Published in Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences October 9, 2012

The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com.URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11097-012-9282-y

The You-I event: On the genesis of self-awareness

Stephen Langfur

slangfur@gmail.com

Abstract: I present empirical evidence suggesting that an infant first becomes aware of herself as the focal center of a caregiver's attending. Yet that does not account for her awareness of herself as agent. To address this question, I bring in research on neonatal imitation, as well as studies demonstrating the existence of a neural system in which parts of the same brain areas are activated when observing another's action and when executing a similar one. Applying these findings, I consider gestural exchanges between infant and caregiver, such as reciprocal smiles and imitative vocalizations. Lacking self-awareness at first, the infant is unaware of her own agency. By returning her unwitting gesture, the caregiver singles out for her—thanks to neural matching—the gesture's kinesthesis. Moreover, the caregiver's smile, imitative vocalization, or other gesture is the form that focusing takes. The kinesthesis of the infant's gesture, in being singled-out, is experienced by the infant as what the caregiver is focusing on. It is experienced as being within the focal center. In this way the infant becomes aware of herself as a bodily entity acting toward the caregiver. Exchanges that involve matching are at first essential, I argue, in making the infant present to herself in action. Matching will cease to be necessary, but self-awareness continues to depend fundamentally on others until the acquisition of language, when the child becomes capable of talking to herself as if she were the caregiver.

Keywords: protoconversation · intersubjectivity · self-awareness · Husserl · dialogue · second-person

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During the past four decades, researchers have discovered facts about infants that

help to solve an old enigma concerning self-awareness. By self-awareness (equivalent here

to self-consciousness), let us mean not only the reflective sort that is exemplified in the

cogito, but also the prereflective sort that permeates humdrum experience. For example,

suppose I am absorbed in reading a story and you interrupt to ask what I am doing. "[T]he

self-consciousness on the basis of which I answer the question is not something acquired at

just that moment, but a consciousness of myself that has been present to me all along"

(Zahavi 2005, pp. 21-22). Gallagher and Zahavi summarize a century of phenomenological

thought on the point (2008, pp. 45-46): "All the major figures in phenomenology defend the

view that a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious

experience."

The enigma is this: Except for myself, every distinct entity of which I am aware is

an object of some sort, something standing opposite me, a Gegen-stand. I perceive, say, a

tree. But how can I who perceive the tree be aware of myself perceiving it? How can I who

am aware be something of which I am aware (in addition to the tree)? What kind of curious

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doubling back is here?

A possible solution can be found in Husserl's thesis that any experience of temporal

succession requires retention of retention. Since retention is a mode of consciousness, the

retention of retention amounts to consciousness of consciousness (Husserl 1966a §39;

Zahavi 1999, Ch. 5 and p. 122). I shall not take space here to examine this famous theory or

its later development, except to note that it does not account for the kind of self-awareness

which becomes explicit when my name is called or an unexpected danger appears. Aspects

of the self are then revealed that are simply not covered by retention of retention: the sense

of a particular body as mine, the sense of my being a vulnerable being among beings, or

simply the sense of myself as a definite entity. One can of course add other factors to

explain these aspects, but with the help of infancy research I wish to present an alternative

theory, which solves the enigma while accounting for awareness of the self as a definite

being. The theory hinges on a kind of event which first occurs in infancy, continuing later

in a derivative form.

The "major figures in phenomenology" are adults describing adult experience. It is

not inconceivable that, once upon a time, there was awareness without self-awareness.

Husserl discusses passive syntheses which occur for consciousness "before the activity of

the ego has as yet carried out any sense-giving operations" (1973b, p. 72). Must we assume

that during the course of these syntheses time is already constituted and the ego already

self-aware? In a late note, moreover (1973c, p. 605), he remarks that a newborn baby does

not yet have "well-formed temporality" (ausgebildete Zeitlichkeit) with retention and

protention. We also read that time cannot be constituted without content (1966b, p. 128).

What, we may wonder, would the content be?

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In this paper we shall avoid taking self-awareness as a starting condition. The claim

will be that an infant first becomes present to himself, both as object and agent, through a

person attending to him.1 Such a happening will be called a You-I event. In the first section

we discuss a clue from adulthood: a rare occurrence in which one becomes aware of

oneself exclusively through another person's act of attention. For the infant, we shall see, an

event of this sort is the norm. In the next section, we take an external view of infancy, using

empirical research into a type of parent-infant exchange known as protoconversation.

Then we ask what protoconversation must be like from the infant's side. We bring in

contributions from Husserl, employing his work on passive synthesis. Next we take up

the notion that the sense "person attending" is original, i.e., not founded on a prior

meaning. With the above as foundation, we turn to the primal instituting of the You-I

event. We propose that the self initially appears to itself as the focal center of another's

attending. But how to account for its awareness of itself as agent? We summon evidence

from two bodies of research: (1) studies of neonatal imitation and (2) studies showing that

the mere observation of another person's gesture activates some of the same brain areas

which are activated when a similar gesture is performed by the self. We propose that,

thanks to such matching, the caregiver's response in kind (e.g., her smile or imitative vocal

sound) first singles out the kinesthesis of the infant's gesture for his attention. Moreover,

since the caregiver's response is itself the form that focusing takes, the singled-out

kinesthesis is experienced by the infant as being in her focal center (which, we recall, is

himself as he first appears to himself). In this way the caregiver's responding gesture makes

1 Because much of the infancy research I'll be quoting involves mothers and their infants, to avoid confusion I shall henceforth use feminine pronouns for the caregiver, masculine for the baby.

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the infant aware of himself as a definite entity performing a similar gesture toward her. I

hold that such exchanges are essential in first making the self aware of itself as agent,

although the need for matching will drop away. Finally, I consider objections to the You-I

account and further questions.

1. A clue from adulthood

We begin with two passages describing adult experience. I cite the first, by Schutz

(1962, pp. 173-74), because it makes a point which is essential for understanding the

second. Schutz describes listening to a lecturer:

We catch the Other's thought in its vivid presence and not modo praeterito…. Now

he starts a new sentence, he attaches word to word; we do not know how the

sentence will end… . The fact that I can grasp the Other's stream of thought, and

this means the subjectivity of the alter ego in its vivid present, whereas I can grasp

my own self only by way of reflection on its past, leads us to the definition of the

alter ego: the alter ego is that subjective stream of thought which can be experienced

in its vivid present.

Waldenfels (1971, p. 307) picks up on this passage while replacing the reference to

reflection with another idea about how the self can become present to itself. The excerpt is

from a chapter called Aufgipfelung des Dialogs—roughly, "when dialogue reaches its

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peak."

