivenessof traditional representations by exponentially multiplying the qualifying cat-

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egory of "difference," and foregrounding the figure of the Mestiza asemblematic of this new, multifaceted subject position. Whereas traditionalnotions of Chicano tended toward a dichotomous logic of Mexican-American, Spanish-English, Man-Woman, First World-Third World, etc.,Anzaldua's new Mestiza incorporates multiple subject localities as a meansof exploding established binaries. Thus, under the dictates of selective inclu-sion and ambiguous synthesis, the new Mestiza prefers the in-between-nessof multilingualism, queer/bi-sexuality, multiculturalism, and a consciousnessthat is as open to intuition and spiritualism as it is to reason and practicality.In essence, Anzaldua's new Mestiza is exemplary of the hyphenistic logicthat underlies the Mexican-American-ness of Chicano/as: neither Americannor Mexican, but the hyphen in-between. She describes her project in part asone of linkage, especially since homosexuals are privileged as ambassadorsof cross-cultural interconnections: "Being the supreme crossers of cultures,homosexuals . . . link people with each other—the Blacks with the Jews withIndians with Asians with whites with extraterrestrials. [Our role] is to trans-fer ideas from one culture to another" (Anzaldúa 1999, 106-107).Anzaldua's model therefore functions as both alliance and synthesis in that itboth links different cultures together while also collapsing them into "some-thing else": "Soy un amasamiento, I am an act of kneading" (101-103). Thisdual function of linking and synthesizing is precisely what many Chicano/assee the hyphen in "Mexican-American" as representing—the possibility ofboth connecting and blending.

Despite the seeming overlap between the ambiguous synthesizing andinterconnecting of Anzaldua's new Mestiza and Bruce-Novoa's insistence onthe indefinability of the term Chicano, it is the hyphenistic logic characteris-tic of the former that Bruce-Novoa both anticipates and rejects in his earlywork: "[No] one would deny the predominance of the Mexican and the U.S.influences; yet we are neither, as we are not Mexican American. I proposed,in 1974, that we are the space (not the hyphen) between the two, the intercul-tural nothingness of that space" (Bruce-Novoa 1990, 98). Bruce-Novoa'scall for nothingness stands in sharp contrast to the associative and linkingmentality posited by hyphenation, which encourages Chicano/as to appropri-ate two nationalisms (Mexican-American) rather than one. Anzaldua's newMestiza, though transcending the binarism of this hyphenated model,nonetheless favors the multifariousness of linkage/synthesis to the void ofnothingness. As noted, Bruce-Novoa calls for the space to remain empty,free of hyphens or any other symbols that would ossify Chicano being asrepresentable or definable. The point here is not abstraction for the sake ofabstraction or the elitism of intellectual obscurity, but rather a necessaryfirmness regarding a philosophical principle that guides our understanding ofself in relation to others and, as such, dictates everything from cultural

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awareness to politics and economic planning. To state this differently, eventhe multicultural, queer, multilingual and intentionally ambiguous subjectivi-ty of the new Mestiza lends itself to ideological appropriation, as it too easilyparallels what David Harvey calls the flexible accumulation of postmoderncapital, which itself is defined by a tolerance for ambiguity and a tendency toappropriate cross-cultural and multinational exchange. Nothingness, on theother hand, is radically universal and yet not appropriable or assimilable toinstitutions like parliamentary capitalism.

Thus, although Chicana writers and theorists like Anzaldúa rightfullycritique and reject earlier, traditional models of Chicano/a subjectivity, thehyper-diversity, ambiguity and ultra-marginalization represented by the newMestiza privileges a logic of difference that nonetheless results in the sameidentity-thinking characteristic of European-Enlightenment subjectivity, theonly difference being the multiplied presence of difference itself. In otherwords, though the content of the new Mestiza may consist of diversity andambiguity, the form—that of synthesis—still aspires to Oneness:

