Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1984

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1984

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Aviation 19848

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PEARL SThreat: Soviet HeUC )twer

40 Air Force Air l I ' I 'Un '1 ln


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Major General Bobby J MaddoxChief, Army Aviation Branch

Project UPDATE

TH TITLE FOR my comments this monthshould make the reader wonder what newweapon system, training program, managementsystem or personnel system I am about todiscuss. Whichever category you picked, you areabsolutely correct. The message concerns amedium that is organic to all systems in theArmy. It provides procedures, direction andguidance while link ing the developer, trainer andcommander to the system user. Publications areth t medium and the Aviation Center is on theleading edge of a program that will drasticallychange the way we write, produce and useprinted materials.The new program is called UPDATE. Under thedirection of COL Frank Milwee of The AdjutantGeneral's Office (TAGO), the program recentlyproduced the Army's f irst UPDATE fieldmanuals-FM 1-100, Combat AviationOperations"; M 1-107, "Air-to-Air Combat ; andFM 1-240, Instrument Flying and Navigation forArmy Aviators.The impetus for a new publishing systemcomes from the huge publishing backlog thatexists in the present 'system. It has becomeincreasingly clear that the present system canno longer effectively and efficiently maintain thenecessary flow of current and usable informationrequired to keep the user ready to fight. Newbooks are in need of revision by the time theyare printed and distributed to the user.Proponents must write changes and have themdistributed in an attempt to maintainpublications that are current. The users mustemploy scarce resources to physically post thesechanges to their basic copy. These bulky,looseleaf publications require a binder andcollectively require considerable shelf space forstorage. The snowball ing effect of this unwieldlysystem makes it hard to maintain an up-to-dateinformation base.UPDATE demonstrates a publishing logic thatreplaces costly, unreliable, manpower-

NOVEMBER 984

demanding printed products with economical,labor-efficient printed communications that arecomplete and up-to-date. An UPDATE productdoes not take as long to produce. It is keystrokedon computer discs using state-of-the-artcomputer terminals replacing typewritten manuscripts. It is printed in book form on modern laserprinters instead of using old-fashioned printingpresses. The UPDATE product weighs less anddistribution costs can be cut by as much as 90percent. UPDATE products do not requirebinders; they are complete, up-to-date issues. Aschanges occur, a new issue will be printed andthe old one can be thrown away. Users will nolonger need to dedicate scarce resources to postchanges.The ultimate goal of the UPDATE program is toincrease readiness by providing the most current,up-to-date information to the field in the mostuseful form. To be successful , we must have yourfeedback. Each UPDATE publication has a readerresponse card for your comments. Every recipientof an UPDATE product should review the publication and submit this card to TAGO. The card issimple to fill out, can be dropped in the nearestmailbox and will help us give you the type of product you want.In addition to the reader response card, youwill get a subscription card in your UPDATEpublication. Use this card to order the copies youneed. If you don't order them, you will not getthem; it is that simple.The Aviation Center point of contact for theUPDATE program is the Publications Division inthe Directorate of Training and Doctrine. Anycomments you have in addition to those youmake on the reader response card shou Id be sentto: CommanderU.S. Army Aviation CenterATTN: ATZQ-TD-PFt. Rucker, AL 36362-5000

UPDATE publications are the wave of thefuture. AIR ASSAULT


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Arn Y Aviat ion

1 9 8 4 to 2 1 5

Colonel E H Grayson JrHeadquarters

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine CommandFort Monroe VA

TH R HAVE BEEN a number of recent articlein this magazine which have addressed a variety ospecific topics such as current tactics, self-deploymentthe Army Training and Evaluation P rogram supportair-to-air combat, crossing the forward line of owntroops FLOT), night training, forward arming andrefueling point movement, etc. The list goes on andon; and it appears that what w are attempting to telthe Army and us aviators) is that w can supporthe AirLand Battle doctrine; that w can fulfill a vitarole in any war, regardless of where and how violentand that yes the senior leadership made the right decision when w became a full-fledged partner with theother combat ,


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AirLand Battle is much more than just the way weplan to fight on the battlefield. It is a philosophy, amentality and an attitude toward war which recognizesand identifies-and tries to define the framework ofwar. Army Aviation provides, for the first time, asingle capability to link the battlefield dimensions ofwidth, breadth, height and time together. f one addsthe dimension of tactical agility, Army Aviation alsoprovides the commander a greater capability than everexisted before to marshal critical assets for decisive action at the time and place of his choosing.

Within the entire inventory of Army systems today,there are none that match or exceed Army Aviation scapability to support the AirLand Battle in:

Providing rapid mobility. Providing indirect firepower. Seeing deep and attacking deep. Plugging gaps.

direct or direct firepower of the cannon artillery or themain tank gun. They are dead wrong for a numberof reasons. There may be times when massed firesfrom a direct support 155 mm battalion will put moresteel on the target at a greater distance beyond theFLOT. However, this might also be the exceptionrather than the rule. Consider the firepower of theAH-IS Cobra or AH-64 Apache whereby 6 or morehelicopters (up to 21) can fire 38 to 76 rockets each.This potent concentration of indirect fire more thanequals that of an entire division artillery.

The same holds true when it comes to killing tanksor other armored vehicles. An AH-IS platoon, orAH-64 tank killer teams, can deliver a greater concentration of antitank fire from concealed positions thanany ground system. Moreover, the inherent mobilityand flexibility of the helicopters provide a much greatercapability to concentrate this

Reacting to penetrations. Rapidly movingsoldiers, ammunition, lightair defense and artillery systems

Using economy of forcemeasures. Matching decisive combat power at critical places in

a rapid manner. Providing rapid logistical

support from the corps support command/division sup-

AirLand Battle is theframework which we have

determined is the bestmanner n which we can

apply our resourcescurrent and projectedagainst the range of

threats which we face.

firepower over and overagain, wherever needed onthe battlefield.Where Will Army AviationFightIn a Mideast rapid deployment scenario, the firstArmy unit to locate theenemy probably will be thescout pilots. Simultaneously,

port command straight to user levels. Providing tactical recon and surveillance.I fully realize that making a statement of Army

Aviation capabilities as those listed above is amouthful-and one that undoubtedly will be debated.However, they are valid The how to question isthe one that Army aviators at all levels must clearlyunderstand and demonstrate. No one will argue thatArmy Aviation can provide the rapid mobility that isso inherent to winning on the modern battlefield. Certainly terrain obstacles pose no major problems forour current family of helicopters, and the ability tomove rapidly over extended distances is unmatched byother systems. But there is much more to rapid mobility than skipping around the battlefield at 100 knots,and this is where the learning process is critical. TheAviation Center and School at Ft. Rucker, AL, mustteach the how why and significance of this rapidmobility capabili ty.Those from the Field Artillery, and the tankers, mayargue that the attack helicopter cannot provide the in-

NOVEMBER 1984

the first Army unit to provide indirect fires on the approaching enemy forcemost likely will be the attack helicopter, firing areafire 2.75 inch rocket. Finally, the first enemy tank killedwill more than likely be by a TOW or HELLFIREdelivered from an AH-I S or AH-64.

Initial forward air control of tactical Air Force assetsmay very well be from a scout helicopter. Army lightinfantry tank killer teams undoubtedly will bedeployed forward by UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.CH-47 Chinook helicopters probably will be supporting port and airfield clearing operations, and rapidlymoving forward ammunition, air defense systems,light artillery (to include towed 155 mm), engineerequipment, mines, etc., and all of this will likely occur before tanks, personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, etc., even clear the ships, ports or airfields.

This scenario can somewhat be transcribed intoeither the European or Korean theaters. There issimply no situation, whether intense or less, in whichArmy Aviation cannot playa significant role as an integral part of the combat arms. How many Return of

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Forces to Europe (REFORGER) exercises have foundaeroscouts locating the main attack; attack helicoptersengaging and destroying enemy parachute assaultsdeep into the rear areas; conducting joint air attack team(JAAT) operat ions; supporting critical logistical moves;supporting counterattacks; and performing suppressionof enemy air defense (SEAD) operations? The list goeson and on. So the bottom line is yes , we have come along way and we can support the AirLand Battle, Army2 *or any other future concept. The how to is our job.

The Aviation School must take the lead in pullingtogether academic programs of instruction (POI) thatteach the how to at every level of the courses offered atFt. Rucker. We must:

Flood the system with field circulars so that unitscan begin training in critical areas while they waitfor field manuals (FMs).

Capture lessons learned from the past, consolidatethem into manageable packets and get them intothe field.

