Army Aviation Digest - Dec 1984

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Dec 1984

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DECEM ER 1984 VOLUME 3

1 Aviation Center Training Expansion, MG Bobby JMaddox2 Army Aviation's Concept for Army 21, MAJ MarionJ. Tyler

10 Challenges for the Aviation Branch, LTC James B.McKenzie Jr.12 "What Do You Mean I'm Not in the Aviation Branch?,"CW4 Mark O. Wrinn15 First Aeroscout Enlisted Graduates; First Aviation

Officers' Advanced Course16 Flight Into Instrument Meteorological Conditions20 PEARL'S22 RSI Report: Procedures for Marshalling Helicopters inMultinational Land Operations, Mr. Rush Wicker24 DES Report to the Field: A Good Safety Record isNo Accident27 Army Aviation Museum28 Aviation Personnel Notes: Volunteer for Airborne

Training, SFC George F. Huggins; How to LoseYour Aviation Career Incentive Pay WithoutEven Trying; Change to AR 13521531 Be Prepared, W01 Erik P. Feldmanis32 Views From Readers34 Threat: Warning, What You Say Will Be UsedAgainst You MAJ John Stewart Wilson39 New Brigade at Fort Rucker, CPT Linda E. Walker40 All Blood Runs Red," MAJ Phillip E. Raschke42 Flight Medic Training Program, CPT Mark B. Hatter

Back Cover: ATC Action Line: New Flight PlanCover: This month's Army 21 cover reflects thenature of the radical change from the linear

page 10

page 4

Honorable JohnSecretary ofMajor General BoCommander, U.S. Arm

Brigadier General PAssistant CoU.S. Army AviaBrigadier General WArmy Aviation Off

Richard K.


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Major General Bobby J MaddoxChief, Army Aviation Branch

Aviation Center Training ExpansionT HE UNITED STATES Army Aviat ion Center is feeling

growing pains of increased student production professionaldevelopment, doctrinal development, force modernization andexpanding roles as a central member of the Combined ArmsTeam. The fielding of new systems to include the AH64Apache, OH58D Kiowa and CH47D Chinook, plus the additionof the AH1 Pilot Night Vision System (PNVS) surrogate trainerhave generated the need for new support airfields (basefierds).The Aviation Center has developed a resourcing plan toaccommodate this expansion.

Shell Army Heliport was reopened this month to begin themajor expansion of the Aviation Center s training resources.Not used since the Vietnam era, Shell will accommodate thestationing of the TH55 Osage training fleet for initial entryflight training. This change will also result in consolidation ofall attack and aeroscout activity at Hanchey Army Heliport.

Likewise effected in the stationing is the U H60 Black Hawk,recently moved to Lowe Army Airfield to combine our utilityresources; similarly, the CH47 completed its move to CairnsArmy Airfield, to combine our medium lift training. Theinstrument training and fixed wing training will continue to beserved at Cairns.

This resourcing allows for future expansion and provides our


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ArmyAviation sConcept

forARMY

21Major Marion J. Tyler

Concepts Branch

With ancavalry anmust avoidmake up thrapidity ofartillery, bmaneuverchoice of pcircumstasoldier is a

Armlately iswithoutunderstaany confuture bproperly idea andcommunarea conThe ra21 concevehicle future orgdoctrinerequiremthis vehithe yearArmy Avfuture is


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2000 to Army 21, was becausepeople were mixing the ALB2000 concept with ALB doctrine.Army 21 is a radical change fromthe linear battlefield previouslyenvisioned. The essence of theconcept is a style of waging warin which agility deceptionmaneuver, and fi repower areused to face the enemy with asuccession of dangerous andunexpected situations happening more rapidly than he canreact to them. This will be ad-

FIGURE 1: Definitions.Theater Command-Unified or combinedcommands established by theNCA or by alliance agreements .Multiservice AirLand Force-A permanently organized force with

capabilities similar to those of todays rapid deployment joint taskforce.Army ComponentLand Battle ForceThe Army component of themultiservice ALF integrates ,directs and conducts the landbattle.Battle Task Force-The BTF is a tactical C headquarters only .Close Combat Force-The CCF is the

basic tactical organization thatconducts close combat.

dressed in detail when the Army21 concept is publ ished laterthis year. However, to allow theuninitiated the chance tounderstand the essence of theconcept, certain definitions arerequired (figure 1). Army 21 envisions three levels of command(figure 2); the land battle force(LBF), the battle task force BTF),and the close combat force(CCF). The super levels of command are being developed in ajOint endeavor called Focus 21.This article addresses the ArmyAviation functions within theLBF.

viation Forrmy 21Army Aviation consists of allaerial platforms employed on theArmy 21 battlefield includingboth manned and unmannedaerial platforms. They enableArmy Aviation to perform com-

LF

I ~

bat, combat sucombat servicemissions as a maof the combinedmission of Armvades all mission ing a wide varietasks and functiotion rapidly depand destroy eneaerial forces thmovement. In thtion assets procapabilities asgreater versatilthis, Aviation uare designed toquick attachmenThis requires thetent in numbersequipment throustructure. Thesewill: Be sman, andintensive. Possess themand, control ation C3) and CSSdependent or sutions as part of aforce. Be structureple and equipmoperate continudays on all typesall weather anenvirons.


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i

ircraftSophisticationAviation equipment will pro-vide the occupants and vital air-craft components protectionfrom nuclear, biological, chemicalN Be), directed ene rgy , andballistic hazards. The aircraftthemselves will not present aunique signature, and will have amultifuel capability common toother units in the force. Ourman ned aerial platforms wi IIhave a look ahead sensingcapability using satellite data

link for lodetectiowill bemaintainmoduladefectivment. Rorearmingwill elimfor forwequipmeDisposders withpreplaceThe crewgiven sethe seal,the aircrdraw thement potached ument. Thuance ocraft thatlefield oquires a uthe use ahigh-lowthe forccomplishward conforce str


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FIGURE 3: Land Battle Force.

multitudinousworking under atenance concepsupport requiraustere conditio

ForceharacteristAviation units to facilitate quicother Aviation uthis is accompl

sistency in the nple and aircraftforce structure. Tdesign allows tcommander theorganize for thwhole units ththe unit integritycontinuity so ession accomplishassets at the LBsolidated into thcombat force figprovides attack, utility aerial expmand and contrAviation maintenato the LBF. Sinceis organized inmaneuver units wenemy rather thclose combat isthe maneuver ofmission-sufficientTo this end, eac


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Close CombatForce viation

These assets consist of unitsof attack reconnaissance andutility aircraft and they are consistent in the number of aircraftassigned to each Aviation unit.The attack and reconnaissanceunits will have the same airframes in each. The type ofperipheral equipment mountedon them will be the delineator. Ifper chance the mission calls foradditional attack aircraft notavailable from the LBF, thereconnaissance airframes canhave their intelligence gathering

equipment demounted have attack equipment mounted andthen be capable of a limited attack role.The utility units contain aircraft that provide for aerialmaneuver of ground forces;engineering and mine warfare;and CSS tasks to include battlesupport, reconstitution, andforce movement. The aircraftmaintenance at the CCF levelwi II be performed by theflightcrew. This will be providedfor by the aircraft system s builtin diagnostic equipment andredundancy for continued operat ion in a degraded mode.

Modularflight crespecific major atransmisreplacedcomponeprovide thindicatiodata recoconditionwith thethe LBF fdata. Anythe capaconducteteams sLBF.


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Battle TaskForceThe BTF has a small Aviationstaff that is capable of planningand coordinating Aviation opera-tions for its assigned close com-bat forces. The BTF commander

(one of the LBF deputy com-manders) and his staff will usethe Aviation assets providedfrom the LBF Aviation CCF. ThisAviation staff is capable ofassuming control of the attachedAviation assets as necessary.

FIGURE 5: land Battle Force s Aviation Assets.

