ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING …concludes that anti-dumping and countervailing actions have...

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

POLICY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMMODITIES

STUDY SERIES No. 9

ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING PROCEDURES –

USE OR ABUSE?

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

by

Inge Nora Neufeld

UNCTADPalais des Nations

1211 Geneva 10Switzerland

UNITED NATIONS

New York and Geneva, 2001

ii

NOTE

The views expressed in this study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the viewsof the United Nations.

The designations employed and the presentation of the material do not imply the expression of anyopinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations Secretariat concerning the legal status of anycountry, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers orboundaries.

Material in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted, but acknowledgement is requested,together with a reference to the document number. A copy of the publication containing the quotationor reprint should be sent to the UNCTAD secretariat:

ChiefTrade Analysis Branch

Division on International Trade in Goods and Services, and CommoditiesUnited Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Palais des NationsCH – 1211 Geneva

UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/10

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

Sales No. E.01.II.D.6

ISBN 92-1-112516-2

ISSN 1607-8291

Copyright 8 United Nations 2001All rights reserved

iii

ABSTRACT

Antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CV) measures have become popular substitutes fortraditional trade barriers, which are gradually being reduced in the course of regional and multilateraltrade liberalization. As WTO legal, judicial instrument for private parties looking for government-enforced restrictions on competition, resort to AD and CV actions became a frequent tool to tackleproblems arising in the context of free trade. Designed as a corrective mechanism, particularlyantidumping has been hijacked for protectionist purposes. Gradually replacing conventional tariff-basedtrade barriers, the advancement of these practices jeopardizes the benefits of tariff reduction andgrowing economic integration.

This paper analyses distribution, duration and final outcomes of AD and CV investigations. Itconcludes that anti-dumping and countervailing actions have resulted in significant reductions in tradevolumes and market shares. Developing countries establish their position as new players on the AD andCV field, but also continue to be a main target of those practices.

The paper also analyses the WTO Agreements themselves and finds that many of the negativeeffects of AD and CV measures are not adequately addressed. Loopholes and ambiguities in theirprovisions open doors for practices constituting abuse rather than use of those instruments. Reforms ofthe Agreements are urgently required. They should focus on clarifying certain provisions and on theintroduction of effective substantial and differential treatment for developing countries.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Bijit Bora, Susan Teltscher and Xiaobing Tang for their valuable commentsand suggestions. Hilary Budd and Raúl A. Torres from the WTO kindly provided me with data fromWTO Rules Division Antidumping and Countervailing Measures Database. I am especially grateful toErich Supper who encouraged me to do this study and supported me with his advice.

v

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1

II. THE USE OF AD AND CV PROCEDURESUNDER THE WTO AGREEMENTS ..................................................................... 3A. Investigations ...................................................................................................... 4

1. Initiations ...................................................................................................... 42. Targets ......................................................................................................... 43. Final measures.............................................................................................. 54. “Success ratio”............................................................................................. 65. Duration....................................................................................................... 76. Duty level................................................................................................... 10

B. Petitioners......................................................................................................... 10C. Sectors............................................................................................................. 12

III. IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES........................................................ 14

IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE WTO AGREEMENTS ............................ 17A. The injury concept ............................................................................................ 17B. Non-enterprise specific approach...................................................................... 17C. Cost and constructed value determination.......................................................... 17D. Cumulation....................................................................................................... 17E. Duration........................................................................................................... 17F. Discretion......................................................................................................... 17G. Standard of review............................................................................................ 18H. Special and differential treatment ....................................................................... 18I. Ambiguities....................................................................................................... 18J. Access ............................................................................................................. 18

V. REFORMS.............................................................................................................. 20

VI. CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................................... 22

ENDNOTES........................................................................................................................ 23

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 29

vi

Tables

1: United States AD-duties in force at 31.12.99.............................................................................82: European Union AD-duties in force at 31.12.99.........................................................................83: United States countervailing orders in effect at 31.12.99 dating from the 1970s...........................94: Canadian countervailing duties in effect at 31.12.99 dating from the 1980s..................................95: Duty level of AD orders imposed by the United States ...............................................................96: Duty level of AD orders imposed by the European Union.........................................................107: Final AD measures imposed, broken by HS section (01.01.95 – 31.12.99)..............................11

Charts

1: Increase in AD investigations (1995 – 1999)..............................................................................32: Increase in CV investigations (1995 – 1999)..............................................................................33: Number of AD investigations initiated by “new users” (1995 – 1999).........................................44: Share of investigations directed against developing countries.......................................................55:Targets of countervailing investigations (1995 – 1999).................................................................66: Targets of antidumping investigations (1995 – 1999) ..................................................................67: AD investigations terminated without imposition of a final measure ..............................................78: Sectoral distribution of United States countervailing investigations (1995 – 1999)......................129: Sectoral distribution of European Union countervailing investigations (1995 – 1999)..................12

1

In the course of the gradual dismantlingof tariffs and increased economic integration,non-tariff barriers to trade and competition havebecame relatively more important.Antidumping and countervailing duty actionsturned into a preferred1 means to impose re-strictions on international trade, replacing ex-isting limitations and/or creating additionalobstacles. Contrary to their design as tempo-rary means to offset unfair competition, thesetrade defence measures are in practice used asa long-term remedy for various economic dif-ficulties. (Ab)used as a substitute for positiveadjustment measures, AD and CV actions arealso utilized to deal with structural problems.

Applied as an instrument for tacklingthe negative consequences of trade liberaliza-tion, anti-dumping and countervailing duty ac-tions became a common tool to protect domes-tic producers from foreign competition. Facedwith the need to protect sensitive domestic in-dustries from increased imports or priceslumps, countries often decide to use AD/CVduties instead of (the more “costly”2 ) safeguardmeasures provided for in the GATT 94.

Antidumping is, in practice, frequentlyutilized as a safeguard mechanism, which blursthe conceptual differences between these twoinstruments. The importance of this develop-ment has been demonstrated by the fact that 95per cent of all antidumping cases are related tosafeguard aspects with only 5 per cent beinglinked with anti-competitive practices.3

The economic rationale behind AD/CVaction has been heavily disputed. Many econo-mists consider the economic basis for thesemeasures to be rather thin, stressing the factthat focusing on injury for certain sectors ofthe domestic industry, would neglect positive

effects on national and consumer welfare.4 Inignoring consumer benefits resulting fromlower prices and the creation of more competi-tive market conditions, antidumping lawswould protect competitors rather than compe-tition. In fact, AD/CV legislation often reflectspolitical rather than economic considerations.Arguments of fair competition are used by do-mestic industries to campaign against low-priceimports. Antidumping action also ignores thefact that dumping might sometimes constitutea legitimate market strategy and may be neces-sary to meet (rather than hinder) competition.5

In discussing the justification of thosemeasures, one has to keep in mind however,that the actual (ab)use of AD and CV provi-sions is sometimes not in tune with their genu-ine economic rationale. Antidumping actionsare intended to (temporarily) counter unfaircompetition6 arising from price discriminationbetween different geographical markets. Theyaim to remedy injury by foreign competitors toan importing country’s industry from interna-tional price discrimination. Similarly,countervailing duties intend to offset unfaircompetition by subsidized (and therefore arti-ficially low) export prices. Negative effects ofantidumping and countervailing measures willtherefore partly have to be attributed to defi-ciencies of the current legislation rather thanthe underlying concepts of the antidumping/countervailing regimes themselves. It also hasto be noticed that by serving as an “escapevalve” for trade protection7 , the AD and CVregime helped international trade agreementsattain a degree of acceptance they otherwisemight not have enjoyed.

It should also be noted that the com-plete dismantling of the antidumping systemmight result in negative economic conse-

I. INTRODUCTION

2

quences. Unrestricted price-undercutting risksdriving enterprises out of their domestic mar-ket, even if they are not inefficient producers.If market segregation or product differentiationallows an exporting company to cover its fixedcosts fully on the domestic market, it can ex-port at marginal (variable) costs abroad and stillimprove profitability. Such competition mayseriously jeopardize domestic companies in theimporting country, even if they produce effi-ciently, as they have to recover their full costsand profit margins on their domestic market(and not just the variable costs plus any marginas the third country exporters). Similarly, mar-ginal pricing may also prejudice competing thirdcountry exporters, which depend more heavilyon the same import market. In such a case, effi-ciency is not enhanced: this kind of price com-petition does not lead to the elimination of in-efficient enterprises, but simply favours com-panies, which pursue those types of pricing poli-cies (and are able to do so in terms of economicconditions).8 By preserving the ability of do-mestic producers to stay in business and offerdomestic consumers steady sources for supply,antidumping action can in such cases ensurebeneficial competition. 9

The complete dismantling of theantidumping and countervailing systems is notnecessarily in the public’s interest. Therefore,reforms proposed in this paper do not campaignfor the complete dismantling of theantidumping and countervailing systems butfocus on their improvement and reform.

