Attributes of a good Leveraged Buyout “LBO” Target Company...
Transcript of Attributes of a good Leveraged Buyout “LBO” Target Company...
Copyright UCT
Attributes of a good Leveraged Buyout “LBO” Target Company: The South African Private
Equity’s Perspective
A Thesis
presented to
The Graduate School of Business
University of Cape Town
in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the
Masters of Business Administration Degree
by
Manabane Rachidi
December 2010
Supervisor: Prof Francois Toerien
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 2
Acknowledgements
This thesis is not confidential. It may be used freely by the Graduate School of Business.
I wish to thank Prof Francois Toerien the head of Finance Section at the School of management
studies (UCT) firstly for agreeing to help and to supervise this study. Secondly for his valuable
input and never failing to draw my attention to shortcoming areas of this report. Lastly his ever
evident enthusiasm for the topic and I do so hope I have done his faith justice.
To all the private equity professionals that afforded time for my interviews and for all their value
adding insight. I do so hope this research makes a meaningful contribution to your work and
industry as a whole.
I certify that except as noted above the thesis is my own work and all references used are accurately
reported.
Signed:
Manabane Rachidi
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 3
Attributes of a „good‟ Leveraged Buyout “LBO” Target Company: The South African
Private Equity‟s Perspective
ABSTRACT
The aim of this research is to determine and analyse the important attributes of what the South
African Private Equity Industry considers to be the make-up of „good‟ “Leveraged Buyout (LBO)”
target-company. The report identifies LBO motivations from prior studies, conducted mainly in
other markets which may have relevance to the local industry. As a way of carrying out the study,
perspectives from the private equity industry using semi structured interviews were captured, and to
a limited degree contrasted against the industry lenders‟ views. The purpose of the research was not
to prove causality, but rather to determine and highlight the South African industry‟s consensus
regarding important attributes considerable for an LBO target company.
The research study finds that in order of priority strong and partner-able management, steady and
predictable cash flow, viable exit strategy and strong market position is the make-up of the ranking.
Therefore in order of significance this ranking describes the valued attributes about or of an entity
that is suitable for an LBO type investment. In contrast the feedback from the lenders indicated that
priority is towards cash flows and/or the cash flow generative capability of an LBO target company.
Lastly the lenders also indicated that, reputation (therefore track record in the industry) of the
private equity firm is a factor in the debt funding decision of an LBO transaction. The above
findings are to a large extent consistent with the available literature.
KEYWORDS:
Leverage Buyout (LBO), Leverage, Gearing, Cash Flows, Target Company,
Private Equity, Returns
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 4
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................................................ 2
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................................................ 6
1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................7
1.1 RESEARCH AREA AND PROBLEM ............................................................................................... 7
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCOPE .......................................................................................... 11
1.3 RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS AND ETHICS ................................................................................... 12
2 LITERARTURE REVIEW ....................................................................... 14
2.1 DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................................ 14
2.2 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 19
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .............................................................. 21
3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH AND STRATEGY .................................................................................... 21
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS ................... 22
3.3 SAMPLING ............................................................................................................................... 24
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS METHODS ...................................................................................................... 26
4 RESEARCH FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ..................... 28
4.1 RESEARCH FINDINGS .............................................................................................................. 28
4.1.1 DEMOGRAPHICS OF RESPONDENTS ....................................................................................................................... 28
4.2 RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION .................................................................................. 32
4.2.1 STRONG AND PARTNER-ABLE MANAGEMENT ...................................................................................................... 32
4.2.2 STEADY AND PREDICTABLE CASH FLOW .............................................................................................................. 37
4.2.3 VIABLE EXIT STRATEGY ...................................................................................................................................... 40
4.2.4 STRONG MARKET POSITION ................................................................................................................................. 42
4.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS ......................................................................................................... 49
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 5
5 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS .................................................................. 50
6 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS ..................................................... 54
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 55
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................... 60
APPENDIX 1 - PROCESS OF THE LBO STRUCTURE ............................................................................... 60
APPENDIX 2 – COVER EMAIL .............................................................................................................. 63
APPENDIX 3 – NON DISCLOSURE ........................................................................................................ 64
APPENDIX 5 – SA TOTAL FUNDS UNDER MANAGEMENT PER CATEGORIES ......................................... 67
APPENDIX 6 – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS - PE ........................................................................................ 68
APPENDIX 7 – STEP BY STEP PROCESS OF THE DATA ENGINEERING...................................................... 71
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 6
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 : Size of International Private Equity Markets (USD bn) Relative to GDP ....................... 8
Figure 2 : Broad Sense and Narrow Sense Private Equity Definitions .......................................... 9
Figure 3 : Participants of the LBO Transaction .......................................................................... 9
Figure 4 : Structure of a Typical Private Equity Fund .............................................................. 15
Figure 5 : Break down of respondents between captive and independent funds ........................... 28
Figure 6 : The respondents / Interviewees, their titles and years of private equity experience ....... 29
Figure 7 : Important Attributes of 'Good' LBO target ............................................................... 30
Figure 8 : Breakdown of important LBO target attributes between captives and Independents ...... 31
Figure 9 : Proportions of ranking for 'Good' Management Attribute .......................................... 32
Figure 10 : Frequency of management change ........................................................................ 36
Figure 11 : Proportions of ranking for C/F .............................................................................. 38
Figure 12 : Proportions of ranking for Exit ............................................................................. 40
Figure 13 : Proportions of ranking ......................................................................................... 42
Figure 14 :Least Important Ranked ........................................................................................ 45
Figure 15 : Lender's View ..................................................................................................... 47
Figure 16 : Does PE reputation matter? .................................................................................. 48
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 7
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Area and problem
This research is based within the parameters of the South African private equity industry and more
specifically the leverage buyout (LBO) investment type transaction structure. Within these
boundaries the study focuses on the target company of a private equity firm, wherein the LBO
investment structure is being considered. Therefore this study is positioned at the due diligence
phase of the LBO transaction process, and the primary focus is the attributes of the target company.
In setting out the research and problem area(s), as well as the relevance and/or importance thereof,
this section will begin by outlining the macroeconomic contribution of the private equity industry
as a whole. Secondly a detailed description of the private equity model will follow, as well as the
main private equity investment structure, the LBO. From hence the section will close by outlining
an appropriate and or ideal target company via its attributes, by that formulating the findings of this
study.
Macroeconomic Impact of Private Equity
According to the DBSA‟s survey, over the three year period from 2005/6 to 2008/9 private equity
backed companies in South Africa have achieved an annual world-wide employment growth rate of
9%, (this versus the 4% recorded by JSE listed businesses) (DBSA, 2009). In addition the study
found that pre-tax profit of private equity backed companies increased by 16% per annum versus
14% for JSE businesses. This provides proof of how private equity impacts on social and the
broader local economy. Therefore the industry (private equity industry) adds value beyond just the
cash effect to develop portfolio business wherein invested. “Private equity investments have
considerable impacts in terms of productivity, skills development and job creation, as it includes the
transfer and exchange of know-how and not only the flow of capital” (SAVCA, 2009). Hence
hereby is justification, on a broader macroeconomic level, why private equity and its related
transaction structures such as the LBO deserve the attention of this and many other research studies.
In addition relative to other industries the size and growth of the local South African industry
provides another reason for the deserving attention. Contrary to the previous decade, when the vast
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 8
majority of funds, over 77% were focused on North America, in 2009 the proportion had come
down to 37% (SAVCA, 2009). This is evidence that the market share of the rest of the world
including South Africa is growing at a rapid pace. In terms of total funds under management
relative to GDP, South Africa‟s private equity industry at 3.0% is below USA but higher than the
global average of 2.7%, and higher than the European average of 2.6% as illustrated in the figure
below (SAVCA, 2009).
Figure 1 : Size of International Private Equity Markets (USD bn) Relative to GDP
What is Private Equity?
“The term „private equity‟ refers to shareholders capital invested in private companies, as
distinguished from publicly listed companies” (SAVCA, 2009). Generally private equity financing
will assist an enterprise from increasing its working capital base during expansionary times,
developing new technologies or products to grow and remain competitive, making acquisitions of
other businesses and more commonly to buying out certain shareholders to restructure the
ownership and management of businesses (SAVCA, 2009). Private equity is also known as the
buyout fund on the basis that it makes acquisitions of companies with substantial portion of
borrowed funds, the leveraged buyout “LBO” transaction.
However there are many forms of private equity. Ogden (2002) referred to a broad sense and
narrow sense private equity definition as illustrated in the figure below.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 9
Venture Capital Development Capital Transmission Capital
R&D
Start-Up
Growth Capital
Buyout
Mezzanine/ BridgePrivate Equity(Broad Sense)
Private Equity(Narrow Sense)
Exit
Turnaround Investments
Figure 2 : Broad Sense and Narrow Sense Private Equity Definitions
On the other hand Pratt (1981) provides another definition that categorizes the types of private
equity activities in terms of elaborate stages of corporate development from seed funding to LBO
and/or managements buy out(s) (MBO).
The Leverage Buyout Transaction
The LBO structure, as depicted below, involves three main parties, the private equity firm, the
lender and the focus for this study, the target company.
Figure 3 : Participants of the LBO Transaction
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 10
An LBO is the purchase of a company using significant debt, whereby the target company‟s cash
flows are used to support the loan repayments. Management participation is integral to the
alignment of incentives in the equity of the new company, usually a combination of personal cash
investment and stock option compensation (Blaydon & Wainwright, 2006).
LBOs are according to Opler & Titman (1993), motivated by one of the following categories:
1. Incentive realignment, i.e. gains from operating improvements resulting from realignment
of management and shareholder interested.
2. Favourable inside information, i.e. gains from acquiring undervalued assets,
3. Stakeholder wealth transfer, i.e. gains from employee layoffs, union-busting or raising the
risk of pre-existing debt, and
4. Tax savings, i.e. tax reductions from increasing leverage and stepping up asset base.
For a detail process of how an LBO is structured see appendix 1 – Process of the LBO Structure
This research takes another approach to the study of LBO motivations and focuses on the target
company (therefore the private equity target). The approach seeks to identify the important
attributes with which a target company can be evaluated against in order to determine its suitability
as an LBO investment. The study differs from vast existing literature around the LBO topic,
notably Opler & Titman‟s (1993) closely related study as well as Kaplan (1989b), Muscarella &
Vetsuypens (1990) and Smith (1990), which infer motives for LBO transactions. These however
have focused on observing changes in the firm‟s operations (particularly but not limited to the
before-tax cash flows) post the LBO transaction. More specifically in Opler & Titman (1993) their
approach involved testing whether or not firms that do LBOs differ from those that do not in ways
that are consistent with theories of the sources of gains from LBO type transactions.
Secondly unlike many of the studies completed this study intends to find consensus from the
industry on the standard attributes that are worth looking into when investing via an LBO structure.