The reciprocal relation of I and You displays an essential asymmetry, because I and

You are present to me simultaneously but in different ways. The explicitly primal

lies for each with the other to whom he is turned. What I currently live through

[erlebe] I do not see, but I do see what you currently live through, my self included.

This originality of the other's presence keeps us from interpreting the You as a

second I. The explicit presence of the self is rather a mediated one; I owe it to the

other—indeed I arrive at it only when I do not seek it. If I recognize the other in

order to find recognition, if I bend back upon myself the bow that spans between us,

the enchantment vanishes. I lose the other and my self. What is left to me then is

completed, past—the ash of afterglow. The principle of gaining oneself through

giving oneself is initially a law of life; it first becomes a moral commandment in the

view of the distorted life.2

The passage does not portray our usual experience, which is often less than

"enchantment" (Zauber). Waldenfels is describing the "peak" of dialogue. Why is this event

exceptional? Why does "the principle of gaining oneself through giving oneself" appear

2 "Das reziproke Verhältnis von Ich und Du zeigt eine wesenhafte Asymmetrie, weil Ich und Du mir zugleich, aber auf verschiedene Weise gegenwärtig sind. Das ausdrückliche Primat liegt für jeden beim andern, dem er zugewandt ist. Was ich aktuell erlebe, sehe ich nicht, wohl aber, was du aktuell erlebst, mich selbst eingeschlossen. Diese Originalität der Fremdgegenwart verwehrt es uns, das Du als zweites Ich zu deuten. Die ausdrückliche Selbstgegenwart ist vielmehr eine vermittelte; ich verdanke sie dem Andern, erreiche sie freilich nur, wenn ich sie nicht suche. Erkenne ich den Andern an, um selbst Anerkennung zu finden und biege ich den Spannungsbogen zwischen uns auf mich zurück, so verfliegt der Zauber. Ich verliere den Andern und mich selbst; was mir noch bleibt, ist Fertiges, Vergangenes—die Asche des Nachruhms. Der Satz vom Selbstgewinn durch Selbsthingabe ist zunächst ein Lebensgesetz; zu einem moralischen Gebot wird es erst in der Sicht des gestörten Lebens." Unless an English version is cited, translations are mine.

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mostly as a moral commandment rather than as "a law of life"? What has "distorted" the

life? I understand the background to Waldenfels' description by observing that in adult

experience, other people do not generally appear to us in their full otherness. The reason

may be traced to the fact that in early childhood, the otherness of those one loves and needs

has a threatening aspect: another person is essentially beyond one's control; one learns

techniques, therefore, to level down the otherness of the other.3 In the rare event that

Waldenfels describes, the banished otherness has somehow broken into presence: a familiar

person appears in the unfamiliarity of full otherness. Fascinated by her, one "forgets"

oneself—i.e., one loses one's usual kind of self-awareness. If at such a moment she is

attending to one, speaking to one or looking at one, one receives oneself back as the person

she is attending to. For as long as the enchantment lasts, the path to self-awareness leads

through her. I see "what you currently live through, my self included."

When such an event occurs in adulthood, it is likely to flicker by so quickly that it

may easily be dismissed as a fluke or illusion. I think we must admit, nonetheless, that it is

a conceivable path to self-awareness. Could it once have been the norm? Could the

structure of experience have subsequently undergone a basic change, because of the

techniques we acquire for leveling down the otherness of others? I shall argue that during

the first two years of life, the main structure is indeed the one just indicated: at certain

moments, the infant's attention is directed to another who is responding to him, and so he

becomes aware of himself as the focal center of that responding. An event with this

3 A basic technique is what psychoanalysts call "identification" with a beloved other—i.e., playing her part toward oneself—as a way of hedging against the potential loss of her. Identification commonly takes the form of talking "with oneself" (cf. Wilson & Weinstein 1990). This mitigates the need for the flesh-and-blood person.

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structure is what we are calling a You-I event.4 In adulthood, on rare occasions like the one

described, the leveling techniques relax and the original structure shines through.

2. Protoconversation

Because of the enigma mentioned at the start, I wish to avoid presupposing self-

awareness. Yet how can I imagine a state where it doesn't exist (in order then to follow its

emergence)? I cannot imagine it away, because in the act of imagining I remain ineluctably

self-aware.

Given this limitation, let us first seek help in the external view provided by

empirical findings. Infancy researchers concur that in the second or third month there

begins a developmental surge, which Rochat dubs "the second birth of the infant" (2001, p.

180). Stern (1985, p. 37) calls it "almost as clear a boundary as birth itself."5 At 2 to 3

months, Stern writes, infants "seem to approach interpersonal relatedness with an

organizing perspective that makes it feel as if there is now an integrated sense of

themselves as distinct and coherent bodies, with…a sense of other people as distinct and

separate interactants" (1985, p. 69). This "revolution" (Rochat) is marked by a new kind

and intensity of interaction between caregiver (henceforth, carer) and infant. For example,

here is Reddy describing an exchange with her son (2008, p. 70).6

4 The pronouns are admittedly anachronistic, for it will be years before the child masters their use. By the pre-linguistic "You," I shall mean a person perceived as attending to one who through this perception becomes self-aware, an "I."5 Concerning the possibility of self-awareness in fetuses and newborns, allow me to defer the discussion until I have presented the dynamic of the You-I event, which appears most clearly beginning in the second month.6 I am indebted to Reddy's How infants know minds (2008) for its comprehensive account of infant development from a second-person perspective.

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Rohan, 10 weeks, lying on the settee with me leaning over him; following a series

of intense face-to-face vocal exchanges between us; there is one particularly long

and expressive vocalization from him which overrides a vocal response I was

beginning to make. I pause in my response until about a second after he finishes the

utterance and then I ask in a quiet voice—"What?" He pauses for two seconds, still

intensely watching me, and then responds with a smiling vocalisation, curving head

and body away slightly. I laugh at this and ask "Are you singing?" He responds

suddenly with a much larger smile—a near laugh—lifting his face upwards, eyes

still on mine.

Trevarthen (1977), who was the first to make a systematic study of such exchanges,

dubbed them "protoconversation." He videotaped five mother-infant pairs when the babies

were 2 to 3 months old. He found features that also characterize adult conversations, among

them the fact that mother and infant take turns, with minimal overlap, and the fact that the

emotions expressed back and forth are coherently related. Since then there has been

abundant research on such interactions, which developmentalists also bring under the

heading of "social contingency" (meaning nearness in the timing, spatial presentation or

intensity of gestures between the partners). The research has shown that if contingency is

interrupted during live face-to-face exchanges, 2-month-olds reduce their smiling and

vocalizations, often expressing puzzlement, frustration or distress. (See Tronick et al. 1978.