Section II of this paper will look at theuse of AD and CV measures in the WTO era(which is post 1 January 1995). Distributionand duration of investigations, their final out-come, petitioners and targeted sectors will bescrutinized with a special focus on the situa-tion of developing countries. Their particularvulnerability and the severe impact of AD andCV measures on their economies will be thesubject of section III. Section IV focuses ondeficiencies of the respective WTO Agree-ments as one of the sources of the existing prob-lems. Proposals on how to overcome some ofthose shortcomings will be presented in sec-tion V.

3

The WTO era saw a notable rise in ADand CV proceedings: antidumping investiga-tions more than doubled and countervailing in-vestigations increased six-fold (charts 1 and2).10

The increase in investigations was ac-companied by growing active participation inAD and CV proceedings. The application ofAD and CV procedures spread from few tradi-tional11 (developed country) to several new (of-

ten developing country) users such as Argen-tina, Brazil, India, the Republic of Korea,Mexico and South Africa. Many of these coun-tries had recently undergone far-reaching tradeliberalization as part of their market-orientedeconomic reforms.12 Apart from trying to tacklesome of the negative effects arising in thecourse of those reform programs, countries thatappreciated their exchange rate regimes alsoseem to have used antidumping to limit cur-rent account deficits caused by external shocks.

II. THE USE OF AD AND CV PROCEDURES UNDER THE WTOAGREEMENTS

Source: WTO Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database.


156

221 233255

349

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

7 7

17

25

42

05

1015202530354045

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Chart 1: Increase in AD investigations(1995-1999)

Chart 2: Increase in CV investigations(1995-1999)

4

A. Investigations 13

1. Initiations

In the area of antidumping, the almostexclusive restriction of AD initiations to theBig Four14 was replaced by a broadened fieldof applicants. Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexicoand South Africa became active users, respon-sible for a significant number of new investi-gations. Together, they account for about onequarter of the AD investigations initiated since1995. Traditional applicants like the Big Fourcontinue to be responsible for a large share ofinvestigations however, accounting for morethan 40 per cent of all the antidumping investi-gations initiated under the new WTO Agree-ment.1 5

Countervailing investigations continueto be primarily launched by developed coun-tries. The United States and the European Un-ion initiated two thirds of all CV investiga-tions.16 Altogether, developed countries werebehind more than 80 per cent of the overallnumber of CV investigations initiated in theWTO period. The domination of developedcountries becomes even more apparent whencompared to how many countries do not useCV procedures at all. Only 13 countries havebeen active users of countervailing actions,among them 7 developing countries.1 7

2. Targets

Developing countries are major targetsof both antidumping and countervailing ac-tions: 42 per cent of all AD and 63 per cent ofall CV investigations18 are directed againstthem. Compared to 5 years before the WTOAgreements came into force, the frequency fordeveloping countries to be the target of AD/CV investigations even increased: between1990–1994, 38 percent of all AD and 50 percent of all CV investigations affected develop-ing countries.

These figures also need to be interpretedagainst the background of almost exclusive tar-geting of developed countries during the 1980s.At that time, dumping and subsidy charges werepredominantly made by a small group of de-veloped countries and also addressed mainlyother developed countries.19 Less than 20 per-cent of all AD and only about 15 per cent ofthe CV investigations initiated during the 1980swere directed against developing countries. Thefrequency of developing countries being tar-geted by AD/CV actions has, therefore, in-creased significantly over the last decade.2 0

Many investigations were initiated inthe wake of the financial crisis in Asia, Russiaand Brazil. Low export prices due to signifi-cant currency devaluations and dropped com-


140

129

96

68

4137

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

India South Africa Argentina Brazil Rep.of Korea Mexico

Chart 3: Number of AD investigations initiated by “New Users”(1995-1999)

5

modity prices led to an increase of investiga-tions directed against exporters from those re-gions. Even though exports at decreased pricesresulting from currency devaluations should notqualify as dumping according to the AD Agree-ment,21 there has been a strong interaction be-tween these currency movements and the risein the investigations initiated. This develop-ment corresponds with the observation of in-creased use of AD/CV measures during timesof economic downturn22 and less frequent ap-plication in periods of economic prosperity. 2 3

India is the country most frequently af-fected by both AD and CV measures. More than15 per cent of all final measures imposed inAD and 21 per cent of all measures imposed inCV investigations were aimed at India.2 4

Countries with smaller import marketshares are frequent subjects of AD investiga-tions. This phenomenon is related to the prac-tice of cumulation – one of the most contro-versial administrative practiques by which in-vestigating authorities aggregate all like im-ports from every country under investigation,assessing their combined effect on the domes-tic industry. Legitimized by the UruguayRound, this practice nevertheless remains ques-tionable. Studies have shown that cumulationbrings a significant affirmative-finding bias intoinjury determination by antidumping authori-ties: Studies25 of United States investigationshave revealed that cumulation changed the out-come from negative to affirmative in a large

number of cases. According to an analysis doneby Prusa, cumulation increased the probabilityof protection by about 30 per cent. An analysisof European Union cases disclosed an evenstronger change in the probability of an affirma-tive decision as a consequence of cumulation:Tharakan, Greenaway and Tharakan (1998)showed that the practice of cumulation in-creases the likelihood of affirmative findingsin European Union antidumping cases by 42per cent. Without cumulation, the outcomewould have changed from a positive to nega-tive injury finding in 36.5 per cent of all cumu-lated cases. They also revealed that cumula-tion has particularly negative effects on coun-tries with small import market shares. Enter-prises with export volumes, which by them-selves would not have been found sufficient tocause injury, get caught in AD investigationsdue to the practice of cumulation. Cumulationfurther contains a strong protectionist bias.Hansen and Prusa (1996) discovered that itleads to more multiple-country petitions by thedomestic industry, which are particularly oftendirected against countries with small importmarket shares. All these facts are particularlyrelevant to developing countries, which tendto have small import market shares.

3. Final measures

The United States and the EuropeanUnion have been among the parties most fre-quently imposing final measures, accounting

Chart 4: Share of investigations directed againstdeveloping countries

Source: WTO Rules Division Antidumping and Countervailing Measures Database.

38%

50%

42%

63%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

AD CV

1990-1994 1995-1999

6

for almost one third of all definitive measuresfor the reported initiations. China has been mostoften affected by final measures, being the tar-get of such actions in 1/6 of all cases. Finalmeasures have also frequently been imposedon Taiwan Province of China, the Republic ofKorea, Brazil, India, the Russian Federation andThailand (together accounting for over 25 percent).

The domination of developed countriesis even more apparent in the case ofcountervailing actions: 45 per cent of all finalmeasures were imposed by the United States.Together with New Zealand (20 per cent) andthe European Union (15 per cent) these threeare responsible for 80 per cent of all final meas-ures imposed in CV investigations initiated inthe WTO era.

4. “Success ratio”

The success ratio of AD and CV inves-tigations – defined as the composition of finalmeasures – is a relatively small one:

Out of all antidumping investigationsinitiated in 1998, merely 11.6 per cent resultedin the imposition of final measures. The 1999data shows an even lower “success-level”: afinal measure was only imposed in 5.4 per centof all investigations opened during that pe-riod.26 Approximately 36 per cent of all CVinvestigations initiated in 1998 and 14.3 percent in 1999 ended with the levying of a finalmeasure.

Broken down by country one finds that79 per cent of all Australian and 70 per cent ofNew Zealand’s AD investigations between1995 and 199927 did not result in the imposi-tion of a definitive duty or a price undertaking.The European Union’s success ratio is higher:37 per cent of all investigations ended withoutan AD measure. Some 27 per cent of all Cana-dian and 32 per cent of all United States inves-tigations did not lead to an affirmative final de-termination.

In analysing the reasons for the largenumber of cases ending without a final meas-ure one finds that lack of injury was the domi-nant factor in United States cases: 80 per cent



Countries in transition

Developed countries

Developing countries

Chart 5: Targets of countervailing investigations(1995-1999)

Chart 6: Targets of antidumping investigations(1995-1999)

Developing countries

Developed countriesCountries in

transition

7

of all investigations28 with no final measurewere terminated for that reason. No dumpingwas found in 6.6 per cent of all cases. Figuresfor the European Union show that no injury wasdetermined in 22 per cent of all cases that endedwithout a final measure; the withdrawal of thecase was responsible for terminating 26 per centof the investigations. In 22 per cent of the casesthe investigation had to be terminated due tothe expiry of the deadline to impose a defini-tive measure.

Indication of a high number of weak2 9

cases can also be found in the area ofcountervailing duty actions. Only 33 per centof all Canadian, 46 percent of all EuropeanUnion and 47 per cent of all United States CVinvestigations initiated between 1995–1999 re-sulted in the imposition of a final measure.

Together with the phenomenon of in-vestigations initiated immediately after the ter-mination of a previous one involving the sameproduct (the so called back-to-back investiga-tions),30 the large number of unsuccessful pro-cedures indicates that investigations are some-times initiated even if the petitioners presumethat these investigations will not lead to theimposition of a final measure.31 It also demon-strates that access to AD and CV procedures istoo easy. These actions appear to be a methodof harassment, especially if there is an aware-

ness that the mere opening of an investigationhas a significant impact on the affected coun-tries’ imports.

