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The Internal Iranian Struggle in the Aftermath of the

Geneva Nuclear Agreement

By: Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall, January 14, 2014

 No. 599 January-February 2014 

  The Geneva nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 has become a focus of growing domestic

controversy in Iran between the conservatives and Revolutionary Guard on one side, and President

Hassan Rouhani, the nuclear negotiating team, and those considered the reformist camp on the other.

 Optimism on a possible improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations is gradually giving way to the anti-American discourse that Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard promote. At the same time, the

regime‟s security establishment, particularly the Revolutionary Guard and the Intelligence Ministry,

are continuing a crackdown on the opposition and social networks, making clear that they will do

whatever is necessary to protect Iran‟s revolutionary Islamic nature.

  In the short time Rouhani has been in office, the Revolutionary Guard commanders have had

considerable success in constraining his hesitant efforts toward a domestic transformation, while

repeatedly warning that they will not accept the use of the nuclear agreement to facilitate far-reaching

domestic, regional, and international changes (mainly toward the U.S.) that would divert Iran from

the path they have ordained for it.

  In any case, Rouhani is part of the establishment, and his room to maneuver in effecting major

domestic changes is limited to begin with. His charm offensive in the West does not add up to a real

change in Iran, given the strong status of the Revolutionary Guard.

  The intensity of public support for Rouhani is of no significance when it comes to Iran‟s nuclear

 progress and status. Nor is the public support for Rouhani likely to have substantial implications for

the state of civil society and human rights in Iran.

The interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1, and subsequent assessments both in the West and in

Iran about “winners and losers,” have become a focus of fierce domestic controversy in Iran between the

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conservatives and Revolutionary Guard on one side, and President Hassan Rouhani, the nuclear negotiating

team, and those considered the reformist camp on the other. The criticism sometimes relates to the agreement‟s

 possible long-term effects on Iran‟s Islamic nature and the course of its Islamic Revolution. The conservative

elements also emphasize that the agreement concentrates solely on the nuclear issue and is not connected to the

issue of relations with the United States, which they continue to see as an enemy, or to the issue of human

rights in Iran. These conservative elements assert that they will not allow the agreement to become a means of

altering Iran‟s revolutionary nature. 

The Revolutionary Guard vs. the Foreign Ministry

The controversy and criticism about the agreements and the conduct of the Iranian negotiating team began to

emerge after a very short period of “unity of the Iranian camp” and congratulatory exchanges between

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Rouhani upon the signing of the interim nuclear agreement in

Geneva on November 24.1

 The harshest criticism of the agreement, and of Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif as head of Iran‟s

negotiating team, was leveled by Revolutionary Guard commander Mohammad Ali Jafari, who objected to

statements Zarif made to students at the University of Tehran in which he strongly defended the nuclear

negotiations and their achievements. Zarif asserted that:

the West does not fear the number [of Iran’s] tanks and missiles, it fears the Iranian people….Do you really

think the United States, which can easily wipe out all our military systems with its bombs, fears our military

 power, that because of this power the United States will not confront us?…I do not claim that the United States

does not fear our weapons and that our military power is not important, as we are proud of those who have

 fallen, of the military and the Basij forces; I claim that this is not the reason the United States does not attack

us, and say that you [the Iranian people who stand firm] are the reason the United States does not attack Iran.2 

Jafari, for his part, said Zarif was an experienced diplomat but lacked any qualifications in the defense field,

and his remarks on that subject were inappropriate. “It is possible that if we are attacked from the air, 10 to 20

 percent of our missiles will be destroyed at the most, but our capability is not based on missiles.” Jafari

emphasized Iran‟s asymmetrical warfare doctrine and cited as an example Israel‟s bombing of southern

Lebanon in 2006, which did not lessen Hizbullah‟s ability to respond.3 He added (echoing Khamenei) that “if  

the Americans and their rabid dog in the region [Israel] had the ability to act militarily against Iran, the United

States and its allies would never have sat down at the negotiating table with Iran.” 

