Apollo 13 Senate Hearing 44-195

8/7/2019 Apollo 13 Senate Hearing 44-195

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A P O L L O 1 3 M I S S I O N

HEAR IN^BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ONAERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCESU N I T E D S T A T E S S E N A T E

NINETY-FIRST CONGRESSSECOSD SESSION

I

APRIL 24, 1970

Printed for the use @ ftheCommibtwon Aeronautical and Scpace Sciences

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C O M M I T T E E ON A E R O N A U T IC A L A N D S P A C E S C I E N C E SCLINTON P. ANDERSON, New Mexico, ChairmanRICHARD B. RUSSELL, GeorgiaWARREN G. MAGNUSON, WashingtonSTUA RT SYMINGTON, MissouriJOHN STENNIS, MississippiSTEPHEN M. YOUNG, OhioTHOMAS J. DOD D, ConnecticutHOWARD W. CANNON, NevadaSPESSARD L. HOLLAND, Florida

MARGARET CHASE SMITH, MaineCAR L T . CU RTI S, NebreskaMARK 0. HAT FIE LD, OregonBA RR Y GOLDWATER, ArizonaWILLIAM B. SAXBE, OhioRALPH T. SMITH, Illinois

JAMESJ. GEHRIO,&ffDtredorEVERARDH. SMITH,Jr., ProfessionalstaffMemberDr. GLENP. WILSON, Professional Staff MemberWILLIAMPARKER,Professional Staff MemberSAMBOUCHARD,A88t8tant Chief ClerkDONALD H . BRENNAN,Research Assfitant

CRAIOVOORHEES,ProJessionat Staff Member

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C O N T E N T SFRIDAY,A P RI L 24, 1970

Opcning statement, Senator Clinton P . Anderson, chairman---. .~..- - .~.Opcning statomcnt, Senator Margaret Ch aw Smith. - -..~ ~ -..~..- - -..~ -Statenicn t of Il r. Thomas 0. Paine, AdministIrator, National Aeronautic.:and Space Administration; accompanied by Astronaut James A. Lovcll,Commander of Apollo 13; Astronaut John L. Rwigert, Jr., CommandModule Pilot of Apollo 13; l>r. Rocco A. Petronc, Apollo ProgramDirector; and Glynn 8. Lunncy, Apollo 13 Mission Director- - _ _ -.~.- -Summary of actions following accident_.. -..-.-.- ~.- -~ .. .- -.- .~.Review Board investigation of accident - - ~ -.- --.- - -.- -..-.- - ..-Im pact of fu turc manned flights_._..___.____._____._._.~ ~ _ . _._-Apollo 13 effect on future prog rams__-_____._______.___._.___Statement of lh. Rocco A. Petrone, Apollo Program Director-- - - - - -.- - -Problems noted 54 hours into mission_.____._~Intensive investigation__. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -.~ -..-. _ _ -. _ _ -.- .. _ _ _ - _ _ - -Expect carly resolution of problem_-_ -.--.--.- -.- - - - - - - - ..-Statement of Glynn S. Lunncy, Apollo 13 Mission Director _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -Lunar module as lifeboat_.-. -.- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _-. _ _ - _ _ .-- - - - _ _ _Sum mary of e v e n t s _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . -Consumables s t a t u s _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . - -- - - - . - - - - . - - - - - - - - .- - - - - - - - -Sequence for c n t r y _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . - - - ~ - . ~ - - - . . - ~ . . - - - - - - - - - - . - . - -Sta tem ent of Astronauts James A. Lovell, Commander of Apollo 13; andJohn L. Swigert, Jr., Command Module Pilot of Apollo 13_________Report of low morale completely false__ _ - - - -.- - - - - -.Summarizes action after explosion - -. - - - - - - -....- - - - -Describes feelings over situation- - -. - - - - - -.- - - - - --.- - - - - - - -Transfer spacecraft control to lunar module__ - -.- - -.- - - - - - - -Comments on environmental system- - - - - - - - - - -.- - - - - - - --.-Employs Apollo 8 technique- - _ _ - - - _ _ - - - - -.- - - - - - -Shows film of spacecraft interior__ -.- - - - -.- - - - -.-Questions by Committee members- - - - .. - - -. - - -..- - - - - - -Keeping cool under adverse conditions- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Space program stimulus to education _ _ _ _ ~ - - - - - - - - -Questions design changes of Apollo 13.._- - - - -.- - - .. - - - - -.- -No safety shortcu ts caused by budget cuts__________.___Meteoroid damage chances- - _ _ ~ . _ ~ Man will travel solar system__________ .. _ _ ~_ _ _ _ _ ~..____.~ _ _ _.___Foreign cooperation during Apollo 13 mission- -.- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Abort proceduresEmergency procedures outlined _ _ _ _ _ - .-.- - - - --.- - - - - - - - - ..- - ~ - .--.Answers last moon mission remarks - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Increase in p r e s s u r e - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - . - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - -No unnecessary risk___________._________Technology transfer benefits- - - - - .- .. - - - - - --.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Reaction t o adversity prompts confidence- - - - - - - - - - - - .. - - - - - - - -Educa tional background of witnesses _ _ _ _ - - - - - - --.-... - - - - - - - -Apollo 13 Review Board- - - - - -.._ _ _ _ _ -~-.- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - ~..-Stat us of Apollo 14 mission- ___.-.___.._ _ -~-.-. _ _ _ _ - _.._ _ _ _ -.- -Ear ly cutoff of en gin e__ __ __ __ __ ._ __ . - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - . - . . - - . . - . -NASA Control Center- _ _ - -~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _______~ .__.Value of space investment- - ._._~ _ _ .._. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - . - -~ _ . Possible cause of blaze_____._._._~.._____.__._~ .__.._..___-._.-Complete qualification test - _ _ - _ _ ~.___._.___~ _._...--__.--.---.~International space cooperation- ~ -.- ~ -.- - -.- - - - _ _ _ .-Difficulty with oxygen tank _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ . _.___.___~ _._.___._~ _____._Significance of lunar experiment___.___~ _____._..~_ _ _ - _ _ -------.-Space program applications t o pollution- - - -.- - - ~ - ......- - . - - -

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Appendix: Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board _ _ _ _ - -~-(In)

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APOLLO 13 MISSIONFRIDAY, APRIL 24, 1970

U N I T E DSTATESSENATE,C OM M I T T E EO N A E R O N A U T I C A LAND SPACESCIENCES.Th e comm i t tee m et , pur suan t to ca ll, a t 10:05 a.m. , in room 1202,New Senate Off ice Bui ld ing, the Honorable Cl in ton P. Anderson(chairman) presiding.Pr ese nt: Senato rs Anderson, Sy ming ton, Stennis , Young, Holland,Sm ith of M aine, Curt is , Ha tf ield, Goltlmater , and Saxb e.Jam es J . Gehr ig , staff d i r ec to r ; Evc rard H . Sm i th , J r . , Dr. Glen P.Wilson, Cr aig Voorhces, sntl Willinrii Pnrkor, professional staffmembers ; Sam Boilchard, tkssistant chief clerk; Dorialtl H. Brcnnan ,rescarch as s i s t an t ; Mary R i ta Robbins , Rhea Bruno , Pa t r i c iaR ob ins on , R u b y L. Hamblen and Crirol L. Wilson, clerical assistants.

Washington,D.C.

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE C H A I R M A N

T h e C H A I R M A N .The hearing will come to order.Ex ac tly one week ago we were holding ou r bre ath s praying for thesafe return of J i m Lovell , Fre d H aise , and John Swigert . Today it isour honor to welcome Captain Lovell and Mr. Swigr r t to appearbefore this committee. Unfortunately, Mr. Haiso is slightly il l andunable to be wi th us today.I wish to convey m y hear t ies t congratula t ions to the ent ire NA SAorganizat ion for the successful return of tho Apollo 13 crew. Theirperformance during a period of great diff icul ty demonstrated thesup erb capabilities of th e NASA te am an d of th e Apollo sys tem .Apollo 13 will be considered by some as a failure, because it didnot accomplish its object ive of a lun ar landing an d retur n w ith newscientific inform ation. B u t in a real and larger sense, it was a humansuccess-a tri um ph of t h r h n m an spirit , an exoneration of the h u m a nmind , a t r ibute to human perseverance, a victory for al l mankind.The purposc of this meeting is to discuss with NASA officials theApollo 13 mission and its problems. We are anxious to l e a r n wha thappened , and what mus t be done to reestablish the Apollo launchschedule. Tow ards this end , we will begin tod ay w ith tes t imony fromD r . T h o m a s 0. Pa ine , Ad m inis trato r of NA SA, th en we will he ar

Dr . Rocco A. Pet rone, Apol lo Program Director , Mr . Glynn S.Lunney, Apollo 1 3 Mission D irector , a nd A stron auts Lovell an dSwigert .A t a la ter da te , af ter the review board has completed its invest iga-t ion and made i t s recommendat ions , the commit tee wi l l meet againwith Dr. Paine and other NASA off icials to discuss the future of th ema nned luna r explorat ion program.(1)

Senator Sm i th?


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2STATEMENT BY SENATOR SMITH

Senator SMITHof Maine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I \voiild liketo join in paying tribute to the astronauts of Apollo 13 for their verygreat courage and coolness in times of great stress.Also, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pay tribute to the entire NASAteam for what T consider one of the greatest achievements made in thespace program, for the way initial adversity was turned into dramaticsuccess.The CHAIRMAN.Dr. Paine?

STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS 0. PAINE, ADMINISTRATOR, NA-TIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION ; ACCOM-APOLLO 13; ASTRONAUT JOHN L. SWIGERT, JR., COMMAND MOD-ULE PILOT OF A P O U O 13; DR. ROCCO A. PETRONE, A P O L L O PRO-PANIED BY ASTRONAUT JAMES A. LOVELL, COMMANDER OF

GRAM DIRECTOR; AND GLYNN S. LUNNEY, APOLLO 13 MISSIONDIRECTORDr. PAINE.Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we appre-ciate this opportunity to appear before you to give you a preliminaryreport on the Apollo 13 mission, Americas fifth lunar expedition andthird landing attempt .

SUMMARY O F ACTIONS FOLLOWING ACCIDENTThis morning we will summarize for you our current understanding

The accident aboard the spacecraft Odyssey while outwardbound for the moon 55 hours and 54 minutes after launch;The immediate steps taken by flight controllers at MissionControl in Houston and the flight crew t o contain the situation;The ensuing 300,000-mile voyage around the moon and back toear th using the lunar module Aquarius as a lifeboat;The investigative measures which were initiated within NASAimmediately after the successful splashdown ; andOur view of the impact of the Apollo 13 accident on the lT.S.space program.Dr. Rocco Petrone, Director of the Apollo Program, will give youhis present best estimate of the principal events prior to and duringthe accident which apparently led to the rupture of oxygen bottleNo. 2 in the service module. The actions taken on the ground torecover from the accident and return the crew safely back to earthwill then be described by Mr. Glynn S. I~ i n n e y ,who was flight

director in Mission Control during much of the critical period followingthe accident. Astronaut James A. Lovell, the commander of Apollo 13,and Astronaut Jack Swigert, the command mothile pilot, will thendescribe to you the events that took place in the spacecraft duringthis period.We thought it best that Astronaut Fred Haise, the lunar modulepilot, not accompany his crewmates here today. As we informed thecommittee yesterday, the astronauts physician asked that M r. Haise

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3be excused from the trip to Washington to faci l i ta te his promptrecovery from the minor infection he has been suffering from sincethe fl ight.

