AsseHanoi anlin d the Geneva Agreement on...

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AsselinHanoi and the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam

Choosing Peace

Hanoi and the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam,1954–1955

✣ Pierre Asselin

Introduction

In early February 1997 the Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist Party(VCP) authorized the publication of a major series of documents relating toits own history. The resulting series, Van kien Dang—Toan tap (Party Docu-ments—Complete Works), has been published incrementally since 1998 bythe ofªcial National Political Publishing House. The series is organized chro-nologically beginning before the founding in 1930 of the Indochinese Com-munist Party (ICP), the forerunner of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP;which existed from 1951 to 1976) and the present VCP. By early 2007 theseries, which includes documents on domestic and foreign affairs generatedby the highest party ofªcials (those on the Politburo and the Central Com-mittee), had reached events of the early 1980s, with new volumes appearingevery few months. Each volume typically covers one year.1 The resulting re-cord is incomplete and selective, but the volumes shed much new light onVWP policies, internal debates and disagreements, and the motivations forspeciªc policies.

Among the topics that are now easier to comprehend is the VWP’s imme-diate response in 1954–1955 to the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam. Muchhas been written about the role of the delegation from the DemocraticRepublic of Vietnam (DRVN) during the Geneva negotiations. Moreover,thanks to the scholarship of Robert Brigham, we now understand how pro-Hanoi groups in the south responded to the Vietnamese agreement.2 Less well

Journal of Cold War StudiesVol. 9, No. 2, Spring 2007, pp. 95–126© 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology

1. Some volumes for the years before 1948 cover multiple years—for example, Vol. 1 (1924–1930),Vol. 6 (1932–1936), and Vol. 7 (1940–1945).

2. James Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986);Robert F. Randle, Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

known, however, is the stance of VWP leaders on a number of key points: thesettlement generally, speciªc provisions concerning the “temporary” divisionof the country along the seventeenth parallel, and the prospects for achievingpeaceful reuniªcation through a political process culminating in nationwideelections.3 Did the authorities in Hanoi believe that the Geneva settlementwas workable and in the interest of the revolution?4 Did they immediately orat a later point regret having signed it? When did VWP leaders realize thatpeaceful reuniªcation under the agreement was impossible and a resumptionof hostilities inevitable?

The volumes in the new series covering 1954 and 1955 contain previ-ously secret documents that make it possible to answer these questions moreor less conclusively.5 This article draws on the volumes and other sources toexplore VWP policymaking in the immediate aftermath of the Geneva Agree-ment and to assess Hanoi’s actions in 1954–1955 relating to that settlement.The article demonstrates that Hanoi accepted the agreement and sought toabide by its provisions, conªdent that implementation would bring peacefulreuniªcation and promote the cause of socialism in Vietnam. Revolutionaryleaders in the south, however, objected to the agreement because they sus-pected that the French, the Americans, and the anti-revolutionary forces thatcontrolled the South Vietnamese government would never abide by its termsor permit a peaceful triumph of the revolution. In a series of directives thatbegan in late July 1954, the leaders of the VWP nonetheless insisted thatparty cadres and supporters in both halves of Vietnam should undertake noactivity that would contravene the spirit of the agreement or that might pro-voke or serve to legitimize non-compliance on the part of the Saigon regimeor its French or American backers. The failure of this policy, which was soonapparent in Hanoi, had major repercussions, prompting a change of leader-

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University Press, 1969); and Robert K. Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations andthe Viet Nam War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

3. Carlyle A. Thayer explored some of these issues in his insightful War by Other Means: National Lib-eration and Revolution in Viet-Nam 1954–60 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989). However, his treatmentof the VWP’s stance on the settlement is cursory and based solely on Western sources and ofªcial Viet-namese histories produced before the era of “renovation” (doi moi) began in 1986.

4. The term “revolution” refers to the effort spearheaded by the VWP and initiated by its previous in-carnation, the ICP, during World War II. That effort had three objectives: (1) to “liberate” Vietnamfrom the clutches of Japanese occupation forces, French colonialists, and, subsequently, Vietnamese“reactionaries” and American “neo-imperialists”; (2) to achieve national reuniªcation of three territo-ries (Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina) that were initially under French rule and then established as twopolities after 1954; and (3) to set up a socialist regime. Liberation and reuniªcation were essentiallyachieved simultaneously in April 1975 with the fall of Saigon; the march to socialism is, by ofªcialaccounts, ongoing.

5. Because of the secretive nature of the party and the fact that its “raw” archives are closed to foreignand most Vietnamese scholars, one would be naïve and irresponsible to contend that available Viet-namese materials can provide deªnitive answers to perplexing questions about VWP policymaking.

ship in the North and causing VWP leaders to lose faith in diplomacy as ameans of advancing the revolution, and induced them to rely predominantlyon military operations to achieve revolutionary success. The DRVN adheredto these policies throughout the subsequent period of American military in-tervention and during the Paris negotiations of 1972–1973 that produced theend of that intervention.

Choosing Peace

On 7 May 1954, Vietnamese nationalist forces under Communist leadershipoverwhelmed the garrison of the French Expeditionary Corps in the Far East(Corps expéditionnaire français en extrême-Orient; CEFEO) at Dien Bien Phu.6

A day later, an international conference on the future of Indochina convenedin Geneva.7 Chaired by representatives from Britain and the USSR, the con-ference was supposed to end hostilities on the Indochinese peninsula by forg-ing a political settlement between French colonialists and their indigenousopponents in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Besides Britain and the SovietUnion, the participants included delegates from France, the DRVN (repre-senting Vietnamese nationalists), the royal governments of Laos and Cambo-dia, the United States, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).8 Also in at-tendance but notably ignored in the deliberations about substantive issueswere representatives from the State of Vietnam (SOVN), which the Frenchhad created in Saigon in March 1949 under former emperor Bao Dai as headof state and Tran Van Huu as president. A puppet regime, the SOVN gained aveneer of legitimacy when the French National Assembly voted in April 1949to repeal the “département” status of Cochinchina and grant autonomy toVietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) within the French Union(Union française).9 Under this arrangement, the SOVN government ostensi-

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6. The best account of the battle is Bernard B. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien BienPhu (New York: Da Capo Press, 1966). One of the most recent is Martin Windrow, The Last Valley:Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003).

7. The Geneva Conference ofªcially opened in April 1954 to discuss the postwar situation on theKorean peninsula. At the conclusion of those talks, on 8 May, the focus shifted to Indochina.

8. The DRVN was proclaimed by Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi on 2 September 1945, following Japan’ssurrender. The event marked the culmination of a relatively peaceful process known in Vietnam as the“August Revolution,” during which Communist nationalists seized the reins of government from theJapanese and forced the abdication of the presiding Nguyen emperor, Bao Dai, thus ending the ten-century-old dynastic system in Vietnam. After the military occupation of Indochina by the Frenchand the outbreak of war in December 1946, the DRVN government retreated to the mountains ofnorthern Vietnam at Pac Bo, on the border with China, where it remained until the signing of theGeneva Agreement.

9. The French Union (1946–1958) was, by ofªcial deªnition, “an association of sovereign and inde-pendent peoples, free and equal in their rights and duties.” On the nature of the French Union, see

bly became responsible for domestic and some foreign affairs of Vietnam anddeployed an army under its own ºag. Leaders in Hanoi were concerned thataccommodating SOVN interests would give that government internationallegitimacy. Hence, the DRVN insisted that the SOVN’s positions onsubstantive issues be ignored. To expedite the diplomatic process, the Frenchacceded to this request.

After weeks of bargaining, negotiators in Geneva agreed on 20 July 1954to three separate agreements—one for each of the Indochinese states (Viet-nam, Laos, and Cambodia)—that, among other results, effectively ended theFirst Indochina War.10 In the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities inVietnam, signed by France and the DRVN, the two parties agreed to an im-mediate ceaseªre, the independence of Vietnam, the temporary division ofthe nation into two zones separated by a demilitarized zone at the seventeenthparallel, a mandatory relocation of all forces loyal to France or the SOVNsouth of that line and forces loyal to the DRVN north of it within 300 days,and a voluntary relocation of individual Vietnamese along the same lines.11

The two parties also agreed to prohibit the introduction of additional foreignmilitary personnel into Vietnam, to refrain from retaliating against former en-emy combatants, and to hold general elections within two years to set up agovernment for a uniªed Vietnam. To supervise the implementation of theseprovisions and monitor violations of them, the settlement created a JointCommission for Vietnam with representatives from France and the DRVN,as well as an International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)with representatives from India, Poland, and Canada.

In line with the balance of forces in the country as of mid-1954, theDRVN inherited jurisdiction over the northern zone, and France—and by ex-tension the SOVN, which was not a party to the agreement—received juris-diction below the seventeenth parallel. Because the partition of the nation wasmeant to be temporary, the Geneva negotiations produced an additional doc-ument titled “Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference: On RestoringPeace in Indochina, 21 July 1954,” which called for consultations between“the competent representative authorities of the two zones” starting in April

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Xavier Yacono, Histoire de la colonisation française (Paris: Presses universitaire de France, 1969),pp. 110–117.

10. The French National Assembly voted to ratify the Geneva agreements on 23 July 1954 by 462 to13, with 134 abstentions. See Arthur J. Dommen, The Indochinese Experience of the French and theAmericans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 2001), p. 251.

11. The text of the agreement is reproduced in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela-tions, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967,pp. 50–62.

1955 to set the terms for nationwide elections leading to reuniªcation under asingle government by July 1956, at which point all French forces were to bewithdrawn from the country.12 By the spring of 1955, the entities effectivelytaking part in this process were the DRVN and the SOVN, the de facto gov-ernments of North and South Vietnam. Despite having been almost totallyexcluded from the Geneva negotiations and the resulting agreement, theSOVN was now playing a crucial role. The SOVN’s cooperation was a prereq-uisite for the success of the agreement and the post-Geneva processes.Yet France ignored the SOVN during the negotiations. The “absence ofany French consultation,” in the words of one historian, was “remarkable indiplomatic history.”13 Not only did this policy absolve the SOVN of responsi-bility for abiding by the terms of the agreement and thereby all but guaranteethe failure of the accord; it also revealed the essence of French attitudes towardVietnamese sovereignty. The Hanoi authorities had colluded with the Frenchto exclude the SOVN from the Geneva negotiations, and if their intent was toisolate the SOVN from the French and from Vietnamese nationalists and toundermine its legitimacy, then “they succeeded brilliantly.”14

Equally lamentable was the non-committal stance of the United States inthe Geneva negotiations, a situation that left another major actor in the Viet-namese arena unbound by the July 1954 agreements. The United States hadbecome actively engaged in Indochina in the spring of 1950 when the Tru-man administration began assisting the French ªnancially and materiallyagainst Vietnamese nationalists, whom the U.S. and French governments re-garded as Communists.15 From that point on, U.S. ofªcials were so deter-mined to preserve a non-Communist Vietnam that they had even consideredmilitary intervention in 1954 to save the CEFEO from defeat at Dien BienPhu.16 The assumption that an agreement on the future of Vietnam could be

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12. “Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference: On Restoring Peace in Indochina, 21 July 1954,”The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, No. 788 (2 August 1954), p. 164.