Ensure that the close ties developed with Ft. Ben-ning, GA (Infantry), Ft. Knox, KY (Armor) andFt. Eustis, VA (maintenance/ logistics) over the

The rationale behind the Army 2 conce pt is to develo p a viable vehicle wi thwhich to guide futu re organizational al ignment s, doc t r ine, trai ning and materi elrequirements. Next mon th watch for the arti c le, Arm y Aviation 's Concept forArmy 21, by Major Marion Tyler.

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past 25 years remain strong and that joint effortswith them continue as Army Aviation grows.

Support every field training exercise (FTX) thaoccurs, learn what problems the other combat andsupport arms must deal with and then help toresolve them.

AirLand Battle TrainingCommanders cannot take tactical and technica

competence of subordinates as a matter of fact. Theymust participate in the training process as follows:

Enhance knowledge. Reinforce skills. Introduce new concepts. Demonstrate the how to . Commanders must train to realistic standards by: Injecting discipline into training. Putting stress into tactical exercises.Commanders ust develop tomorrow's leadersArmy Aviation must train to fight as t intends to fight

if it is to continue making great strides forward in thedevelopment of its combat capabilities .

Unquestionably the critical element in training is totrain as we intend to fight. Commanders at all echelonshave major ro les to play within the AirLand Battletraining arena. Your obligations are to demand ex-cellence, know your profession and ensure that yoursubordinates know theirs. Challenge your junior

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leaders to think, plan and decide under realistic conditions. Have the courage to accept risks and the conviction to allow for honest errors. Adopt Josephus'attitude that "drills must be bloodless battles, and battles bloody drills."Ensure that there is a vigorous training effort in thecombat and combat support Aviation units designedto support the ground commanders 24 hours daily, 7days a week, regardless of the weather. In fact, providing critical support during adverse weather periodsshould be emphasized. After all, when you are hovering in the trees in an attack position on a foggy dayin Germany or Korea, you have the advantage overthe tanks-they are buttoned up and their visibility islimited far more than yours. However, you must trainextensively to be able to cope with the adverse weatherand get to the tanks, which have much less of a problem in this respect.Get The Word Out On What's Happening.One way to get the word out is through the Directorate of Standardization and Evaluation (DES),located at the Aviation Center. This directorate unquestionably has a better picture of what is going onthan any single agency anywhere. Why not considercompiling a general quarterly report and send directto unit level, comments from the DES, to include theU.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) Safety and Standardization Board, U.S. Army Forces Command aircraftreliability and maintainability simulation and Aviationoperational readiness safety evaluations to include,Who is doing what; what's working in Korea;specialized training at Ft. Campbell, KY; what's happening at Ft. Hood, TX; etc"? It is imperative for Aviation unit commanders to know what the rest of theAviation arena is doing, particularly since new innovations in Aviation tactics, techniques and procedures arebeing developed worldwide and are rapidly changing aswe move into the mid-1980s.Combined Arms Team: The Key.Can Army Aviation fight in this arena? Unques

tionably Do we fight alone? Certainly not.Our role in fighting on the modern battlefield is asan integral member of the combined arms team; toreinforce the eyes and ears of ground commandersfrom vantage points not available to them by othermeans; to perform a multitude of essential missionsfor the armored cavalry regiment and division commander including reconnaissance, long-range indirectfires, pre-positioning air defense and towed artillery

NOV MBER 984

systems, supporting and augmenting direct firesagainst enemy formations by our tanks and groundTOW IDragon systems; finding the enemy commandposts with our electronic systems; positioning tankkiller teams throughout the main battle area; movingcritical ammunition as far forward as possible; airassaulting infantry troops into needed areas; movingmines, bridging equipment, medical items, petroleum,oils and lubricants- and a multitude of other significant logistical items forward; plugging gaps and yes,defending key terrain by fire.

It is imperative to study lessons learned from thepast before pinning down doctrine and concepts forthe future. I would hope that the new academic POIwill include a fairly hefty block in Army Aviationhistory: What did we learn from the French use of airmobile and air assault armed helicopters (UH-21s) during the war in Algeria? Major Hilaire Bethouart wroteabout it in his article, "French Army Aviation," inthe May 1960 issue of the A viation Digest Did we learn anything from the highly successfulBritish operations in Malaya that lasted from 948 to1960? The British made good use of helicopters andlight aircraft in that campaign, as Lieutenant ColonelM.W. Sutcliffe wrote in his article Malayan Operations" in the October 962 issue of the AviationDigest What did we learn from 2 years of extensivetesting, training, tactics, etc., by the th Air AssaultDivision (Test)? Have we recaptured how the divisionsuccessfully fought the 82d Airborne Division duringthe 1964 version of the Swift Strike operation? ...ormoved major portions ofthe division from Ft. Benning,GA, to Ft. Stewart, GA, during numerous FTXs toengage the 2d Infantry Division (Mechanized) and armor battalions? Where are the reports gathered by thetest and evaluation agency that monitored divisionoperations for 2 years? What have we captured from the Army Aviationsupport during past REFORGER exercises? Do wehave down on paper that flying in Europe is not likeflying at Ft. Campbell? Have we learned howUSAREUR Aviation units conduct cross-FLOT operations against a sophisticated air defense threat, whichis not to be found to the same extent during FTXs inthe continental United States? Where are the lessons learned from 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) operations in Egypt? Who is compiling lessons learned from ongoingJAT operations? We have a new joint Tactical Air

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1984 TO 2 15Command/U .S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TAC/TRADOC) manual out, but does it work?Does it need changes?

Who out in the big training world is still usingcommand and control helicopters, or have the lessonslearned from Lam Son 719 forever made an imprintthat command and control aircraft and ZSU-23s don'tmix?

Who has put anything to the field that addresseshow to change an AH-1 engine in the field at nightusing a borrowed wrecker and a portable lighting set?

What critical authorized stockage list/prescribedload list and other critical support items are essentialwhen deploying for FTXs?

How does the general support (GS) battalion contact team system work-or does it work? Who endsin reports, suggestions, etc., to Ft. Rucker or Ft. Eustisto ensure that the word gets out?

How does the GS maintenance company deploy?Can it deploy, or is it stuck on the airfield becau e ofinsufficient vehicles and nonportable equipment?

How does one pump Aviation fuel (JP4) from arailcar into a 10,000 gallon tanker? s there a bettermanner than the way it is done in USAREUR?

Who is capturing lessons learned fromUSAREUR and other major Army commands, fromAir Force forward air controllers running missions andfrom the front seat of scout helicopters?


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Who is pulling together lessons learned from nighttraining? t is understood that critical to the successof night operations is the ability of the Air Force toperform missions of counterair, interdiction, close airsupport and reconnaissance. Simultaneously, it isequally as significant and critical that Army Aviationprovide its full support complement at night. Where are these lessons learned? Along withsignificant advances in night combat techniques, it isequally as essential that both services develop consistent concepts for employment and complementarytraining programs to ensure nd maximize effectivejoint combat.

Who is teaching joint SEAD (JSEAD) to Armyaviators? Does anyone use the TAC TRADOCunclassified training text to train for this essential mission? Whether supporting tactical Air Force assets withour indirect fire systems, or crossing the FLOTourselves, it is vital that local and campaign JSEADoperations be studied and understood.

Who monitors after-action reports from Red Flagwhich unequivocably state that if helicopters don'thave the Have Quick radio, that it is impossible tocommunicate in a high jamming environment?

In 1963, the 227th Air Assault Helicopter Battalion developed a contingency plan to move the entire battalion from Ft. Benning to Trinidad. The onlyoutside support was to be provided by CV -2 (nowdesignated C-7) Caribou from the 10th TransportationBrigade which would pre-position JP4 and navigational aids. Where is that plan today, and could it haveassisted in the recent Urgent Fury deployment?

In 1969, in the Republic of Vietnam it was standingoperating procedure (SOP) in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) that when conducting air assaults intothe Ashau Valley that detailed planning ensured flightroutes transcended the worst possible terrain. Why?Because, for the most part, 37 mm and 3 mm antiaircraft systems (which were numerous) were tied to roadnetworks, thus rugged terrain offered some safety fromthese weapons. Where is this SOP, and how can it fitin Europe, Korea or the Mideast today? Were thelessons learned from 1969 included in the soon-to-bepublished cross-FLOT operations FM? Read ColonelBill Pages' March 1980 igest article entitled RollerCoaster Operations Across the FEBA. Have wecapitalized on his experience and lessons learned fromcommanding a combat Aviation battalion in Korea?Did we record that the continenta l United States attackhelicopter battalion conducting cross-FLOT operationsduring REFORGER 78 was destroyed every time it ap-

NOVEMBER 1984

proached the FLOT?Does this mean that if we conduct detailed in

telligence planning, take full advantage of existing terrain and plug into the JSEAD effort, and are includedas an integral part of the combined arms team that wecan conduct cross-FLOT operations to support thedeep attack; support the battle at the FLOT; and support the rear area battle? Certainly we canWhat's Down the Road?

