ARMOR MAGAZINE Destruction Groupement Mobile

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Death on the Highway:

The Destruction of Groupement Mobile 100

This Viet Minh attack on a French convoy had strategic implications

by Captain Kirk A. Luedeke

Introduction

The ambush and subsequent de-struction of Groupement Mobile100 was one of the last engage-ments in the French-Indochina Warthat involved more than one battal-ion of French and Viet Minhtroops. This overview will discussthe strategic implications of the

time, the area of operations, theantagonists in terms of their leader-ship, order of battle, doctrine, andstrengths and weaknesses.

Strategic Setting

In late June 1954, the French-Indochina War was all but over.1 The massive French defeat at DienBien Phu, along with a proportionalyearly increase in French casualtiessince the conflict began in 1946, haddrained France’s desire to continuewith the hostilities. France was begin-ning to call her soldiers home.

The fledgling Vietnamese NationalGovernment believed their victory atDien Bien Phu was not enough to guar-antee the concessions they desired fromthe French government.2 As such, or-ders went out to continue to fight theFrench military and to inflict as manycasualties as possible. The more Frenchblood was spilled in Vietnam, thestronger the position of Vietnamesenegotiators at Geneva, Switzerland.

The French Army garrison at An Khewas one of several outposts that wasabandoned in the wake of Dien BienPhu. In many cases, civilians and high-ranking military officials were flownout of An Khe, while the majority ofFrench soldiers evacuated An Khe inarmored columns along the windingcolonial routes that snaked across theVietnamese Central Highlands. Onesuch convoy was known as Groupe-ment Mobile 100, a conglomeration ofinfantry and artillery units that hadbeen fighting the Viet Minh in the Cen-tral Highlands for over a year. Bloodiedand tired, yet proud, the soldiers ofG.M. 100 were ready to return home

when they departed their garrison onthe 24th of June, 1954. Most wouldnever make it, dying in a little-knownambush that resulted in the destructionof their once-mighty task force. Whilenot a major engagement by the standardof the French-Indochina War, the deathof G.M. 100 was characterized by sav-age fighting, and doomed by the mis-takes of its senior leadership. The sol-diers of G.M. 100 were some of thebest in the French Army, and it was forthat reason that any of them at all wereable to reach the safety of Pleiku sev-eral days after the ambush.

Antagonists

Prior to 1941, Indochina had not beenan important colony in the French co-

lonial empire. French involvementthere began with priests who first cameto Vietnam in the 17th century in anattempt to convert the natives to Chris-tianity. By the 19th century, the Frenchgovernment had discovered that Viet-nam’s three great rivers might allowthem a more direct trade route to China.While the rivers turned out to be use-less for trading purposes, the Frenchwere in Vietnam to stay.

French rule did not benefit the Viet-namese people. France built a modern

infrastructure of roads, railways,and ports, but this was not done tohelp the local people, but to exploitthem.3 Unlike the British, theFrench did not allow their coloniesa degree of self-rule. As a result, anumber of clandestine groupsformed to resist French rule, butthey lacked dynamic leadership tounite them. Ho Chi Minh wouldchange that.

Ho Chi Minh attempted two upris-ings in the 1930s in the name of theVietnamese Communist Party, butFrance suppressed both. Ho es-caped Vietnam and waited for an-other chance to free his countryfrom the yoke of colonial rule. Af-ter the fall of France to the Germanblitzkrieg, France was allowed to

keep her holdings in the Far East. Japandemanded they be allowed to use Indo-china as a staging area for their armyand navy, as well as use of Indochina’s

natural resources.Japan’s defeat in 1945 created a pow-

er vacuum in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minhand his supporters established a provi-sional government in Hanoi and at-tempted unsuccessfully to get the Unit-ed States to recognize the governmentas legitimate. France, adamant that In-dochina was still its colony, preparedto go to war against Ho and his VietMinh. Hostilities between France andthe VM broke out in November, 1946.The conflict would rage on until July20, 1954 when the French-IndochinaWar officially ended.

Area of Operations

Located in the central highlands ofVietnam between the provincial capitalof Pleiku and Qui Nhoi, on the coast ofthe South China Sea, An Khe was animportant French Army outpost. Be-cause of its proximity to the few Viet-namese roads in the highlands, theFrench military was able to patrol thearea with its mechanized forces andcould interdict Viet Minh combat unitsas they attempted to infiltrate south.4

22 ARMOR — January-February 2001



By late June, 1954, the French Com-mand, recognizing that the Viet Minhwere in position to launch a major of-fensive in the Central Highlands, andwith no reserves with which to combat

them, ordered An Khe evacuated. TheVM intended to strike at the French asthey withdrew, positioning themselvesto intercept the French columns as theymade their way to the various link-uppoints throughout Vietnam.

Late June, 1954 was dry season inVietnam. The roadways were easilytrafficable, making movement alongthe Route Coloniales (R.C.s), a rapidaffair. Having been in Vietnam for wellover a year, the French troops wereacclimatized to the summer’s brutalheat.

Terrain played a major role in the de-struction of G.M. 100. The road be-tween An Khe and Pleiku (R.C. 19),was bordered by tall elephant grass anddense jungle vegetation which providedexcellent concealment for attackers. Inmany places along R.C. 19, the rockyterrain channeled the road into narrowdefiles, severely restricting any kind ofmounted maneuver. The Mang YangPass was the link-up point where G.M.100 and G.M. 42 would join, 20 kilo-meters from An Khe. Colonel Barrouviewed the pass as key terrain.