ATTACK1 11.t _

.lQ it tnUTILITYI 11I__IAVN MAINT

RECON

OPN SPTAVN

OPN SPT MED/ HVYAVN LIFTAERIAL EXPLOITATION

Land Battle FAviation CCThe LBF Aviat5 performs coCSS missions.cludes units ofnaissance, utilitport, aerial expAviation maintensolidation of thforce s AviationCCF level allowcommand, immeand the requisitecapabiliti.es to fiThis consolidaimizes the commcontrol while atimal commitmecost effective mSuccessful ctions demand thafast, strike hard, aArmy Aviation iment with which extends his capaclose combat taBy the consolidplatforms, the tarrapid and highly tionally the LBneeds only to dmander for the aehis campaign.


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viationEquipmentThe aircraft and equipmentused by Army 2 Aviation unitsprovide protection from NBCforms will have the ability to lookahead for radiation and chemicaldetection. All aircraft have acommon airframe for simplicity

etc. Readucted vmunicatautomate


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Technologyor TheutureThe Army 2 concept requirestechnologically superior systemsto ensure the capability to fight

weapons to automatically prior- .itize aim and engage through anonboard system. Missiles will betrue fire and forget, and willemploy multipurpose warheadsand seekers to attack armor airdefense or airborne targets.Communications will operate

telligence, anrepresentationstions enhance nvide 2 to 5 meposition accuraof compositeassociated manniques reduce strength, andwithout depenmaterials. Advasion will be incmit high tempeIn addition redimize


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CH LLENGES for th VEARLY 983 while slatloned at the United StatesMilitary Academy (USMA), I wasapproached by one of mystudents who said happily, "Sir,did you know Army Aviation isgoing to have its own branch?"Having been a party to thisrumor numerous times duringthe last decade or so, I assuredthe cadet with allknowingauthority) that what he had heardwas mostly talk, without muchaction expected in this century.

After all, this issue of an AviationBranch would never be permitted by the Air Force, let alone byour own U.S. Army leadership.My credibility as a source ofinformation on Army Aviationwas diminished considerablywhen the Secretary of the Armysigned, sealed and delivered thenew Army Aviation Branch inApril 1983.Considering the period of timeI was "away" from Army Aviationdeveloping my other speciality, I

have manignorancesignificanthe U.S. Howeverchange hreflect onArmy Avbranch stimistic abut at thewith the mage andAviation B

Making Aviatiohas contributed

the needs anare consideneed to omanner, s

and acthat


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BR NCHAs far back as I can remember,Aviation and aviators have beenplagued with image problems. Inever concerned myself muchwith these image problems

while I was serving in Aviationassignments. The only times image was a topic was when I servedoutside Aviation. Those outsideAviation have a tendency to seeus with white scarf blowing inthe breeze" while professing a"devil may care" attitude. Or toput it bluntly-displaying a lot offlair and flamboyance withoutmuch substance. (Their words,not mine )The subject of flight pay fallsinto the same category as thescarf. This dashing display image used to describe the perceivedimage of aviators is reflected inthe big watch and expensive carjokes. How many times have youand I had long-and tedious "happyhour" discussions justifying thereceipt of flight pay while notserving in a flight aSSignment?These image problems will mostlikely fol low us around for a longtime. The symbols associatedwith our image are often at theroot of interpersonal problemsthat can be solved through conversation and education withthose unfamiliar with Aviation(e.g., "Gee, you're an aviatoryou sure don't act like one ).

Lieutenant Colonel James BJoint AirLand Staff Offic

AirLand Forces Application DCS Doctrine/HQ TRAD

Langley AFB, VA

of the letter of reprimand or Article 15 variety. The instances arefew and are probably just asprevalent in the other branches,but when coupled with the scarf,big watch and pay benefits, theydo nothing to help our image. Aswe embark on our new branchstatus, we certainly do not wantto portray ourselves as an undisciplined and unprofessionalcollection of misfits. Clearingour ranks of these bad actorsshould have high priority. Otherwise, we will probably get whatwe pay for in terms of those attracted to Army Aviation.An equally serious image problem is linked to our expertiseoutside Aviation. From a professional viewpoint, some of us hadto really fight to get a commandin our basic branch. Some felt wewere not capable of handlingthese commands since ourbackgrounds were predominatelyin Aviation. When we finally didget those opportunities, oftenthe commands were of the headquarters variety or in the table ofdistribution and allowancesarena. These commands werecertainly not easy nor lesschallenging, but they were considered insuff icient for thenecessary branch qualification. Iwould expect that selections ofthe more desirable staff posi

and therefore shodifferently. We receptive to ourand one that uidiosyncrasies. Where. In my cabranch transferrDecember 1983Strangely ennewfound opability to remainthat worries me.tremely careful we may face evlems than beforethe branch has step in the careof Aviation persodone much to soissues. Howevspecialization btain limitations.In the past, deour assets was cdifficult and misand aircraft wereoccurrences. Than insider toour assets backand narrow wereconcile somficulties. Somficul ties stem frotlefield perspcaused us to seeas wider and deeother arms. Widtranslates into


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FIRST AVIATION OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSELeft to RightBottom Row: CPT Robert H.Lee, CPT Harold C. Walker, CPTMario H. Acevedo, CPT WilliamBoltralik, CPT David Richards,CPT James W. Daley, CPT MiguelAlfaro class leader), CPT Don S.Cornett, CPT Robert A. Childers,CPT Richard M. Bega, CPT DanielBarreto, CPT David S. Smith, CPT

CPT James T. Gaetjen, CPT EarlM. Yerrick3d Row: CPT Mark E Valentine,CPT James T. Brockway, CPTDavid O. Odegard, CPT Tim EPerley, CPT David A. Cox, CPTBenjamin F. Adams, CPT MichaelR. Higgins, CPT Joseph L. Flynn,CPT Thomas P. Driscoll, CPT

Wallace, CPT JeCPT Donald MacDonald G. DunkeMichael E KruegA. Stiehm, CPT CPT Ronald J. H5th Row: CPT Rippel, CPT TimCPT Vance C. R


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Flight Into Instrumen"IWILL NEVER PUSHWEATHER again as long asI fly " That vow was made bya civilian pilot who hadinadvertently flown intoinstrument meteorologicalconditions IMC) but was luckyenough to survive and talk aboutit.

He took off on the final leg of across country VFR flight after a3-day delay due to weather. Heintended to follow the coastlineand was prepared to stop at any ofseveral airports en route to hisdestination if weather required it.When he suddenly ran into IFRconditions he was a few miles froma major airport . There was anextremely low ceiling and visibilitywas restricted to less than a mile.He was 125 yards offshore, flyingat approximately 50 feet and hewas afraid to turn farther seaward

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a s Meteoromilitary area.The ceiling wasstill no more than 300 feetand visibility was only 2miles. He elected to remainat 75 to 100 feet, forcing

ondhim to move several milesoffshore.He got past the restricted areaand was able to follow the breakerline to his destination airportwhere luckily weather conditionshad improved allowing him tomake a normal VFR landing.

The number of mishaps frominadvertent flight of Army aircraftinto instrument meteorologicalconditions has been reduced in thepast few years. However, whensuch mishaps do occur the cost isextremely high, in aircraft

safely. f tmaintain hinstrumeneven less. marginal wexpecting gambling with the dthem.udgmeAn erroto loss of abe made bmade furtcommand


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off because of congestion causedby the large number of aircraft onthe ramp. The flight leader decidedto try the pass. Ceiling andvisibility began to decrease shortlyafter takeoff and the mountaintops were soon obscured by lowclouds.