Similarly, Yadollah Javani, adviser to the Supreme Leader‟s representative to the Revolutionary Guard,

criticized Zarif‟s remarks as “unprofessional statements that apparently stem from a lack of familiarity with

military and defense issues.” Iran, Javani claimed, is strong enough that in the event of an attack by the United

States and its allies on key facilities, Iran

would respond with crushing force that would cause regret….Our defensive and missile capabilities will

enable us to hit back at the American and Zionist interests in the region within a considerable radius….The

 Americans and the Zionists are aware of the West Asian region’s strategic importance and Iran’s role in

maintaining security in the region, and they are also aware of their vulnerability in the Persian Gulf [a

reference to the American forces stationed there], in the Strait of Hormuz, and in the Indian Ocean.

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Iranian ships and submarines. It was reported that two-thirds (200) of the (290) Majlis members have

cosponsored the bill.11 Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), chilled the

Majlis‟ tough nuclear line, saying: “If one day we plan to use this nuclear energy to fuel ships or submarines, it

is better to use nuclear reactors…[but] if the Majlis deems it expedient that 60-percent enriched uranium is in

Iran‟s interests and votes it into law, we will have no option but to obey.”12 

“Inappropriate Behavior” 

In a series of articles, the conservative newspaper Kayhan, which usually reflects Khamenei‟s views, criticized

the nuclear negotiating team while trying to avoid criticizing the Supreme Leader himself, who expressed

cautious support for the nuclear agreement. This criticism intensified when, after the signing of the Geneva

agreement, the U.S. Treasury Department decided to impose sanctions on additional Iranian individuals and

companies. Excerpts:

  A short time after the agreement was reached, contradictory statements were heard about its nature!

The Iranian foreign minister called the achievements good and successful and claimed that Iran‟s

nuclear rights had been safeguarded, whereas John Kerry within less than an hour called the

agreement an American victory that ensures the security of America‟s allies in the region and

 particularly Israel, and added that the agreement does not include recognition of Iran‟s right to

enrich!…The negative statements of the United States less than a few hours after the signing of the

agreement bear out Khamenei‟s words about the nature of the United States and his characterization

of it as arrogant and a violator of pacts….The path is still long and the agreement must not, amid the

media enthusiasm, be portrayed as a victory for the citizens, since this will likely encourage vain

expectations whose eventual fulfillment is not certain given the nature of the agreement that was

reached.13 

  The Foreign Ministry published an announcement confirming the telephone conversation between Dr.

Zarif and John Kerry. The announcement stated that the Iranian foreign minister expressed Iran‟s

dissatisfaction [with the additional American sanctions on Iranian individuals]. This announcement is

so vague and unclear that it does not even explain which issue Iran expressed dissatisfaction about!

The U.S. administration violated the Geneva agreement and imposed sanctions on seventeen Iranian

and non-Iranian companies.14 Dr. Araghchi, the deputy foreign minister, said the measure ran counter

to the spirit of the Geneva agreement, but Dr. Zarif, who indeed previously warned in an interview

to TIME  that the imposition of new sanctions would mean the death of the Geneva agreement, now

said in an interview to the Washington Post 15 that the Geneva agreement had not yet died. What is

amazing in all this is the repeatedly inappropriate behavior in the telephone conversations and

meetings with the U.S. secretary of state. In the recent instance as well, the telephone conversation in

question did not really lead to any compensation for the breaching of the agreement. Such behavior

does not benefit the national interest, and most certainly boosts the optimistic stream that wants to

cross the red lines! This inappropriate behavior during the trip to New York, instead of leading to a

change in the American positions, only intensified Obama‟s audacity in making military threats

against Iran. One must ask his honor the foreign minister whether the proclamation of Iran‟s

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dissatisfaction is anything more than a further instance of inappropriate behavior? What did we gain

from this?16 

  [From an editorial by Kayhan‟s editor in chief Hossein Shriatmadari, headlined “Why Not Be