So it is positioned at the due diligence phase of an LBO investment process. Lehn & Poulsen
(1989) previously, narrowly tackled this issue, but found evidence that supported Jensen (1986) that
firms with high free cash flow are most likely to go private and thus provide for ideal LBO targets.
Later Lehn, Jeffrey, & Annette, (1990) conducted the study with a wider set of variables than Lehn
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 11
& Poulsen (1989) and found that dual class recapitalization firms have greater growth opportunities
and thus make for better LBO investments. However a potential weakness in previous studies, has
been their over emphasis on quantitative measures. Therefore not accounting for the qualitative
elements (views and opinions of industry practitioners) worth considering in a LBO scenario as a
whole and as related to the target company, which is the basis of this study.
Thirdly this study is particularly focused and tailor made for the South African industry. All
existing studies are based in the Western context and thus a different geographical dimension is
added. Particularly since on a general level South Africa presents various dynamics and contrasts to
its Western counterparts.
Lastly this study is based on the views of the professionals in the industry, as well as those of
lending parties. The views of the lenders were deliberately added and are sought after as they
present another dimension from an important stakeholder in leverage buyout transactions.
By its nature this type of research is explorative and seeks new insights (Saunders, Lewis, &
Thornhill, 2000). Furthermore by the time of conducting this research it was envisaged that both
private equity players and lenders to the industry will have keen interest in its findings. More
importantly it should serve as a standard bench mark to all private equity professionals regarding
how a LBO target is viewed and analysed.
Following this introduction the report will adhere to the following structure: Chapter 2 will cover
the literature review conducted with regards to the area of study. Subsequently Chapter 3 will
follow, detailing the methodology used for the research, followed by Chapter 4 which will draw on
the findings of the research. Chapter 5 concludes and Chapter 6 indicates areas for further study.
1.2 Research questions and scope
The following questions formed the focus of enquiry when considering the overall research topic.
Thus the collection of data and all analysis herewith undertaken has been focussed on specific
topics, the results of which endeavours to answer the following research questions:
Primary question:
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 12
What are the attributes of a good LBO target, from South Africa‟s Private Equity Industry
point of view?
The above research question addresses an important question, and attempts to advance the
frontiers of knowledge regarding what industry players should „check list‟ in their consideration
for an LBO target investment (Bryman & Bell, 2007).
Secondary questions:
How do does this ranked list weigh up against that of the other important parties to the LBO
structure, namely the lenders?
Does the source of private equity funds (therefore Captive versus Independent) reveal
anything about the choice of attributes?
What is the impact of large gearing on the LBO target companies and more importantly
whereas related to the private equity shareholder?
1.3 Research Assumptions and Ethics
It is assumed that the researcher‟s perspective and assumptions will have an influence on the
conducting of this research, this also includes but not limited to the interpretation of the findings
and the theory that emerges from the research. Further more it is important to note that the
academic research in South African LBO under private equity context is limited, and of the private
equity literature that is available most is based on developed markets.
The most important requirement to enable success of this research is the quality and
representativeness of the private equity industry. In total 28 requests for interviews were sent out to
private equity houses and 13 ended up being interviewed. In essence this equates to a 46% response
rate. Based on this outcome it is assumed that this response rate provides sufficient input data to
enable credible conclusions to be drawn. To add to that the obtained responses were assumed to
have common elements. However where this was not the case, the need for further in depth analysis
or understanding was highlighted, that also provided value adding discussions.
Other Assumptions include:
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 13
The assumption that private equity firms‟ view regarding attributes of a good LBO target
will mirror that of their employees. So the interviewees of this study who are employees of
private equity firms are good representatives of the general views of their firms.
Assumption that a good target is understood to be the one that ultimately warrants an
investment mandate
South African private equity firms are engaging and will continue to have great interest in
LBO investments
Private equity employees interviewed have adequate exposure to LBO transactions and/or
have adequate experience of targeting investment potentials with a LBO structure in mind.
The research will be conducted in compliance with the UCT/GSB research guidelines. The
proposed research has no intended potential harm for the survey participants from the private equity
industry and/or the companies of the information used. Despite the challenges of openness and
transparency as well as accessibility of information no methods of coercion will be utilised.
There is an ethical obligation to process and analyse the data independently, accurately and without
influence or bias towards the results in any way or the other. All selection and ranking has taken
place in line with principles outlined within the methodology and any required deviations from the
principles have been fully disclosed.
A detailed covering email, included in the appendix 2, provides the research background and formal
request for participation. In addition signed non-disclosure agreements (included as appendix 3)
were included as part of the requests sent out. However most importantly all responses included as
part of this report are on the basis of anonymity, and all demographics will only be presented in
aggregate form. The main purpose of this study is not to single out responses, but where it is so, no
names and or references that allow names to be deduced will be included. All in all the research‟s
primary interest is in identifying commonality among the response themes.
The actual interview session were conducted in a formal manner and prior to interview questions
participants were again taken through an introductory session that outlined the intended objectives
of the study and reiterated the confidential nature of the content to be shared. By way of preparation
questions were also sent to confirmed respondents in advance.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 14
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Discussion
The literature review discussion to follow will begin by explaining private equity, therefore the
structure and/or the model, narrowing off with the South African private equity industry. Secondly
the leverage buyout investment structured is briefly explored. Including but not limited to the
positive and negative aspects and impacts of the LBO structure.
Lastly the section is set on reviewing the theoretical perspective and previous research findings
regarding the problem at hand. While this study has characterised itself as determining the
attributes of an „ideal‟ potential LBO target, this essentially follows in the same lines as what vast
previous studies have termed, motivations for leverage buyout transactions. In the end the attributes
of a target company become the basis of why an LBO investment is motivated and thus completed.
2.1.1 Private Equity
“Private equity is not quoted on a public exchange. Private equity consists of investors and funds
that make investments directly into private companies or conduct buyouts of public companies that
result in a delisting of public equity. Capital for private equity is raised from retail and institutional
investors, and can be used to fund new technologies, expand working capital within an owned
company, make acquisitions, or to strengthen a balance sheet.” (Investopedia)
See appendix 4 for the fundamental difference between private equity and quoted equity as outlined
by Gilligan & Wright (2010).
Private Equity funds are designed to be “self – liquidating” that meaning that they are structured to
dissolve after ten to fifteen years. This imposes a healthy discipline that forces private equity
investors to take the necessary-but-painful step of terminating underperforming firms (investments)
in their portfolios (Lerner, 1997). These investments will typically realise value in the form of
capital gains through a sale to, or merger with, a competitor in the same sector, sale to another
private equity investor, or by eventual flotation on the stock market within the ten to fifteen year
period (The Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM), 2006). The
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 15
objective of the private equity fund is to invest in equity risk capital in a portfolio of companies
which are identified and researched by the private equity fund manager. By their nature these funds
are primarily designed to generate capital profits from the sale of investments rather than the
income from dividends, fees and interest payments. Below is a structure of a typical private equity
fund adopted from (Gilligan & Wright, 2010).
Figure 4 : Structure of a Typical Private Equity Fund
Prowse (1998) found that the fund manager‟s fee ranges between 1.5% - 2.5% of asset and extra
interest of performance during the investment period. The performance and/or track record is
measured by the returns of investments generated (Internal Rate of Return – IRR). This stems from
the company‟s cash flow (i.e. return) the generation of which is in stages, and follows a J curve
effect based on the quantum of value added by the private equity.
Private Equity Value Add – Financial engineering vs. Operational efficiencies
Talmor (2006) believes that private equity‟s source of return are largely inconsistent with the
accepted academic paradigms: Firstly multiple arbitrage flies in the face of market efficiency
theories. Secondly profit from de-leveraging is just financial engineering and runs counter to
theories of capital structure.
On the other hand operational improvements as a private equity value add to its portfolio
companies, violates the fundamental tenet of separation of ownership and management. However
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 16
on the contrary, believers of the private equity model like Jensen (1986), buy into the notion that
private equity firms apply financial, governance and operational engineering to their portfolio
companies, and, in so doing, improve firm operations and create economic value. While both the
arguments of Jensen (1986) and Talmor (2006) present merits, given recent developments in the
global financial services alternative assets have attracted a lot of attention. As a result it is certainly
more plausible that the era of multiple arbitrages is fading. Hence LBO as a structure will no longer
be a significant source of value, by investors just waiting for the debt pay down. As a matter of fact
more effort will need to be exerted on company operational performances, such that assets will
sweat and liquidity will suffer, therefore increasing default risks.
2.1.2 The theories around LBO
Dominant themes from the literature are gathered below to prompt this study towards the critical
issues around the LBO topic.
LBO incentives management to generate cash flows
When companies undergo a LBO, increased management ownership and high financial leverage
associated with the buyout provide strong incentives for managers to generate higher cash flows
through improved operating performances (Jensen, 1989).
Cash flows drive the value of LBO
LBO‟s are likely to be particularly valuable for companies with a strong cash-flow-generating
capacity and limited profitable growth opportunities. Kaplan (1989a), Lichtenberg and Siegel
(1990), and Baker and Wruck (1989) provide evidence supporting this proposition.
There is a positive relationship between debt and management discipline
“The high financial leverage also limits managers‟ ability to undertake wasteful investments
because free cash flow is committed to debt service. The substantial management equity ownership
ensures that managers do not meet debt payments through short-term cash-flow improvement at the
expense of long-term” (Palepu, 1990).
2.1.3 Motivations for Leverage Buyouts (LBO)
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 17
For the most part, in the past, the benefit derived from the interest tax shield, introduced by the
Modigliani & Miller (1963) theories, justified the appeal of leveraging, from a fund managers
perspective. However since then numerous writers have referred to other benefits and the appealing
characteristics of LBO in particular.
Firstly Olsen (2003) presented a number of appealing characteristics of leveraging buyouts, which
included; tax advantages associated with debt financing. In support prior writings by Kaplan
(1989b) and Marais, Katherine, & Abbie (1989) all agreed that tax savings were a source of gains.
Secondly Gagliano, (2004) distinguished a successful LBO, as whereby equity holders‟ receipt of
very high returns as a result of locked debt holder‟s fixed returns. Thereafter the equity holders
receive all the benefits from any capital gains. Thus, financial buyers invest in highly leveraged
companies seeking to generate large equity returns. In a typical private equity LBO transaction, the
private equity firm agrees to buy a company and if that company is public, the private equity firm
typically pays a premium of 15 to 50 percent over the current stock price Kaplan, (1989b) and
Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, & Zutter, (2007).The buyout is typically financed with anywhere
from 60 to 90 percent debt – hence the term, leveraged buyout (Stromberg, 2008).