The flight leader had had somereservations all along about theweather but he had chosen not tosay anything. Now he announcedover the radio that the weather wasdeteriorating and he didn't thinkthey were going to make it throughthe pass. But when the platoonleader replied, let's go a little bitfurther, he elected to follow thoseinstructions instead of telling theflight to turn around.A minute later two of theaircraft broke formation. The leadaircraft, with the copilot at thecontrols continued on and shortlyentered IMC. The PIC, flying inthe gunner station, took control ofthe aircraft. His attempts to levelthe aircraft and initiate a climbwere not successful and he lostcontrol of the aircraft. The Cobracame out of the clouds in a nosedown attitude at approximately 50feet agl, at a high rate of descent,

Table 41 Army VFR Weather MinimumsUncontrolled Airspace)

and impacted the ground. Theaircraft was completely destroyed.The copilot received major injuriesand the PIC minor injuries.Inadequate weather information

An aviat ion unit was engaged intransporting troops in a combatzone. Early on the morning of themishap, the crew had received anarea weather forecast but hadfailed to receive a weather briefingspecifically for their flight. Theweather was less than that requiredfor VFR operations, however, theunit had successfully operated invery marginal weather for 6months which may have led tooverconfidence on the part of thepilot.Two UH-60A helicopters wereon the daytime VFR servicemission. When the pilot of the leadaircraft encountered low cloudsand ground fog near the head of asmall valley he decided to try to getthrough to the next valley. Theaircraft was flying atapproximately 100 feet agl when itwent out of sight of the secondaircraft.

Repeated attempts to contact thelead aircraft by radio wereunsuccessful. Evidence indicates

VisibilityOperation Ceiling RW FWDaylight:Over flat terrain 300 1/2 mile 1 mileOver mountainous terrain 500 1/2 mile 1 mileNight:Over flat terrain 500 1 mile 2miles

the flight crew mto execute inadvflight recovery pwhich the aircraon a 15 degree uapproximately 5leaving the secoBlack Hawk impon its right side.people on boardcrash.Supervision aregulationsThe aviation usuccessfully flowmissions for threon the fourth daweather. The coappeared excessaccomplish his mto pick up troopthe fifth day.The unit had moperating aircraduring tactical othough environmwere less than thprescribed by throtary wing aircAR 95-1, ArmyProvisions and FRegulations. )

No.1 aircraft the strip to provilineup of the othaircraf t were beidespite the fact testimated at belovisibility was limand clouds. Theinstructed to conform-up of the fdown and wait foweather.

No.2 aircraft


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clouds. t climbed 50 or 60 feetabove tree tops, in the clouds,paused, turned left and began adescent, picking up airspeed as itwent out of sight of witnesses.They heard a loud bang and saw abright glow. All threecrewmembers had been killed whenthe helicopter crashed on a risingslope, rebounded and hit two trees.The pilot had tried to make aninstrument takeoff from the leftseat position. Most of the unitPICs routinely performed theirduties from the left crew stations.The UH-1 MaintenanceInstruction Manual designates theright crew station as the pilot sposition. This is primarily becauseof the arrangement of flightinstruments and switches withinthe cockpit.The pilot became spatiallydisoriented and his apprehensionand inexperience in instrumentflight, combined with the reducedinstrumentation on the left side ofthe aircraft, may have contributedto his loss of control.nexperience and lack osupervision A 20-year-old pilot with 250rotary wing hours, 100 of them inthe aircraft he was flying, enteredIMC shortly after takeoff from afield site. While trying to return tovisual meteorological conditions(VMC) his aircraft crashed and hewas killed.The unit had been involved in afield training exercise which wasnearing completion. The pilot wasone of three scheduled to flyaircraft back to the airfield alone.The unit commander was under theimpression that all three pilots had

deteriorating, departure time wasmoved up two hours. Thecommander did not want to beforced to remain in the fieldovernight. He had told pilots in hisunit, however, that he wouldsupport them in decisions not to flydue to weather or if they felt theflight would exceed theircapabilities. The only commentmade by the pilots was thatperhaps they should wait for thescheduled takeoff time. When herepeated his desire to take off earlythey began preparing for the flight.Weather conditions were withinthe guidelines of AR 95 1 and theairfield was only 5 miles away. Thefirst aircraft took off with the unitcommander as a passenger . Shortlyafterwards it encountered IMC andthe commander told the pilot toradio the remaining two aircraft(who were to follow at 30-secondintervals) to stay on the ground.The third aircraft remained onthe ground but the second aircrafthad already taken off. Shortlyafter takeoff, the pilot of No. 2aircraft radioed that he was NOEand proceeding to the airfield. Theother pilot cautioned him aboutwires across his flight path andasked him if he was using hislanding light.No reply came but the light wasseen to go out. The aircraft entereda fog layer then was seen emergingfrom the top, in a climbing turntoward the west. Witnesses saw theaircraft between cloud formationsat about 500 to 700 feet agl andclimbing. t was next seen about 2kilometers farther west at cruisespeed, low altitude and in a rightdescending turn from a western to

procedurefor the schmishap pilprocedureanswer radhad the coon as requ95-1, becaquestion aHis appconductina single pifacility mainexperientry to returflight cond Anothexperiencewas flyingdocumentethe aircrafactual instcaused himdisorientedconditionsHe lost conthe top ofThe pilopassengersto the pickmember ofcrew chief,the unit fiethe airfieldwas told torunway cenemergencyreturned toheld in fligtime his reqgranted.After flyhe was unasite becauscondition areference l


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control and the aircraft banked leftand right several times.

About 3 miles south of theairfield, the aircraf t clipped the topof a tree, crashed through severalother trees and came to rest on itsleft side.

The air traffic controller wasrelatively inexperienced and theother tower operator was a trainee.Although the airfield control zonehad been under 1MCapproximately 9 minutes beforethe mishap the condition was notbroadcas t to any aircraft in thecontrol zone. The weatherinformation appeared on a weathermonitor screen in the tower 4 to 7minutes before the mishap but theoperator either didn t see it orfailed to realize that the weatherwas IMC. The controller also hadtrouble understanding the pilotwhen he tried three times to declarean emergency. While the toweroperator was calling back to theaircraft in an attempt tounderstand what was happening,the pilot became so involved inhandling the emergency that hecouldn t respond.The lack of any documentedinstrument training in the OH-58,the lack of any actual instrumentflight in IMC for the pilot, and theinexperience of the tower operatorand his failure to warn the pilot ofIMC at the airfield, combined todestroy an aircraft and causemajor injuries to the pilot. Thepassenger sustained minor injuries.Most of the mistakes which ledto such catastrophic results whenaviators entered IMC need neverhave happened. Fac torscontributing to these mishaps must

marginal weather is asking fortrouble. Accident investigationshows that many times someonehad reservations about the weatherbut either did not speak up oryielded to someone else's decision.Lack of proficiency ininstrument flying. The fact that apilot has experience in flying anaircraf t does not necessarily meanthat he is experienced in instrumentflying. Even with documentedinstrument flying experience, anaviator who has not had recentexperience or kept in practice canbecome disoriented andapprehensive when inadvertentlyentering IMC. Then he makesmistakes which lead to mishaps.