For examples of protoconversation, see Papoušek 1995).

Protoconversation appears to be the kind of exchange in which the You-I event may

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occur. Let us now try to get an inside view.

3. Contributions from Husserl

To the extent that we can, we shall imagine protoconversation from the side of an

infant who is not yet self-aware. Although we cannot escape our own self-awareness, we

can posit a process that does not presuppose it. We ask what conditions must be fulfilled in

order that a You-I event may occur.

Something must appear. If not yet a fully constituted object, it must at least be an

"objectlike" formation (eine Gegenständlichkeit, Husserl 1966b, p. 121). Now, in the

course of constituting a spatial object, consciousness works with impressions such as

colored surfaces. These impressions are not raw matter (hyle). They have already

undergone organization in what Husserl calls passive synthesis. Consider the field of

passive data "as it is before the activity of the ego has as yet carried out any sense-giving

operations whatever with regard to it…. [T]his field is still not a pure chaos, a mere 'swarm'

of 'data'; it is a field of determinate structure, one of prominences [Abgehobenheiten] and

articulated particularities" (Husserl 1973b, §16). He considers, for example, the visual field.

A particular element in it can be raised to prominence in such a way that it contrasts with

something—say, red patches against a white background. The ego need not act upon the

patches, comparing them, in order that their common redness should be noticed; rather, by

virtue of contrast with the white background, that redness obtrudes on consciousness,

attracting attention. Husserl continues (1973b, §17), "the stimulus exercised by the

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intentional object in its directedness toward the ego attracts the latter more or less

forcefully, and the ego yields to it." The object (which is not yet fully an object, he notes)

affects the ego, which turns toward it. Such "receptivity must be regarded as the lowest

level of activity" (ibid.).

In these passages, Husserl is reflecting on data (e.g., the red patches) which can be

abstracted by the phenomenologist from fully constituted objects, and which must have

been present as a condition for that constitution. These data are relatively accessible. It is

necessary to stay within the realm of such impressions, Husserl writes, for the sake of "a

systematic [phenomenology of] genesis" (Husserl 1966b, p. 150). He continues:

"Accordingly, we may only take from the sphere of the heart [Gemütssphäre] some feelings

[Gefühle] that are co-original with the sensible data, and say: On the one hand, the

emergent affection is functionally co-dependent upon the relative size of the contrast, on

the other hand, also upon privileged sensible feelings like a passionate desire [Wollust]

founded by a prominence [Abgehobene] in its unity. We may even allow originally

instinctive, drive related preferences" (ibid.).

If we include the "sphere of the heart," then the carer surely outshines all other

prominences. This is the case from birth, when overwhelming needs appear which the fetus

did not have, and a particular prominence becomes associated with their fulfillment.

Newborns prefer the mother's voice (DeCasper & Fifer 1980), familiar from the womb

(Rochat 2011). They also prefer to look at her face (Bushnell et al. 1989; cf. Pascalis at al.

1995; Walton et al. 1992). Within 6 hours of wakeful exposure to her, the newborn is able

to re-identify her after an absence of 15 minutes, perhaps longer (Bushnell 2001). By the

age of 3 days, he identifies her face (indeed, any face) on both a frontal and a three-quarter

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view, although not beyond that toward the profile (Turati et al. 2008).7

The last fact suggests that the infant has begun (but only begun) to constitute

persons as spatial objects. Husserl and his interpreters usually exemplify the constituting of

spatial objects by reference to the shapes that appear and disappear as a perceiver changes

position or rotates a thing. It would seem, however, that the first such constituting—the

Urstiftung—takes place when a person, usually the carer, occasionally turns her head.

Already by the third day of life, the infant knows that a face has the possibility of appearing

otherwise. Already he sees it as including a horizon of hidden aspects in addition to the one

in view. It is the partial vanishing of what was present (e.g. the face in full view) that

enables the current appearance (the face in three-quarter view) to be perceived as an aspect

of something. The horizon of vanished aspects is essential to the carer's appearing as one

who exists in her own right, apart from the infant's current experience of her.8

To summarize the presentation so far: Among the stimuli attracting the infant ego,

none can rival a countenance that (1) is associated with the fulfillment of needs; (2) is

accompanied by a voice familiar from the womb; (3) often remains steadily present at

optimal viewing distance; and (4) occasionally turns, thus motivating an initial, partial

constitution of it as an object existing in its own right. We shall soon add further features.

7 Turati et al. (2008) have determined that in both these views, the identification is based on the abundant and similar perceptual information from the inner face. 8 Following Husserl, Overgaard (2004, p. 113) conducts a thought-experiment in which, per impossibile, all aspects of the perceived object would be fully manifest, i.e. there would be no horizon containing hidden aspects, no rear sides. Husserl (1973a, pp. 116-117) asks whether, in such a case, there would be a difference between appearance and what appears, and thus whether there would be the transcendence of the object that is determined by that difference. He answers in the negative. Overgaard comments: "Hence a perception of something, of a tree as something 'out there in the garden,' something transcendent in relation to the perceptual experience, is only possible in the way that the 'properly' manifest [i.e., the side that is sensually presented—Author] is embodied in a horizon of not-properly-manifest…." Without such hiddenness, "[t]he experience would seem to absorb the object completely, so that perceived [sic] could not be differentiated from the perceptual experience."

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4. The sense "person attending"

A particular prominence gains significance for the baby: it means "that which can

satisfy needs." But why "that which"? Why not "one who"? Why should we grant priority

to the non-personal? We cannot build up the self and the world from the non-personal

alone. Even the traditional approach, relying on the indubitability of the cogito,

presupposes the personal, i.e., the awareness of an inherently meaningful self whose

interests serve as a source for projecting meanings into non-personal data. However,

because self-awareness is burdened with enigma, we avoid taking it as fundamental. We

keep the personal but reverse the relation. The person who attends to the baby, we claim, is

the fundamental prominence, the phenomenon from whom the baby's self-awareness is

derived.

