What is Husserl's First Philosophy 1982

8/13/2019 What is Husserl's First Philosophy 1982

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/what-is-husserls-first-philosophy-1982 1/12

International Phenomenological Society

What is Husserl's First Philosophy?Author(s): Jeffner AllenSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Jun., 1982), pp. 610-620Published by: International Phenomenological Society

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107381 .

Accessed: 18/10/2013 07:16

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.195.110.10 on Fri, 18 Oct 2013 07:16:27 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107381?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107381?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips



DISCUSSION

WHAT IS HUSSERL'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY?

The first article on Edmund Husserl's First Philosophy(1923/24), volume I, Critical History of Ideas, states,

Husserl'sphenomenology as entered periodofnewactivity . . thecriticalhistoryf deas is tobe recommendedn that t refers nedirectlyto the systematic undamentalproblemsof phenomenology. n thefuture,no one can treatthehistoryfthought hilosophicallywithoutentering into it.'

The summary of First Philosophy, volume I, compiled by LudwigLandgrebe, makes briefreference to the necessityof a historical in-troduction to phenomenology as firstphilosophy (FPI, p. 298).2

To inquire into thesense and significance ofsuch comments,weask: What is Husserl's firstphilosophy?To arrive at an exegetic andanalytic response to thisquestion, we propose an examination of thefollowing topics:

I. Phenomenology as First Philosophy

II. First Philosophyas a

Critical Historyof Ideas

III. Critical Reflections on the Necessity of First PhilosophyThroughout the examination we suggest that the unique sense andsignificanceofFirstPhilosophy, volume I, lies entirely n the issue ofwhetherand how it accomplishes something which could not be ac-complished otherwise. While thiscriterion s difficult o determine, itis only from its quite rigorous standpoint that the specificcharacteristicofHusserl's first hilosophy can come to light and thatthe introductoryremarks, cited above, can be justified.3

'Dieter Henrich, Uber die Grundlagenvon HusserlsKritikder Philosoph-ischenTradition, PhilosophischeRundschau, vol. VI (1958), pp. 1, 26.

2Husserl,FirstPhilosophy1923/24), Part I: CriticalHistory f Ideas, trans.Jeffner llen The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, orthcoming). eferences o this extwill be abbreviatedFPI, followedby theGerman pagination.

3Husserl's irstPhilosophy, olumeI, is the edited and completedtextof thecourse which Husserl gave under that title,winter emester1923-1924, at theUniversityfFreibourg-im-Breisgau.he originalmanuscript,writtennHusserl'sshorthand, s washiscustom,wasexpandedeitherustprior o thebeginning fthe

course,winter 923,or

slightlyater, during he winter f that ame year.The first

lecturetook place November2, 1923, and the last lectureof FirstPhilosophy,volume , wasgivenDecember18, 1923. The firstyped ranscription asmade, atHusserl's request, by his assistant, Ludwig Landgrebe, during the winter

610







WHAT Is HUSSERL's FIRST PHILOSOPHY? 611

I. Phenomenologys FirstPhilosophy

The term first hilosophywas introduced y Aristotle utfellinto disuse when replaced, in the post-Aristotelian eriod, bymetaphysics, wordwhich ame intousebychance.Husserl dopts

the term first hilosophy, maintaining hat its literal sensemayserve s an indication f the theoretical urposeof thenewdisciplineofphenomenology.

The literal ense of first hilosophyeems, nitially, o be self-evident. t is that philosophywhich, mongthe variousphilosophies

which omprise hilosophys a whole, spreciselyhefirst. he waysin which uch a discipline s first lso seemto be clear enough:1. Firstphilosophy s first or ntrinsic easons. It is firstn

value and dignity.All other ciences, ncludingmetaphysicsitself, presuppose it and, accordingly, are secondphilosophies. he primacy f thenew discipline s not positedat randombut,Husserlmaintains,s based on an orderwhichthesciencesbear in themselves.

2. First hilosophys first ecause it sguided by theteleologi-cal idea ofscience.The sciences re createdby purposefulc-tivity;hetruths f the ciences tandunderguiding deas. Allsciencesare subordinate o first hilosophy,which s guidedby the supreme eleological dea of science tself.The teleo-logical idea indicates n all inclusive nity or hesciences,unitywhichexpands endlessly nd strives orward n everhigherforms.This is Husserl'spreferredway of explainingtheprimacy fphenomenology.