Our Aviation equipment is better than ever, witheven better and more sophisticated systems scheduledto join the inventory. We are an expensive branch;however, the Army leadership is fully supporting thecost of both aviator training and equipment as a resultof being convinced that Army Aviation will unquestionably provide an invaluble role on tomorrow's battlefield. Will this decision be justified? Certainly it will,but we, the Army Aviation community, are the oneswho must ensure our leadership made the right decision. Yes, we've come a long way since the first ArmyL-4 Cub roared from a Navy carrier off North Africaand from the early days of OH-13 Sioux and a fewUH-19 Chickasaw operations during the Korean War.Yes, we've come a long way from the absolutely invaluable contribution Army Aviation made during theVietnam War; and yes, Army Aviation can playa major role in the AirLand Battle as an integral part ofthe combined arms team. You are the ones who willmake it work.

"Those that cannotremember the pastare condemned to

repeat it.George Santayana

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Captain Ron KleinCombined Arms Division

Department of Combined Arms TacticsU.S. Army Aviation Center

Fort Rucker, AL

VI TION EMPLOYMENTinDefensive Operations

This is the third and final article in a series covering the employment of Army Aviation in each of the principal operations. The

first article, Aviation In Special Purpose Operat ions, appeared in the September 1984 issue. It was followed in Octoberby Aviat ion Employment In Offensive Operations. Copies of

these articles can be obtained by writing to Editor, AviationDigest P.O. Drawer P Ft. Rucker, AL 36362-5000.

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HE AIRLAND Battle emphasison initiative and the aggressivepursuit of fleeting opportunitiesdoes not imply that defensiveoperat ions are of secondary importance. We muststrive to incorporate the offensive spirit in alldefensive operations. Napoleon wrote in hismemoirs, The entire art of war consists of a wellplanned and except ionally circumspect defensefollowed by rapid, audacious attack. 1

In many respects the employment of Aviation inthe defense is much more difficult than in the offensive operations. The enemy decides when andwhere to attack, and the mobility of currentweapons systems makes response times short.Discerning which enemy attacks are feints, whichare supporting attacks, and which is the mainbreakthrough attack further complicates thedefense. The mobility of helicopters makes theman ideal force to reconnoiter and to respond tothreatened sectors with the firepower necessaryto destroy the enemy first echelon forces whilefriendly ground maneuver forces are repOSitioning.Success in such attempts depends on morethan a rapid response. The effectiveness and survivability of Army Aviation units also hinges onsuch determinants as the availability of earlywarning information assets, the suppression ofenemy air defenses (SEAD), and the selection of acommand or support relationship that yields flexibility commensurate with our mobility.

FM 100-5, Operations, specifies four types ofdefensive operations: the defense the delay thedefense of n encircled force and rear area protec-tion operations. The other defensive activitiesidentified in FM 100-5 are counter tt cks ndspoiling attacks reliefs to continue the defenseand withdrawals. The planning and conduct ofcounterattacks and spoiling attacks closelyparallel the attacks covered last month in the article, Aviation Employment in Offensive Operations. Therefore they will not be discussed here,nor will the conduct of a relief to continue thedefense which is so similar to the special purpose operation relief to continue the attack.

1. FM 100-5, page 1 -4.2. FM 1 -5, page 1 -4.

NOVEMBER 1984

Although the conduct of withdrawals may beeither under enemy pressure or without enemypressure, they are all planned as withdrawalsunder enemy pressure and most of those planning considerations are covered below under thecategory of delays. Consequently, this article islimited to the four primary defensive operations.

,,,\

- Although the overall ad-

DEFENSEvantage in the campaignlies with the attackingforce, a well planneddefense and responsiveearly warning systems can significantly reducethat advantage. And once the battle is engaged,

the force ratio advantage favors the defender.There are several contributing factors that resultin this advantage. When enough warning hasbeen received to thoroughly prepare a deliberatedefense_ he defender: is dug into protected positions (reducedvulnerability with concealment), has clear fields of fire, has emplaced obstacles, arranges for converging direct and indirectfires,

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efensiveOperations

Enjoys greater accuracy (since he s stationary), and is familiar with the terrain.To compensate for such a local advantage, the attacker attempts to funnel his force into a narrowbreakthrough sector where he can achieve anoverwhelming force ratio advantage, attack withsurpr ise and move with enough speed to precludereinforcements on the defender s part.

Although there is a continuous battlethroughout the entire depth of the battlefield, anartificial separation into three areas is often doneto facilitate a discussion of the special aspects ofeach. These areas are the deep battle (crossforward line of own troops (FLOT)), close-in batt leand the rear area protection (RAP) operations.In defensive operations, the close-in battle isfurther divided into the covering force area (CFA)and the main battle area M SA) (figure 1).Deep str ikes across the FLOT are applicable inoffensive operations and defensive operations.They are generally conducted for one of threepurposes: To take out specific weapons or enemyassets. To delay the enemy. To destroy large concentrations of enemyforces.

FIG URE 1: Organization of the Defense.

F l O T ~ ; u 6 ~~ erI r; \ K Me~ t l t t l

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rmy Aviation in the Deep BattleAlthough Aviation supports and conductscross-FLOT operat ions (raids, reconnaissance-inforce), a more frequent employment is in Aviationunique missions. In a high in tensity environmentour current capabilities are limited. Even with effective SEAD and accurate information on thelocation of targets, aircraft losses due to enemyfire during day operations would be exorbitant.Deep strikes at night and during obscured

weather conditions improve survivability, but current equipment capabili ties do not permit acquisition or engagement of targets at an appropriatestand-off range. The fielding of the AH-64 Apacheand the OH-58D Kiowa closes this gap and willsignificantly improve ourcross-FLOT capability.With accurate intelligence, at tack helicopters candestroy armor and mechanized vehicles, enemycommand posts, fuel trucks, ammunition convoys and other high-payoff targets within theirfuel range. Indicative of Aviation capabilities inthis spoiling attack role are the 720 HELLFIREmissiles that an AH-64 battalion can carry acrossthe FLOT. Longer range missions requiring theestablishment of forward arming and refuelingpoints in enemy held territory are much riskier, re-quire a major allocat ion of assets and will be executed less frequently.rmy Aviation in the Close In BattleThe CFA commander is tasked to identify themain breakthrough attack, delay the enemy andforce him to deploy into his attack formation,

thereby revealing his intentions and capabilities.Aviation units operating in the CFA will be underthe control of the CFA commander, who may be aground maneuver commander or the combat Aviation brigade commander. The covering force isnormally tank heavy.3 Regardless of who the CFAcommander is, air and ground cavalry forcesshould be deployed along the FLOT where theirmobility permits them to screen the front with aminimum of forces. They can determine the size

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of enemy forces crossing the FLOT and relay thatinformation immediately to the CFA commander.The CFA commander then can move forces inreserve and from less threatened sectors to delayor destroy the enemy in the breakthrough.

In an economy-of-force mission, cavalry forces(reinforced by attack helicopters, as needed) canbe assigned the defense of the remainingg rou nd. 4 5 I n restrict ive terrai n, assau It hel icopters can move troops to reinforce blockingpositions, strong pOints and delay positions. Asthe battle progresses toward the forward edge ofthe battle area it becomes increasingly more difficult to pull back relatively immobile forces suchas infantry or those that have lost their primemovers. Assault helicopters should be planned onto assist in the extrication of those forces.If the CFA commander succeeds in delayingthe enemy force, and provides the MBA commander with sufficient advance notice, specificallyabout where the breakthrough(s) is expected,what follows is a particularly time-critical operation to move forces to reinforce the anticipatedbreakthrough sector. Assault and medium lifthelicopters can make a signi ficant contribution tothe expeditious movement of light infantry, towedair defense artillery weapons, artillery and otherequipment.The MBA is where the decisive battle is fought .There the commander may defend, delay and/orcounterattack. Defense courses of action canvary greatly and it is imperative that supportingAviation units clearly understand the com-mander s intent as the unpredictab le battle progresses. Attack hel icopters should be fullyemployed here to destroy the enemy force Becauseof their mobility and firepower, attack helicoptersare the quickest and most effective means ofstopping and destroying enemy tank andmechanized format ions that have broken through.Assault helicopters will be able to contribute in avariety of roles including the repositioning offorces, resupply, and in command and control.(Rear area operations are discussed later in thisarticle as a separate defensive operation.)3. FM 71 100, page 5-13 .4. In a division operation , air cavalry forces from the corps will have to

supplement the division s organic air cavalry.5. FM 71 -100, page 53.6. FM 1005, page 122.