Thirdly a study by Lehn & Poulsen, (1989) augments Jensen‟s (1986) findings that the target
company‟s cash flow is sufficient inducement for fund managers to want to buy out via high
leverage. The cashflow argument is particularly relevant, to making an LBO target attractive, as it
directly addresses the issue of meeting the high finance costs inherent in the life of a post LBO
transaction structure. In their writing Lehn & Poulsen, (1989) make references to LBO‟s and
company financial distress. In particular firms with lower cash flows have higher financial distress
costs and are also burdened with higher expectations of cash flow growth when considered for LBO
(Lehn & Poulsen, 1989).
Lastly Opler & Titman, (1993) extends the cash flow discussion further by agreeing that, firms that
attracted LBOs have relatively high cash flow but also added that these firms are characterized by
unfavorable investment opportunities (low Tobin's q). This is what is termed the financial distress
hypothesis also consistent with the free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986). The Tobin‟s q as noted by
Opler & Titman, (1993) is a proxy variable for the cost of taking on debt, insofar as high „q‟ firms
typically have less collateralizable assets and greater growth opportunities. In their study that was
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 18
set on investigating the determinates of LBO activity by comparing firms that have implemented
LBOs to those that have not, Opler & Titman, (1993) found that ideal LBO targets have product
uniqueness, collateral and growth, less cash flow volatility and a limited degree of information
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Opler & Titman, (1993) concluded that
informational asymmetry increases the chances that a firm is undervalued. This creates
opportunities for individuals with superior information such as management to initiate management
buyouts „MBOs‟, thus induces LBO‟s.
2.1.4 Attributes of a good leverage buyouts (LBO)
In this regard based on prior experience Olsen (2003) provides a criteria list for a good LBO
candidate;
steady and predictable cash flow,
clean balance sheet with little debt,
strong, defensible market position,
limited working capital requirements,
minimal future capital requirements,
heavy asset base for loan collateral,
divestible assets,
strong management team,
viable exit strategy,
synergy opportunities and
potential for expense reduction.
According to Olsen (2003) firms with high expected costs of financial distress are less likely to do
LBOs. This for instance includes those companies with high research and development
expenditures (Opler and Titman, 1993).
In summary a good LBO target will have a strong balance sheet, therefore fixed assets and limited
gearing, profitable and cash generative operations –therefore limited capital expenditure (capex)
and manageable working capital as well as a viable exit – either by outright sale to a strategic
buyer, or even another financial buyer or Initial Public Offering and/or Recapitalization (Gagliano,
2004).
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 19
2.1.6 LBO structure: default risk, the burden and benefit of debt
A general criticism for LBO by Fox & Marcus, (1992) takes the stance that leveraged buyouts
(LBOs) are controversial, as they have ethical problems and redistribution issues. To add another
prominent LBO criticism is that it increases corporate default risk. The debt in leveraged buyouts
often includes a junior, unsecured portion that is financed by either high yield bonds or “mezzanine
debt” (that is, debt which is subordinated to the senior debt) (Demiroglu & James, 2007). So in
actual fact LBO structures burden the company with finance costs obligations. That said a study by
Stromberg, (2008) has proven that only a trivial fraction of LBO firms end up bankrupt. Assuming
an average holding period of six years, this study found that annual default rate of LBO‟s worked
out on average to be 1.2% per year. However the positive side about leverage is the pressure it
creates on managers not to be wasteful (Jensen, 1986). This pressure reduces the “free cash flow”
problems described in Jensen, (1986). However a fine balance is required between achieving
leverage levels that ensure efficiency and those that can tip the insolvency scale.
All in all a good debt market and bond market capitalisation provide enablers for LBO‟s and result
in positive and significant influence on investment growth. Results from Abor et.al (2010)‟s study
point to the fact that emerging markets should therefore focus on developing their financial
superstructure further to enhance the performance of the financial markets and investment growth.
2.2 Conclusion
In conclusion it is quite clear that the „curtain is beginning to come down‟ on financial engineering
based value creation by the private equity industry. Thus the future for private equity value-add lies
in operational improvements.
Nevertheless prior writing on the LBO topic has lead to three main and recurring theories. Firstly
LBO is a good management incentive tool; it provides for managers to participate in equity and
focuses them on cash generation. Secondly there is positive relationship between debt and
discipline. Lastly the combination of cash and low growth opportunities equates to an ideal LBO
candidate. All in all the overall strong themes are management and cash flow.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 20
The notion of tax shield as a motivating benefit has been widely written about, but the significance
of this still remains untested. Finally even though default risk remains relevant for LBO structured
investments literature has indicated that only a handful of LBO structures have ended in default
(Stromberg, 2008).
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 21
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research approach and strategy
The research methodology is dictated by the nature of this study‟s question(s). The objective of this
research is to provide insight into understanding into the important attributes of a LBO target
company, and in so doing, aid in developing theory around this topic. Hence the inductive research
approach is fitting, whereby the approach results in theory that will be the output of the research by
a process of drawing generalisable inferences from the observations (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p.14).
Therefore the study will draw a conclusion from one or more of the evidence obtained. This
conclusion(s) will explain the facts, and the facts will be used to support the conclusion (Cooper &
Schindler, 1998, p.31). In that regard this study will not be deductive in approach and hence the
researcher will not deduce a hypothesis based on available theory and subjects it to empirical
scrutiny (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p.11).
Further more the research strategy of this study is qualitative. This qualitative research will be used
to enable the researcher to gain new insights about attributes of LBO targets and to develop theories
about this phenomenon (Peshkin, 1993).
By studying these phenomena in all of its complexity, data will be continuously collected and
analysed, resulting in a continuous reflective theory (Leedy & Ormond, 2005, p.133). Furthermore
the benefits and/or purposes of qualitative research is to; describe how things are, gain new insight
into this particular phenomenon and/or discover the problems that exist (Leedy & Ormond, 2005).
On the other hand Bryman & Bell (2007) highlights some limitations of qualitative research
namely; the issue of subjectivity, „un-replicability‟, transparency and the problem of generalisation.
As part of addressing these, deliberately the semi-structured interviews were recorded and a
prescribed methodology presided over the process.
According to Bryman & Bell (2007, p.28), the qualitative research strategy has epistemological and
ontological considerations. There are various epistemological positions positivism, realism and
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 22
interpretivism. This study‟s epistemological orientation will be of interpretivism, which “rejects the
practices and norms of the natural scientific model and of positivism in particular in the emphasis
on the ways in which individuals interpret their social world” (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p.28).
Therefore understanding of the participants forms the basis of the analysis as well.
As with regards to considering the ontology two key positions are available, namely; objectivism
and constructionism. This study‟s ontological orientation will be of constructionism, therefore the
social phenomena and the meanings thereof continue to be altered by the relevant social actors.
All in all this is a combined interpretivist and constructionist stance, which also coincides with
qualitative research characteristics (Bryman & Bell, 2007).
3.2 Research design, data collection methods and research instruments
The choice of a research design, framework for the collection and analysis of data reflects decisions
about the priority being given to a range of dimensions of the research process (Bryman & Bell,
2007, p 40). The survey that will take place will take more of a cross-sectional design. The content
hereby will be collected via semi-structured interviews seeking to assess the view points of the
private equity industry at a given point in time. Furthermore the ranking is used in order to
distinctively categorize the different responses received. This is also used by Jones (2009) whereby
the inclusion of rankings within his survey is particularly used to enable variation between
responses to be explicitly indentified. The ranking is based on previously identified LBO attributes
from the literature review.
The data for this study will be field-based (Private Equity Industry). The actual data collected will
be via semi – structured interviews with industry players (Associates and Principals). The data
collected will include the perspectives and voices of the industry.
The interviews were structured to minimize the researchers input. To this regard close ended
questions included demographic information, while the open ended offered participants opportunity
to provide in-depth details. The actual interview process closely follows the following guidelines
(Jones, 2009):
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 23
Interview questionnaire preparation:
1. Questions will be identified in advance – no leading questions
2. Consideration of participant‟s background and potential influence on answers
3. Interviewees are intended to be representative of the group
4. Location chosen with suitability in mind
Each of the 28 available private equity houses were contacted
Only 13 confirmed.
5. Get written permission
30-60 minute Interview
6. Focus on actual rather than the hypothetical
7. Don‟t put words people‟s mouth
8. Reward responses of verbalism
9. Minimize reactions
10. Ensure of hardware
The interview questions themselves were sent to the respondents in advance for preparation sake.
Also the respondents were expected by the beginning of the interview to come prepared with their
ranked choices, the attributes that make a good LBO target. In this way the interview was structured
to focus on the reasons for the respondents‟ choices made and ranking thereof. (Appendix 6 -
Interview Questions) The interviews were tailor made to suit the respective audience(s), i.e private
equity houses and the debt houses. Similarly as done in Jones‟s (2009) study, the questions were
used as a basis for the interviews, but consistent with a semi structured interview format,
interviewees were encouraged to discuss freely, around the questions. Accordingly in some
instances for the sake of clarity the researcher was prompted by the interviewee‟s feedback to probe
for further information.
The process then continues with a transcribing exercise, which allows for the content to be checked
and cross referenced. Following that the ranking were given scores, consolidated so to yield a
combined ranking of the groups‟ responses.
If attribute ranked 1st = 4points
If attribute ranked 2st
= 3points
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 24
If attribute ranked 3st= 2points
If attribute ranked 4st= 1points
The total per element/attribute determines the final score which then determines the position of that
attribute. Furthermore these totals were converted to % to be able to graph and present the findings
in graphical point.
3.3 Sampling
In sampling the local private equity industry the focus was on eliminating potential sampling bias,
therefore a selection restricted to only a narrow group (non-representative group) of market
participants. Therefore in so doing avoid the risk of potentially only being exposed to a small subset
of the issues facing the industry as a whole (Lerner et al. 2005 p 90).
In a similar manner Lerner et al (2005) and Lingelbach (2008) also chose to target different groups
in their studies. Thus to cover the two targeted groups for this study, private equity houses and debt
providers, the researcher identified and contacted the following potential participant groups:
1) Members of private equity firms registered as full members of the SAVCA website
2) Debt houses that have particular focus on servicing the private equity industry
The South African context provides at least two previous instances Van Deventer & Mlambo
(2008) and Jones (2009), where SAVCA was used as a source for target respondents. The SAVCA
database was used in conjunction with internet (company internet sites). In addition the actual
process of identifying individuals in each firm to take part was assisted by the fact that the
researcher is in the field and was able to use existing networks to target specific individuals. This
was done on the basis of rank and experience in the private equity industry.
In terms of the debt providers these were as recommended by the private equity houses engaged.