REVIEW BOARD INVESTIGATION OF A C C I D E N T

Before Dr. Pe tron e begins, I will take a few mom ents to summarizefor you the act ions Dr. 1 1 0 ~and I h a v e t ak e n to assure a p ro mp t ,vigorous, com peten t , and object ive invest igat ion of th e causes of th eApollo 13 accident and the effectiveness of the mission recoveryact ions so th at app ropriate correct ive act ions can be taken. Copies ofthe documents involved are appended to m y s ta te m ent . (See p 52. )Immedia te ly af te r the sp lashdown, Dr. Low an d I establ ished anApollo 13 Review Board chai red b y M r. E d g a r M . Cort r igh t , d i rec torof NASAs Langley R esearch Cen ter. Seven mem bers were nam ed toth e board-all highly qualified senior ind ividu als fro m NA SA , th eAir Force , and AE C who ha ve ha d no dire ct responsibilities for Apollo13. T h e boards assignment is to m a k e a ful l and com plete invest iga-tion of th e circum stance s si irroundiiig th e accid ent to the Apollo 13spacecraft , to establ ish the probable cause or causes of the accident ,assess the effectiveness of the recovery actions, and recommendappropr ia te correc tive or other ac t ions . The board repor ts d i rec t lyto m e and Dr. Idow,and h as been meet ing in Houston s ince Tue sdayevening, April 21, delving into eve ry aspect of the a cciden t an drecovery. T he cha rge to the board and the m emorandum naming itsmembers were forwarded to your commit tee upon issuance aridNASA wil l cont inue to keep the commit tee ful ly informed as theinvestigation proceeds.We a lso announced immedia te ly af te r sp lashdown tha t we hadrequested NASAs statutory Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel toreview th e Apollo 13 Review B oards procedures a nd i ts f indings whenthe y become available, an d to subm i t a n independent re jort directly tor ington, is president of Douglas-Uni ted Nuclear , Inc . The Panelconsists of six non-NASA m embers and one NASA mem ber : Mr. B ru c eLund in , D i rec to r of t he Lewis Resea rch Cen te r . The Pane l me t inW ash ing ton on Tuesday , Apr il 21, and is carry ing o ut i t s ass ignmentas the work of the Review Bo ard proceeds.A th i rd ass ignment was m ade to M r. D a l e Myers, NASAs A ssociateAdm inis t ra tor for M anne d S pace Fl igh t , in two par t s : First, his orga-nizat ion wil l provide al l data and technical support required by theRev iew Board f rom the th ree M anned Space F l igh t Cen te rs and OMSFHeadquar ters . Secondly , the Manned Space Fligh t organizat ion willmo ve forward imm ediately with the req uired in-depth studies, analyses,and o the r s t eps to p rovide me and D r . L o w with the best possible plan sand recommendat ions for el iminat ing the problem encountered inApollo 13 and proceeding with Apollo 14 a n d fu t u re ma n n e d sp a c eflight missions. This work also go t underway a t Hous ton imm edia te lyafter splashdow n.Th us, f indings an d recornm endat ions from three sources will beavai lable to help NASA management make t imely decisions on th ecorrective and other m easures th a t should be take n pr ior to Apollo 14an d subse quen t m anne d flights .

m e a nd D r . Low. T h e C h ai rm a n of t h is Panc l , Dr . Ch arles D. H a r -


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4IM P AC T O N F U T U R E M A N N E D F L IG H T S

N ow let me say a few words on the impact, as we now see it, of theApollo 13 accident on the future of US.manned space flight activi-ties. As Dr. Petrones presentation will show, we expect th at the largequanti ty and high quality of the telemetered da ta received from theApollo 13 spacecraft a t the time of the accident will permit a preciseand early identification of the causes of the failiire. The oxygenthermos flask believed to be involved is a relatively simple componentand corrective action should not prove to be t~, major task. If thisturns out to be the case, we should be able to move out promptlywith the necessary alterations and proceed with Apollo 14 and subse-quent flights on approximately the same schedule we have presentedto you before.I think it is important that your committee understand clearlyour view in NASA of the Apollo 13 accident and recovery. The Apollo13 mission was a failure. We did not succeed in Americas third lunarlanding attempt, and m e wore, therefore, unable to explore the moonsPra Maiiro formation. This hilly region remains a high priorityobjective in o u r lunar program. Its exploration should add much toour understanding of the moon, its origins, and its relationships tothe earth. We cannot yet say which of the reniairiing Apollo missionswill be sent there. Although the Apollo 13 mission failed, we regardthe recovery actions that followed the accident as a gatifying successwhich mill contribute greatly to the Nations space flight competence.The Apollo hardware, the contingency planning, the training of flightand ground crews, arid the backup systems for emergency use appearto have demonstrated their flexibility and soundness. However, asI have stated, our charge to the Apollo 13 Review Board includesnot only a critical review of the cause or causes of the accident, butalso a critical assessment of the effectiveness of the recovery measurestaken. We intend to learn everything possible from both the ticcltlentand the safe recovery of Apollo 13 .

APO LLO 13 E F F E C T ON F U T U R E P R O G R A M SFinally, let me state my view as to how the Apollo 13 accident shouldaffect the future of the space program. I see no reason why thissetback should be-or should be made to be-the occasion for nmajor change in the course of the Nations space program. We haveclearly demonstrated the basic soundness of the Apollo system andof our operational procedures with the successful manned flights ofApollos 7, 8, 9, 10, 1 1 , and 12. Since the qtart of manned space flight,NASAs astronauts have safely flown a total of 70 !nillion miles inspace. From a technical standpoint, there is no qurastlon but that weare prepared to move forward in the 1970s with the spt~ceprogram wchave outlined to you in our previous appearances before you.I am happy to be able to report that the President fully sharesthis view. During our flight to Honolulu last Saturday to meet theastronauts, he expressed his strong sup1)ort for n vigorous on-goingU S . space program, particularly i r i manned s p i c e flight. Worldwidereaction has been the same. Virtually all editorial comment fromcoast to coast has strongly supported the position that the UnitedStates should not respond to this accident by cutting back or loweringits sights in space.


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5Now, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to askDr. Petrone to describe to you what we know today about the eventsleading to the accident.The CHAIRMAN.Thank you.Dr. Petrone?

STATEMENT OF DR. ROCCO A. PETRONE, APOLLO PROGRAMDIRECTORDr. P E T R ON E .Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, theApollo 13 mission, planned to perform a lunar landing a t Fr a Mauro,was launched at 1413 e.s.t. on 11 April 1970. Lift-off and initialpowered flight were nominal. Midway into the second stage burn, anunexpected high level thrust oscillation of the center erigiiie causedthat engine to cut off about 2 minutes and 12 seconds early. Theremaining four engines burned about 34 seconds longer than planned,to make up part of the deficit. To make up the remainder of therequired velocity, the launch vehicle computer extended the thirdstage orbital insertion burn approximately 9 seconds longer thanplanned. With the third stage propellant remaining, we still had acapability to perform the translunar injection burn with a perforni-ance margin twice that which we normally require. This burn wasinitiated on schedule arid end conditions were nominal for translunarcoast . Subsequent docking and extraction of the lunar module fromthe launch vehicle third stage were performed without difficulty.

PROBLEMS NOTED 54 HOURS INTO MISSIONAbout 31 hours into tho mission, a prcmission planned trajectoryshift was performed. This shift took the spacecraft from a trajectorywhich would fly around thc. moon and back to earth, to a trajectorywhich woiild requirc a subsc~qucntmaneuver to perform a lunar flybyand rrturn to earth. The purpose of the transfer was t o optimize theconditions o f time, velocity, and hcight above thr lunar surface uponarrival at thc moon. At about 54jh hours into the mission, thc Corn-mandcr and liinar modulc pilot moved into the lunar module to per-form % planned trarisfcr of equipment from the command module andpreliminary examination of thv l u n a r module. Shortly thereafter,while thc crewmen were closing out the lunar modulc, Astronaut Lovt!llcalled niissioii control to report '(We've got a problem here. Initialindications of the anomaly were a warning light indicating an under-voltngc o i l onc of the command module spacecraft electrical buses andindiceation of loss of all pressure in one of the two liquid oxygen storagevessels, followed shortly thcrcaftw by tt loss of two of the threo fuelcells.Until this particular probltm occurred, the mission had been pro-ceeding in nearly a trouble-frcc rnt1niier. Insofar as we have been ableto dctcrminr thus far, thcrc wcw no early indications that the oxygensystem was other than normal c3xcq)t for the quantity indicator goingoff scale high approxirnatcly 9 hours bcfore the incident. Following theindications that w o had a problem, tho immediate requirement was tostabilize 1he situation t o allow time to plari subsequent courses ?f: d o n . Mr. Glynri Liinrioy will discuss these actions in more detrtillatcr.hi a(-cordance with our generid jmtctice, t~ large niiniber of con-tractor systems personnel were providing direct support to the mission

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6a t all times. I n order to bring all available resources to bear, we im-mediately requested the major spicecraft con tractors, their subcon-tractors arid vendors, to augment this uroiind-the-c.lock support. Theresponse of o u r industrial tlnd university team working with theGovernnient team during this very dern:inding time was most helpfuland gratifying .With regard to the incident. itself and its cause, our immediatearialyticnl efforts during the mlssion were concentrated only on theanalysis necessary to deterrnine effects or delayed effects on othersystems. O u r prime objective was to ensure that t~llnecessary actionwas being taken to bring the astronauts back to earth as qulckly aspossible with the least imposed additional risk.

INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION

Upon completion of the successful recovery of t,he astronauts, theApollo program immediately initiated an intensive investigation ofthe cause of the incident and possible remedial measures. Since lastFriday afternoon, a team of Government, industry, and universitypersonnel have assembled at the Manned Spacecraft Center and arereviewing and tinalyzing all data.Allhough it is too early at this time to provide you with conclusiveresults, the preliminary assessment of the problem and systemsinvolved has caused us to focus our attention on N o. 2 oxygen tankand its associated hardware.If I might have viewgraph No. 1, I will attempt to orient it here.This is the overall view of the command and service module. Thearea right in here-and I will have another viewgraph o n that-is thebay of the section we are interested in. You will see fuel cells on thetop, you see oxygen tanks in the center, and hydrogen tanks at thebase. (See fig. 1.)