3. First hilosophys first s a scientificiscipline fthebegin-ning. n itself, irst hilosophys thebeginning fphilosophyas such. It isa self-containediscipline,with tsownproblems

1923-1924. A second transcription listed at the Husserl Archives underMT3/F34Ia) containsnumerouscorrections nd notationsmade by Husserl,butnoneof them eemstobe laterthan1928. The textpublishedby RudolfBoehmisin accord withtheoriginalmanuscript, aking nto account the latercorrectionsand notations.Part II of FirstPhilosophy 1923/1924) is entitledTheoryof thePhenomenologicalReduction and forms olumeVIII oftheHusserlianaseries. n-

formationoncerning hecomposition f the text sgiven n the Introduction y

RudolfBoehm,ErstePhilosophie 1923/24), Erster eil: Kritischedeengeschichte(Husserliana,vol. VII), ed. Rudolf Boehm (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 956),pp. xi-xxxiv, nd in the Avant-proposdu traducteur, by Arion L. Kelkel, inHusserl,PhilosophiePremiere 1923/1924), deuxiemepartie: Thgoriede la reduc-tionphenomenologique,trans.Arion L. Kelkel (Paris: PressesUniversitaires eFrance, 1972), pp. vii-xlvi.







612 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

concerning the beginning of philosophy. All other sciences

are preceded by phenomenology as firstphilosophy, whichfounds them with respect to theirmethod and theory. Thebeginner of firstphilosophy does research into the origins ofthought: beginnersofsecond philosophies reproduce, in theirown insightful hinking,the truthspreviouslythoughtbyfirstphilosophers.

In sum, the ways in which the new discipline is first formvariants on the same foundational theme: there is an intrinsicorderto all philosophies, for all philosophies are guided by a teleological

idea of philosophyitself.Yet, thisfoundation for the primacy of firstphilosophy is, in itself, not clear at all.

The task of first philosophy is to fulfill the idea of firstphilosophyand, in doing so, to lead us to be beginningphilosophers.It encompasses a theory of rational life, a theoryof theoretical, ax-iological, and practical reason. In that its task has not been fulfilledby any philosophical systems,past or present, it is a matter ofnothing less than a reformofphilosophy as a whole and, included in

that, a universal reformof all sciences as such (FPI, p. 17). Thetheoretical purpose of the new discipline of phenomenology isradical, going to the roots of all philosophy. However, insofaras thepurpose of firstphilosophy is indicated by its literal sense, whichitself,rests on an unclear foundation, its task is not immediately self-evident.

Unclear notions of intrinsic order and teleology appear toobscure, at least initially, the theme of phenomenology as firstphilosophy.Nevertheless, t s, perhaps, bymeans of theirclarification

that firstphilosophycomes to accomplish somethingwhich could notbe accomplished otherwise. We will begin such a clarification bysituating Husserl's firstphilosophy in its proper context.

II. First Philosophy as a Critical Historyof Ideas... in these onsiderationst s a matter fnothingess thanuncoveringthe unityof motivationgoing throughthe centuries and which, asdevelopmentaldrive,has lived n all philosophynsofar s it wantedtobecome truephilosophy, nd in all philosophicalmethod nsofar s it

wanted to become truemethod. (FPI, pp. 141, 142)The unityofmotivation may be understood as a systemof ex-

perience.4 The unified system s constitutedby the interrelationbe-

4Husserl, deas: General ntroduction o Pure Phenomenology, rans. W. R.Boyce Gibson New York: Macmillan, 1931), p. 134.







WHAT Is HUSSERL'SFIRST PHILOSOPHY? 613

tweenobjects ndicating nd objects ndicated n actual experience,in actual experiencewhichrefers eyond tself o possible xperience,and in possible xperiencewhichpoints onewpossible xperiences,ad. inf. History,the history f ideas in general, and particularmomentsnthehistoryf deas maycomprise uch objects.The unityof motivationriseswhen certain bjectsorstates f affairs fwhosereality omeone has actual knowledge ndicate to him the reality fcertain ther bjectsorstatesof affairs,n the sensethathisbelief nthereality ftheone is experienced thoughnot at all evidently)smotivating belief r surmise n thereality ftheother.5 The con-

tents f suchsystemsfexperiencemayconcern hings lreadyknownor wholly nknownndstillundiscovered. he relation etween hesestates faffairss notarbitraryut, rather, s guided by the contentwhich the object posited alwaysalready ncludeswithin tself.Withrespectto the formof the motivation unning hroughout istory,Husserlwrites,