Poor crew coordina tion. Suddenand unexpected entry into IMCrequires immediate transition toinstrument flying and exacerbatespoor crew coordinat ion. Aviatorswho become anxious are morelikely to make errors just at thetime when demands on judgmentand skill are the greates t.The crew which tried to fly aCobra through a mountain pass indeteriorating weather is a goodexample. The flight leader, whowas PIC, told the copilot, who wasat the controls, to break right. Thecopilot asked if he meant left(toward a highway). The PIC againtold him to break right. As thecopilot began a right turn withapproximately 30 degrees of bank,the aircraft entered IMC. The PICtook control and increased powerto begin a climb. He was unawarethat the copilot had increasedpower before relinquishingcontrol. Airspeed had decreased to60 knots. The PIC added more

trouble and triedof the aircraft to The pilot of one oairc raft tried to ccould regain contaircraft. During copilot got backWhen the aircrafclouds in a nose-about 50 feet abothe PIC and copicyclic. Just beforthe ground, the Pcollective pitch bdescent could nothe aircraft crashon its left side.Single-pilot flipilot, flying at niinadvertently entquickly become tThe OH-58 pilotflying alone at niVHIRP procedurapparently decidto low-level visuaconditions. f thecommunicationscaused aviators wperformed seconsent from the fieprematurely, thismight still be flyiThe differenceunplanned entryprepara tion. Plashould include thencountering IMweather is margishould discuss anrehearse what eafly into IMC.During the fligcontinue to talk awill do. Then if tIMC, the confus


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PEARI SPersonal Equipment nd Rescue/survival LowdoN

Debra Gerisher photo by Reflections Studio

Guidance For Maximum Service Life For Food Packet,Survival, General PurposeThe following is U.S. Army Natick Research andDevelopment Center s NRDC) guidance in determining shelf life and replacement criteria for the foodpacket, survival, general purpose, NSN 897() oo'{)82-5665,ration:

temperature conditions, it is ththe rations should be replaced

An important note here is nwith shelf life. The shelf life iscontrolled conditions. The seritem goes into use or service. Inbegins when the food packet islevel, to be used onboard an a

Point of contact is WalteNatick, MA, AUTOVON 256

SRU-21/P Survival VestSome of you may still be recevests without the newAN/PRCsewn on. f you are, you canordering the radio pocket (Nseparately and sewing it in thethe vest. I refer you to the latesin the PEARL S article on pageof A viation Digest

There are some smaller veststo 37 inches. To order the smaltents, order NSN 8465-01-17without contents may be orde173-8098. For chest sizes largeorder the large vest with8465-00-177 -4819. To order tcontents order NSN 8415-00-1confusing; however, we are attfor all aviators by offering two


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and the first aid kit are larger than they used to be. fyouare having a problem packing all the components intothe inner case of your survival kit because of the increasedsizes of the five containers of candles and the first aidkit, switch one can of rations from the inner case to theouter packet of the kit. This will allow adequate room inthe inner case for the remaining components.

Suspension System For Aviator Use Wearing theAN/PVS-5 Night Vision Goggles

Pilots have reported difficulty using the AN/PVS-5night vision goggles (NVG) while flying. The gogglesweight induces neck muscle strain and headaches afteronly a short period of use The Night Vision and ElectroOptics Laboratory, Ft. Belvoir , VA, in conjunctionwith the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity,

you are currently using. However, thehave to do until the Aviator s NighSystem (ANVIS) NIA VS-6, be(sometime in mid fiscal year 1985).brighter for you aviators when wNIAVS-6. PEARL will keep youactions in this related Aviation life sarea.

More sizes of Nomex Flyer sCoverallsIn the Nomex Update arti

PEARL'S we stated that the coveradard tariff sizes. Upon further investthe CWU-27/P actually comes in 24your requisitioning of this item, weand their NSNs here. By the way, althe Army Master Data File.

8ize N8N 8ize328 8415010438376 40L32R 8415010438377 w348 8415-01043837834R 8415010438379 428368 8415010438380 42R36R 8415010438381 42L36L 8415010438382 448388 8415010438383 44R38R 8415004910915 44L

when exhausted use 4688415010438384 46R

38L 8415010438385 46L408 8415010438386 48R40R 8415010438387 48L


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RS eeort

Canada

enmark

Federal Republicof Germany

-Greecel 1 ~

AVIATION UN ITS that may be required tooperate as a joint national force should beaware that the U.S. Army has ratified a NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization NATO) standardization agreement STANAG 2351, Procedures for Marshalling Helicopters inMultinat ional Land Operations) that directs theprocedures for marshalling helicopters. As asignatory to this agreement, it is incumbentupon U.S. Army Aviation units to abide by theterms of the STANAG. Units are encouraged touse this document as a gu ide for developmentof their standing operating procedures.Units which are subject to this agreementare encouraged to validate the content of theSTANAG. If it is determined that there areterms of the agreement which need to be considered for changes, a standard DA Form 2028should be submitted.1 Aim The aim of this agreement is to standardize procedures forthe NATO forces to beused by marshallers/guides direct ing groundmovements of helicopters in multinationalland operations.2 Agreement Participating nat ions agree toadopt the procedures set out below.3 Definitions The fol lowing terms and defini

tions are used for the purpose of thisagreement:a. Load Control Group. Personnel who areconcerned with organization and control ofloading within the p ickup zone.b. Hookup Man. The person -responsiblefor attaching the external load and controll ingthe take-up of strain of the load sling.c. Marshaller. A person who directs theground movement of aircraft by the use of

with a minimum delay,point. It is recommendfeasible) between the sing units be effected pshalling operations.5. The mars hailer is to

applicable marshalli3117 . DETAILS OF TH6 nternal Loadsa. One marshalleeach landing point, dep

of aircraft to be controltween ai rcraft and the ding points.b. The marshallerprocedure to be used athe leader of the load cc. Before the arrivamarshaller is to move desired landing point,look into the directiohelicopter.d. Prearranged sigcontact with the appro

Position of Helicand HookUp/R


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res for Marshalling Helicopters n Multinational Land Operations

has been established by the appropriate control group.e. Marshallers should ensure safeclearance and operating conditions betweenaircraft when directing an aircraft to itsdesignated landing point.f. The marshaller shall remain in view ofthe pilot when directing the movement of theaircraft. When handover to another marshalleris required, the initial marshaller will not directhis attention away from the aircraft untilpositive control by the second marshaller isattained.g. Upon completion of loading, the aircrew will signal the marshaller that the aircraftis ready for movement.7 External Loads.a. A marshaller and at least one hookupman should be provided for each helicopterwhen attaching external loads.b. The hookup man is to ensure the

discharge of the static electricity of thehel icopter before attaching the load. The marshaller is to position himself in sight of thehelicopter pilot and is to direct the helicopterover the load until the hookup man has attachedthe external load.c. After hooking up the load, the marshaller indicates to the pi lot that the load is attached. The hookup man is to ensure that thehook is properly closed and is to guide theslings until the slack is taken up in orderto ensure that they do not foul the load.d. When the slings are seen to be taut andcorrectly fitted, the hookup man is to clear to asafe distance (about 20 meters to the side ofthe helicopter). When the load is clear of theground and the marshaller is satisf ied that it issecure and properly suspended, he is to give

crew. The intensity of these lights will vary,depending on the means of vision e.g., unaided ornight vision devices) the aircrew uses.c. Additional reference lighting for external load operations will be provided whenrequested.9 Marshalling SupportedUnit. The respon

sibilities of the supported unit are as follows:a. Provide specially trained personnel tomarshall helicopters to their landing points forthe pickup and release of external loads.Whenever practicable, these personnel are tobe equipped with distinctly colored clothing(e.g., fluorescent international orange oryellow).

b. Use marshalling signals as set out inSTANAG3117.c. Position marshallers and hookup personnel as shown in the figure.d. Restrict the presence of personnel inthe danger area around the helicopter to thosedirectly involved in the marshalling, loading,hookup or release of cargo.e. When conducting hookups at night,equip ground personnel with a night lightingdevice. The intensity of this light will vary,depending on the means of vision e.g., unaided ornight vision devices) the aircrew uses.f. Aid the pilot in hooking up loads atnight. Additional reference lighting may be re-quested by the helicopter unit.10. Marshalling Helicopter Unit. Thehelicopter unit may issue special instructionson hookup procedures if necessary.11 Emergencies. In case of emergency, thehelicopter may need to land quickly, avoidingthe load. The hookup men should therefore


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Directorate of Evaluation Standardization R PORT TO THE FIELD ST

A Good Safety Record is No Accident

M U H HAS BEEN said and done recently toreverse an upward trend of Aviation mishaps. The problemcentered on inadequate self-discipline on the partof some aviators, and inadequate supervision by somepeople in the chain of command.The Army cannot accept the risk of aviators whoknowingly and willfully violate rules and regulations,and consequently cause aircraft mishaps. Therefore theDepartment of the Army (DA) took stringent action torequire precise and comprehensive aircrew missionbriefings and mission br ief backs for flights.

n addition to this DA level action regarding high-riskaviators, senior aviators must take the lead in policingtheir own, and commanders must ensure that violatorsknow before mishaps occur that they will be held accountable for their own actions.All Aviation units do not have aviators who exhibitunacceptable behavior in that they knowingly violateArmy regulations, standing operating proceduresorother established procedures or prudent air disciplinesthat place personnel and/or equipment at unnecessaryrisk. Some in fact have outstanding records.This article provides informationabout some of the

The areas of interest survey Management. Operations. Training. Mishap prevention pro Aviation medicine.