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM

- + Y

ECS RADIATORS

EPS RADIATORS

Figure I


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7In the next viewgraph this model is a blown up scale of that samesector. Here we see two of the three fuel cells, the third one behindthese two. We see oxygen tank N o . 2 and No. 1. N o . 2 is the one whichhud our ariorrialous condition. Then here we see the hydrogen tanks.(See fig. 2.)

SERVICE MODULE [SECTOR IV]

L 4

Figure 2


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8The next viewgraph is the' cutaway of the oxygen tank itself. It is25 inches in diameter. It has the capacity of 330 pounds of oxygen.We have two of these aboard. We normally operate ti t pressure of870 t o 930 pounds per square inch. It is made of steel, vtLcuum jacketed,has an inner rtnd outer liner of very high quality steel. Within the tank,we have tin element here called a heating element itrid two fan motors.Th e purpose of the heating element is to introduce energy.to con-tiiine causing the oxygen to remain at the pressure we need in orderto feed t h a t t o the fuel cells. The fan motors are t,iirned on on commandt o give $1 1)roper mix of the oxygen within the tank. This quantityserihor is th e one I referred to, that did go off scale high :q)proxirnrttely9 hours prior to the incident, and there is a tenipernture sensor here.This is a very simplified diagram, showing the tank basicdly, theheating elerrieiit and the sensors, itnd I will discwss those with theanomtilous situation and our telemetry system. (See fig. 3 . )

OXYGEN TANK

D I A M E T E R - 25 I N C H E SC A P A C I T Y - 33 0 L B S 02N O R M A L P R E S S UR F870 - 930 P S I

Figure 3We have a trernendoiis amount of information on the ground thatwe did receive. A11 t h a t can be now analyzed with very accurute timecorrelation. ' h e preliminary data now shows time correlation ofevents. 1 liave extrtictetl just a fen here to shon the indication that wenow have of where our problem occurred.At 55 hours and 53 niinutes ground elapsed time, or 10:06 easternstaiidard time, April 1 3 , we see that the oxygen tank fans lire turnedon. At 5 5 : 5 3 : 2 2 ,we hnve a high current spike, fuel cell N o. 3 . This


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9fuel cell is responding t o a demand for current from somewhere. Thedenii~ridis improper or t in uriomuly. We see that 14 seconds later,there is a rise in the pressure of oxygen tank 2; some 2 seconds later,we see another current or rather, an electrical disturbance. This wasan 11.3-volt drop on our alternating current bus N o. 2 . What is sig-nificapt about N o. 2 is it is feeding the power on fan and intake No. 2 .There we see a correlation of a voltage drop, a current spike, and apressure rise.From there, we have another high current spike on the same fuelcell 3 seconds later.Four seconds later, we saw a temperature rise; we have been leftwith an anomaly of about 190' Fahrenheit. This continued to risefrom there.At this time, 55 :54 :45, \\re have the maximum recorded pressure.The maximum recorded pressure was not sufficient itself to burst thetank . However, it is recording pressure just prior to release.At 55:54:53 seconds we have measurable spacecraft motion. Thiswas measured by the guidance system. It is at that time we believethat the tank ruptured, exactly there. The tank pressure read zero3 seconds later.And at 55:55:20 plotted Astronaut Love11 reported "I believe wehave a problem here." (See fig. 4.)

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

GROUND EASTERNELAPSED TIME STANDARD TIMEAPRIL 13, PM55:5355:53:2255:53:3655:53:3855:53:4155:53:4555:54:4555:54:5355:54:5655:55:20

10:0610:06:221006:3610:06:3810:06:411 006:4510:07:45

10:07:5310:07:5610:08:20

EVENT

OXYGEN TANK FA NS TURNED ONHIGH CURRENT SPIKE, FUEL C ELL #3OXYGEN TANK 82 PRESSURE RISE11.3 VOLT TRANSIENT, AC BUS #2HIGH CURRENT SPIK E, FU EL CE LL #3OXYGEN TANK #2 TEMPERATURE RISEOXYGEN TANK # 2 MAXIMUM RECOR DEDPRESSUREMEASURABLE SPA CECR AFT MOTION

OXYGEN TANK #2 PRESSURE ZEROLOVELL "I BELIEVE WE HAVE A PROBLEMHERE"

Figure 4The next slide, please.This picture which is very difficult, to make out-it has been blownul)-is one of the photographs the usi,ronauts did bring buck. Thisarea right up here is the area of interest. This is the same bay we werelooking ut earlier. T h e r e are tjvo fuel cells here, the hydrogen tankshere. Right about in here is where oxygen tank 2 had been. We aregoing through the technique of enhancing these photographs and feelwe can learn much from them. O ur primary reliance will have to beon telemetry data. (See fig. 5 .)


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Figure 5All of these indicators must, of course, be ex2imiiied in greaterdetail. One conclusion that we can (Irtiw, primarily becctuse of theelectrical anomalies and pressure anti temperature rise just prior tothe N o . 2 oxygen tank fnilure, is that this event \vas riot caused bya meteorite. From the preliminary examination it does iippear thatthe observed rapid rise in oxygen tank No. 2 pressure would require

an amount of heat much greater than that produc$ed from electricalcurrent flow for the tank fans, heaters, and instrumentation operation.This does not rule out electrical power as a source of init iation forsome other energy source as yet unde1,ermined. Analysis and testshave been and are being conducted to tleterrriirie whsit such an energysource could be and how it could have been initiated.EXPECT EARLY RESOLUTION OF PRORLEM

I n parallel with the above analysis, intensive effort is underwiry todetermine what corrective wtions might be taken to modify theoxygen system rind associateti hardware to eliniinate the possiblecause or causes that led to the oxygen tank failure. Final action mus tawait the completion of the failure investigation.I am confident that the actions currently underway will lead to anearly resolution of the problem that caused the termination of theApollo 13 mission.I would like to conclude my remarks with a few comments on theperformance of the Apollo hardware and the flight anti ground crew.The actions taken to bring Apollo 13 safely home demonstrated under


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11extremely adverse conditions the inherent flexibility that has beendeveloped into the Apollo systems and operations. The flexibility ofthe spacecraft systems provided us with many different options fromwhich we selected a series of configurations in meeting the varyingrequirements on the trip home. This long, arduous voyage continuouslypresented the challenge to balance tlie spacecraft systems required toperform necessary functions against the availability of consumablesof water, electrical power, oxygen, and the lithium hydroxide toremove the carbon dioxide. The options available to flight and groundcrews in every case permitted acceptable courses of action to beselected. During this emergency situation, the remaining systemsperformed in an outstanding manner in meeting the unusual demandsplaced upon them. A t the same time, the flight and ground crewsdemonstrated exceptional competence in meeting a set of unusualcircumstances.

I n the preparation cycle for each Apollo mission, much of the flightand ground crew effort is spent in reviewing and improving the plansand established procedures to handle contingency situations. Verifi-cation of and proficiency in handling these procedures is developedthrough simulations involving the flight crew in spacecraft simulatorsand the flight controllers at their consoles in the Mission ControlCenter. However, the depth to which this contingency effort canproceed must be limited to some practical bound. The point 1mustemphasize is tha t the mission planning and training develops not onlyspecific contingency procedures, brit much more importantly, a teamof people with the capability to respond to unexpected events duringmanned space missions. T o show how this capahilitiy was employed,M r. Glynn Lunney will summarize the actions taken by this teamwhich resulted in a successful recovery of Apollo 13 1 week ago today.STATEMENT OF GLYNN S. LUNNEY, APOLLO 13 MISSION DIRECTOR

Mr. IJUNNEY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, per-sonally, as ~t member or a represmtativr of the Mission ControlCeritcr team, and that is a lot of rncn arid women, 1would like to thankthe committee for the opportunity to report on how WI: conducted theApollo 13 flight. I would like to profacc my remarks by referring t othe status that we are in in the rourse of the Apol lo program today.We have had a number of flights; we have had a number of flights t othe moon. The Apollo 9 flight was the first flight where we had a mancheck out the luriar module, and that was done in oarth orbit lastwinter. We hitd a series of tests conducted to first verify th at thc lunarmodule would do its j o b at the n10011,arid secondly, we operated in anumber o f fashions, the applicatio~isof which lent themselves to tlieproblem t hat we had in Apollo 1 3 .

The CHAIRMAN.Mr. Lunney?

LUNAR MODULE AS LIFEBOATSecondly, when we started flying to thr moon with the lunar moduleon Apollo 10, wc recognized tha t thc lunar module ship providedlifeboat facility for thc astronauts in case wc got into serious prob-lems. Wc have paid it lot of attention to that in our planning. We made


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12a number of preparations. Most of the preparations are prepared in ageneral sense and it is difficult to try to cover all of the cases on theway out and the way back. Bu t we had pu t the personnel through thediscipline in thinking that out in order t o respond to that kind ofproblem were we ever to run into one.

With those remarks, let me go through what will of necessity herethis morning be a rather sketchy outline of what we were gojng throughin the control center. Then I think you will hear from the pilots pointsof view how this worked out.The first slide (fig. 6) very simply describes the mission we werein. I n earth to moon, we were on the familiar figure 8 maneuver. Wewere on this trajectory called hybrid transfer maneuver, the dottedline-we had left the free-return trajectory, which is the dashed line-around the moon and back to earth . Tho st art of tho problem occurredabout 180,000 miles away from the earth, at about 55 hours, 55 min-utes. (See fig. 7.)


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13

/

Figure 6

IIci09b un3ccdIa

44-195 0-70-3


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55:55

57:3758:1058:40

61:X63:ZO

14S U M M A R Y O F EV EN TS ( 1OF 2 )

" 1 B E L I E V E WE ' V E H A D A P R OB L E M H ER E"V A R I O U S S T A G E S OF A C T I V I T Y

C R EW E N TR Y I N TO L U N A R M O D U L ETR A NS FE R GU I D A N C E A L IGN M E N T TO L U N A R M OD U L EC O M M A N D M O D U L E PO WER D O W ND ECD EC

S I O N . E X E C U T I O N OF M ID CO UR SE FOR FREE RETURNS I O N ON PROJECTED OVERALL FL IGHT PLAN

Figure 7S U M M A R Y OF EVENTS

Very briefly, a summary of events from that time on. It started witha report of the problom from tho astronauts . What I have summarizedfor you here are a number of steps tha t we have consitlerect iinportmtones, both in tleciding things and cxcwuting things that have had to bepcrforrned to successfully complctc the flight.After the problem, which went through a series of stages tha t couldbe described us an increasing awareness of the extent of the problemand the seriousness of it, in about an hour and a half, both t h e groundcontrollers and the crew had decided that it was time. to go into thelunar module to prepare tha t ship for the lifeboat technique which \vchad discussed over the years in preparing for these flights, as I saidearlierWe also did, something else shortly after the crew entry into thelunar module which transferred the guidance idinement from thecommarid module into the lunar module. We actually used some o f theprecious buttery power to do thtit, but we felt that if we did, thtLt wehad something which would then permit the pilots to d o propulsion.We were not on a free-return path flight to the earth so we did want toget a platform alinement.A t about 58:40 we powered down the corrimantl module. The oxygenwas about gone and we turned off the power drawn from the commandmodule batteries to stkve them for the return portion of the flight.We had a number of courses available to us. W e actually had thelunar module powered up. We could do n miticourse relatively soon i in t lget biwk on a free return. We did have one option hic.h did not getvery serious consideration. It h t i t i to d o with tloiiig t~ direct return : ibortto the eitrth, but t h a t would have required :L trenieritloiir > m o u n t of


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15velocity of the engine. The only engine we had that could provide th atwas the service propiilsion engine arid it would have required droppingthe lunar module. So that option was quickly deleted from ourdiscussions.The other option we had was to power down immediately since wewere concerned about the amount of power and water the commandmodule was using. We accepted the opportunity we had at hand andthat was to do a midcourse maneuver relthvely soon, get back on freereturn and plan a lit tle more leisurely how we wanted to manage theremaining consumables in the lunar module. We decided to executeth at at midcourse at about 61 hours m d 30 minutes and address theproblem of what would be ou r plan for the rest of the way back.By about 2 hours from that time, we had gone through a series ofdiscussions both in the Control Center and with the pilots in deter-mining what our projected ovorall flight plan would be.