NOVEM BER 984

The intent of delays isDELAYS

to gain time. Destructionof the enemy force is ofsecondary importance.Defensive operations need

time to succeed and there are a variety of circumstances when the commander may orderdelays. A few include: In the covering force battle To cover withdrawals To prepare defenses To participate in an economy of force effort To gain information To prepare a counterattack.

Delays can result in the destruction of anenemy force much larger than the delaying force.They gain time by forcing the enemy to concentrate repeatedly against successive battle positions. As enemy units begin to deploy for the attack, the delaying force withdraws to new battlepositions. The enemy must then repeat the sametime-consuming deployments and costly attacksat the next positions. At the same time, deep attacks slow the enemy s advance and prevent himfrom maSSing overwhelming combat poweragainst the delaying force. The delay is much more difficult to execute ifthe initiative is left to the enemy. The delayingcommander should devise a scheme of operation


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efensiveOperations

that seizes the initiative even if only temporarilyand even if in a limited locale. Successful conductof a delay requires the utmost in command, control and mobility.7The execution of delays is extremely difficultbecause the delaying force must simultaneously: Maintain contact with the enemy to avoid being outmaneuvered. Cause the enemy to plan and conduct suc-cessive attacks. Preserve its freedom to maneuver. Maintain operational coherence. Preserve the force. 8The conduct of delays may be either from successive positions or from alternate positions(figure 2 . In fast moving, high threat situations,delay forces will invariably be forced into usingthe more complex delay from alternate posi tions.rmy viation in the elayA major risk to the ground forces executingdelays is the possibility of becoming decisivelyengaged and losing the freedom to maneuver.

This occurs because in most terrain the groundFIGURE 2: Types of Delays.delay from successive posit ions delay from alternate positions

2

force s limited visibility results in the enemyforces often achieving greater gains to the flankthan the delaying forces are aware of.This decisive engagement also may occur

when the enemy unexpectedly masses overwhelming combat power very quickly. Attackhelicopters are perfectly suited to assist theseground forces to disengage. Unimpeded by terrain and able to respond on short notice, attackhelicopters can stand off to the flanks and engagethe enemy with enough suppressive fires to permit the ground forces to pull back. This is typica lof the integration of ground cavalry and air cavalryforces conducting a delay mission. Attackhelicopters can also launch limited counterattacks to divert the enemy and permit thedisengagement by the delaying force.

Assault helicopters can rapidly repositionforces to more threatened sectors. Care must betaken in the use of assault helicopters to move infantry forces from one delay position back to thenext when facing a mechanized threat. Thehelicopters will be subjected to heavy indirectfires, and in rapid moving si tuations enemy armorand mechanized forces may be able to bring thehelicopters under direct fire before they can pickup the troops and take off.

Air cavalry forces and attack helicopter battalions can conduct delays by themselves insome situations. The enemy force must bemounted and the helicopter delaying force cannotbe assigned time limits that restrict its rearwardmovement. 9

7. FM 71-3 , page 4-37 .8. FM 100-5, page 12 -2.9. Because a the hel icopters can mass great fi repower but not hold

terra in, and b) the helicopters are part icu larly vulnerable to therolling barrages of enemy artillery , pure Aviation is limited to delaysthat don t specify the amount of t ime to be gained.

10 . FM 100-5, page 13-1 .11. However, depending on the terrain and weather, helicopters

are less likely to have th is capability in high-intensity warfare.12 . The timing of when to destroy the fr iendly equipment to be

abandoned w ill be one critical aspect of this operation.



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DEFENSE OFEN IR LED FOR ES

DEFENSEOFEN IR LEDFOR ES

The nonlinear bat tles oflow and mid-intensi ty conflicts as well as the rapidpace anticipated in a highintensity war will inevitably result in friendly forces becoming encircled.

In high-intensity environments, threat doctrineadvocates rapid movement that necessitatesbypassing strong positions and leaving them forfollow-on echelons.Although encirclement is a grave situation, it isimperative that the unit(s) encircled maintain itscombat effectiveness. In many types of terrain,like military operations on urbanized terrain, it isanticipated that outnumbered, encircled forcescan fight effectively for long periods. The currentIraq-Iran war has certainly reinforced this concept. The commander of the encircled forcesfaces three alternatives:

Dig in and defend in place. Conduct a break-out attack toward friendlyforces. In extreme cases, divide the force into smallpatrols and attempt to exfiltrate duringlimited visibility.'oThe decision as to which option to selectdepends on many factors, not the least of whichincludes the size of one's force. Choosing exfiltration for a brigade or a break-out attack for a squad

NOVEMBER 1984

would rarely be the first choice. Once enCircled,the decision must be made quickly and im-plemented immediately. With each passingminute the enemy strengthens his position andlearns more about your specific weaknesses. Iftime is not critical, the enemy will likely attempt todestroy the encircled force by fire (artillery, direct,close air support). If time is critical the enemy willprobably attack with a series of penetrations todestroy the encircled forces piecemeal.rmy viation in the Defense of Encircled ForcesHelicopters should not become a part of the en-circled force. First, they have the mobili ty to avoidsuch a situat ion and second, it is not in the groundcommander's best interest to direct them to re-main with the force. An encircled force can be expected to receive a great deal of artillery and air

force bombardment which may destroy thehelicopter force. And, it is improbable that an encircled force would have the necessary fuel andammunition resupply to operate the helicopterseven if protected locations (underpasses, tunnels,underground parking lots, etc.) could be found.However, the contribution of helicopters canmake the difference between success and failureof encircled forces. Normally the encircled forceswould be within the range of helicoptersoperating from terrain held by friendly forces. Thesame capabili ty we consider in cross-FLOT operations enables us to assist the encircled force.When the encirc led commander elects a breakout attack it will often be conducted in conjunc-tion with a link-up attack by friendly forces. Hereair cavalry forces may be able to reconnoiterenemy positions as the link-up attack progressesand recommend routes where the least resistanceis for the break-out force. Attack helicopters maybe able to join the break-out force for the initialassault add their antiarmor firepower andlorcreate a diversion elsewhere to enhance the success of the break-out attack. The rear guard maybe considerably smaller and more mobile if it canbe reinforced by attack helicopters during thecrit ical early phases. In some instances it may befeasible to land assault helicopters (most likely atnight) within the encircled force to extract theinjured. In other cases, particularly with smallencircled forces, assault helicopters could conduct an operation similarto a raid where they extract the entire encircled force.'2

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efensiveOperations . . . . - - - - --- . .

When the commander elects to defend in place,assault helicopters may be able to resupply theencircled force with critical ammunition and sup-plies. If the situation is particularly fluid, aircavalry forces may be able to identify the move-ment of major enemy forces and attack helicopterbatta lions can often divert, delay or destroy themefore they attack the encircled force or duringthe defense once the attack has begun.In cases of exfiltration attack helicopters can

assist in the diversion or rear guard action to ini-tiate the escape. In low-intensity conflicts, mid-intensity warfare or fluid high-intensity warfare,assault helicopters can often pick up patrols atpreselected locations (like our pilot pick-uppoints) to limit the distance the patrols musttravel.

FIGURE 3: Cavalry reconnaissance around a mobilesupport area.

4

RE RAREAPROTECTIONOPERATIONS

As mentioned, the de-fense of the rear area is anintegral part of the overalldepth of the battlefield.RAP operations wi II be

continuous. They will be ongoing in all defensiveoperations and offensive operations. There aretwo components to RAP: rear area combat opera-tions (RACO) and area damage control (ADC).Note: The terms RAP and RACO are being replac-ed by the term rear battle in FM 90 14 which willprovide doctrine for conduct of the rear battle. Themanual is scheduled to be published in June 1985.RACO are those operations taken to prevent orcombat enemy forces within our rear area. Itshou Id be apparent that even a few small am-bushes of resupply trucks or blown bridges in ourrear area will resul t in a significant degradation ofourcombat effectiveness. The enemy s capabili-ty to destroy or disrupt our rear area operationsdepends on his equipment, and in general, the fac-tors of mission, enemy, terrain and weathertroops available and time apply. To delineate thetype of threat operations in our rear area, they aresubdivided according to the extent of enemycapabi lities. They are:Threat level I Enemy agents,saboteurs, terrorists



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Threat level II Sabotage attacks anddiversionary operationsby enemy military unitsgenerally pla toon size)Threat level III Airborne, airmobile,ground maneuver oramphibious enemyforces attacking battalion size or larger 13

rmy viation in R P OperationsAny combat force that the commander divertsfrom the deep battle or close-in battle to conductRAP results in a lessening of firepower up frontand must be avoided, except when absolutelynecessary. This is also true of Aviation resourcesexcept that due to Aviation's extraordinary comparative mobility we can often operate in theclose-in battle and have an on-order mission torespond to enemy incursions to the rear area. Thisis a capability other forces armor and infantry) donot normally have. Consequently commandersoften plan on Aviation forces attack helicoptersand assault helicopters) being the combat forceto respond to threat level III.