13. Dommen, Indochinese Experience, p. 249. Dommen’s work offers a nuanced assessment of theterms of the Geneva agreements (see pp. 256–260).

14. Ibid., p. 250.

15. On the origins and evolution of the U.S. commitment to Indochina, see Lloyd C. Gardner, Ap-proaching Vietnam: From World War II through Dienbienphu (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988).

16. In the end, the Eisenhower administration decided against military intervention. However, on8 April, the day the administration communicated its decision to France, Secretary of State John Fos-ter Dulles allegedly offered French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault two nuclear bombs for France touse to save its garrison, an offer the French declined. On this purported episode, see Georges Bidault,D’une résistance à l’autre (Paris: Les Presses du Siècle, 1965), p. 198; George C. Herring and RichardImmerman, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: ‘The Day We Didn’t Go to War’ Revisited,” inAndrew J. Rotter, ed., Light at the End of the Tunnel: A Vietnam War Anthology (New York: St. Martin’sPress, 1991), p. 80; and J. R. Tournoux, Secrets d’état (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1960), p. 56. For a more

successful without the acquiescence of the United States was therefore morethan misguided; it was folly. The U.S. government was so deeply concernedabout the region, which it viewed exclusively through the prism of the ColdWar, that it was not inclined to uphold an agreement to which it was not aparty, especially an agreement that might—and likely would if the partieshonored its terms—result in the reuniªcation of Vietnam under a Commu-nist regime. In a unilateral declaration at Geneva, the United States had re-fused to endorse the agreements on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia or to jointhe “Final Declaration” approved by the negotiators. Instead, the U.S. delega-tion merely “took note” of those agreements and of the “Final Declaration”(aside from a section in the declaration stipulating that conference members“agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them”by the ICSC “to insure” that the agreements “are respected”) and pledged to“refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb” the agreements and“view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the [agreements] withgrave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.”The U.S. government also afªrmed that it would “continue to seek to achieveunity [in Vietnam] through free elections supervised by the United Nations toensure that they are conducted fairly,” an arrangement altogether differentfrom that set forth in the Geneva accord.17

The omission of two crucial parties meant that the Geneva Agreement onVietnam amounted to little more than a bilateral accord between France andthe DRVN to end the 1946–1954 war and endeavor to unify postwar Viet-nam. Despite the obvious ºaws in the settlement, it fulªlled the immediateneeds of both France and the DRVN: it rescued France from a highly unpop-ular sale guerre (“dirty war”) on terms short of capitulation before a deadlineimposed by Premier Pierre Mendès-France; and it presented the DRVN withan opportunity to advance its revolutionary goals by means less costly thanthe long and destructive war it had fought for the previous eight years.18

In accepting the Geneva Agreement, the DRVN seemed uncharacteristi-cally willing to compromise, placing at risk the achievement of substantive

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comprehensive treatment, see Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien BienPhu, 1954 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); and John Prados, The Sky Would Fall (NewYork: Dial, 1983).

17. “Unilateral Declaration of the United States at the Concluding Session of the Geneva Conference,21 July 1954,” in The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of the United States Decision-Making in Vietnam—Senator Gravel Edition, 5 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Vol. 1, pp. 570–571.

18. Six days after the collapse of the Laniel government in Paris on 12 June 1954, Pierre Mendès-France was appointed president du conseil (that is, leader of the ruling coalition) by the French presi-dent. Mendès-France, in his acceptance speech, promised to deliver peace in Indochina by 20 July1954. See Pierre Mendès-France, Gouverner c’est choisir, 1954–1955 (Paris: Gallimard, 1986).

revolutionary goals. Some scholars have argued that the DRVN was acting re-luctantly and under pressure from the USSR and the PRC.19 The SovietUnion and China, the argument goes, “sold out” their Vietnamese allies byinsisting that they accept a partition of the country and a highly problematicplan for reuniªcation. The USSR and China, according to this view, were lessinterested in helping the Vietnamese Communists than in improving rela-tions with Western countries, including the United States. Coming on theheels of the end of the war in Korea, the Geneva Conference supposedly of-fered an opportunity for a thaw in the Cold War. By one Vietnamese account,Soviet ofªcials went to Geneva “with the intention of rapidly ending the onlyhot war remaining in the world after the ºames of the Korean War were extin-guished.” The USSR, according to this account, was aiming “to bring aboutfavorable conditions for détente” and “international cooperation.”20 The Chi-nese, for their part, supposedly wanted to facilitate the settlement of a majorinternational conºict in order to gain wider credibility for the recentlyfounded Communist government in Beijing.21 The same Vietnamese sourceclaims that the Chinese were so eager to make a deal with the West that theyacquiesced in “a Korea-type solution for the Indochina war, namely a militaryarmistice without a full political settlement.”22 According to another, moreproblematic, Vietnamese source, the Chinese pressured the DRVN delegationin Geneva to accept the partition of the nation because Beijing feared thatWashington would intervene militarily in Vietnam if it found the outcome ofthe Geneva talks objectionable.23

Although Soviet and Chinese pressure may have affected the outcome ofthe Geneva talks by inducing the DRVN to be more accommodating, there islittle reason to believe that Hanoi could have achieved a better agreementwithout that pressure. Dien Bien Phu may have been a momentous victory

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19. See Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991) pp. 38–39; Gary R. Hess, Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War (New York: Twayne Pub-lishers, 1998), p. 48; and George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam,1950–1975 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), pp. 39–40.

20. Le Kinh Lich, ed., The 30-Year War, 1945–1975, Vol. 1, 1945–1954 (Hanoi: The Gioi, 2000),p. 368. See also Ban chi dao Tong ket chien tranh—Truc thuoc Bo chinh tri, Tong ket cuoc khang chienchong thuc dan Phap: Thang loi va bai hop (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 1996), pp. 216–217.

21. For an elaboration of the Chinese position at Geneva, see François Joyaux, La Chine et le règlementdu premier conºit d’Indochine—Genève 1954 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1979); and QiangZhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,2000), pp. 49–63.

22. Le Kinh Lich, ed., 30-Year War, p. 368.

23. Su that ve quan he Viet Nam-Trung Quoc trong 30 nam qua (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Su that, 1979),p. 32.

for the Vietnamese resistance, but it was also a bloody and costly climax to along and devastating war. During the siege, the revolutionary forces sufferedmore than 20,000 casualties, including perhaps 10,000 killed in action. In theaftermath, those forces were in desperate need of respite.24 Furthermore, al-though the outcome of the battle deªnitively undermined France’s position innorthern Vietnam, it did little to affect France’s position in the south (or thestrength of France’s indigenous allies there). In fact, the colonial apparatus inthe south remained almost intact, an outcome that facilitated the “American-ization” of the South after 1961. At Dien Bien Phu, the French, pro-SOVN,anti-Communist side lost a battle, not a war.25 Ho Chi Minh admitted asmuch in a letter in May 1954 addressed to participants in the Dien Bien Phucampaign. The victory marked “only the beginning,” he told the participants.“We must not be self-complacent.” The revolutionary struggle “may be longand hard” before “complete victory can be achieved.”26 The PRC eventuallycounseled Hanoi to the same effect, suggesting that in the near future theNorth Vietnamese desist from ªghting and use the peace to mend theirwounds.27

More important, in signing the Geneva Agreement, VWP leaders wereconvinced that its provisions were workable, precluded direct U.S. militaryintervention, and created “favorable conditions” for the triumph of socialismin the whole of Vietnam.28 On the one hand, the settlement recognized theliberation of the North by revolutionary forces. The VWP publicly hailed thisas “a major victory for our people’s struggle for liberation” because it allowedfor the establishment of a “solid base” (dat co so vung chac) to “achieve peace,unity, independence, and prosperity in [all of ] Vietnam.”29 On the other

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24. Jules Roy, La bataille de Dien Bien Phu (Paris: René Julliard, 1963), p. 568; and Phillipe Devillersand Jean Lacouture, End of a War (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 149.

25. “We emerged victorious from that war” with the French, one cadre later commented, “but [the en-emy’s] forces had not been completely destroyed. That is why we signed the Treaty of Geneva.”Quoted in Joseph J. Zasloff, Political Motivation of the Vietnamese Communists: The VietminhRegroupees (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1968), p. 53.

26. Vo Nguyen Giap, Dien Bien Phu (Hanoi: The Gioi, 2000), p. 8. (All translations mine unless oth-erwise noted.) In a recent interview, Giap himself admitted that the victory at Dien Bien Phu was im-portant only to the extent that it “contributed to the success of the Geneva Conference, which recog-nized Viet Nam as an independent and uniªed nation and completely liberated North Viet Nam andthe capital city of Ha Noi.” Vietnam News Service, 5 May 2004.

27. Ang Chen Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conºict,1956–1962 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1997), p. 13.

28. Truong Loi Hoa, Cuoc chien tranh chong My cua Viet Nam (Ho Chi Minh City: Nha xuat banThanh pho Ho Chi Minh, 1998), p. 9. The work of a Chinese scholar, this translation offers valuableinsights into the Vietnamese Revolution.