Next slide. (See fig. 8.) Very simply, after tho star t of the problem,wc did tho rnidcorirsr to frce-rcturn to tho earth a t about 6ljh hours.Wo now had a trajectory established-again i t was the dark onc-back to the earth. We did huvr. a number of ninneuvcring oppor-tririitics in order to improw both the time it was to take to return totho cwth urid tho area in the carth to which wo would return. Oneof thosc opportunitios is labeled up there, PC+2. That ciescribes anopportunity 2 hours aftor periconter, at the closest approach to them o o n , which wus one of the techniques that we would have used if wohad to do an abort during tho interim orbit. We had two midcoursecorrections scheduled, midcourso 5 and midcourse 7 . There is no mid-coursso scheduled six, because generally it occurs between those twoand we did not do th at in our budget scheduling.


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STARTOFPROBLEM(55:55)

\MCCTOFREE-RETURN(61:30)

m ti CE

FORENTRY

CORRIDOR

FORPACIFIC

CORRIDOR

0FREE-RETURN(61:30)

FO

(137:40)-

\

(79:28)

2


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17CONSUMABLE STATUS

Next slide. (See fig. 9.) This is an important set of facts bu t thereis a lot more that needs to be said than those facts up there. TheC O N S U M A B L E S T A T U S

A V A I L A B L E A 1L M E NT RY

WATER, POUNDS 324

P OW E R, A M P H O U R S 2 1 8 1

OXYGEN , P O U N D S 50.3

R E M A I N I N G ATL M JE TT

28. 2

410

28.5

C02 R E M O V A L , H O U R SL M 5 8 ( 5 U N I T S ) 22

C S M 1 5 6 ( 1 3 U N I T S ) 108-TOTAL 130

Figure 9chart describes the amount of water, power, oxygen, and carbondioxide removal capability we ha.d in the lunar module a t entry andwhat we had remaining when we jettisoned the lunar module.One point I would like to mention is when we made o u r rojectionat about 7 hours after the problem occurred, we ended the light witha set of consumables which were within about 2 percent of what wepredicted back a t 63 hours. So the view we took of the mission a t 63hours held very well.We stuck to the plan that we had. We used only the power and thewater and the oxygen that we had forecast and we were very closeto predictions made almost 80 hours earlier.

The second point is that although this does show that we arerunning down to 28 pounds of water, we had not employed anotherseries of procedures which could have been used to further stretchthe consumables on board the lunar module. By that I mean we keptthe lunar module communication system, the telemetry system, theenvironmental control system up all the way back. If the consumableposture we were in had worsened or if we had absorbed anotherfailure in some of these areas like an oxygen tank, we would have had


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18to resort to scheduling communications times with the crew and goneon what we call a duty cycle operation, where we might turn theequipment on for 10 minutes or 20 minutes out of every hour. I onlysay that to give assurance that although we were probably wlthin12 hours to 24 hours of running out of our most critical consumable,which was water, had we proceeded into this other set of proceduresentailing dut y cycling the communications gear on board, we probablycould have stretched that further.The third point I would make was that with the lunar moduleenvironmental ,control system running full time, we knew th at wewould deplete the canisters in the lunar module which are used toremove the carbon dioxide from the air f o r the astronauts to breathe.We knew we had to find some way to use the CSM canisters in themodule. There were a number of ways to do that. We finally selectedthe method represented by this configuration on my right. This is acanister designed to withdraw carbon dioxide by drawing the oxygenthrough it. This is LL hose from the lunar module (indicating). This isconnected to the lunar module ship and the fan; the compressor in thelunar module sucks the oxygen through there and cleanses it as itcomes through.That plan having been agreed upon, we then had a number ofoptions for the maneuver that we were to perform 2 hours afterpassing behind the moon. The options were about, three. One, wecould have decided to try to come back in the absolute minimumtime by dropping the service module, thus getting rid of about50,000 pounds of weight. This would htLve enabled us to get a lotmore velocity with the LM engine m d would have eriubled us t oreturn to earth sooner. However, we discarded that on the basis ofthe unknown thermal environment, the command module heatshield and the command module control system, propellant anti jetcontrol system we use for entry, would be in if we jettisoned theservice module. Those systems are essentially at the lower end ofthe module and they are protected by the command module beingattached. To remove it would have endangered the all-importantheat shield for entry.

The second option we would have had would have been to tryto land in the Atlantic. We would have been able to land about 9hours earlier than we did. Th e problem with that was we would haveused essentially all the propellants in the descent tank to accomplishthat and it would not have allowed us to make the midcourse cor-rections subsequent to that posture. Second, there was the recoveryposture we were in in the Atlantic. You know there was a fair amountof work going on to see what would have been arranged in the Atlantic.We would have certainly had a lot of aircraft and people to recoverthe module. There were a lot of ships going in the urea. However,that option was also discarded because we would have run the lunarmodule propellant out. We chose to go on to the Pucific at a spttsh-down time of 79 hours, to almost 143 hours.(See fig 10).


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19S U M M A R Y OF EVENTS (CONCL'D 2 OF 2 )

70.28 D E C I S I O N , E X E C U T I O N OF M A N E U V E R 2 H O U R S A F T E R C L O S E S T A P P R O A C HT O M O O N ( P C + 2 )

94:OO1OO:OO

C A R B O N D I O X I D E S U C CE S SF U LL Y R EM O VE D W I T H C S M C A N I S T E R F I XS I M U L A T O R - V E R I F I E D C H E C K L I S T R E A D U P F OR M C C B U R N A T 105:18

105: 18 M I D C O U R S E C O R R E C T I O N F OR E N TR Y C O R R I D O R126:15 S I M U L A T O R - V E R I F I E D C H E C K L I S T R E A D U P FO R E NT RY P H A S E133:35 B E G I N L U N A R M O D U L E P OW ER U P F OR E N T R Y P R E P A R A T I O N S142:54 SPASHDOWN

Figure 10The carbon dioxide was removed from the canister here. We used

111) what sounded to the outside world like more numbers. We read up achecklist which was verified in the simulator by other sets of astro-nau ts j list running around the clock to perform the Inidcourse correc-tions we performed with the secondary guidance system. We had tod ine i t with the unique power stbvirig technique that we had to discusswith Captain Lovell. It worked very well. The midcourse was burneda t 105:18 approximately. The other checklist was read up a t about 126hours. You now recall at this stage of the flight, we were approachingthe entry phase where we had, one, a lunar module with us that wewanted to use as long as possible. Two, we had a service modulewhich was essentially impowered which we had to jettison. We also atsome point had to jettison the lunar module. Third, we had a verycritical or short supply of power in the command module and we couldonly stand a short number of hours in the command module with thepilots getting the vehicle ready for entry before we actually did enter.We also wanted to keep the tasks and the time length for the astro-nauts as simple as we possibly could. Those kinds of thoughts were inthe work tha t we (lid, the check lists we got for the simulator and thechecklists we read up. The other powers were for entry and splash-down.

SEQUENCE FOR ENTRYNext slide (fig. 1 1 ) gives yoti an idea of the sequence for entry.We have the LM power up; the midcourse correction. We jettisoned

the service module behind us. We have the command service modulepower up. 'I'his time we transferred the equipment from the lunarmodule to the command module. Later we jettisoned the lunar module.The entry altitude and attitude was reached and the landing was aspredicted a t 1425 4 .


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ENTRYATTITUDE

CSMPOWERUP

G.E.T.137:40

21

Fm w r

SMJETTISON

LMPOWERUP

G.E.T.138:Ol

G.E.T.141:30

G.E.T.133:35

I

G.E.T.142:54

ip--


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21Next came the splashdown, which I guess for the people in ourThat concludes my remarks.The CHAIRMAN.Now we are going to have a chance to meet anold friend. Captain Lovell, I hope you and Mr. Swigert will start byrising and facing the people in the audience.

STATEMENTS OF ASTRONAUTS JAMES A. LOVELL, COMMANDER OFAPOLLO 13;AND POHN L. SWIGERT JR., COMMAND MODULE PILOT{OFAPOUO 13Astronaut LOVELL.Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members ofthe committee. [Applause.]Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thought today that

Jack and I would informally tell you what went on in the spacecraftduring the flight of Odyssey and Aquarius. Dr . Petrone and GlynnLunney have covered pretty thoroughly all the varied details. Butthere were certain emotional factors and techniques which I thoughtmight be interesting to you.Actually, the flight began several says before we lifted off. Thisflight was somewhat unusual in the fact that we had a rather minorcrisis in the crew at the time. One of our backup crew members camedown with the measles and in examining the primary crew, we foundout that Lt. Comdr. Ken Mattingly was susce tible to the disease.I t was quite a dramatic decision that we shoulcfnot fly Ken, in casehe did come down with the disease during the flight. We then lookeda t the backup crew-and Jack was backup. In the last 2 days prior tothe flight, Jack, Fred Haise, and myself worked close together-tobe sure that we did work as a team. T o prepare for space flights, it isvery difficult for the backup and the prime crews to get togetherbecause there are so many details to take care of ourselves that crosstraining is somewhat limited. But I am happy to report that as wemade the decision to go in April with Jack, Jack did an outstandingjob and we are very proud of how he worked in with the prime team.

business has to be one of the most beautiful sights in the world.