Although Aviation's contribution to RAPprimarily will be to threat level III, it does havesome capability to intercept threat level II incursions. Securi ty is one of the inherent cavalry missions and Aviation will often be tasked to performrear area security. Much like Navy recon-naissance aircraft providing early warning arounda task force, cavalry forces can screen around astationary or moving rear area figure 3, page 14 .The cavalry scouts will be able to intercept incoming enemy air assault aircraft, amphibious insertions, vehicular movement, and in many cases,small patrols. 14 Every effort should be made todefeat enemy forces while they are still en route,in the air or on the landing site. Once landed anddispersed they pose a much greater threat tofriendly forces. 5The cavalry has antivehicle andantipersonnel capabilities now with its attackhelicopters and will soon have an improved antihel icopter capabili ty with the air-to-air Stinger. Inthe event of a major enemy drive to the rear area,the cavalry should be able to call on field artillery,air defense artillery, close air support, attackhelicopter battalions, and the air assault capability of the combat Aviation companies to aid in thedestruction of the rear area threat. Often there willbe corps Aviation assets available for just such a

NOVEMBER 984

contingency.16 The cavalry commander shouldalso have communications with the airbome wamingand contro l system to permit him to direct groundmaneuver forces, air assault forces and attackhelicopter battalions to enemy airborne dropzones.

Aviation's contribution to ADC is primarily areactionary one. Assault helicopters can serve astemporary command and control facilities toassist in reestablishing communicat ions, performmedevac missions and move in Engineer support.Cavalry forces can quickly assess the extent ofthe damage and ascertain which routes areavailable for vehicles bringing forward Engineersupport. Medium l ift helicopters can quicklyemplace temporary bridges thereby avoiding congested and u ncertai n road networks.

T e defensive operations are not mutuallyexclusive. Several of them will be conductedsimultaneously, resulting in the increased importance of command, control and communications.As more Army Aviation converts to the combatAviation brigade structure, we will be required tohave the tactical competence to plan and conductoperations in every possible situation. A thoroughknowledge of what the basic operations are, howwe can contribute with Army Aviation assets andthe capabilities of the other weapons systems isan absolute prerequisite. 17This series of articles is intended to introducethe subject, mention some of the possibilities forArmy Aviation employment and to serve as acatalyst to further discussion. It is not meant to belimi ting in any sense. Space precludes a completediscussion of how to conduct each of the specificoperations. The emerging Aviation doctrine fieldmanuals) addresses the how-to-fight issues.

Although helicopters always will be limited innumber, we operate very capable systems andmust .employ them wisely if we are to bevictorious. {13 . FM 1005, page 14 4.14. Although intuitively , the acquiSition of small patrols may not seem

to be possible by helicopters, we were often very successful inVietnam doing just that.

15 . FM 1005, page 143.16 . FM71 101 , page57.17 . As a personal recommendation for novice tacticians I think that the

first texts that every aviator should be familiar with are: FM 1005Aug 1982), FM 1111 due out in Jan 1985 as Fe 1111), FM 71100Feb 1984), and FM 1100.

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Accident AftermathWhat to o when thelawyer calls t r . t ~ ~ ~ ; ~ ; : : ~ : Y C e n l e rort Rucker L

m ~

16 U S RMY VI TION DIGEST


19/48

HE INCREASING numberof lawsuits related to militaryaviation mishaps has led toseveral recent instances whereaccident safety investigatingofficials have been asked toprovide statements, depositionsand courtroom testimony abouttheir involvement in the accidentinvestigation process and whatthe investigation revealed. Thepurpose of this article s toexplain what the Armypolicy s concerningthe questioning

or testimonyof accident

NOVEMBER 984

safety investigating officials,"expert" testimony byArmy personnel, or testimony ofthose people who are merelywitnesses to events. This articleshould not be considered as asubst itute for specific legal adviceon the issues which you, as aprospective witness, must resolvebefore testifying. You shouldalways consult a judge advocate orArmy civilian legal advisor forsuch advice.Accident/Safety InvestigatingOfficials and Advisors"It s the policy of theDepartment of the Army thataviation safety board members notbe made available under anycircumstances for questioning byany party in litigation that arisesout of the subject matter of theiraviation safety investigation."Policy letter dated 27 July1984 from LitigationDivision, Judge AdvocateGeneral of the Army to U.S.

Army Safety Center.)

The Army does not permitcomplete release of any aviationsafety investigation reports, wpichby regulation are privileged"limited use" reports releasablewithin the Army only for accidentprevention purposes see AR385-40, paragraph 1-9a). Thereason for this strict control on therelease of such reports s theArmy's critical interest ininsulating aviation safety boardmembers from outside pressuresthat could affect their judgment orcause them to be less than candid intheir reports. In addition, someinformation obtained in thisinvestigative process s obtainedonly under a promise ofconfidentiality. f he integrity ofthe process is to be maintained,that confidentiality cannot becompromised.

For many of the same reasons,the Army cannot allow aviationsafety board members to bequestioned about theirinvestigations. It would bevirtually impossible to precludeinquiry into matters such asstatements of opinion, comments,findings of accident causes,recommendations for correctiveaction and confidential witnessstatements, all of which would beexempt from release if requestedunder the Freedom of InformationAct. f questioning of aviationsafety board members werepermitted, we would, in effect, beallowing the requesting parties toobtain information indirectlywhich they could not obtaindirectly, contrary to clearlyestablished Army policy and Armyregulations which govern therelease of such information. SeeAR 385-40, paragraph 1-7, andDOD Directive 6055.7.)This restriction on releasingaccident report data s a lifetimerestriction. f former investigatorsare suspected of a breach ofprivileged data they can beinvestigated by the InspectorGeneral even though they are no

7


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longer in federal employment. (SeeAR 600-50, chapter 5.) If theInspector General finds there hasbeen a violation of the Standardsof Conduct, the Secretary of theArmy can impose sanctions againstthe violator (such as restrictionfrom entering Army installationsor other restrictions). Anyone whoprofits by such a conflict ofinterest violation (i.e., is paidexpert witness fees for testifying)may have court action takenagainst them through theDepartment of Justice by theDepartment of the Army forforfeiture of their ill-gotten gains.TheArmy does notpermitcomplete releaseo fany aviationsafety investigation reports, which

by regulation are privilegedclimited use ' reports releasablewithin theArmy only for accidentprevention purposes.Since many investigators may beliving in, or assigned to, otherlocations away from the location

of the accident when the requestfor testimony or questioning is firstmade, it is imperative that theyrefuse to make any statementswithout first consulting the nearestArmy judge advocate or Armycivilian legal advisor. That legalcounsel should contact the JudgeAdvocate of the U.S. Army SafetyCenter (AV 558-3819/3005 or FTS533-3819/3005). The Armylawyers will handle the matter forthe safety investigator or board

8

member advisor in accordancewith the procedures of AR 27-40.These requirements o not applyto those people who are appointedto conduct' boards ofinvestigation or other MACOMor corps-directed safetyinvestigations. Such investigationsdo not result in limited useinvestigation reports. Aircraftaccident investigations and SafetyCenter ground accidentinvestigations are the mostcommon types of limited useinvestigation reports. Forinvestigations where general useinvestigation reports are prepared,safety officials or board membersshould follow the proceduresdescribed below in testifying aboutinformat ion concerning theconduct of Army activities andinformat ion received pursuant toofficial duties.

xpert Witnesses for PrivateLitigationI t is the policy of theDepartment of the Army tomaintain strict impartiality inprivate litigation. t is for this

reason that AR 27-40, paragraph7 -17, generally prohibits militarypersonnel and civilian employeesfrom appear ing as expert witnessesin private litigation. Thisprohibition is strictly applied incases where the expert test imonysought involves knowledge andexpertise acquired in the,performance of duties pursuant toor in support of an official

investigation of any type.(Policy letter dated 7 July1984 from LitigationDivision, Judge AdvocateGeneral of the Army to U.S.Army Aviation Center.)Some information obtained inthe investigative process sobtained only under a promise ofconfidentiality. f he integrity ofthe process is to be maintained,that confidentiality cannot becompromised.

