Battle for Aschaffenburg

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CHAPTER 4xilmAm

This chapter deals wlth the battle for the clty ofAschaffenourg from 25 March to 3 April 1945. covering the fourpnaaes of the struggle: Engagement (25-26 March). Equilibrium(27-28 March,. Attrltion (28-30 March,. Reduction (31 March - 3April). I t Is chronoloqical. describ ing the actlons taken Dy botnsides t o gain the Initiative ana secure a tactical advantage.

For U he new s in the west was bad. The All ies haaOreachea them. lezed the Saar Palatin ate and the

' Rhineland. crossed the Rhlne in several places and now werewiving. almost unopposed. towards the heart of theu nsouth central Germany remnants of Wehrmacht units were screamingDack to the next ecnelon of defensive positions along the Waccer.Main ana Tauber River systems. Their fitness roc combat was poorana anv effort at defense resetnoled more of an armea delay.Pushin q them were two strong American armies. the Thlr a and theSeventh. 00t h with as much combat experience a s any Americ an units.

The Thlra Army spearhead was the 4th Armorea Dlvision racingacross the flat country between the Rhine a nd the Main throuqnDarmstaat. The operation wa s aided by the German

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commander s aeclsion to abandon the defense of Darmstadt. a cityalready SuDstantially destroyed by aeria l bombing.' In the 38weather of the Bavarian spring morning LTC Creiqhton W. ADrams,Combat Command B (CCB), a strong f o r c e of 2500 men. r acea to tneMaln Rlver In Aschaffenburg following a report of a road Driagestill undamaged over the rlver.

Awaiting them on th is Palm Sunday were the five thousandcombatan ts of (&&A) and German troopsunder tne control o t the p 3 RODI- Dl vi g LM staff. hastilyoraerea by L Wto control all forc es along the Main River fronttrom Hanau to MiltenDerg.' Most of the alvislon's l(1.000partially-trained troops were concentrated In the ma.ior towns alongits 60 Kilometer tront. However, at the start ot the battleAscnaffenDurg was an isolated aefenslve stronghold with tew othertroops for support.' ELI(B positioned Its forces as seen at Figure dwitn an initial echelon of troops on the west DdnK of tne river inthe Nilkheim salient and the second echelon arrayed in strongpointstrom west to east on high ground. o r in fortlfiea positions iniront ot tne urDan area of the city. A weakly nela area was tneopen ground south of the clty in the vicinlty of the Nilkneimrailroad mi dg e.

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OPENING TROOP DISPOSITIONS. 25 MARCH 1945

Figure 8

SoLrce: irhois Staatmueiier. hschafrenDura i m 2wei ceCIrretisrieq._ (AscnartenDurg: Gescnicnts- Und hnscverein e . vnscnarren~urg. 9'71). 177.

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Dav 1 - March 19qgAt 0900 hour s the German comnand at Babenhausen. nine mile s

to the west , called Aschaffenburg to report that the town wa s underattack DY str onq Amerlcan armored forces. Th ls lnformatlon wentout to all strongpoints and MaJor Lamberth. the Combat C m a n a e r .orae rea the burn lng of all secret documents. At noon sentries inthe towers of the reported the approach o t theAmer ican s along Darmstaedter Strasse. the road from Babenhausen.The mem ber s of CCB. 4th Armored Dlvlsion were driving for theMalnDrucke over the Maln at the apex of the Nllkhelm salient.'They reached the brldge and trled to push their way acr oss underintense small arm s flre. As the flrst Sherman tank triea to forceits way acro8s i t exploded with a flash from multlpl e hlti fromantitank rockets. antltank shells. mortars and small arms tire.'Thi s caused tne Americans to Witheraw from the nose of tne saiient.Simuitaneouslv German detenders in the Schloss saw American men andarmorea venicies crossing the undamagea rai lroaa Driaqe tnreekiiomete rs upriver (south) from the road briage.

As the lead American un lts were pulli ng back from tne roadmi dg e. LTC Harold Cohen. c m a n d e r of the 10th Armored Infantrv.received a radio call celllng hlm of the rallroad bridge. tieairected the battalion recon platoon to take the bridge ana ailavailable vehicles to provide tire Support. In rapid succession.unaer intense small arms flre. the scouts Swarme d across the

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one-track-wide iron glraer structure, cuttlng wires, pusnlng aerialDom~s iggea for demolition Into the river. Once on the other siaesome men dove in the water to swlm to the center support to cutaway addltional boms.' When reasonably assured that the briaqewould not Dlow up In their faces, three companies of infantrv wentacross on foot, followed by their halftracks and some tanks fromthe 37th Tank Battallon.' By 1230 hours the Amerlcans had moveaaway from the river and were fighting their way up the slopes ofthe &.lWu#u nd the &Q& agalnst llght reslstancs. Realizingthe importance of tne arldgehead, LTC Aarams movea as much comatpower over the bridge as ne darea.

The Amerlcan approach to the clty haa occurred so tast thatthe plans for the destructlon of the bridges were not executed.UDerleutnant Paul Kell, the rallroaa brlage c k a n a e r . w as awaitlngaemolltlons wnlch dld not arrlve In t1me.l When thls was reporteato tne combat commanaer he ordered lmmedlate counterattacm. butthe Americans had built up such strong forces that the attacKstailed. While cne defenders were trying to stop cne nemorrhaae acthe railroad brlage. they did succeed in blowing u p thesenalng two spans into the muaay water. By mid-atternoon. aespicerepeated Wo u n d counterattacks and sortles ~y ME-I09 flgnters. tneAmericans naa openea an eight square kilometer loagement on theeast banK o t the Maln. The Nllkhelmer railroad brldge was the onlyintact Drldge across tne Main River from Frankfurt to MiltenDerg;tne ketterau - Line had been compromlsea. In the

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afternoon tne German a v e n t h Bunr commander, &wc&l der nfantrletmaJor general) Felber vlslted the clty to assess the sltuation.Havlng the recent example of the Remagsn railraod bridge, he wasespecially aware of the Importance of containi ng tho AmerIcanpenetration.) He dlrected that all available u nlt s be sent to tneMain front at Aschaffenburg.

I n mid-afternoon the Americans attempted to capitalize onthe briagehead by trying to seize the town of Schwelnheim oy aW. stro ng force of tan ks and Infantry. supported oyartillery, attacked the town along the flat rolling farmland. butpulled back to Posltl ons on the ErbIg. the Sternberg and theBiscnberg after loosing several t anks and engaging in hand-to-handfighting.'" Before nightfall US unlts had moved north along tnerlver to the southern approaches to Aschaffenburg. The elementsnot engaged in the bridgehead mounted assaults to eliminateisolated German defensive posltlons In Schoenousch Park and inLelder (Figure 8 ) .

Thus. on tne first day of the battle o t Aschattenourq tneAmer ican s had gained a foot hold acros s the Main River, out at acost or four tanks put out of action and and several men kiiled orwounded. Although a Drlageheaa wa s flrmly establisned tnev naamiss ea an important opportunity. The area south of the clty wasinitiaiiy lightly defended, but in the word s of LTC Cohen, " th eWehrmaCht moved I n and bullt up a crust." A massing o t torces inthe Aschaffenburg area could have provlded a quick entrance into

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tne Spessart Mountains a nd the Franconian hea rtland neyond.Germans saw the posslblllty and the Aschaffennurg area became a

The

draw ing forces from the entire area. Yet, they weretoo late to erase the bridgehead and had comnlttea a tactlcalblunder similar to that made at Remagen.

Destruction of m i d g e s was an englneer functlon that wascentralized in englneer channels. Acco rdln g to Major Lamberth. thedestruction of the Maln brlages tone road and two rail Drlag es i nthe &2, sector) was not a part of the defensive plan developed inthe fall of 1Y44. I n an artlcle wrltten after the war he stat esthat the plan for the nrldg es came to the clty. wlthout comment. on23 March from WshcKrels X I 1 I n WlesDaden.iL Brlages were sucn astrategic asset that pronably c hose to central ize their controito avold thelr destruction ny Inexperlenced, o r at least notfully-Informed. commanders.

The Americans seized the lnltiatlve at the m i d g e and tnenl e t i t slip awav wnen they dia not follow up against aefenaers sofeenle that DOth the c o m a n d e r of the R e o i w n t 13ivislon.shome Uehrkrels and the chief of staff of Seventh Bunr werepainfully aware of the inferlor quality of its men and equipment.*-There are several possible reasons why the Americans did not pressthe attack. They were at the end of a lengthening supply line.were tne only f orce acros s the Maln River and aid not know if thevwere Delng drawn Into a trap wher e they could be hlt in the f l a wana destroyed. A l so . because of its position in a bowl formed by

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the Spessart Mountains and the Maln River, the clty could not bebypassed, The reduction of a defended city Is always a costly,time-consumlng operatlon, especlally for an armored formation. I twa s the hablt of the US Army In Europe In the Seco nd Worl d War toattach aaaitlonal Infantry to armored combat c o m a n d s to glve themadded protectlon and make them more sulted for canbat inrestrict ive terraln. The 4th Armored Dlvlsion had received the328th Intantry Reglment from the 26th Infantry Dlvlsion on 24March. but CCB ha d not yet been re1nforced.l' But pe rhap s tne mostimportant reason CCB dld not press the attacK was that, eftective260001 Mar 45, an army boundry change would make Aschaffenburgofficlally the responslblllty of the US Seventh Army. On order, CCBwoul d cros s the Maln at Hanau and Jo ln the rest of tne 4th ArmoreaDivislon in a push north towa rds Glessen. So the lnitlatlve gaineaby the seizure of the bridgehead was allowed to paas to theGermans, who were rushlng relnforce ments Into the area by r a l l .

p a v 2 - March 19q5As an indicatlon of the serl ousn ess with whlch the American

penetration w as vlewed by the Germans, a two-person speciaicommission was dlspatched from W .tSS-lieutenant coio nel ) Wegener. an p1(41 staff officer. andSraosapotheker tstafr pharmicist) Stumpf, a district Jud ge trom theBerlin area, arrived in the city on the 25th wlth credentialssignea by chief Fleld Marshal Wllhelm Keitel. They were

SS

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empowered to direct operatio ns In the city if necessary. i t wasplain that Lamberth wa s going to have plenty ofnelp in nis defense of the city.'*

As the Seventh ushed reinforc ements to the Main front.the Americans maintained pressure on the brldgehead. To outfianKthe American bulg e on the east bank the defe nde rs reinforced theposltlons in Schweinhelm and Stengerts l l l to the east o t the noseot the penetration. Whlle the defender s kept up a stream of smaiiarms ana mortar fire on the bulge, the eleme nts of CCB in the bulgereceived word to disengage. They were to mak e no furtnerpenetration. but Just withdraw and hold the bridge.'' As theycomplied. tne Wehrmacht wa s making organizational changes in thedefendi ng forces.