We call it furthermore a formal regularity pertaining to a universalgenesis, which s such that past,present, nd future, ecomeunitarilyconstituted over and over again.... But, within this form, life goes on

as a motivatedcourse of particularconstituted erformanceswith amultiplicityfparticularmotivations nd motivationalystems, hich,according to universal laws of genesis, produce a unity of universalgenesisoftheego. The ego constitutestself or tselfn,so tospeak,theunity f a 'history.'6

The formal egularityn the motivation unning etween bjects n-dicating and objects indicated formsa descriptiveunity which,though ften overedbythe sediment f prejudices nd presupposi-tions,underliesour various researches. ndeed, Husserlclaims, it

forms n essential ype, or essential onfigurations, ' hich arepresent n history nd whichcan be uncoveredonly nsofar s wefollow strictmethodological rocedure.At thispoint here rises, obe sure,an essential uestionto whichwewillreturn: s the unity fmotivation, onstituted yreflectingubjectivity,obe equated withtheteleological dea which s said toguide first hilosophy?

If, however,weproceedto an examination f thetype f methodappropriatefor investigationf the unityof motivation unningthroughout he centuries, we findourselves onfrontedwith the

5Husserl,Logical Investigations, rans.J. N. Findlay London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 270.

6Husserl,CartesianMeditations:An Introduction o Phenomenology, rans.Dorion Cairns The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 960), p. 75.

7Husserl, deas, p. 135.








issue: How is the unity of motivation disclosed? and, related in-

separably to that, What is the unity of motivation disclosed?Here it is clear that the proper context of Husserl's FirstPhilosophy, volume I, is neither that of an empiricism, for whichhistorywould be an accumulation of objective facts which occur incause-effect sequence, nor that of an idealism, for which historywould be the accomplishment of a world-spirit.The appropriate con-text for Husserl's firstphilosophy is, rather, that of eidetic history,thehistory fideas and, even more significantly, hehistory f the ex-emplary moments, the crucial paradigmatic moments, which form

turning points in the development of philosophical thought. Since itis an eidetic history, ndividual philosophers are presented insofar astheir thought contributes to the essential typologyof philosophicalconsciousness. Husserl's project is also that of a critical history,namely, one that endeavors to break through customaryassumptionsabout the history f ideas in order to discover its fundamental prob-lems and the relation between them, as seen from the perspective ofthe present-day philosopher. Husserl's eidetic and critical historyclaims to be an account of the meaning of so-called objectivehistorical facts and a rendering, as is often insufficiently stablishedby idealist accounts of history, of the foundations of history n in-dividual subjects. Eidetic and critical history s accomplished by aspecific methodological approach to history: he historical reduction.

The term historical reduction was introduced by RudolfBoehm as a distinctiveway into phenomenology, as having a subjectmatter and approach other than that of the generally acknowledgedthree ways to the transcendental phenomenological reduction: the

Cartesian way, the path of intentional psychology,the critique of thepositive sciences and ontology. It has been used subsequently bynumerous philosophers to designate the particular procedure used byHusserl to investigate the meaning of history.8 n the most generalterms, the historical reduction involves (1) a setting aside ofcustomaryaccounts of objective factsofhistory, 2) description,fromthe viewpointof the present-day philosopher, of the idea-content ofmajor turning points in history,and (3) reduction of the historyof

8RudolfBoehm, La Phenomenologiede i'histoire,Revue international dephilosophic,vol. LXXI (1965), pp. 55-73; David Carr, Phenomenology nd theProblemofHistoryEvanston:Northwesternniversityress, 1974), pp. 110-33;ArionL. Kelkel, Avant-propos u traducteur, n Husserl,PhilosophiePremiere(1923-24) deuxiemepartie: Thgoriede la reduction henomenologique,pp. xxiv.







WHAT Is HUSSERL'sFIRSTPHILOSOPHY? 615

ideas to the fundamental nterconnectionsetween ts mostsignifi-

cant moments, ogetherwith disclosure f the unityof motivationwhich has lived n all philosophynsofar s it has wantedto becometrue philosophy.... Accordingly, he historicalreduction s aspecificmethodology eveloped to accomplisha specifictask: theunderstandingfhistoryrom hepointof viewof a criticalhistoryfideas. Description f the basic stagesof thehistorical eductionwillprecedecriticalreflectionsn it.