Private litigation is a courtaction or lawsuit in which the U.S.Army or the U.S. Government isnot a party and has no direct orindirect interest in the outcome ofthe court case. For the reasonsexplained in the next paragraph,there is much private litigationfollowing Army fatal and disablinginjury mishaps. Since many Armyaircraft and much equipment isunique or is not commonly presentin the civilian community, it can beexpected that attorneys for eitherside in private litigation will seekout aviators, maintenancepersonnel, or others in the militaryservices to testify about theequipment involved in an accidentor to testify about some technicalprocedure at issue in the privatelitigation.

I t is the policy of he Departmentof he Army to maintain strictimpartiality in private litigation.t should be noted that anylitigation following a militaryaviation accident usually involvesthe servicemember or hislher

survivors filing a lawsuit againstthe manufacturer of the aircraft orof a component. This is because ofthe U.S. Supreme Court's ruling inDecember 1950 in the case of Feresv. U S. Thatdecision establishedthat servicemembers or theirsurviving family members cannotsue the U.S. Government forinjuries received or for death of theservicemember which was

u s RMY AVIATION DIGEST


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incidentto military service,even though there s clearnegligence on the part of somegovernment official or Armymember.f you are contacted to givetestimony as an expert you should

refuse to make any statementexcept that appropriate clearancemust be obtained from the Officeof the Judge Advocate General,Headquarters, Department of theArmy You should refer therequest through your supervisorsand commander to yourinstallation legal advisor or judgeadvocate for resolution of therequest.

After leaving the military serviceor federal employment there sgenerally no restriction ontestifying as an expert witness solong as you did not act for the U.S.Government in those matters andyou are not using insiderinformation. AR 600-50 containsmost of the conflict of interestprohibitions and should beconsulted prior to your departurefrom your last position in themilitary or as an employee of theU.S. Government.Military Personnel and CivilianEmployees Who Witness anAccident or an Event in Litigation

The appearance of militarypersonnel and civilian employees inprivate litigation, or forquestioning or interviewing by alitigant's attorney, s solely apersonal matte r between theprospective witness and thelitigant's attorney who requeststhem, subject to the approval ofthe individual's commandingofficer or supervisor. (See AR27-40, paragraph 7-12.) f forpersonal reasons the militaryservicemember or civilianemployee does not want to beinterviewed, or to testify, he or shemust be counselled by theinstallation's judge advocate orlegal advisor on the legalconsequences of any refusal. The

NOVEMBER 984

use of a deposition (sworntestimony not in court but with alllitigants' attorneys present) sencouraged since this procedurehelps to minimize interference withthe witness' performance of duties.Obviously many people whowitness an event have factualinformation, based on theirpersonal observations, about anaccident. Generally there s norestriction against testimony bythese witnesses. You may nottestify or be interviewed withoutDepartment of the Army approvalifit appears that (1) thetestimony interview will concernthe manner in which Army or unitactivities were conducted, or (2)information exempt from releaseto the public s sought, or (3)information s sought which wasacquired in the performance ofyour official duties. (See AR 27-40,paragraph 7-17c.) In any case, youare never wrong in seeking theadvice of your judge advocate orArmy civilian legal advisor on thepropriety of your testifying or

being interviewed by a lawyerconcerning an Army accident.Some Final ConsiderationsAs citizens each of us has amoral obligation and aresponsibility to truthfully presentfacts and come forward withinformation so that justice canprevail. On the other hand, if forpersonal reasons you do not wantto give testimony in a court case,there may be legal or regulatoryauthority to support your desirenot to testify. Legal counsellingcan dispel some of the fears thatyou may have and may indicate toyou that in the end you may still beforced to testify by a court order.f you do have to testify there are

many circumstances in which youmay have an Army legalrepresentative present while youare testifying and you may travel tothe trial in a duty status. (See AR27-40, chapter 7.) After seekinglegal advice both you and yoursuperiors will be in a good positionto determine if your testimony iswarranted. . (

About the AuthorMajor Karl F. Ivey graduatedfrom the United States MilitaryAcademy at West Point in 1969with a B.S. degree in engineering.

He completed law school atMemphis State University in 1976and s a member of the TennesseeBar Association and the LawyerPilot Bar Association.

Major I vey has served as JudgeAdvocate of the Army SafetyCenter since September 1982. Hisprior assignments includedDefense Counsel/Legal AssistanceOfficer, 1st Armored Division, inGermany; Deputy Judge Advocateat SHAPE, Belgium; and as theChief Trial Counsel, 101stAirborne Division (Air Assault.)

Prior to attending law school,Major Ivey served in Vietnam withthe 173d Airborne Brigade and inCONUS with the 82d Airborne

Division. He has been awarded theRanger Tab, Parachute Badge, andAir Assault Badge.

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Major C.J. WesterhoffAvionics Research andDevelopment ActivityFort Monmouth N

The rmyMicrowaveanding System

SOM TIM AROUND thelate 1950s it was discovered that thenational instrument landing system(ILS) had some significant short-comings and should be replaced. Fora few of you who can rememberback that far, that was when the nowclass ic' 56 Ford and' 57 Chevy werenew cars Planning was begun toreplace the ILS with a microwavelanding system (MLS). You don'tneed a home computer to figure outthat this began almost three decadesago.An article announcing the MLSappeared in this magazine inSeptember 1976. I t optimisticallysaid, The first MLS systems are ex-pected to go into operation in 1978."Glad I didn't hold my breath. Thegood news is that the MLS may yetget off the ground, if you'll pardonthe pun. There may be some badnews too; but for that you must readon.What Is Wrong With The ILS?So what is wrong with the nationalILS system? After all, it has been

2

demonstrated that some commercialcarriers can actually conduct a zero-zero approach to the ground usingthe ILS. Not bad for a system thathas been around longer than manyArmy aviators have been alive. Well,for starters there is no tactical ver-sion of the ILS. The only tacticalprecision approach system in theArmy inventory is the tacticalground controlled approach (GCA)radar . Using a GCA radar is the on-ly way to conduct a precision ap-proach in the field. Problems withtactical GCA equipment are con-siderable. It's large, heavy, un-reliable, manpower intensive andthrows out one whale of an elec-tronic signature. Signature is a bitunderstated; it's more like a bill-board announcing the airfield loca-tion. With no existing tactical ILS,and only GCA to provide a precisionapproach, the Army is fairly limited inits ability to operate tactically duringpoor weather.When a commercial ILS system isused at major Army airfields thereare some significant drawbacks. The

approach area requires a lot ofcleared real estate. An ILS works onthe principle of reflected radio waveswhich are literally bounced off theground in front of the transmitter.

Runway

Elevation

- 2

9n m i 2 nm i

FIGURE 1

IIW

3 nm iDesi red

U.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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Because the ILS works at fairly lowfrequencies, it has sizeable wave-lengths. That means a lot of propertyhas to be kept clear to ensure an ac-curate signal. In many cases, it issimply impractical to clear the terrain.The ILS is limited to a single ap-proach path and glide slope. There isonly one specific heading azimuth orlocalizer path and one specific glideslope. An aviator cannot change theheading azimuth or the angle of theglide slope (figure 1). What thatreally means is, for practical pur-poses, only one aircraft can use theILS at a time. f you have ever madean ILS approach at one of the largerairports you may remember a plea tokeep your airspeed because there wasa stack of faster aircraft right behindyou waiting their turns. The MLScan accommodate the full range ofaircraft types (figure 2, page 22).

What Will MLS Do?How then, will the MLS solve allthose problems? First, and most im-portant for the Army, the nationalMLS will have a tactical littlebrother. A smaller version of thefixed base MLS will be developed for

Azimuth

Runway

NOVEMBER 984

use in the field (figure 3, page 22).That means you will be able to con-duct a tactical precision approachusing the same aircraft equipmentyou will use to practice at your homeairfield. Furthermore, the tacticalMLS ground equipment probablywill tip the scale at about 400pounds, considerably lighter thanthe GCA system which is well over aton and often takes hours to set up.The tactical MLS is not exactlymanportable; but it will be a wholelot easier to move around andoperate than a GCA. Not only that,but you also won t need a dedicatedoperator sitting behind a screen totalk you down. That has a lot of ad-vantages in a tactical environment.From the aviator s seat therewill note much difference etween conductingan MLS approach or an ILS ap-proach. The idea will still be to keepthe cross hairs in the course devia-tion indicator (CDI) centered and

that s about it. You will, however,have some remarkable options withMLS that you don t have with theILS.First, you will be able to choose anumber of approach courses. Rightnow it is expected that choices will

40 0/ \ \/ \ \ \

\\\

range anywhere from 10 to 60degrees from centerline. Eventuallythe choice may actually include theentire compass rose. For example, ifthe active runway is 27, you won t belimited to using that as the approachcourse for the conduct of an MLSapproach. One aircraft can initiatean approach to 250 degrees whileanother initiates an approach to 290degrees. There are several reasonswhy that is a convenient and prac-tical choice for a pilot to have. f heprevailing winds are particularlyheavy, it may be safer to choose adifferent approach course than thatof the active runway heading. Moreimportantly, several aircraft canbegin an approach simultaneouslyusing different approach directions.Obviously the timing of who willreach the runway first is important.You certainly don t want three air-craft to reach the numbers at thesame time; but, that can be regulatedusing approach radar or timing.