29. Quoted in Vien nghien cuu chu nghia Mac-Lenin va tu tuong Ho Chi Minh, Lich su Dang Congsan Viet Nam, Vol. II, 1954–1975 (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 1995), p. 27.

hand, new evidence suggests that the leaders of the VWP believed that theSouth Vietnamese state created by the French in 1949 would not long survivethe political process set in motion by the Geneva Agreement.30 The titularhead-of-state in the South, Emperor Bao Dai, was unpopular and was per-ceived on both sides of the seventeenth parallel as a French stooge. Accord-ingly, North Vietnamese leaders were conªdent that their side would win theupcoming elections and would reunify the nation under their authority. Theybelieved that even if the Southern regime and its French allies tried to sabo-tage the agreement and boycott or cancel the elections, such efforts would failunder the weight of popular pressure. Thus, the North Vietnamese leaderswere convinced that reuniªcation would come peacefully and in a relativelyshort time, probably before 1957.31 DRVN President Ho Chi Minh was sin-cere when he heralded the Geneva Agreement as a “big victory” (thang loilon). The settlement, Ho insisted, had compelled the French to “recognize theindependence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of our country.”32

The VWP Central Committee subsequently reiterated this view, adding in apublic declaration that the Geneva Agreement was a “great victory” (thangloi vi dai) for the people and the armed forces of Vietnam. For the VWP, thevictory was doubly pleasing. Not only did it mark the collapse of French mili-tary power in Indochina, but it also signaled “the defeat of the American im-perialists’ plan to transform Indochina into an American colonial outpost andmilitary base.”33 Unlike Ho, whose statement on the subject made no refer-ence to the United States, the VWP Central Committee voiced concern aboutU.S. intentions. Acknowledging that the French position in Indochina gener-ally and in Vietnam speciªcally had been undermined by Dien Bien Phu andthe Geneva Agreement, the VWP Central Committee nevertheless warnedthat the future of the revolution remained uncertain and that the people, thearmy, and the party must remain vigilant and keep “their ªghting spirit” well

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30. See Dang Cong san Viet Nam, Van kien Dang—Toan tap, Vol. 15, 1954 (Hanoi: Nha xuat banChinh tri quoc gia, 2001) (hereinafter referred to as VKD with years covered). See also William J. Dui-ker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 181.

31. Janos Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes, and Diplomatic One-Upmanship in Viet-nam (South Bend, IN: Gateway Editions, 1978), p. 14. Radvanyi was a Hungarian diplomat who reg-ularly dealt with North Vietnamese counterparts.

32. “Loi kieu goi sau khi Hoi nghi Gionevo thanh cong, ngay 22 thang 7 nam 1954,” in VKD, 1954,p. 229.

33. “Loi kieu goi cua Ban Chap hanh Truong uong Dang Lao dong Viet Nam, ngay 25 thang 7 nam1954,” in VKD, 1954, p. 234. “By their intervention in Indo-China,” Prime Minister Pham VanDong added later, “the American imperialists pursued the aim to gradually oust the French from Indo-China and turn Indo-China into an American colony.” Quoted in American Imperialism’s Interventionin Viet Nam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), p. 21.

honed in case the United States tried to sabotage the peace process establishedby the settlement.34

In contrast to the optimism expressed by leaders in Hanoi, revolutionar-ies in the South were dismayed by the outcome of the Geneva negotiations. Intheir view, the agreement did nothing to help the revolution in the South anda great deal to harm it. The source of their immediate concern was the provi-sions concerning South Vietnam. By giving France and the SOVN jurisdic-tion over everything below the seventeenth parallel, including areas already“liberated” by revolutionary forces, it nulliªed the results of years of strugglewhile legitimating the SOVN. “Our armed forces had to regroup and retreatto the North,” a Vietnamese source later noted. As a result of the GenevaAgreement, “large liberated areas and revolutionary bases fell under enemycontrol, where our people had to live under the cruel yoke” of the Southernregime and its American ally.35 Many of the revolutionaries, in the words ofanother account, experienced “a profound sense of frustration in having to ac-cept not only the partition of the country, but a sudden halt to a march to-ward the victory of the Revolution.”36 Instead of waiting for the problematicresults of the political processes devised in Geneva, insurgents operating in theSouth “wanted to continue ªghting until complete victory or ªghting for awhile longer to pressure the enemy into making further concessions.”37

Ho Chi Minh himself eventually acknowledged the validity of these assess-ments before the VWP Central Committee.38

The Southerners believed that the forced retreat of revolutionary forcesfrom the South as mandated by the Geneva Agreement meant that VWPleaders in Hanoi had essentially abandoned the South. The surrender of areasthat had been “liberated” at great cost was particularly difªcult to accept.Although the war against the French and their indigenous allies had beenwaged under Northern leadership and by a predominantly Northern army,thousands of Southerners had contributed to the effort. Now, after the cessa-tion of hostilities in July 1954, those men and women had little to show fortheir efforts and sacriªce. The tradeoff of concrete assets for the promises of a

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34. “Loi kieu goi cua Ban Chap hanh Truong uong Dang Lao dong Viet Nam, ngay 25 thang 7 nam1954,” in VKD, 1954, p. 236.

35. Vien Lich su Dang—Hoi dong bien soan lich su Nam Trung bo khang chien, Nam Trung bokhang chien, 1945–1975 (Hanoi: Tong cong ty phat hanh sach Lien ket xuat ban, 1992), p. 237.

36. Philippe Franchini, Les guerres d’Indochine, Vol.2, De la bataille de Dien Bien Phu à la chute deSaïgon (Paris: Éditions Pygmalion/Gérard Watelet, 1988), p. 151.

37. Vien Lich su Dang—Hoi dong bien soan lich su Nam Trung bo khang chien, Nam Trung bokhang chien, p. 238.

38. See Duiker, Communist Road to Power, p. 172.

political process in which they had no faith was not an exchange that South-ern revolutionaries made willingly.

Hanoi tried to assuage these concerns by repeatedly assuring the South-erners that the setbacks were tactical and temporary and the reuniªcation ofthe nation under revolutionary leadership was a foregone conclusion. TheSoutherners were unmoved, and they increasingly viewed the VWP as aNorthern-dominated organization willing to advance the interests of theNorth at the expense of those of the South. Some of them quit the VWP inprotest and joined other nationalist organizations more concerned with theadvancement of Southern interests.39 As these developments unfolded, Hanoiremained committed to the Geneva Agreement and to the process of peacefulreuniªcation it entailed.

When the Geneva Agreement was signed, DRVN leaders had not yet setforth their position on the agreement’s provisions and had not instructedparty cadres on their responsibilities in the new phase of the revolution. In thedays and weeks that followed, the VWP laid out its position in increasinglyspeciªc terms. On 27 July 1954, VWP First Secretary Truong Chinh toldparty cadres that “our nationalist struggle has entered a new era” and “becomea political struggle to consolidate peace.”40 In revolutionary terminology, thismeant that the VWP would forgo military activity and instead use politicsand diplomacy to implement the settlement and achieve revolutionary goals.Hanoi’s stance, according to the historian Robert Brigham, manifested its“willingness to persuade legal and semi-legal organizations to agitate for im-plementation of the political provisions of the Geneva Accords.”41 The deci-sion to abandon the military struggle also signaled Hanoi’s acceptance of the“Moscow line.”42 Anxious to reduce Cold War tensions after the death of JosifStalin the previous year, the Soviet Union had been hoping to avert a resump-tion of war in Vietnam. For Moscow, the easing of tensions in Indochina cre-ated an important opportunity to reduce East-West tensions in the Cold Wargenerally. Although the Soviet political line may have inºuenced Hanoi’s deci-sion, satisfying the interests of the USSR was ultimately not a priority for theVWP.43 Although Soviet leaders welcomed North Vietnam’s decision to sus-

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39. Bhabani Sen Gupta, “The Soviet Union and Vietnam,” International Studies (New Delhi), No. 4(October–December 1973), p. 560.

40. “Chi thi cua Ban bi thu, ngay 27 thang 7 nam 1954: Tuyen truyen ve nhung Hiep dinh cua Hoinghi Gionevo—Tinh hinh va nhiem vu moi,” in VKD, 1954, p. 238.

41. Robert K. Brigham, “Why the South Won the American War in Vietnam,” in Marc Jason Gilbert,ed., Why the North Won the Vietnam War (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 100.

42. Ibid., p. 101.

43. A similar claim regarding Hanoi’s decision to abide by the terms of the agreement is presented in

pend military activity in favor of peaceful struggle, and although Moscowjoined Beijing in urging Hanoi to abide by the Geneva Agreement and avoidgiving the Americans a pretext to intervene, the VWP decided primarily forits own reasons to accept the agreement and work for its implementation. TheVWP chose peace—that is, to discontinue the military struggle—mainly be-cause that was the sensible approach to take under the circumstances.Avoiding war for the time being was crucial for several reasons.44

First, the armed forces had been exhausted by the war with France andneeded to regroup for a possible U.S. intervention in Indochina. In the imme-diate aftermath of Dien Bien Phu, the revolutionary forces would have beenhard pressed to continue the war against the French, much less against anAmerican army equipped with superior weaponry and other resources. Ac-cording to the revolutionary army’s own account, “the majority of our weap-ons and equipment were infantry weapons, which were not uniform in quan-tity or type and were of poor quality.” Many of the armaments “wereunserviceable, and they were technically obsolete when compared to equip-ment used by other armies around the world.” In addition, the army’s techni-cal support facilities “were very poor.”45 Regardless of what VietnameseCommunists thought about the United States, they were mindful of U.S. mil-itary might and the ability of the United States to destabilize the region andundermine the revolution.

Second, peace would give the DRVN desperately needed time to consoli-date itself politically and economically. From 1938 to 1954, North Vietnam’spopulation had increased by 50 percent to 15,300,000 at the same time thatannual rice production had declined from 3.5 million to 2.5 million tonslargely because of disruptions caused ªrst by the Japanese invasion and thenby the war against the French. More people and less food spelled trouble forDRVN leaders and compelled them to rely heavily on assistance from theUSSR and the PRC.46 Moreover, the long period of almost continuous warand disruption had led to a dire economic situation. The North Vietnamese

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Duiker, Communist Road to Power, p. 172. The paucity of references to Moscow’s foreign policy objec-tives in the Vietnamese documentary record also suggests that the VWP was not mainly concernedabout satisfying Soviet interests.

44. According to Carlyle Thayer, Hanoi’s decision to accept the Geneva Agreement “was not withoutcontroversy,” and disagreement within the VWP was “rife.” See Thayer, War by Other Means, pp. 7, 8.Although little is known about some of the VWP’s internal debates, including this one, King C. Chenhas argued that General Vo Nguyen Giap and other VWP leaders had strong reservations about end-ing the war through negotiations. See King C. Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938–1954 (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 294–295.

45. Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Ofªcial History of the People’s Army of Viet-nam, 1954–1975, trans. by Merle Pribbenow (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002),pp. 9–10.

46. Franchini, Les guerres d’Indochine, pp. 170, 177.

estimated that 57 percent of urban workers at this time had no formal train-ing in vocational skills, in part because most of them were former peasants, re-cently demobilized soldiers, or both. The lack of training and the absence ofan individual work ethic resulted in an average rate of worker absenteeismabove 20 percent.47 Years of war had also taken their toll on the state’s physicalinfrastructure. Roads outside large cities were in generally poor condition, aswere bridges everywhere. The French-built rail system was in even worseshape because revolutionary forces had routinely targeted railways duringthe recent wars to disrupt the movement of enemy forces and supplies. Railconnections to China that carried food and other assistance, including vitallinks between Pingxiang and Dong Dang, Longzhou and Cao Bang, andFangcheng and Mon Cay, were in particularly poor condition and in need ofrepair or reconstruction. The restoration of these links was especially pressingbecause North Vietnam was dependent on imports from China for its survivaland recovery from war.48

The disastrous consequences of rural land redistribution and forced agri-cultural collectivization, the brainchild of First Secretary Truong Chinh andmodeled after similar programs in the PRC, compounded the DRVN’s eco-nomic problems. These policies were key components of the VWP’s effort tocreate a socialist Vietnam. The aim was to abolish “feudal” agrarian practicesby eliminating landlordism and tenancy, redistributing land, and setting upcollective farms. The program failed so miserably that it further dislocated theeconomy, produced widespread disenchantment among peasants, and, ac-cording to Edwin Moise, prevented the VWP from paying close attention todevelopments below the seventeenth parallel.49 In crisis-prone Nghe An Prov-ince, for example, the collectivization campaign provoked a bloody rebellionamong peasants at Quynh Luu. Many of the rebels were Catholics, and themilitary forces that were sent to quell the unrest consisted mostly of exiledSouthern guerrillas embittered by having to give up revolutionary gains they

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47. Raymond Toinet, Une guerre de trente-cinq ans: Indochine-Vietnam, 1940–1975 (Paris: Lavauzelle,1998), p. 225.

48. “The absence of an appropriate technical framework [encadrement technique compétent],” one his-torian wrote, “will ªnd only a partial solution in the assistance [provided] by fraternal countries and,especially, in the formation of the Vietnamese themselves.” See Franchini, Les guerres d’Indochine,p. 177. Despite receiving economic assistance from China, the DRVN steered clear of entering into aformal alliance with either China or the USSR, a step that would have violated the terms of theGeneva settlement.

49. This is one of the primary conclusions in Edwin E. Moise, Land Reform in China and North Viet-nam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,1983). On the land reform effort generally, see also Christine P. White, “Agrarian Reform andNational Liberation in the Vietnamese Revolution: 1920–957,” Ph.D. Diss., Cornell University,1981.

had made in the South.50 The exiled insurgents had no ties to the Northernpopulation and were loyal only to the VWP. Hence, during the land-reformcampaign, the exiles were often deployed by the North Vietnamese authori-ties to crush resistance.51 Such measures intensiªed popular resentmentagainst land reform and against the ofªcials responsible for it, includingHo Chi Minh.52

Third, North Vietnamese leaders believed that their own example inhonoring the Geneva Agreement would encourage the other side to do like-wise, paving the way for peaceful reuniªcation and fulªllment of revolution-ary objectives. Ofªcials in Hanoi ªgured that even if the settlement collapsedand war broke out because of violations by the other side, this would make iteasier to convince Vietnamese on both sides of the seventeenth parallel of thelegality as well as the righteousness of the VWP’s cause. If the revolutionaryforces showed restraint and endeavored to keep the peace in the face of enemyviolations, they would also make world opinion more sympathetic than itwould otherwise be, thus facilitating the mobilization of moral, diplomatic,and material support abroad. Hanoi would enhance its credibility and itscause if it could cast itself as a victim of aggression.

Finally, and perhaps most important, North Vietnamese leaders believedthat peace under the Geneva Agreement would be more promising thanwar as a vehicle for encouraging national reconciliation after reuniªcation.Leaders in Hanoi were aware that the French and their American allies had forsome time been playing “divide and conquer,” actively recruiting Vietnameseto ªght their war against Vietnamese revolutionaries. Through the creation ofthe SOVN and its pro-French army, the French had damaged the revolution-ary cause by changing the nature of the conºict in Vietnam from an anti-colonial resistance to a war between conºicting Cold War ideologies. TheSOVN had held its ªrst military draft and founded a military academy at DaLat in 1950. By 1954, many non-Communist Vietnamese, including manynationalists, had come to regard the SOVN and its government as legitimatepolitical entities despite continued French tutelage and even interference, andthey saw no reason to continue ªghting Hanoi’s battles. Radical nationalists,including most Communists, saw the situation differently. For them, the typeof independence the French permitted the SOVN was unsatisfactory, andthey continued their struggle. The role of SOVN forces in the military phaseof the Franco-Vietnamese war gave that conºict a veneer of civil war.53 By

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50. Franchini, Les guerres d’Indochine, p. 181.

51. Zasloff, Political Motivation, pp. 44–45.

52. Ibid., p. 50.

53. More than forty years ago, Jean Lacouture convincingly argued, in Vietnam between Two Truces

1954, more than 300,000 men had joined or been drafted into the SOVNarmed forces, and nearly one-ªfth of them (58,877) had been killed or de-clared missing. Additionally, from 1946 to 1954, 26,923 Indochinese service-men in the CEFEO—many of whom were Vietnamese from the South—hadalso been killed or declared missing. That Vietnamese had been killing Viet-namese for a long time and in large numbers was detrimental to the VWPcause.54 In opting for peace under the Geneva Agreement, the VWP hoped toforestall further internecine conºict and thereby improve the prospects for asmooth transition to national unity.

Resuming hostilities was also unappealing because the seventeenth paral-lel was a historical “fault line” between the two Vietnams. Starting in the eigh-teenth century, when Vietnam began to take its present form, the two halvesof the country had been variously hostile toward or suspicious of each other.For much of the eighteenth century, warfare resulting from a feud betweentwo aristocratic families, the Trinh based in Hanoi and the Nguyen in theSouth, divided the nation along sectional lines that hardened over time.55

During the colonial era, the division grew more pronounced as a result of theconcentration of the French presence in Cochinchina, which Paris favored inmatters of economic and infrastructural development to the relative neglect ofthe rest of the country. What is more, the French-imposed division of the na-tion into three administrative districts (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina)largely undermined Vietnamese nationalism, which was already nascent whenthe French intervened in Indochina in the middle of the nineteenth century.The “devitalization” of Vietnam, as one scholar has argued, began under theFrench when they effectively destroyed “the constructive economic link[le lien économique efªcace]” between the Red and Mekong river deltas,thereby removing the primary connector between northern and southernVietnam.56 Thereafter, Northerners and Southerners were no longer condi-tioned to see each other as extensions of themselves. Given this long history ofprovincialism, the resumption of hostilities by Hanoi after the Geneva Agree-ment could easily have been interpreted by Southerners as Northern aggres-sion and encouraged many of them to view the SOVN and its allies moresympathetically. Moreover, North Vietnamese leaders understood that undersuch circumstances, mobilization of the populace in the North would be chal-

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(New York: Random House, 1965), p. 9, that the creation of the SOVN transformed the Vietnameseconºict into a civil war.

54. Yves Gras, Histoire de la guerre d’Indochine (Paris: Denoël, 1992), pp. 578–579; and Dommen,Indochinese Experience, p. 252.

55. Charles Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays d’Annam, 1592–1820 (Paris: Plon, 1920), pp. 13–25.

56. Hugues Tertais, “L’impact économique et ªnancier des deux guerres d’Indochine,” in Charles-Robert Ageron and Philippe Devillers, eds., Les guerres d’Indochine de 1945 à 1975, No. 36 (Paris:Cahiers de l’Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent, 1996), p. 222.

lenging. As Philippe Franchini writes: “The patriotic motives invoked [duringthe First Indochina War] would not this time have the same impact becausethe state in the South was independent and the American presence couldnot as a matter of fact be compared to an occupation of the neo-colonialtype.”57

Initial Steps to Uphold the Geneva Agreement

Having resolved to renounce war for the time being, the leaders of the VWPsought to convince the party’s southern cadres that this was the correct strate-gic move. They instructed all party members to respect the letter and spirit ofthe Geneva Agreement and to avoid hostilities. The revolution must continue“according to a peaceful approach [phuong phap hoa binh],” Hanoi instructed.For now, the pressing task was to “explain the present situation” to membersand masses alike and to impress on everyone the importance of avoiding vio-lent action even in the face of provocations by the enemy. “Our people mustcontinue their protracted and arduous struggle by peaceful methods,” theVWP insisted, “in order to consolidate peace and achieve reuniªcation, totalindependence, and democracy throughout the nation.”58 Shortly after theseinitial directives, the VWP First Secretary elaborated on them, emphasizingthe necessity for revolutionary forces to refrain from hindering the Genevapeace process or otherwise adversely affecting the political situation in theSouth. Any actions that obstructed the agreement, the First Secretary warned,would legitimate the desire of the Americans and their SOVN and French al-lies to thwart peaceful reuniªcation. VWP ofªcials called on supporters of therevolution to court Vietnamese who were traditionally friendly to Westerninterests, including Catholics and those who had served in the colonial ad-ministration, and let them know that the VWP and the DRVN governmentfully supported the Geneva settlement and the peace and reuniªcation itpromised.59

These instructions became part of a broad campaign to win the heartsand minds of people in both halves of Vietnam. In a missive dated 31 August1954, Truong Chinh instructed cadres in the North to keep close watch overthe movement of people from the South to the North under the regroupmentprogram authorized by the Geneva Agreement. Such people might inºuence

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57. Franchini, Les guerres d’Indochine, p. 190.

58. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 27 thang 7 nam 1954,” pp. 238–241.

59. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 30 thang 7 nam 1954: Ve viec chap hanh lenh dinh chien,” in VKD,1954, pp. 248–249.

the results of the general elections scheduled for 1956, and the VWP wantedthem to be treated generously. Kindness toward these people would, TruongChinh hoped, have a “very big inºuence” (anh huong rat lon) on the spirit of“southern compatriots” and increase the prospects for peaceful reuniªcationunder VWP leadership.60 Some 50,000 to 80,000 of an estimated 90,000Southern supporters of the revolution regrouped to the North after July 1954.Those who remained were directed by Hanoi to uphold the terms of the set-tlement and serve “as a hedge against the failure of the uniªcation of Viet-nam” if the agreement collapsed.61 Upon arriving in the North, maleregroupees of appropriate age received military or other practical training, andtheir families had access to a variety of educational, economic, and social op-portunities. Despite these efforts, many regroupees eventually regretted theirdecision to move to the North. They had been forced to sever their ties withfriends and family and in time had developed feelings of homesickness and re-morse. Others developed feelings of alienation, as Vietnamese parochialismmade it difªcult for them to integrate into Northern society. Even within thearmed forces, Southerners found it difªcult to bond with their Northerncomrades. “The Northerners stayed with Northerners, the Southernerswith Southerners,” one regroupee later commented. “They didn’t mingle eas-ily.”62

Another concern was the regrouping of signiªcant numbers of Northern-ers to the South. VWP leaders believed that the French and the SOVN gov-ernment were enticing (du do) or pressuring (bat ep) Northerners, especiallyCatholics, to move to the South as part of a strategy to inºuence the politicalsituation there by “gathering a few more votes for the upcoming elections.”Undermining the French/SOVN strategy by limiting the number of North-erners who chose to regroup to the South was thus a “pressing struggle” forthe VWP.63 In and around Hanoi alone, more than 30,000 people signed upfor emigration to the South, including 7,373 who left within days after theGeneva Agreement became effective.64 To thwart this movement, the VWPFirst Secretary urged cadres at all levels to work cooperatively with Catholicand other organizations that enjoyed inºuence among potential regroupees.

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60. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 31 thang 8 nam 1954: Ve viec don tiep bo doi, thuong binh, ot socan bo va dong bao mien Nam ra Bac,” in VKD, 1954, p. 259.

61. Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam (New York: Da Capo Press, 1991), p. 41; and Dui-ker, Communist Road to Power, p. 183.

62. Quoted in Zasloff, Political Motivation, p. 59.

63. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 5 thang 9 nam 1954: Ve viec dau tranh chong Phap va bon NgoDinh Diem du do va bat ep mot so dong bao ta vao mien Nam,” in VKD, 1954, pp. 263–264.

64. Dang Cong san Viet Nam—Ban Chap hanh Dang bo thanh pho Ha Noi, Lich su Dang bo thanhpho Ha Noi, 1954–1975 (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Ha Noi, 1995), p. 10.

Cadres were to assure these organizations that the party would protect religionand freedom of belief. Gaining the trust of the sizable Catholic communitiesin Bui Chu and Phat Diem was a major objective for the VWP. Those com-munities included staunch military and political supporters of the Frenchduring the 1946–1954 war. The leaders of the VWP now sought to co-optthem and other Vietnamese Catholics by relying on pro-VWP Catholics tospread information favorable to the party and the DRVN. In September 1954the party made a further effort to curry favor in Bui Chu and Phat Diem byenacting a suspension there of reductions in land rents and land redistribution(central features of the agrarian reform program) and allowing the circulationof foreign currencies, including Southern currency, prohibited in the rest ofthe DRVN. More signiªcant, the VWP also ordered the return of propertyseized from Catholic organizations and the release of clergy members thenunder house arrest.65 Shortly thereafter, Truong Chinh directed cadres in theNorth to help their “Catholic compatriots” prepare for and celebrate Christ-mas. “Christmas has a peaceful meaning,” he wrote, and celebrating the holi-day offered party members an opportunity to “generate an atmosphere ofhappiness in Catholic areas” and “make our [Catholic] compatriots under-stand our Government’s correct execution of the religious policy” of freedomof belief. The directive also instructed party members to keep an eye onpriests and report any of them who encouraged their followers to regroup tothe South.66

As the VWP endeavored to improve its political position in the North, italso sought to cultivate a positive relationship with the ICSC. In a revealingletter to party cadres on 26 September 1954, Truong Chinh reviewed thepolitical dispositions of ICSC member-states and stressed the importance ofmaintaining cordial relations with them. The commission, he argued, couldprove helpful if the SOVN or its allies undermined the Geneva Agreement oraccused Hanoi of doing so. Describing Poland as “our friends” and India as“agreeable to peace in Indochina,” Truong Chinh warned that “Canada is[ideologically] close to the United States” and that the presence of Canadianrepresentatives on the commission would likely compromise the GenevaAgreement or otherwise cause problems for Hanoi. Truong Chinh thereforestressed the need for caution while at the same time trying to “develop gooddiplomatic relations with the Canadian representatives.” He urged party cad-res to make every effort to accommodate the Canadians, for doing so would

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65. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 5 thang 9 nam 1954,” pp. 264–270.

66. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 14 thang 12 nam 1954: Ve viec to chuc ngay le Noen cho dong baoCong giao,” in VKD, 1954, p. 403.

“create favorable conditions for the struggle to consolidate peace and achieveour reuniªcation.”67

The VWP Politburo’s September 1954 PositionStatement

In September 1954 the VWP Politburo issued a lengthy and deªnitive state-ment of its policy for dealing with the situation created by the Geneva Agree-ment. Entitled “New Situation, New Responsibilities, and New Policy,” thedocument elaborated on the views already expressed by Truong Chinh andthe VWP Central Committee, offering a list of pressing tasks and fundamen-tal requirements of the “new period” (giai doan moi) needed to preserve peaceand achieve reuniªcation.68 The report speciªed ªve transitions that wouldcharacterize the new period: (1) from war to peace, (2) from national unity topolitical partition (the temporary creation of two Vietnams), (3) from rural tourban life, (4) from decentralization and dispersal to centralization, and(5) from separation to unity of the three Indochinese states. The documentexplained how to implement these transitions in a wide range of domestic andforeign areas, including agricultural production, land reform, industrializa-tion, defense, the situation in southern Vietnam, and relations with neighbor-ing Southeast Asian countries and the United States. The VWP Politburo saidthat although the North was now liberated, the revolutionary struggle wouldcontinue in the South, where Vietnamese compatriots were under the “yoke”of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime and its American patrons.69 But the documentstressed that “the mode of struggle [phuong thuc dau tranh] must change” tomeet changed circumstances. It called on revolutionary forces to respect theceaseªre and to shift from “armed struggle [dau tranh vu tranh] to politicalstruggle [dau tranh chinh tri].”

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67. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 26 thang 9 nam 1954: Ve nhiem vu cua cac cap uy Dang o cac diaphuong thuoc bac vi tuyen 17 doi voi Uy ban quoc te,” in VKD, 1954, pp. 320–323.

68. The Politburo issued the resolution at the conclusion of a meeting/conference from 5 to 7 Septem-ber 1954; it is reproduced as “Nghi Quyet cua Bo chinh tri: Ve tinh hinh moi, nhiem vu moi va chinhsach moi cua Dang,” in VKD, 1954, pp. 283–315.

69. Diem became prime minister of the SOVN on 19 June 1954 and, by imperial decree, received fullcivil and military authority. A Catholic from central Vietnam, he had served as minister of the interiorunder the French and had become a well-known mandarin-administrator. After his resignation, hispopularity and prestige among southern nationalists soared. Frustrated by conditions in Vietnam, hetraveled to the United States and studied at a seminary in New Jersey in 1952. There, CardinalSpellman, the archbishop of New York City and head chaplain of the U.S. armed forces, andSpellman’s successor, Cardinal Cook, took notice of Diem and recommended that Washington sup-port his bid for power in the South. Among the most recent and well-researched works on Diem isPhilip E. Catton, Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam (Lawrence, KS: UniversityPress of Kansas, 2002).

The VWP Politburo indicated that, above the seventeenth parallel, theparty and the people must foster conditions conducive to reuniªcation, inde-pendence, and democracy for all three Indochinese states. To revive the econ-omy from the damage inºicted by many years of war and foreign occupation,they must increase agricultural production through land redistribution, pro-mote industrial growth, and take other steps to improve living standards andthe quality of life. The party must also facilitate national unity by not interfer-ing in religious matters and by otherwise encouraging social harmony. Thisemphasis on the North and Northern concerns suggests that within the newmode of political struggle the VWP was pursuing a “North First” policy. In-deed, the Politburo document was far more speciªc about the tasks and re-sponsibilities facing the revolutionary movement in the North than aboutanything to do with the South. By the autumn of 1954, the authorities inHanoi realized that development and reform in the North were essential toconsolidate the revolution. Fortifying the gains of the revolution above theseventeenth parallel while improving standards of living would enhance theparty’s image during the campaign for national uniªcation. Beyond satisfyingimmediate needs, the effort would lay the foundation for the establishment ofa socialist economy after the “liberation” of the South.70

With respect to the situation in southern Vietnam, the VWP Politburodocument was much less substantive, reiterating earlier pleas to revolutionarycadres there to observe the peace and work to implement the Geneva Agree-ment. “Your situation is very complex,” the Politburo said to its Southernsubordinates, urging them for the time being to limit their activism to thepromotion of peaceful reuniªcation while preparing the South Vietnamesepeople for a more active struggle against the Diem regime.71

As part of a united-front strategy, the Politburo called for close collabora-tion with friendly elements in Laos and Cambodia. Although the Genevaagreements effectively abolished “Indochina” as a political entity, party leadersstill believed that the fate of the Vietnamese nation and the revolution waslinked to that of the peoples of Laos and Cambodia.72 Perhaps the war thatended in 1954 had convinced them that Vietnam’s national security and terri-

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70. On this point, see “Thong tri cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 22 thang 11 nam 1954: Ve may viec can dechinh don bien che trong quan doi,” in VKD, 1954, pp. 370–372.

71. Ban chi dao tong ket chien tranh truc thuoc Bo chinh tri, Chien tranh cach mang Viet Nam, 1945–1975: Thang loi va bai hoc (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 2000), p. 88; and Trung tamKhoa xa hoi va nhan van quoc gia—Vien su hoc, Lich su Viet Nam, 1954–1965 (Hanoi: Nha xuat banKhoa hoc xa hoi), pp. 54–65, 179–180.