5. Duration

Although AD and CV action is sup-posed to be purely temporary, it actually oftenturns into a long-term obstacle to trade andcompetition, aggravating the negative impactof these measures on developing countries.Lengthy terms cannot only be observed withregard of the average duration of investigationsbut especially when looking at the permanenceof final measures imposed.

While most of the countries manage tocomplete their AD investigations within themaximum time limit3 2 foreseen in the WTOAgreement, some parties (the European Unionbeing the most prominent among them) exceedthis limit to conclude their procedures. TheEuropean Union took an average of 589 daysto complete their investigations33 thereby ex-ceeding the WTO Agreement’s maximum timelimit by 58 days. Some cases took up to threeyears to complete.34 Some 15 per cent of allinvestigations initiated by the European Unionhad to be terminated unfinished due to expiryof the deadline to impose final measures, rais-ing the question of these proceedings’ mean-ing.


Chart 7: AD investigations terminated without impositionof a final measure

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Australia New Zealand EuropeanUnion

United States Canada

Investigations without final measure Total number of investigations

8

The longevity of the final AD measuresimposed constitutes an even more severe prob-lem – both in terms of frequency and negativeimpact. An analysis of the definitiveantidumping duties in force as of 31 Decem-ber 1999, shows the long average duration ofthese duties since their imposition:

In the United States the average dura-tion of final AD duties amounted to more than9 years, the oldest duty still being in force formore than 32 years, dating back to September1966. Duties valid since the early 1970s canbe found as well (see table 2). Over 90 per centof all United States measures lasted more thanfive years.

Product Against Date of impositionCarbon Steel Wire Rod Argentina November 1984Canned Bartlett Pears Australia March 1973Elemental Sulphur Canada December 1973Steel Jacks Canada September 1966Barium Chloride China October 1984Chloripicrin China March 1984Cotton Shop Towels China October 1983Grieg Polyester Cotton Print Cloth China September 1983Potassium Permanganate China January 1984Carbon Steel Plate Taiwan Province of China June 1979Colour Television Receivers Taiwan Province of China April 1984Large Power Transformers France, Italy, Japan June 1972Bicycle Speedometers Japan November 1972Fish Netting of Man-made Fibre Japan June 1972Polychloroprene Rubber Japan December 1973Steel Wire Rope Japan October 1973Synthetic Methionine Japan July 1973Television Receivers Japan March 1971Colour Television Receivers Republic of Korea April 1984Stainless Steel Plate Sweden June 1973

Source: Semi-annual report under Article 16.5 of the Agreement by the United States for the period1 July–31 December 1999.

Table 1: United States AD – duties in force at 31.12.99

Product Against Date of first impositionFerro-silicon Brazil December 1987

Polyolefin woven sacks and bags China November 1990Silicon metal China July 1990Tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide China September 1990Monosodium glutamate Taiwan Province of China June 1990Synthetic textile fibres of polyester Taiwan Province of China December 1988Electronic weighting scales Japan April 1986Monosodium glutamate Republic of Korea June 1990Television (colour) Republic of Korea April 1990Polyester yarns Turkey December 1988Ferro-silicon Venezuela February 1990

Source : Semi-annual report under Article 25.11 of the Agreement by the European Union for theperiod 1 July–31 December 1999 and various Official Journals.

Table 2: European Union AD – duties in force at 31.12.99

9

Definitive duties remained in force foran average of 6 years in Canada with some ofthem being as old as 23 (or 15) years. The ma-jority of these long duration duties were im-posed on developing countries or countries intransition. About two thirds of all Canadianmeasures lasted longer than 5 years.

New Zealand’s average duration of ADduties totals 6 years as well – the oldest dutybeing in force since 1988.35 Duties of about 10years of age can be found in various other casesas well – together they account for 27 per centof all duties being currently in force in NewZealand. Australian duties being in force at theend of 1998 show an average duration of 4years.

European Union duties currently inforce have an average age of 3.5 years – someof them being as old as 11 or 12 years (see ta-ble 3).

The long duration is also a problem of

countervailing actions. While CV investiga-tions usually do not exceed the 18-month timelimit,3 6 orders finally imposed very often re-main in effect for a long time. Both the UnitedStates’ and the Canadian CV duties have anaverage life expectancy of about 10 years, fol-lowed by Australian duties with 7 years. Someof the United States duties currently in effectdate from the 1970s (see table 4). Some 60 percent of all Canadian CV orders are more than14 years old (see table 5).37

The existence of these long-term ordersdemonstrates that the obligation to conduct 5-year reviews of AD/CV duties did not showthe anticipated results. Introduced by the WTOAgreements, these “sunset provisions”38 wereexpected to significantly reduce the number ofduties stemming from the pre-Uruguay era.Five years later one might therefore legitimatelypose the question why those reviews failed toprevent the long life of AD and DV duties. Theextensive period envisaged for the completionof these reviews is one of the reasons. The fact

Table 3: United States countervailing orders in effect at 31.12.99 dating from the 1970s

Against Product In force sinceBrazil Castor Oil Products 16.03.76Brazil Cotton Yarn 15.03.77European Union Sugar 31.07.78Sweden Viscose Rayon Staple Fibre 15.05.79Source: Semi-annual report under article 25.11 of the agreement by the United States for the period of1 July-31 December 1999.

Table 4: Canadian countervailing duties in effect at 31.12.99 dating from the 1980s

Against Product In force sinceDenmark Canned Ham 07.08.84European Union Canned Pork Based Luncheon Meat 07.08.84Netherlands Canned Ham 07.08.84Source: Semi-annual report under article 25.11 of the agreement by Canada for the period of 1 July–31December 1999.

Table 5: Duty level of AD orders imposed by the United States

Product Against Duty levelNatural Bristle Paintbrushes and Brush Heads China 352 %Sebacid Acid China 243* %Carbon Steel Wire Rod Argentina 119 %Carbon Steel Wire Rope Mexico 112 %

*”all others” rate. Individual duties range from 82–141 per cent in this case.Source: US Federal Register (several issues from the 64 FR series 1999).

10

that reviews of transition orders39 need not becompleted until June 30, 2001 certainly con-tributed to the sustained life of many of thelong-term orders. Other reasons for the sunsetprovisions falling short of expectations are re-lated to the language of the Anti-dumpingAgreement (ADA) and the GATT itself. Am-biguous definitions and gaps in their provisionsled to controversial readings and disputable im-plementation rules at unilateral level. The roomfor manoeuvre opened by GATT and/or ADAregulations40 was used by some countries tomake far-reaching recourse to specific nationalimplementation rules, which they introducedin addition to the rules of implementation setout in the ADA. The risks of extensive imple-mentation rules at the domestic level can bestbe demonstrated when looking at the situationin the United States. In making use of loop-holes left open by the WTO Agreement, UnitesStates guidelines interpreting ADA provisionscreated several presumptions in favour of thecontinuation of an order.

6. Duty level

The duty level is significant.Antidumping duties imposed in the EuropeanUnion account for around 25 per cent on aver-age; the percentage for the United States is evenslightly higher with about 30–35 per cent. In-dividual orders often far exceed this percent-age with AD duties of more than 100 (up to35041 ) per cent (see tables 6 and 7). Accordingto Prusa (1999) AD duties are now on average10 to 20 times higher than the most favourednation (MFN) level, with some of them exceed-ing the average MFN level more than 100 times.

Reference to constructed values is oneof the main reasons for the high level of theseduties. The use of pre-dumping prices against

actual firm data on cost, as practiced by theUnited States, further contributes to this devel-opment. (In certain cases, reference has beenmade to prices or constructed costs calculatedtwenty years ago). The issue of constructed val-ues is of particular relevance since it consti-tutes an often-used method to calculate normalvalue, leading to extremely high and severelycontested dumping margins. Defined as fullcosts plus profits and often based on outdatedinformation, constructed value determinationfrequently results in anticompetitive findingsof dumping as well as in overstated dumpingmargins.

On the other hand, one also findsantidumping and countervailing duties of anextremely low level. 42 Duties hardly exceed-ing the de minimis threshold are no rarity, rais-ing the question of the rationale behind thesemeasures. For the United States, this develop-ment can be attributed to the policy of demand-ing at least three consecutive years of non-dumping as a condition for the lifting of an or-der. This leads to the continuation of existingmeasures even if the margin was determinedto be at a very low or zero level.

B. Petitioners 4 3

Antidumping cases are concentrated ina few industries. An analysis of the petitionersin AD investigations44 shows that less than fourindustries lodged about two thirds of all casesopened in the United States and the EuropeanUnion: metal industry, chemical industry, in-dustry producing electrical equipment and (nonelectrical) machinery.

A look at the petitioners in antidumpingcases reveals the extent to which antidumping

Product Against Duty levelTelevision camera systems Japan 200 %Wolven polyolefin sacks China 124 %

Table 6: Duty level of AD orders imposed by the European Union

Source: Official Journal of the European Communities.