Serious?!”] One must say first of all that there is no doubting the fact that Iran‟s negotiating team is

comprised of sons of the revolution and trustworthy and reliable people who have been assigned a

complex and fateful mission, which has made support for them a religious and national duty. But

even the sons of one family [a quote from Khamenei] who are trustworthy can, despite their pure

desire and positive motivation, make mistakes, without detracting from the trust that the public feels

toward them….There are many testimonies and documents pointing to the fact that the heads of the

American-Israeli fitna 88 [opposition figures who led the protests after the June 2009 presidential

elections], after having failed in their plot, now seek to damage the Islamic regime under a false

 pretense of supporting the government of Mr. Rouhani and false claims of support for the nuclear

negotiating team. Precisely for this reason, they insist on creating the impression that all constructive

criticism stemming from a desire to help the negotiating team is hostile and opposed to the current

government and the negotiating team.

 Kayhan also criticized Zarif‟s statements to the students belittling Iran‟s military capability compared to theUnited States, calling it a “message of surrender” and a “very harmful error that must not be repeated….In

dialogue and particularly in the diplomatic arena, when one says something, what counts is what the other side

understands and not this or that intention of the speaker.”17 

An Ice Breaker

On the other hand, former president and head of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom

the West has long regarded as a “savior” working to promote Western-Iranian relations, called the agreement

an “ice breaker” that had overcome the taboo on relations with the United States. The conservative camp has been attacking Rafsanjani for this stance and trying to disassociate, as much as possible, the issue of the

nuclear talks from the issue of relations with the United States, which still, despite the “Rouhani effect,” is a

loaded, almost taboo subject in Iran. Rafsanjani expressed gratitude to the nuclear negotiating team and said

the signing of the agreement had “rescued us from great distress….Now we feel a letup. Our international

status will improve, though much time remains until the final agreement takes shape.”18 

The newspaper Jomhouri-e Islami, which is affiliated with Rafsanjani, wrote in that vein under the headline

“The Victory of Logic”: 

The signing of the nuclear agreement is beyond doubt a victory for the Iranian people that was achieved

through the rise to power of the moderate stream. Therefore, the victory should be called the victory of logic.

Such an agreement could also have been reached in previous years, but because the previous governmentlacked logic and because the senior officials of the previous government, and particularly the president himself

[Ahmadinejad], adopted harsh, violent language, not only was there no progress in talks but hardship and

distress mounted and the wall of distrust grew higher and thicker. The agreement will not only benefit Iran but

also the region and the whole world. The important aspects of the agreement are that enrichment will continue

in Iran, new sanctions will not be imposed, and the previous sanctions will be gradually reduced and

eventually lifted….The Iranian negotiating team achieved all this without crossing the red lines that have been

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laid down [by the Supreme Leader] and without at all forgoing Iran’s nuclear rights or closing a single

nuclear facility.19 

Sadegh Zibakalam, a senior professor at the University of Tehran and a well-known political analyst, asserted

that the Geneva agreement is not restricted to the nuclear issue and called it

a historic turning point because the policy of struggle [that was promoted by radical elements in Iran] againstthe West [mainly the United States] was breached. The details of the agreement are not important, nor is what

 Iran or the West will do during these six months [of the implementation of the interim agreement]. What is

important is that for the first time since the Islamic Revolution an agreement was reached between Iran and

the West, an agreement that the extremists [inside and outside of Iran] are trying to subvert.

Ziva Kalam claimed that the Supreme Leader‟s support for the agreement prevents the extremists from

characterizing it as a failure. “What is important is the rift that was created among the extremists regarding

their anti-Western stance.” Rouhani‟s Twitter account quoted parts of Kalam‟s article.20 

“The Elements That Engage in Petty Criticism” 

Foreign Minister Zarif did not passively countenance the Revolutionary Guard‟s attacks on him and the

negotiating team. He used his Facebook and Twitter accounts (ordinary Iranian citizens are not allowed to use

these networks) to contend with his critics, particularly among the Revolutionary Guard and including Jafari.