Segmented approaches can beconducted. Accordingly, a certainpart of the approach may be con-ducted on one course, then changedto another course. That gives airtraffic control (ATC) tremendousflexibility, yet it will not lessen theprecision part of the approach.The other major choice you willhave with MLS is a choice of glideslope angles. Pilots will no longer belimited to the single, predeterminedglide slope angle of an ILS. You candial in any approach angle from 1 upto at least 20 degrees. That means anapproach can be tailored to meet theexact needs of a specific aircraf t orairfield. A choice of glide slopeangles is particularly desirable fortactical approaches. High angleprecision approaches into a confinedarea will be possible. Not only that,but they can be set up in minutesrather than hours. The MLS will alsohave the use of some 200 channels,instead of the 40 now dedicated tothe ILS and it will provide greater ac-curacy while being considerablymore reliable.

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he rmyMicrowaveanding System

What the MLS signals look likefrom a birdseye view is somethingresembling a stack of building blocksor perhaps a stack of windows(figure 4). The pilot can choose anyof the windows from which to makethe approach. Obviously, the ATefacility also can tell the aviator whatangle and approach heading to dial.Potentially, numerous aircraft canbegin approaches without extensiveholding. Timing aircraft arrival atthe approach end of the runway mayrequire some unique proceduralworkout, but that's what computersare all about .Although the pilot will be able tochoose the glide slope angle and ap-proach heading, there will be com-binations at some locations whichare not safe. For those, the MLS willautomatically flag the indicator thustelling the aviator the combinationchosen is not safe (figure 5 page 24).I f he MLS is expanded to cover theentire compass rose, there will nolonger be any back course ap-proaches. Now, that is somethingmost aviators can appreciate Thatalso means that precision ap-

FIGURE 3

proaches can be performed to anyexisting runway. Eventually this mayrevolutionize the way in which ap-proach plates are developed and pro-duced. Even small, lightly used air-fields can have several precision ap-proaches. Producing a separate ap-proach plate for each of them couldresult in something like the Encyclopedia BrittanicaeforeMLSThe story of the MLS is a fasci-nating journey through the world ofcompromise, delays and controversy.As is the case with many majorFederal procurement programs,MLS has been buffeted by numerous

MLS: Service for All Users

SM LL IRFIELDS

CIVIL ---------. -1 MIL I TARY- - - - -J IRCR FT REMOTE

M JOR IRPORTS C RRIERS T CTIC L SIT S

FIGURE 2

22

political winds. I f you follow thedevelopment of the MLS, it becomesobvious that the tactical version ofthe MLS is really an adaptation ofthe civil version. That means that theArmy is taking what is really acivilian system and adapting it formilitary purposes.

FIGURE 4

U s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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The need for a highly portableprecision approach system to replacethe unreliable and bulky GCA radarwas recognized many years ago. Outof the recognized need was bornsomething called the tactical landingsystem (TLS) which was designedand built specifically for Army use.t is a small, highly portable micro-wave landing system. The TLS uses afrequency band called the Ku bandwhich is a relatively high wavebandin the microwave range. The reasonfor choosing that frequency band isbecause it allows for very smallantennas, and therefore results in theproduction of a very small groundsystem. The Ku band also providesvery accurate distance to stationinformation.

So accurate is the distance infor-mation provided by using the Kuband, that the system can evenprompt the pilot to begin a decelera-tion so as to arrive at the point oflanding with zero groundspeed. That

NOVEMBER 984

capability is nice to have if you don twant to break out of the clouds rightabove your confined area still doing90 knots. Unfortunately, there weresome drawbacks which eventuallyresulted n the system being dropped.First, it can t use the Federal MLSsystem because it doesn t use thesame frequencies. Therefore , if theArmy bought the TLS for the entirefleet, aircraft flying the Federal air-way system would need to be equip-ped with two ILS receivers, one forairfield use and one for tactical use.That would be not only inefficientbut also very expensive. Fortunately,all of the development and engineer-ing which took place creating theTLS did not go to waste. The SpaceShuttle carries Army developedavionics to guide it for landing.When the national MLS systemwas being designed, a decision wasmade to use the C band frequencyrange for the localizer and glideslope. The C band, because it s a bit

lower in frequency than the Ku band,does not lose the signal as quicklyand has much better range. Obviouslythat is good Unfortunately, there isalso a drawback . y using the lowerfrequency range the transmittergrows proportionately in size. Thatmeans an MLS using C band fre-quencies is no longer a manportablesystem. Suddenly one of the mostdesirable characteristics of a tacticalMLS, the small, compact size, wasgone.Meanwhile, the Marine Corps hasdeveloped a system called the MarineRemote Area Approach and Land-ing System (MRAALS). TheMRAALS is a tactical MLS whichuses the Ku and L band frequencies.t is a relatively lightweight system

and has the distinct advantage of hav-ing already been produced. Thus allthe development costs have previouslybeen paid and the ground system is inproduction, ready for fielding now.Sounds great again with but onedrawback: The aircraft receiver be-ing developed for the MRAALS issomthing called the multimodereceiver (MMR).The MMR is to be a receiver whichwill allow the user to use theMRAALS as well as the projectednational MLS system. That is sup-posed to be the answer to a most dif-ficult problem, how to build an op-timal tactical MLS, yet also be ableto use the national landing systemwith the same receiver. The MMR,which is still in development today,turned out to be a real technicalchallenge. t seems that the MMRcan also solve the Army's problem ofhaving an optimized TLS which isinteroperable with the national land-ing system. Unfortunately the MMRis turning out to be an expensivealternative. The MMR is probablygoing to be at least three t imes as ex-pensive as the receiver planned forthe national MLS. Multiply that costescalation times the thousands ofArmy aircraft which must be equip-ped with an MLS and that differencebecomes a whole lot more significant.

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The rmyMicrowaveLanding System

As it turned out, the decision onwhich way to go was made for theArmy in January 1983. Guidancefrom the Deputy Secretary ofDefense told the services that the national MLS was going to e the standard for all of the services. Thatsimply means that the Army mustdevelop a tactical derivative of thenational MLS. The reasons for thedecision are pretty clear. t is expected that the development andfielding of a national MLS for allusers of the airspace, military andcivilian, will cost the FederalGovernment in excess of 3 billiondollars. For that kind of money, thefull support of the services is required if the system is to be a worthwhile investment.The only exception to the DefenseDepartment guidance is theMRAALS and MMR which willcontinue to be developed for theMarine Corps.Even with the full support of allthe services the national MLS is stillnot out of the woods. t will requireextensive funding from Congressduring the next few years. There hasbeen some significant reluctancefrom the civil side of the aviationcommunity to accept the nationalMLS. Al though it promises to do alot of things for a lot of users, it willalso require the installation of yetanother airborne receiver. At a timewhen the scheduled airlines are insome financial difficulty, the idea ofanother fairly expensive avionicssystem is not greeted with muchdelight. Full support of the services isalso not totally assured. After all, ifthe Army is gong to invest in theMLS then the money must comefrom somewhere. Someone has todecide what Army Aviation can dowithout to get the MLS. Nothingcomes for free, and to buy thousandsof airborne receivers for Army air-

4

craft will certainly mean a reductionin some other program. The problem of deciding what is necessaryand what is luxury is a challengingdilemma and certainly whenoperating on a limited budget thosedecisions do not come easily.Army Microwave Landing SystemFielding ScheduleEven if the Army fully funds theMLS program, not all Army aircraftwill be equipped with the MLS. Theproposed plan calls for the purchaseof 4,425 airborne receivers. Since theArmy has more than twice that manyaircraft it doesn t take much figuringto see that half of you won t see onein your aircraft. Some 124 tacticalground systems are planned, some ofwhich will be installed at fixed basefacilities overseas. Army bases in theUnited States will get a civilian version of the MLS for their landingsystem. The installation of the MLSat fixed bases will be followed by theretirement of the GCA radars.Again, it doesn t take much figuring to see that if only one-half of thefleet will get MLS receivers, and the

FIGURE 5

GCA is gone, then one-half of thefleet will not be able to perform aprecision approach. That soundslike bad news, and it is. The hope isthat other advances in navigationalequipment may take the edge offthat deficiency. Plans now projectthe logistic, medical evacuation andSEMA (special electronic missionaircraft) to get the MLS. Projectedschedules are for avionics systems tobe purchased starting in fiscal year(FY) 1988 with the last ones to bebought in FY 1993. There is plenty ofreason to believe that the schedulemay be a bit optimistic. At thiswriting no actual hardware has beenbuilt. With no prototype hardwarein 1984, yet hoping to field a systemby FY 1988, is extreme optimism inthe world of research and development. Obviously don t look for anMLS in your cockpit for some timeyet.