I find a measure of support for this position among thinkers who stress the

immediacy with which we adults experience other persons as such. Among them is Husserl

(1952, pp. 139-40, 235-36, 240-41, 244, 375), although he retains priority for the self-

aware ego. I have quoted Schutz and Waldenfels on the point. Others are Merleau-Ponty

(1964, p. 52 and 2005, pp. 411 ff.), Scheler (1973, p. 254), Strawson (1959, pp. 98-110),

and Wittgenstein (1980b §170), who writes of the other person: "In general I do not

surmise fear in him—I see it. …[I]t is as if the human face were in a way translucent and

that I were seeing it not in reflected light but rather in its own."9

9 "[A]ccording to Wittgenstein (although he would not put it like this), 'human being' is a fundamental ontological category of its own—one that should be contrasted with lifeless material things as well as Cartesian immaterial things, if there are any" (Overgaard 2007, p. 26). Krueger (2012) defends the idea that

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"When you see the eye, you see something go out from it. You see the glance of the

eye [...]" (Wittgenstein 1980a, §1100). But does the infant too see the glance of the eye?

That is, does he see the carer as attending? Few would dispute that coyness betokens

awareness that another is attending to one. Reddy (2000) found coy behavior in infants

from the age of 2 months.10 Nor does someone call out for attention without believing in the

possibility of being attended to; by about 4 months, infants make what appear to be

"calling" vocalizations (Reddy 1999, p. 41). It may be argued, however, that natural

selection has determined such behaviors, in order that the mother should favor the infant

and fulfill his needs. Indeed, some developmentalists resist interpreting the infant's

sensitivity to contingency as a social phenomenon. When a 2-month-old discovers

contingency with a mobile (effected by means of a cord connecting it to his foot), he reacts

with smiles and cooing, but he shows distress and frustration if contingency stops (Watson

1972). His behaviors with the carer could be reactions to mere contingency or the loss of it:

perhaps he does not perceive the carer as a minded being!11

Most would allow, however, that joint attention is a sufficient criterion: if the infant

looks back and forth at the carer while pointing at something, clearly he regards her as

capable of attending. Such behavior becomes robust at around 10 months, but we now have

studies showing that 3-month-olds sometimes track the exchanges between their parents

and make bids for triangular exchange, sharing their affects with both (Fivaz-Depeursinge

there is direct perception of some mental states. He cites empirical evidence suggesting that "some forms of expressive behavior are proper aspects or components of the mental phenomena being perceived. In seeing this behavior, we are seeing parts of another’s mind."10 I thank an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to this article by Reddy.11 Some take the position that a child does not recognize minded beings, including himself, until he passes the false belief test at 3 or 4 years. For criticism of this view, see Gallagher & Zahavi (2008, pp. 171-192).

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& Corboz-Warnery 1999, pp. 103-106; cf. Nadel & Tremblay-Leveau 1999). Legerstee et

al. (2007) found joint attention at 5 months, though not yet robust or in the form of

pointing; in the case of dyads with well-attuned mothers, they also found a significant

relation between how much an infant monitors the mother's gaze at 3 months and the

amount of joint attention at 10 months with pointing. On these grounds, I see no

"adultomorphism" in supposing that the infant, during protoconversation, perceives the

carer as attending.12

If we are allowed that much, there is no need to presuppose an enigmatic self-

awareness. Instead we can track its genesis.

5. The primal instituting of the You-I event

The power of another's eyes on one has an evolutionary background. For most

animal species, the gaze is likely to belong to a predator. Sensing it, some reptiles freeze.

Other animals seek to escape or prepare to fight. For helpless human offspring, however,

the gaze of the carer functions to a different end. Kobayashi & Kohshima (2001) suggest

"that the dark coloration of exposed sclera of nonhuman primates is an adaptation to

camouflage the gaze direction against other individuals and/or predators, and that the white

sclera of the human eye is an adaptation to enhance the gaze signal." Farroni et al. (2002)

found that "from birth, human infants prefer to look at faces that engage them in mutual

gaze." Lengthy eye contact between mother and infant, which starts in the second month, is

12 Several recent voices in infancy research and phenomenology maintain that infants perceive intentions from the start (e.g., in psychology: Butterworth 1998; Meltzoff & Brooks 2001, p. 188; Reddy 2003 and 2008, Ch. 8; in phenomenology: Fuchs & De Jaegher 2009; Gallagher & Hutto 2008; Krueger 2012).

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likewise unique to humans and crosses cultural lines.

Hains and Muir (1996) discovered that "when adults engage in normal face-to-face

interactions with 3-6-month-olds, adult eye contact appears to cue infants to engage in

communicative exchanges." However, "both [infant] smiling and gaze dropped

significantly each time the adult's gaze shifted from making eye contact to looking [sic] the

infant's ears (Muir & Hains 1999, p. 176)."

If we accept the position that the infant perceives the carer as attending, then it is

reasonable to think that when the carer's eyes are on him, the infant feels looked at. But

suppose that until this moment he has lacked self-awareness. In that case, when the glance

is directed at him, it appears as seeing something. This "something," I hold, is the first

glimmer of the self to itself. It is the threshold of self-awareness. The self begins to appear

to itself, in other words, as a person's focal center. Let us delay importing other

characteristics that we justly associate with minimal self-awareness. More follows at once,

but we need to distinguish the threshold: "The infant's awareness of others as attentive and

intentional beings cannot be considered apart from her awareness of herself as the object of

this attentional and intentional directedness" (Reddy 2008, p. 126).

Yet self-awareness includes more than being an object of attention. It includes

awareness of oneself as an agent. The me is also an I. We must probe further into the

moment between carer and infant.

The You-I event brings about, we shall see, the self's awareness of its agency. There

are various routes to this event. We have been following the route of the glance, but the

event can occur through vocal exchanges, and perhaps through touching and hugging as

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well.13 We shall isolate the social smile as our first clue (although it generally occurs in

combination with other gestures, especially vocalizations). It is occasioned by a person's

voice at 4 weeks or by a face at 5 (Wolff 1987, p. 114). Its universality among humans

appears to extend to the adult's responding smile (cf. Schilbach et al. 2008), unless the latter

is deliberately inhibited.

To avoid presupposing self-awareness, we shall assume that the infant is initially

conscious of the carer alone. He is smiling at her. His attention is directed to her, not to the

kinesthesis of smiling, but even if it were directed at the kinesthesis, the latter would

provide no basis by which he could recognize it as his own. The kinesthesis of smiling is

indeed a special kind of sensation when we attend to it, but there is nothing about it in itself

to specify one who is feeling it.14 Now, if the infant is to become aware of himself as agent,

his unwitting gesture must become a witting one. As a condition for this, the kinesthesis of

the gesture must attract his attention, he must recognize it as his own, and he must be able

to reproduce it, i.e., to repeat the action wittingly. Given that he is attending to the carer,

how can all this come about?