Comparison of Antagonists

When the French-Indochina War be-gan in 1946, France firmly believedthat her superior technology and mili-tary machine would defeat the Viet-namese peasants quickly enough.France received a good deal of militaryequipment from the United States andGreat Britain and benefited from thesupport of both nations. France set up aseries of provincial commands in Viet-nam’s towns and cities from which itwould launch attacks into the northernportion of Vietnam, using overwhelm-ing combat power to grind the VietMinh into submission. To help them in

their fight, the French also used specialoperations troops to recruit mountaintribesmen who disliked the Vietnam-ese. France underrated the ability andfighting savvy of their opponents andwould continue to do so for the dura-tion of the war.5

The Viet Minh had no illusions abouttheir capabilities against the Frenchmilitary, nor how they would wagetheir war for independence. The VMinitially fought a guerrilla war againstthe French, ambushing light convoys,

overwhelming under-defended outpostsand striking at supply and ammunitiondepots to hinder France’s resupply ef-forts while adding to their own cache ofweapons and ammunition. As the years

progressed, the VM, receiving militaryaid from China in the form of equip-ment and military advisors, were ableto fight larger engagements with Frenchforces, oftentimes overwhelming Frenchforces with human wave tactics. VMdoctrine attempted to avoid the set-piece battle unless they enjoyed anoverwhelming force ratio, as evidencedin their 12-to-1 advantage against theFrench defenders at Dien Bien Phu. HoChi Minh’s strategy was to bleedFrance dry, knowing that his peoplewere in it for the long run, while theFrench were not.

The G.M.s were designed as self-sustaining motorized brigades modeledafter the U.S. Army’s World War IIcombat commands. The G.M.s typi-cally consisted of three infantry battal-ions with one artillery battalion, alongwith elements of light armor or tanks,engineer, signal and medical assets,totaling 3,000-3,500 soldiers. TheG.M.s were effective at rapidly rein-forcing threatened sectors in the Delta,but the hills and swamps, prevalent inVietnam, hindered their effectiveness,restricting the G.M.s to narrow roads.Their mobility quickly became their

Achilles heel, as their vehicles couldnot traverse the restricted terrain.6

The French order of battle included:

• Groupement Mobile 100, ColonelBarrou, commanding.

• Headquarters Company 100, Capt.Fievet, commanding.

• Regiment de Coree (Korea Regi-ment), Lieutenant Colonel Lajounie,commanding.

• 1st Bataillon de Coree (Korea), Ma- jor Kleinmann, commanding.

• 2nd Bataillon de Coree (Korea),Major Guinard, commanding.

• Bataillon de March /43e Regimentd’Infanterie Coloniale, Major Muller,commanding.

• 10e RAC (Artillery), Major Ar-vieux, commanding.

• III Escadrille/5e Rgt Cuirassiers(‘Royale-Pologne’), Captain Doucet,commanding.

Groupement Mobile 100 was a vet-eran force with a paper strength of 834

soldiers in each infantry battalion. TheKorea Regiment had distinguished it-self fighting alongside the U.S. 2ndInfantry Division in Korea and proudlywore the unit’s Indianhead patch.7

Many of its officers had taken a reduc-tion in rank to serve in the Coree. The43rd Coloniale was a crack unit ofCambodian and Vietnamese soldierswho had fought well in the past.8

It can also be said that G.M 100 wastired from the bloody fighting andmany saw their withdrawal as a signthat the war for them was over. G.M.100 was well-led by officers andNCOs, at the company level as well asin senior leadership positions. ColonelBarrou was a compassionate officerwho recognized the Groupe Mobile’svulnerabilities early in his command

when he wrote in his diary:“The most delicate problem remains

that of the protection of the artillery andof the means of command and communi-cations, since the largest possible num-ber of infantrymen must be left free tosearch out the enemy and fight him.

“The very means of support and coor-dination which makes the strength of theG.M. also create some enormous obliga-tions in a mountainous area whereroads are rare and of poor quality” 9

These words would haunt the colonellater, considering the fate of his unit.

G.M. 100’s leadership was strong, con-sisting of blooded, dedicated officerswho were no strangers to the war inVietnam. Perhaps it is a tribute to them— the sergeants, lieutenants, captainsand majors of the G.M. — that any ofits soldiers survived the bloody ambushat PK 15.

Viet Minh Regiment 803

The Viet Minh enjoyed widespreadsupport among the civilian populationof Vietnam, and dealt harshly withthose who had profited from the Frenchpresence. The Viet Minh army wasformed from tough peasants, ideologi-cally committed to an independent,Communist Vietnam. The sufferingsheaped upon the people by corruptVietnamese in power, as well as mili-tary operations and atrocities by theFrench military, ensured a continuousstream of volunteers into General VoGiap’s VM Army. Those less willing tofight could provide invaluable serviceto the army as porters. It was the por-ters or “coolies” who had hauled hun-dreds of mortar and artillery pieces and

ARMOR — January-February 2001 23



ammunition across the Vietnamesecountryside and up to the high groundsurrounding the French base at DienBien Phu. It is estimated that each regu-lar division needed approximately50,000 porters to move equipment and

supplies.