11

Notes:a Prepared foodstuffs; beverages, spirits and vinegar; tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes.b Raw hides and skins, leather, fur-skins and articles thereof; saddles and harnesses; travel goods, handbagsand similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silk-worm gut).c Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal; cork and articles of cork; manufactures of straw, of esparto or ofother plaiting materials; basket-ware and wickerwork.d Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulose material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper of paperboard; paperand paperboard and articles thereof.e Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof;prepared feathers and articles made therewith; artificial flowers; articles of.f Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials; ceramic products; glass and glassware.g Machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment; parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers,and parts and accessories of such articles.h Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment.i Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments andapparatus; clocks and watches; musical instruments; parts and accessories thereof.

a few large firms are behind a high proportionof complaints. AD measures are part of theircorporate strategy. An examination of the indi-vidual petitioning firms 45 within the industrieswhere antidumping action is most frequent, re-veals an even higher degree of concentration:46

In the European Union, Hoechst AG has beena complainant in about 80 per cent of the in-vestigations in the synthetic chemical indus-try. Montedison lodged complaints in about 20

per cent of the cases involving industrial chemi-cals. Bayer AG, ENI S.p.A., ICI Ltd. andRhone-Poulenc have also been very frequentcomplainers.

Philips International and Thomson Con-sumer Electronics were complainants in morethan two thirds of all investigations concern-ing television sets and radios. Arbed was in-volved in about one third of the steel cases.

Table 7: Final AD measures imposed, broken by HS section (01.01.95 - 31.12.99)

HS section Frequency (per cent of total finalmeasures)

I. Live animals; animal products 0.4

II. Vegetable products 1.7

IV. Prepared foodstuffs a 3.3

V Mineral products 1.1

VI. Products of the chemical or allied industries 9.6

VII. Plastics and articles thereof; rubber and articles thereof 9.8

VIII. Leather b 0.2

IX. Wood c 2.8

X. Pulp and paper d 4.1

XI. Textiles and textile articles 5.7

XII. Footwear e 1.5

XIII. Glass and ceramics f 2.6

XV. Base metals and articles of base metal 40.0

XVI. Machinery and electrical equipment g 10.3

XVII. Vehicles h 0.4

XVIII. Various Instruments i 2.6

XX. Miscellaneous manufactures articles 2.6

Unclassifiable 0.4

Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database.

12

action has been captured by (private) compa-nies. Contrary to the myth of antidumping lawsdefending the public interest, reality shows that

Figures for the United States are moredifficult to obtain. Complaints are lodged by(ad hoc) committees47 rather than single com-panies. Still, one can see that the situation isvery much alike: A handful of big companiesdominate a large proportion of all cases initi-ated. In the steel and other metal industries sec-tor, complaints are almost exclusively lodgedby enterprises including U.S Steel,Georgetown, Bethlehem Steel, Armco Steel,Atlantic Steel, or LTV Steel. The 1998/1999major AD initiative launched by the mainUnited States steel producers provided a recentexample for this development.

Hercules Steel Inc. and Du Pont are be-hind most cases in the chemical industry. In-vestigations may even continue if the originalpetitioner is disbanded due to a take-over ormerger.4 8

C. Sectors

Analysis on a sectoral basis is con-fronted with difficulties. Problems arise fromthe fact that the semi-annual reports, servingas the main source49 of information for thispaper, do not indicate the tariff headings appli-cable to investigations. Classifications by sec-tors are therefore based on an allocation of ADinvestigations to sections in the HarmonizedSystem (HS).5 0

An inventory of all final measures im-posed in antidumping investigations between1995–1999 broken down by HS sections showsa high degree of concentration. Some 40 percent of all measures targeted concern steel andother base metals. Together with chemicals,machinery and electrical equipment and plas-tics (each about 10 per cent) more than twothirds of all AD measures concentrate on thosefour sections.



Base metals

Other sectors

Other sectors

Base metals

Chart 8: Sectoral distribution of United Statescountervailing investigations (1995 - 1999)

Chart 9: Sectoral distribution of European Unioncountervailing investigations (1995 - 1999)

13

A breakdown of the distribution ofantidumping actions by sectors and reportingcountries shows an even higher degree of con-centration: 50 per cent of all Canadian investi-gations and 57 per cent of their final measures51

affected steel and other base metals. Thesectoral distribution of investigations is equallyconcentrated in the United States: 49 per centof all investigations between 1995–1998 in-volved steel, and other base metals – 46 percent of the total amount of final measures af-fected this HS section. Steel and base metalsare also the leading sector in the EuropeanUnion, accounting for 30 per cent of all openedinvestigations and for 25 per cent of all finalmeasures imposed from 1995–1998. Thesectoral distribution of antidumping actions ishighly concentrated in New Zealand as wellwith 35 per cent of the started investigationsaffecting glass and ceramics. Together withprepared foodstuffs these sections account for86 per cent52 of all final measures for the re-ported initiations. Similar data are reportedfrom Australia with 32 per cent of all initiated

investigations involving plastics.

Countervailing investigations concen-trate on very few HS sections as well: 52 percent of all cases affected base metals, 31 percent involved prepared foodstuffs. Brokendown by initiating country, the concentrationis sometimes even greater (see charts 8 and 9).

One observation arising from thisanalysis is that AD and CV action seems to bemore frequent with regard to products for whichtariffs have been substantially lowered or en-tirely removed. Investigations involving chemi-cals,53 cotton and polyester yarns54 and steelproducts55 are examples for this tendency. Inthe case of textiles, the phase-out of the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA)-type of quantitativerestrictions56 led to an increase of AD actionsinvolving these products. The 1998 level of ADinvestigations covering textiles and clothingequated the overall amount for the three previ-ous years.57

14

Antidumping and countervailing ac-tions have a variety of negative implications.They can create substantial distortions withdamaging effects on trade and competition.5 8

The imposition (or even the mere threat) of aduty may lead exporting firms to change pro-duction and seek alternative sources of supply.The exclusive focus on certain domestic pro-ducers neglects costs imposed on consumersdue to price increases.59 Furthermore, the ex-istence of these trade defence measures encour-ages rent-seeking behaviour by import-compet-ing firms.6 0

Developing countries are especially hurtby these effects: apart from being most fre-quently affected by AD and CV measures, theirenterprises are also particularly vulnerable tothe adverse impact of those actions. As (fre-quently) infant entrants to the internationalmarket61 and typically in an economicallyweak(er) situation, uncertainty andunpredictability in international trading rela-tions have more severe effects on developingcountry industries than it is the case with well-established exporters. Lack of expertise, finan-cial capacities and technical equipment makesit much more difficult for these companies todefend their interests in an AD investigation.6 2

Furthermore, they are to a much lesser extentcapable to absorb the economic effects causedby antidumping and countervailing actions.

The most negatively felt impact of ADand CV actions is their influence on exports.Already the process of opening an investiga-tion can have negative effects on trade flows –regardless of whether a duty will finally be im-posed.63 The mere threat to open an investiga-tion can induce a drop in exports.64 Importersare scared off and seek alternative sources ofsupply. AD and CV procedures as currently

applied can therefore result in undue losses forexporting enterprises irrespective of their finaloutcome. The situation is worsened by the pos-sibility to levy duties retroactively: Article 10.8of the WTO Agreement allows the retroactiveimposition of a duty from the date of initiationof the investigation.6 5

Earlier studies have shown that importsdeclined significantly following the opening ofan investigation: Messerlin’s analysis of Euro-pean Union imports revealed that import quan-tities had dropped by 18 per cent, one year af-ter the initiation of an antidumping investiga-tion.66 Imports had (on average) dropped to 50per cent of the pre-investigation levels fiveyears after the opening of the investigation. Amore recent work by the United States Interna-tional Trade Commission (USITC) demon-strated that imports with high dumping mar-gins suffered declines of 73 per cent followingthe imposition of a duty. 67 Latest surveys byPrusa (1999) on the impact of United Statesantidumping actions showed similar results.According to his studies, import quantities fellby an average 50-70 per cent over the first threeyears following the imposition of a final (af-firmative) measure. Import prices were reportedto have risen by more than 30 per cent duringthe same period. Rejected petitions were foundto cause damage as well: in this case, importvolumes dropped by 15–20 per cent.