Infancy studies again prove helpful. Researchers have found that within days and

even minutes of birth, some neonates imitate tongue protrusion and mouth opening

(Fontaine 1984; Kugiumutzakis 1999; Legerstee 1991; Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1983).15 13 For examples of protoconversation with infants born blind, see Bigelow 1995, Schögler & Trevarthen 2007. 14 Cf. Gallagher (1996): "[P]roprioceptive awareness, on its own, provides an awareness of one's own body but not of one's own body as one's own." 15 Several researchers dispute the existence of neonatal imitation (Anisfeld 1996; Anisfeld et al. 2001; Jones 2009). They point out that the only gesture which has yielded a strong positive result across groups of neonates is tongue protrusion. This alone does not suffice to prove imitation, because neonates have been seen to protrude their tongues in response to various arousing stimuli: the apparent imitation may have merely been an arousal response. Yet the criticism bypasses a strange fact that requires explanation: On a case by case basis, one does find neonates—and not just a few—who make significantly more mouth openings than tongue protrusions when mouth opening is modeled, as well as more tongue protrusions than mouth openings when

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How can newborns reproduce gestures which they see in another's face, using gestures

which they merely feel in (their own) faces?16 Meltzoff & Moore (1977) have shown that

the imitations are unlikely to be caused by innate releasing mechanisms or reinforcements

from the adult. Moreover, by the age of 6 weeks, when protoconversation begins, the

imitating infant seems to be aware of the similarity between the model's visible gesture and

the one he merely feels. For example, when a model displays a novel gesture, protruding

the tongue to the side, 6-week-olds may fail at first to match it, but they persist in trying;

here similarity functions as a target (Meltzoff & Moore 1994). What is more, if a stranger

models a particular orofacial gesture and returns the next day with a neutral face, 6-week-

olds tend to make the gesture she modeled the day before (ibid.). The researchers propose

that these imitations are based on "active intermodal mapping" (Meltzoff & Moore 1997).

They hypothesize that the neonate is able to represent visual and proprioceptive information

in a form that is common to both sensory modalities. They write, "The infant could thus

compare the sensory information from his own unseen motor behavior to a 'supramodal'

representation of the visually perceived gesture and construct the match required" (Meltzoff

& Moore 1977).17

Studies of adults indicate the existence of a neural basis for intermodal mapping,

namely a system in which the mere observation of another person's gesture activates, albeit

at a lesser intensity, some of the same brain areas that are activated when a similar gesture

tongue protrusion is modeled. For neonatal imitation among chimpanzees, see Myowa-Yamakoshi et al. (2004), Bard (2007).16 I shall occasionally parenthesize phrases (e.g., "their own" in his sentence) that may help the reader grasp my meaning, although they are not to be taken as part of the infant's experience prior to the You-I event.17 As further evidence of neonatal intermodal capability, Streri & Gentaz (2003) have found that newborns "can visually recognize the shape of an object that they have previously manipulated with their right hand, out of sight."

18

is performed by the self.18 For example, Fadiga et al. (1995) recorded motor-evoked

potentials from hand muscles; they found that merely watching another person grasp a

thing produces significantly bigger twitches in the muscles used for grasping than does

watching a dimming light. Important for our question about agency is the finding that the

observation of an action creates a match with the motor plan for performing it: a path is

opened for deliberately repeating what was not originally deliberate (cf. Ferrari et al. 2009).

With regard to facial expressions, Mojzisch et al. (2006) found that on seeing

another's expression, there is automatic involuntary activity of muscles in one's own face.

Further, when an adult sees someone smile, the areas activated in the brain include the

facial motor area but extend beyond it, "recruiting brain regions known to be involved in

social cognition" (Schilbach et al. 2008).

Other brain studies have focused on sensations and affects. The mere observation of

a person grimacing in pain activates a neural network which overlaps, to a large extent, the

network activated by the first-hand experience of pain, although the observer is spared

feeling pain; that is, the areas coding the sensory aspects are not included in the overlap

(Lamm et al. 2007). A similar partial match has been found for disgust (Wicker et al. 2003).

To adapt a Husserlian usage: the observer apperceives the disgust or pain, no inference

required. (Recall Wittgenstein: "In general I do not surmise fear in him—I see it.") The

apperception of another person's affect is possible because affect is bound up with bodily

expression (James 1918, pp. 451-452). To be sure, affect and gesture are distinct, but they

are so closely linked that when we wish to hide what we are feeling, we must take measures 18 Much of the research I shall now cite was inspired by the discovery, in macaques, of neurons which discharge both when the macaque performs a motor act and when she observes a similar act performed by another (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2008). The research into such "mirror neurons" uses electrodes implanted in the brain, a procedure not normally permitted in work involving humans.

19

to inhibit its bodily expression. I shall be assuming that in protoconversation the kinesthesis

of the infant's gesture is imbued with affect.

We live, it seems, not only in ourselves, but also in other people. Among adults

neural matching does not normally engender behavioral matching, because the latter is

inhibited (Kinsbourne 2002). In extreme circumstances, however, neural matching tends to

spill over into behavioral matching: "The mob, when they are gazing at a dancer on the

slack rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own bodies, as they see him do, and

as they feel that they themselves must do if in his situation" (Smith 1976, I.I.3). Among

adults in ordinary circumstances, neural matching does not spill over, but it enables

understanding. When I observe my neighbor unlock his door, I am as if there in his body

doing it, and, accurately or not, I sense from his posture what it feels like to be him entering

his apartment. I apperceive his affect-imbued kinesthesis. This requires no decision to "put

myself in his shoes." I am in his shoes from the moment I observe him.

And babies—do they have matching systems for actions and affects? The work on

neonatal imitation indicates that they do.19 As for neuroscience, in the present state of brain-

scanning technology a subject must keep still, which infants do not. Nevertheless, for 6-

and 7-month-olds, Shimada & Hiraki (2006) were able to determine that the motor areas of

the brain are significantly active when babies merely watch the actions of someone else.20

Reciprocal smiling is not imitation, and the period of protoconversation begins too

late to be called neonatal. Yet on the basis of the neonatal research as well as the cited 19 In addition to the sources cited for orofacial imitation, see Field et al. (1982) on the neonatal imitation of happy, sad and surprised expressions.20 For research suggesting the existence of an observation/execution matching system in infants, see also Nyström (2008) and Craighero et al. (2011). If infants have mirror neurons, it is likely that these get shaped by experience (Lepage & Théoret 2007). Ferrari et al. (2008) found direct evidence of mirror neurons in 1-week-old macaques; the macaque neonates also imitate (Ferrari et al. 2006, Ferrari et al. 2009).