10

Most of the VM regular units were

formed in the Viet Bac and after 1949,at Chinese Camps at Wenshan, LongZhou, Jing Xi, and Szu Mao. Trainedby Chinese Red Army soldiers, the VietMinh were molded into a fanaticalfighting force capable of marching fordays with only a few rice balls for sus-tenance.11

The Viet Minh 803rd Regiment hadfought the French in the Central High-lands for two years and had exacted abloody price from the soldiers of G.M.100 since February, 1954 with am-

bushes and mortar attacks on An Khe.It was a price that G.M. 100 had paid inkind at Dak Ya-Ayun in March. Itseemed only fitting that the 803rdwould be the ones executing the am-bush two months later that would sig-nify the death knell of the French unit.

The 803rd’s leadership is unknown.There is no record of any of the namesof its regimental or battalion com-manders, for theirs was a war of ano-nymity. The Viet Minh won its battlesat great human cost and therefore,many of its officers did not survive thevicious fighting. A private in one battlecould very well find himself leadingVM troops as a sergeant or lieutenantin the next. As their struggle was onefor freedom and liberty, the Viet Minhdid not recognize individuals, butfought as a collective. Viet Minh lead-ership was different than that of theFrench, but it was effective enough.There was much politics in the VMArmy, as commissars often worked inconjunction with the officers and NCOswho led the Viet troops to ensure theirdedication to the Communist cause.

The Destruction of G.M. 100 –

Opening MovesWith the fall of Dien Bien Phu com-

plete and no French reserves availableto stem the tide of the imminent Com-munist offensive into the central pla-teau, the French high command gavethe order for G.M. 100 to evacuate AnKhe and move to Pleiku, 80 kilometerswest over enemy-held road. G.M. 100was to depart on 25 June, upon comple-tion of the air evacuation of Frenchcivilians, high-ranking officials, andequipment from An Khe.

By the 23rd of June, intelligence re-ports indicated that the Viet Minh803rd regiment was on the march toR.C. 19 from its base near An Hoa.Indications were that the 803rd hadevery intention of stopping the evacua-

tion force before it could reach Pleiku.This information proved to be critical,leading to Colonel Barrou’s first costlymistake that contributed to the destruc-tion of his force. Moving the departuredate up one day to the 24th of June,Barrou decided that G.M. 100 woulddrive 22 kilometers to Mang YangPass, where elements of G.M. 42 andAirborne Groupe 1 were waiting to linkup and escort the An Khe convoy intoPleiku. Barrou intended to drive thedistance quickly, forsaking reconnais-sance and security for speed. The origi-nal plan had called for G.M. 100 to haltat kilometer (PK) 11 while one com-

pany from the 43rd Coloniale con-ducted a recon of the next 11 kilome-ters before committing the rest of theforce to the narrow defiles and re-stricted maneuver terrain betweenkilometers 12-20. Barrou now calledfor the column to move to PK 22 in onebound. He hoped to beat the 803rd toMang Yang Pass and was prepared tosacrifice security to do so.

G.M. 100 departed An Khe at 0300hours on 24 June, 1954. The Cambo-dian-French 43rd Coloniale led thecolumn, followed by the 2nd Korea andthe 1st Korea. All three battalions haddismounted and were providing ascreen for the Groupe’s vehicles. Alsopresent in G.M. 100’s formation wasthe 520th Tieu-Doan Kinh-Quan(TDKQ or Commando Battalion), aunit comprised of Vietnamese schooledin the fighting methods of the VietMinh and designed to close with anddestroy the Communist guerilla units.The TDKQ unfortunately were an un-disciplined force, and their presence inthe armored column that fateful daywould end up having dire consequencesfor Colonel Barrou and his men.12

Each of the infantry battalions in G.M.100 had one artillery battery task-organized to them. Headquarters Com-pany and the Groupe’s mobile com-mand posts were placed in the convoybehind the 520th TDKQ. By dawn, thecolumn was on its way to Pleiku fol-lowed by 300 or so civilians from AnKhe who had not been evacuated byair. Although it was against the ordersof the French High Command to allowcivilians to move with a military con-voy, nobody in G.M. 100 seemed to

either notice or care. As the formationmoved down the open road, French B-26 bombers destroyed the ammunitionand supplies left behind at An Khe. Theroad march was underway.

The Viet Minh 803rd Regiment knew

where G.M. 100 was going and at thispoint, they were in a footrace to reachRoute Coloniale 19 before the Frenchcould rendezvous with G.M. 42 andAG 1. The VM knew that if the Frenchwere successful in linking up, the VMwould not have the combat power tointerdict their move to Pleiku. It wouldbe critical to the mission’s success thatthey hit the French column somewherebetween PK 11 and 15.

Colonel Barrou did have one asset athis disposal he fully intended to use. Acompany of Bahnar tribesman led byCaptain Vitasse, an elite French com-

mando who had fought in Vietnam forover four years, was positioned in the jungle to the north of R.C. 19. AnyCommunist unit attempting to cross theroad west of An Khe would be spottedby Vitasse and thus provide the Frenchwith early warning.

At 0900 hours, the convoy reachedPK 6 and was hit with automatic smallarms fire. Several soldiers in the 1st Ko-rea were wounded, but the enemy with-drew as quickly as it had come. Firstblood went to the VM. As the columncontinued its march, the Groupe’s sol-diers grew increasingly edgy, sensingthe dangers that potentially lay in thedense jungle surrounding them.