R E P O R T OF LOW M O R A L E C O M P L E T E L Y F A L S EThere was one other aspect to o u r training which I would like toreport. It had been mentioned previously that I thought the moraleat the Cape was low and that I was worried about the booster and thespacecraft and the people therc. This is completely false. I think oneof the little sidelights, one of the little jobs that we have as a crewbesides training for ourselves is to go around and talk to the peoplethere. I am happy to report that the crew people, the su port team,

conipetely behind us and completely enthusiastic about the approach-ing flight. I had no qualms whatsoever on April 11 to step in tha tspacecraft and undertake the mission.I would like to set the scene as we saw it from the spacecraf? a tjust about 55 hours, as Dr. Petrone had mentioned. Up to that t!me,our flight was rather normal. We tiad proceeded along the fllghtplan and were actually ahead of it. So we requested from ground con-trol to enter the lunar module Aquarius 3 hours earlier. There

everybody that was connected with the flight of ApolPo 13, were

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22was some work that Fred Hake and I had to do and we were alsoscheduled to turn on oiir television to show the people back homeon the grorrnd some interior photography of the vehicles. We haddone that. We were just completing our television work. I hatl beeno erating the camera. I was moving back tlirough the tunnel, and&ed was still in the lrinar module, just about ready to close thehatch. Jack was in the (*ommaridmodule on the left,-hantl seat, whenwe heard a rather large explosion.I n the testing of a lunar module, there is a valve which we actuateduring this procedure which also gives oiit this slime loud noise. I hadforgotten the amount of imise from this vtilve which rather iinriervetliis a bit. We thought perhaps this \\its a repent of the same test.Brit i t tiirnetl oiit, as I SRW Freds face u s he looked cio\vi1 through thetunnel, th at he had nothing to (lo with this explosion.About that time, I looked a t Jack. Jack s tarted to see s o m e of thewarning lights come on and I think that I will let Jack explain whathe saw a t that time.

S U M M A R 1 2 ES ACTION AFTER EXPLOSIONAstronaut SWIGEET.Mr. Chairman and members of thc committee,shortly after the explosion-of course, in s~)acc ,there is no air, sothere is no sourid ; the sound itself was transmitted by thc structurc.Since I was attached to thc seat with a lap belt, I did! fcel a smallshudder with the explosion. At about 2 swonds thereafter, \VC had timaster alarm arid a main bus-B undervoltage light which comes onwhen the main bus gocs under 263: volts. I had some immediatc con-cern becausc we had an iinexplained problem at thc main bus duringtesting. I transmitted that we had a problem and immediately gotover to the right-hand seat to look a t tho readings of the voltage rindthe current.At this time, the main bus voltage was iiormal. The current was lo IVand fuel cell 3 was normal, which indicated to me that whatever itwas, it was transitory.At that time, being a command module pilot, I had an awful lot offaith in the command motlulc t i n t 1 I thought i t WLS in the TihI. Thcywere sitting in there without a hatch. So 1 said, Jim, wc ht~tlbct tcrget tho hatch in arid then lets sit back i d take :L look a t what I\ chave.I started preparations to install the hatch, which is in the commnndmodule to close off the tunnel area. Fred Hake hatl come clown fromthe tunnel a t this time arid looked into his seat over on the right him1side arid began looking at the remaining indicators. At this time,main bus B voltage was off scale low, so i t was somewhere less, than 23volts. The current was zero a n c l the fuel cell 3 was zero, which gaveindication t ha t fiiel cell 3 hti t l stopped putting o u t and we indeed had

no voltage and no current on main bus B.Shortly thereafter, as Fred started transferring wrne of the loadfrom that bus onto our remaining good hiis, lie l i d a main bit5 Arindervoltnge. This c-tiiisetl him to look I L t the fiiel rells thrtt werepowering the main bus A , fuel cells 1 and 2 . H e did notice that o i l fuelcell 1, the flow was also zero.


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to the lunar modulo and u se these thrusters. Wo had practicccl this,fortunately, in our training and found o u t that with the termination ofa translation controller, which is normally used to niovc th c luntirmodule in the translation, plus t hr atti tude controllcr, we could cmtrolthis cntire stack. Remember now that we have a servico module thathad almost ful l fuel plus the reaction control system or attitude thatwas almost in full fuel.Our first burn with thc hclp of tho ground was surcessful. Wc wcrcback o n frcc return. At the same time, we were trying to tlctcrminojust how much in thc I\ tty of consumablcs \vo hat1 on board tho s l ~ i c e -craft. This was a problem that concerned me. I kne\v that if this engineworked properly, we could make it back as far as the trajectory w a ~ :concerned, because w o had clono this beforo in simnliition arid cJimMcDivitt arid tho crew on Apollo 9 had tictually tctstcd this out. Rut Idid riot havo at my fingrrtips at the momcrit just horn much consum-ables we hatl on board and whether we could lust the return voyagc.Again thc ground came through. They computed for us, and I mustgive Fred Hake some credit, too, because hc hatl in th e back of hismind what the situation was arid he thought hc would kchonest by checking out to see what we actually had to soc whuthcrthe ground was going to give us tho t r u o figure or not. When Frcd saidthat we had about an hour to spare, I felt a little bit more relieved.Our second milestone was just after wo passed th e moon and we gotto within 130 or 140 miles of the lunar surface. As we went throughthe back side, even with the emergency going on-and since I hadbeen there before, I was anxious to get this second maneuver out ofthe way-but Jack arid Fred managed to pick up a few more photo-graphs fo r scientific development and exploration. So I finally had toturn them away from the windows so we could get on with the burn.The second burn was important because it increased o r decreasedthe time of transit from the moon back to the earth. Again, we usedthe descent propulsion engine. A t this time, since Jack had completelypowered down the command module, he was the third member aboardthe LM and helped us out in our maneuvers as we lit off the engineand made a very successful automatic burn to decrease our time corn-ing home.Jack, why dont you comment a few minutes o n just what ourenvironmental system was as wo tried to power down the lunarmodule?

C O M M EN T S ON E N V I R O N M E N T A L S Y S T E MAstronaut SWIGERT.Let me just state now, we have an activnvehicle up here, completely passive around here [indicating]. One ofthe things that was unusual is that when you are right side up in thelunar module, you arc upside down in the command module. S o whenyou go from one area to another, there is a period of acclirnitizat>ion.The lunar niodulr with its systems powcred was warm. W r of coursehad no power in the corriniaritl modiilc anti as tirnc wcrit on, it keptgetting colder and colder. We tiid use the command module for slccpingfor the first 2 days. It allows you a placo to strctch o u t , i t has sleeprestraints that you can attach to tho spacecraft structure. uritl thesleeping accommodations were very comfortable until i t got too coldfor sleeping. Then we were all together in a group in the lunar module,as crowded as i t was.


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25One of the critical consumablcs was the water, and we were j u s tnot going to use any of our TAMwater because, as precious as i t was,

W P at lcast wanted to get back. So with the help of tho ground, wedevised a procedure for cxtracting the water from the portable tankin tho command module. This wc did.We atc fairly well. We used juice bags for our water and I wouldgo up them and would take 10 or 20 juice bags and fill them up asfull as I could and storc thcm away until tho oxygen pressure ranout. About 24 hours prior to the ent,ry, we ran out of water in theportable tank in the command module.W e had sufficient other food in what would be called wet packs,which are small packages of hot dogs and beef arid gravy and thingslike that , which also afforded somc moisture as well as food.We had arnplc cubes and squares of gingerbread and fruitcake,things like that, which wore also solid food.We did find that conditions did get a little bit-wt? rcferred to thecommand niodulc and its combination-wc had a two-room suitehere. We refcrred to the command module as the bedroom for awhileuntil it got too cold. Thcn we startcd calling it the refrigerator. Thetemperature upon entry of tho command module wtis 38 arid whenwc laridcd was still a comfortablc 50 if you call that comfortable.One of tho problcnis wc had was gcttirig the lithium hydroxidecanister modification. We havc a picturc of that . I do not knowwhether it has been rcleased but it shows thc modification that looksexactly like what you scc hem. Thc ground read us up tho instructionsand Ji m and I constructed it arid it worked perfectly. It reduced thepartial pressure of carbon dioxide from 734 millimeters down to %O ofa millimeter in 2J4 hours. It will show you the resourcefulness of theground and the vcrsatility we havc and I guess good old Yankeeingcnuity.One of the things we also had-that I do not think was men-tioned-that we dkcussed as crew mcmbers using, in conjunctionwith the ground, was the portablo life support systems, the backpacks that thc crcw wears on lunar surface. Those two back packs didhavo a supply of oxygon.. They did havc li thium hyclroxidr canistersand they did havc electrical power and fans for circulating oxygen.So we did discuss the possibility of using these to supplement theconsumablcs th at we had on board.I think that p ret ty well covers it .

EMPLOYS APOLLO 8 TECHNIQUEAstronaut LOVELL.As we were becoming accustomed to theenvironment, rubbing our hands together, putting on our lunarboots to keep our feet warm-I never thought we wquld be using them

for tha t purpose--me had a third maneuver coming up. After thesecond maneuver, we found out that the angle for hitting the earthsatmosphere was still not sufficient. The ground was tracking us. Theycontinued to give 11sthe procedures f o r this third maneuver. The thirdmaneuver was different, however, because we were powered down,essentially a dead spacecraft except for communications, except forthe life support system, particularly the air and oxygen pumpskeeping things cool. Back in Apollo 8, when we were not too sureabout a lunar voyage and all the ramifications that might occur, we


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26looked at the way-out procedures which, iii case all W:LS los t , could gelthe crew buck. Thirlgs like you never give ul), you j u s t keep tryirig.One of them \\-as if you lost the phtforni, hen- could I\ e make arnaneuver to change the mgle of enlry to make the t~iiglesafe. Thismaneuver consisted of maneuvering the iticecraft with :itt itnde l oline u p with the earths terrninntor, n h 11 WILS ti h:uidy referericesystem. Back in Apollo 8 , ulthough 1 leariled it very astutely iindremembered it, 1 never thought in :dl the n o r l d that I I\ ould ever1i:ive to use a technique of this nature. So when they cdled u p and stkid,Do you remember the technique back in Apollo 8 :md why not mei t for this maneuver? we did. We Inaiieuvered the pacec craft. At 1,hi.;time, we had a three-man team all helping t o make this intineiiver,which was strictly n manual one u ~ i dit changed the angle for u s tohelp make the entry.The ground WLS hclpful in other \\:iys.Wc h I b:ittoricis 011 bourtlthe spacecraft that were weak. Tlicy provitlcti i i s with i~ proccdurcthat we had never heard of before, to rrchargc~thc btLttt*ricsfrom thcLM power system. This, of coiirsc, liclpctl to powcr L I ~tlic cornniantlmodule earlier fo r reentry. The l as t 5 hours ~ v e\ v ( w fillctl \\it11 tech-niques and procedures. I requested that the ground come up with pro-cedures that we could, in our rather fatigued stat(>,(lo sufficiently aridaccurately to makc sure that \\re did not makc any mistakes. Thcywere very responsive. W c got these procd\ircs and, in the last 5 ho\irs,we w ~ n tthrough an aliricmcnt of the LM, tho srrvicc motlulc jettison,in which w e were able to get sornc photographs of t h c tlarnagcd area,arid then pow.cr up of thr corninand ~iiodiilr,Lit n hich tirnc I rcniuincclin the lunar rriodule and I could wc t h e earth getting biggclr arid biggrr.If you are familiar with this littlc drvic(>,thc lunar motlulc is t~ veryfragile m ach iric.Then aftcr the conini:~iidmotlulc IC iis po\vclrctl u p t ~ n t l \\ (h couldactually got an alincment, in which Jack did gct a fiiic aliricmcnt, Iwent hack through thc tunnel, closcd off thc niodulc~.w r jettisonedthe lunar module, and rniidc u normal reentry.