The following is a summasurvey. All observations inclcommon to at least two of the Most were present in all three

MANAGEMHighly qualified Aviation combattalion levels) Command positions filledextensive Aviation backgroun

They had extensive Aviati Were also strong in manabilities.


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Report to the Field

Individual aviator training increased aviator'scapabilities in basic tasks while minimizing limitationsin accomplishing required aircraft training manualtasks.Emphasis placed on skilled qualification test training'atall chain of command levels Noncommissioned officer managed.

Command monitored.

MISHAP PREVENTION PROGRAMA viation safety off icers were involved and suppor ted

Experienced aviators selected as safety officers. Actively involved in unit operations. Command support enhanced the influence and effectiveness of Aviation safety officers.Safety surveys were performed and results acted upon Identified special hazards/problems. Results received action through command support.

Enhanced safe by-the-book operations.Safety programs well managed Appointment of senior aviators (credibility) assafety officers was key to well-managed programs.Aviators and commanders listen up to safety whenskilled/experienced safety officers speak. Commanders made known their support for theAviation safety officers and the safety program.

AVIATION MEDICINEOptimum use of flight surgeons

Used primarily in Aviation medicine specialty. Other medical duties minimized.Flight surgeons supported individual aviators Knew most aviators well. Gave high degree of attention to individual

Flight surgeons support aviat Extensively involved in u Timely advice providedAviation medicine matters.Flight surgeon credibility Highly respected by avia Highly valued by commaFlight surgeon support of avi Enhanced knowledge

interrelationships. Improved medical care o

The following conclusionsobservations.Management techniques emor new. However, the key to ttions was that management techniques.Commander involvement wtant factors found in these sucprograms. A variety of leaemployed, but they were all sumand involvement throughou

The following commandelements in the management o Established performance Ensured all personnel wmance criteria. Made certain training was Guaranteed operations w Took immediate and effetions from established perforAs reflected by the U.S. Arm

these units to have a good saInadequate self-discipline iingly violating regulations, opedent air discipline of their own40 percent of all pilot-error m


29/48

GOAL-$ 2 ,500,000.00 ~ r B Y AviatioaECEMBER 1984$1 ,450,000.00cash andpledges US UMThis is the first o regular series about the Army Aviation

Museum. Currently, plans call for building modern complex tohouse your Army Aviation Museum. So far, enough money has beencontributed to begin the first phase o construction. But we still havea ways to go, as the barometerabove shows. f you would like to help

build the Army Aviation Museum's new home, you are invited tosend tax deductible contribution to: The Army Aviation Museum

Foundation, P.O. Box H, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362-5000. f you desireadditional information, call Mr. Ed Brown at (205) 598-2508.

What s in Your MuseumThe L-4 Cub built by Piper Aircraft, played a signi

in the history of Army Aviation. Powered by a 65 hor4 cylinder engine the Army s first L-4 was accepteSeptember 1941, and was the principal combat airpby Army Aviation throughout World War II. Used pran observation aircraft, the L-4 first saw combat insion of North Africa on 8 Novem-ber 1942 after taking off from thess Ranger Today you can s

the L-4 at the museum.


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Volunteer for Airborne TrainingSFC George F. HugginsSoldiers who are interested in training and duty thatoffers challenges and rewards along with extra moneyshould consider volunteering for airborne training withan ultimate assignment to the 82d Airborne Division atFt. Bragg, NC.Three military occupational specialties (MOS) in theenlisted Aviation field (CMF 67) are on the airbornecritical list at Ft. Bragg. They are:MOS 67V, Observation/Scout Helicopter Repairman, grades El throughE5 needed; MOS 68B, AircraftPowerplant Repairman, grades El through E4 and E6needed; and MOS 68J, Aircraft Fire Control Repairman, grades El through E6 needed.A fourth MOS, 67N (Utility Helicopter Repairman),

is not on the airborne critical list. However, there aremany requirements at Ft. Bragg in airborne positions,especially in grades El through E4.Along with an assignment to the 82d Airborne Division, soldiers will serve in airborne positions and willreceive jump pay of $83.00 per month. Soldiers now onpromotion lists to E5 and E6, who have completed airborne training and who are in airborne positions, maybe able to have their promotion point cutoff scoresreduced. Soldiers should contact their local military personnel office for information.Soldiers should check the criteria in chapter 6, sectionII, paragraph 6-6, AR 614-200, to determine their

plete the airborne course atthey can be assigned to the 82After completing the airboassigned to Ft. Bragg for atsoldiers who are assigned to antion of training, normally wilan airborne position for thassignment.

For career soldiers, the lenbeyond 1 year will vary, depeborne strength levels in the soFor more information, contPERCEN, DAPC-EPL-TA,

How to Lose Your Aviation CIncentive Pay Without Even TBefore you read this articleyourself that you are willing tany deficiencies in your recordbe over or un er paid Now thyou need to do two things: Get a copy of your latest Lment (LES). Get a copy of your mosBrief (ORB).f you don't have one, see yofice. Now that you have theseprepare to inspect them caref


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FIGURE 1: Leave andEarnings Statement

JUllPS-ARMYLEAVE AND EARNINGS STATEMENT COPY 2 _election on the ORB. Are these two items synchronized? Ifnot, it's time to send out the Mayday call and proceed with the following emergency procedures: I__ .... . lJ.. i. ITlDCODI F-:F Contact your local fmance and accounting office. Contact your local military personnel office.

o I , IOC.KC.MO . I I ET PAY DUE ~............ 7. AU.OTWJIT'COt.LJ:c:T1CM ' . OTMnICOLlIC'f.... -- ...... -- .....

or ...TUWONIATtOl I

I f you cannot get the problem resolved locally,write to: Commander, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPCOPA-V, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA22332-0400. This step can be taken to resolve ny Aviation Career Incentive Pay data problem, but any requestmust be accompanied by appropriate documentation tojustify the change.

H' ::': ',' r I ; ; ~ ; - r = r::.T ... r:; .Recently, here at MILPERCEN, we have been able to

resolve more than 200 mismatches of ASED and TFOS.This is an ongoing effort which requires extensiveresearch of each case to pinpoint the exact problem.There are still an estimated 300 cases yet to be resolved.Don't be one of those 300 who suddenly fmd their flightpay reduced or cut off because of an administr.ative er-

81ATl TAl U A I I I ~ T I O N....:.:.,. := r=.:-' r::.rt.:..r=: ' ,

t:.j r ' ~ ~

T - 0 0 0 d 8 ~ - \ r...T '-r'-AI'OMtJ .. ' A U 0 7 l , . o r . . . . . = - ' _ ' = ' D . . \ A C . \TOFDC (Total OperationalFlying Duty Credit). Thecumulative number of monthsan aviator is assigned to

operational (not proficiencyor nonoperational) flying dutypositions.