However all in all the sampling of this study provides an instance of convenience sampling, as the
SAVCA database was chosen out of convenience and the fact that it provides full contact details of
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 25
its members. Another characteristic of this study‟s sampling is non probability sampling technique,
as some units in the population are more likely to be selected than others. (Bryman & Bell, 2007)
However a number of stumbling blocks are anticipated; firstly the issue of non response anticipated
and to counter that at minimum two interview requests targeting principals and senior associates per
organisation will be sent out. Secondly invariably decisions about sample size represent a
compromise between the constraints of time and cost, the need for precision and a variety of further
considerations. (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p194) Thirdly the lack of transparency in qualitative
research is related to sampling (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p.497).
Bryman & Bell (2007) state that reliability, replication and validity must be considered when
evaluating business and management research. Reliability therefore is the study repeatable?
Replication - therefore the ease of replicating the study. Validity - therefore the integrity of the
conclusions that are generated from a piece of research. However, the relevance of applying
reliability and validity to qualitative research is questionable. LeCompte & Goetz (1982) relate
reliability to qualitative research as external reliability or the degree, to which a study can be
replicated, and internal reliability or the consistency of observations between two or more
observers. Similarly internal validity or the degree to which a match exists between the researcher‟s
observations and the theoretical ideas they develop, and external validity or the degree to which
findings can be generalized across social settings (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982).
Given that this study is qualitative and specifically limited to the South African context, herein are
potential issues in terms of replication. Due to varying geographies having specific and unique
characteristics. Nevertheless reasonable replicability would require an accurate replication of the
methodology outlined in this study. Furthermore and on the basis that this is a qualitative study the
concepts of validity and reliability are substituted by trustworthiness and authenticity. This
substitution is proposed by Cuba & Lincoln (1994) because reliability and validity are concepts that
more easily applied to quantitative rather than qualitative studies.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 26
3.4 Data analysis methods
The responses to the first part of the interview, which constitute the closed ended questions allowed
for the generation of simple analytics of the responses. The analysis of the open ended questions
focused on presenting the findings of the ranking questions pictorially as done in Jones (2009).
This was done to aid comparison as well as to present the proportion of respondents indicating
specific answers to the other closed questions.
As per Leedy and Ormrod (p, 142, 2010) the data analysis for a grounded theory study begins
almost immediately, at which point the researcher develops categories to classify the data.
Subsequent data collection is aimed in essence at learning as much as possible and at finding any
disconfirming evidence that may suggest revisions in the categories identified or in
interrelationships among them (Leedy and Ormrod, p.142, 2010). This essentially is the constant
comparative method, as it involves a data process of moving back and forth between data collection
and data analysis (Leedy and Ormrod, p, 143, 2010).
Ultimately the presentation below is the result of the interviews conducted. The point of the study is
not to prove causality or to establish significance and/or otherwise of opinions between the groups
(Jones, 2009). Rather this research is aimed at capturing as broad a set of views as possible within
the private equity industry and debt providers of the private equity industry. In the end the results
of interview represented a combination of perspectives. From hence the focus was on highlighting
the areas of consensus and divergences.
The steps which are highlighted by Corbin (2008) towards strict sense of coding presented too
structured a process to the point that they limited the flexibility of the researcher. This one
drawback was also identified by Charmaz (2000). Furthermore based on the intentions of the study
statistical analysis of the results was not appropriate in this instance.
In summation just as with Jones (2009) and some adoptions from Corbin (2008) the interview
sessions lasted between 30 – 60 minutes,
Each interview was recorded
In conjunction detailed notes were taken
Notes were then amalgamated with the recorded content to form final data
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 27
Data then scrutinised for commonalities in categories and themes
Data then examined for sub-categories as well
Followed by further development of each category regarding conditions, context, strategies
and consequences thereof
Develop a story that describes the attributes of a „good‟ LBO target, from combination of
category themes and interrelationships
Then finally the theory in a visual model
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 28
4 RESEARCH FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Research Findings
This study sought to establish and asses the factors considered, by the South African private equity
industry, good attributes of a potential LBO target. The findings below represent the results of the
interview surveys conducted on the industry. The following sections include the research findings,
analysis and discussion thereof.
4.1.1 Demographics of respondents
Out of the 28 private equity houses contacted, a total of 13 responses were received. This represents
a 46% response rate. The respondents were either from captive (46%), therefore managers who
manage on balance sheet funded funds by a parent company, or independent funds (54%), which
manage funds on behalf of third parties (SAVCA, 2009). Here below is an illustration of the
breakdown of respondents between captive and independent funds.
Independents54%
Captives46%
Break down of respondents between captive and independent funds
Figure 5 : Break down of respondents between captive and independent funds
The quality of information obtained out of the interviews was of a high standard and as anticipated
provided a lot of content and insight. This was largely assisted by the high level of private equity
experience, of the interviewees, that formed the basis of the respondents‟ feedback.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 29
0
5
10
15
20
Years Experience
Years Experience
Figure 6 : The respondents / Interviewees, their titles and years of private equity experience
The average private equity experience of the sample respondents was 7 years, made up of 62%
principals/associate principals and 38% associates.
4.1.2 Results of Interview feedback
Based on the feedback of the interviewees the following findings as represented by the graph below
were made. (See Appendix 7 for step by step derivation of the data – graph)
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 30
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Important attributes of a ‘good’ LBO target
Figure 7 : Important Attributes of 'Good' LBO target
The four most important attributes of a „good‟ LBO target company were identified and ranked, in
order of importance (priority), by the South African industry as follows;
1. Strong and partner-able management
2. Steady and predictable cash flow
3. Viable exit strategy
4. Strong market position
The mean line (red dotted line) indicates where the average lies. Evidently the four most important
attributes stand well above the average line and the rest of the choices made. This is evidence of
existing high consensus achieved in the results.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 31
Furthermore captives are compared to independents in the below graph. While from both groups
the list of attributes did not change, the order of priority differed (captives versus independents).
Notably the captives prioritised steady predictable cash flow above strong partner-able management
unlike in the combined results and the independents results. As shown in the graph below.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Breakdown of important LBO target attributes between captives and Independents
Independents
Captives
Figure 8 : Breakdown of important LBO target attributes between captives and Independents
The section to follow will provide in-depth analysis of the findings above, as well as a discussion
with regards thereof.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 32
4.2 Research Analysis and Discussion
4.2.1 Strong and partner-able management
Strong management team definitely came out the strongest of the attributes selected. Out of the 13
interviewees 38% (5 out of 13) rated it the most important and another 38% prioritised it second on
their list. The graph depicts the proportion of people per the ranking made for good management as
an attribute.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
15%
8%
38%
38%
Proportions of ranking for 'Good' Management Attribute
No Choice 4th 3rd 2nd 1st
Figure 9 : Proportions of ranking for 'Good' Management Attribute
One other theme that is clearly evident from the interview feedback is that, of the respondents that
ranked management 1st and 2
nd none of them were at the associate level, all were either holding
principal or associate principal roles. While literature was not able to provide concrete reasoning
behind this, it is concluded based on the descriptions of private equity roles and responsibilities that
associates are less likely to appreciate the role and or the work of portfolio company
management(s). This because for the most part the board representation on behalf of private equity
firms on portfolio companies is mostly a responsibility carried out by principals and associate
principals in the private equity firm. As a result the associates are left to do much of the technical
and modelling exercises. The end result being that associates get limited face time with the
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 33
management of portfolio companies, and hence tend to have limited appreciation for the role they
(portfolio company management) play this may somewhat, explain the ranking results.
This section will briefly explain the term „good management‟, there after move into the discussion
around the benefit of good management in an LBO transaction. Following that the negative impacts
of LBO and management are explored, and then the section rounds off with a potentially
contentious debate about whether, management is relevant as an attribute, in the first place.
What is good management?
Palepu, Healy and Bernard (2004) and Palepu (1990) provide us with a inverse answer to the above
question by outlining what does not constitute a good manager from the practical view of a private
equity investor:
Management that is not cost conscious and thus have high ratios of general & administrative
expenses and overheads to sales in comparison to competitors in the industry
Lacking focus and making significant investments in unrelated business areas
Not focussed on performance as measured by cash generation
Poorly incentivised, therefore weak linkages between management compensation and firm‟s
performance
All in all Palepu, Healy and Bernard (2004) describe these as value-eroding characteristics of
management. In addition Wang and Hanson, (2009) characterizes working experience and
professional knowledge as relevant, good management characteristics. Further to add, one of the
private equity respondent‟s company website, described good management as “management that is
partner-able”
The benefit(s) of good management in an LBO transaction
Some of the vivid comments from the interviews about good management were as follows:
“without a good captain even the best of ships will have no direction” and “in the end you need
good people who you can trust your money with...”. There have been studies in the past regarding
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 34
management in relation to private equity in general. One such study is of Bloom et al (2007) who
found that management scores are highest for private equity owned firms. One possible
explanation for this is that private equity firms only buy well managed firms, therefore good
management is such an important factor that private equity is forced to be good “cherry pickers” of
companies who have good management. The other consideration is that private equity is able to
incentivise management to be good, via appropriate performance based incentives.
Jacobs Andersson, (2005) included strong management in the top three of his six primary LBO
investment criteria of private equity in Scandinavia. This view is strongly supported by Wang and
Hanson, (2009) who in their master‟s thesis study found that a qualified management team is a
crucial factor for a successful LBO, that because manager‟s diligence positively affects a
company‟s financial performance. To link this to an evident theme from the interviews, the
interviews revealed that to sustain the cash flows needed for the high debt obligations that are
inherent in LBO structures performing management teams are required. So good management is
beneficial in an LBO structure because they drive performance and efficiencies that realise the
needed cash to finance the LBO debt.
Management performance and the derivation thereof has been widely documented, particularly with
regards to private equity buyout funds. Opler and Tim (1993) on the other hand, attribute incentive-
intensive operating environments as positive influences of management performance. On the other
hand Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, (1988) presented evidence that firm performance is positively
related to ownership concentration and ownership of management. This is where management
buyout current shareholders in partnership with a private equity firm (buyout or management
buyout MBO) and as one respondent put it, “management with „skin‟ in the game”. This provides
great confidence in the merits of the transaction for the private equity partner. Management as an
insider will be privy to a more accurate picture regarding the future prospects of the company as per
theories around, information asymmetry.
The concept informational asymmetry between shareholders and management raises another issue
inherent in LBOs, the issue of agency theory from The Theory of the Firm. Jensen and Meckling
(2000) according to this theory pointed out that failure to maximize the value of the firm is still
consistent with efficiency. The debt of an LBO transaction plays its part in curbing the impacts of
agency theory. As so eloquently put by two of the interviewers when a company is geared there is
very little cash to „squander‟ as its mostly used to service the debt. In that regard the private equity
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 35
manager also minimises on agency costs such as the monitoring expenditures, which according to
Jensen and Meckling (2000) include efforts on the part of the private equity firm to control; the
behaviour of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies and operating rules.