G.M. 100 conducted a short halt at PK11, the initial target for the roadmarch’s first day. After PK 11, theroad, surrounded by the thick junglesand rocky overhangs, passed throughnumerous sites along the route ideal forambush. It was here that Colonel Bar-rou decided to split the convoy intofour elements, each consisting of infan-try, artillery and light armor, each aself-contained unit capable of defend-ing itself if trouble arose, while pre-

venting the entire column from annihi-lation in the event of a VM trap. Thefirst element of the 43rd Coloniale, itsfirst company led by the veteran Cap-tain Leouzon, left PK 11 at 1250, thesecond element at 1300, the third at1330 hours and the fourth and finalelement departed at 1400. All groupsmaintained radio contact as the marchresumed.

At 1330, Captain Vitasse sent an ur-gent dispatch that G.M. 100’s radiotruck received: “Important! Viet Minh




elements 3 kilometers north of R.C.19.” Almost simultaneously, a Frenchreconnaissance plane identified anotherVM formation at Kon-Barr, 8 kilome-ters north of PK 11. Soon, the 105s of4th Battery, who had not yet left PK 11,

were sending rounds at the grid thespotter plane had identified near Kon-Barr. With this critical information, itseemed the French convoy had what itneeded to avert disaster.

G.M. 100’s radio truck compiled thereports and relayed them down the lineto the different elements of the convoy.The 520th TDKQ, 1st and 2nd Korea,10th Colonial Artillery battalions allacknowledged the transmission. Theproblem was, the radio truck never con-tacted the 43rd Coloniale, and theywere leading the march! It was neverdiscovered how this fatal error hap-

pened, for the radio truck and its per-sonnel were all killed in the battle thatfollowed. However, Colonel Barrouhad complained several times previ-ously that he was short 20 radio opera-tors from his authorized strength.Without the critical warning that theVM were at R.C. 19, Leouzon and therest of the 43rd Colonial Infantrymarched on unaware.

Luckily for G.M. 100, Captain Leou-zon was a savvy jungle fighter who hadseen his share of VM ambushes in hisseveral years of fighting. At PK 15, theroad stretched out into a small plaincovered with 6-foot-tall elephant grassthrough which the road wound furtherwest. It was quiet. Too quiet. Thereweren’t even any birds to be seen andthis made Leouzon nervous. ContactingMajor Muller, his battalion command-er, he requested permission to send outa screen prior to moving the entire col-umn through the area. Muller was con-cerned about the time it would take todo so. He also felt that if Leouzon raninto enemy, Muller’s other companieswould not be able to support him withthe dense vegetation obscuring theirfields of fire. Undaunted, Leouzon pro-

posed a compromise:

“Well, then let’s cut the problemhalfways. I’ll leave the road with mycompany and just cut across the arc ofthe road through the high grass. If thereis nothing that close to the road, it’llgive us an additional screen, and if I getcaught, it’ll give you an early warningand permit you to support me withouthaving to weaken the convoy.”13

Muller gave his consent and Leou-zon’s 1st Company left the road and

moved cautiously through the elephantgrass, attempting to move to a smallhill in the middle of the plain thatwould afford them a better view of thesurrounding area. Sergeant Li-Som, aCambodian, and one of Leouzon’s best

soldiers, stopped and told his squad tobe silent. He listened intently, eyeswidening when he realized what he washearing. When a large body movesthrough elephant grass, the long strandsmake a “knack” sound as they return totheir normal position after having beentrampled out of place. Li-Som quicklydeduced that the Viet Minh were thereand ready to destroy G.M. 100 as theymoved through the wide open areawithout cover. Suddenly, two VM ma-chine guns opened up on another pla-toon of Leouzon’s Cambodians at arange of about 30 meters. Sergeant Li-Som charged towards the machine

guns’ reports, ordering his platoon withhim. As he threw the grenade that de-stroyed one enemy gun, the other gunkilled Li-Som with a hail of bullets. Thetime was 1420. The battle had begun.

The Battle andSubsequent Actions

Leouzon’s 1st Company immediatelywent into action, returning fire. Leou-zon’s RTO attempted to contact MajorMuller, but his radio had been smashedby a .50 caliber bullet. Destroying therest of the radio set so that the VMwould not be able to use it, he joinedthe battle. The VM savaged the 43rdColoniale with fire from their machineguns, bazookas, recoilless rifles, andheavy mortars. The 803rd was in factfully-deployed along PK 15 and nowexecuting a perfect ambush of a con-fused and disoriented foe. The ele-ments observed by the spotter planehad apparently been decoys, for the803rd had been in place for severalhours prior to the arrival of G.M. 100.The French had lost the race to MangYang Pass and were now fighting fortheir lives.

Prior to 1420, Colonel Barrou traveledbehind the armored platoon, consistingof three half-tracks and two M-8 ar-mored cars. Barrou was in an open jeep, but moved with the Groupe’s ra-dio truck, which informed him of alight stone barricade in the road at PK15 at 1405 hours, as reported by an-other light recon plane.

By 1415, Barrou noted that the leadelement of the convoy picked up speedand the armored platoon widened thegap between the lead element and

headquarters company to keep up. Bar-rou ordered the radio truck to tell thearmored platoon to slow down. Imme-diately after the platoon leader ac-knowledged the transmission, Barrouheard the machine gun burst and Li-

Som’s grenade explode. Suddenly, theHeadquarters Company was struck byheavy mortar and recoilless rifle fire.Trucks and vehicles began explodingand the screams of men struck by bul-lets and shrapnel threatened to drownout the explosions.