20

studies of the adult brain, we may suppose that rudimentary matching systems, awaiting

refinement, exist at 2 and 3 months. It is these systems, and not specifically imitation,

which my thesis requires.

The following will now be shown: When the carer smiles or vocalizes in response to

a similar but unwitting gesture by the infant, the kinesthesis of the infant's gesture comes to

his attention and is recognized by him as his own, so that he can wittingly repeat it. What

makes this possible?

When the infant begins to become aware of himself through the carer's focusing, the

difference between other and self first opens for him: it is the difference between focuser

and focal center. Suppose the carer smiles in response to his unwitting "social smile." On

the basis of the neural matching system, her smile has the effect of underlining the

kinesthesis of his—of singling it out for attention amid the swarm of sensations. This

suggestion seems reasonable if we bear in mind the findings on neonatal imitation: a

model's orofacial gestures arouse similar gestures from the infant.21

How then is the singled-out kinesthesis recognized by the infant as his own?

The beginning of self-awareness, we recall, is awareness of the carer's focal center.

Her smile (or other gesture toward the infant) is the form that focusing takes. The

kinesthesis of the infant's smile, in being singled-out, is experienced by the infant as what

she is focusing on. It is experienced as being in her focal center, i.e. as part of himself. In

this way he becomes aware of himself as a definite entity smiling at her. The focal center 21 Concerning adult imitation, Iacoboni et al. (1999; cf. Iacoboni 2009) discovered that when one imitates another while observing her, the amount of activity in certain brain areas approximates the sum of the amount which normally occurs in observation and the amount which normally occurs in execution.

21

gets a body—and (again, thanks to the matching system) the motor plan is activated by

which he can repeat the gesture.

That is the core of the You-I account where agency is concerned. The reader may

wonder, however, why the infant does not confuse the kinesthesis of the carer's smile with

his own, including the affect imbuing it. (For in line with what has been said about living in

other people, we apperceive the kinesthesis of another—not that we feel it, but we sense

what it is like to be feeling it.) The solution is provided through timing. Protoconversation,

we recall, is characterized by the taking of turns (Papoušek 1995, pp. 61-65). If we watch a

carer and infant engaged in it, we see smiles, vocalizations and gazing; each partner often

displays all three kinds of gesture at once. Turn-taking is clearest when the carer imitates

the infant's vocalizations. While the carer's gesturing is at its peak, the infant observes her,

and vice-versa (as in the example of Reddy and her son Rohan). Turn-taking marks a clear

difference for him between the apperceived kinesthesis of the gesture he observes and the

felt kinesthesis of the gesture he performs.

Vocalization deserves special consideration when we ask about infants who never

see a response: how do they become self-aware? If my thesis is correct, then these infants

must be able to experience being a focal center without benefit of vision, for example on

the basis of vocal sounds, handling and touch.22 Assuming this, suppose that the infant

vocalizes and that the mother, seeking to make contact, slots her imitations into his pauses.

22 Bigelow (1995) describes the protoconversation of a blind-born 6-week-old and his mother: "The mother was distressed at her baby's unresponsiveness and passivity…. I asked the mother to interact with her child in a way she especially enjoyed. After some hesitation, she took her baby in her arms and rolled gently back and forth on the bed talking softly to him as she repeatedly kissed him on one cheek and then the other. After a few minutes, I asked her to stop in mid-roll. She did, and the baby, who had been inactive during this procedure, slowly turned the other cheek. To the mother's delight, he showed anticipation of the coming kiss and knowledge of their intimate ritual."

22

If he feels focused on when she does so, then—as in the example of mutual smiling—we

may speak of a match: the carer's imitative vocalization singles out the fading kinesthesis of

the infant's, while activating the motor plan for his repeating it. I find support for this

statement in the results of a study by Fadiga et al. (2002) with normal adults: listening to

words or pseudo-words, when these require use of the tongue, induces an increase of

motor-evoked potentials recorded from the listener's tongue muscles.

The following additional points may now be made:

(1) When the kinesthesis comes to the infant's attention, the coming is experienced.

Kinesthesis has a comet's tail, pointing back to a time when it was given among other

sensations without attracting attention. (Illustrations from adulthood are easy to find:

watching the slack rope dancer, one finds oneself writhing and knows that one has been

writhing unwittingly for some time.) The carer's smile makes the infant aware of himself

not merely as smiling but as having been smiling. Therefore, her smile is perceived by him

ab initio as a response. He becomes present to himself as riding the crest of a past in which

he existed but was not aware of himself.

(2) Concerning the horizon of the future, Stern notes that a mother imitates with

variations (1985, pp. 106-07, 139, 193), working within the child's "zone of proximal

development" (Vygotsky 1978, p. 86). The infant perceives in her gesture what he has been

doing, but then, in her new and variant gesture, he perceives the variation, which arouses

the motor potential to match it. In this way the carer's gesture develops from a response to

an eliciting.

(3) If we apply Husserl's work on passive synthesis, we may suppose (using "me"

for "the infant") that my singled-out kinesthesis is a kind of prominence, and in attracting

23

my attention, it draws attention away from you (the carer). However, it cannot distract me

entirely, and not for long, because it is only by attending to you that I have access to

myself. I am, as it were, drawn away from you like the bowstring from the bow, but I must

snap back. When I do snap back, however, your gesture singles me out once again. An

oscillation is established, although I never lose sight of you.

(4) In the event as described, is the infant present to himself as a definite entity, a

being among beings? I have already mentioned one reason for an affirmative answer: he is

aware of himself as focused on. A second reason is this: because the matching system

establishes similarity between the carer's observed gesture and the performed, the latter is

experienced as the gesture of one who is similar in kind to the carer, and the carer is a

definite being.

The considerations of the present section hold promise, then, for solving the enigma

of self-awareness. We asked: "But how can I who perceive the tree be aware of myself

perceiving it? How can I who am aware be something of which I am aware (in addition to

the tree)?" At least in connection with one kind of object, a carer, we now have an answer:

My attention to the object makes me self-aware. It would remain to show that You-I events

found all relations with objects, as well as the later forms of self-awareness; these tasks lie

beyond the bounds of the present paper.