In the early morning hour s of 26 March placed the&u&ement Uivisi~n nder tne command of tne Seven- . 'Tnerewas still no incermediate headquarters. but the German d l 9 h Commandteit it had to achieve some operational control of che Main iiiverrront. *' I t can ne argued that in the face ot tne near totalnreakdown in the command and control a pparatu s of the German torcrsat tnis stage of tne war, ass igning any higher contr olling s t a r t :anove co rp s level was wishful thinking, but W must have felt tnisnecessary. Certainly the influence of mv G r o w G ana SevencnBunr necame less as the battle progressed. crnv GrouD G.especia lly, had no reserves. no intelligence system, no adequate

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comma na facillties. and almost no right to make indepenaentdecisions in its zone of actlon.

To relnforce U the 36 Volksaranadler Dlvlslpa (ILEp) wasOrdered from north of Mlchelstadt to the area south of thepenetra tion to block any Amerlcan breakout to the south. They wereaccompanied by the m t r v IvLgLP n directed to occupy thearea to the south of the and element s of the

whlch entered the llne along wlth the on the clty sriqht flank.Ia In an attempt to improve coorainatlon on Its tlanksU established lialson with the combat commands in Kllngenoerg onits left and Hanau on Its right. Hanau. like Aschaff enburg, wa sunaer oraers to fight to the end. although it was still quiet inmost of the city.

On the tactlcal slde the sltuatlon was ap proac hlnsequilibrium. The Americans dld not want to attack and the Germanswer e not yet st ron g enough t o do so. CCB mounted limited assualtstowara the Obernauer Kolonie section on the southern ena of city.-ana along Bischaerger Strasse i n the direction ot Schweinneim.Both attac ks extended the US llnes and gave them a toehold in thesub urb s of the city.

I t Is In thi s context that the even ts of the HaminelbursRaia untold. US Third Army commander Lieutenant General George S.Patron directed the use of the Aschaffenburg bridgehead to launchan armored thrust towards the German POW camp at the Wehrmachr

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infantry trai ning ar ea at fldIImIe1DUrg. forty ml le s northest of thecity. The ObJeCt was to free the Amerlcan officer pris oners helatnere and Oring them back to American lines. Amon g those pris oner swa s Patton's son-in-law. LTC John Waters. The aecision wa s sta rtedauring the aay and Patton hlmself came to the Aschaffenaur g area todiscuss the mission with the leaders involved. The troo ps for tnemission woula come from CCB.I'

During the night of 25-26 March, Ma Jor Stiller. Patton'saiae. ca me to Aschaffenburg and told LTC Cohen to "prepare for adangerous mission. 2a After several hours of alscussion on itssize , and whether I t shou ld go at all, a task force of 53 venicies(.jeeps. llght and mealum tanks, halftracks and assault guns1 and294 men under the command of CPT Abraham Baum was asse ml ea .equippea ana oriefea during the aaylight hour s of 26 March.plan callea for the Task Force Baum to punch through Schweinheim.get on the main road towar ds HaiOach and follow routes 8 and 26 tohammeIDurg. Sta rtin g with a thirty minute artillery preparation at2030 nou rs the infantrymen. engin eers ana tankers of CCB fouqncinto Schw einn eim and cleared a path through the town. The tiermansput up a aetermined detense and it wa s not until mianignt tnat T7Baum pusn through ana reached the main roaa in the vicinity of

The

ie K m n the southeastern part of Ascnaffenourg. Onceon the mai n roa a they drove rapidly to the northeast encounteri ngight resistance.

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The immediate reaction on the part of the Germans was one o tcontusion. Outp osts along the route report ed the presence of amechaniz ed column in the German rear, and a number of t rain s movi ngtroops and supplies west along the Main River valley were engagedand aamaged.2a Upon reachlng these rep ort s cont ribu ted to theimpression that the Main Rlver front was in jeopardy , andContributed to the strengthening of the front at Aschaffenburg bYconvincing the German High C o m a n d that a leak must be plugged. A tthe same time, der nfantrle Welsenberger. the commander o t

, took steps to stop the penetratlon which eventualiysucc eede a on the morning of the 28th when the force was surro unaeaana While the rai d contributed directly to thereinforcement of the Aschaffenburg area, it also inairectlycontrlbuted to the long term weak enin g of the front. The Wehrmacntrealized tne necessity of hold ing at least some forc es in reserve.

After tne departure of Task Force Baum. CCB pulled back toits positions on the hlgh ground ove rloo king the city. 'The haratouqnt toenold in Schweinheim was rellnqulshed as i t prepared r o ranother mission. The battle of Aschaffenburg was about to enteranother phase. The Germa ns had lost the bria ge, but. witn theexception of TF Baum. they were able to contain the penetration.Meanwnile. the Ame rica ns were retrenching.

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To enhance the control on the Main R i v e r the staff of thetrv DivigLPn was orde red by the German to

take over control of the defense of the area from the 4.i3t DlvisLpn.= Even though better equlppea. and with a

more experlenced staf f, the struggle d to receive, organizeand properly distrlbute the many small independent units thaC wnerearriving on che front. They were mostly tralning units of theReplacement Army, with inadequate trai ning and equipment. Duringthe day Aschaff enburg recelved a grenadier training battalion. alight artillery trai ning section. a medlum artillery training unit.a tra lnl ng batta lion and an engineer training company.;*Facing the Americans was a collection of various replacement anatraining unlts.27 Notably absent In the fo rces avaiiable wereaaeq uac e infantry units. However, we should not mak e too mucn ortne lack o t Infantry units. for durl ng the Battle of tne Buige tneU .S . Army rus hea men not assigned to infantry units to tne tron:dna many tought well. As will De seen below. r egarales s o r tneirapparent quality, tne replacement units fougnc vigorously.

On tne American side, CCB was pulling acr oss the Main intoas se mi y area prior to moving towards Hanau to r w o i n tne rest o tthe division. Its place in the Nllkheim Drldgenead was taken oythe 1st Battallon. 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division), thenactacned to the 4th Armored Division. I n the early morning hours


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the battalion. reinforce d wlth a company of medlum tanks from tne778th Tank Battalion, moved to the Aschaffenburg front and relieveaCCB. While the 1/104th IR cautlously approached Schweinhelm(Flgure 9 other Amerlcan units were beglnnlng to learn aboutAschaftenburg.

The boundry change that had become effectlve the preceedingday gave the Seventh Armys XV Corps responslbillty forAschaffenburg and it In turn directed Its left flank unit, the 45thInfantry Division, to mov e lnto the area. Th e 45th ID was movingeast agalnst llght reslstan ce wlth three reglments abreast (SeeFigure 10). MG Frederlcks. the dlvlslon cOmmander, gave the 157thInfantry Regiment, movlng on hls right flank the mission of seizingthe town. I n the morning of the 27th. LTC Fellx Sparks. thec m a n d e r of the 3rd Battallon, 157th Infantry, was ordered toarive rapidly f o the Main at Aschaffenburg and seize the hignground Immedlately beyond the rlver.was informed that the town had been cleared by the Thlrd Army. hewas not told of Task Force Baum operating beyond the river.altnougn he was told not to fire on any American tanks ne mightfind to his tront* Leavlng its assembly area at 1200 hours the3/15? IR arrived at the Nilkheim railroaa bridge a t 1400 nours.The iead elements of the battallon dlscoverea the bridge pidnkeaover to facilitate vehicle movement, but found no friendly [oops.A platoon. and then a company, was sent acro ss the Dridge. and

Accordlng to LTC SparKs ne

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ASCHAFFENBURG, 1945

Flgure 9Legend: S - Schloss Johannisburg L - Lagarde KaserneA - Artlllerie KaserneB - Bois-Brule KaserneJ - Jaeser KaserneP - Plonier Kaserne

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EXPANSION OF TH E AMERICAN RHINE BRIDGEHEAD

Flgure 10Source: U . S . A r m y , Sev-ted St ates &my I n F r u

Y . 1944 1945: ReDort of ODeratIQ[1S. (Holdelberg. Germany:A . Graf. 1946), V.3. 750.91


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while being eng aged with mortar s and miall arma fire, i t met theAmerican troops holdlng the brldgehead.ao

The 3 1 5 7 IR took up def ensi ve posl tion s on the west bank ofthe MaIn whlle the leaders coordinated the relief In place. LTCSpar ks met wlth the captaln commandin g the brldgeheaa who sai a tnathis orders were to hold the bridge "untll relleved." He also tolaSpar ks that the town was not cleared.a1 After relievlng the recontroop, the 5157 IR moved acros s the brlage and took u p aefensiveposltlons. At 1400 hours and agaln at 1600 hours the Americansrepulsea two st rong counterattacks by the defenders In Schweinheim.They aiso receiv ed mortar and mall arms flre from the hign groundeast of the town, but by 1640 hour s the relief in place wascomplete ; the battle was thelrsaz Imnedlately two rlfle companiessupported by artillery and tank destroyers made a c oorainat eaassault on the town. A small toehold was siezea on tne east sideana flfteen prisoner s captureda*. The period of equilibrium in rnebattle of Ascnaffen Durg was over.