72. Party leaders, a former VWP cadre asserted in a recent memoir, “always considered Indochina asone geographical entity and a single battleªeld.” See Bui Tin, From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnam-ese Perspective on the War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002), p. 11.

torial integrity hinged on the political situations in Laos and Cambodia andthat Vietnam could not be free and secure from outside interference unless itswestern neighbors were equally free and secure. That conclusion was by nomeans unreasonable. Vietnam, which at its narrowest point is no more thanforty miles wide, had long been vulnerable to circumstances in the rest of theIndochinese peninsula. Moreover, the borders of the three states had neverbeen deªnitively drawn and over time had been mutable and ºuid. Until theFrench imposed themselves on the region, borders on the Indochinese penin-sula had shifted on numerous occasions over two thousand years. The regionhad always been characterized by a dynamic of its own, much of it attribut-able to the expansionist designs of successive Vietnamese leaders. Indeed,Vietnam itself as a political entity had been forged out of territory originallybelonging to the Cham, Lao, and Khmer peoples.73 By some accounts, if theFrench had not intervened during the nineteenth century, the Vietnamesealong with the Thais to the west would have swallowed up what remained ofCambodia after the Vietnamese had taken from it the rich and fertile MekongRiver delta in the late eighteenth century.74 As students of history, VWP lead-ers knew that Vietnam had thrived historically partly because of its people’ssuccess in encroaching on and absorbing territory belonging to the country’sneighbors. They therefore had no compelling reason to assume that Vietnamcould “evolve” properly unless they took account of what was occurring else-where on the peninsula. Nor could they assume that the Geneva Agreementon Vietnam could be fully implemented unless the related accords on Laosand Cambodia were also carried out.75

Regarding other international matters, the VWP Politburo asked itssupporters to work with “progressives” in France and elsewhere to assure theimplementation of the Geneva agreements and the reuniªcation of Vietnam.Mobilizing world opinion on behalf of the revolution was fundamental tospread it to the South. World opinion would be especially important if thepeace and reuniªcation efforts failed amid international controversies overwho was responsible for the failure.

Until the failure of the Geneva accords became irreversible in late 1956,

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73. See Dao Duy Anh, Viet Nam van hoa sa cuong (Paris: Sudestasie, 1985), pp. 33–35.

74. At the end of the ªrst millennium CE, the Khmer empire was the grandest in Southeast Asia andone of the greatest in the world. After the Thais sacked its capital in the ªfteenth century, the Khmernation entered a period of gradual decline and lost signiªcant portions of territory to the Thais andthe Vietnamese.

75. On the historical and political evolution of the Indochinese peninsula, see Pierre-Bernard Lafont,ed., Les frontières du Vietnam: Histoire des frontières de la peninsule indochinoise (Paris: L’Harmattan,1989); and Michel Blanchard, Vietnam-Cambodge: Une frontière contestée (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999),pp. 33–50.

the VWP Politburo’s September 1954 document remained the basis of partypolicy. In the context of the immediate post-Geneva period, it was the mostconsequential document produced by any of the VWP branches on theGeneva Agreement.

Efforts to Implement the Document

Within the parameters of the September 1954 Politburo document, the VWPinstructed the Central Ofªce for Southern Vietnam (COSVN; Trung uongCuc mien Nam), its arm below the seventeenth parallel, to exploit contradic-tions (mau thuan) there between the French and the Americans. North Viet-namese leaders correctly sensed that despite the common goal of creating apro-Western, non-Communist state in the South, the French and the Ameri-cans disagreed about important matters, including governance structures andthe role of the military therein. Having learned that the chief-of-staff of theSOVN army, General Nguyen Van Hinh, a “stooge [con bai] of the Frenchcolonial reactionaries,” disapproved of Ngo Dinh Diem, a “stooge of theAmericans,” the VWP Politburo directed its Southern operatives to try to ex-ploit that enmity and, by extension, the differences between the Americansand the French. The goal was to foster the creation of a new government inthe South that “cared relatively little about the Americans [tuong doi it thanMy].”76

North Vietnamese leaders understood that France was obliged to give theUnited States a voice in South Vietnamese affairs because of the material assis-tance the Americans provided to the Saigon regime. They also understoodthat French ofªcials resented U.S. involvement because they regardedIndochina as being within France’s exclusive sphere of inºuence. The Frenchauthorities particularly resented Washington’s designation of Diem, a staunchanti-Communist who despised France’s mission civilisatrice, to head theSouthern government. The VWP Politburo, having surmised that the Frenchwere worried that the Americans were trying to edge them out of the region,sought to capitalize on the resulting tensions between the two powers. Amongother initiatives, the Politburo suggested spreading disinformation and inªl-trating the Southern regime and its armed forces.77 For the time being, how-ever, the most pressing task was to “coordinate legal and illegal political activi-ties closely, but give primary emphasis to the illegal work, and at the same

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76. “Dien cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 6 thang 10 nam 1954: Ve nhan dinh tinh hinh va chu truong cong tacmoi,” in VKD, 1954, pp. 327–328.

77. Ibid., pp. 328–329.

time take full advantage of every legal and semi-legal opportunity to propa-gandize and educate the masses on a large scale.”78

In the face of mounting difªculties in the South, the VWP Central Com-mittee called in mid-December 1954 for intensiªcation of the propagandacampaign against the Americans, denouncing them for intervening inIndochina and sabotaging the Geneva agreements, while disparaging theirFrench and Vietnamese “lackeys” for perªdy. In a parallel effort, the VWP un-dertook to spread its views among the people of South Vietnam. These mea-sures were responses to the disillusion felt by many Southern revolutionariesabout the political struggle. “We must overcome subjective, remorseful,” and“pessimistic” and “faltering” thoughts, the VWP urged. Perhaps most impor-tant, supporters of the revolution had to overcome “fear of the Americans”and “lack of belief in the triumph of the political struggle.” To dissuade revo-lutionary elements from resorting to violence, the VWP Central Committeerepeated earlier warnings about the importance of respecting the ceaseªre.“We must give all our attention to protecting the foundation [laid by theagreement], avoiding provocations, [and] avoiding manifestations of force.”The Central Committee called on party leaders in the South to promotepeace more actively, making use of such slogans as “Vietnamese do not killVietnamese” (nguoi Viet Nam khong ban giet nguoi Viet Nam).79

Growing Strains on the Accord

Despite such efforts, the situation in the South continued to deteriorate, mak-ing increasingly obvious the shortcomings of the VWP’s policy. Southern rev-olutionary leaders tried their best to follow that policy, praising its merits innewspapers, magazines, and public meetings.80 Privately, however, they neveragreed with the policy, and their disaffection grew as the shortcomings be-came more evident. Vo Chi Cong, a prominent Southern revolutionaryleader, admitted as much in a recent memoir. Hanoi’s acceptance of theGeneva Agreement, according to Cong, effectively nulliªed all the gains therevolutionary forces had achieved below the seventeenth parallel, and it wastherefore detrimental to the revolution generally. Equally disconcerting

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78. Quoted in Trung tam Khoa xa hoi va nhan van quoc gia—Vien su hoc, Lich su Viet Nam, p. 179.See also Dang Cong san Viet Nam, Nhung su kien lich su Dang, Vol. III (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Thongtin ly luan, 1985), pp. 12–13.

79. “Chi thi cua Ban Chap hanh Trung uong, ngay 17 thang 12 nam 1954: Tuyen truyen van dongmanh dau tranh chong de quoc My can thiep vao Dong Duong va pha hoai Hiep dinh dinh chien,” inVKD, 1954, pp. 409–419.

80. Vo Chi Cong, Tren nhung chang duong cach mang (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia,2001), pp. 148–152.

to Southerners was Hanoi’s insistence that all the provisions of the settlementbe observed and violence foresworn, even when the enemy resorted to it. Rev-olutionaries in the South argued that in light of the duplicitous history ofFrench colonialists and the Cold War mindset of U.S. ofªcials, it was naive toassume that either group would permit the reuniªcation of Vietnam under aVWP-led government. They feared that this misplaced optimism, evennaïveté, would result in the loss of the South for the people and setbacks forthe revolution.81

Southern leaders shared some of their reservations with Hanoi. Followinga discussion of the VWP Politburo’s September 1954 policy pronouncement,the Executive Committee of Region IV (essentially Quang Tri and ThuaThien provinces) in the South suggested to Hanoi that the new policy was notin the best interest of the revolution because it left Southern revolutionaries atthe mercy of enemy violence. Sustaining a purely political struggle in theSouth, the Region IV leaders insisted, would be “extremely difªcult and com-plex,” especially in the “Tri Thien” theater, whose people had suffered greatlyduring the Franco-Vietnamese war and now faced further violence. Despitepledging to implement the will of the VWP, the regional party ofªcials madecertain that Hanoi understood the nature and depth of their concern.82

A month later, the Executive Committee of Region V, in the central partof South Vietnam, voiced similar concerns, though in far more explicit lan-guage. After a three-day discussion in October 1954 about the VWP Polit-buro’s document, the regional committee sent a lengthy critique of it to Ha-noi that covered a wide range of issues, such as helping peasants to producehigher yields and encouraging more Northerners in the South to returnhome. The committee’s critique highlighted the priorities of Southern revolu-tionaries after July 1954 and what would be necessary to achieve them. In dis-cussing these issues, the committee pointedly refrained from mentioning themerits or eventual triumph of the political struggle mandated by Hanoi.83

Instead, after making the necessary obeisance to Hanoi’s directive, theRegion V Executive Committee expressed its wariness of enemy intentionsand doubts that reuniªcation could be achieved peacefully. “Our army andgovernmental structure [chinh quyen] have retreated to the North,” the com-mittee told Hanoi. Consequently, the French “enjoy military and political su-

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81. Vien Lich su Dang—Hoi dong bien soan lich su Nam Trung bo khang chien, Nam Trung bokhang chien, pp. 235–236.

82. “Quyet nghi cua Lien Khu uy IV, ngay 26 thang 9 nam 1954: Ve cong tac o Thua Thien va QuangTri (Thi hanh Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri ve tinh hinh moi va nhiem vu cong tac moi cua mien Nam),”in VKD, 1954, pp. 560–562; and Vien Lich su Dang—Hoi dong bien soan lich su Nam Trung bokhang chien, Nam Trung bo khang chien, pp. 227–229.