While apparently showing restraint because of his mother‟s illness (meanwhile she died), Zarif wrote on his

Facebook page:

 In recent days the Americans acted inappropriately, and we will respond as necessary while taking all aspects

into consideration. Of course, some elements [that is, of the Revolutionary Guard, along with other domestic

critics], who from the start were not happy about what occurred in Geneva, reported on the early death [of theagreement], which is more of a wish than the truth. We are seriously continuing the Geneva talks, though of

course we will react in a way that is appropriate, calculated, effective, and wise to any inappropriate and

unconstructive step (even if it does not entail a violation of the agreement). In addition, the elements that

engage in petty criticism of us, while exploiting our inevitable silence, certainly know that we have a fitting

response to everything they say. But the negotiating team has a more important mission, namely, the national

interest, and at the moment does not see fit to respond on some of the issues. The team is prepared to hold its

 peace amid unfair and unjust accusations out of consideration of the national interest, but we will respond to

all these assertions at the right time.21 

Meanwhile, in a series of interviews to the Western and domestic media, the foreign minister emphasized that

he upholds the Supreme Leader‟s red lines regarding Iran‟s right to enrich uranium and maintain its nuclear

 program, despite the claims of the United States and of the White House “fact sheet”22 that was posted on the

White House‟s website. As Zarif told the University of Tehran students, 

They [the West] claim that the wor d “enrichment” does not exist in the text of the agreement. True, the word

“enrichment” does not exist in the White House “fact sheet,” but if that is one’s point of reference instead of

the text of the agreement that [the nuclear negotiating team] signed 23…then do as you wish….Enrichment is

mentioned in two places in the document and it is stated that there is no solution to the nuclear dossier without

acknowledging [Iran’s inalienable right] to enrich….[Rest assured that] not an iota was missing from this 

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 people’s rights….[Even] the Washington Post claimed that the White House lied 24 in publishing the “fact

 sheet.” 

In the same speech Zarif underlined the fact that the building of the Arak heavy-water (IR-40) reactor would

continue and, moreover: “Who has said that we cannot produce 20 percent [enriched] uranium

anymore….Today, we are only unscrewing two taps between a cascade and if we decide to enrich uranium to

20 percent we will do it in a period of 24 hours.”25 

The foreign minister made similar remarks in a speech to the Majlis in which he described Iran‟s achievements

and improved international status:

The deal will also see Iran maintain its enrichment program and have access to financial resources….UNSC

 sanctions would be lifted at the beginning of the final phase, and at the end of that phase, Iran’s nuclear

dossier would be normalized like that of other countries such as Japan, Australia, and Germany.26  

My Dear Friend, JafariZarif also responded to the attack on him by the Revolutionary Guard commander. He said he respected

Jafari‟s view, but “I do not share his opinions and belief system and think what we [the negotiating team]

achieved is noteworthy….Some claim that I lack all security-military qualifications; I claim that I taught

national-security studies for decades and read numerous documents related to American national security.”

Zarif again explained, in response to Jafari, that:

the main fear of the United States is not of Iranian weapons but of the power of the Iranian nation….If we do

not understand the rationale of the government, we will not be able to deal with our enemies….The main

obstacle the United States has encountered in dealing with Iran is our culture of resistance and self-sacrifice

[martyrdom]…[and] we cannot replace this capital with weapons. 

The foreign minister also asserted that:

in any case the final adjudicator when it comes to continuing or ending the nuclear negotiations is the Leader,

 Khamenei….I am only a negotiator….I too am not optimistic [an allusion to Khamenei’s speech in which he

 said he was not optimistic about the outcomes of the negotiations]27  about the negotiations and we put our trust

in God.28 

In an interview to the Washington Post , Zarif addressed Jafari‟s criticism of him and said, “I respect Gen.