The stift resistance at the MaIn River line was unexpeciea.The 45th I D nad met determfned resist ance at the Westwall and wnilecro ssin g the Rhine. but the forty kilom eter s between the Rhine anarne Main naa been lightly defended. The division had encounter eamore civilian s witn white flags than solaiers witn assuait rifles.i t must have seemed as i f the end was finally in sight and tiermanreslstanc e was crum Dllng at last. I n the words of LTC S park s, .'Tneresistance in the Aschaffe nburg area came a s a great supris e to my

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reglment and dlvlslon."a* Th e news that the reglment had an enemytorce several thousand strong to overcom e was not welc ome, and a sthe ti$h tIn g progressed. led to Increased blttern ess on the part ofthe attackers. The soldlers of the 45th ID felt they had been lieato by the 4th A D S a s

As the 3 1 5 7 IR settled Into the bridgehead the Germans wereconsolld atlng thelr posltlons to block any breakout. The 36 VGPoccu piea positons on the rlght flank of I(I(B In the milltarytralning area on the south side of Schwelnheim, and in the hillsbeyond. To increase the level of control on the frontalerted the Corn3 to take over the defense of the Main Rlverllne by 1200 hour s the next day.=- In addition to Its own weakunits it would have ILI(B with Its coilection of some 15 variousreplacement and conval escent unl ts to de fend the rlver line."

stlll held. The was weakly outposting tnesoutnern end of the city and tne had troops in contact witntne western st rongpoint in Mainaschaff. The Amerlcan penetrationnad Deen sea led off, and German forces wer e strong enough that tneonly safe US crossing sltes were still around the ralllOdd bridge.As the strongest of the German unlt s facing the Americans. the 36YQ was Selected to conduct a counterattack to eliminate wnac theGerm ans called the "Obe rnau Bridgehead." Before dawn the anaw a n t r v along with two light and one medium

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artillery battalio ns, were In place to the south.3U Throughout theday the leaaers conducte d reconnaissance an d rehearsed the pian,wnich calle d for the 165 G r w e r e- (G R) to hit the rigntflank of the American bulge in the vlclnlty of the Erbig. whlle the

pushe d to the river at Obernau. The dlvision's otherregiment, the l Lafh was stlll mov lng up from the Michelstaat area.The town of Gailbach served as the assemblIy area.

On the Amerlcan side. beglnnlng at 0730 hou rs the rest ofthe 157th IR. and its supporting arms and services. motored to theMain River near Aschaff enours and started to cross the railroadoriage. wnich was under enemy air attack by ME-109s for part of tneaay.2s All element s of the W 57 IR wer e in positlon In theoridgehead by 1200 hours, those not in the line occupied anas se mi y ar ea near the river east of the Erbig preparing to a t t a winto Scnweinneim. The U 57 IR followed, crossed into theoriageh ead and made prepara tions for an attack to the north alongthe river. The U157 IR crossed the railro aa bridge at 1530 hoursana occupied an assembly area preparing to attack Detween itssister battalions.*U

A c approxlmately 1530 hour s the reglment began a generalattack supported by the 158th Field Artlllery Battalion. set up inSchoenbuscn Park three kilometers west of the town.-" Canpany A,19lst Tank Battalion. Company B. 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion anaCompany 8 . 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion. The 2/15? IR attackedinto rne m r o l u on the reglmental left flank in a column

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of co mpa nie s with Company F leadlng. The company met strong m a 1arms, machinegun and antl-tank grenade fi re, and Inched Its wayforward to a posltlon two kllcineters northeast of the railroadnrldge where It remalned overnlght (Flgure 11). The 3/15? IRattacked into the eastern end of Schwelnhelm encounterlng verystlff resistance wlth C mp an y I on the left. Company K on the rigntand Company L in reserve. Although SUpPOlted t i y tactical alr andartillery, i t failed to pass neyond the outskirts of the townnecause of determined German reslstance, whlch Included offlceraspira nts from the officer training school In the town.The 1/157 IR the regimental reserve. sent Company C north into thegap between the 2nd and 3rd Battallons against heavy sniper fire.The attack halted at dark as companies tled In to the flankingunlts for the nlght.

Whlle the attack wlthln the brldgehead was in progress.other sola ier s of the regiment cleared the last resis tance in tneNilKheim salient in the town of Lelder." Wlth the salientciearea, Company A lPUth Engineer Co m a t Battaiion repairea t n eapproacnes ana the planKlng on the floor o t the railroad bridge t oimprove the trafficanility. An interestlng find a w i n g the aay wastne aiscovery of a ware hous e full of liquor, whlch w as distritiuteathrougnout the dlvislon.*d

Meanwhil e the rest of the 45th Division w as moving to theriver. The division CP became operatlonal at 1545 hours In thetown of Gross Osthelm. where i t was jolned by the CPs of the

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45TH INFANTRY DIVISION SITUATION OVERLAY282400A MARCH 1945

Source: U.S. Army. 45th Infantry Divislon. G-3 Report,280001-282400A March 1945. CARL.96


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division artlllery and the 645th TD Bn (Flgure l l ) . ** The otherInfantry regi ments of the 45th ID moved to the Main River. Tne179th IR arrived flrst an d sent W179 IR and then tne 11179 IRacross the rallroad brlage to clear Obernau and occupy the hignground to the east of the river tylng In wlth the 157th.

As the 45th ID consolldated on the Maln Rlver the Germa nswere increaslng thelr Investment of men and materlel In the defenseof Aschaffenburg. By 1200 hours the reported to&ventn hunr that It had posltlve contact wlth the 256 UP,,l l Gp and the 4L61p. Although the Germans were rapldly becomingOutnumDered, they still had sane 5000 combatants defending in acity that was increasfngly becoming rubbled Dy artillery, aeriaibombing and g round attack.

While the defenders fought resolutely against the 157tn IW.the military and political leadership of took steps t o claritythe role of every person In the fortress. To remove any dount asto what lay in store for the clty two proclamations wer e issuea.one by tne Kr ei sl ei tc (County Leader) and one by the- That published by I(reisIeitxc Wohlgernuth. nodoubt with the concurrence of Q u l e I t c Hellmuth in Wurzburg.ordered mothers, the very young, the very old. and the sick OUL oftne town. I t said in part.:

Whoever remains In the clty belongs to aDattlegroup whlch wlll not know any selfishness.nut will know only unllmlted hatred for thiscursed enemy of ours. They will know only

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complete sacrif ice for the Fuehrer and thenatlon. Day and nlght we will work. We willcommit all our power to do the enemy thegreatest possible dam age because we know thatGermany will live I f we are prepared to give ourIves.-"

There nad been scattered reports of clvl lans figh tlng wl th theldehrmacht along the Main River front, and I t is the attitudeexpressed In this proclamatlon that explalns the increased use otcivilians in the defense.47 A t thi s point of the war the termcivilian can really only be applied to the very young. very old anafemales, because virtually everyone else was either in the army o rin som e quasi-military organizat ion of the Nazi Party aeputiz ea t o rtne aefense of the Fatherland. Wlth the official sanction of theParty those who were able started movlng out of the city to smalltowns and the farming villages in the Spes sart Mountains.*& LocalAschaffenburg historian Dr. Alois Stadtmueller re lates that of apre-war population of 38.000, only some 3500 civilians livea in m ecellar s of the aestroyed city throughout the battle.*'

Ma.ior Lamnertn. the - also issued aDrociamation addresses to "Solalers. Men of themComraaes'.

The fortress ot Aschaffenburg will be aefenaeato the last man. As long as the enemy gi ves ustime we will prepare and employ our troops toour best advantage. This mean s fight. buildoarrlers. erect dugouts. get supplies As ottoaay. everyone is to give his [si c] to tnelast. I order no one shall rest more than threenours out of twenty four. I forbld any sittingaround o r loafing. Our bellef Is that it is ourmission to give the cursed enemy the greatest98


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resistance and to send as many as POSSlb le ofthem to the devi . OAs a veteran combat leader LamDerth was aware of the sense ofNapo leon 's aphorism that In war the moral Is to the physicai asthree Is to one.garrison. Whether they fought for thelr homes. for the fatherlanaor out of fear of the SS and the Party, the defende rs ofAschaffenburg would fight. As i f to relnforce the point. duringthe night he received a teletype message from

He was remo ving all doubt as to the fate of the

ordering FesFunato "fight to the last cartridge."'

During the night the opposing slaes traded mortar fire, m a i larms fire, and probed each other's Ilnes. I n actlv itles elsewhereaffecting the oattl e, the 416th Lp southern flank was threatened ~ycrossings of the Main Dy the 3rd Infantry DlvIslon In the vicinityof Obernberg and Klingenberg. and the fall of Hanau to the 26tn

i n f a n t r y Divlsion .~eo para lzea he right f l a n ~ r f j y d r i v i n gDdCk tne &j& &Q."

As in all analysis an appreciation of the situation aepenason perspective. On the American side. the com manders o t tneSeventh Army and XV Corps were pleased.out trom the Rhine Dridg eheaa the next significant barrier wasbreached. Two dlvisions, the 45th ID and the 3rd ID. heldDrlagehea ds on the east bank of the Maln River and were advancing.

Two da ys after Dreaking

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although resistance was stiffening. The Germans Seventh Brmy andComa comna nders were less sanguine. They had sto ppea the

hemorrhaging of the front, but could not be opti misti c about thefuture.

What do es a closer l ook at the sltuatlon reveal? TheAmerican tight now belonged to the 45th Infantry, a veterandivision particlpating In Its fifth campaign. The mlsslon wasclear, ASChaffenDUrg was to be Invested and reduced. AS the Alliesdrove east for a link-up with the Russl ans the objectlve now oecam ethe - and any other con centr ation s of Nazi power. i tDecame apparent that Aschaffenburg wa s both a mllitary and apolitical otxiective, military because of its garrison, political asa seat of Nazi power resis ting American mliltary mlgnt. After thefailure of a bold attempt at a GOUD de during their first f u i iday at the city. the veteran leadership of the division s aw thenecessity for a reduction in detail as time-consuming and costiy.

The Amerl cans had material super iority , but a case can bemaae t o r the superiority o f will of the Germans. A t tn1s pointboth si aes couia see that the war wa s almost over, and theAmeri cans resent ed the Stubborn resistance of the defen ders orAscnatfenourg. A press release from this time captures the mooa.

Our own troop s have never been more bitter aoouta single act ion, despite thelr participation infive campaigns. Thund erblrd troops. realizingthe futility of German defe nse , were never soanxio us to clear a town as they were to wipe out

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thls garrlson that has cost them so manycasualltles.JEven granti ng that the correspondent was overstatlng the case toget his dispatch prlnted, the passage above Indicates a reticenceto close wlth the enemy, while at the sam e tlme an acce ptance ofthe necesslty of aolng so. Thl s attitude hardened as the battleprogressed.

Compare this ml ndset w I h the f I gh t - to-the- ast-car tr ageattitude of the Germans.combat COmIand. an order to flght to the last man. andproclamations exhorting the populatlon to greater efforts werehaving their effect. The Germans were capitalizlng on the onlyreal strengtn they possessed. their will.