ASED (Aviation Service Entry Date). Thedate an officer is first qualified, i.e., onvalid orders, for Aviation service. Onceestablished, ASED is not normallyTFOS(Total Federal ficer service comporig inal appointmen

changed. /FIGURE 2: officer Record Brief m'7icer. OFFICER RECORD BRIEF IDA P.m - . / ' I O M I ~ t n _ O M U I T . o t o I U:CTION M M ctJllHTY DA'A K . W C I : D. 1'II MenON IV ~ ( i O N . u ' './1 - , .., ,., ,-,' . / 1 I / I ' .. . , ,Pilot Status Code 1 .. ,..-1. : K.'''''' , ,. ... NO.,G. ) r'

1 = ~ ~ ~ ~ d o n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ / ~ i ~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~= Medically Disqualified ~ .. . . .... .3 = Non-Medically ~ ~ I I I I I ( ~ : i = q ~ ~ K ~ . _ ~ ~ N ~ : : D u C : : ~ - - - isqualified : : . ~ ~4 = Aviator-Not in ~ - ; : . :Aviation Service .. .: ... ... .,.''' ...., ... ,,,.... .,. .,. . 0


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Personnel Notesror. Check your LES and ORB to ensure all the data isvalid. The guide to changing any element of the ORB sDA Pamphlet 600-8.

Change to AR 135-215Since more Other Than Regular Army (OTRA) officers are now requesting Conditional Voluntary Indefinite (CVI)/Voluntary Indefinite (VI) status, achange to Army Regulation 135-215, Officer Recordsof Service on Active Duty, is required to facilitatemaintaining the necessary strength limits in both thehigh and low density functional areas (branches,specialties) and meeting the basic needs of the Army.The new system will require the establishment of a proactive centralized board responsible for the qualitativemanagement of the officer corps. The proposed pro-cess, outlined within, will use a centralized screeningprocess which will review the CVI/VI applications of allOTRA officers requesting career status.

Conditional Voluntary Indefinite StatusEvaluation will be accomplished by a singie panel

board. The board will include one member from aReserve Component, an appropriate minority andfemale representation. The board president will be, as aminimum, a colonel. The board will select only thoseapplicants with the potential to serve 20 years activefederal service and whose manner of performance(MOP) s competitive with his/her contemporaries. Officers' MOP that represents a possible promotion riskwill not be selected.

CVI applications will be processed as follows: OTRA officers will complete at least 2 years continuous active federal commissioned service(AFCS) prior to submitting a request for CVI. Officers will not be scheduled for advanced courseattendance until CVI status s determined.

f the officer desires totransferred, this desire aapplication.

Voluntary IndeBoard membership and prsame as used for CVI. OTRA officers will be cothe centralized board prioAFCS. The centralized selectioficer's file for VI at the 7th

AFCS. All CVI approvedautomatically by compution is required for VI.

All officers approved formain in the Army until stegrated into the Regularsooner under other appr At the VI point it s the deArmy to have succeededstrengths. If basic branchowever, it may be necetional officers from ovethose under-strength. If theffort will be made to asmove on a specific officeevery effort to branch tranmade, preferably selectinthe most experience in thAll officers already approv

tinue active duty service underThe implementation of this about 1 January 1985.

The proponent to AR 13ATTN: DAPC-OPP-M. Poins Personnel Actions Branch,AUTOVON 221 0146/7 or Co


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Have you ever considered what you would o if put into asurvival situation? Well with little innovation several itemmay be readily available for use but first you should ..

BEPREPARED

W 1 Erik P FeldmanisDirectorate o Plans and Training

Aviation DivisionFort Knox KY

IT s 0700 HOURS on a cold winter morning andyou are tasked to carry four passengers in a UH-1 HHuey to afield site in the mountains. You preflight theaircraft, file a localflight plan and check weather.The weather forecaster is currently reporting 2500broken with 3 miles visibility. He is predicting the ceiling and visibility will drop with heavy snow possiblearound 1600 hours local. You review the specified timesgiven 1 hour to destination, about 4 hours ground time,to include refuel, and 1 hour flight time back to homebase) and decide to fly the mission.Theflight out to thefie ld site is uneventful; however,there is a 6-hour delay at the field site rather than thescheduled 4-hour delay. By now it has started to snowbut the visibility is still about a mile. You know that theforecaster isn t predicting the heavy snow until about1600 hours. You estimate that it will only takeyou about45 minutes to fly home, so you decide to fly back tobase.

bout25 minutes into the flight, you notice that thetransmission oil pressure gauge is reading zero. You immediately start a descent to land. Due to your altitude

You know that sinceyou couldn t tact, nobody knows your positioweather conditions, it ll be imposslocate you. You now realize that yosituation.This is just a hypothetical situatioyou do?First, you must build ashelter. The cargo doors,crew doors and jump doorscould be used for the shelterframes or walls see figure).The insulation could be usedas a ground cloth or blanket.The jump doors also could be used aare injuries. Jet fuel can be used to sta

wood is wet. WARNING: You wanoil or hydraulic fluid due to the tox duce.) Th


34/48

VIEWS FROM RE DERS

Editor:Believe it or not, I just recei.ved and

read the excellent September issue ofA viation Digest The Directorate ofEvaluation and Standardization reporton night vision goggles and MajorZebehazy's threat article on secondgeneration antitank guided missiles wereboth highly informative and relevant totoday's tactical aviator. Even moreintriguing, from my point of viewanyway, were Aviation Employment inSpecial Purpose Operations, by Captain Ron Klein, and OH-58 Loss of TailRotor Effectiveness; Why It Occurs, byCaptain David Snellen. These articles aresuperb examples of the great stridesAviation is continuing to make as theArmy's newest branch.

Starting with Captain Snellen's article,

establish the Joint Special StudiesGroup, and who was responsible for theprevious blizzard of changes to the dash10 over the past 2 years, each incorporating a new, and incorrect, emergencyprocedure for L TE. I do have one reservation about the article, to which I shallreturn shortly.

Capta in Klein's article on special purpose operations is equally praiseworthy.As one can deduce by checking his footnotes, Captain Klein had to pull inseveral different sources of referencematerial to reach his conclusions. That isthe situation facing the Aviation leadertoday as he tries to understand theArmy's doctrine on how he should bestemploy his unit to support the groundtactical plan. I hope that somewhere in

have some redeal with theall painfullyand-hide aanymore.

With all thneed now ising to put it ithat the dayscraft are ovemander woujeeps or tactwith no weaevery effort form their mHarm's Waymust be equito-ground wgrenade laun


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Finally comes my one reservationabout Captain Snellen's fine article onLTE. He says LTE can be avoidedand/or overcome if the pilot will concentrate fully on flying the aircraft.This leaves the guy in the other seat toperform all the tasks related to accomplishing 'the mission. But where isthat other guy coming from? The TOE[table of organization and equipment]for aeroscout platoons only authorizesone pilot and one crewchief per aircraft.Thus, the commander must double uphis pilots, halving the number of crews hecan field. In the Army's one recent test ofthis arrangement, aeroscout platoons inGrenada were augmented with pilotsfrom other units. I hope this is not howwe plan to fight the next war. I also hopethat the much mentioned but little seenaerial observer does not turn out to bethe school solution. The workload on the

aeroscout, or air battle captain, is toogreat to entrust the conduct of the operation to some undertrained soldier whowill more than likely spend most of hisgarrison time in the motor pool or ondetail. We need to bite the bullet, admitthat the aeroscout mission requires twopilots, and have the TOEs changed accordingly. t just doesn't make sense tohave the crew that, within the scout/gunteam, is by far the busier of the two, handicapped with a nonpilot onboard.

Well, I've gotten rathe r far afield. I dowant to congratulate you on your excellent and ever-improving publication.Here's hoping if we ever have to go,we've got the right baggage packed.

CPT Randall N. BriggsAeroscout Platoon Cdr

niques, principles and procedures fortraining and training management in allcombat arms, combat support, and combat service support units, both Activeand Reserve Component.

These manuals are the basis for allArmy training and training management. FM 25-1, Training, covers thephilosophy and principles of training. tis for leaders a t all levels. FM 25-2, UnitTraining Management, provides theArmy training management process. t isfor battalion and above commandersand staffs. FM 25-3, Training inUnits, provides the how to for theconduct of training. t is for leaders atbattalion level and below, first-linetrainers. FM 25-4, How to ConductTraining Exercises, describes the conduct and use of training exercises to sustain skills. t is primarily for commanders and staffs at battalion level andabove.