A comparison of import levels for sev-eral products before and after the initiation ofan AD investigation supports those results68 .Export volumes of the country affected by anAD measure were often found to have signifi-cantly declined after the imposition of a duty.According to United States trade data,6 9

Argentinean exports of Carbon Steel Wire Rodto the United States declined by more than 97

III. IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

15

per cent following the issuance of the order.7 0

Exports of the same product originating fromMexico dropped by 96 per cent, from 2,882 tonsin the year preceding the imposition of the or-der to 112 tons the year after.71 Another exam-ple of dramatic decline is the case of Chineseexports of Natural Bristle Paintbrushes andBrush Heads. United States imports of theseproducts fell from 38,000,000 units in 1984 (theyear before the AD petition was filed) to 1,225,000 units) or 3.2 per cent of its pre-order levelsin 1997.72 In some cases, exports even ceasedentirely after a duty had been imposed: UnitedStates imports of Chloropicrin from China,which amounted 2.45 million kilograms in theyear prior to the imposition of the AD order,completely stopped one year after the duty en-tered into force.73 In another case involvingAspirin from Turkey, export volumes werefound to have dropped from 1.3 million poundsto 200,000 pounds in the year immediately fol-lowing the imposition of the order and ceasedcompletely after 3 years.74 Findings of sharplydeclined or ceased imports can also be detectedin numerous other cases such as Steel Wire Ropefrom Japan75 and the Republic of Korea,76 andRoller Chain, Other Than Bicycle, from Ja-pan.77

Duties imposed on developing countryexporters do not merely concern highly spe-cialized commodities or products with smalltrade volumes. They are also directed againstmajor developing country enterprises, whichare often main suppliers to a region or even theworld market such as Pohang Iron & SteelCorp., the world’s second largest steel producer,or the Argentinean ASCOR, which turned intoa primary multinational steel producer. One canobserve a growing tendency of industrializedcountries to turn AD and CV measures againstthese companies from developing countries.According to Prusa,78 “…it often seems thatjust when developing countries begin to effi-ciently operate and become more competitivein particular markets, industrialized countriesshut down those precise markets…”

Apart from the impact on exports, AD

and CV action also have negative effects oncompetition. AD/CV measures are anti-com-petitive almost by definition since they contra-dict most of the very essential principles andobjectives of competition. In protecting (cer-tain) competitors rather than competition theybring benefits to some enterprises at the ex-pense of the consumers.79 Price increases onimports as well as on home market productsfollowing the imposition of a duty impose un-necessary costs on consumers.8 0

The argument favouring anti-dumpingaction as a means to prevent anti-competitivebusiness practices, falls short when looking atthe actual frequency of such scenarios. Accord-ing to the OECD study mentioned above, only5 per cent of all antidumping cases are actuallyrelated to anti-competitive practices such aspredatory or strategic pricing. In reality, ADmeasures do not only often prevent competi-tion from more competitive producers but cer-tain forms of remedies actually favour the for-mation of international cartels. (See for exam-ple price undertakings cum quotas accepted inregard of Russian aluminium). Undertakingsproved to have particular competition reduc-ing effects. The obligation to observe a maxi-mum export volume or the fixing of exportprices of the subject merchandise at a levelabove the original price contradicts fundamen-tal concepts of competition. In considering theanti-competitive effects of these measures onehas to keep in mind that undertakings repre-sent a very frequent action. Particularly theEuropean Union is known to make extensiveuse of this measure to terminate AD proceed-ings. More than two thirds of their finalantidumping decisions end with the acceptanceof an undertaking.8 1

Finally, involvement in an AD/CV in-vestigation is a very expensive undertaking.8 2

Apart from significant legal costs83 the open-ing of an investigation ties down exporting en-terprises with uncertainty over the outcome,which can last for years. This makes it difficultfor developing country exporters to equally de-fend their interests. Insufficient legal and fi-nancial resources do not only restrict the ca-

16

pacity to contest the legitimacy and legality ofan AD or CV action but it also limits develop-ing countries possibilities to become active us-ers of these instruments themselves. This is oneof the reasons why so many developing coun-tries84 do not actively engage in AD/CV proce-dures and do not even adopt their own nationallegislation.

These disadvantages have led to grow-ing frustration among developing countries. ADand CV measures are perceived as “measures

(that) are being virtually used as weapons bycertain developed countries to deny access tothe products of developing countries.”85 Anxi-ety was expressed that “The misuse of the(se)trade remedy measures (…) by some developedcountries against exporters originating fromdeveloping countries (…) has become a sig-nificant barrier to the exports of developingcountries.”86 Even developed countries87 are“…concerned that easy access to and increaseddependence on such trade remedies will nul-lify the benefits of tariff reductions.”

17

While recognizing those intrinsic prob-lems of the AD/CV regime, it is important tonote that some of the negative consequenceshave to be attributed to deficiencies of the cur-rent legislation rather than the underlying con-cepts themselves. Although the WTO Agree-ments are an improvement over pre-Uruguayregulations in terms of predictability and trans-parency,88 many problems remain. Among themost problematical issues of the ADA are:

A. The injury concept

The ADA defines injury as that causedto certain sectors of the domestic industry, with-out consideration of national or consumer wel-fare aspects. The exclusive focus on profit-lossto some domestic producers neglects theeconomy-wide impact of AD action. Further-more, the standards set out for the determina-tion of injury are imprecise – important param-eters such as changes in commercial prices,currency devaluations or rising competitionfrom other domestic sources are not sufficientlyconsidered.

B. Non-enterprise specific approach

The AD code does not base itsdeterminations on an enterprise specific ap-proach, buts allows them to be made on acountrywide basis. Discriminating against in-dividual exporters and sometimes ignoring bestinformation available, the ADA contradicts thefundamental concept of AD legislation to coun-ter unfair trade practices by specific exporters.

C. Cost and constructed valuedetermination

The ADA tolerates the use of pre-dump-ing prices against actual company data on cost,

referring to the still tolerated “best informa-tion available” principle. This often leads tooverstated and questionable AD duties. Definedas full costs plus profits and often based on out-dated information, constructed value determi-nation often results in artificially high dump-ing margins.

D. Cumulation

Legitimized under the new Agreement,this practice permits investigating administra-tive authorities to aggregate all like importsfrom every country under investigation and toassess their combined impact on the domesticindustry. This leads to a significantly higherprobability of affirmative injury (and follow-ing dumping) findings. Furthermore, experi-ence has shown89 that cumulation leads to moremultiple petition filings with smaller enterprisesbeing named most often.

E. Duration

Duration is a problem both in terms ofthe length of the investigations and in regardto an average duties’ life expectancy. While theintroduction of the 18-month limit90 improvedthe situation concerning the first issue, the longlife of an average AD duty continues to causesevere distortions. Despite some progress, thesunset provisions91 failed to prevent the exist-ence of long-term orders.

F. Discretion

The ADA leaves a large degree of dis-cretion to the domestic authorities in charge ofthe implementation of the Agreement. Insuffi-cient disciplines, and ambiguous or impreciseformulations give rise to controversial interpre-tations at unilateral level. The dispute over the

IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE WTO AGREEMENTS

18

application of the de minimis threshold92 is oneof the most prominent examples for difficul-ties arising from divergent readings. Equivo-cal provisions further let to fault implementa-tion at national level. Some countries did notbring their domestic laws in line with WTOrules. This has also been acknowledged by arecent panel ruling, 93 recognizing the incom-patibility of the United States Antidumping Actof 1916 with WTO law.

G. Standard of review

The current standard of review as con-tained in Article 17 of the ADA constitutes afurther capital shortcoming of the Agreement.In restricting the role of the WTO Dispute Set-tlement Panel to purely determine whether “theauthorities’ establishment of the facts wasproper and the evaluation was unbiased andobjective”94 the Agreement establishes a stand-ard of review that is much more restrictive thanthe one normally granted to the Panel in theWTO. The different and confining reviewstandard allows antidumping authorities of im-porting countries to escape closer scrutiny bythe WTO Panel and represents an undue re-straint that limits effective reviews. Being anintegral part of the WTO, it is not clear whythe Antidumping Agreement should have a dif-ferent standard than the one applied to disputesunder all other WTO Agreements.

H. Special and differential treatment

The ADA lacks effective granting ofspecial and differential treatment to develop-ing countries. Their specific situation is onlyinsufficiently recognized in its Article 15. Thestatement that “…special regard must be givenby developed country Members to the specialsituation of developing country Members whenconsidering the application of anti-dumpingmeasures…” is not accompanied by any con-crete criteria for the granting of benefits. Therequest to explore “…constructive remedies(…) before applying anti-dumping duties wherethey would affect the essential interests of de-veloping country Members” remained a bestendeavour clause which has hardly ever been

applied. In practice, alternatives to the imme-diate application of duties against exports fromdeveloping countries have rarely been explored.On the contrary, resort to antidumping meas-ures has even increased over the last years.9 5

Article 15s well-intended provisions becamepractically inoperative due to lacking precise-ness.

I. Ambiguities

Loopholes and ambiguities containedin the Agreement created additional problemsby opening the door for abuse. Imprecise regu-lations and ambiguous definitions of the ADAand the Subsidies and Countervailing Meas-ures Agreement (SCM) (which by themselveshave to be considered an interpretation of theGATT 94) led to controversial readings at uni-lateral level. The “interpretation of the inter-pretation” in national regulations and adminis-trative guidelines sometimes resulted in faultyimplementation. Prominent examples for dis-putes arising from divergent interpretations arethe question on the applicability of the de mini-mis threshold to review cases and the disagree-ment over the WTO compatibility of the UnitesStates Anti-Dumping Act of 1916. Other con-troversies arose over the interpretation of Arti-cle 7 (4) ADA’s maximum duration for provi-sional measures.9 6

J. Access

Finally, access to AD measures hasproven to be too easy. Low thresholds and in-sufficient disciplines allowed the initiation ofa large number of unjustified cases, which neverled to the imposition of a final measure. Insome cases, investigations on the same prod-uct have been initiated immediately after theunsuccessful termination of a previous one.These back-to-back investigations rank amongthe practices most heavily criticized by devel-oping countries.