With regard to matching, I have reversed the usual direction of interpretation, which

proceeds from an assumed self-awareness as follows: I see you as being "like me."23 On a

You-I account, in contrast, I discover "me" to be an entity "like you." It is not the case,

23 Meltzoff has used "like me" frequently, including in two titles (in 2007, and with Brooks in 2001), but Gallagher & Meltzoff (1996) speak of "an innate system that does not necessarily give priority to body experience over and against the experience of the other."

24

then, that on the basis of kinesthesis, I first understand a smiling carer to be feeling what I

feel when I smile. It is rather the case that, given her smile, I first become present to myself

in what I am doing and feeling.

Initially the You-I event requires matching. Soon, however, the need for it drops

away. Recall that when the infant perceives the carer's response, it is not just his act that is

revealed to him—it is the self, her focal center in action. Henceforth, when her glance or

voice is directed at him, he can no longer appear to himself as a mere focal center: the focal

center was earlier revealed as having a body, and this will not be forgotten. Moreover, the

limits of the owned body expand as protoconversation continues. For example, the infant

knows (his) arms at first through kinesthesis, touch, and vision, yet there is nothing in these

sensations themselves to specify the arms for him as his own. But suppose that, while

smiling at him, the carer imitates him when he brings his hands together. The kinesthesis of

the moving arms now enters the same focal center as that to which the kinesthesis of

smiling belongs. Henceforth, if she smiles when he, unsmiling, brings his hands together,

her smile will be perceived as a response to him in his action. She relates as well to (his)

sensations and affects, including negative ones such as pain and anger, and they too enter

the ambit of ownness.24 Amid smiling at him, raising his arms, nibbling his toes, jiggling

him and talking motherese to him, the carer will be experienced as responding to more than

isolated acts; she will be experienced as responding to one who is an entity as she is,

subject to the good and ill that flesh is heir to.

24 When the carer wants to respond to a negative affect like anger or frustration while showing the infant that she does not share it, she need not deliberate how to do so; she does so quite naturally by playfully exaggerating its expression (Fonagy et al. 2002, Ch. 4).

25

6. Objections to the You-I account

Objection 1. There are more parsimonious explanations for self-awareness.

Reply: In the psychological literature there are simpler accounts of self-awareness, but these

ignore its enigma: "How can I who am aware be something of which I am aware (in

addition to the tree)?" For instance, some authors emphasize certain constants, such as the

perfect contingency between the kinesthesis of kicking and the visible moving legs, or the

constantly visible eye sockets bounding the field of vision. But these constants do not have

anything about them that specifies a perceiver to whom they belong. They "provide a good

reason why a subject of experience should have a very special regard for just one body,

why he should think of it as unique and perhaps more important than any other. …But they

do not explain why I should have the concept of myself at all, why I should ascribe my

thoughts and experiences to anything" (Strawson 1959, p. 93).

One account which does take up the difficult question is the following. In touching

himself, the infant becomes aware of himself simultaneously as subject (touching) and as

object (touched). But this claim fails the test of experience. When I touch a part of my

body, the result is a single sensation. Granted, when I touch my hand, the sensation has a

special quality compared with that of touching stone, wood, or another person. But if I am

not already self-aware, there is nothing in the sensation to specify a self that is touching

while being touched.25

25 "[T]he two hands are never simultaneously in the relationship of touched and touching to each other" (Merleau-Ponty 2005, p. 106).

26

The difficult question is also addressed in the account of J. J. Gibson (1986). To

review it here would take us too far afield. Let me just say that, as best I see, it only

answers that question in the case of an animal which is self-locomoting: Visual data specify

one who receives them (i.e., their perceiver) as being an entity in motion. They amount to

what Gibson calls "visual kinesthesis." But the perceiver is only specified as a body when

the visual kinesthesis is seamlessly accompanied by muscular kinesthesis—that is, when an

animal moves by its own power. This cannot be a salient account for humans, who are self-

aware before they crawl.26

Objection 2. For a fetus who is alone in the womb, no You-I event can occur, but there is

evidence that he is self-aware: As observed through ultrasound, many fetal movements of

the arms and hands seem goal-directed; from 18 weeks, the fetus reaches at different

velocities to respectively different places in the womb and shapes his hand to what he

encounters (Craighero et al. 2011; Sparling et al. 1999; Zoia et al. 2007). In seeking to

reach a goal, one must plan and execute the reach: this requires awareness of oneself as an

agent.

Reply. Barring exchanges not dreamt of in our current state of knowledge, I agree that a

26 Gibson might answer that from birth the infant can move his head and that therefore the following would apply: "[T]he world is revealed and concealed as the head moves, in ways that specify exactly how the head moves" (Gibson 1986, p. 118). But I do not see how the global shifts of the visual field during head motion, along with kinesthesis, can specify an entity that is perceiving them. They amount to shifts in sheer spectacle, but there is nothing in them to specify the infant as an entity existing among the entities in the spectacle. Once the infant is specified as an entity, then indeed the shifts will specify how his head moves. Further, the infant is not capable of smooth visual tracking before the age of 2 months (von Hofsten & Rosander 1997), when the You-I event has already been instituted.

27

You-I event cannot occur for a fetus alone in the womb.27 If nonetheless he can be shown to

be self-aware, then we shall need to find a different solution to the enigma. But do goal-

directed reaches require self-awareness? When we adults reach, we are usually self-aware,

and it is hard for us to conceive of goal-directed behavior that is not. Yet fetal reaches may

reflect an evolved connection between organism and environment, requiring no self-

awareness. "We all fit into the substructures of the environment in our various ways, for we

were all, in fact, formed by them. We were created by the world we live in" (Gibson 1986,

p. 130). A need to explore the environment may be biologically programmed. It is

conceivable that a fetus who is not self-aware, on encountering by chance something new,

repeats the movements recently made and learns, by further circular reactions, to adjust

them to the target.28

There is an additional argument against the objection. In order to be self-aware, the

fetus must encounter something that he knows to be other; the reverse holds as well:

something can appear as other to the fetus only if he is self-aware. Hence, selfhood and

otherness must first appear together: their differentiation is a condition for the appearance

of either (Bermúdez 1996; Gallagher 1996). Now, there is abundant evidence that fetuses of

a certain age react to stimuli which we observers know to be other than they, such as

sounds, a bright light focused on the mother's abdomen, tastes and smells (Rochat 2011). It

27 In the case of twins in utero, there is evidence of sensitivity to persons (Castiello et al. 2010). From the 14th week of gestation, the reaches of Twin A toward Twin B take longer, and decelerate over a longer period, than reaches toward the uterine wall or A's mouth. They take slightly longer, and decelerate over a slightly longer period, than reaches toward A's eye, the most sensitive part of A's body. Although no reciprocal exchanges are recorded, these findings demonstrate a prenatal "propensity to social action" (ibid.). They appear to support the assumption that the meaning "person" is fundamental. 28 Piaget (1963, pp. 147-149) holds that the infant's awareness of his action originates when he performs a complex act, such as getting food from a closed box, for he has to keep the main goal and direction in mind while performing the intermediate steps. I have offered a different account, but it is of interest that Piaget too did not concede that all goal-directed actions imply self-awareness.