Jafari‟s remarks, his views, and I expect him to have differences of views with me.” He also said Iranian

opponents of a deal with the West had “asked for my removal.”29 

A Fitting AllyAli Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), supported the foreign minister and

the negotiating team and stressed in a series of interviews that Iran‟s nuclear program continues to advance,

Iran has joined the countries that have a complete nuclear fuel cycle, and that Iran has installed one thousand

advanced centrifuges of the IR-2M kind but, in line with the Geneva agreement, has not fed them with UF6

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gas.30 On another occasion Salehi said his organization aims to make Iran a center of uranium enrichment for

West Asian countries.31 

Conversely, Salehi‟s predecessor in the post, Fereydoun Abbasi, said Iran had unnecessarily accepted the

conditions the West had dictated on curbing its level of uranium enrichment. “A hero is the one who does not

surrender to the conditions of his powerful opponent.” He asserted that suspending 20-percent enrichment

would “prevent Iran from reaching its developmental goals on the time schedule it had set for itself.” Abbasi

also criticized “Rouhani‟s vague and passive stance that undermines the will and resolve of the Iranian

 people.”32 

Leveraging the Geneva Agreement to Enhance Ties with Regional States

Iran is also trying to leverage the nuclear agreement to improve its relations with the states of the region,

 particularly Saudi Arabia. But here, too, some amiable statements by the foreign minister (on attempting to

resolve a dispute over certain islands with the United Arab Emirates, and on improving ties with Saudi Arabia)

have prompted sharp criticism by conservatives. In the Saudi-owned pan-Arab newspaper Asharq Alawsat ,

Zarif published an opinion article, “Our Neighbors Are Our Priority,”33 in which he tried to use the nuclear

agreement to court Iran‟s neighbors. He also visited the Gulf states bearing such messages. 

President Rouhani, for his part, published an article in the Saudi daily Al-Eqtisadiah in which he touted the

agreement‟s importance and again denied that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons, mentioning

Khamenei‟s  fatwa against such weapons –  a fatwa from which no direct quotation can be found, not even on

Khamenei‟s own website.34 

In response to these initiatives, Kayhan wrote that “the statement by Mr. Zarif that it is possible to converse

with the UAE about its claim to possession of the island of Abu Musa [a strategic island overlooking the Strait

of Hormuz] was ill-considered” and “a statement one does not expect to hear from an experienced diplomat.” 

Alraf Ala‟eddin Borujerdi, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, has termed Arabstates‟ request to attend the nuclear talks as irrelevant. “I wonder why countries with no nuclear capability and

with no leverage in negotiations would demand such a thing….[I]t is not even worthy of consideration.”

Borujerdi‟s deputy said the announcement that the security of Arab states was connected to the security of Iran

is a true and real announcement. For years we wanted the Arab states to acknowledge this reality.” He added: 

 It is very impudent of them to demand to participate in the talks between Iran and the P5+1, because not a

 single one of them wields any significant weight. They can only watch from the side as Iran takes strategic

 steps to ensure the security of the region. We will talk with the Foreign Ministry so that we can officially

clarify Iran’s position on these pointless demands.35 

No Real ChangeThe domestic debate in Iran on advancing the nuclear program concurrently with the negotiations with the

West will likely continue and intensify, if the negotiations progress. It is only at the end of January that the

implementation of the interim agreement is supposed to begin. But criticism related to the nuclear negotiations

 by elements in Iran –  some of them close to the Supreme Leader –  is mounting.

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The optimism, almost to the point of euphoria, that accompanied that signing focuses particularly on a possible

improvement of relations with the United States. Meanwhile, amid ongoing revelations about secret U.S.-

Iranian contacts that led up to the negotiations, the optimism is gradually giving way to the anti-American

discourse that Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard promote. Central to this discourse is the denigration of

the United States as an untrustworthy partner and breaker of promises. Khameni said in this regard that “One

of the blessings of the [nuclear] negotiations was that America‟s hostility towards Iran, Iranians, and Islam

 became clear to everyone.”36 In adding Iranian organizations and individuals to its blacklist following the

signing of the agreement, Washington provided ammunition to opponents of ties with the United States. At the

same time, issues such as human rights, freedom of expression, women‟s rights, and executions keep rising to

the surface, partly on the initiative of the Iranian opposition.