Within four minutes, the armor pla-toon was destroyed. All three half-tracks and one M-8 were ablaze. Theremaining M-8, though immobilized,located an enemy machine gun rakinghalted French vehicles on the road, andtore it apart with a blast of automaticfire. At 1425, G.M. 100’s radio truck

took a direct hit from an enemy 57mmrecoiless rifle and exploded in a ball offire. Anybody inside who might haveexplained why the 43rd Coloniale hadnot been warned of the presence of theViet Minh in the area died a fierydeath. Along with the truck went Colo-nel Barrou’s ability to command andcontrol the convoy. The 43rd Colonialeand Headquarters Company were bothin contact, having to fight separate bat-tles for survival. Chaos reigned.

Colonel Barrou and Captain Fievet,Headquarters Company’s CO, attempt-ed to rally soldiers for a counterattack

on VM positions on the hill crest northof the convoy that was continuing torake the halted vehicles of G.M. 100with murderous fire. Fievet fell, mor-tally wounded, while Colonel Barrouwas also hit in the thigh and rolled intoa ditch next to the dying Fievet wherehe conferred the Officer’s Cross of theLegion of Honor on Fievet before heexpired.

Lieutenant Colonel Lajouanie, CO ofthe Korea Regiment, also counterat-tacked against the enemy-held hill. Thesurviving M-8’s canister shells weresuppressing the enemy positions there

and it appeared that the French mightbe able to take the hill in a flankingmaneuver. However, as Lajounie ledthe attack, the M-8’s gunner was killedand the VM turned their full fury on thecharging Frenchmen who were moweddown by the murderous fire. Lajouniefell near Colonel Barrou and he too,was awarded the Legion of Honor. By1445, Headquarters Company had beendestroyed as a fighting force, and sev-eral key officers of G.M. 100 weredead.




Barrou crawled to the silent M-8 andmanned the vehicle’s weapon attempt-ing to bring fire on the Viet Minh posi-tions. Unfortunately for Barrou, he wasspotted and shot before he could get themachine gun going again. Barrou wasknocked from the vehicle and rolledinto a ditch where he resolved to die.Tearing up his identification, he laythere until a medic bandaged him. Notrecognizing his colonel who lay therecovered in blood, the corpsman movedon towards positions of the 43rd afterproviding first aid.

Major Hipolite, the Korea Regiment’sexecutive officer, was killed shortlyafterwards and Viet Minh infantry

swarmed the headquarters trucks, exe-cuting wounded soldiers and continuingthe G.M.’s destruction. Ten minutesafter the ambush began, G.M. 100 hadlost its means of communications andall three of its ranking officers. MajorMuller and his 43rd Infantry were inthe fight of their lives, but help was onthe way. Muller did the right thing andtook charge of his element, not waitingfor orders from Colonel Barrou. Littledid Muller know that his CO was lyingin a ditch dazed from his wounds and inno condition to lead the fight.

The 520th TDKQ, normally not a part

of G.M. 100 and bearing a poor reputa-tion as combat troops,14 broke and ranat the outset of hostilities, leaving theHeadquarters Company and the 10thArtillery’s Headquarters Battery aloneto fight the Viet Minh. Truck driverscarrying engineer demolitions aban-doned their trucks and ran into the jun-gle seeking safety. At 1500, the aban-doned engineer trucks, packed withpyrotechnics and demolitions began toexplode under the onslaught of Vietrounds. Shrapnel tore into French sol-diers nearby, who were using the trucksas cover.

The 2nd and 1st Korea Battalions ar-rived shortly after 1500 and pressedforward through the mass of burningvehicles in order to link up with the43rd. Taking advantage of the VietMinh surprise at the arrival of two freshbattalions and their artillery, the 43rdattempted to break out with as manyvehicles as they could and sufferedheavy losses under the VM fire. A fewvehicles from the 43rd

did manage to

escape the carnage and arrive at PK 22to tell of the ambush.

Major Kleinmann, 2nd Korea’s COand the ranking officer left in G.M. 100,organized a defense around the shatteredconvoy. He ordered his 4th Battery toset up their howitzers and fire fuzes atminimum setting into the Viet Minhpositions as enemy infantry attemptedto charge the French. This action un-doubtedly saved the French, as the VMattack broke under the devastating artil-lery fire. For the beleaguered soldiersof the 43rd and Korea Battalions, see-ing the Viets cut down was a tremen-dous lift to their morale and theyseemed infused with the elan to con-tinue their savage fight for survival.

By 1620, ammunition was running

short. Air Force B-26s arrived to pro-vide close air support, but by thenmuch of the fighting was occurring soclose, that both French and Viet sol-diers were cut down by the indiscrimi-nate machine gun fire from the air. Asdusk approached, the French realizedthey would not be able to hold muchlonger. The 4th Howitzer Battery wasout of action; its crews dead andwounded, its guns out of ammunition.While the French had stopped the VMinfantry attacks, enemy mortar firerained down on the French perimeter en-suring a steadily rising casualty count.