Problems arising from the SCM prima-rily concern the categorisation of prohibited,actionable and non-actionable subsidies. Bymaking subsidies for agriculture, development,

19

diversification and industry upgradingcountervailable, the SCM bans exactly the typeof subsidies primarily used by developing coun-tries (while allowing subsidies preferablygranted by developed countries such as subsi-dies granted for research, regional developmentor for the adoption of environmental standards).Problems further arise from the qualificationfor the list of countries exempted from the ex-port subsidy prohibition.

In addition, some of the above-men-tioned problems resulting from the ADA are

of relevance for the SCM as well. They con-cern the duration of the procedures, the lon-gevity of imposed orders, tightened review pro-cedures and the clarification of certain proce-dures.97 Despite concrete forms of special anddifferential treatment for developing countries,some of these provisions need to be expanded.Among the most frequently requested changesare the raising of the de minimis thresholds ofArticles 11 (9) and 27 (11) and a limitation ofcountervailing duty level.

20

The following reforms could help miti-gate the negative impact of antidumping andcountervailing measures:

1. The limitation of unjustified in-vestigations is one of the most pressing issues.A stricter ex-ante test of injury should exam-ine the impact of dumping/subsidization on thedomestic industry as a condition for the open-ing of an investigation. The likelihood of acausal link between alleged injury and allegeddumping (or subsidization) should further beassessed already at that stage. For that purpose,it should be mandatory to consider the influ-ence of factors such as the range of price fluc-tuations occurring in the normal course of busi-ness, changes of exchange rates or rising com-petition from other domestic sources. Qualitydifferences between similar products must alsobe considered. Injury should further be deter-mined on an enterprise specific basis, consid-ering individual company data (where avail-able).

2. In addition, the requirements forthe initiation of an investigation ought to betightened by raising the thresholds for the de-termination of de minimis dumping, subsidymargins and import shares. Following themechanism set out in the Subsidies Agreement,the ADA should provide for different marginsfor developing and developed countries settingthe de minimis margin for developing coun-tries twice as high as for industrialized coun-tries. Given the frequency and amplitudes offluctuations of commercial market prices andcurrencies, a significant increase of the gen-eral price threshold would further be warrantedfor all countries.

3. To reduce undue recourse to ADand CV procedures, access to antidumping and

countervailing action could further be limitedby raising the “standing” threshold of Article5.4.9 8 The overall economic wide impact ofAD/CV measures could be considered by theintroduction of a public interest clause.9 9

4. To reduce the number ofantidumping investigations, the harmful prac-tice of cumulation should further be prohibited.Significantly changing the probability of af-firmative injury findings and leading to moremultiple petition filings with smaller enterprisesbeing named more often, cumulation provedto be particularly injurious to developing coun-tries, which tend to have small import marketshares.

5. The possibility to open new in-vestigations on the same product right after thetermination of a previous one, should be re-stricted. This use of back-to-back investigationsturned out to be particularly damaging for de-veloping countries, which find their exports tomain trading partners disturbed by such ob-structive action. To limit this restrictive prac-tice countries should not be allowed to initiatean investigation on the same product within oneyear from the date a previous investigation wasfinalised without the imposition of a duty.

6. The introduction of a financialimpediment may also be considered to reducethe frequency of AD/CV investigations. Peti-tioners may be required to bear the defendantslegal costs in case the petition turns out to beunjustified, or to deposit a guarantee, which isnot reimbursed if the investigation found nodumping or injury. An exemption for small pro-ducers with limited financial resources couldprevent a restriction of their ability to initiateinvestigations. In addition, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from developing

V. REFORMS

21

countries should be reimbursed for their legalcosts resulting from unjustified AD or CV in-vestigations opened against them without theirdefault.

7. In order to reduce the negative ef-fects of constructed value determination, re-course to this method should be limited. Anamendment to Article 2.3 of the ADA shouldallow the use of constructed values only whenprices of third country markets are not avail-able.

8. High dumping and countervailingduties could be reduced by limiting the discre-tion of national authorities to impose duties upto the full amount of the dumping margin de-termined. Revised Articles 9.1 ADA and 19 (4)SCM could require a duty to be below the de-termined margin in case of it being sufficientto eliminate injury to the domestic industry.

9. The problem of ambiguous pro-visions100 could be mitigated through the elabo-ration of common interpretation guidelines.This would help avoid multiple, differing read-ings at unilateral level. In order to ensure ap-propriate implementation, the mandate of theAd Hoc Group on Implementation should fur-ther be expanded. Instead of being limited toissues of purely procedural nature, the Groupshould be entitled to deal with substantive ques-tions such as the consistency of the notifiednational legislation with the ADA.

10. To cut down the life expectancyof AD/CV orders, a general time limit of 2-3years should lead to their (automatic) lapse oncethey reach that stage. A re-imposition of a dutyhas to be subject to a complete new investiga-tion examining all relevant factors from thebeginning.

11. Granting competence to the WTOPanel to fully review the decisions of nationalAD authorities in substance would further pro-vide a necessary counterbalance to the domes-tic authorities’ exposure to strong pressure fromboth national industries and policymakers.

12. Finally, to more effectively grantspecial and differential treatment to develop-ing countries, Article 15 of the ADA needs tobe revised and made operational. Concretisingits rather vague provisions, differential treat-ment could take the form of higher thresholdsfor developing countries. As is the case withthe Subsidies Agreement, different thresholdsfor developed and developing countries couldbe introduced, granting higher1 0 1 de minimisdumping margins and de minimis import sharesfor the latter. The present thresholds for de mini-mis margins should be raised for developedcountries as well. Against the background oflarge daily fluctuations of commodity prices adexchange rates, which surpass thresholds setout in the Agreement, injury can hardly objec-tively be determined on the basis of the current1 per cent, 2 per cent or 3 per cent limits. Itshould be further made clear that the de mini-mis threshold does not only apply to newly ini-tiated, but also to review cases.102 Special anddifferential treatment could also be granted todeveloping countries by not applying Article5.8s provision to regard collective imports asabove de minimis if they exceed 7 per cent.

Special and differential treatment pro-visions of the SCM need to be extended as well:both Article 11 (9) and Article 27 (11) de mini-mis thresholds should be raised. The present 1per cent ad valorem limit of Article 11 (9)should be to doubled for developing coun-tries.1 0 3 Similarly, the 3 per cent threshold forthe imposition of countervailing duties againstdeveloping countries should also be increased.

22

Antidumping and countervailing pro-cedures continue to be (ab)used as a protec-tionist tool. Resort to AD/CV measures evenincreased due to the strengthening of the mul-tilateral disciplines on safeguards, the prohibi-tion of voluntary export restraints and the phas-ing out of the MFA quotas under the TextilesAgreement. As a quasi-judicial mechanism thatcan be invoked at individual enterprise level,(particularly) AD measures risk becoming aWTO-endorsed route for legitimized unilateralprotection.

Although use of AD/CV instruments isno longer restricted to developed countries, theycontinue to dominate these measures. AD/CVmeasures applied by industrialized countries areprecisely focused and target key sectors of spe-cific importance (such as steel products in thecase of the United States or textiles in the caseof the European Union). AD and CV action isinitiated by established producers to preventnew competitors from entering the market.1 0 4

A small number of big companies from indus-trialized countries are responsible for a largeproportion of all proceedings. Investigationsare opened even if the outcome is likely to benegative. They are lengthy and cause seriousdamage to developing country exporters, whoare the main targets of these trade restrictivepractices. Once an order is imposed, it remainsin force for a long time. A high percentage oforders date from the pre-Uruguay Round era,with some of these measures being in force formore than 20 years. Reviews are not very fre-quent, lengthy and suffer from differing anddisputable unilateral interpretation of the pro-visions concerning the conduct of these re-views.

Many of the continued problems are re-lated to the WTO Agreements. Despite some

improvements, WTO regulations still allow ADand CV action to be (ab)used as an instrumentto harass exporters and impede trade. (Ab)useof existing loopholes has been particularly at-tractive in times of tariff dismantling. Gaps inthe Agreements gave room for multiple inter-pretations and controversial readings. Impre-cise1 0 5 or ambiguous regulations and a highdegree of discretion for domestic administra-tive authorities further led to faulty implemen-tation. The room for manoeuvre resulting fromthese gaps has been used by several countriesto obtain protective cover. The advance of theserestrictive business practices, which more andmore replace traditional trade barriers, reducescompetition and endangers gains from the dis-mantling of tariffs and growing economic in-tegration. Particularly developing countriesfear that the benefits of trade liberalizationcould be neutralised by such measures.