These manuals are significant doctrinal contributions. Be sure to updateyour DA Form 12A (by checking blockno. 159, Techniques of Military Instruction) or write the U.S. Army Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard,Baltimore, MD 21220 to obtain copies.

Colonel Andrew P. O'Meara lrPresident, Army Training BoardFt. Eustis, VA 23604

Editor:Please forward a copy of your series of

articles on brigade airspace managementto the address below.

CPT Mark WiseFt. Leavenworth, S

me as I am unableissues of A viation DThanking you in

MAl Bruce CarletChief, Tactics andHqs, 32d Army AAPO, New York

The Army has estapoint within the Armto submit new tool idminor items ofequipand encourage tool usuggestions to the Acommunity for evaluacquisition.The new screening p

CommanderUSAMC MateriActivity MRSATTN: AMXMDLexington, YNew ideas also ma


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BR NCH

Major Directora

U S

Warning, what you sayWILL beused against youCommunications is the basic means to ensure troop control. Los

of communications is the loss of troop control. and the loss of troopcontrol in battle invariably leads to defeat.

LTC L. Titov


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The Soviets know they can't completely disruptenemy C 3 for long periods, so they have developedmathematical models to determine the crit ical timesof a battle. These are moments when action is requiredand delay could mean the difference between victoryand defeat; this is when the Soviets intend to use REC.There are REC units at different levels from front todivision. The tank and motorized rifle divisions havetheir REC capability in the radio/radar reconnaissancecompany in the reconnaissance battalion. Field Manual(FM) 100-2-3, Soviet Army Troops, Organization andEquipment, shows that these units have signalintelligence (SIGINT) and direction finding (DF)equipment. They do not appear to have any jammingcapability. This means that everywhere an Army aviatorcould expect to operate, there will be at a minimum, aSIGINT and DF threat. There is a battalion-sized RECunit at the army level and a regimental-sized REC unitat the front level. Jamming capabilities appear at thearmy level, but the actual jammers would probably beclose enough to the forward line of own troops to beeffective. The destructive aspect of REC would be atevery level of command. The Soviets will use all meansavailable to destroy enemy emitters, including indirectfire, ground and air attack.Signal IntelligenceThe two components of SIGINT are communicationsintelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence(ELINT). The purpose of COMINT is to determine theenemy force structure, composition, condition andintentions, while ELINT is used to gather data on enemyemitters.The Egyptian use of Soviet equipment during the1973 Mideast War against Israel demonstrated theextensive intercept capability for radio transmissions.Intercept units are moved forward immediately behindleading regiments and they can intercept enemytransmissions within the following ranges of theforward line of own troops: Artillery ground radar-about 25 km Very high frequency (VHF)-about 40 km High frequency ground waves-about 80 km High frequency skywave-unlimited Frequency modulated (FM)-about 40 km

need to know more about this subjec Use secure equipment. Use correct communications pr Don't use the radio unless you h Don't key the mike more than 1 Use the CEOI (communicationoperating instructions)/brevity codesin the clear. Use low power. Authenticate when: You think tnet; someone asks you to authenticaenemy contact; you transmit directifire, return to the command post or t

are authorized to send classified inclear; you transmit to someone undsilence; entering a net; you transmit areceiving a timely response; you canother station can't recognize you. Wauthenticate. Use other ways to communicate light, send-a-message (SAM) or pyroThe Direction Finding ThreatOnce the enemy has picked up yournext step is to find you. This is dobearings from one or more positiemitters. t is possible to pinpoint the50 to 200 meters. Normally threedirection finding (RDF) locations are emitter. By plotting the locations of thazimuths to the emitter, a triangle wiemitter would be found inside this accurate and effective method, andSIGINT and other intelligence itpositions, track the movements of uweakly defended areas. Tactical FMlow power can be picked up in excesspower signals up to 40 km. Operatiousually within 3.5 degrees.The time required to intercept a silocation and take steps to jam, destroyis illustrated in figure 1 The chart sho25 seconds after communications btargeting sequence can begin-evestation has stopped communicating.


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o seconds10 seconds

25 seconds

55 seconds

85 seconds

115 seconds

U S transmitter initiatescommunications.During search of VHFband, CommunicationsIntelligence Operatoridentifies U S trans-mitter and flashes alertto Radio DirectionFinder RDF) NetControl Station NCS).ommunicat ions

Intelligence COMINT)Operator also notifiesommunicat ions

Intelligence Analysts.

RDF Net Control Stationrequests bearingsfrom stations 2 and 3to target transmitter.COMINT Analysts for-ward information toPlotting and AnalysisSection.

RDF Stations Number2 and Number 3 acquirebearings and reportback to RDF Net ControlStation.RDF Net Control Stationreports approximatelocation to Plotting andAnalysis Section.Plotting and AnalysisSection refines approximate location by apply-ing collateral infor-mation, map analysisand COMINT.

All of these are important,basis for the disruption/destruThe following simple counteth wart this threat:

Move frequently-it ihelicopter. Move the unit oftthe OI loves better than to set Remote antennas-thebetter-put them at least 1 k Mask your antennasbetween your antennas andtheir pinpointing your locati Never refer to your friefeatures-establish checkpoi Use secure voice or areferring to location. It takes it s money in the bank. Land and talk face to fa Don t use you radio unl Don t key the mike morThe Interference Threat

The Soviets will try to degraradio interference or jammpassive. Active interference radio waves against enemy rsignals. Passive interference isreflectors to create false targeActive interference happens inbarrage and sweep jamming.

Spot jamming is used oconcentrated power. I t defr.Yquency while not wastinwhere the enemy is not operawith friendly transmissions. type of jamming to work thrBarrage jamming spreads ta wide spectrum of frequefrequencies within the band anSince this will affect friendlyprobably will be used whenimportant to the Soviets orenemy receiver s location.Sweep jamming is a comcharacterized by rapid chfrequencies through a wide b


39/48

After you realize you are being jammed you should: KEEP OPERATING-Don't let the enemy knowif they are being effective. Try to work through thejamming by repeating the transmission, saying wordstwice and speaking slowly. Use a relay station to pass traffic for you. Use alternate means of communications, i.e.,switch to UHF, VHF or FM radio if these aren't beingjammed. Use SAM or hand and arm or pyrotechnicsignals. The better the unit standing operatingprocedures and the more thorough the pre-missionplanning, the less you will need to use the radio . Switch to high power on your radio. Mask antennas. Put a terrain feature between yourantennas and the enemy. Don't use your radio unless you have to.

Don't key the mike more than 1 seconds. Report (by secure means) enemy jammingimmediately to your headquarters. This allows our unitsto locate, jam or destroy the enemy jammer. Switch frequencies. This needs thorough planning,

Ope

enemy with the hope that we will actthis type of deception would be radithat reveal information about nequipment, plans for future operatioenemy losses, battle damage, false inthat gives false imagery to radar useweapon systems. The other form ofmost of us are concerned with.Imitative deception is the intrusionour radio nets or the altering of navimislead unwary aviators who aNA VAIDs. The enemy may mimic soafter monitoring it for some time to ainformationor to gain intelligence. Amovie, The Conversation , also would be easy for the enemy to recorradio broadcasts, edit them so thmeaning is changed, and then playtakes is a receiver and a tape recorderthe enemy to disrupt operationprocedures were followed. f you


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~ L L BL ) )DVNS RED

Eugene Bullard, anAmerican, was theworld's first blackaviator. For morethan 2 years he

fought in some of thebloodiest battles of

history.

\\

Major Phillip E RaschkeMajor Raschke is currently chief of the Centralized AviationReadiness Training team at Ft. Lewis WA. He holds an Sin mass communications from the University of Tennessee

and is a frequent contributor to military publications

illus

TH MOrrO ON the sidAll Blood Runs Red. Thi

holes adorned the aircraft'spilot, Eugene Bullard, thankedaircraft's tail and not his.