A Fuehrer directlve making tne clty a

But often wlll Is not enough. Wlth superiorlty of armor.artillery and air support on the slde of the enemy, the aefenaersdid have strengths. They had a sophist icated aetense. terrain tnatforcea tne attacker into frontal assault, troops wh o knew tneterrain, the support of the population. a resupply ana replacementlink to the interior of theu well-tested city cornataoctrine. and an effective messenger system linking strongpoint tostrongpolnt.

However. in the final analysis, as they started the fiftnday of the desperate fight for the clty. the Germans w ere at adisadvantage. The proalems are sumnarIzea by the commanaer o t thea3 HeDiacement Di vislqn who explalned poor performance

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as the result of: constant revlslon of or de rs which o vertaxe dstaf fs and confu sed commanders: primitive comma nd and controlmecha nisms because of the lack of commu nicat ions which enabled theenemy to galn local tactical advantages: tactical inferloritystemmlnq from inferlor forces, poor st aff s and poor leaders: a lackor reser ves which ellmlnated tactlcal flexlDility: enemy a i rsuperiority which st opped daytime resupply and relnforcement: anainadequate supportin g arms for the infantry.34 The German conceptof h u t t r a a s W , or mlssion-type orders, only WorK s well whenootn the leaders and the led are trained to a standard witn acommon frame of reference. The level of trainin g wa s so unevenalong the Main front that B u f t r a a s w Woula not work.

With US unlts In control of the high ground to the soutn ofAscnaffenaurg the strategy was to reinforce the soutnernapproaches. Elements of the garrlson deployed on a line runningtnroupn Schwein neim west tow ards the river. The tactical plan wa sto iteep tne enemy off the hlgh ground of Schweinneim Hill wnichsepara tes tne town from Aschaffenburg proper. Schweinheim wasbecoming ruonled. but the defenders capitalized on tne destructionDY constructing nasty fighting positions in tne aestroyeaDuilaings.responsiDility of officer candldates from the Reserve OfficersL'anaiaate School in Bois-Brule Kaserne.'= Th e ae fe ns es of

The defense of Schweinheim wa s becoming the

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Schwelnheim were also tied to the in the local training arearunning east through Hill 209 to H l l l 347.

Despite the pressure of repeated local counterattacks InSchwelnheim. by 0730 hours the Americ ans resumed their attacks: the2 1 5 7 IR north along the rlver and the 3/157 IR east intoScnweinheim. The 2nd Battalion attack immdeiately bogged down anait called for the medlum tanks of W191 TB to help clear out enemyresistan ce with main gun and machinegun fire.reauc ed against a res olute defense.. In the Sch weinh eim sec torthe 3157 IR, wlth Company C from the 1/157 IR on its left flank.attacked wlth two coinpanlee up and one bacK, reached the firststreet by 0830 hours against the same determi nea resistance. Thefighting was house-to-house wlth repor ts of clvllians fightingalongside the V.hcmacht s01diers.~ In Schweinh elm the fightingwas so intense that Company L. attacking on the right across theopen tielas into the town, lost all its offic ers and 100 men of i8uin rive minutes.5 Once the attack stal led the Amer ican s dug i nan 0 hela on while artillery ana mortars softened u p the town.

Each house had to oe

Because of the strength of the resistance Colonel UBrien.tne regimental COtMIander. decided to commit his reserve Dattaiion.ana following a ten minute artlllery preparation by the i05mmhowitzers of the 158 FA Bn. the 1/15? IR attacked in the gapbetween the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. The divlsion G-3 Reports t o rthe period indicate that the fightlng was difficult and theprogress was very slow throughout the day due to fanatical German

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As an indicator of the serious nature of the aay,.Sengagements, the cle aring statlon of the 120th Mealcal Battalionsupporting the 157 IR recorded Its largest daily casualty count ofthe battle on 29 March.*o To add weight to the assaul t, allavailable guns were used to fire on the town. including the M36tank destroyers of the 645th TD Bn. Wlth one platoon of Company Battacned to each battallon of Infantry, they flred harrassing fireInto Scnweinheim. Including 25 rou nds at the steeple of theCatnollc Church In the center of the town whlch was being used a san observatlon post."

Because of the character of the German defense the Americansnaa to clear eacn house and barn Indlvlduaiiy. As veterans ofnouse-to-house fighting in Italy and southern France the 157 i R wasproflcient In the use of direct flre from heavy callber weapons.such as the 761rh gun on the 14643 tank or the 90m gun on the newM36 tank destroyer. to sup res s the defenders wnich could tnen berusnea Dy a squ ad of infantry. I t was tough, olooay fighting onboth siaes. Not only were personnel casua lti es high. out k141 T Blost two tanks because of Danzerfaust and artillery tire a w i n g tneday.

As the 157 IR was locked In the struggle for Schweinneirn tnerest of the 45th ID was preparing to conduct further operations.Company A. 120th Englneer Combat Battallon w as busy at the riverguaraing tne railroad bridge and preparing the banks fo r theempiacement o t a treadway bridge and the use ot boats and rafts t o

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expedite crossing the rest of the dlvlslon over the Main. For thatPurpose the 831 and 832 DUKW'Truck Companles were attached to thealvlslon.-z The 179 IR contlnued Its attac ks against heavyopposition fr om the 3LYQ In the area south of Schwelnhelm, whilethe 180 IR moved across the rlver on the rallroad bridge and tooKUP posirlons on the 179tn rlaht flank for the start of the divisiongeneral attack pla nned for the next day.-' Th e flnal Amerlcanposltions are seen In Figure 12.

The 29th was the second of the two days specified byitec Wohlgem uth for non-ccinbatants to leave the clty. and.

many dld so. The clty adnlnl stration worked to get all those lettinto air raid shel ters where they could be supplied with bread andwater. The stree ts were deserted as Amerlcan artlllery shellscontinu ed to rain down on the tcwn. Civilian wounded ana dead werenow addlng to the medlcal and sanltatlon problems in the ~ i t y . ' ~I t wa s on this day that Lamberth demonst rated hiswlll to flght to the last man. In front of a wlne shop In thecenter o t town ne nung a Wehrmacht lieutenant who had beenconvlcted of fahnenflucht (fleeln g the flag), i.e. desertion. The0tfic er.s body was left to hang with a sign warnin g death to alltraitors.'-' Such harsh treatment of a potential defenderiilustrates the lengths to whlch Lamberth was wllling t o go toProsecute the fight. HIS declslon w as encouraged by the otficersof the SS Special C om is sl on supervlslng the defense. I t nowDecame apparent to the defende rs that their leadership Would stop

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I

Flgure 12Source: U.S. A rm y 45th Infantry Divl s lon , G-3 Report,290001-2924006 March 1945, CARL.

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at nothing to aefend the ~ l t y : ~ Durlng the day another oraer wasreceived from Q& alrec tlng the city to fight to the lastcartridge. further clarl fylng the sltuatlon for the city.

Other event s serve d to Indicate the lncceaslngly hop elesssituatlon of l I B. Durln g the day the AmerIcan 324th InfantryRegiment of the 44th Infantry Dlvlslon c r ossed the Main near Kahlana Klelnosthelm. not far downstream from Aschaffenburg. Havingalready been pushed back from the Main near Hanau. the nowhad an Amerlcan penetratlon In the center of Its sector. As aprecaution the set up a radlo station in Aschaffenburgto keep comnunlcaflons i f the garrlson was surrounded.-* While theL X XW C o m a c m a n d e r struggled to counter the Amerlcan at t r i t i ontactlcs, he saw that he might have to pull back from the river,thereby leaving the city's garrlson isolatea.

The terrain most coveted by the Ger mans at this point wasthe nign gro una to tne south of the city which dominated m eAmerican Dridgeh eaa and the nulge. Capture o t the wooded Eroigwould permit tnem to control the saddle between the Bischberg anathe EroIg that was the US avenue of approach into Schweinheim. i nGerman hands it would make Schwelnheim untenable. The capture oftne ErDig woula als o split the seam Detween the 157 IR and the 17'3IR, and Isolate the 179 IR from Its line of cm un ic at io n over tne

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railroad bridge. Succes s in this endeavor wa s crucial to theLxxxl l CorD,g' effor ts to stabilize the Main River front.

At 0001 hours two battlegroups, based on the headqu arter s oftne nd the Bz_EB, launched an lnflltration attack. The I si 5EB was to seize the Erbig and then the Blschberg. while the B.UEwould regain Ubernau. Th e Imnedlately fell on the soldie rsof K/3/157 IR in their night defensive position, pinning them aown.and Dypas sing them enroute up the hlll. Th e Bz_EB Droke througnAmerican lines and made the woo& east of Obernau. Once the shockof tne attack passed the American re spons e was heavy and direct.Eleme nts of 1/157 IR. 3/15? IR and W179 IR count eratt acked tneGerman penetration supported by tanks and heavy mor tar andartillery fire. The Germa ns conti nued the attack in several rusnesat 0100 and 0320 hours, and Dy 0400 hours had a foothold on theErbig and were pushing acr oss the saddl e between the Erbig and theBiscnberg. The fought hard, but under attack by armor anaarcillery eventually had to withdraw to the Erblg by 0830 hours:''The en.Joyed limited success. but, i t also had to withdraw.Under tank-supported CO Untela ttdCk S both German reg iment s wereariven Dack t o tneir jumping off poin ts by 1200 hours with heavy1asses. .'

i t was apparent to General Hahm of the LXXXlI Coma that hissituation was Decoming untenable and that orders would nave to beissued to p u l l DdCk from the Main River line. Repor ts werereceiv ed dur ing the aay of the fall of the cornat comm ands south of


34/76

Aschaffenburg a t KlingenOerg and Mi Itenberg. Of four co ma tc m a n a s I n hl s zone of action along the Maln (Hanau,Aschaftenburg, KI ingenberg, M I tenberg) only Aschaffenburg wasstlll reslstlng.7A Small packets of relnforcemen ts tromanti-aircraft, artillery and service unlts were stlll arriving ontne front, out they were not enough. The three divislons o t tnecorps were a l l Oelng slowly arlven back from the river. The 256l l Ep was tenuously holding on to posl tlon s west of Hanau, out underconstant attack. The was conaolida ting its positions in theforests ana villages to the south of Aschaffenourg, out was beingsteadi ~y pushed back by the advancing American infantrymen. TnePLhLp In the south was also pushed back and at the end of the daywas eight k llometers from the river.