Therefore it is very easy to understand what Jensen and Meckling (2000) meant when they said, the
impact of debt in addressing the agency theory provides valid reasons why debt was relied upon as
a source of capital even before debt financing offered any tax advantage relative to equity.
By way of rounding off the benefits of a good management appears to be more required by the
South African private equity than western countries, particularly USA. This is due to the fact that
developments of the local private equity stills lags behind that of the developed markets.
Particularly when it comes to operational involvement in the portfolio companies. So the South
African industry still relies more on their company‟s encumbered managements and most often just
adds value by financial engineering. Hence they depend more on management quality for the
success of their LBO transactions. For instance from our interviews only 3 out of 13 interviewee
had knowledge of a „100 day plan‟. This is contrary to developments in the USA where recent
newspaper reports indicated that private equity firms are bolstering their operational resources. For
instance ex operational CEO (since February 2010) AG Lafley of Procter and Gamble has joined
Clayton, Dubilier & Rice LLC Private Equity as a special partner, advising the firm and its
companies on management issues ranging from product innovation to global expansion. This is in
addition to others such as John F. Welch Jr., the former General Electric Co. CEO, and Edward
Liddy, the ex-CEO of insurer Allstate Corp.
Does management quality of a target company really matter?
This topic brings attention to a specific point discussed at length in some of the interviews. That
good management in the portfolio companies is a private equity imperative, but not necessarily an
entry criterion. This is because as with buyouts the significant private equity shareholder is able to
effect a change management process once on the board. However the South African industry has
not presented some of the aggressive change management actions as seen in the United States of
America. As pointed out by one of the interviewees the local industry has a reputation to protect.
Though all the interviewees were in agreement that opportunities for buyouts do exist locally, the
acknowledged fact was also the difficulty of unearthing them and the close network that guards
these potential pipelines of deals. Hence it is necessary for private equity houses in the local
environment to appear partner-able rather than hostile to management and current owners of South
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 36
African business. This is very different to USA and UK environments where there is large
concentration of business and where respectively 68% and 74% of all private equity buy out deals
entail changes to management whether it is at the start of the investment, during and/or both as
illustrated below (Ernest and Young, 2006).
USA (74%) Europe ( 68% )
39% 38%
13%5%
22%25%
Frequency of management change by private equity
Start Start and During During
Figure 10 : Frequency of management change
To extend this further the need to protect reputation appears to be less of a concern with
independent funds. One of the interviewees mentioned that in most cases the shortage of skills and
therefore the lack of replacements for encumbered management in potential portfolio companies is
a major South African change management hindrance. Therefore instead most cases management is
incentivised to increase alignment with the private equity firm‟s objectives. On the other hand the
captives involved in this study were banks, which inevitably have a business that relies on
creditability and reputation; therefore assumedly captives should value their reputation more than
independent funds.
The cons of LBO on management
This section focuses primarily on the myopic behaviour of management‟s tendency to be over
consumed by the debt obligation(s). Therefore the terms and covenants of the debts, which
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 37
naturally have a short term outlook, at the expense of long term growth objectives of the firm. This
argument is carried in more depth in the steady and predictable cash section to follow
Overall this section managed to uncover mostly congruencies and in some places diversions of
findings among the authors and in relation to this study‟s findings. Firstly there seems to be
widespread consensus on the importance of good management as an attribute but some differences
in the prioritization thereof (ranks) between this study and reviewed literature. Secondly the benefit
of good management in LBO structures is that they will produce the required performances that
will yield debt servicing cashflows. But also debt has proven to have its own benefits of minimizing
agency costs. Lastly some diversions regarding the level of involvement with local private equity
versus that of the west and the frequency of change management. However there is merit in the
argument for both reputation and skills shortage under the South African context as probable
constraints that are not so compelling in the west.
4.2.2 Steady and predictable cash flow
Steady and predictable cash received the lowest standard deviations in the rankings and featured in
all the ranking except for one interviewee. As depicted by the graph below.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 38
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
8%
23%
23%
31%
Proportions of ranking for Steady and predictable C/F
No Choice 4th 3rd 2nd 1st
Figure 11 : Proportions of ranking for C/F
What is steady and predictable cashflows?
Steady cash flows in many ways infer that the company has the ability to generate cash flows that
are consistent and sustainable. This speaks directly to the fundamentals of a business and
performance thereof. One of the recurring reasons for the prioritization of steady and predictable
cash flows and even above viable exit strategy for an LBO is that a cash generative business is
generally attractive and the attractiveness thereof is assumed will attract interest from potential
buyers.
The relevance of cashflows to LBO
Free cash flow and the capability of a company to generate thereof is particularly relevant to LBO
transaction above all else because as mentioned previously, it ensures that debt will be serviced. As
mentioned by one of the interviewees the ideal geared company will pay its debt in the shortest
possible time and avoid bullet type debt terms. In this way the company maximises by using a
cheaper means of financing, debt. As per the Pecking Order Theory and minimising on financial
distress costs as previously discussed in the literature.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 39
In addition each company needs free cash flow to support new profitable projects as per Wang and
Hanson (2009). This also introduces a related theme that developed during the interviews and
previously documented by Andrews, (1987) Reich, (1989) and Fox & Marcus (1992) that LBOs
have a tendency to focus private equity portfolio company management on short term strategies of
their businesses. This is primary due to two reasons. Firstly the shareholder private equity has
inherent short term views as they look to exit mostly via a listing in 3-5 years time Fox & Marcus
(1992). Secondly the management of these companies are so often consumed by the obligation to
service the debt at even the expense of long term growth strategies. An example of this is where
management of companies neglect R&D investment(s) as pointed out by Wright et al (2000), in his
study that found that R&D investment and intensity tended to decline in companies post LBOs.
However as a counter and a fair balance to the argument, 70% (9 of the respondents) of the
interviewees put forth the argument that, private equity companies will always have a growth
strategy in place for their portfolio companies. Further more they pointed out that this plan is
designed to factor and consider both expansionary strategies and the ability for the company to
service the debt. One respondent put it so clearly by saying that in the end the determining factor is
the highest potential benefit, therefore the incremental return on capex and/or growth related
expenditures versus the levering that potential debt will have on the Internal Rate Return (IRR). All
in all it therefore all depends on the quality of a firm‟s investment opportunity set.
But is it only cash flow?
As a matter of fact it is the combination cashflow and low Tobin‟s q that is relevant, and again the
issue of agency theory is also applicable here.
There are a number of documented literatures including Lang & Litzenberger (1989) and Opler &
Sheridan (1993) regarding Tobin‟s q as the measure for a firm‟s investment opportunities. As
matter of fact Opler & Sheridan (1993) found that firms that initiate LBO‟s can be characterised as
having a combination of unfavourable investment opportunities (therefore low Tobin‟s q) and
relatively high cash flow. This is in line with the free cash flow theory.
In concluding this section we have discussed the following; firstly it‟s not so much the cash flow of
a company, but the capability to generate consistent and sustainable cash flow (in order to have this
the company is most likely to be in its mature state) that matters in an LBO target. In addition the
cash generative business has to be coupled with a low Tobin‟s q (therefore having real free cash
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 40
flows), indicating the poor quality of investment opportunity set available and therefore ruling out
the argument of trading off growth for debt servicing. On the whole there is consensus as to the
importance of cash flows in the consideration process for an LBO target.
4.2.3 Viable exit strategy
Out of the 13 interviews 6 ranked exit as the least priority of the four choices made, as reflected in
the graph below. The sub sections to follow will briefly include an explanation around exits and the
importance thereof exits strategy at the LBO investment consideration stage, secondly the different
views around the importance of an exit strategy are explored in general and from a captive versus
independent funds‟ perspective.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
8%
46%
0%
23%
23%
Proportions of ranking for Viable exit strategy
No Choice 4th 3rd 2nd 1st
Figure 12 : Proportions of ranking for Exit
The choice of exit is important to determine how return is to be gained from the given LBO
investment, and determined by the private equity manager in accordance with the (current or
expected) condition of the company (Povaly (2007). Exit options include listings (public offering of
shares on the public market), sales (merger and/or acquisitions by another company) and share
repurchases.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 41
Is exits strategy more compelling for independent funds?
Out of the 13 respondents only 3 prioritised exits above all other choices and notably all of these
were independent funds. Which immediately begged the question – does an exit strategy matter
more to third party fund managers than on balance sheet fund managers? On the basis that third
party fund commitments typically expire often according to a time schedule based on a use it or
loose it principle, once a maximum drawdown time period expires (SAVCA, 2009). In addition to
this it is the industry norm for independents to only start raising funds when 70%-80% of current
funds are spent. As one principal put it fund raising is on a vintage basis, therefore success of
previous funds will determine the fundability of your next fund. The combination of the above
factors make probable reasons as to why exists are more important to independents than captive
funds. However interestingly according to subsequent conversations with the captives respondents,
there should really be no difference. It merely becomes an issue of different type of investors.
According to the captives their parent company will have similar terms on the money that is
allocated to the private equity division. To take this further in the case of this study, the captive
funds are banks. These ultimately have depositors who are the ultimate owners of the funds and
further reason why effectively the balance sheet funding will have no lesser terms in comparison to
the independents.
How important is an exit strategy?
Out of those that had not prioritized an exit strategy in their choice, the emphasised reason is that,
the fundamentals of the business are the determining factor for buyer‟s interest. All in all a viable
exit strategy at the onset of the LBO transaction was not given significance. This is some what
different to Wainwright and Groeninger (2003) strong stance from their study, that private equity
only invests in portfolio companies that have a clear exit sense at the beginning. Several GPs
indicated that they need to see at least three clear buyers at the outset to believe that an M&A exit
approach is viable (Wainwright and Groeninger, 2003). Notably one of the interviewee explained
that the value of the LBO investment is derived from the exit. Hence the importance to work
backwards in prioritising these attributes starting with exit as most important. “Through an exit,
investors realize returns …” Exits essentially allows the company receives to an infusion of capital
and/or a new strategic direction from a new partner.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 42
So the connotation for exit in private equity terms refers to exit via a listing (IPO). But in fact many
other options are available such as sales to trade and/or financial buyers. The exit strategy at the
onset is important as it directly impacts on the expected return to be earned. In addition there
appears to be some merit in the argument that independent funds are more concerned about exits
than their captive counterparts, based on the nature of the source of funds. However in reality this
argument is limited by the fact that captives have indicated to be subjected to similar funding terms
from their parent company investors. In the end as per the findings „exits‟ might not be as important
relatively, because given good business fundamentals selling the business will sort itself out.
4.2.4 Strong market position
Notably there were a large number of interviewees that did not have this attribute in the top four
ranking, 38% in total (5 out of 13).
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
38%
8%
46%
0%8%
Proportions of ranking for Strong market position
No Choice 4th 3rd 2nd 1st
Figure 13 : Proportions of ranking
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 43
This section explores the meaning of market dominance and related links to the cash flows of a
business. Further on elements and characteristics that provide strong market positioning are finally
outlined.