Bullard's comments wereWhy? Because he was the worthe only black pilot to fly in coI. Moreover, he was an Amer


43/48

General de Gaulle walked up to him, grasped hishand and warmly embraced him.

Enlisting in the Foreign Legion, he underwent infantry training near Paris and arrived at the Somme Frontin December of 1914. For more than 2 years, he foughtin some of the bloodiest battles of history.

At Verdun, he won the Croix de Guerre for gallantryin action. He also received a serious leg wound whichhospitalized him for more than 3 months.

During his convalescence, Bullard became acquainted with a Commandant Ferrolino, Chief of theFrench Airfield at Brun. When Ferrolino casually askedabout Bullard's plans for the future, he replied, Iwould like to be an aviator.With Ferro lino's help, Bullard eventually obtainedorders for pilot training. Following graduation in thespring of 1917, he received orders for advanced trainingat the Avord Aviation School. Upon arrival, however,he found himself in charge of the sleeping quarters forAmerican pilots being assigned to the LafayetteEscadrille. He took the assignment in stride, hoping itwould quickly pass. But as the weeks ticked by, Bullardbegan to ask, What's goingon? ,Inquiries with friends soon revealed that a Dr. Edmund L: Gros, an influential American, who hadhelped form the Lafayette Flying Corps, disapproved ofan American black becoming a combat pilot.

Feelings similar to Dr. Gros' were not uncommon atthe time. In fact, the United States did not train blackpilots until 1943.

French squadrons were encouragedAmerican Flying Service. Many did,plication went unnoticed.

Bigotry, however, was not limitedalone. On a rainy night in NovembBullard unwittingly struck a superioFrenchman had made a racial remar

His outstanding war record savedmartial, but his flying career was overthe elite flying corps, he was groundeback to the Foreign Legion.

Following the war, Bullard remaining the 1920s, he worked as a bandleawell-to-do French countess. Later, henightclub and athletic club.

With the advent of World War II, Bfound himself defending France agavader. Although badly wounded inBlac, he eluded capture, escaped to Spreturned home to his native America

In America, Bullard remained relaworked at a series of menial jobmomento-cluttered apartment in Ha

Shortly before his death in 1961, hoa rare honor. General Charles de GaFrance, was visiting New York. An aito a reception for the French Preside

At the reception, de Gaulle noticed


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45/48

Captain Mark B HatterOperations Officer

3d Platoon, 498th Medical Company AA)Fort Stewart, GA

TH IR MBUL NCE flight medics aresoldiers held in esteem by subordinates and superiorsand envied by their peers. They are, by necessity, expertsin medical and technical training above and beyond thatlevel achieved by the basic 9 B medical specialists. Theyare th key members of aeromedevac crews.

Flight medics assigned to air ambulance units arecarefully selected by the chain of command through aprocess of interviews and record screens. The processassures selection of only the most qualified, motivatedand work productive soldiers. Minimum training

almost always includes training anemergency medical training (EMdemonstrated proficiency in all of the basthe 91B military occupational speciseries. Those units participating inAssistance to Safety and Traffic (MAby AR 500-4 to crew flight medics wlevel training.

What impact does this create on aiwith regard to training and managempersonnel? Every enlisted MOS in tha skill level manual providing a compoutline for assigned soldiers in the reqpertise determined by that MOS. Tspecialists are no exception untiadvanced medical skills training thatbasic skills required in the 91B serieadvanced skills include basic EMT, adparamedic training. Additionallspecialists now designated with a foxidentifier must be totally familiar witthe aircraft they will soon crew on an(Modification Table of Organizationmedical equipment they will workmedical specialist series manuals doadditional medical and nonmedical smastered and practiced by 9 BF flighthen, do unit commanders turn foguidance for planning and conductingindividuals?

The answer is often as nebulous asbegin with, ow does a commanderwith advanced and specialized skills reference materia l is available? The 67Corps flight officer unit commanderssupervise EMT level or higher medicathey have people authorized by MTOsupervision. Further, the aircraft knobe trained, learned and tested is notmilitary training manual tailored to


46/48

upon successful completion of the course. The programis comprehensive and trains 9 B medical specialists ingeneral aircraft operating procedures and theaeromedical aspects of flying.

The problems cited above challenged the 3d Platoon,498th Medical Company (AA), Ft. Stewart, GA, todevelop a viable 9 BF training program that addressesthe following challenges:

Develop and maintain a standing operating procedure (SOP) that continues to teach and train EMTlevel skills.

Develop and maintain as part of the SOP a sectioncovering the installation, operation and servicing of thespecialized medevac equipment unique to the unit.

Develop and maintain as part of the SOP a sectionthat covers the training of nonmedical general aircrewmember tasks.

Standardize all of the training to be covered in theSOP under the task, conditions and standardsmethodology.

Establish and maintain a medical treatment folder(MTF) for each assigned flight medic listing iterations oftasks required to be conducted on a semiannual basis.

Develop the program with both comprehensivenessand simplicity in mind.

The program successfully addthrough the implementation o

The first of the three phaseAll people newly assigned to thplaced into the initial entry pinprocessing. In this phase thtraining and testing in a battejects extracted from the 9 Breceive training and testing in the chain of command. Thesfamiliarization, installation, oall non-MTOE medical equipthe aircraft and used onnonmedical general crewmemis trained and tested under themethodology and was eithermilitary manual (91B skillstasks Maine Army National Gphlet 95-2) or was written by(special medical skills).

Training and testing of thesedaily under the supervision omissioned officer in charge (Nofficer. The trainees educatioassigning them to aircraft


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medevac duty. Riding shotgun with medevacqualified crews, the trainees assist in actual missionsunder the close supervision of the standby crew medic.The initial entry phase is programed to last 3 weeks.Modification of the program length is contingent uponmission requirements or personnel expertise.

The second program phase is the hospital trainingphase. This phase is programed to develop the flightmedic trainee in skills that are best learned and moreeasily practiced in a medical treatment facility. Trainingin this phase is programed by the medical treatmentfacility through direct coordination with the unit operations officer and flight medic NCOIC. Doctors, nursesand special technicians supervise the training and testingof each task.

While in the hospital phase, trainees rotate throughthree clinics, each lasting 1 week in duration. Theseclinics include the emergency room, the operatingroom, and the labor and delivery room. As in the initialentry phase, the hospital training phase emphasizeshands-on training.Upon completion of the hospital training phase,medic trainees are scheduled for emergency medicaltraining if certification has not yet been received. Uponcompletion of EMT or if already EMT certified,trainees enter the next phase of the medical trainingprogram.

The third phase of the program is the continuationphase. The trainees at this point are qualified as fullymission capable medics and remain in this phase as longas they are assigned to the unit. Upon entry, a medicaltreatment folder is established for each medic. TheMTF, designed specifically for the flight medic, is

medevac duty without further supervmedic.

Maintenance ofEMT skills for eachtinuation phase is accomplished throuand instruction. Weekly, medics arevanced skill topic by the flight medtrained and tested by a selected medic The training is conducted in accordaconditions and standards concept. Ouare prepared by the instructors usindate EMTor paramedic li terature avsion, doctors or nurses are programedon advanced or innovative procedurestheir medical background.

Semiannually, continuation phrescheduled again for hospital traininhigh proficiency is maintained in thospracticed in the hospital. The durationbased on current mission requiremproficiency.

The continuation phase is furthscheduling medics for seminars, symferences offered by the hospital andagencies when available. Again, the epand the flight medics backgroundstheir medical knowledge.

Finally, every medic trains quarterannually in cardiopulmonary resusconjunction with EMT certificatiophased medical training program, amaintain all assigned 9 BF personnelof medical readiness feasible.

The medical training program d


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Army Aviation Digest - Dec 1984

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Transcript of Army Aviation Digest - Dec 1984