SHOWS FILM O F S P A C E C l t A F T INTERIOHI mould n t this time likc to show you soin( of the movies which ivch ad taken on the interior. Remember, no \\, that most of thc film wr hadon board wtts for our ~ I ~ I ~ I L I cxploration \\ ork ant1 i v r tlctrrmiricd t h i L f\v c woultl h a v ~plciity of film on botird. Wc wantcd t o show yori sonicof the living conditions abroad this particrilur spticcc.rtdt co1lfigiir:itioii.1might add that wvo flew the spacecraft i i i foiir cwnfigiir:itions, whichI d o not think has bccn done bcforc. Thc cwrnplctc stack. Whc.ii \\ (Lgot done with thc servicc rriodule, w c flew tho comrntiritl rnotlulr rindthe lunar module togethrr. Then aftor m c got through \vitli th c lunarmodule, i t was thc cornmarid motlnle. And prior to tho :tctual docking,we flew the command and service rnodulc, t hew two togcthcr, so ~ ( 1had quite a combination of cxpericnccs in flying.If I could have that movic now, I coiild show you sorric. of our in-house conditions.(A short movie is shown.)


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27Astronant LOVELL.I might tidd that our launch was as normal aswe coiiltl expect, except for the one engine malfunction which l h .Petrone has rnentioned. 111tt s f o r t u n d e enough t o be ab le to participatein tw o launches with the Sutrirn V. 1 urn dways arnwetl at the accuracy:mIthe way th:it the simiilation5 that we conditct tLre very similar to

th e :wtiial perforrnance of the vehicle itself.Ast,roiiiLiit SwIGExrr. This is :L shot of t l ic. cornrnaiicl rnodiilc coiningbtwk into dock with t h c lunar modal( . booster combination. You wills ( v t h c b shadow of th t coinmmd motli i lc as i t (onies :lcross, puts thc~)robcinto thc. groove.A s t r o n a u t T ~ O V E L L . This is :iftrr the. ticdrrit, in tlic lunnr niodnlc.\170u C U I L s w things grtti iig cliiitc. Iic~ tic.Iliat bag \\.USoriginrdlyclcAgncd to s t o u watc.r from tliv lifc sripport systrm. I t is now bringtitilizrd to s t or(. iirinc, bec*tusri t (1 \VCIY n o t dumping ;bny ovcrboiwd.Brcd is in his normal slwp position in t h e luiitw rnodulr. T h e trm-pcraturc is gcttirig quitc low m t l lic h:is his h i d tiickcd tiway.Ruck in t l ic t r inncl is Jack. Hv 11 :is d s o slccpirig.Astroniiut~SWIGERT.Hrrr nrci w r n c shots of f o o d . Wc mcnt this tiinch\vith somc spoon-bowl matcrid in which i w hiid somc1 adhesive m n t c -r i d that would stick to t l r r spoon aiid riot float >t\v:iy.Ihnt had som(1oft h e gravy iri it, I think.Astronant L O V E L L .I tricd to point out that lithiiini hydroxidc cx-I)cricncc. Tti:it bag in buck o f J i m s clhow tlicrcb-- you will br nblc. toscc tho crisscross taping. During most of our flight, \ye wcrc in tin iin-controlled rotat ional modc to k w p tlir sunlight ovcii o n the vcliiclc fort cmlwr>~turc~considrratioii. Ih(~r(~for(~,\vc had light only nt ccrtaintiincis atid most of our timr 1 ~ : ~ ssprrit with t l i r flnshligtit.Astronaut SWIGERT.What \\ e :ire doing right here is the entryprocedure and Jim arid I are rolling over t o get it more closely. Hemould be working in the lunar module, myself in the commandmodule and this took a lot of cooperation. We found o u t that theprocedure worked very well.Astronaut LovELrA.I :mi rubbing my hnnds because it is cold inthere.We ended u p wearing both of our sets of underwear ant1our garmentthat you see there, tirid the l u r i ~ l rboots. Unfortunately, when Jack(nine aboard the commaiitl module, we (lid not provide him with ase t of lunar boots .This is the cornm:intl module showing the configuration as i t lookedthrough most of the emergency. The hatch y o u see at the left, thedocking groove in the center and now through the 1,unnel. There isthe configuration of the lnnar module outside panel.I might add this gave 11s a unique s t u d y in operating vehicles ofIL volume that are considerably larger than either the commandmodule or th e l una r module separately. We found out thtLt me hat1no difficulty at all in trtinsporting onrselves back a r i d fo r th throughboth vehicles.Our one sonrce of entertainment 11:is our little tape recorderthat we were able to linve some music o n . It was indeed fortunatethat o u r communication system 11 as as good ILS i t was, because theprimary reason why we are buck today is the way tjhe ground took


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28hold of unusual situations t ~ i i t lutilized their resources antl initiatedthem in getting procedures for gettiiig u s home.questions any of you may have.

(Conclusion of film.)Dr. P A I N E . Mr. Chairnitin, we \voiild be very htippy to answer anyThe CHAIHMAN.Senator Smith?

KEE PING COOL UN UE B ADVERSE CONDITIONSSenator SMITHof Maine. Thank yoii, N r . Chairmnii, for giving usthis privilege. This is certainly one of the most Inomentoils occasioiisof my career.I have a number of cluestions but I will limit mine a t this time totwo simple ones.Captain Lovell, as the young people w o i i l t l say , yoti ant1 yc!ur :LSSO-c-iates kept your cool. What in your bac~kgroiintldo you think con-tribriteti most to this ability to keep your c~)ol?Astronaut LOVELL.Senator Smith, I think that the ability to keel)working under the conditions that exist is the result, perlitips, of theinany years of training in the business th:Lt Bred Hake, Jack, s i i t lmyself are in. W e are esseii titilly 1)eoplen Eio test equipment. We expecttit times to meet adverse c~onditions. In this biisinehs, you cwinotexpect complete success all the time.Among other things, 1 think, it n : i h the coolnehs of the groiintl inhelping i i b to determine \+hatour problems were and to assure us t h tthe techniques were correct to keep I I ~going tilong as we did.Senator SMITHof Maine. Mr. Swigert, do you have mything to addto that?Astronaut SWIGERT.No; 1 think I agree thoroughly with Jim thati t wits the test pilot background that we had. T am sure that all of iisbeing in that background had encountered u n u s u d situtitiom before.I think this is in large mensure w h a t ermhletl us to work so well withthe ground.

SPACE PROGRAM STIMTJLUS TO EDUCATIONSenator SMITHof Maine. One thing that impressed me most ILS

the coolness antl the courtige shown by the wives antl f:imilies. It miitleme feel that :it least if they c ~ ) u l t lhave t~orifitlericv.?in what yori weredoing arid t h a t you would come back stifely :LS you did, that 1 alsoshould httve confidence and not be worried.I presume you get a great deal of mail. Wc hcrc in Congress get agreat deal of mail from young people of school age w ho \vould likc to buastronauts, who would likc to get into the space program. I sometimeswonder ho w to answer those lcttcrs. Do you offer m y spccifio ndvicc orwords of caution to these yonng peoplc?Astronaut LOVELL. Wc do , Senator Smith, gct quit(. ti fcw lcttcrsfrom young peoplc who ould likc to krio\v t h o l i t ont sp ice progntmantl about how to critcr it. Wc usually :imncr thcni in ii nianncr thatsuggests that of all things, thoy contiiiiic thcir cducation. Wc f w l th:~fone of the best ways that \vc can for\vartl our 1)rogr:tni is to h:tw wellcducatecl pcople in it. I think their resourcefulncss, their bi~ckgroiind,made it possiblc for this flight to bc c.oniplctcti . Wc say abovc :dl


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things, continuc your ethication. W c bclicvc. thc spacc program, ifnothing clse, is a stimulus to cducation and inspires young people tofollow along.Senator SMITHof Mainc. hlr. Swigclrt, do you hrtvo anything toadd?Astronaut SWIGERT.N o , 1 think that says what I wonld say.Senator SMITHof Mainc. Thank you.

QUESTIONS DESIGN CHANGES O F APOLLO 13The CHAIRMAN.Senator Symingtorl.Senator SYMINGTON.Mr . Lovcll, I join my colleagues in tho pleasureof seeing you back again succcssfully from another moon trip. I con-gratuhtc you on your glorious achicvcmcnt. It represcnts dl thcl besti n this country, and also congratulatc your collcagucs.Dr. Pninc, may I congratulatca you, too, sir, on having such a

superb organization. Wh e n you ran into this trouble, you were ablethrough probably the fincst pic(-(.of coopmition wc havc hatl in tcch-nological history to bring thew gentlemen back safcly.Dr. PAINE.Thank you.Senator SYMINGTON.Were there any changes in design of the Apollo13, especially in the service module, which made it cliflerent from theprevious Apollos and which might riot have been adequately tested?Dr. PETRONE. senator Syniington, there were no significant changesin the design in the service module, specifically in the area where wethink we had o u r difficulty.N O SAFETY SHORTCUTS CAUSED BY BUDGET CUTS

Senator SYMINGTON.Thank you.Some people have alleged that the sharl) reductions in approprirb-tions tha t NASA has taken in the la5t feu years has caused NASAto take shortcuts which mLLy have c~)mpromisetlsafety. Dr. Paine, isthere any truth, in your opinion, in that allegation?Dr. PAINE.None whatever, Senator Syniingtoii. NAS A u ill not flyany missions unless we feel we are prepared in a11 respects to do so.The fact that \\ e have been able to effect substantial economies hashad nothing to do with the fact that we hatl this difficulty. We havekept all of the essentials and we expect that despite the economy, weare fully prepared to fly these missions.

CHANCE OF METEOROID D A M A G ESenator SYMINGTON.Thank yon.What's the theoretical estimate in percentage, if you have one,about the chance of having one of our space-one of our spacecraftbeing hit by t~ meteoroid o n future {lights?Dr. PETHONE.Senator' Syrniiigton, the numbers t her(. Itre vcrydifficult to tirrivt. at . But wc havr a sc4cs of nuinburs--it is lcss thanonc in a million in this particular time cxposurc. Whcii you say howmuch less than one in a rnillion, with vcry simplc changes in yourassumption makc i t on0 in 10 million. Then: is a vcry high order ofmagnitude, a vcry low probability t h a t a meteorite could do damagein a space flight.