Developing countries regard the reformof AD and CV procedures a top priority issuefor future multilateral trade negotiations. Theirdemands need to be addressed. Seattle hasshown that developing countries are not will-ing to see their interests disregarded. Ignoranceof their demands might not only severely dam-age the momentum of import liberalization indeveloping countries but also block consensusin a future round of multilateral trade negotia-tions.

A reform of the WTO Agreements isalso in the interest of developed countries,which increasingly experience the negative ef-fects of AD and CV action themselves.106 With-out improvements, use of AD and CV meas-ures will continue to be associated with abuse.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

23

The number of antidumping and countervailing dutyinvestigations has risen significantly over the lastyears. (See section III.) Recourse to AD/CV meas-ures holds various attractions for the domestic indus-try: AD and CV actions are a remedy expressly sanc-tioned by the WTO and allow for the levying of sec-tor specific tariffs without palpably violating tariffbindings. (See Prusa, 1999). They further impose sig-nificant costs on the enterprises targeted. Once inforce, they have a high probability to remain in placefor a long time. In some countries, this preference isof particular significance: According to a World Bankstudy, “Antidumping law has become the most im-portant of the remedies in U.S. law to restrain im-ports.” (Ehrenhaft, Hindley, Michalopoulos and Win-ters, 1997). According to Hoekman and Mavroidisantidumping “…is already the instrument of choicefor industries seeking to reduce competition from im-ports…” (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1996). See alsoPrusa (1999).

Recourse to the safeguard provisions is limited bythe requirement of these measures to be applied on anon-discriminatory basis. Import duties or quantita-tive restrictions can therefore only be used againstimports from all countries. Furthermore, the injuryhas to be serious. (Art. 2, paragraph 1 and 2 of theWTO Agreement on Safeguards).

OECD (1995).

See for example Hoekman and Mavroidis (1996), stat-ing that “The protectionist biases that are inherentin the application of antidumping are well known,but economists have not had much impact on weak-ening its political support.” According to Tharakan(1999), “…we are approaching a situation where oneof the necessary conditions which could be advancedto ‘justify’ the use of antidumping actions is createdby the existence of the anti-dumping mechanism it-self!” See also Hindley and Messerlin (1996) andPrusa (1999).

In addition one might also ask why antidumping lawbans international price discrimination when price dis-crimination takes place in various contexts at domes-tic level.

An exporter should not be allowed to restrict compe-tition in his home market and profit from the open-ness of other countries’ markets by selling at lower

prices there. Free trade ought to be accompanied byfair trade practices.

AD/CV actions are used to direct pressure exercisedby protectionist groups into a limited number of sec-tors, in order to allow for liberalization to take placein other (broader) areas.

Because their home market is big enough to coverthe fix costs, etc..

One should not forget however, that there are alsoalternative approaches, which could allow settlingsuch problems by means other than antidumpingmeasures. The country concerned could, for exam-ple, attempt negotiating with the exporting country areduction of its import barriers allowing high domes-tic prices; or not to tolerate any longer anti-competi-tive business practices on its market having equiva-lent effects; or to remove other barriers, which allowmarket segregation.

Unless indicated otherwise, data presented in this pa-per draws on information contained in the semi-an-nual reports on antidumping/countervailing duty ac-tions submitted by WTO member countries.

Countries are considered to be “traditional” users ofantidumping measures if they have been involved inthe conduct of such investigations since the 1970s.Australia, Canada, the European Community, NewZealand and the United States fall under this category.

The phenomenon of increased antidumping activityfollowing trade liberalization could already be ob-served in Latin America during the 1990s.

Unless indicated otherwise, all data refer to the pe-riod 1.1.95 – 31.12.99.

Australia, Canada, the European Union and the UnitedStates are referred to as the “Big Four” since theywere the major users of antidumping andcountervailing duty actions in the 1980s, accountingfor over 90 per cent of all such measures.

Source: WTO Rules Division Anti-dumping Meas-ures Database. Unless indicated otherwise, all datarefer to the period from 1.1.95-31.12.99.

Each of the respective countries was responsible forone third of all investigations. Source: WTO, RulesDivision Countervailing Measures Database.

ENDNOTES

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

24

WTO Rules Division Countervailing Measures Da-

tabase (as of July 2000).

In some cases, developing countries were the almostexclusive target of CV action: 94 per cent of CV in-vestigations were directed against developing coun-tries.

More than three quarters of the AD and about 80 percent of all CV investigations aimed at developed coun-tries. WTO Rules Division Countervailing MeasuresDatabase.

This increase was accompanied by growing anxietyby developing countries noting that “Exports of de-veloping countries have been facing more frequentantidumping and countervailing measures” and ex-pressing that the “Frequent use … against exportsfrom developing countries by major trading coun-tries has become a matter of serious and growingconcern.” Communication of Egypt to the WTO(WTO 1999 g)

See Article 2.4.1 Anti-dumping Agreement (ADA).

This phenomenon could particularly be observed atthe end of the 1970s as well as towards the late 1980s.

As occurred during the mid-1980s and the end 1990s.This is consistent with the material injury require-ment as set out in the WTO Agreement, since it ismore likely that such injury will be caused and claimedduring times of regression (rather than during peri-ods of economic growth.)

WTO Rules Division Antidumping Measures andCountervailing Measures Database.

See Prusa (1998).

Source: WTO Rules Division Antidumping MeasuresDatabase.

Like in all other cases (unless indicated otherwise)the period investigated covers 01.01.95–31.12.99.

This data refers to all United States investigationsinitiated between 1995 and 1998.

“Weak” in the sense of the underlying facts not justi-fying the imposition of a final measure.

The most prominent cases were the European UnionAD investigations on grey cotton fabrics againstChina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Turkey and Pakistanas well as the repeated EU investigations on bed linenagainst Egypt, India and Pakistan. See also the UnitedStates steel cases. A recent WTO dispute panel hasconcluded that some aspects of the European Union’santidumping measures against imports of cotton-typebed linen from India violated the WTO Anti-Dump-ing Agreement. See WTO (2000b).

The abolition of those back-to-back investigations

was one of the main demands vocalized by develop-ing countries. See for example India’s reform pro-posals submitted to the WTO (WTO 1999). Similarproposals were made by Cuba, the Dominican Re-public, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Indo-nesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka andUganda. See WTO (1999b)

Both the Antidumping and Subsidies Agreementforesee a period of 12 months for a review to be com-pleted, without making it a strict obligatory time limit.Article 11.4 of the ADA as well as Article 21.4 ofthe SCM Agreement only state that “Any such re-view shall be carried out expeditiously and shallnormally be concluded within twelve months of thedate of initiation of the review.” In practice, the du-ration of reviews often exceeds 12 months. This isparticularly the case in the European Union. Accord-ing to Article 5.10 “Investigations shall, except inspecial circumstances, be concluded within one yearafter their initiation, and in no case more than 18months.”

This number refers to all investigations opened andcompleted since the WTO Agreement entered intoforce.

See for example certain footwear (leather uppers)from China, Indonesia and Thailand (The investiga-tions opened on the 22nd February 1995 and werenot concluded until the 28th February 1998), certainmagnetic disks (3.5” microdisks) from Canada,Macao and Thailand (06.04.95–04.03.98) orglyphosate from China (13.10.95–18.02.98).

It was imposed on 31.5.88.

Investigations are concluded after an average of 332(European Union), 272 (United States), 202(Canada), 179 (New Zealand) or 156 days (Aus-tralia).

It should be noted that the European Union makes itparticularly difficult to reveal the actual duration oftheir duties in force. Unlike most other parties, stat-ing the date of the original (first) imposition of theduty the European Union only refers to date andnumber of a certain edition of its Official Journal,thereby creating the misleading impression of thatdate corresponding with the day of (first) impositionof the duty. An examination of the mentioned Offi-cial Journal (going through numerous reviews andprovisional measures) often reveals the fact that theactual date of imposition dates back much longer.Differences of up to 9 years can be found frequently.

Article 11.3 of the ADA states that “any definitiveantidumping duty shall be terminated on a date notlater than five years from its imposition...” unless an(obligatory) review finds that the expiry of the dutywould be likely to lead to continued or recurreddumping.

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Transition orders are the antidumping andcountervailing duties (and suspended investigations)in effect on January 1, 1995.

Article 11.3 of the ADA is particularly troublesomesince it leaves the possibility for countries to restrictthe application of various provisions of the ADA toreviews of measures taken under the new Agreement.

64 FR 25011, May 10, 1999.

See for example the 2.72 per cent duty imposed onSonar Cotton Mills in Cotton Shop Towels FromBangladesh, the 2.90 per cent “all others” order inSorbitol From France, or the 2.6 per cent duty im-posed on two Indonesian companies in Certain foot-wear with uppers of leather or plastics originatingin the People’s Republic of China.

Due to the very time-intensive undertaking of a peti-tioner analysis, the examination is restricted toantidumping procedures.

The analysis covers all investigations, which led tothe imposition of a duty currently still in force.

The names of the companies quoted in this paper arethe ones in force by the time those enterprises lodgedthe complaint. For reasons of consistency and com-parability changes in names (caused by mergers, re-structuring etc.) were not considered.