If we turnto the initialstep of thehistorical eductionwe findthat,by a retrospectivelance Rickblick]at thehistorical radition,

it s possible o disengage he meaningofhistory rom tsnaiveobjec-tivefacticity. uch meaning,which is at firsthidden from tself,becomes visiblewhenwe place ourselves n themotivation f thebeginning,nthehistoricalmotivation hichdeterminedheSocraticand Platonicreaction tothescepticism ftheSophists] nd therebydetermined hedevelopmentf the dea of a philosophy aving newsense,and of a methodologywhich was usefulfor t (FPI, p. 32.)Thus, the senseof historys disengagedfromhistorical actwhenwe

place ourselveswithin he beginning, hat s, when we look back atthepast by relivingt, albeit from henecessarynd inevitable tand-pointof thepresent.

Yet, one may ask, why s theretrospectivelance necessarilyndinevitably ooted n the present?Why does Husserlproposean over-comingof thepastas ithasbeen viewed ustomarilybythemodern-dayphilosopher) y wayofa reliving f thepast as itemergesn thepresent situatednessof the contemporary hilosopher)?Any ap-proach to history s an objectivecollectionof factswould consider

Husserl's roposala violation f thehistoricityf historytself.Or, inotherwords,how are we to understandHusserl's tatement,madewithreference oKant, that to take overhis Kant's] ystems it s orto improve tsdetails,this s not what snecessarybove all else,butrather,to understand he ultimate enseof his revolution and tounderstandhimbetter hanhe himself, hetrailblazer, ut not theperfecter, as capable ofdoing FPI, p. 286).9 Here the parentheticremarks peak forthemselves,orthey ndicate the oftenunnoticedand yet nescapable positionalityfanyapproachtohistory. here isno nonpositional oint a pointwhichwould, in principle,have to

9Husserl, Kant and the Idea of TranscendentalPhilosophy, rans.Ted E.Klein and William E. Pohl, SouthwesternJournalfPhilosophy, ol. V (1974), p.55. This articlealso forms supplementaryext to FirstPhilosophy,Part I.








be outside historyfrom which to view history.To understand that

everyviewing of history s positional is to begin to see history riticallyand eidetically.Suspension of the natural, objectivisticattitude toward history,

and establishment of one's positionality s a viewer of history, nablesthe philosopher to undertake a description of the idea-content ofthose turning pointscentral to thehistory f thought.Salient featuresof Husserl's account include the fact that (1) each of the turningpoints is comprised by a juncture of theoretical, axiological, andpractical reason, i.e., by a transformation nd renewal of the life of

reason as a whole, and (2) each of the major paradigms evidences afundamental shift in the preliminary forms of intentionality,perhaps the major concept of phenomenologyingeneral and certainlythe major concept of Husserl's work. More specifically, and withrespect to those philosopherswhom Husserl finds to stand out aboveall others:

1. Socrates is viewed as a reformer f ethical life, of a life ofpurereason, that is, a life n whichman, in untiring elf-reflectionand radical justification, submits himself to a critique- anultimately evaluative critique-of the goals of his life andthen, of course, by means of this, to a critique of thewayshelives his life and the specificmeans he uses (FPI, p. 9).

2. Plato is seen as extending the Socratic principle of radicaljustification,both as creator of theproblem ofphilosopyandthe science of method, namely, the method of systematicallyactualizing the supreme teleological idea of 'philosophy,'which is inherent in the essence of cognition itself, and as

founder of the doctrine of social reason, of a trulyrationalhuman community,a theme which determines the essentialcharacter and destiny of the development of Europeanculture (FPI, pp. 13, 17). Moreover, with Plato, genuinecognition, genuine truth (valid in itself, determinant onceand for all) and being in the true and genuine sense (as theidentical substrateof truthswhich are determinantonce andfor all), become essential correlates (FPI, p. 13).

3. Aristotle s examined as givingthefirst ketch of the science of

subjectivity,namely, as a psychology.4. The Sophists are considered as those thinkersforwhom the

naive pregivenness of the world became problematic and,along with that, the world itselfwith respect to the fun-damental possibilityof therebeing knowledge of it and with







WHAT Is HUSSERL's FIRST PHILOSOPHY? 617

regardto the principal ense ofits being n itself.With Pro-

tagoras and Gorgias, subjectivity irst ppears as that inwhichor throughwhich all conceivableobjects receiveforaconscious ubjecttheir ontent nd sense FPI, p. 60).