The new mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for contradic-tions, a tolerance for ambiguity . . . not only does she sustain con-tradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else, . . .That focal point or fulcrum, that juncture where the mestizastands, is where phenomena tend to collide. It is where the possi-bility of uniting all that is separate occurs. In attempting to workout a synthesis, the self has added a third element which is greaterthan the sum of its severed parts. That third element is a newconsciousness—a mestiza consciousness. (Anzaldúa 1987, 101-102)

Maintaining difference in synthesis nonetheless results in a privilegingof the one over the multiple. And, as Badiou observes in the context of theChinese communist revolution, a premature synthesis that has not truly tra-versed the dialectical tensions of the two is essentially a disguised method ofmaintaining the status quo of the one: "Taken as a subjective formula, asdesire for the One, the maxim of synthesis (two fuse into one) is declaredrightist because . . . it is entirely premature. The subject of the maxim is yetto fully traverse the Two to its end. . . . It follows that the One it covets is noteven yet thinkable, which means that under the cover of synthesis, this desireis calling for the old One . . . [It] is restorative" {The Century 60). This cri-tique is not intended to suggest that Anzaldua's new Mestiza signifies aretum to Chicano nationalist reductionism, but the model, though heteroge-neous, does rely on the unifying structure of identity-thinking, one which ischaracteristic of the homogeneous, patriarchal and imperialist subjectivitiesAnzaldúa criticizes.

It should be noted, however, that Anzaldúa did re-think her privileging

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of difference, as evident in the preface to the anthology this bridge we callhome, where she states: "Twenty-one years ago we struggled with the recog-nition of difference within the context of commonality. Today we grapplewith the recognition of commonality within the context of difference" (2).Although far from rejecting her previous emphasis on a politics of alterityand recognition, Anzaldua's refocus from difference to commonality repre-sents an important step towards the ontology theorized by Badiou. The com-monality that Anzaldúa mentions could easily continue in the tradition ofalliance, and could thus fall victim to the same mistakes as its multiculturalpredecessors. Or, it could signify a radical foundationalism that refusesappropriation, and thus stands against the status quo as something "impossi-ble"—as nothingness. Such an uncompromising and universal commonalityundermines the artificial differences needed to maintain established relationsof power, differences such as those perpetuated through sexism, classism,nationalism, racism, and homophobia. This commonality also allows for thegeneric interchangeahility suggested by the statement "Beckett is aChicano," which, interestingly, parallels a hypothesis posited by Bruce-Novoa in 1989: "Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca's La Relación (a narrativeaccount which details his eight years of adventurous roaming through thesouthern part of what is now United States territory between 1528 and 1536). . . marks the beginning of Chicano literature" (Reconstructing 4). Bruce-Novoa's daring thesis, which is largely based on the writings and teaching ofLuis Leal, states that another European, this time a Spanish explorer, is notonly Chicano, but the father of Chicano literature. Though such a thesis maybe easily regarded as politically incorrect and perhaps even irresponsible inregard to cultural and historical specificity, Bruce-Novoa's notion ofChicana/o subjectivity as nothingness allows for commonalities that are oth-erwise dismissed as impossible, nonexistent, void or unreal.

The ontology of nothingness advocated by both Badiou and Bruce-Novoa recalls the anti-humanism of Jacques Lacan's psychoanalysis, whichis not surprising, considering the influence of Lacan on Badiou's philosophy,and the influence of Bataille and Blanchot on Lacan. It is important to note,however, that the anti-humanism in question does not refer to a stanceagainst humanity, but rather is meant to suggest a philosophical positionagainst inherited traditions of liberal humanism that tend to privilege an ego-centered and rationalistic model of human subjectivity. The aim of this anti-humanism is to de-center the anthropomorphism that dictates the centralityof human being above all other being. Not only does this result in the typeof arrogant self-absorption typified by humanity's role in the current environ-mental crisis but, even worse, this self-centeredness eventually leads to com-peting factions that are determined to stand out as the authentic human arche-type. This, of course, generates various ideologies used to differentiate one

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type of human being from another. Rather than addressing such problemsthrough traditional notions of human rights and national sovereignty, anti-humanism recognizes the structural dimension of such issues, those systemictendencies—some of which escape our conscious awareness, and thereforeour ability to objectively and rationally address them—that dictate and rein-force our understanding of the world. Consequently, anti-humanism focuseson the structural nature of human subjectivity and interaction, calling atten-tion to the tendencies and differences that only serve to reinforce our generaldiscontent.