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30M A N WILL TRAVEL SOLAR SYSTEM

Senator SYMINGTON.Thnrik you, Dr. Potroiic.Dr. Pairie, do you hclic.vc in munnrd spxo flight bcyond thc 111oo1iand think that we should preparc for it?Dr. PAINE.Thcrc is 110 qucstioii in riiy milid, Scncitor Symingtoii,that wc are only tit the vrry first stvps of man in spacc. Tt has bccnpossible for 11s in the first dccadr of s p u c ~ ~to cxtcrid riiaii's rcitch allthe way out to thc moon and for the i i cx t decade in space, we willlargely br confined to tho luiitir arca. But in the\ decadcs to come aridpurticularly in thc centuries to come, thcro is 1 1 0 qucstion in rny mint1that i r i m will indeed travcl throughout tlic solar system.Senator SYMINGTON.Dr. Petroiw, d o you ngrcc' wi th t h n t ?Dr. PETHONE.Absolutcly, sir. I think t l i c ycurs tilict~dwill :illowus to tukc tliosc stops. 'Micrc is no qiwstioii of o u r capb i l i ty iri t h c k

decades and the centuries nbcncl.Senator SYMINGTON.Mr. Lumicy, your thoughts?Mr. TJUNNEY. Yes, sir. 1 belicvcl wc will do that soincdtty. 1do i i o tknow \vhcn. 1 recall tiwhilo back wlic.ii wc wcrc first playing withuirplanes, t h r i buildiug tlicm and flying t h c m . Thc~history of the.busirioss of flight has come so fur in tho last 50 yrars that c v c r ~toatt,crript to predict wherc. it is going to go in thci Iictxt 50 I think istaking a risk. But it is going u p .SenatorSrMINGTON. Captain Lovcll, lion- do yoii m t i your cwllcagursfeel a b o u t this?Astronttiit L O V E L L .I think, sir, I ( ' i ~ t ispak f o r jiist : ~ \ ) o i i fovcryboclyin thr flight group of tlic future> of our space t ravcl . I t is our onlyrpgrot, porhps, t h a t \vv might bv too ol(1, thoscl of 115 a b o i ~ r dno\\ ,to go to Mars.Senator SYMINGTON.Tlittnk you. A11 I C'UII say is you d l in:Lk(l ni(Lvery proud this morning to bc an Anicrican. [Applurrsc.]The C H A I R M A N .Senator Curtis?Scrriitor ( 'URTIS I w m t to s a y to you, (:apttiin Lovcll :mtl Mr.Swigcrt, you huvch t lo~icmow to iticroiisr~ thc t L t tcntluiic*c~of thiscomrni t tcc than ttnything thitt 1 kilo\\- of . Arid t l i i t t iippli(>sto thrispectators and the press, too.I would like to tLsk you, M r. Ywigcbrt, t m t11c.ygiviiig you :L badtime o n your tax mattw?Astronaut SWIGERT.No, sir . It w(~nist h t I 1i:ivc r i i c t l sorncbotlywho knows t h ~Director, so I tliink I i i i i i .;:if().Scnutor CIJRTIS.In c a s ~Irc carmot gcit i t ( I o i i c k , I l r : ~ \ r c h l ) ( > i it :L c*orIl)lvof t l ( ~ u t 1 ~oii thc . tnx-it ritirig c~ornr~rittc~c~sof 1)otIi t t i c b Housv turd t h c kS ~ r i t i t ~t i i has thri distirigiiishcd c-hiLirrnaii, ('huiriniLii Ailticrsoii.Whilr 1 havr r n : ~ d ( ~it :L riilr i i o t to intc~rc(~(lcon bchiilf o f i r idividi idtaxpayers on the. merits of their claims, I will violato tlittt rule. ifnccesstbry.Astrontuit SWIGERT.Thank yoii, sir.Senator CURTIS.Dr. Painp, I warit to take cxc-cl)tion t o orlc statc-meri t you made in your pr(~scritr~tiori.Yoit rcfm.rctl to \\.hat litish a p p c n e d as a f d u r r . 1 would rathcr dcscribo it ns cxpcricncing 811Itccidcnt and uccvpt that ILS not t i fttilurcb. Sorricwrw, irnd 1do not rrcullwho it was, said that civilization rnovcs forward on stepping stones


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31of tragedy. That 1 1 0 d o u b t is trne. The very sad rind unfor tunatefire thiit we had :L few yews a ~ oin lvliich three bmve men, White,ChtLf fee ,arid Grissorri lost their lives, hiis c::Lrised tjhe concentration iiiitlthc . s~i(:(:oss iu t1t:vc:loj)itig fire-rctsistimt, fireproof Iri:itcirials h L t willbo of boriofit, to cvcry I ~ H I ~ ,\ v o t r i m , t t t i t l child i n Atric:ric:ii rind bcyontl.

Dr. P A I N E .Yes, \ve have rntule very subststitid p roSeiiiitor Cultus. Mr. Chairrn:Ln, I have iL question I'. Pnitie:m1four for Dr. Pet,rone,but iintler t h e circLiunstances, I would liket ,o submit, those to them for msweririg in the record.T h e C H A I R M A N .They will be lriitritletl to t h e m : ~ n dthey ciLIl replyto them fo r the record.(The questions submitted by Senator Curtis a i i d the ails\\plied for th e record by Dr . Puitie i d Dr. Petrorie are as folloi

Is t , l d I I O ~truc?

F O R E I G N COOPIERA'TION D U R I N G APOLLO 13 MISSIONQuestion 1. (a ) D r . P a i n c , thc ~ C W Sn~cd inr i~por t c r lthat d u r i n g thc: d i f i c u l t i c s o fA p o l l o 1 3 , /hv ( J n i t r d Slates rccciucrl o f l c ~ sf o r no f f w e d thr i r sh , ip s , ~ t o p ~ ~ ~ dradio l ransrn i ss ions operiods , and so f o r th . A g a i n w i t h th e sp i r i t of in lernat ional cooperat ion en ge nd er d b yt he space program , na t i o ns moved l o cooperalc u'ilh one another cmtl peopl t around l h eworld were drawn closcr logcthcr. t wontlcr i f ?jou would coiierncnl on t h i s f o r l h ecommit tee and place in the record a ( l c ta ikd statcmcnt of the cooperation oflercd theUni ted S ta tes dur ing th e A p o l l o 13 m i s s i o n .( b ) H o w m a n y p e o pl e a r ou n d th e world followed the Odyssey oJ Apo l lo 132 W o u l dy o u get the S ta te Depa rtmen t l o p r e p a r e a papcr or rcpor l o n tht: c$cct th c A p o l l o I Srnissi0.n had on U.S. re la tions w i th o ther na t ions a nd slates around t he woridlAnswer: (a) As soon as the word wcnt that Apollo 13 had ciicoiintrrcd agrave cmcrgency, govcrnmcnts in all qi i i irt of t h r world hastcmed to offer thcirassistance. Thcrc were messages to thc P dcnt, ininistrrittl telcphonc calls inthc early morning hours to oiir embassies, tclcgranis to 1J.S.Navy and Air Forcearithoritics, arid telegrams and phonv calls t o t hc Administrator of NASA.Some coiint,rics alcr tcd their naval and air rinits imd placed thcni a t o w disposal.Others offered the w e of coinmunications :tnd other facilities. Still othcrs askedto be informed of whatever requirement wc might havr and promised t,o cooperatt:to tho fiill extent of th ri r abil ity. All offers exprcssod doep sympathy and conccrn.As i t turned out, our o w n resources wcrc adcqnato t,o bring the Apollo crewback safely. This in no way detracts from the, importanco of thcsc offers of assis-tance nor from oiir gratitiidc for The assistance so frccly volnntcercd, as

wcll as the many expressions of mthy from oiir friends throughont thcworld, wcrc important sourccs of ragcinent and confdcnco. Thcy denion-strat,(:t,hn extcnt to which othcr n and othcr pcoples sense that they sharcthe advcntrires of spacc. Thcy rcflcct the spir it of cooperat,ioii tha t irivcsts thoexploration of space, tt spirit that wo belicvo o w ow n cmphasis on working withothcrs has donc much t o fostcr.Messages offering assistancc wcrc rcccivcd from thc following coiintries: Argon-t>in:t, Aiistralia, Brazil, Burundi, thv 1tc:priblic of China, Colombia, Cook Islands,Franco, t,ho Federal Itrpiiblic of Grrrriaiiy, Grc:ccc, Iran, It't~ly,Rl:Llagas.v, thcNcthcrlands, NPWZcaland, I'iLkistan, Portiigd, Senrgal, South Africa, thc SovictUnion, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkty, thr IJnitcd Arab Itcl)riblic, thc:[Jnitcd Kingdom, arid Urugnay.In addition, leaders in sonic 80 corni1,ric:s sent cordial iricasagcs of sympathy ,suppor t and coiigratiilations concerning the plight and rrcovcsry of th e Apollo 13astronants. From thv 1kp:~rtnicmt of Stat(,: hf( 'mOTun(l7L~L;t,o Arnold W .tn nt Administr:itor, Intc~rii:~tion:tlAffnirs, N:ttionnl Arroiimiticsi t n d S1):icv Adniiiiistr:~tioii; froin H ( ~ n i i i nYoll:ick, I Xrcctor. 13iirv:tir of 1ritc.r'-nat,ion:tl Scit,ntific arid Tcehnological Aff:iirs, 1)q):irtrnc~iitof Stat('; siil)jcxc.l,Effect of Apollo-13 Mission 0 1 1 Anic~ic: t ' s Forvigii Affairs.

ancc from ?t iany eounrt a in j r q 1 ~ c n c i c ~du r i


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32111 rcsponsc: t o y o u r nie~norandiiniof April 2 8 forwnrding Svnator Ciirtisrcqiiest, f o r :L Stntc 1)c~partniciit cssmcmt of thc cffwt of thc Apollo-13 missionon L7.S. rc1:itions with othcr iiations arid st:tt>csarorind t h c x w o r l d , wv :ire ploascdt o su bmit the attached statt:niont which you m:ty wish to niukc avnilablc t o theSrnatc Cornniit tw on Aoron:triticnl arid Spacc Sciences.Fhclcsiires: Stn t c m c n t on Eff cc t of 1,ho i2l)ollo- 1 3 Mission on Aniwicas

Foreign Relations. M A Y20, 1970.EFFI:CT O F T H I S APOLLO-1 3 h S1 0N ( ) N AMI.: 11I C .A s F()11 1%:IG N 1: I, . \ T I 0 NS