Througnout the d a y , as the 179 IR ana the 180 IR continue aa t t a c w to tne east to flank the clty, the 157th inched forwara.The Germa ns launched at least five company-sizea CounterdttacKsthat were rep ulse d witn moderate American losses, Out withsuDstantial German casualtles. As the day progressea theCounterat tacKs become less aeterminea. The Germ ans were raplaiyapproachlng the llmit of thelr aolllty to take even local otfensiveaction. The 3157 IR continued its attack into the southern par;of Ascnaf fenourg, with fighting so close that the defenaers werearopping nana grenaa es on the attackers from second storywindows. The 3157 IR contlnued Its push into Schwelnhelm and.against stitf resistance, reac hed the far slde of the town on

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ground level with the edge of Brtillerie aserne in Aschaffenourgproper.'3 By nightfall the infantrymen of the 3/157 IR had splitthe town in two , but continual German infiltration behi ndpreviously cleared posltlons made h oldlng the ground difficult.the early afternoon. in an effort to envelop the defen ses of E;b;B.the V157 IR wag ordered to attack on the right flank of the 3 1 5 7IR to sei ze high ground to the south of Schweinheim. I t dld sowith only two companies because Company C was pinned down by mortarand small arms fire in its position s between che 2nd and 3rdBattalions. The battalion gained a thousand yard s againsteffective resistance.'*

I n

We can see in these latest dispositions a recognition by tneAmerica ns that the battle of attrition based on frontal assa ultswas not worklng, and that the city was not going to be easily takenDY direct assault. Cond itio ns were now right for an envelopment ofthe city. The 179th ana 180th Infantry Regiment s were oucfia nkingthe city to the south, driving back the Germ ans holding tnesoutnern sector of m. Moving the V157 IR from the miadle of tneUS line to tne southern flank sho ws an appreciation for the neea touse the indlrect approach of envelopment. Thi s cou rse of actiongave the Americans a chanc e to fight in WOOded instead of urDancerrain, and tne opportunity to seize high ground dominating the~ a s e r n e s n WurzDurger Strasse. The fighting in Scnweinheimforetold wnat c o m a t would be like in Aschaffenburg icsert. Torea uce the city without massive use of American life Woul d taKe tne

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proper use of the availabl e combat multipllers. The Americanleadership did not take long to use them.

On the German side, the failure to capture and hold theZrbig represe nted the last concerte d German effort to prevent atactical envelopment of Aschaffenburg. The Corus haagamD1ed and lost. Its most cm at -w or th y unit had failed to breaktne American hold on the east bank of the Maln River. With theGerman unlts t o the south of the clty weakened. the 45th ID was ina position to execute the plan seen at Figure 13. where the 179thand the 180th Infantry Regimen ts would sweep around the southernflank of the city and envelop the defenses, thereby cutting otf tneclty from its life lines to the east.

For the Americans Aschaffenburg was difflcult house-to-nouseflghtlng. To Improve the fire support avallable to the infantrymenorganizational cnang es were necessary. At 0700 hou rs LTC Uolvin.tne commanaer of the 191St Tank Battalion, Ordered three platoon sof light tanks of Company D to mass in Schweinhelm to support the3/157 i R . The 37mm guns and machineguns of the M5 tanks gaveexcellent mobile firepower for infantry s~ pp or t. ,' ~ hese tanks.co mi n ea with the M4A3 Shermans of Wi91 TB and the M36 tankdestroyers of 3/B/645 TD Bn already in support, made thebreakthrougn possible. Whlle W191 TB stayed with the 2 1 5 7 IR inAschaffenburg. W191 TB accompanied the 1/157 IR in its mission togain the high grouna to the south and east of Schweinheim.

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45TH INFANTRY DIVISION DRIVE FOR ASCHAFFENBURG

Figure 13Source: U.S . Army, 2lbe S e v W United sv. 1744 1945 ReDort of O ~ e r a t l ~ l l g(Heidelberg, Germany:

A . Graf, 1946), V.3, 766.

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The dlvislon took step s to I ncrease the number of artlllerytubes available to provlde supprssslve and harrassing fire. Toaugnent t he flre s of the 45th ID Dlvarty (three battallons of 10%and one of 155mn) the divlsion artlllery of the 44th InfantryOlvlsion, mov lng up I n a quiet sector on the left flank, wa sattached to the 45th 10. I n addltlon, the 194th Field ArtilleryGroup (three heavy battallons) and the 173rd Fleld Artillery Group(two Dattalions) w ere placed in general support." For the rest ofthe Dattle up to thlrteen battallons (90 tubes of artillery) fireain support of the Amerlc ans at Aschaffenburg. To thls was adaeathe weight of the 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion (4.2 ) ttached totne 157th Infantry throughout the flght. Fo r massed indirectfire, In the words of a clty admlnlstrator, "...played death andaestruction on the ~lty.'~' The American artlllery fire was soheavy that some German partlclpants of the battle called i t asrapid as macnlnegun fire. The result of the incessant pounding wasthe gradual dest ruction of the clty , wlth a concurrent redUCtlOn o tthe will of the defende rs to fight.

Most of th is Good FrIday of 1945 was rainy and overcast, somuch so that the U.S. Army Air Force s could not f l y in support o toperations. However, by 1800 hours the weather cleared and theP-47 Thunderbolts of the 64th Flghter Wing , flying from Dases JustInside France, flew elght sortles over the clty dropping b o m s andflring rocKet s on the city center." But because of the closene ssof the oelligerents to each oth er, most of the effect of these

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mlsslons dld not directly affect the tactical flght. The P - 4 7 scould only fire .50 caliber machlneguns In direct support of theengaged troops because the front Ilnes wer e so close to eacn other.

I n the afternoon after consultatlon wlth thecommanaer. General Hahm gave the order for a general withdrawl ofthe Coma from the Maln Rlver Ilr~e.~ This decisionrecognized the reallty of the sltuatlon because at the time nocorps units rem alnea on the river. It permltred a somewhat oraerlywithdrawl to posltlons further to the east.LamDerth was Informed of this decislon and that from this point onhe would be fighting as a true combat c m a n d wlth no physicalcontact with other German units. HIS mlssion was still to hold outas long as possible. Thi s Is an excellent IIlustratlon of how thefighting strength of a military organization breaks down when Unitsare unaer two different headquarters wlth dlfferent mlsslons.

CorDg was subordinate to Seventh with a mission todefend in this part of theu , although located i n theSeventn hunr zone. as a combat command was under cne direct oraersot Q / with a mission to fight to the end. When -1 Co r D gtroops pulled back was Isolated but not yet Surrounded. itsonly Contact with Yahrmacnt unlts was by phone and radio. Thisl a w of unity of command left no doubt about the eventual fate of

Though he was Deing abandoned by the Lamberthwas still Dusy directing ope rat ion s against the enemy. He

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continued to capitalize on his real stren gth, the will of thedefenders. and publlshed a newletter with the assistance of his

National SocialistGuldance Officer) (NSFO), the political commisar attached to thecommand.Uo In addition to reprlntlng the pl(hl war bulletin for 28March, the Sol- began with a quote fromHitler on the necessity of contlnuing the struggle, but thenincluded an extraordinary editorial from the - Z e i t uentitled W i a Blut " (literally 'Calm Blood ) meaning "KeepCalm." The editorial called for calm and gave ways in which thepopulation could assist In defeating the enemy, but then made anunusual a ~ i s s l o n . Saying that i t would be sllly to deny that thesituation was grave, the author wrote that it was now time t o rMain-Fr anconia to pay the high prlce demanded of it. That MaJOrLamberth puolisned this vlrtuai admission of defeat is unusual anaindicated a desire to prepare the population for cne eventualoutcome. 'That it was done with the help of the Nazi Party showsthat even some element s of the Party saw life atter Hitler.

MaJO r Lam0erth.s time was a l s o occupiea with more militaryactivities. With the withdrawl of the )Q the southern tianknad to De reinforced and elements of w e r a w l i o n 9 were sentto the high ground to the south of Schweinheim. The Germans stilineld out hope tnat the crossing site at the railroad bridge couldbe interdicted. Witn the present American posltions the bridge wasat the extreme range of the Indirect fire wea pon s availao le to tne

. .

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defenders. Repeated ground attacks towards the bridge had failed,as naa several aerial attempts, including a try by a flight of twoME-262 .Jet fighters. The most bizarre action w as conducted by ateam ofagainst the sandst one center support of the Dridge and bring i tdown. Attem pts during the night s of 29-30 March and 30-31 Marchboth tailed.g1

frogmen who attempted to place a torpedo

As German resistance dlminished more soldiers and civilianssurrendered to the 45th ID. Among the 465 captured by the divisionon this date were many 16 and 17 year olds who were surly anddefiant." The Hung aria n POWs said that Major Lamberth orougnt in50 SS troops to enforce discipline and that the SS were to shootthose wh o tried to escape to the American Iines.la B y the ena ofthe day the Americans had firm control of most of Schweinhcim, werepress ing into southern Aschaffenburg. and h e l d high ground on thesouthwes t of the city. They had suffered ten Killed and over 30wounded. American unit dispositi ons at the end of the day are seenat Figure 14.

During the day the 45th Infantry Division's parent unit. theXV Corps, consolidated Its hold on the Main River Line from theooundry with the Third Army's XI1 Corps near Kahi. In theAschaffenburg sector the 106th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadronrelieved tne last element of the Thi rd Army on the western sia e ofAschaffenDurg. I t reported no German forces on the western flankof W . Elements of the 114 IR (44th ID) held the left flank o t

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Flgure 14Source: U.S. Army, 45th Infantry Dlvlslon. G-3 Report,300001-302400A March 1945, CARL.

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the 45tn ID on the west side of the river. The Main River wassecure for ten kilometers on each side of Aschaffenburg.ua

pav 7 - March 1945The seventh day of the battle was a tlme of transition for

both sides. For I t was on e of accomodation wlth the fact thatthey were on thelr own, and that the fight " to the last man " nadbegun. The was withd rawln g to the east and had lostall contact wlth the forces I n Aschaffenburg. still controlleda ma l l part of Schweinheim, Gailbach to the southeast. Haiaach tothe east, Hoesbach and Goldbach to the northeast. Da mn on thenorthern rim of the city, and Mainaschaff to the west. Withinthese confines the battle would a8 fought to a conclusion in thenext four days.of groun d inside an ever decreas ing perimeter. They would De hitwith all the weapons of modern war that the American s could muster.but on Dalance, they wou ld give as much as they received.