The strength of any company‟s position in its industry directly speaks to the dominance within the
industry, therefore the competitive advantage and the barriers of trading in the industry (Porter,
1979).
The common theme reiterated in all the interviews was that strong market position leads to good
performance i.e. revenue growth. Wang and Hanson, (2009) also alluded to the conclusion that cash
flow of any entity begin at the topline. Therefore on that basis we conclude that strong market
position should go hand in hand with cash flow of the firm. However as the interviews indicated
management is vital in making sure the market positioning is translated into cash value and not just
top line growth that is eroded by cost inefficiencies.
In specific instances the strength of companies will be derived from unique products. However
literature by Titman & Wessels (1998) as well as Opler & Sheridan (1991) agree that several
proxies for product uniqueness are negatively related to leverage ratios. These proxies include:
1. research and development divided by sales,
2. selling expenses to sales and
3. dummy variable for firms in the machinery and equipment industries. Titman & Wessels
(1998)
The third proxy indicates that, the strength of the market position also depends on the relative asset
base in the industry. In some instances large capital intensive companies keep out competition
through required initial capital outlays. These trade barriers limit new entrants and competition. All
in all an LBO capital intensive target company provides an advantage, the collateral factor, as
pointed out by one of the interviewees. The references about significance of collateral is also made
by Galai & Masulis, (1976), Jensen & Meckling, (1976) and Myers, (1977) who show that
collateral makes creditors less vulnerable in the above sense. This is because equity holders of
levered firms have incentives to invest sub-optimally to expropriate debt providers (Opler and
Sheridan, 1991). However there was also some lack of consensus on the importance of collateral.
One of the interviews minimized the collateral and/or asset intensive requirement in LBO
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 44
transactions by illustrating the many intellectual property (IP) based companies and services
companies transactions such as Tourvest LBO in 2009 with Old Mutual (SAVCA, 2009).
In conclusion prior writing has elaborated on strong market position as a competitive advantage,
more specifically a potential protective barrier to competition. The link between strong market
position and cash flow is also distinctively made. Hence as a way of deduction an inherent link is
possible between market position and cash flows, ranked second.
From henceforth this chapter proceeds with the following sections; firstly the attributes that were
not prioritised (ranked) from the interviews are briefly explored. Followed by a limited secondary
study that provides perspectives of debt providers and finally focus on of the secondary research
questions about whether private equity companies have a checklist against which a typical LBO
opportunity is measured against.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 45
4.2.5 Least important ranked
0%
1%
1%
2%
2%
3%
3%
4%
4%
5%
Low Enterprise Value/ EBITDA
multiple
Large amount of tangible assets for
loan Collateral
Potential for expense reduction
Minimal future capital
requirements
Limited working capital
requirements
Clean balance sheet with little debt
Least Important attributes of a ‘good’ LBO target
Figure 14 : Least Important Ranked Attributes
The mean average of the lowest ranked attributes is 2%, versus the 10% of the mean average of the
highest ranked attributes.
The most commentary from the least ranked attributes was about the clean balance sheet with little
debt attribute. Most (over 70%) of the interviewees indicated that the advantage of minimal debt is
somewhat limited, under LBO context. Infact the primary benefit of introducing the debt is that the
private equity player is able to negotiate their own terms. However for the private equity investor
whether debt is existing or introduced during the time of investment the net effect is a reduced
equity cheque. See illustrated example below:
At T-1 :
If one assumes the following 2 companies with R1000 Enterprise Value (EV – Equity +
Debt) company A with no debt and Co B with 60% leverage of R 600.
Therefore effectively Co A has R 1000 equity and Co B has R 400 equity (NAV)
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 46
Lastly the assumption is that both companies have a EBITDA of R200 and can only be
leveraged up to 3x EBITDA therefore maximum debt of both companies can only be R600.
i.e Co B is fully leveraged.
A ] EV = 1000
Debt = 600
Equity = 400
B} EV = 1000
EV = 1000Debt = 0
Equity = 1000
EV = 1000Debt = 600
Equity = 400
Debt = 600
Equity = 400
T-1
T+1
At T-1 :
A 100% leverage buyout is done on both companies
Since there is maximum debt Co B will require an equity cheque of R400 for 100% of the
business
Co A can be levered up to R600 first, and then an equity cheque of R400 is required for
100% of the company.
Conclusion: In the end, in principle it does not really matter whether, the private equity
firm introduces debt or not the net effect is that minimum equity is put in for a firm that is
much higher in value (EV). This is inline with the MM theory that states that the total value
is the value of all its sources of funding. Therefore the total cash flows a company makes for
all investors (debt holders and shareholders) are the same regardless of capital structure.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 47
Changing the capital structure does not change the total cash flows. Therefore the total
value of the assets that give ownership of these cash flows should not change (Modigliani-
Miller, 1976).
4.2.6 Debt houses‟ perspective
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Debt Houses' Important attributes of a ‘good’ LBO target
Figure 15 : Lender's View
According to Mester (1992) and Smith & Warner (1979) LBO firms rely on bank debt because
concentrated ownership makes bank loans easier to renegotiate than with listed company which
have wide shareholdings. In addition Gilson, et al (1990) argued that the ease of renegotiation aid in
lowering financial distress costs. The feedback from interviews done with the providers of debt
adds an interesting dimension to the attributes considered for an LBO investment. The lenders
highlighted cash flows as the most important attribute. As vividly illustrated by one of the
interviewee there are in essence two main things to consider in funding a typical LBO transaction.
Firstly the repayment ability of the target company. This is the debt quantum determinant that the
entity is able to withstand and is largely focused on the Debt to EBITDA ratio (EBITDA is
representative of the cash of the company), then there is the consideration of the inherent risk, this
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 48
will involve the nature of assets and the business plan. The outcome of which can also have some
impact on the debt quantum, already discussed.
Notably reputation of the private equity firm also featured as a prioritised attribute from the
lender‟s perspective.
Does reputation of the private equity firm matter?
Given the results from the interviews with lenders the private equity firms were asked follow up
telephonic questions regarding, whether they considered the reputation of their firm as an important
factor in securing leverage funding LBO investments.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
14%
57%
29%
Does PE reputation matter in LBO financing?
Not Certain NO YES
Figure 16 : Does PE reputation matter?
From the results above private equity firms did not necessarily think their reputation is an important
factor in securing LBO debt funding. However from the small sample of this study (only two
lenders) the conclusion from findings can be made that reputation of the private equity matters.
Reputation generally refers to the track record and the general prior performance of the fund
manager. Demiroglu & James (2009) also completed a study on this topic, the reputation of
acquiring private equity groups (PEGs) and their relatedness to financing structures of leveraged
buyouts (LBOs). The study found that reputable private equity firms secure more favourable debt
funding. Thus narrower bank and institutional loan spreads, longer loan maturities, and rely more
on institutional loans (Demiroglu & James, 2009).
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 49
4.3 Research Limitations
According to Bryman & Bell (2007), qualitative research has the following limitations:
Subjectivity - therefore findings are reliant on researchers unsystematic impressions about
significant levels
Replication – it is thus hard to refute or confirm a research findings
Generalisation – the sample are general and small and non representative
Transparency – it is difficult to decipher what the researcher actually did and how they
arrived at the conclusion
To add to this the population of the study is not homogenous and hence analysis, interpretation and
applicability of the research are difficult (Muriithia et al, 2003). This lends itself from the fact that
non probability sampling has the danger of introducing bias, from choosing of categories of the
population (Aarker, 2001, p. 26).
The study was limited in its attempt to cross-sections of the respondents between private equity
practitioners and debt providers of the industry because of the poor response rate from the debt
providers. Therefore there is a need to increase the lenders sample. Furthermore amongst the
private equity practitioners the sample needed more broadness to allow significant representation of
the different private equity types based on the source of funding beyond just captive and
independent. Therefore instead captives government, captives financial services and captives other
(SAVCA Survey, 2009).
Furthermore the biggest limitation on the interview process was time. Firstly the constraints of time
provided for solicited interviews to be accepted and confirmed. Secondly the time availed by each
practitioner for the conduct of the interview sessions were limited as generally the session were
scheduled in diaries amidst very active and tight time commitments. Lastly the provision of follow
up questionnaire could only be secured as a telephonic interview.
Finally the study on the whole is deliberately limited to the South African Private Equity Industry,
and is thus geographically biased.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 50
5 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS
This is a private equity research, based within the parameter(s) of the South African industry, and
more specifically refers to the leverage buyout (LBO) investment structure. The study has a
particular focus on the private equity target company. Therefore as a result it is positioned at the
due diligence phase(s) of the LBO transaction process.
The study is set out to determine and analyse the important attributes of a „good‟ LBO target
company, this particularly from the South African private equity practitioners‟ perspective. The
findings of this report will also sufficiently serve as recommendations to the local industry, at
minimum to be considered during targeting of an LBO investment.
As the study has outlined there are essentially three main players (private equity, lenders and target-
company) in an LBO structure as depicted below:
The primary aim of the study is to gather opinions from the local private equity industry and to a
limited extend contrast this with opinions from debt funders of LBO transactions. From thus some
interesting discussions have emerged. The result and summary of which is included herein the
answers to the revisited research questions below.
The local private equity industry has grown rapidly over the years. Studies and surveys mentioned
in this research study have proven that this industry (private equity) is making significant local
Private
Equity
Target
Company
Lenders
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 51
macroeconomic contributions. Hence the decision to focus this study on the private equity industry
has some noble intensions, and is aimed at furthering the industry, and indirectly contributing to its
success, and that of the macro economy at large. In particular this study intends to add value by
improving the local success rate of LBO transactions. By providing the industry practitioners with
consensus around a list (ranked) of attributes for a good LBO target, should aid their choices for
suitable LBO investment targets.
The study‟s approach began with a comprehensive review of previous literature, to determine
attributes that previous writers have highlighted in the past. From hence practitioners of the
industry were interviewed to determine a consolidated view(s) that represents the South African
industry (i.e. the consensus view).
The research set out to answer a number of questions as set out previously in this report:
Firstly what are the attributes of a good LBO target, from the South African Private Equity
Industry‟s point of view?
The literature review conducted in chapter 3 highlighted prior work conducted into the LBO
structure and which outlines various motivations for LBOs. These range from the benefit of tax
savings to the positive impacts of debt on management behavior and solving shareholder issues, to
be explored below.
The results of the feedback from the local industry indicated that the four most important attributes
of an LBO target company are as follows:
1. Strong and partner-able management
2. Steady and predictable cash flow
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 52
3. Viable exit strategy
4. Strong market position
Notably prior writings also make extensive mention of both strong management and cash flow
attributes.