A s l x i r t o f his tostinioriy on A p r i l 6 of this ycar, 1)r. lainc: siil)niittcd to t,hrSmatt! Cornmittec. on A(~ronaiilica1and S1)acc Sciences thc S h t c I)cp:~rtriic~nttnl s p a c ~ b1)rogr:ttri on Anic.ric:in foreign rclationvcsr:il ways in wliicli t,hc sp:tc(: 1)rogr:Lrri hns h:t:i1 offcct 011 oiir postriro on t h v world :tnd on oiirforeign rclat,ions. Tho prwtigc. which thv L7tiitc.d Stutcs has gaincd in the CJC-:of th e \vorld :is a rcsiilt of thc sl):tcc~progr:ttn coni(s r I):trtly from t h c s prngr:iirisrinpreccdcntc~d succms. O t h u i m p cliidc its coiitribiitioris tosciencc and to coriirri(wx :tiid the. f r nl)cnnvss with which it h:whcen conductcd.Even t,hough i d failed t o tncc~tit s 1)rini:try ol)ject,ivc., thc: Al)ollo-13 missionwas :In overwholmingly imp1 ivv drnior1str:ition of tcchnic:il 1)rowcss and dis-ciplined hiirnan skill. Contin c>- proccdiir cs d(xsignc,d in ndv:tncc to cope withsuch a n emergency, cornhinc.d witah tlisciplincd arid I)r(:cisc. irn1)rovisation byhiindrcds of rnrn working iiiidcr cLxtr:rordin:iry strcss, cii1rriin:ttcd i n t,hv saferct,itrn of the Apollo-13 :Lst,roii:iiits.It, is difficiilt to cstinintc: with : my l)wcision t l i r itnl);ict of tho ovent s of that,week 0 1 1 t h e pcoplrs of t h c x world, I ) u t thcrc. is no qiic>stionthat, i t W:LS coiisidcrablr.A s soon :is thc c,~nc.rgeiicydcvclopcd, n~css :~gc~sof coii 1 arid o f f ( ~ sof help t~ognnto strcarri in from ric\arly vv(*rycorner of t,hc world. c1r:il of tho worlds largernnvics werc: prit o n alert, :is war(' thv riiorchaiil, f l c of ri~:triynations. I 3 ~ v c msmall nations such :is Trinidad and Tol):igo offcrcd t,hc sc~rviowof their Coast(;(lard. AS t h c timc of spl:tsh- down :ippro c d :i n u n i b o r of ships i r i t h c s o i i t h -west Pacific were diverted f r o m their coiir so :LS t o I)(: ncarcr :it h m d i n C ~ S Oof need.Another cxarnpl(: of t h c willingness of thc worlds nntioiis to :issist was 1)rovidod

rnent, of tho c:ffect of oiityort, drnions trat cd t hl)ortant :ind highly tion

we h a w diploniatic posts.It hits born wtirnatcd that, al)l)roxiniatc~lyhalf a billion l )cwl) l (~watchcd lasfdrilys niooii w a l k on lives tr.lvvision. Th(5 [J.S. Iriforrnat,iori Ag-c.ncy c~st iniatcst.hatthc :iridicnco on Al)ril 17 ni:Lj- havc: h : i i (tv(\ii 1argc.r. Tho strcvts of niajor citirst,hrorighoiit t,ho world w(r(t dwcirtcd as p ( w l ) I ~st:tyc:d indoors to wittch arid listvn.When it bcwmw ck a r t h a t t l iv itstroiiaiils \ v ( % r csafc, :I wnvcx of s1)oiitiLii(soiisrc1ic.farid joy was cxxl)rcwcd, IJiinc1,iiatc.d i n s o m l cititss I),Y tho rhgirig of chiirch Ix~lls.A flood of rncssagcs of congratiilat ion from kings, l)rirric, miiiistcrs wid ordinar!.citizens d(wvnded on Washingt,on arid on oiir cxibassicls arid consriltitos abroad.T h c prws and other nictdia o sign nations, which had h w n following thv clvcintswith growing c~xcitc~nic~ritfo csral days, w(>rv,with it fvw c~xcc~l)tioris,warm i i itheir praiscl, no t only citir I( : coiiritg(~of t h c irstroi1:iiits : tnd thc tcehriic:Ll:whiov(:mcrit biit gi iin(nt :ittt:ritiori to tho fa ct t lint o i i r 1)nIicJ- of frc.cllysharing thv Apollo )iis with t l i c b I)c~olJlwo f the* world, \vhicah hiid svrvcd ii sso wc:ll on c~arlic~rriii , had stood thc. tcs t o f i t l)oriod of t,rial i i i i d ttiixic~ty.A niorc coniplctt: mciit o f nwdia rvact ior i t tirorighoiit thct world, 1)rcl) : ircdby thc U.S. InformAftcbr th(5 biirst of c:nthiisi:isin f d t t ) j r most of t,hc world toward orit miintry alt,hc tinio of thc n i n o n walk hiid srihsidcd \YO w(rc lc:ft, with a siibst,aiitial rvsidiic.of admiration arid I)rcstjigv which, wliil(s itn1)nssiblv 1 o t i t v i t s i i w i n qiiaritit,at,ivotcmis, continiics t o t w of r c d val i ic with rc)sl)c,ct t o niir 1)os t i i r c i n thcn wor ld :tiido w relatioris abroad. lho ni:tnncr in which niir sl):tce tcani corrdrictc:d i l scllf driring

ncy, is :ipl)onded t o this rvl)ort, .


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33the c:rncrgcncp in t,hci A1)ollo-Imsitivo contribution t o the It,h( siicccxsfiil rc.covcry of thethc:sc: i q m t s of thc sl x m ~progrim o n Anicric:is forcigil rc~lntions.

mission, the fact that other ii:rtions could make :Iciic effort, throiigh maintaining radio silence, aridtronauts havr all hrll)od in significantly deepening

17.8. INFORMATIONAGENCY-MAY5, 1970L F O R E IG N M E D I A I t E A C T I O N S TO APOLI,0-13The: Apollo-- 13 flight and the safe rctriiii of t>hc:astronaiits evoked a rcrnarkablcintc~rnationalrcsponsc. of official and 1)opiiIar coriccrn followed by rdirf and wtrmc,ongratiilations. Kings, l)rvsid(~nts,and prim(: ininist,c%rsdircctcd congratulatoryi~icssagesfrom thc:ir pcoplc t o t,he Prchsident, t,hc: nation, t he: :lstronniits, t t nd th(:NASA suplmrt t eam on the groiind.1 c~lc~viaionand radio covcragc: of th r splashdow~ as 1)rok)aI)ly:it its liigllcstI)cak fo r :my siriglc csvcnt in history, q)l)arc:ntly siirl) ing c ~ v ( ~ i ithat of thc act,linlw a l k 01 1 the: moon by Al)ollo- 1 1 .Scvcral hundrod Czech v i w e r s called thc: Pragrics stat.iori t o protest th e lack oflive coverage of the splashdown. Czech telcvision had adticread t o its scheduledprogram of Ilrisak a t a Leniri bi rthday c(1lebration, t irl t it did sho\n.the splashdown

lator O I L tap(. A t Biijiimbura, the Prc.sidt:nl of Riiriindi nl:ide! a11 iinprecedcnt,cdand snrprise visit o n thc Ambassador after thc flight,. Arriving in his ow n carwithont an official driver, the: Prcsid(m1, st ay rd fo r inorc thari an hour to cx tcndhis congratulations. I n anothcr typical reaction, thc Trinisian Prim; Ministerpersonally tclephoncd th e Ambassador to cxprrss thc: joy and pride of tho Tunisiansin this grea t accomplishrqent.Foreign media comment revcalcd that t h c flight may 1i:~vchad an impact onth o image of the U.S. a . Specifically, media cornment o n the flight streswdtho following positive I(1) Ihc: flight i c ~ law:rnrriicss of Inen cvcrywherc of o u r c o r n i n o nconcerns and iini cn i through thcir rniitiial hopw for tho safety o f(2) The openness of American society allowcd the rcst of the world to(3) Tho safe retur n of Apollo-13 indicated the: high lcvol of technical(4) Thc courage of tliu crew nnd th e siipcrb pcrform:tncc of tho groimd

SoInc media comment was seasoned wit.h reservations coriccrning tho risksof rnanncd spaceflight and thc wisdom of devoting major rosoiirccs t,o th e Apolloprogram when thcrc is so iniich that needs attention on earth, but thcsc negativeaspects wcre ovcrwhelmcd ricnrly evorywhcrc by rnthiisiitstic and positivc. rcac-tions.Itcprcsentativc media comment on each of thcsc thonies follows:U n it ed M a n k i n d . . .IIainburgs indcpendcnt Die, Wcll disccrriocl :t spirit of cosmopolitan solidariLyin offers of an international rcsc~ ieeffort which will leave its t,raccs in the heartsof mankind . . . . . . if tho people on earth can bo brought, t,ogcthcr in solving other isstiesas they wcre over the Apollo-13 incident, it will not be difficult to achievc peacc:in th e world. Apollo-13 pointed t o thc: possibility of global imity fo r mankind.( S e o u l S h i n m u m , Scoiil) W c do not wish t o give tho slightest nationalistic coloration to t r n (:vent thatiinites the ontirc civilized world in a single ft:cling of coiiccrn. ( I l N o matter how big man ge t s , hc rcmains small in this iinial -Hal , Beirut)

r 7

A1)ollo- 13.shar e this experience.cornpetcrice in America.personnel illustrated the finest qiiali tics of contcrnporary Arncric:i.

cle of hiiman so1idarit.y is moving and speaks highly of the senti-in men whcn one of their kind is in dangcr in thc cause of peace(EL M e r c u r i o , Chile)It (the flight) resulted in a morc: united mankind . . . It favored n l i r t k rcomprchcnsion among men . . . (Corrieie rlella Sera , Mi1:tn)The Openness of A m e r i c a n SocietU . . .

Thc Amrricans ran a considerablc: risk by agreeing from the oiitsct t o sayevcryLhing and show cvcrything about thcir space programs, regardless of whatthis might sabsi!qucntly cost thcrn. It is only right tha t they now be rewarded forthis. (L e Monde, Paris)


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34America, committed as sho is t o an open system, places n o t only her triumphsbut also her failiires in the harsh glare of world piiblicity and world criticism . . .( T r i n i d a d G u a r d i a n ), innocrncr d mo s t , i n the Amcrican way of lifc sparcs 11s nonc ofs. Biit i t idso tlcnics 11s nonc of the glory. ( D a i l y Mail,Loritlori)Foiir thousand ncwsnicn from all ovrr thv world w r r r : ~ I ) l ct o :Lttrnd t,lircnvcbrits woiild hnvr I)roiiil)t,rti:L 1)ost-I)oncrnc:nt of the laiinch hcaiis v t,tic,y woii ld Iiavr twrn t ,akrii a s nri ornirioiis ])or-tcnt. Brit t ,he 1J.S. is not snl)c:rstitioris like 11s. I t i s :L highly scirritific coiiritrywhich dow not, rnt,ert,aiiisiich irrational roiisidrrations. (Togo-lrexse, I l o ~ i n c ~ )R T ASTE I1Y 0F 1MPO N I ) E It A 131,PX ( I Iradli nr, Combat, Pa.ris)By coping with t he rincxlxctcd, NASA has dcmonstratjrd mastcry. I W o r ryestorday, t,hr conyiiest of s[)acch was only a rt5asonc.d b i i t tot id gsriibl~:on t h rq i i a l i t y of the cqiiiprncmt. From now on i l . is also iin cmt,c

Apollo 13 Senate Hearing 44-195

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Transcript of Apollo 13 Senate Hearing 44-195