All this has led to the current crackdown by the regime‟s security establishment, particularly the Revolutionary

Guard and the Intelligence Ministry, on social-network activists, an increase in executions since Rouhani was

elected, attacks on writers, bloggers, and poets, the blocking of websites and SMS networks, the ongoing

house arrest of Mir-Hossein Musawi, one of the heads of the Green opposition, and the intensifying extremist

discourse that calls the Green opposition “the greatest anti-Iranian conspiracy.” These extremist elements want

to make clear that they will not countenance any linkage between the nuclear talks and the path Iran takes.

Rouhani, for his part, was included in Foreign Policy‟s list of one hundred “leading global thinkers” for

2013,37 and the “Rouhani effect” is continuing to revitalize his camp with its goals of a nuclear agreement and

 better relations with the West. (Recent visitors to Iran have included the Italian foreign minister and

 parliamentary delegations from Britain and the European Union.) At the same time, Zarif, Rouhani, and the

rest who seek to leverage the nuclear agreement to improve Iran‟s international status are well aware of the

 power of their opponents, especially among the Revolutionary Guard, who want to obstruct this trend and

 particularly its ramifications regarding the United States and human rights. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary

Guard leaders keep affirming that they will do whatever is necessary to protect Iran‟s values and revolutionary

Islamic nature. When, during Khatami‟s presidency, they perceived a sharp deviation from the revolutionary

values as they understand them –  including the anti-Western struggle –  they sent Khatami a letter of warning

and were able to make him tone down the reform process.

The Revolutionary Guard commanders learned the lesson, and in the short time Rouhani has been in office

they have had considerable success in constraining his hesitant efforts toward a domestic transformation, while

repeatedly warning that they will not accept the use of the nuclear agreement to facilitate far-reaching

domestic, regional, and international changes that would divert Iran from the path they have ordained for it.

In any case, Rouhani is part of the establishment, and his room to maneuver in effecting major domestic

changes is limited to begin with. Although Rouhani is still basking in the glow of the elections and his charm

offensive in the West, his actions do not add up to a real change in Iran, given the strong status of the

Revolutionary Guard.

The intensity of public support for Rouhani (which “moderate, reformist” former presidents Khatami and

Rafsanjani also enjoyed), or the lack of it, is of no significance when it comes to Iran‟s nuclear progress and

status. It is already clear that the interim agreement allows Iran to maintain its capabilities regarding the full

nuclear fuel cycle as well as enrichment, even to high percentages “within twenty-four hours,” as Zarif said.

 Nor is the public support for Rouhani likely to have substantial implications for the state of civil society and

human rights in Iran.

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In sum, the Revolutionary Guard and the Supreme Leader will keep steering the president and the foreign

minister along a clear-cut path of seeking to extract maximal concessions from the West. Such concessions

would entail, on the one hand, Iran‟s preservation of its nuclear capability, and ability to “break out” to nuclear

weapons, and, on the other, an easing of the economic pressure.

We are still in the midst of the drama of Rouhani‟s election as president, ostensibly despite Khamenei‟s stanceand auguring a “strategic change in Iran.” The Iranian reality has proved time after time, however, that the

Revolutionary Guard‟s hold on power and influence on the Supreme Leader is only growing. From the

Revolutionary Guard‟s standpoint, the nuclear negotiations are of diplomatic importance and may be of some

economic benefit to Iran. The Revolutionary Guard, however, will obstruct any attempt, by means of the

negotiations, to effectuate the transformation that the reformist camp and the Iranian people desire.

If necessary, Rouhani, too, will receive a letter of warning from Revolutionary Guard commanders, as the

“reformist” president Khatami once did. 