The Ger mans would fight resolutely for each meter

?o r the Americans i t was a time of a gradual shift tromattrition to maneuv er warfare. Throughout the rest of the fightthe a157 IR, in its battleground in the southern appro aches to tnecity cente r, remained as the anvil upon whlch all other tacticalmovement compre ssea the enemy.to maneuver. only to slug it out toe-to-toe with the defenders.The 3 1 5 7 IR. after clearing Schweinheim and moving on thekaSerneS. would conduct a sweep around the eastern part of the city

I t would never have the opportunity

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pushing PICK the defenders Into the center. To the 11157 I R fellthe role of the hammer sw eep lng around the clty from the south andeast to capture the outlylng towns and drlve the defenders againsttne 2nd Battalion anvll. The 157 IR would be asslsted by the 3241R atfackl ng the clty from the west. However, the eve nts justdescribed would only occur gradually over the next four days.

The IS7th brldgehead was a busy place as DUKWs. ferriesand smali boats were In use to supplement the rallroad bridge.'-Starting at 0630 hours the 157 IR attack continued. The 11157 IRmoved arouna the right flank o f the reglment In a column ofccmpanies. I t slowly moved up the slope s of H l l l 347, its effortssupported by the W179 IR also attacking In that area towards thetown of Gallbach, whlch slts I n a deep, narrow valley north of Hill347. The Dl57 IR contlnued its assault Into the industrial areanear the Sudbahnhof (South Railroad Station). while the 3/157 IRwith D/191 TB in support contlnued to mop up in Schwelnheim, whichwas cleared by 1700 hours.

A l l US ground combat actions during the day were supporteaby the 64th Fighter Wing which flew 176 sortles in the divisionzone. According to dlvision reco rds the air force droppea I 0 0 tonsof bombs. iaunched 300 4.5 rockets and fired over 200.000 rounasof .50 caliber m u n i t l o n on Aschaffenburg. Gailbach. Haibacn.Goldbach and othe r targets in the area." Th e intense artiiieryshelllng of the town continued. In addltlon to calls for flre indirect support of the attacks, twice during the day the massed

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American artlllery executed flre plans sendlng 400 rounas perbattalion on selecte d targets In the city." Th e artil lery wa saccompanied In its destructlon by the new 105mn assault gu ns of the191 TB whlch fl red 120 rounds In direct support of the Infantry.'T

Until this day the clty had arstalned only moderate wardamage, but the c m l n e d effects of the artlllery, the whltepnospho rus shell of the 4 .2 mort ars and the alr forcefighter-bomaers increasingly turned the city into a heap of rubble.The received an especlally seve re pounding a3i t wa s an easlly identifiable landmark In the clty.

The defenders dld not take the hi fforts lying aown:"Accorai ng to Amerlcan counts, between 1000 and 1500 COUndS Ofmortar flre landed in Schwelnheim durlng the day in support o tiocal counterattacks. lncludlng 200 rou nds in one fifteen-minuteperiod. A t one point I n the late afternoon two tanks rol lea out coengage the America ns in Schwelnhelm. The tanks. one GerUIan MarK V Iand an American M4 operated b y the Germans. were aestroyed." inthe air four ME-262 made brief passes over tne city. The Germansdefended th e city room-by-room, cond ucti ng heavy infiltrationbehina American iines, sni ping at the atta cker s and forcing them tosecure again and again are as previously cleared.excellent advantage of thelr Knowledge of the clty to m v e freelyabout the rUbDle to resupply, reinforce and generally meet theAmerican cnallenge.

They t o OK

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On the 31st both slde s resorted to the wrltten word in theprosecution of the struggle. At noon the commander of the 157thInfantry dispatched Captaln Anse Spears, the reglmental adjutant,In an L-19 spotter plane to drop an ultimatum on the Germanheadquarters In the The purpose of the note, wrltten inGerman and addressed t o the commandant of the Clty ofAschaffenburg. is plaln:

Your sltuatlon Is hopeless. OurYou are offered herewith the opportunity,superiorlty in men and materlal 1s overpwerlng.

by acceptlng unconditional surrender, to savellves and property of countless clvlllans. Thecondltlons of the Geneva Convention are assuredto you and to your garrlson.The follovlng Is requested immediately uponreceipt of thls message:

1. The ralslng of the white flag on theEngineer Barracks.2. The sending of a delegation under awhlte flag to the south end of the clty, whlchwlll be authorlzed to negotlate for theconcluslon of the capitulation of Aschaffenburg.Should you refuse to accept theseconditions. we shall be forced to levelAschaffenburg.The fate of Aschaffenburg is in your nands.

The com ma nder of the Alli ea Troops.'"

Ma.ior LamDerth ignored the ultimatum and the fighting continued.The Americans also dropped leaflets on the city addressea t o tneGerman soldie rs specifylng the condltions under whicn they would bekept prisoner i f they surrendered.*4 Although i t may have oeencoincidental, as the battle progressed the number of prisoners aid1ncrease .

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The ae fenaers were continuing their own campaign to maintainthe will o f their soldiers. Duri ng the day cop ies of tne

aer Frontzeltuna began to appear. Published by tneParty instead of the gamafkommandant I t was slmllar in content tothe Aschaffenaura Soldate nzaituna and also included referenc es toilfe after Hitler. But i t stated "Neverth eless We Belleve WeFight We I n it we can see the attempts t o applypolitical pressure on the soldlers to flght on In splte of thedreadful conal tlons they saw around them. Still, as the Germansread the words they contlnued to fight.

Lace I n the afternoon W157 IR had cleared Schwelnhelm andgotten on the high gr ound along Wurzburger Strasse.oostacles in thelr path were Artilleri e Kasecne on the soutn Sideof the street, and &Is -Brule Kaserne across the street on slightlyhlgher grouna. The kasernes were not built as fortresses P$K 3.eour they nad been turned into formlaable defensive positlons by tnedetenaers. t about 1730 hours iVW157 IR attacked rtll lerleKaserne attempting to take i t by GOUD de m&n . The attack quicklyDogged aown and the infantrymen pulled back while artiliery.aviation and tanks softened u p the area. The attackers were OnlyaDle to gain a small foothold on the kaserne betore nightfail.

The first

A t the end of the day's fighting the American s had ClearedSchweinheim. although continued inflltration was still a problemrequiring repeated mopplng up. The 1/157 IR was still fightlng itsway up the steep sl opes of Hill 347 above Gailbach against stiff

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resistance. while on the other end of the American lines the U 57IR contln ued to slug It out wlth the defenders along the river.The Germans stlll held all the kasernes and most of the clty Itselfbut had lost 680 pri sone rs dur ing the day to the Americans.** Th eplan to envelop Aschaffenburg was not yet a reality. On the cityswestern flank the 324th IR was In the process of rellevlng the106th Cav Recon Group west of the Maln. The unit that Wou ldenvelop the city from the left was movlng Into place. leavlng its1st En on the west side of the Maln whlle the 2nd and 3rd Enscrossed I t to occupy forward assembly areas on the east bank.EIgure 15 has the 45 ID dls pos lton s at the end of the perlod.

On th ls Easter Sunday there was n o Joyo us religl ouscelebration in Aschaffenburg. In the center of the city a Jesuitprlest Sai d mass in the - one of the shelt ers beingused by the defenders.Pu AmerIcan chaplal ns also held services inhonor of the Prince of Pe ace, however the sym boli sm wa s lost onmost parishoners.

During the day the Americans finally achieved some measureof treeaom o t maneuver and continued the envelopment of the city.Accoraing to the commander of D/191 TB, this was to be done throughthe use o t tleld artillery, tanks and air power, to reduce American

the American infantrylery, and that the

osses. * A German officer observed thatsimply walked behind tanks and fleld arti

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Flgure 15Source: U.S. Army, 45th Infantry Dlvlslon. 6 3 Report.310001-312400A March 1945. CARL.

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Infantry was in visi ble.L Uo The American infantry did not feelinvislale but reali zed that such tacti cs took best advantage of theoverwhelming American superiority of artillery, ar mor, andautomatic weapons.

The key to the encirclement was the capture of the town ofHaiaach on high grou nd to the east of Aschaffenburg. In themornlng the 3 1 7 9 IR cleared the northern end of GallDach thereayisolating that town from Aschaffenburg. I t was through this gapthat V157 IR attacked a cro ss the rugged wooded hills and fieldstowa rds Haibach. which it cleared against light opposition. i ttnen occupied Hill 313 to the north.'O' With an opportunity toaavance agalnst light raslstance the battalion continued theattack. The battalion commander. LTC Ralph Krleger, orderedCompany B to attack in the direction of Goldbach. Company A towardsHoesDach and Company C to follow and support.'Y1 The mlssion wasto capture the two towns and link up with 179 IR units sweeping ina wider arch around the city. Moving steadily the battalion cutthe main rail and road IInKs to Wurzburg and began the reauction o rthe twin towns. Both were resolutely defended and the battalionwould not clear them until 1500 hou rs the next day. For tneGer man s the damage had been done. the last line of communicationto the east was cut.

Before other American combat elements coul d take advantageof the open flanK to the east of the city the kaSeln eS had to betaken. The 3 1 5 7 IR which ha d secur ed a tenuous ho la within

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Artillerie k the prev lous nlght prepared for the attack.Star ting at 0700 hou rs artlllery flre wa s dlrecte d at the kaserne.At 1300 hours Company K attacked but was driven back by heavymachinegun and rifle flre. A second attack carried the buildingsafter tanks had flred whlte phosphoro us shells Into the basementwlndows to suppress the defenders. The attackers had to figntroom-to-room to elimlnate all reslstance. They found that thedefenaers were som e 100 men from three convalescentThe same proc ess was repeated for Bpls rule Kaserne across thestreet and by 1700 hours all resi stance haa ceased. There nad beenheavy losses on both sides. every one of the aefenaers captured in

. .

Delng wounded. With the two eastern-mostkdSePneS In American hanas the other kaSerneS along WurzburgerStrasse were in Jeop ardy. LTC Sparks, the 3 r d Battalion commander.now sent troops to the north clearing the hlgh ground on theeastern f ring es of the city, flanKing Laaarae ana Jaeaer Kasernes.After four day s of flgh tlng fanatical def ende rs they were nowadvancing against light opposition.'"