5. Descartes is understoodas having discoveredthat whichthroughout ntiquity emained mperceptible, ven thoughlack of it alwaysmade itself elt n someway:the absolutelynecessarybeginningof philosophy n the ego cogito. Byestablishinghe ego as theArchimedeanpointupon whichgenuinephilosophymaybe founded,he givesriseto an en-

tirely ewturn n the historyfphilosophyFPI, p. 62).6. With Hume,Husserlfinds he firstttempt t a scienceofthe

puregivens fconsciousness,n attempt t a pure egology,fonlyHume had not posed the I as a pure fiction. n fact,Husserlwrites hatHume's Treatise s the first ketchof apure phenomenology,hough n the formof a purely en-sualistic nd empiricalphenomenologyFPI, p. 157).

7. In Kant's work, Husserl maintains,philosophybegins to

move, albeit naively, within the frameworkof thephenomenological ttitude.With Kant there s realized aturnpredelineatedntheessential enseofphilosophytselfnits developmentfrom the natural to the transcendentalmethodof cognition,fromthe positiveor dogmaticto thetranscendental ognition nd scienceof the world. Or, asHusserlwrites, at last,thephilosophical evolutionncipientin the historicallymergingphilosophy f themodernagebecame fact. With its appearance there was revealed to

philosophy itself the methodological form essentiallynecessary o it as scientificallyruephilosophy,hat s to say,thegenuineteleological dea which all further evelopmentsmust trive o realize n consciously urposefulctivity FPI,pp. 285, 286).1

Description f the idea-content f themajor turning oints nthehistoryfthought, ymeans ofan eidetic nd critical eflectionon thehistoryfphilosophy,ontainswithin tself needfor hethirdstageofthe historical eduction:reduction f the historyfideas tothebasicrelationshipsetween tsmost ignificant oments,ogetherwith disclosure of the unity of motivationwhich pervades itthroughouttsdevelopment.ndeed, the third tageof thereduction

'0Ibid.








has, in part, already been accomplished: we have seen how such rela-

tionships and the unityof motivation are disclosed, but we have notdeterminedwhat, precisely, s theunityofmotivationthat sdisclosed.We have viewed its specific content with respect to particularmoments in the history of philosophy. We have not establishedwhether and how it is related to our earlier analysis ofmotivation, tothe teleological idea ofphilosophy,to the idea offirst hilosophy.Ac-cordingly,we must expand and deepen our descriptiveapproach toHusserl's historical reduction by a critical reflectionon the unity ofmotivation which it both discloses and presupposes.

III. Critical Reflections on the Necessity of First Philosophy

To the extent that the unity of motivation is disclosed by thehistorical reduction, FirstPhilosophy, volume I, may have a necessityof its own. In contrast, to the extent that the unityof motivation ispresupposed by the historicalreduction, FirstPhilosophy, volume I,may in some way not be necessary at all. Or, as Husserl writes inIdeas, volume I,

. .. theconcept ofmotivation ndergoeson essentialgroundsvariouschanges,but theequivocations hatarise therefromre notdangerous,and evenappear to be necessary,s soon as thephenomenological tatesof affairs re clearedup.11

We will examine thisstate of affairsby inquiring further nto what istheunityof motivationand, at the same time, bycontinuingthethirdstage of the historical reduction. More precisely,we will consider themotivational unity 1) as a regulativeprinciple for the unity of think-ing and willing, as exhibited in the ideal of a rational humanity, and(2) with reference to the historical reduction and to Husserl's for-mulation of the Cartesian reduction.

In one sense, the unity running throughouthistorymay be seenas a regulative principle determinant for the relation betweenthought and will, philosophyand human culture, thehistory f ideasand thehistory f deeds. It brings togetherthe idea ofphilosophyas auniversal science which provides the foundation for all knowledgeand thephilosopher'swillto attainclarity oncerningsuch a rigorously

founded science. It unifies the autonomy which arises with the sub-ject's self-understandingand self-criticism nd the freedom whichemerges with the subject's self-responsibility. andgrebe writes,

11Husserl,deas, p. 134-35. Slightalterationshavebeenmade in theEnglishtranslation.







WHAT Is HUSSERL'sFIRST PHILOSOPHY? 619

It [Husserl'shistorical-teleologicalstablishing f phenomenology]s ...a regulative principledeterminativeor man's activitynd behavior... This teleologyfhistorys discovered nlywhen t stakenup by thewill of the one who reflects nd who thereby akesupon himself hisdatumwhich erves o establishhis own existence .. it thisteleology)sa task posed to the beginningphilosopher by his own history ndgrasped in resolve. 12

As such, the unity fmotivations disclosed as a principlefor therenewalof the ifeof reason, theoretical, xiological, and practical,that s, as a principle orthe development f a rationalhumanity.