Conclusion: Radical Universality and Anti-Humanism inChicano/a Literature

During the heyday of Chicano nationalism in the 1960s, few could haveimagined the development of a "minority literature"—as theorized by GillesDeleuze and Félix Guattari—within the already minoritized literature of theChicano/a community.2 And yet, as Bruce-Novoa points out, there remainsan institutional mentality, even within those communities that claim to standagainst mainstream, institutional thinking. In his essay "Canonical and Non-Canonical Texts," Bruce-Novoa explains how the oppressive structures thatfoster and perpetuate marginalizing practices like racism and sexism areequally at work, albeit at a much lesser scale, in the politics of literary canon-ization. Whereas some writers are praised for their depiction of theChicano/a experience, others are overlooked due to their problematic repre-sentation of, or relationship to, such Chicanismo. Two writers that Bruce-Novoa mentions are Oscar Zeta Acosta and Cécile Pineda. For his part,Acosta offers a far-from-romantic view of Chicano/a political activism in hisexaggerated yet nonetheless historically inspired novel, The Revolt of theCockroach People. Pineda's work, on the other hand, makes no effort torepresent Chicano/a cultural traits and thus, on first impression, reads morelike existentialist fiction than Chicano/a literature. For these reasons, bothwriters find themselves at the margins of the Chicano/a literary canon,despite offering some of the most insightful and formally engaging novelsavailable in Chicano/a literature. Since neither writer reaffirms conventionalnotions of what it means to be Chicano/a in their work, they are relegated toa level of canonical recognition far beneath their merit. To explain why thisis the case, I offer a brief analysis of Acosta's second novel. The Revolt ofthe Cockroach People.

In Revolt, Acosta explores the dark, carnivalesque underside of theChicano civil rights movement, depicting the world of sex, violence, anddrugs that underlay the more publicly celebrated political activism. Similarto Badiou's ontology of nothingness, Acosta also emphasizes the political

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potential of de-subjectification and anti-humanism in Revolt. Rather thancontinue with the identity politics of recognition and difference made popu-lar by the civil rights movement, Acosta posits a more radical vision foundedon a logic of sameness, which he locates in the metaphor of the "cockroach,"his symbol for an anonymous collective composed of the disenchanted, themarginalized and the dispossessed—essentially those that count as nothingwithin the system. This shift from a politics of identity and difference to apolitics of non-identity and sameness is evident in the final chapters of thenovel, especially in the famous court scenes. More than a simple decon-structing of the legal system, Acosta's questioning of the Grand Jury selec-tion process underscores how difference can be ideologically manipulated tobenefit certain groups in specific situafions. He argues that, whereas legalinstitutions prescribe a structure of equality-through-anonymity when itcomes to jury selection, the reality is in fact a privileging of certain identities(WASP) over others (Chicano), as suggested by Acosta when he asks, "Isn'tit a fact that all your nominees to the Grand Jury are white Caucasians?"(226), Because the Grand Jury selection process is, in many respects, theState's unspoken form of identity politics, Acosta is disallowed to follow thisline of questioning, though he pushes the legal situation to its limits. He thenhighlights how the socio-cultural differences among the various groups pre-sent in the courtroom —hippies, Chicana/os, college students, Anglos,African-Americans, Native-Americans, etc—function as artificially imposedtraits that obfuscate similarities in socio-economic location, similaritieswhich he idenfiñes in the figure of the "cockroach":

Under the ruling, we have a right to inquire into the types of per-sons excluded , , , if there is such a type , , , I'd say this court isfilled with them, , , , A hippie is like a cockroach. So are theBeatniks, So are the Chicanos, We're all aiound. Judge, Andjudges do not pick us to serve on Grand Juries, (228)

Acosta thus calls attention to the fragile consistency underlying the legalsystem by addressing not the specific identity politics of what constitutes a"cockroach," but rather how the cockroach is constituted through the exclu-sionary practices of the legal system, Acosta's strategy is thus negative—asubtractive approach to subject-formation, rather than one that is determinis-tic or positivist,