The key to auccesa in the a 1 5 7 IR sector was PLonierm he home of Plonler (Engineer) bta ill on 9 .aomi nate s Schweinhelmer Strasse. the maln r oaa from Scnweinneim toAschaffenburg. I t had to be taken to permit an assault on thesoutneastern section of the clty. Just as in &tiller ie anabois Bruie E;asernes, the defenders built strongpoi nts among tnetnick-wallea barracks and slg hted machinegu ns to sweep the roaa and

The kaserne

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the flelds to the east. Its Achil les heel w as the height ofSchuelnheimer chwelnheim H l l l overl ookln g the kaserne fromthe south.

The Y157 IR had the mlssion of seizlng the kaserne and theunlt moved on I t across open fields from the east and from highground on the south. Having learned in the assault s on the firstkaser nes along Wurzburger Str asse, the attacker s planned In advancefor adequate flre support. In addition to ad Jus ted flre on enemyconcentrations. two M12 1 5 h Long Tom howitzers were arlven u pSchwelnhelmer Hohe and sit ed to fire over open slgh ts down on thekaserne. As the Infantry slowly fought thelr way into the barracksand workshops of the kaserne area the "L ong Toms" fired 100 roundsin support.Los is much larger than any kaserne InAschaffenburg wlth more bulldlngs. The Germans fortifled each oneand the attac kers made very slo w progress. By 1500 hours only halfthe kdSerne was In American hands. Lo*

As on the previ ous day good weather DrOUghC the air force insupport of tactical operations. Eighty-two sorti es were flown insupport of the 157th. Dlrected very close to friendly troops.aircraft of the X I 1 Tactlcal Air Force dropped 45 tons o t bombs,launched 200 rocket s and fired 100.000 rounds of .SO calibermacninegun m u n i t i o n on the Germans.'07 The aircraft wereairected to their targets by ground llalson of fi ce rs and DY fielo

ery that fired mar klng rounds.'ys There W a s still plenty ofery avallable to the regiment. The 158 FA had four

art1art

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oattailons relnforclns its fires and two more in general support.Between noon and 1700 hours the massed art11 lery flred flfteen"ti me on target" mlsslons on Aschaffenburg.a"s

The effect of thls flrepower was startl ng to make an Impact.Pri son ers surr ende red In ever-lncreaslng numbers. Durlng the daythe reglment would accept the surrender of 1037 enemy solalers.L'dStill. tne artillery was at tlmes Ineffective because the defenderswent unaergrouna In the rubble , but the Incessant poun dlng made i tlmposslble for the defe nder s to get any rest. Llvlng In such anenvironment undoubtedly affected the mental attltude of the Germ ansand r educed their desire to resist. Food, water and anununitlonwere in very short supply as the Amerlcan ground troops battledtheir way into the Kasernes. The result s of the American etf ortsoccaslonally were se en In concrete ways. At about 1500 hours inthe U157 IR sector the resist ance seemed to break and an esci matea300 pris oner s surrendered. Many more were taken durl ng the rest orthe

The hope iess ness of the situation was apparent to a group o rGerman officers in B o n i e r aserne who went to tneir commandersay ing tnat the city was lost and the kaserne ougnt to beaDanaoned."- Still will ing to resi st, the commander repo rcea tneincldent to Major Lamberth who "sentencea " them to service in tnefront lines - just what they had been doing. Thi s indicates acnange In che ' attltude about the struggle. Onthe 29th he execute d an offlcer for desertion, but three days iater

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4STH INFANTRY DIVISION SITUATION OVERLAY012400A APRIL 1945

Figure 16Source: U.S. Army, 45th Infantry Dlvlslon. G-3 Report,010001-012400A A p r i l 1945, CARL.

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On thi s ninth day the defense became less a centrally-controlledand unified mllitary effort and more a contest Dy an armed rabblewith each man desperately fl ghting for hls Ilfe. The hopeles snature of the German posltlon was rblnforced when at about 1100hours i t became gener ally known that the political leadership ofthe city had fled.1a*

Early on thls Monday m ornlng the two slster regiments of the157th. the 179th and the IEOth, started operations to assist in thereduction of the fortress by clearlng the eastern appro aches to thecity. The previous day XV Corps Field Oraer t24 dlrected thedivlslon to shlft Its axi s of advance from east to northeast. Thedivision Implemented thls by dlrectln g two regimen ts to thenortneast wnile the 157 IR con tlnue d to red uce AschaffenDurg.'L'As a result the 180 IR exchanged places wlth the 179 IR and orieflybecame the division reserve. A t 0320 hour s on 2 Aprii 1945 i toccupied Gailbach. then attacked at dawn estab lish ing roa abio cKs onall r oad s from Asch affe nbur g to the east. Thl s further seal ea tnecity.

in the face of c r u m l l n g resistance the Americans continueoto execute the envelopment and reduction of the city.'-' Beginningwith a t h i r t y minute artillery prepar ation the atta cke rs jump ea offat 0630 hours."' With Company C occu pyin g Halbach. the rest ofthe 1/15? IR mopped u p resistance in Goldbach and Haibach. I n tneafternoon the oattaiio n swung to the west c utting tne roads to thenorth of the city and linking u p with Co. A . 1st Bn. 324th Infantry

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at 1700 hours.12s Whlle the llnkup of Amerlcan force s wasoccurrlng the reinforced 2 4 2 4 IR attacked Malnaschaff, scatterlngmoaerate reslstance and taking 120 prisoners. By 1850 hours thetown wa s cleared.L2L The clty wa s physically surrounded. butresistance contlnued to be strong.'"'

The reduction of the rest of contlnuea. Tneestlmated 400 remalnlng defenders were under constant attackinclualng 15% round s flred In direct flre at enemystrongpoints.'l' Th e sltuatlon became crltical for the defendersana between 1000-1100 hours a large group of aefenders exfiltrateatrom the kaS+rne."* At doout 1530 hours the last strongpoint telland tne Ameri can s wer e In control of th ls vltal Installatlon. Withthe capture of the backbone of the defense i n thesouthern section of the clty was broken.reglmental hlstory of the battle, the U157 IR was now able to

In the wor as of one

conduct a "...slaughter of the retreating Germans.""" BYnigntfall the battallon wa s able to make Its way Into the center oftne city i n bitter room-to-room flghting. Late in the day theywere assisted Dy Companies I and L from the 3rd Battalion.

The 3/15? IR took Laaarde and auring the aayin hara fighting wnile capturlng many prisoners. Its Company k:fiankea the eastern suburban area and established nighttimepositions in the ' , a wooded park reachlng into the heartof the city.'j* On the city's western front the U324 IR continueaits attack and by 1900 hours the bunker complex on Hill 214. the

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Kappellenberg. between Ma inaschaf f and the western fringe of thecity, was in American hands.lJ'

After holding out for nine days the Germa ns were paying ahigh price f o r their defense of Fortr ess Aschaffenburg. Theywithstood another day of incessant artillery and aerlai bombarment(48 sorties flown) and were still putting UP a determinedresistance, but they lost vital defensive ground and the confinesof was reduced to the area around the Schloss in the center ofthe city. The Americans captured 1117 prlso ners durlng the daybringing the total taken from the city t o over 3000.'da By the endof the day the American troop dfspositions were as seen at Figure17.

The Ameri cans sensed the battle for Aschaffenburg was almostover and planned for its culmination. Th e previous day. toexpeaice the traffic over the river, W120 Eng Cbt Bn hadconstructea a Class 30 Stringer Bridge a kilometer down river tromthe r a i l r o a d bridge."' Thls provided for two-way traftlc, andmany units, including several headquarters, crossed the Main.

Following a short artillery preparation the 157 IR began itsattacks for the day between 0630 and 0700 hours. However , at 0720hours the units were directed to hold In place as surrendernegotiations took p l a ~ e . " ~ Major Lamberth had been in contact

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Flguce 17Source: U.S. Army, 45th Infantry Division, G-3 Report,020001-022400A Aprli 1945. CARL.

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wlth Gaulelter HeIImuth. the B&bs Defense Commissioner inWurzourg. and other civllian and Party leaders about COndl tlOn S inthe city. Lambert h told Hellmut h duri ng the night of 2-3 April ofthe Impendi ng AmerIca n takeover of the city.

At 0700 hou rs Lamoerth sent t he leader of his 7th VolkssrurmCompany escorted by an American captured on Easter Sunday to theAmerIca n lines requ estl ng surrend er terms. Colonel OBrIen. tne157th intantry Regimental COMnander, rejected negotiatlo ns anddirected tne emissary to tell h is Commander to hang whlte flagstrom the towers of the Schloss by 0800 hours or the attacks wouldcontinue. To insure the messege got through and to assist witnany deta.IlS. Colonel OBrlen sent two Germ an-spea king POWInterrogation Officers (IPWs) aCk with the delegation. They wereto Oring Major Lamoerth back to reglmental headquarter s where hewould surrender.

Upon rea ching che LatnOerth Informed the Ame rican sthat he WOUld surrender, but not to offl cers of inferior rank cbotnof tne America n IPWs were lieutenants). Colonel OBrien oirecte aLTC Sparks, the nearest Oattalion Commander. to go to the Schlossand accept the surrend er. At 0900 hours MaJor L w e r t h s ur re nd er eahis COIMIdnd to LTC Sparks. For the next f ew hours, escort ed Dy theIPWs. he travelled around the clty to the various remainingstrongpoint s supervising their surrender. Finally he wa s taken toregimental headquarters to surrender agaln to Colonel OBrien anago into captivity.

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At 1300 hours on 3 Aprll 1945 the clty of Aschaffenburg wasdeclared cleared by the 157th Infantry and by nlghtfall the unitwas assembled In the towns of Goldbach and Hoesbach awaltingturther orders.