At 1715, Major Kleinmann was or-dered by French Zone Headquarters toabandon the Groupe’s vehicles andbreak through to PK 22 on foot with hisinfantry and whatever wounded hecould carry, to link-up with G.M. 42and other French forces there. Klein-mann discussed options with the 2ndKorea’s CO, Major Guinard. Both de-cided that there would be no way tocarry out the seriously wounded. Hav-ing to trek a distance greater than 10kilometers through thick jungle anddoing so under fire would only createmore casualties. They made the deci-

sion to leave the wounded on the road,along with all remaining medical sup-plies and any medical personnel volun-teers willing to stay with them. Thefollowing conversation between MajorKleinmann and Major-Doctor Varme-Janville, G.M. 100’s surgeon, epito-mizes the self-sacrifice and dedicationto the wounded that the French doctorpossessed.

“Janville, we’ve just received our or-ders. We’re pulling off the road at1900.”

“And the wounded?”

“Janville — the wounded are stayinghere. You know there’s nothing we cando for them once we’re off the road.”

“Gentlemen, I don’t think I can be ofmuch further help in this. They’ve gotgood doctors up in Pleiku but my menneed me here. I’ll stay with them.”15

Unfortunately for Varme-Janville, allthe wounded he elected to stay witheventually died because the Viet com-missars refused to allow him the sup-

plies to treat them. It was a dark chap-ter in the doctor’s life, for he wasforced to watch his men suffer and die,all the while he was prevented fromattempting to save their lives.

At 1900, the remaining soldiers ofG.M. 100 broke out of the trap that hadkilled so many of their brethren. Asthey escaped into the surrounding jun-gle, they saw their leg-wounded com-rades still with the convoy fight onelast delaying action in order to buy the




rest of the infantry time to escape. Thebattalion commanders realized that theVM would figure out that they hadwithdrawn and attempt to cut them off.They decided to split the remnants ofthe battalions into platoon-sized groupsunder the command of an officer ofsenior NCO, to make the trek to PK 22.

For the next several days, the groupsencountered impossibly dense jungles,isolated Viet Minh ambushes, andmountain tribesmen who attempted tokill and rob the French. Finally, at 1130

hours on 25 June, a platoon from 4thCompany, 1st Korea encountered apatrol from the 1st Airborne Group.The battered remnants of G.M. 100 hadfinally reached PK 22. While these menhad arrived alive, their unit, the once-proud G.M. 100 had died the day be-fore at PK 15 on Route Coloniale 19.

Key Events, Outcome of Action

Sadly, for the men of G.M. 100, theirordeal was not quite over. They had tobrave 55 kilometers more of enemy

road and the conglomeration of G.M.s42 and 100, plus the 1st AirborneGroup, was harassed continuously untilthey arrived in Pleiku on 29 June. Ofthe 222 men assigned to HeadquartersCompany when G.M. 100 left An Khe,only 84 were left. The 43rd Coloniale,1st and 2nd Korea Battalions, contain-ing 834 soldiers each could now claim452, 497 and 345 soldiers respectively.The 2nd Group, 10th Colonial Artilleryhad only 215 out of an original 474.Eighty-five percent of G.M. 100’s ve-

hicles, 100 percent of the artillery, and68 percent of the signal equipment hadbeen lost. Fifty percent of the Groupe’srifles and machine guns were capturedby the Viet Minh.

Colonel Barrou, amazingly, survivedthe destruction of his unit, and wasdiscovered by a French patrol and car-ried out on a stretcher. The patrol waslater captured by the VM and Barrouparticipated in a death march over ahundred or so miles to enemy prisonerof war camps, but he did survive the

war, and was eventually repatriatedback to France.

The 803rd Viet Minh Regiment gaveas much as it got and received a battal-ion of replacements within a day of thefight at PK 15. They quickly rejoinedoperations in the Central Highlands andcontinued to fight the French until thearmistice was signed on July 20.

Because of the nature of the VietMinh’s operational security, it is notknown how many casualties the unit

suffered, but there is no doubt that theregiment covered itself in glory by de-stroying one of the best mechanizedoutfits in the French Army. Years later,the 803rd would return to action againstanother invading force. This time, theArmy of the United States.

The Viet Minh’s goals for destroyingthe French convoys en route to Pleikuwere relatively simple. By demonstrat-ing their ability to inflict massive casu-alties on the French Army in the wakeof the disastrous defeat at Dien Bien




Phu, the Viets could then dictate theterms of the peace agreement betweenFrance and Ho Chi Minh’s ProvisionalGovernment of Vietnam. Under no cir-cumstances did the Viets want Franceto retain any portion of Vietnam, nordid they want the French to feeltempted to resume the war. By destroy-ing France’s armored convoys, the Vi-ets were kicking an enemy who wasdown, but they did so to send the un-equivocal message that Vietnam wasthe victor.

The war was, for all intents and pur-poses, over when G.M. 100 died on the24th of June, 1954. However, by doing

what they did, the Viets hastenedFrance’s departure from Vietnam andresigned the French to the fact that untilthe last soldier withdrew, it was a fightto the death. France had lingered toolong in a place they were now preparedto give up. Just to ensure there were nosecond thoughts, no serious Frenchconsiderations to the feasibility of con-tinuing the war in Indochina, GeneralVo Nguyen Giap, Vietnam’s greatestgeneral, continued to apply the pressureuntil France realized that maintainingits presence in Vietnam would come atthe cost of more of its soldiers. Lessthan one month after the disaster at PK15, the last French soldier departedVietnamese soil.