How does the ranked list weigh up against that of the other important parties to the LBO
structure, i.e. the lenders?
Contrary to the findings of private equity results, the lenders indicated that they prioritized the
following attributes in their debt funding decisions:
1. Steady and predictable cash flow
2. Debt/ EBITDA multiple
3. Reputation of private equity firm
4. Minimal future capital requirements
The main difference between private equity results and that of the lenders is that lenders prioritized
cash flows above all attributes, and not management.
Another contrary juncture between the two parties is the focus and/or consideration placed on the
reputation of the private equity firm, by the debt providers (lenders). The lenders prioritized
reputation (third) of the private equity firm as part of consideration made in funding an LBO
transaction. This is reasoned that naturally, as parties to the deal, lenders have a interest in ensuring
that funded LBO‟s succeed, reputation reflects track record, and indicates potential. However in
contrast and a vital point of divergence the local private equity players did not consider reputation
to be a factor in their LBO transactions.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 53
Does the type i.e the source of private equity funds (Captive versus Independent) reveal
anything about the choice of attributes?
From the feedback obtained the differences between captive and independent funds are limited.
Notably there is differing prioritization of the „exit‟ attribute. However this might just be as a result
of third party funds placing more pressure on the private equity manger for a definitive exit strategy
at the onset of all investments, including LBO‟s. However in many ways both types of funds are
subjected to terms by their different investors (source of funding).
What is the impact of large gearing on the LBO target companies and more importantly
whereas related to the private equity shareholder?
The dominant themes that came out of the literature regarding both positive and negative impacts of
debt were validated by the private equity industry‟s interview feedback.
The positive element(s) of debt is in reference to its impact on management discipline. Whereby
literature talks to and about debt decreasing agency costs (monitoring costs). The negative elements
include the risk of default and the related costs of distress from large debts. All of these were
reiterated by the feedback of the local industry interview.
An important juncture of difference is however as related to the tax shield, while literature has
talked to this extensively as a benefit and a potential motivation for LBO the local industry only
perceive the tax shield as a by-product of the overall LBO, and not necessarily a benefit that
solemnly justifies a transaction.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 54
6. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The findings of this study have also highlighted the need for other possible future studies in this
area. Firstly a more comprehensive study between private equity debt providers and private equity
houses, as attempted in this study, would be meaningful. Therefore to look specifically and to
outline the consensus and divergences of views regarding valued attributes of LBO target
companies.
Secondly there is a need for research around the assessment and analysis of failed historic local
leveraged buy outs (specifically with the intention to determine causality). According to Palepu
(1990) the three reasons why buyout(s) might fail are:
(1) Flawed structure of the LBO
(2) Poor post LBO management
(3) General economic conditions
Thirdly, this study has found that the South African private equity industry has limited portfolio
company change management activity versus their USA counterparts. Thus a future study that
looks into the nature of these activities, so current private equity firm‟s involvement in their
portfolio company investments, would be beneficial. Also but not limited to an analysis into the
reasons why the South African private equity industry is so conservative in applying change
management to LBO and other type structure portfolio companies.
Lastly, on the basis that private equity reputation is a factor of consideration in the financing of
LBOs by lenders, and as written about by Demiroglu and James (2010), a worthwhile study would
be to see the determinants of a private equity firm‟s reputation, especially in the South African
context.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 55
REFERENCES
Abor, J., Charles, K., Adjasi, d., Godfred, A., Bokpin, & Osei, K. (2010). Do Emerging Market
Financial Markets Matter in Investment Opportunity Set? .
Anderson, J. (2005). An Insight to the Dynamics of a Leveraged Buyout. Masters Thesis,
Coppenhagen Business School.
Bargeron, L., Schlingemann, F., Stulz, R., & Zutter, C. (2007). Why do Private Acquirers Pay so Little
Compared to Public Acquirers? Harvard Business School Innovation Working Paper .
Barker, G., & Karen, W. (1989). Organizational Changes and Value Creation in Leveraged Buyouts .
Journal of Financial Economics 25 , 163-190.
Blaydon, C., & Wainwright, F. (2006, February). The Balance Between Debt and Added Value.
Retrieved May 12, 2010, from Tuck School of Business: www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pecenter
Bloom, M., Christos, G., Sadun, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2007). What drives good management
around the world. Quarterly Journal of Economics , pp. 2-5.
Brealey, R., & Myers, S. (2003). Principles of Corporate Finance. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2007). Business Research Methods. London: Oxford University Press.
Charmaz, K. (2000). Grounded Theory : Objective and constructivist methods. CA : Thousand Oaks.
Cobin, J., & Strauss, A. (2008). Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for
developing Grounded Theory. CA: Thousand Oaks.
Cooper, R., & Schindler, P. (1998). Business Research Methods. New York.
DBSA. (2009, June). Surveys. Retrieved April 20, 2010, from Development Bank of South Africa:
http://www.dbsa.co.za
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 56
Demiroglu, C., & James, C. (2007). Lender Control and the Role of Private Equity Group Reputation
in Buyout Financing. Florida, Florida State, USA: Uni.
Demiroglu, C., & James, C. (2009). The Role of Private Equity Reputation in LBO Finance. Journal
Financial Economics .
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., & Lowe, A. (1991). Management Research An Introduction.
London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
Ernest and Young. (2006). How do Private Equity Investors Create Value. EY Surveys , p. 12.
Fox, I., & Marcus, A. (1992). The Causes and Consequences of Leveraged Management Buyout.
The Academy of Management Review , 17 (1), 62-85.
Fox, I., & Marcus, A. (1991). The Causes and Consequences of Leveraged Management Buyouts.
Jstor , 62-85.
Gagliano, J. (2004). Note on Leverage Buyouts. Retrieved June 2, 2010, from Tuck School of
Business: http://www.tuck.com
Gilligan, J., & Wright, M. (2010). Private Equity Demystified - An Explanatory Guide. ICAEW,
Corporate Finance Faculty. ICAEW: Corporate Finance Faculty.
Guma, E., & Lincoln, Y. (1994). Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. In N, N. Denzin, & Y.
Lincoln, Hand book of Qualitative Resarch (pp. 16-35). Calif:SAGE.
Investopedia. (n.d.). Investopedia Search: Private Equity. Retrieved August 2, 2010, from
Investopedia: http://www.investopedia.com
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American
Economic Review , 323-329.
Jensen, M. (1989, September). Eclipse of the Public Corporation. Havard Business Review , 61-74.
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (2000). Theory of the Firm. Journal of Financial Economics 11 , 5-50.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 57
Jones, M. (2009). An Analysis of the Reasons for the Lack of Early Stage Venture Capital Funding in
South Africa and Proposal for its Development. MBA Thesis, Graduate School of Business, MBA,
Cape Town.
Kaplan, S. (1989a). Management Buyouts : Evidence on Taxes as Source of Value. Journal of
Finance 44 , 611-632.
Kaplan, S. (1989b). The effects of Management Buyout on Operating Perfomance and Value.
Journal of Financial Economics 24 , 217-254.
Lang, L., & Litzenberber, R. (19898). Dividend Announcement : Cash Signalling vs Free Cash Flow
Hypothesis . Journal of Finacial Economics 24 , 181-192.
LeCompte, M., & Goetz, J. (1982). Problems of Reliability and Validity in Ethnographic Reserach.
Review of Educational Research , 52 (1), 31-60.
Leedy, P., & Omrod, J. (2005). Practical Research. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Lehn, K., & Poulsen, A. (1989). Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in going Private Transactions.
Journal of Finance 44 , 771-788.
Lehn, K., Jeffrey, N., & Annette, P. (1990). Choice of Organisational Form: The Case of Leveraged
Recapitalization and Leveraged Buyouts. Journal of Finance Economics 27 , 315-353.
Lerner, J. (1997). Venture Capital and Private Equity. Harvard Business School -Research Division .
Lerner, J., Moore, D., & Sheperd, S. (2005). A Study of New Zealand's Venture Capital Market and
Implications of Policy. New Zealand: Report for the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology.
Lichtenberg, F., & Donald, S. (1990). The Effects of Leverage Buyout on Productivity. Journal of
Financial Economics .
Lingelbach, D., & Gilbert, E. (2009). Towards a Process Model Venture Capital Emergence: the case
of Botswana. Druid Summer Conference . Copenhagen.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 58
Malepu, K., Healy, P., & Bernard, V. (2004). Business Analysis and Valuation using Financial
Statements.
Marais, L., Katherine, S., & Abbie, S. (1989). Wealth Effects of Going Private for Senior Securities.
Journal of Financial Economics 23 , 155-191.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. (1963, June). Corporate Income Tax and the Cost of Capital: A
correction. American Economic Review .
Morck, R., Schleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1990). Management Ownership Market Valuation : An
Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics , 293-315.
Muscarella, C., & Vetsuypens, M. (1990). Efficiencies and Organizational Structure : A study of
Reverse LBOs. Journal of Finance 45 , 1389-1413.
O, Opler, T., & Titman, S. (1993). The Determinants of Leveraged Buyout Activity. The Journal of
Finance , 48 (5), 1985-1999.
Ogden. (2002). Advance Corporate Finance: policy and strategy (1st ed.). Upper Saddle River:
Prentice Hall.
Olsen, J. (2003). Note on Leveraged Buyout. Tuck Business School - Class Discussion Paper .
Opler, T., & Titman, S. (1993). The Determinants of Leverage Buyout Activity : Free Cash Flow vs.
Financial Distress Costs. The Journal of Finance , 48 (5), 1985-1999.
Palepu, K. (1990). Concequences of Leverage Buyouts. Journal of Financial Economics 27 , 247-
262.
Peshkin, A. (1993). The Goodness of Quality Research. Educational Researcher , 22 , 2, 23-29.
Povaly, S. (2007). Private Equity Exits : divestment process management for LBO (Vol. Ch 4). Berlin:
Heidelberg.
Pratt, S. (1981). Guide to Venture Caoital Sources (5th Edition ed.). Wellesley MA Capital
Publishing.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 59
Prowse, S. (1998, 3rd Quarter). The Economics of Private Equity . Federal Reserve Bamk of Dallas
Economic Review , pp. 21-35.
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2000). Research Methods for Business Students. Essex:
Prentice Hall.
SAVCA. (2009, May). Surveys. Retrieved August 15, 2010, from South African Venture Capital
Association: http://www.savca.co.za
Smith, A. (1990). Capital Ownership Structure and Performance : The Case of Management
Buyouts. Journal of Financial Economics 27 , 143-165.
Stromberg, P. (2008). The new Demography of Private Equity. Institute for Financial Research .
Sweden: Working Paper.
Talmor, E. (2006). Time for European Private Equity to Change Gear. European Private Equity &
Venture Capital Association (EVCA) Symposium (pp. 7 - 10). Monaco: uropean Private Equity &
Venture Capital Association (EVCA).
The Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM). (2006). The Benefits of
Private Equity. CISDM Research .
Van Deventer, B., & Mlambo, C. (2008). Factors Influencing Venture Capitalists' Project Financing
Decisions in South africa. South African Journal of Business Management , 40 (1), 33-41.
Wang, J., & Hanson, B. (2009). Leverage Buyout. Master Thesis, Lunds Univeristy.
Wright, M., Hoskinsson, R., Busenitz, L., & Dial, J. (2000). Enterpreneurial Growth through
Privatisation. Jstor , 591-601.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 60
APPENDICES
Appendix 1 - Process of the LBO Structure
Below is a process of the LBO transaction structure as detailed by (PE simplified)
Fig : Participants of the leveraged buyout transaction
There are two sides to every corporate transaction: those acting with or for the purchaser,
and those acting with or for the owners of the target company (the target), the shareholders.
o On the purchaser‟s side is the private equity fund that intends to invest in the
transaction
o And the bankers who will lend in support of the deal and their respective advisers.
They must negotiate between them a funding package to support the bid.
The bid will be made by a newly-formed company, usually referred to as „Newco‟, which
will be funded by the bank and the private equity fund.
On the target‟s side are the shareholders who are generally seeking to maximize the value
they receive from the sale.
o They will be represented by the management of the business or independent advisers
(or both) who will negotiate with the private equity fund acting on behalf of Newco.
o The role of the incumbent management of the business in any buy-out varies.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 61
They may be part of the group seeking to purchase the business and therefore
be aligned with the private equity fund. This is often termed an insider buy-
out, or more often simply a management buy-out or MBO.
Alternatively the private equity fund may be seeking to introduce new
management if they successfully acquire the business. This is an outsider
buy-out or management buy-in or MBI.
In some circumstances management find themselves acting as both vendor
and purchaser. For example, in a buy-out by a private equity fund of a
company that is already owned by another private equity fund, management
may on the one hand be vendors of their current shares, but also be
purchasers of shares in the company set up to acquire the target. This is a
secondary buy-out.
Where management has a conflict of interest the shareholders‟ interests are
typically represented by independent financial advisers and, in a quoted
company buy-out, the independent non-executive directors of the target.
The role and rewards of management are a key difference between a
corporate takeover and a management buy-out.
In a management buy-out, management will be expected to invest their own
money in the business acquiring the target and expect to have the risks and
rewards of a shareholder of that business, not an employee.
The new company („Newco‟) is established and raises funds to acquire the target company.
Fig: Outline structure of a leveraged buy-out
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 62
Private equity funds use a combination of their own funds and bank debt to fund each
separate newco that acquires a company.
The debt is the so-called „leverage‟ or „gearing‟. The use of leverage increases the returns
for private equity investors from successful investments and creates financial risk in under-
performing investments: it amplifies the underlying investment return.
The limits on the amount of debt
o The amount of debt available to fund a buy-out is a function of the bank‟s estimation
of a company‟s ability to repay the capital amount and to pay the interest on the
capital, as well as the security available to the bank in the event that the company
cannot repay the loans.
o Using debt increases financial risk in businesses, and if a business does not generate
enough cash to repay the capital and interest, under-performance can lead to failure.
o A crucial skill of a private equity fund manager and a banker is to balance this
risk/reward equation when structuring a transaction.
The sources of cash to repay debt
o Cash can be generated in any business in a limited number of ways: from increased
profitability; more efficient uses of capital; reduced taxation; or from new capital
from outside lenders or investors. Any debt in a buy-out has to be serviced by either
profits or capital efficiency improvements. Capital efficiency might mean selling
assets that are under-performing or leasing assets rather than owning them.
o The body of academic evidence is weighted against the idea that buy-outs are
successful simply because of asset sales or reduced investment.
While the above presents a detailed buy out process, it is worth nothing that the process really
begins at the point where the private equity manager discovers a potential LBO target and based on
the attributes of that target company is motivate to make the investment.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 63
Appendix 2 – Cover Email
Hi [Name]
As talked over the phone here with the formal request:
As part of my MBA studies at the Graduate School of Business (UCT) I am conducting an Academic
Research Survey on the South African Private Equity Industry. More Specifically the "LBO" Leverage Buy
Out Investment Structure. In attempt to minimize your effort with this, the Survey is designed as an
Interview - 30min (but otherwise if more practical for you, it is acceptable to just fill in your responses and
email back) and all information to be shared will be opinion based, thus there will be no need to divulge
any confidential fund specific information and/or data. Nevertheless all information shared will be in strict
confidence and will only be included in my final report in an aggregated form. Therefore there will be no
mention of specific names and/or details of specific fund references. (Please find attached a signed UCT
Graduate School of Business’s Non Disclosure Letter as well). Please feel free to refer me to a colleague
should you not be in a position to afford the time.
The Questionnaire is divided into three parts; an Introduction (demographics section which is below), then
followed by as attached a multiple based question and lastly some further insight questions into the
choices made from the multiple choice questions.
I sincerely thank you in advance for taking the time out of your busy schedule to consider my request and
advancing academic research in the Private Equity industry. You and/or your colleague’s a contribution
will also mean that I can share with you the final report once completed, should you have any interest. My
timings are such that I need to have completed this data collection phase by 30th Nov 2010.
Kind Regards,
Manabane Rachidi
MBA (Modular) 2009/10 --------------------------------------------Mobile - 071 609 7196
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 64
Appendix 3 – Non Disclosure
PRIVATE EQUITY RESEARCH
CONFIDENTIALITY AND USE OF INFORMATION
I understand that confidentiality and high ethical standards are important prerequisites for participation in the
Private Equity Value Add Research as a student of this University, and that this study involves confidential
material of a company (ies).
I undertake to abide by the following:
1.
To keep confidential, information gained about the company(ies), other than public and/or published
information, outside the classroom, or other than in academic discussion with staff at the Graduate School of
Business, and,
2.
Not to use information learned about the company (ies) for personal gain, directly or indirectly.
I acknowledge that these obligations continue after completion of the MBA course work.
DATE: 15 October 2010
NAME (PRINT): Manabane Rachidi SIGNATURE:
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 65
Appendix 4 – Fundamental difference between private equity and quoted equity
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 66
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 67
Appendix 5 – SA Total Funds under Management per categories
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 68
Appendix 6 – Interview Questions - PE
University of Cape Town GSB MBA Research Project – Industry Survey
Topic: Attributes of a good “LBO” Leveraged Buyout Out Target Company: South
African Private Equity’s Perspective
The objective of this research project is to assess from a South African Private Equity perspective, the attributes of
what is considered a good target for an LBO structure investment. In this context, please provide the most
important and valued features for you, in a potential portfolio company, that makes for an ideal LBO transaction
structure.
Introduction: Demographics – This information will only appear in aggregate form in the final report and no names
or specific details will be included here from.
a. Name of Fund e. Employment Title b. Date of Close f. Qualification c. Size of Fund g. Years of PE Experience d. Estimate % spent
1. Choose/rank what you consider to be four of the most important attributes for a good/ ideal LBO target company?
Steady and predictable cash flow – To ensure that the LBO target firm is able to meet its interest payments for the debt it will take on. Steady and
predictable makes it easier to get a loan since there is less risk that the firm will not be able to meet interest payments.
Low Enterprise Value/EBITDA multiple - An indicator of how easily the cash flows will be able to cover the purchase price
Large amount of tangible assets for loan collateral - Tangible assets will help to obtain more low-interest financing. The more low-interest
financing the acquiring firm can get, the less cash will be necessary to repay the loans
Potential for expense reduction - Reducing expenses will increase margins and free up cash and allow for faster repayment of the debt
Minimal future capital requirements – No need to have to make large cash outlays to keep the company running and growing.
Limited working capital requirements - This is pretty much the same as the point above.
Clean balance sheet with little debt - This makes the deal less risky (lower leverage = less risk) and allows excess cash to go to the debt necessary for
the leveraged buyout.
Strong market position - A strong market position can ensure that the target company won't be squashed after the leveraged buyout goes through. Such a
position makes cash flows less risky.
Viable exit strategy - Without a good exit in site, the LBO probably won't (and shouldn't) happen.
Strong and partner-able management Other: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 69
a) Out of the four choices above which would constitute the most important? - Why? b) Out of the four choices above which would constitute the least important? - Why?
1. What provides the most enabler and stumbling block locally for LBO structuring?
2. How much of the decision to leverage is based on tax savings? I.e. Tax reductions from increasing leverage
finance costs that warrant a tax shield. Why is this Significant or not?
3. Post the LBO, does leverage, address theorized issues of too much liquidity, hence does it increase
management discipline? How and Why?
4. Based on your and / or your firm’s opinion does the local SA market present sufficient LBO opportunities for
the Private Equity Industry? Why?
5. What are you and/or your firm’s outlook for the local LBO market or opportunities?
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 70
I will also be adding the following angles on which I would like to understand your opinions:
Tax shield saving as an incentive to do transactions
Industry influences on the ranking of attributes
Reputation of PE as a factor considered in the decision to finance
LBO debt obligation and tendencies to force Short term strategies
Views on Change of management on entrant of LBO structure
Copyright UCT
MBA Research Report Page 71
Appendix 7 – Step by step process of the data engineering
Step 1 – Score the rankings
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Steady and predictable cash flows 2 1 2 3 4 4 3 4 4 1 2 3
Low Enterprise Value/ EBITDA multiple 1
Large amount of tangible assets for loan Collateral 3
Potential for expense reduction 3 2
Minimal future capital requirements 2 1
Limited working capital requirements 1
Clean balance sheet with little debt 1 2
Strong market position 2 4 2 2 1 2 2 2
Viable exit strategy 3 4 1 1 1 3 1 4 1 3 4 1
Strong and partner-able management 4 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 3 4
Private Equity Fund
Step 2 – Calculate Totals and %‟s
Totals %
33 25%
1 1%
3 2%
5 4%
3 2%
1 1%
3 2%
17 13%
27 21%
37 28%
Step 3 – Ready for the Graph
Totals %
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Steady and predictable cash flows 2 1 2 3 4 4 3 4 4 1 2 3 33 25%
Low Enterprise Value/ EBITDA multiple 1 1 1%
Large amount of tangible assets for loan Collateral 3 3 2%
Potential for expense reduction 3 2 5 4%
Minimal future capital requirements 2 1 3 2%
Limited working capital requirements 1 1 1%
Clean balance sheet with little debt 1 2 3 2%
Strong market position 2 4 2 2 1 2 2 2 17 13%
Viable exit strategy 3 4 1 1 1 3 1 4 1 3 4 1 27 21%
Strong and partner-able management 4 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 3 4 37 28%
Private Equity Fund
Step 4 - Graph