The (Army Hlgh Comnana) dailyannouncement for 3 Aprll 1945 Included the statement:

v e r l o r m(Aschaffenburg is glven up for lost.)La*

Followlng the battle the clvlllan aminlstration was kept i nplace until the US Mllitary Government co uld begin aismantl ing tneNazi regime and start the de-Nazlflcatlon program. By 7 April theprovisional mllltary amlnlstratlon was replaced. and US MilitaryGovernment Detachment H1A3 took over the clty from the NationalSoclailst government. On 14 April Jean Stock. the leader of theSocial Democratic Party In pre-Nazi Aschaffenburg was installed asthe OberDutsermeisrer (Lord Mayor).1A'

The Post-war period is beyond the scope of this Study. nutsome oasic information illustrates the character of the struggle.Durlng the battle the clty was 709: destroyed, wlth mllitarycasual ties estimated in one German source at 1600 killed o r wounaeaand 3500 POWS.'~" Of the estimated 8500 German military anacivilian pa rticipa nts present I n the clty during the battie thisrepresents a 60% casualty rate. American casualti es are also

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alfflcult to estlrnate. but prooably exceed twenty kllled and 300wounded. The Impact on the Amerlcans who fought I n AschaffenoursIs best su marlzea by a sentence that appeared In the 45th InfantryDlvIsIons Operatlons S u m a r y for Aprll 1945:

I f a chart were composed representlng reslstanceIn Aechaffenburg at 100 percent, by analogyElamerg would be asslgned 25 percent, Nuernberg75 percent and Munlch 10 percent.*

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CHAPTER 4EiiuUm

' Charles B. MacDonald, The Last Off-. The United StatesArmy in world War 11: European Theater of Operatlons. (Washington.D.C.: Ufflce of the Chlef of Mllltary History, U . S . A r m y , 1984).279.

j Oberst I G. Horst WI lutzkl, "Army Group G (22 Mar-6 May1945). USAREUR Historical Dlvlslon. 12 November 1947. CARL. 16.Originally from (Nuremb urg) the 413 ReplacementDivision, w as commanaed by Genlt. von Schacky auf Schoenfeid.Generalleutnant (Frelher r) Slegmun d von SChaCKy. "Re port ortne 413th Replacement Dlvislon's Activitles Between Area Wurzourgto the Thurlngian Forests," USAREUR Hlstorlcal Dlvlsion. 18 Marcn1'946, CARL, 7.CCB's major unlts for this operatlon consisted of the 37tnTank Battalion. 10th Armored Infantry, 22nd Armorea FielaArtlllery. and a troop of the 25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.LTC Abrama ( pro mot ed to colonel In April) had been in command forabout a week.

a Thls alffers from the report of the bridge com and er.Oberleutnant Keil. who wrote after the war that no exploslves wereon the Drlage. The account appea rs In Dr. Alols Stadtmueller,q im Zweiten Weltkrleq, (Aschaffenburg: 1971). 172.- Manfrea Baunach. dlicusslon with author 15 Marcn 1985. tierrBaunacn was on auty in the Pre-Renaissance, middle tower. or cnescn los s at the time.

Harold Cohen. discussion with author on I 1 N o v e m e r 1985.L Dr. A l o i s Stadtmueller, m r a m Zweiten Wekt uie q,(Ascharfenourg: Geschichts- und Kunstvereln Ascnaffenburg e. v .1971). 172-173.' i b id . . 174.' " U.S. Army, 4 Armored Dlvlslon. "After-Actlon Report t o r cnePeriod 1-31 March 1945," 9 May 1945. CARL, entry for 25 Mar 45.

I Em11 Lamberth. "Der Bericht des Kampfkommandanten" (T heReport of the Comoat Commander),UEcho5 March 1955, 70:.Stadtmueller. -cl Im Zweiten Weltkriea, 233.Gen. U. Inf. Karl Weisenberger, the Deputy Connnander of WehrKreis

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XI I I . an a Genm.1 tr'reiheer) von Gernsdorff. Chief of Staff ofSeventh Army. felt the division was only 35% effective.15 April 1945, CARL, entry for 24 Mar.U.S . Army. X I 1 Corps, Report of Ope rations (1-31 Mar 4 5 ) ,

Stadtmueiler, -a in Zweiten We1tkrie.g , 196.Cohen, discussion with author.Wiiutzki, "Army Group G", 6.

l 7 Ibid., 18.Dr. Percy E. Schram. "Th e German Wehrmacht in the Last Daysof the War ( 1 Jan - 7 May 45>, Ur l d War I 1 Gpunao M i l i w(New York: Garland Publi shin g Inc.. 1979), 242.

Ii' Stadtmueller, Ascnaffenbura im , 237.2u The Obernauer Kolonle even today is called 'hi-oer g". o r"American Town", by those oldtime Asch affenbur g citizens whoremember that i t was the first part of the city to put out whiteflags to ann ounce surrender to the Americans.11 The story of the raid itself is Oeyond the scop e of cnispaper, however the details are interesting to provide backgroundfor a later dlscussion on Its effect on German Army reintorcementsinto tne Aschaffe nburg area. Briefly, CCB sent a task f o r c ecommandea by CPT. Abraham Baum with 53 vehlcles and 294 men t oiiuerate the American POWs. Although they got t o the camp atter aharrowing 12 hour Jou rne y, they were eventual y overpoverea anacapturea. A t a coat of 9 KIA. 32 WIA. 16 missing and 232 captureatne mission failed. LTC Wat ers was in the camp Dut was woundea inits capture Oy the America ns and hospitalized. The camp wasriueratea nine aays later by the 14 Armorea Division.There are several possible re ason s why Patton sent the raia:I to match the expl oits of the US Sixth Army in the Philippi neswhich had rescuea POWs from Cabanatuan Camp on 28 January. tromSanto To mas Universlty In Manila on 3 February and from Los BanosCamp on 23 Feoruary: 2) to rescue his son-in-law: 3) to contuse tneGermans with a deep thrust. Per hap s he wanted to a0 aii three.LTC Cohen. who su ppl ied most of the men felt strongly that Pattondid I t to confuse the enemy, out in a discussion with the author neSaia that nis good frlends Creighton Abrams and Abe um feel thac?atton did i t to rescue hi s son-in-law.

one o t tne best is Dr. Alois Stadtmueller. "Die WaghalsbgeOperation aer Task Force Baum ("T he Daring Operation of Task ForceBaum" . W s a r : M f t des S , H W ~ ~ I985,3-8.

There are several boo ks and articles on the Harmrhmrg Haia.

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J s The "crea tive tension" that al ways exists between infantrvand armored unit s was not helped by an article that appearea inS t r i D a on 29 March 1945 that said the Third Army hadcleared the Main River towns of Hanau and Bschaffenbura3- ODerst (Graf) 1. G. L uaw ig von Ingelheim. L X X X I I Corps. 27Marcn - 6 May 1945. USAREUR Historical Dlvision. 6 May 1946. CARL.5.37 Stadtmusller, -a im &iten Weltkrim , 237.- Generalm ajor Helmut Kleikamp. "36 th Volk Grenadier Division(28 arch - 3 May 1945). USAREUR Historical Division, 4 August1946. CARL. no page numbers.

conversation with author June 1985.39 William San ders (fo rmer Corporal, WW157t.h IR).

4u U.S Army, 45th Infantry Division, "Operations of the 45thInfantry Divlsion, Germany, 1-31 March 1945. CARL, 17-18. Thenarrative for the 28th was taken from this source. other otflcialrecor ds of the dlvision. and the histo rles of the supporting tank,tank destroyer and artillery DattallOnS.afternoon attack on the 28th the record Is at varlance with anaccount written by General Spar ks ('The Aschaff enPurg Battle,"Note 29. page 3 ) , whlch indicates a morni ng assault. Since his isthe only account of a mo rning fight on the 28th. in all pr obabilityGeneral Spa rks meant the 29th.158th FA Bn, March 1945, 24 Aprll 1945, 4Sch ID Museum, 4.

I n describing an

U.S. Army, 45th Infantry Dlvision. "Historical Recora.

*i U.S. Army, 45th Infantry Division, "Wa r Room Journal ( 2 1 - 3 1ilarch IY45), 45th ID Museum, 14.t the 157th Iofantrv ReairnenC. (Baton Rouge: ArmyNavy Publ isning Company. 1946). 150. There are many accou nts ortne capture of the liquor warehouse, including one in tne officialTransmittal of the Unit History of the 157th for the montn of Marcns u m i t t e d to the 45th ID. The warehouse contained IiquersGonfiscatea in various Western European count ries occupiea by theNazis. After the discove rers took their share the rest wa s rlrrneao ve r to regiment for f urthe r distribution. At least on e accountincludes a recipe for a '157th Zombi e" containing portions of

Cognac. Benedictine and Colntreau. with a champagne cnaser curHowara A. Buechner.w: he Hour of the A venaec , Metairie. LA:Thunaerbird Press, Inc., 1986). I t is probable that on the 28thand the followlng day s many men of the 157th IR fought tortitleawith tne con ten ts of the warehou se, but it is impossible to tell i tthis improved or hindered their performance of duty.

.&A 'St

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** "oper ation s of 45th ID.' 17.-e von Ingelheim, oOo(I1 Corps," 7.*- Flaht lna Fortv Flfth: The art f anw Baton Rouge: Amy L Navy Pub1 ishing Company, 1946), 146.This work conta lns an Engllsh translatlon. A German version Is inStadtmuel Ier. -a lm m t k r l e q on pages 239-40.* 7 Dr. Stadtmueller In hls hlstory of the war in the Malnreglon (Aschaffenburg: 1983) on page 586. mak es the polnt that there wa s nogeneral clvilian partlclpatlon In the battle, and that no organlzeaHItlerjugend or young girls fought. But he acknowle ages that theAmeri cans tnought so, and that the Nazl dally newspaper. the- B e o w , entions civlllan participatlon inAschaffenburg In its 3 Aprll 1945 edltlon. Clvillans, o r those wnowere clvillans by the loose deflnitlon of the day. probably foughtfor home ana country, elther dlrectly a3 combatants. o r lnalrectly

by PrOVldIng food. carrylng suppll es and runnl ng messages betweenthe battle positlons.A * Manfred Baunach. dlscusslon wlth author, 15 March 1985.4 i r Dr. A1013 Stadtmu eller. a em Z w e i mWelfKrlea (Ascnaf fenburg After the Second Worl a War).(Aschaffenburg: Paul Pattloch Verlag, 1 9 7 3 , 19.

U.S. Army, 45th Infantry Olvlslon. "Th e Story ofAschaffenDurg." 1 May 1945. 11. This Is a compilation of newsscories. raaio reports and press releases about the battle,published an a given to the troops to send home. A German versionof the proclamation app ears I n Sta

Battle for Aschaffenburg

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