* * *

Notes 

1. http://president.ir/fa/72880 ; http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=contentShow&id=11312

2. http://isna.ir/fa/news/92091208775/%D8%B8%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%81-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AF-

%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3-

%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-

%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85

3. http://www.seratnews.ir/fa/news/148571/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF-

%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%84%D8%B4%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-

%D8%A7%D8%B8%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B8%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%81

4. http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/219948

5. http://www.tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/201725

6. In the Iranian post-revolutionary discourse, “poisoned chalice” refers to Khomeini’s readiness (on Rafsanjani’s advice) for a ceasefire with Iraq 

in 1988. The term is sometimes used in the internal debate regarding reengaging with the West and particularly the United States.

7. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1mkb_OMocEg&feature=youtube_gdata

8. http://rasaee.ir/content/482;http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/271296/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF-

%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-

%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B8%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%81

9. http://khabarfarsi.com/ext/7745956;%20http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13921014001164

10. http://www.aftabir.com/news/article/view/2013/12/13/13554

11. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=139210080001

12. http://www.jamejamonline.ir/newspreview/1341403718997628531

13. http://www.kayhan.ir/920904/2.htm#N200

14. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20131212.aspx

15. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-qanda-with-mohammad-javad-zarif-irans-foreign-minister/2013/12/15/653fad68-

65c8-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html

8/13/2019 The Internal Iranian Struggle in the Aftermath of the Geneva Nuclear Agreement

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-internal-iranian-struggle-in-the-aftermath-of-the-geneva-nuclear-agreement 11/12

16. http://alef.ir/vdcdoj0xkyt0z56.2a2y.html?208745

17. Keyhan .

18. https://twitter.com/hashemi1392/status/405068151198875648

19. http://www.jomhourieslami.com/1392/13920904/13920904_01_jomhori_islami_sar_magaleh_0001.html;  http://www.farsnews.com/plarg.php?

nn=636418&st=1100809

20. http://www.zibakalam.com/news/1670; http://www.rouhaninews.com/12396-

%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85 – %D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-

%DA%98%D9%86%D9%88-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B7%D9%87-%D8%B9%D8%B7%D9%81%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-

%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AE-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-

%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-

%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A8-

%D9%85%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF.html;https://twitter.com/drRouhani/status/404917205906640896

21. https://www.facebook.com/jzarif/posts/722602297751221; https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/412067682549121024

22. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/23/fact-sheet-first-step-understandings-regarding-islamic-republic-iran-s-n

23. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13920905001087

24. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/final-iran-deal-needs-to-balance-out-the-concessions/2013/11/28/72741e92-5772-11e3-835d-

e7173847c7cc_story.html?wpisrc=nl_cuzheads

25. http://isna.ir/fa/news/92091208775/%D8%B8%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%81-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AF-

%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3-

%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-

%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85

26. http://www.iran-daily.com/1392/9/7/MainPaper/4662/Page/2/Index.htm

27. http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanat&id=11230

28. http://khabaronline.ir/(X(1)S(4rzorha1cgyof5nsplqsd0tj))/detail/328304/Politics/diplomacy; http://mellatonline.ir/news/news.cfm?id=3448

29. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-qanda-with-mohammad-javad-zarif-irans-foreign-minister/2013/12/15/653fad68-

65c8-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html

30. http://tinyurl.com/o82r3c8

31. http://tinyurl.com/o82r3c8

32. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/12/25/341933/exnuclear-chief-critical-of-geneva-deal

33. https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/403349644878422017

34. Al-Eqtisadiah , December 19, 2013.

35. http://www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2191742

36. http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=24940

37. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2013_global_thinkers/public/rouhani

8/13/2019 The Internal Iranian Struggle in the Aftermath of the Geneva Nuclear Agreement

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-internal-iranian-struggle-in-the-aftermath-of-the-geneva-nuclear-agreement 12/12

About Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall

IDF Lt.-Col. (ret.) Michael (Mickey) Segall, an expert on strategic issues with a focus on Iran,

terrorism, and the Middle East, is a senior analyst at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and

the Terrogence Company.

- See more at: http://jcpa.org/article/the-internal-iranian-struggle-in-the-aftermath-of-the-geneva-nuclear-agreement/#sthash.WTRf630d.dpuf