In another ense, heunity fmotivations somewhat mbiguous

inmeaning.Fromthe perspectivefthehistorical eduction, tformsthe beginning f all philosophynd it founds henomenology.n thehistorical eduction he naive and anonymous ccomplishment f theunity ecomesa theme n its ownright. ts identitys seen as alwaysalreadyposited n itshiddenbeginningsnd elaboratedprogressivelyin the historical rocess, .e., as the supreme eleological dea whichguides the history f ideas. Recovery f the unityof motivationsunderstood s leadingtothenecessityf a newabsolutebeginning fphilosophyntranscendentalubjectivity.romthestandpoint f theCartesian reduction, t is transcendentalubjectivity hichfoundsphilosophy bsolutely nd, moreover, t is the ego cogito thatcon-stitutesthe sense of history, ifting t out above the play ofphilosophical ystems FPI, p. 286).13 Accordingto Husserl'sfor-mulation of the Cartesian reduction,the unityof motivation er-vadingthe history f deas appearsas a presupposition hichmustbefounded new,albeit n terms f thesystemf motivated xperience,whichwediscussed n Section I. Of course,one might ay thatboth

forms of the reductionare necessaryand complementary, achleadingintophenomenologyn itown way.The historical eductionsimply shows us the teleological idea which philosophy,untilphenomenology, as unabletorealizefully, utwhich an be realizedanew by the beginningphilosopherwho carriesout the Cartesianreduction.However, nemight lso say thatbeginnings nd absolutebeginnings re differentnkind,such that the historical eductionsunnecessary,for in that it does not offerabsolutely groundedknowledge, t cannotgenuinely oundphenomenology.

In sum, the ways n whichFirstPhilosophy, olume , is and is

12Ludwig Landgrebe, Husserl's Departure fromCartesianism, n R. 0.Elveton, The Phenomenologyof Husserl: Selected CriticalReadings (Chicago:Quadrangle Books), pp. 284, 285.

13Husserl,Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy, p. 55.








not necessary,correspond to the equivocal meanings of the concept ofmotivation. First philosophy is necessary to the extent that it ac-complisheswhat could not be accomplished otherwise, that is, insofaras it discloses, rather than presupposes, various meanings of the con-cept of motivation. For instance, firstphilosophy is indispensable inthat it discloses the unity of motivation as a regulative principleleading to the ideal of a rational humanity. It is indispensable in thatit delineates a way into the method and contentof the philosophicaltasksof the presentage, bringingthem to light in a way which is notdone by any other approach to philosophy. As such, it marks the

beginning of a period of new activityfor Husserl's work, leading,eventually, to his concern with history nd the teleologyof reason inThe Crisis of European Sciences and TranscendentalPhenomenology. It also refers us to the fundamental problems ofphenomenology, for in the tension between the several senses of theconcept of motivation it clarifies and keeps open, in particular, anongoing problematic concerningwhat it means to be first, what isthe relation between historicityand apodicticity, and what is thescope and significance of presuppositionless philosophy. Further-more, FirstPhilosophy, volume I, is necessaryforanyone who wantsto treatthe history f thought philosophically, for t initiatesand car-ries out an eidetic and critical, that is, a phenomenological, view ofthe history f ideas. Most significantly, irstPhilosophy,volume I, isnecessary as firstphilosophy, as a science of the originarysources ofphilosophy,for t attemptsto lead the truthof the unityof motivationto its deeper and deepest epistemological grounding. The unity ofmotivation, whose sense it elucidates, serves as both the primal in-

stitutionand the final institutionof firstphilosophy itself.In response to the question What is Husserl's firstphilosophy?we propose thatFirstPhilosophy, volume I, presentstheongoing taskof going to the roots of thought, of reflectingon and therebycon-stitutingthe unityof motivation pervading history nd, at the sametime, of carryingon such reflectionswithinthegivennessof the unityof motivation that is always already constituted. In that its aim is thereactivationof the older and oldest motivesof thinking nd the shap-ing of completely new ones (FPI, p. 287),14 it proposes nothing less

than an unending reform of all philosophy.JEFFNER ALLEN.

DEPAUL UNIVERSITY.

14Ibid., p. 56.

What is Husserl's First Philosophy 1982

Documents

Transcript of What is Husserl's First Philosophy 1982