28

is easy to make the mistake of attributing our knowledge to the fetus as well. Yet what basis

could he have for knowing the sound or light to be other? Just as proprioception by itself

does not provide an awareness of "one's own body as one's own" (Gallagher 1996), so the

sound, the light and the uterine wall do not contain marks that indicate a difference which

would enable the fetus to become self-aware. In the You-I event the problem of self and

other is solved. For a singleton in the womb there is nothing comparable.

The question remains as to when the You-I event first takes place. I have

emphasized the period of protoconversation, but it is possible that it occurs already upon

the initial fulfillment of the great new needs which arise at birth. We have seen that the

newborn prefers his mother's voice and face. In the first 3 postnatal days, maternal

vocalization during pauses in breastfeeding arouses vocalization from the infant, and the

voices then tend to overlap (Rosenthal 1982).29 From the research on neonatal imitation, we

know the strength of intermodal mapping in the oral area. In coinciding vocalizations, the

sight of the mother's moving lips and tongue, coupled with the sound of her voice (familiar

from the womb), could perhaps enable an approximate match. The voices do not alternate,

however, and we have seen that turn-taking is essential for differentiating self from other.30

If the event occurs so early, moreover, it may be ephemeral. In his initial 4 weeks,

the infant cannot maintain eye contact.31 Indeed, the only situation in which he does

29 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to Rosenthal (1982). 30 Likewise, the neonatal-imitation experiment has the ingredients required to trigger the You-I event—it even stresses them. We should note, however, that neonatal imitation does not noticeably occur in nature. (If it did, its discovery in 1972 would not have encountered almost universal skepticism.) As distinct from later imitation, the neonatal sort is likely an experimental byproduct of the matching system, which has a different and more important natural function, namely, the instituting of the You-I event. 31 Citing Trevarthen (1984), Lavelli & Poli (1998) write that "the capability to maintain visual contact starts to emerge between the fourth and the sixth week of life (although in most of cases this capability doesn't seem to appear before the sixth week)...." Between 4 and 6 weeks is the time when the social smile emerges. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing me to Lavelli & Poli.

29

maintain contact is in feeding, where he engages in a burst-pause pattern that is apparently

unique to humans. During a pause, the carer jiggles the baby or the bottle and the baby

resumes sucking. Thus is established a regularity of interaction which may be the prelude to

turn-taking (Kaye 1977). Could the jiggle single out the kinesthesis of sucking? Possibly,

roughly. Yet we must allow weight to the common observation that life's first month is

scarce on alert and sustained interaction with others, certainly when compared to the

"revolution" that occurs in the second (Rochat 2009, p. 69; Stern 1985, p. 69).

Objection 3. Some babies get no attention and yet become self-aware.

Reply. An infant who gets no attention does not survive. Concerning feral children: there is

no firm evidence about "a putative wild child's life either before or during the period of

isolation" (Saxe 2006). Where severely deprived or isolated children have been

rehabilitated, imitation by carers has played a crucial role (Hundeide 2007, p. 251; Hunt et

al. 1976).

If need be, infants will wait months for relationship. In studies of Romanian orphans

who were severely deprived of human contact (some were even fed with propped bottles),

Rutter et al. (2004) found that an infant can be neglected and nevertheless catch up

cognitively and socially, if he is adopted into a responsive family before having lived 6

months in the orphanage. Those who are not adopted in time may nonetheless get enough

response from each other to develop self-awareness.32

32 See Freud & Dann (1951) on 2-year-olds in and after a Nazi concentration camp.

30

7. Further questions

The results of infancy research and brain research have helped us raise a new

possibility for the genesis of human self-awareness. Yet basic questions remain. Attempts

to answer them would take us beyond the bounds of a single paper, but I shall briefly

indicate, for each, a direction in which we may look.

1. How can the infant remain self-aware when the You goes absent or attends to

something else, or when the infant attends to mere things, not persons?

When the carer goes absent, things remain behind which are associated with her.

From the age of 4 months, the infant can get effects from some of these things, just as he

got responses from her. By way of present things, the You-I event with the absent carer can

continue in a modified form.

2. How can continuity be maintained, given the fact that in the course of time, a

child encounters more than one potential You?

After becoming attached to a particular You, the infant wants the specific

relationship to continue without interruption from other potential You-I relations. The

ongoing unconditional relation with a beloved You, present or absent, affords him a

measure of independence from others, enabling him to condition each new relationship on

the stranger's behavior. The number of You-I relationships is therefore limited. Yet the

primary You becomes, consciously or unconsciously, the lifelong model of what a person

is.

31

3. How does the original You-I event of infancy develop into the solitary self-

awareness of the adult?

"At the end of infancy and in early childhood, children duplicate social roles:

behaving 'as if' they were mommy, acting from a mommy-like perspective, and expressing

mommy-like desires and beliefs, even if they are not the child’s own" (Meltzoff & Moore

1994). In particular, as the child acquires language, he becomes capable of taking the role

of the carer toward himself, especially by talking to himself, i.e., talking as if he were the

carer and listening as himself, or talking as if to the carer and listening as if he were she. As

a result, he no longer needs a flesh-and-blood You for self-awareness.33

Such "identification" brings about a major change in the structure of experience.

People and things lose much of their original importance because they are no longer

required to make one self-aware. Identification produces the "subject," containing a

chattering "inside," who relates to external "objects" without feeling an essential connection

to them. Life with others is now more secure but less interesting, less enchanting, and what

was once a law of life becomes a moral commandment (Waldenfels, above). Beneath the

inner chatter, consequently, there persists a longing for the banished You. The longing is

accompanied by dread, because fulfillment would entail surrender of control. After

identification, then, the pure You-I event occurs rarely, while longing for the banished You

achieves alternative expression in cultural forms.

Acknowledgments

33 See Note 3 above.

32

My gratitude to Nancy Mangum McCaslin for her keen and unflagging eye. Likewise to

Daniel Price and the two anonymous reviewers for their many productive criticisms and

suggestions.

33

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