Several events contributed to G.M.100’s destruction. Colonel Barrou nor-mally was careful and made good useof reconnaissance and an advance guardwhen maneuvering the Groupe. Whenhe received reports of the 803rd Regi-ment attempting to cut him off fromPleiku, he attempted to race the VietMinh, rather than conduct the properreconnaissance and security measuresthat might have prevented the ambush.Thanks to the independent actions of

one Captain Leouzon, the column had avery small measure of early warningbefore the convoy came under directand indirect fires. This action savedG.M. 100’s destruction from being evenmore devastating than it was. Splittinghis force also resulted in allowing the803rd to mass on the lead elements ofthe convoy, inflicting heavy damage onthem before the Korea Battalions couldarrive to stem the tide.

The inability of the radio truck to no-tify Major Muller and the 43rd Coloni-

ale Infantry that the Viet Minh hadbeen observed near PK 15 was criticalinformation that might have altered themethod in which Muller deployed hiscombat power. When Captain Leouzonrequested to screen the convoy’s flank,neither he nor Muller had any idea thatVM forces were in the area. This criti-cal failure in communications no doubtcontributed a great deal to the deaths ofFrench soldiers at PK 15.

G.M. 100 lost all of its leadership andcommand and control nodes in theopening minutes of the ambush. As aresult, all three infantry battalions werefighting on their own, without coordi-

nation of any kind. The battalion com-manders did a superb job of fightingtheir units, but without any centralleadership, the French were unable tomake a concerted effort to break thering of death around them, making sev-eral unsuccessful piecemeal attacksbefore withdrawing into a perimeterdefense. The deaths of LTC Lajounieand MAJ Hipolite, and the incapacita-tion of Colonel Barrou, had a devastat-ing effect on G.M. 100 and it was onlybecause of the discipline and leadershipwithin the infantry ranks that the entireforce was not wiped out.

The commander of the 803rd Regi-ment did an excellent job of choosingthe appropriate ground in which to killhis enemy. He used his heavy weaponseffectively, destroying vehicles andthus stacking up the convoy within hiskill sack where his soldiers were able tocontinue to inflict devastation upon theFrench ranks. Maintaining a steady firewith his heavy mortars, he never al-lowed the French an opportunity toeffectively consolidate and reorganize,and was able to easily defeat thepiecemeal counterattacks. When hisinfantry began to become attrited dur-

ing their attacks, he pulled them back toallow his mortars and heavy machineguns to weaken the French resolve. Heexecuted a perfect ambush from whichany French at all were lucky to escape.

Conclusions

With the defeat of G.M. 100 came therealization that any further bloodshedin Vietnam was futile. The war hadbeen lost before the ambush at PK 15,but a French victory over the 803rdwould not have altered the armistice in

the least. France failed in its bid to re-tain Vietnam as a colony, not becauseits army was not capable of defeatingthe Viet Minh, but because France wasnot willing to pay as much of a price tokeep Vietnam as its people were will-ing to pay for independence. Francelearned this lesson at a cost of over172,178 French and French-Alliedtroops killed and wounded. Francelearned that despite having a profes-sional army with excellent equipment,the mass and fanaticism with which theViet Minh fought each day was more ofa match for her. This lesson was therefor all to see, yet the United Statesfailed to pay attention to what hap-

pened to the French, and had to re-learnmany of the lessons paid for in bloodby the French Army.

Vietnam’s struggles were not overwith the defeat of the French in 1954.Ho Chi Minh desired to see a unitedVietnam under the banner of Commu-nism. However, South Vietnam, underPresident Ngo Dinh Diem, had no in-terest in Communism. Raised under theinfluence of French Colonial rule,Diem was pro-West and did not shareHo Chi Minh’s vision. Minh dedicatedthe remainder of his life to unitingNorth and South Vietnam and as earlyas 1957, his Communist agitators beganinfiltrating the south in preparation fora war of unification, one in which theUnited States soon became involved.

Had the United States’ senior leader-ship studied the patterns of the French-Indochina War, perhaps much of theloss this country incurred fighting inSoutheast Asia might have beenaverted. Our armed forces committedthe same mistakes the French made,fighting an enemy that was far morededicated to the country of Vietnamthan we were. Our blind fear and loath-

ing of the spread of communism dic-tated that we undertake a battle wewere not committed to win. The long-term effects of the bloodshed at PK 15on June 24, 1954 can be seen in everyAmerican name written on the VietnamMemorial in Washington, D.C.

The Principles of War

Maneuver. The Viet Minh knew thatthe French column, caught in the open,would not have the time or ability tomaneuver once they initiated the am-

“Our armed forces committed the same mistakes the French made, fighting an enemy that was far more dedicated to the country of Vietnamthan we were. Our blind fear and loathing of the spread of communismdictated that we undertake a battle we were not committed to win.”




bush. The French infantry operateddismounted, but the tall elephant grassprevented them from coordinating theirattacks with other infantry and theirvehicles. This lack of ability to maneu-ver doomed the French to having to

fight a defense in the open while sur-rounded by enemy who had the benefitof concealment and high ground.

Economy of Force. Although theFrench convoy had over 2,000 fightingsoldiers at its disposal, Colonel Barrousplit his force on the road, allowing theViet Minh to attack G.M. 100 as itpiecemealed into the ambush. Thenumbers on both sides were about evenon paper, but by the time the KoreaBattalions arrived, the 520th TDKQhad been routed, the HeadquartersCompany had been destroyed, and the43rd was surrounded and under heavy

fire. The French were never able tomass their forces at any one point, orelse they might have been successful inbreaking the ambush.