83. “Nghi quyet Hoi nghi Lien Khu uy V, tu ngay 18 den 21 thang 10 nam 1954,” in VKD, 1954,pp. 577–607.

premacy” in the South, and the people there suffer under a “colonial and feu-dal regime.” The “new situation” created by the Geneva Agreement, thecommittee said, was producing “many difªculties in the task to lead thereuniªcation effort.” In language intimating a sense of betrayal, the critiquereºected the pessimism of revolutionary leaders who knew that the Frenchand their allies would never give up southern Vietnam without a ªght. TheAmericans represented a particularly signiªcant threat, the committeewarned, because they clearly intended to intervene in the South and “carryout the destruction of peace in Indochina.” Working in collusion, the Ameri-cans, the French, and their Vietnamese allies “will not allow us to achievepeace and national reuniªcation through free general elections.” The commit-tee reported that in areas under U.S. control, people were being terrorized,cadres jailed or killed, and revolutionary bases destroyed. Under these circum-stances, the committee advised Hanoi to prepare for “the subversion of thegeneral elections” of 1956 and “the resumption of war.”84

The tone of these warnings reºected the growing frustration of Southernrevolutionaries with Hanoi and its response to the post-Geneva situation.85

Again, however, Hanoi ignored the warnings and concomitant problemsof Southern cadres and instead directed them to continue the regroupment ofrevolutionaries from the South to the North, restructure their ranks with newrecruits, and otherwise adhere to the policy announced earlier by the Polit-buro.86 The leaders of the VWP remained committed to the advancement ofthe political struggle through early 1955. They redoubled their efforts to keepNorthern Catholics from regrouping to the South and launched a wider cam-paign to rally public opinion in and out of Vietnam behind their cause. Theauthorities in Hanoi instructed cadres on both sides of the seventeenth paral-lel as well as North Vietnamese diplomats abroad to publicize the VWP’s con-tinued commitment to the peaceful reuniªcation of the nation despite themachinations of the Americans and their “lackeys” in Saigon to derail thatprocess. North Vietnamese leaders by then were worried that the party’s credi-bility was minimal and that the masses still did not understand the VWP’s in-tentions. They urged party members to ªght harder for “the spirit of the peo-ple [tinh cam dan toc].”87 The ostensible aim was to “make the people in thecountry and the people of the world understand clearly that we have alwaysstrongly advocated peace” and the scrupulous implementation of the agree-

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84. Ibid., pp. 577–581.

85. Ibid., p. 580.

86. Vo Chi Cong, Tren nhung chang duong, pp. 163–165.

87. “Nghi quyet cua Ban Bi thu so 03-NQ/TW, ngay 29 thang 1 nam 1955, ‘Thanh lap Tieu ban dantoc,’” in VKD, 1955, p. 37.

ment, and that the “opponents of the agreement are the American imperialistsand their puppets.”88 Party leaders argued that because of the increasingly bel-ligerent stance of the enemy, appeals to the global community by “interna-tionalizing” the political struggle had become more important than ever.89

The world must recognize the “wicked intentions” of the enemy and be madeto “feel resentment” toward the hostile forces.90

The VWP was indeed growing more concerned about the United Statesand its role in Vietnam. By March 1955, Hanoi saw the Americans as primar-ily responsible for the failure to carry out the agreement. “The American im-perialists have compelled the French colonialists to betray the agreement andare determined to rely on feudalists and the most reactionary bourgeois col-laborators headed by Ngo Dinh Diem and destroy [the prospects for] peace,uniªcation, independence, [and] democracy in Vietnam.”91 A statement is-sued by the VWP Central Committee at a plenum in March 1955 assertedthat although France and the Diem regime in Saigon were monumentalobstacles to peace, the United States was “the primary and most dangerousenemy [ke thu dau so va nguy hai nhat].”92 Shortly thereafter, the VWP Polit-buro referred to the Americans as “neo-fascists,” adding that Washingtonmight intend to keep Vietnam permanently divided, like Germany andKorea. To avoid that odious prospect, the Politburo advanced a new slogan,“Oppose the Americans, Oppose Diem, Peace, Uniªcation” (Chong My, chongDiem, hoa binh, thong nhat).93

Equally disconcerting for North Vietnamese leaders at this juncture wastheir growing sense that the difªculties they faced in promoting implementa-tion of the agreement were multiplying. After launching the political strugglein mid-1954, the VWP had achieved several successes, but, by its own admis-sion, “the campaign to implement the agreement has had many shortcomings[thieu sot].” Speciªcally, coordination of the effort to implement the agree-

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88. “Dien cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 9 thang 2 nam 1955, gui Xu uy Nam Bo va Lien khu uy V, ve chongam muu dich du do va cuong ep giao dan di cu vao Nam,” in VKD, 1955, p. 54.

89. See “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu so 06-CT/TW, ngay 10 thang 2 nam 1955, ve viec chong hoi nghikhoi xam luoc Dong Nam Ao Bang Coc,” in VKD, 1955, p. 61.

90. “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri so 07-CT/TW, ngay 16 thang 2 nam 1955, day manh dau tranh phaam muu cua dich trong viec du do va cuong ep giao dan di cu vao Nam,” in VKD, 1955, p. 71.

91. “Ket luan cuoc thao luan o Hoi nghi trung uong lan thu bay (Hop tu ngay 3 den ngay 12-3-1955),” in VKD, 1955, p. 177.

92. “Nghi quyet cua Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu bay mo rong, hop tu ngay 3 den ngay 12-3-1955,”in VKD, 1955, p. 207.

93. “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri so 26-CT/TW, ngay 15 thang 6 nam 1955, tinh hinh hon loan o mienNam va nhiem vu cong tac cu the cua chung ta o mien Nam Viet Nam,” in VKD, 1955, pp. 361–362,387.

ment was poor, and local party branches were ineffectually connected toHanoi. Consequently, party policies and plans did not reach lower levels in atimely manner, and “the struggle to implement the agreement is oftentimesbelated and passive, which is why our victory has been limited.”94

Frustrated by existing conditions and intent on placating the growingnumber of detractors in both halves of Vietnam (particularly in the South),the VWP started espousing a different line in the spring of 1955. Althoughparty leaders continued to press for implementation of the agreement andnon-violent struggle, they now claimed that resumption of war must be de-layed at least until the North had been “consolidated” (cung co). In light of thehavoc created by the Americans and their allies below the seventeenth parallel,solidifying the North had become a prerequisite for national reuniªcationbecause only the DRVN could provide the guidance, manpower, and otherresources necessary for success under these changing circumstances. TruongChinh afªrmed in March 1955 that although “our strength resides in the en-tire nation,” the “most essential” priority for the time being was “the northernregion.”95 Ho Chi Minh supported that position, stating in a public addressthat the principal tasks of the VWP included continuing the struggle to im-plement the Geneva provisions, developing stronger leadership at all levels ofthe party, and consolidating the North on every front while intensifying thepolitical struggle in the South.96

The VWP claimed later that another reason for the adoption of the“North First” policy was concern that the enemy might exploit the vulnerabil-ity of the DRVN and attempt to “roll back” the revolution if the party spreadits resources too thin. Truong Chinh argued in a report to party members that“if our northern region is not consolidated, then not only will uniªcation beimpossible” but the Americans and their allies “might use the South as aspringboard to encroach on the North.”97 This assertion by the head of theVWP is remarkable in its suggestion that concern about U.S. intentions hadreached the point that party leaders feared for the very survival of the DRVN.The aim of the political struggle by mid-1955 was no longer promoting im-plementation of the Geneva Agreement; it was saving the revolution generally.

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94. “Tinh hinh hien tai va nhiem vu truoc mat, bao cao cua dong chi Truong Chinh o Hoi nghi Trunguong lan thu bay mo rong (tu 3 den 12-3-1955),” in VKD, 1955, p. 116.

95. Ibid., pp. 129, 135.

96. “Loi khai mac cua Ho Chu tich, ngay 3 thang 3 nam 1955 tai Hoi nghi lan thu bay mo rong BanChap hanh Trung uong Dang Lao dong Viet Nam (khoa II),” in VKD, 1955, p. 93.

97. “Bao cao cua dong chi Truong Chinh tai Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu tam, hop tu ngay 13 den20-8-1955 doan ket nhan dan toan quoc dau tranh de thuc hien thong nhat Viet Nam tren co so doclap va dan chu,” in VKD, 1955, p. 485.

Only after the DRVN had become a viable political entity could the struggleagainst the enemies of the revolution be reoriented. For the time being, theVWP needed peace.

In April 1955, Hanoi issued orders for the creation, consolidation,and organization of guerrilla units throughout the DRVN—a decisionthat suggested fear of an American invasion of the North.98 In the South, theVWP remained committed to the pursuit of the political struggle. In a dis-patch to the Region V Executive Committee, Truong Chinh wrote that theplan of action for the South remained “political and economic struggle, notarmed struggle.” The VWP leader conceded, however, that party memberscould indirectly assist other groups, including criminal organizations andreligious militias, that were actively ªghting the Diem regime and the Ameri-cans.99

On 19 May 1955, voluntary regroupment ended. By that time, theVWP’s attempts to keep Catholics in the North had failed. Most of the north-ern Christians, including the entire communities of Bui Chu and Phat Diem,had decided to “follow the Virgin Mary” and go south. In their new location,they reestablished their communities and, predictably, became dedicated sup-porters of the Southern regime.100 In all, nearly a million Northerners, mostlyCatholics, migrated southward.101 After the regroupees arrived in the Southand after the territory formerly under revolutionary control had been ceded tothe Southern regime, Diem moved to wipe out the revolutionary movementby launching a vigorous anti-Communist campaign across the South.102 Soonthereafter, Diem publicly announced that as a non-signatory to the GenevaAgreement his government was under no obligation to support the 1956 elec-tions and would in fact not participate in them.103 Instead, he held a referen-dum of his own in October 1955 asking the Southern population to make

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98. “Chi thi cua Trung uong so 14-CT/TW, ngay 16 thang 4 nam 1955, ve van de tiep tuc pha ammuu gay phi cua de quoc,” in VKD, 1955, p. 260.

99. “Dien cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 15 thang 5 nam 1955,” in VKD, 1955, p. 299. Such organizations in-cluded the Binh Xuyen criminal syndicate and the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious factions.