And that is the story of MLS. t isa story without a conclusion becausechange has become the only certainty inthe program. In the meantime, don tforget to practice a few GCAs now.and then. b

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MissedpproachPointtoSafeLanding

Runwayi g h t e d HereToo late toset up abase leg

RunwaySightedHere

Runwayi g h t e dHereZ,

FIGURE : The circling approach

NOVEMBER 1984

CW3 Clark J WilsonDirectorate of Evaluation and Standardization

U S Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker AL

OST AVIATORS ARE trained in androutinely practice instrument approach procedures. Thetransitions from en route navigation to instrument letdown and missed approach are clearly defined procedures and are highly standardized. Human limitations, instruments and equipment control the heightabove the airfield to which an aircraft may descendbefore either making a fur ther descent and landing withvisual guidance or alternately executing a missed approach procedure. t is the maneuvering between theend of the instrument approach to the landing that hasresulted in aircraft accidents in the past. In training, it isdifficult to simulate and practice a bad weather approach. Most Army instrument rated aviators havenever flown an instrument approach to a landing innear-minimum weather. The novice instrument pilotoften finds himself in a very unfamiliar situation uponreaching the missed approach point in marginalweather.The transition from instrument flight to visual flightrequires a rapid orientation (usually with poor visualcues) and maneuvering safely to a landing; this is a tasktoo many aviators have had to master on their own.Pilots need to understand the potential hazards involvedin making all types of approaches-to-Iandings in actualmarginal weather.

The following two fixed wing accidents are typical examples of how things can go wrong during a circling approach. In these instances, the aircraft were transitioning from an instrument approach to one runway tomake a landing on a different runway:Case 1: The aircraft was executing a circling approach in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). Thetower noted the aircraft was in close on the downwindportion. A steep turn to final was initiated whichresulted in a stall. Three died in the crash .

Case 2: The aircraf t circled in VMC and rolled out onfinal about three-quarters of a mile from the end of therunway at circling minimums. The pilot lowered thenose, and flew a 10 degree glide slope in order to avoid

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Missed pproach Pointt Safe Landing

overshooting the runway. The force of the landing collapsed the landing gear and resulted in a majoraccident.In these aircraft accidents, pilots transitioned frominstrument flight to visual flight, and then set up a landing pattern that differed considerably from what theywere used to flying. Coping with the unfamiliar, thepilots got into trouble. This much is clear: A circling approach is a potentially hazardous maneuver, and shouldnot be attempted in actual low ceiling/poor visibilitysituations, unless the pilot is proficient and understandsthe pitfalls.A circling approach should be flown above the circling minimum altitude if visibility and ceiling permit.Practice these maneuvers in visual conditions, reducingaltitude as proficiency increases. Manage ciu l badweather approaches so you can land from a straight-inapproach whenever possible .Consider the common problems which can lead toaccidents:

Overshoots: The pilot flying an approach is likelyto see the runway at a shallower angle than he is accustomed to, because the circling approach altitude isusually about one-third the altitude above the groundthat he is used to in a normal traffic pattern. Theshallower sight picture results in a tendency to fly adownwind and base leg so close to the runway that he

FIGURE : Missed approach from thecircling approach

26

/ {-t Visual~ ) Reference/. // / ~ Lost HereP ~ b l i s h e dt / Missed/ ' \ \ ApproachI \VI Y

Published____ . Missed+ Approach: ~ ~~ / / / Visualt/ ReferenceLost HereIoI

either overshoots the final approach or has to descendtoo rapidly on final, or both. This also can be caused bythe pilot not anticipating the effect of the wind. A tailwind on base leg requires a longer turning radius versusa headwind or no wind. Overbank: A tendency to overbank occurs when

attempting a short radius turn during the circlingmaneuver. Steep bank angles can place fixed wing aircraft in a stall condition, high sink rate, or both. A steepbank angle increases the wing loading which increasesthe stall speed. For example, an airplane which stalls at85 KIAS (knots indicated airspeed) wings level will stallat 120 KIAS in a 60 degree bank level turn. Recoveryfrom these conditions may not be possible beforeground impact.

Underpower: Higher power settings aresometimes needed in the circling maneuver. Failure touse sufficient power for the condition of flight and theresultant loss of proper airspeed can place your aircraftin the conditions of stall and high sink rate describedabove.

Wrong runway: In a poor visibility and lowaltitude situation, it is easy to line up and land on thewrong runway.The circling maneuver is somewhat vague. Soundjudgment and knowledge of the aircraft s capabilitiesare the criteria for a pilot to determine the exactmaneuver in each instance, since airport design, aircraftposition, wind, altitude and airspeed must all be considered. No hard and fast rule can be stated. When notaligned with the runway of intended landing, maneuverthe shortest path to a base or downwind leg, as appropriate. Try and maneuver the airplane so that therunway you intend to land on is on your side of the aircraft within visibility range. Usually there is no restriction from passing over the airport or other runways.One cardinal rule, however, is that the aircraft shouldnot go below the prescribed circling altitude until the aircraft is in a position to make a normal descent for landing. While studying the approach procedure, the pilotalso should study the airfield diagram to plan hismaneuvering from the point he goes visual. Flying during the circling maneuver may have to be largely on instruments, visual cross-check being made to ensureorientation, position and alignment.When the runway environment becomes visible,maneuver the airplane so that turns to base and finallegs will not require steep banks (more than 45 degrees) ,Maintain visual contact with the runway environmentwhile maneuvering to a proper distance for the downwind or base leg (select downwind leg distance from the

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runway depending on airpseed, wind and visibility}.While maneuvering, the airplane should be in the approach configuration landing gear down, and flaps atapproach setting). The airspeed should be at least Vrefvelocity reference speed) + 20 knots. The point to commence the turn to final from downwind leg is best determined by timing after passing abeam the intended landing point. Assuming the visibility to be 1 mile and withan aircraft speed of 120 knots, a figure of 30 secondsshould be suitable. A 180 degree medium bank turn,while maintaining altitude, will position the aircraftabout in line with the runway on final figure 1 page25). f visual reference is lost while circling to land, themissed approach specified for that particular proceduremust then be followed unless an alternate missed approach procedure is specified by air traffic control). Tobecome established on the prescribed missed approachcourse, the pilot must make an initial climbing turntoward the landing runway and continue the turn untilestablished on the missed approach course figure 2).

Aircraft performance has a direct effect on theairspace and visibility needed to perform circlingmaneuvers, turning missed approaches and final alignment corrections for landing and descent. f it isnecessary to maneuver at speeds in excess of the upperlimit of the speed range for the aircraft's approach

TURTO10DME

category, the minimum for the next higher categoryshould be used.For example: A category B airplane flies an instrument approach procedure at Vref + 20 knots aircrewtraining manual standards for Army fixed wing aircraft). f his speed equals 121 knots or more, categoryC minimums should be used to ensure that the aircraftdoes not maneuver outside protected airspace. A landing off the end of a straight-in instrument approach hasits own hazards. The pilot will find himself from 1 mile

to directly overhead the landing threshold at a heightbetween 100 and 400 feet above the surface, about inline with the runway. The pilot must be able to rapidlyorient himself with very poor visual cues, identify eitherthe runway, or its lead-in lights and then lose altitudeand speed for the landing. The airplane will be in the approach configuration landing gear down, and flaps atapproach setting). The approach speed will be Vref +20 knots. Orientat ion is assisted if the aircraft is correctly aligned with the runway. f t appears that the approach is going to be made in minimum or near-minimum conditions, it is wise to request that the lightsbe turned up before commencing the approach .As soon as the runway has been positively identified,the pilot will have to act quickly. Landing flaps can belowered; it may be necessary to turn in order to achieve

Remainmandatory part of the procedure,but are intended to provide additional guidance where they areimplemented. A VASI lightingsystem is normally available atlocations where VDPs areestablished. Where VASI is installed the VDP and VASIglidepaths are normally coincident. No special technique is reoquired to fly a procedure with aVDP. However, in order to beassured of the proper obstacleclearance, the pilot should notdescend below the M DA beforereaching the VDP and acquiringthe necessary visual referencewith the runway environment.The VDP is identified on the profile view of the approach chart bythe symbol V.

I within 10 NMI

Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1984

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Transcript of Army Aviation Digest - Nov 1984