Mass. The Viet Minh 803rd Regimentemployed mass against G.M. 100 togreat effect. Employing machine gun,heavy mortar, 57mm anti-armor andsmall arms fire against the exposedconvoy, the VM succeeded with deadlyeffect. Conversely, the French wereunable to mass, having been separatedand without the means to effectivelycoordinate their counterattacks. TheFrench inability to counter the Viet

Minh’s superior employment of massdoomed G.M. 100 from the start.

Security. Colonel Barrou sacrificedsecurity at the cost of speed and manyof his soldiers paid the ultimate price.By not adequately reconnoitering thearea west of PK 11, he allowed hismounted force to advance blind, with-out knowledge of the terrain or whatdangers lay ahead. In doing so, he gavethe Viets the initiative and a clear ad-vantage. The Viets knew where theFrench were, and the extent of theircombat power. Colonel Barrou had noconcept of VM locations other than the

fact they had been spotted near RC 19.Instead of adjusting his plan to createsome local security, he continued onblindly.

Surprise. The French force’s lack ofadequate security allowed completesurprise for the Viet Minh. Althoughthe French had an idea they were outthere, the column’s lead element didnot. Had Leouzon’s instincts not dic-tated that he screen the battalion’s ad-vance through the area surrounding PK

15, the surprise might have been com-plete and the entire column might havebeen caught on the open road. As itwas, the Vietnamese still benefitedfrom surprise and used it to great effect.

Unity of Command. G.M. 100 hadplenty of leadership, yet disaster struck

in the opening minutes when the topthree ranking officers went down. Be-cause the other battalion commanderswere in the midst of the fight for theirlives, nobody took charge until MajorKleinmann arrived 40 minutes after theambush began. In those 40 minutes, theentire armor platoon was destroyed aswell as most of the convoy’s vehicles.Kleinmann inherited chaos and did thebest he could with it, but by the time hearrived, the ability for the French toseize the initiative had passed and thebattle was firmly in the hands of the

Viet Minh. Barrou had no concise planfor countering an ambush, nor did heprovide any guidance to his subordi-nates on what to do should he be takenout of action. As a result, critical timewas lost in re-establishing a chain ofcommand, and with that time wentG.M. 100’s ability to win the battle atPK 15.

Epilogue

The men of Groupement Mobile 100were some of the best in the FrenchArmy. They had “faced the elephant”on numerous occasions in the highlands

of Vietnam over the previous year andwere some of the most experienced andprofessional troops anywhere in theworld. The 1st and 2nd Korea Battal-ions had won battlefield glory at placessuch as Chipyong-Ni and ArrowheadRidge several years before and wereproud of it. Yet, as those veteranswould soon discover, “Indochine no estCoree.” Vietnam is not Korea. G.M.100 died at PK 15 because of a seriesof mistakes that compounded to createa battle they had no chance of winning.Poor judgment on the part of theGroupe’s senior leadership lost the

lives of many of its troops, just as out-standing leadership at the junior levelsaved many more. Such is the way ofwar. LTG (Ret.) Harold G. Moore per-haps summed up G.M. 100’s fate bestin his book, We Were Soldiers Once.. And Young.

“Shortly after we arrived in Vietnam,Sergeant Major Plumley and I took a jeep and a shotgun guard and drove tenmiles west of An Khe on Route 19, intono-man’s-land, to the PK 15 marker post. There, the Viet Minh had de-

stroyed most of French Group Mobile100 in a deadly ambush 11 years ear-lier. We walked the battleground,where a bullet-pocked 6-foot-high stoneobelisk declares in French and Viet-namese: ‘Here on June 24, 1954, sol-

diers of France and Vietnam died fortheir countries.’…Plumley and Iwalked the battleground for two hours. Bone fragments, parts of weapons andvehicles, web gear and shell fragmentsand casings still littered the ground.From that visit I took away one lesson: Death is the price you pay for underes-timating this tenacious enemy.”16

Notes1Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (Stackpole

Books, New York, 1964) p.187-188.

2Fall, p. 190.

3Jim Mesko, Ground War - Vietnam 1945-1965 (Squadron Signal Pub., Carrollton, Texas, 1990)p. 3-4.

4Fall, p. 186.

5Mesko, p. 6.

6Martin Windrow and Mike Chappell, Men-At- Arms Series: The French Indochina War (OspreyMilitary Publications, Wellinborough, UK, 1998)pp. 16-17.

7Robert Barr Smith, Men At War (Avon His-tory, New York, 1997) p. 349.

8Fall, p. 193.

9Fall, p. 189.

10Windrow, Chappell, pp.20-21.11Windrow, Chappell p. 21.

12Fall, p.206.

13Fall, pp. 210-211.

14Barr-Smith p. 350.

15Fall, p. 218-219.

16Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, WeWere Soldiers Once…And Young (Harper Peren-nial, New York) 1992 p. 49.

CPT Kirk Luedeke was commis-sioned in Armor in 1994 from The

Citadel. He served as a tank pla-toon leader and tank company ex-ecutive officer for 3-37 Armor (later1-13 Armor) at Ft. Riley, Kansas.As XO of A/1-13 Armor, he spentseven months in Bosnia-Herzego-vina as part of Operation JointGuard. Subsequently, he served as1-13 Armor HHC XO. A graduate ofthe Armor Captains’ Career Course,he currently commands A/2-10 In-fantry at Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo.


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