Acosta's use of the cockroach as a metaphor for radical universality rep-resents the controversial transcending of Chicano nationalist ideology thatBruce-Novoa advocates, and gestures towards a type of anti-humanism pro-posed by Lacan and traceable in Badiou's ontology of nothingness.Moreover, it is emblematic of a resurgence in the humanities surrounding theimportance of anti-humanist crifiques. An example of this is seen in the con-

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cept of planetarity proposed by Gayatri Spivak, which aims at countering thearrogant anthropomorphism underlying the Enlightenment concept of "glob-alization," As Spivak states, "Globalizadon is the imposition of the samesystem of exchange everywhere" (72), Spivak views globalization as theforced sameness of capitalism, an exchange-value system which reinforces,through material practices, a type of identity-thinking characteristic of het-erosexism, racial prejudice, nationalism and patriarchy. As such, capitalismis global, not universal. By this I mean that its effects are felt globally, whileits ability to empower remains restricted to a small percentage of the globe'spopulation. Whereas globalization imposes hegemony while maintainingideological differences —such as nationality, gender and class—planetarityallows for an understanding of sameness that avoids such contradictions.Rather than continue with the most reductive of Enlightenment-inherited tra-ditions—that of thinking everything, including the planet, through the cogni-tive model of "Man"—the concept of planetarity compels us to think human-ity through the model of the planet. This necessitates a different type ofthinking, the type found in Beckett's ethical anti-humanism—that disciplinedthinking that substantiates his ability to express the "Not-I" of the other.And let us not forget that, though such thinking may at times border on theincomprehensibility of what Lacan terms "the real," we should not refrainfrom attempting to think in such terms, for, as Spivak reminds us, to think interms of the planet's alterity is to "experience , , , the impossible" (102), Ifind that, whether through the shipwrecked consciousness of Cabeza deVaca, Anzaldúa's call for commonality, or Acosta's cockroach people,Chicano/a literature has always gestured toward such impossibility, nevermore evident than in the unfeasibility of the statement "Beckett is aChicano,"

NOTES

1, Although this idea of the one that divides into two is used by Badiou to describethe necessity of antagonism in Marxian dialectics (as debated in communist China), Iam appropriating it here to refer to Badiou's views on ontology. See "One DividesInto Two" (The Century 58-67),2, The notion of a "minor literature" is developed by Deleuze and Guattari as ameans of distinguishing works of literature that position themselves against a domi-nant majority viewpoint. Within the canon of Chicano literature, for example, femi-nist perspectives were definitely a "minority literature" throughout the 1960s and1970s, even though females did not constitute a numerical minority within the move-ment. The "minor" in this case has less to do with statistics, and more to do withpositioning in relation to a dominant status quo. For more on Deleuze and Guattari'snotion of a minority literature, see Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (University ofMinnesota Press, 1986),

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WORKS CITED

Acosta, Osear Zeta. The Revolt of the Cockroach People. New York: Vintage,1973.

Anzaldúa, Gloria. 1999. Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. 2"'' ed. SanFrancisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1987.

. "Preface: (Un)natural bridges, (Un)safe spaces." this bridge we call home:radical visions for transformation. Eds. Gloria Anzaldúa and Ana LouiseKeating. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Badiou, Alain. The Century. Maiden: Polity, 2007.

. Being and Event. New York: Continuum Press, 2005.

Bruce-Novoa, Juan. Retrospace: Collected Essays on Chicano Literature, Theory,and History. Houston: Arte Public Press, 1990.

. "Shipwrecked in the Seas of Signification: Cabeza de Vaca's La Relaciónand Chicano Literature." Reconstructing a Chicano Literary Heritage.Ed. Maria Herrera-Sobek. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1993. 3-

2 3

Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Translatedby Dana Polan. Foreword by Réda Bensmaïa. Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1986.

Perloff, Marjorie. "Presidential Address 2006: It Must Change." PMLA 122:3(2007): 652-662.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. Death of a Discipline. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2003.

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