100. By one account, Northern regroupees, most of whom were Catholics supportive of Diem, even-tually dominated the South Vietnamese government and armed forces. See Anthony James Joes, TheWar for South Vietnam, 1954–1975 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), p. 36.

101. On the resettlement of Northern Catholics, see Tran Thi Lien, “Les catholiques vietnamiens dansla République du Vietnam (1954–1963),” in Pierre Brocheux, ed., Du conºict d’Indochine aux conºitsindochinois (Paris: Éditions Complexe, 2000), pp. 53–80.

102. By January 1956, Ordinance No. 6 granted South Vietnamese ofªcials carte blanche to incarcer-ate and put to death suspected Communists and other opponents of the regime.

103. The position of Diem’s regime regarding the 1956 elections was articulated in Republic of Viet-nam, The Problem of Reuniªcation in Vietnam (Saigon: Ministry of Information, 1958). On 20 July1954, the day of the signing of the Geneva agreements, Diem declared an ofªcial “day of shame” (jourde la honte). Diem is quoted in Tranh-Minh Tiet, Les relations Americano-Vietnamiennes de Kennedy àNixon, Vol. 1, Kennedy–Ngo Dinh Diem (Paris: Nouvelles Éditions latines, 1971), p. 35.

him head of state in place of Bao Dai “with the mission of installing a demo-cratic regime” below the seventeenth parallel. Despite indications that thevoting was rigged—in some districts the number of ballots cast was greaterthan the number of eligible voters, and the outcome of the vote was 98.2 per-cent in favor of Diem—the referendum nonetheless removed Bao Dai fromofªce and made Diem the head of state as well as the prime minister of a vehe-mently anti-Communist and anti-revolutionary government. The referen-dum therefore enhanced the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Southern re-gime and set the stage for the formal creation of the Republic of Vietnam(RVN). The U.S. Senate’s vote to ratify the treaty creating the Southeast AsiaTreaty Organization in February 1955 formalized the U.S. commitment tothe preservation of a non-communist South Vietnam, completing a series ofsetbacks for the VWP.

In response to these developments, the VWP came under unprecedentedcriticism from its supporters, including harsh condemnations by prominentNortherners who attacked it for the unpardonable Communist sin of dogma-tism.104 The VWP was no longer able to deny the failure of the Geneva Agree-ment and with it the prospect of peaceful reuniªcation under a revolutionarygovernment. Under these circumstances, party leaders reassessed their strategyand allowed for a measured shift of emphasis from political to military strug-gle. This reversal was chieºy the result of the effort of Le Duan, the highest-ranking VWP ofªcial in the South, who presented a stinging critique of theparty’s Southern strategy to the VWP Central Committee on the eve of itsEleventh Plenum in December 1956.105 Entitled De cuong cach mang mienNam (Directions of the Southern Revolution), Le Duan’s report urged theabandonment of the “Geneva line” and the gradual resumption of armedstruggle in light of the mounting setbacks to the revolution in the South.106

After lengthy deliberations, the VWP Central Committee approved a limitedescalation of violent action in the South, and the Politburo soon ratiªed thedecision, thus effectively jettisoning the effort to achieve reuniªcationthrough a purely political, non-violent struggle. The escalation had to begradual, however, because the DRVN was still frail and the VWP could notafford to give the Americans a pretext to attack.107

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104. See Georges Boudarel, Cent ºeurs écloses dans la nuit du Vietnam: Communisme et dissidence1954–1956 (Paris: Jacques Bertoin, 1991).

105. One observer has called Le Duan the “chief ” VWP “critic of Geneva.” See Kevin Ruane, War andRevolution in Vietnam, 1930–75 (London: UCL Press, 1998), p. 41.

106. Vien nghien cuu chu nghia Mac-Lenin va tu tuong Ho Chi Minh, Lich su Dang Cong san VietNam, p. 52; and Le Mau Han, Dang Cong san Viet Nam: Cac Dai hoi va Hoi nghi Trung uong (Hanoi:Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 1995), pp. 73–74.

107. According to historian Philippe Devillers, Diem’s anti-Communist campaign was so effectivethat “if Hanoi had not resolved to resume the armed struggle . . . the prospect for reuniªcation would

The failure of the line adopted by the VWP in the immediate aftermathof the signing of the Geneva Agreement discredited the leaders in Hanoiwhile vindicating Southern critics of the political approach. These and otherdevelopments eventually led to a purge of some of the VWP’s highest ranksand the emergence of new ªgures in the party’s policymaking bodies. In themost notable change of all, the Politburo summoned Le Duan to Hanoi in1957 and made him acting and then permanent First Secretary of the VWP,replacing Truong Chinh.108 As setbacks in the South continued, the “new”leaders began reassessing the party’s approach and soon decided to resort tototal military struggle. Having lost faith in political and diplomatic solutions,the VWP turned to violent struggle in all forms, including acts of terrorismagainst enemy ofªcials, sympathizers, institutions, and communities. Soonthereafter, the VWP began encouraging armed insurrection among theSouthern populace generally, announcing its commitment to the violent over-throw of the Southern regime by proclaiming in December 1960 the found-ing of the National Liberation Front of Southern Vietnam (NLF; Mat trandan toc gia phong mien Nam Viet Nam), an umbrella organization of Southernopposition groups under the close supervision of Hanoi.109 Long after theUnited States escalated its military intervention in 1965 and the “Anti-American Resistance for National Salvation” (cuoc khang chien chong My, cuunuoc) began, Hanoi persisted in the military mode of struggle with evergreater use of violence.110

Conclusion

The VWP’s strong and uncritical commitment to the Geneva Agreement isbest explained by the costs of years of continuous violent struggle against the

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have disappeared for a long time.” See Philippe Devillers, “Une même guerre? Points de vue d’unhistorien du Viet-nam,” in Ageron and Devillers, eds., Guerres d’Indochine, p. 252.

108. The conventional understanding among Western scholars is that Truong Chinh’s demotionresulted from the failure of the land-reform campaign he had enthusiastically championed in theDRVN. It is not implausible that it was precipitated by the failure of the Geneva line.

109. The best traditional interpretations of the origins of the insurgency in South Vietnam leading tothe formation of the NLF include Joseph J. Zasloff, Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960: The Role of the Southern Vietminh Cadres (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1968); JeffreyRace, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); and Carlyle Thayer, Warby Other Means.

110. Charles Fourniau suggested that Vietnam’s revolution had to be radical and violent and its leadersuncompromising on account of the historical development of Vietnamese nationalism. By halting“the development of the bourgeoisie by persecuting and annihilating 20th-century bourgeois national-ism,” French colonialism “contributed to denying the national movement the moderate path that tri-umphed in other colonial territories.” Fourniau avers that because the interests of the old “structuremandarinale” were congruent with those of French colonialists, “the national movement could not be

Japanese and then the French. The ofªcial record offers no evidence thatwould cast doubt on the sincerity of this commitment, and it underscores theparty’s determination to stick by the agreement even in the face of criticismfrom revolutionary leaders and other supporters in the South. In the end, thisdecision was a disastrous failure, and war resumed. More than twenty yearswould be needed before the foreign occupiers left Vietnam, the Southern re-gime collapsed, and the nation was reuniªed. The waging of this long andcostly struggle, the refusal for a long time even to talk to the enemy, and, oncecontacts began, the continued unwillingness to negotiate seriously may all beexplained by the VWP’s experiences in the immediate aftermath of theGeneva Agreement.111 In July 1954 the VWP staked the future of the revolu-tion on the implementation of a diplomatic settlement, only to ªnd that at-tempts to reach a settlement were sabotaged by Diem and his regime, abettedby their French and American supporters. The most enduring consequencemay have been a deep sense of disillusionment in the North with diplomaticnegotiations. If the post-Geneva experience taught Vietnamese revolutionaryleaders one lesson they would not forget, it was to distrust diplomacy as ameans of advancing the revolution. They concluded that there was no alterna-tive to a full-scale military struggle.

Among the most egregious errors of DRVN negotiators at Geneva wastheir failure to insist on guarantees that the Americans would not interferewith the process of reuniªcation speciªcally or in the affairs of the Vietnamesepeople generally. The United States had not participated directly in the ªrstIndochina conºict, but by 1954 it was largely funding and thus sustaining theFrench war effort. This was a clear indicator of Washington’s purpose inIndochina, and should have prompted DRVN negotiators to demand provi-sions in the agreement that the United States disengage from Indochina onthe same terms as France. The VWP ignored that reality and approached thefuture of Vietnam as if it were a purely Hanoi-Paris affair. That none of theGeneva agreements bound the United States in any way and left loopholes forits involvement in Indochina undercut VWP claims that the United Stateswas violating the settlement governing Vietnam. By the same token, DRVNauthorities failed to anticipate the political vigor of the anti-revolutionarygovernment in Saigon, speciªcally its success in creating a centralized, rela-tively autonomous polity that many people found tolerable. The regime Ngo

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but revolutionary and aim at both social revolution and the independence of the country.” See CharlesFourniau, Annam-Tonkin, 1885–1896: Lettres et paysans vietnamiens face à la conquête coloniale (Paris:L’Harmattan, 1989), p. 280.

111. Despite certain accounts to the contrary, Hanoi had no intention of negotiating in good faithprior to 1972. See Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agree-ment (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

Dinh Diem forged proved to be a remarkably viable foe for the VWP andsupporters of the revolution in the South.

The two years following the signing of the Geneva Agreement were thus acrucial phase in the Vietnamese Revolution. What Hanoi came to see as theperªdy of the West discredited diplomacy as a mode of struggle useful for therevolution, and so intense was the conviction on this point that it was not un-til 1968 that the VWP was again willing to talk diplomatically with theWest.112 When it decided in 1972–1973 to negotiate seriously and end thewar with the United States through a diplomatic settlement, it did so only onterms that assured the success of the revolution by precluding another betrayalby the Americans and/or the Saigon regime. Even then, the VWP refused togive up armed struggle, and the resulting hostilities lasted until the South wascompletely liberated.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank the Hawaii Council for the Humanities and theCenter for Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Hawaii at Manoa fortheir ªnancial support; Idus Newby for editing and commenting on earlierdrafts of this manuscript; and Justine Espiritu for her diligent proofreading.

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112. On this issue, see ibid., pp. 4–25.

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