Notes of initiations of AD investigations publishedin the Official Journal and the Federal Register.

Such as the Ad Hoc Committee of Domestic Nitro-gen Producers (Urea from the German DemocraticRepublic), the Committee on Pipe and Tube Imports(Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes fromSpain), the Committee of Domestic Steel Wire Ropeand Specialty Cable Manufactures (Carbon SteelWire Rope from Mexico) or the World Trade Com-mittee, Parts Division, Electronic Industries Asso-ciation (Television receivers from Japan).

See for example Elemental Sulphur From Canada,were the original petitioner Duval was later takenover by Freeport-McMoRan Sulphur Inc.

Information provided by the WTO Rules DivisionAntidumping Measures Database is also based onthese reports.

Due to the inability to classify about 1 per cent of thetotal number of investigations, all following calcula-tions should be regarded as approximations.

“Final measure” means that the final determinationhas been affirmative. The number refers to the re-ported initiation for this period.

Each section accounts for 43 per cent.

Such as the United States AD investigation on

persulfates against China, on polyvinyl alcoholagainst China, The Taiwan Province of China, Japanand the Republic of Korea, sodium azide against Ja-pan or the European Union investigations on mono-sodium glutamate against Brazil and Viet Nam, fur-furyl alcohol against China, the United States andThailand, on Glyphospate against China, thioureadioxide against China or polysulphide polymersagainst the United States.

Like the European Union investigations onunbleached cotton fabrics against China, India, In-donesia, Pakistan and Turkey, on bed linen (cottontype) from Egypt, India and Pakistan, on polyestertextured filament yarn from India and the Republicof Korea, on synthetic fibre ropes from India and theRepublic of Korea, on polyester yarns from Malay-sia or the United States investigations on spun rayonsingles yarn from Austria.

Some of the numerous examples in this sector arethe United States investigations on stainless steel platein coils from Belgium, Canada, Taiwan Province ofChina, Italy, the Republic of Korea and South Af-rica, on steel wire rod from Canada, Germany, Trini-dad & Tobago and Venezuela, on Hot-Rolled flat-rolled carbon quality steel products from Brazil andthe Russian Federation, stainless steel round wirefrom Canada, Taiwan Province of China, India, Ja-pan, the Republic of Korea and Spain, on cut-to-length-carbon steel plate from China, Russian Fed-eration, South Africa and Ukraine, on stainless steelwire rod from Taiwan Province of China, Germany,Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Spain and Swe-den. The European Union initiated investigations onsteel wire ropes from China, India, the Republic ofKorea, South Africa and Ukraine, on certain sectionsof iron or non- alloy steel from the Czech Republicand Hungary, stainless steel bright bars from India,stainless steel big wire from India and the Republicof Korea, narrow steel strips from the Russian Fed-eration and stainless steel heavy plates from Sloveniaand South Africa.

This is provided for under Art. 2 of the WTO Agree-ment on Textiles and Clothing.

WTO Rules Division Antidumping Measures Data-base.

In the case of antidumping, its harmful effects waseven officially recognized by the United States stat-ing that “antidumping laws sometimes reduce com-petition and raise prices.” U.S. Government Print-ing Office (1994).

See also the findings of an OECD study stating thatAD measures applied to non-monopolizing dump-ing (constituting the majority of the cases) has theeffect of protecting suppliers at the expense of con-sumers and competition. See OECD (1996).

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See Hoekman and Mavroidis (1996).

Their links with importers and consumers are par-ticularly fragile. Subsidies granted to these enter-prises often serve as one method to compensate forspecial exogenous factors.

AD and CV investigations often demand the pres-entation of data not readily available in developingcountries. Also - contrary to industrialized countries- developing countries receive only very little back-ing from their Governments.

See Prusa (1999) and Messerlin (1988).

According to a study done by Messerlin, EU importquantities declined by 5 per cent (on average) be-tween the year before the initiation and the year af-ter. See Messerlin (1988).

“No duties shall be levied retroactively pursuant toparagraph 6, on products entered for consumptionprior to the date of initiation of the investigation.”

Messerlin (1988).

USITC (1995). This study also showed that unit val-ues increased by 32.7 per cent at the same time.

All of the following cases led to the imposition of afinal measure.

U.S. Census Bureau IM146 Reports. See 64 FR28975, May 28, 1999.

Export volumes dropped from 68,335 net tonnes in1983, the year after the imposition of the duty, to2,756 net tonnes in 1997.

U.S. Census Bureau trade statistics; 64 FR 42905,August 6, 1999.

U.S. Census Bureau trade statistics; 64 FR 25011,May 10, 1999.

Source: US IM 46 reports. See also 64 FR 11440,March 9, 1999.

U.S. Census Bureau IM146 Reports; 64 FR 36328,July 6, 1999.

64 FR 35626, July 1, 1999.

64 FR 43166, August 9, 1999.

64 FR 43166, August 9, 1999.

Prusa (1999).

It should be noted however, that in the case of non-predatory pricing, maximizing consumer welfaremight not always maximize overall welfare - depend-ing on whether the initial resource is distorted.

It has to be said however, that the imposition of aduty does not always mean that domestic producers

and exporters raise their prices by the full amount ofthe duty. Trade diversion effects might keep domes-tic producers from raising their prices by the fullamount of the dumping duty imposed.

According to Tharakan, 72 per cent of all decisionsin favour of the petitioner take the form of undertak-ings. See Tharakan (1995).

The exporter’s obligation to participate not only inthe initial investigation but also in administrative re-views has been considered to be a “hidden tax”. SeeEhrenhaft, Hindley, Michalopoulos and Winters(1997).

Overall investigation costs of $ 1 million are norarity in the United States.

Among the 137 WTO members, only 31 ever initi-ated a AD, and only 13 a CV investigation. Aboutone half of all members are without domestic AD/CV legislation. Source: WTO Rules Division Data-base and the reports of the committees onantidumping and on subsidies and countervailingmeasures WTO (1999d, 1999e).

Communication of India to the WTO. WTO (1999f).

Communication of Egypt to the WTO. WTO(1999g).

Such as Japan. See WTO (1999h)

Important improvements in the area of antidumpingconcern new methods of margin calculations, tight-ened investigation procedures and the introductionof the “sunset clause”. A better distinction betweenactionable and non-actionable subsidies was aprogress achieved in the field of subsidies.

See Hansen and Prusa (1996).

See article 5.10 ADA.

Article 11.1 ADA.

The United States insisted on the restricted applica-tion of the lower 2 per cent de minimis threshold tonewly initiated cases, while the Republic of Koreawanted Art. 5.8 to be applied also to review cases.The panel decided in favour of the United States(WTO 1999c).

The incompatibility of the US Antidumping Act of1916 with WTO law has been recognized by a panelruling in March 2000. See WTO (2000a).

Article 17.6 (i) ADA.

From 1995 to 1999, the number of AD investiga-tions more than doubled. See also section III. An-other indicator for the unwillingness of look for al-ternative remedies is the high number of provisionalmeasures.

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Mexico claimed that an extension beyond 6 monthscould be interpreted as being in conformity with “thespirit of Article VI of the GATT 94.” See the panelreport on the Mexico Antidumping Investigation onHigh Fructose Corn Syrup from the United States(WTO 2000b).

Such as Article 27 (3) or Annex 1.

Or at least make sure that the current threshold isnot weakened. Article 4.1 (i) states that producersrelated to exporters and importers are to be kept outof the process to determine the standing of the com-plainants, with the result that actual thresholds areoften lower than foreseen in Article 5.4.

No duty could therefore be imposed without the find-ing that this measure would be in the public interest.Such a clause can already be found in Canada andthe European Union. It has to be noted however, thatexperiences with such a public interest clause haveonly partly been successful. Nevertheless, an obliga-tory assessment of the economy-wide impact of AD/CV measures would help reduce their protectionistbias.

Such as the provisions concerning the de minimisthreshold of dumping margins.

One could consider doubling the de minimis thresh-olds for developing countries.

The ambiguous/imprecise wording of the ADA al-lowed the United States to restrict the 2 per centthreshold to cases which had been initiated after theAgreement went into force. For details see the PanelReport WTO (1999b).

A subsidy investigation would therefore be immedi-ately terminated when the subsidy given by a devel-oping country does not exceed 2 per cent ad val-orem.

Prominent cases in this respect are salmon case(United States versus Chile) or General Motors andFord v. Hyundai.

The consequences of this inpreciseness becomes ap-parent when looking at some of the disputes broughtin front of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panels (andthe difficulties of Panels to find guidelines for theirdecisions unequivocally based on the Agreement’sprovisions).

Particularly the emergence of the new users in thearea of antidumping made traditional players fearthat those new users might employ this instrumentthe way they did. See for example the statement ofthe United States Trade Representative noting thatfuture trade negotiations maintain “antidumpinglaws as affective remedies against unfair trade prac-tices” while also “prevent misuse of other countries‘

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antidumping laws against U.S. exporters.” (Inside U.S.Trade 1993)

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Bhala Raj (1995). “Rethinking antidumping”, George Washington Journal of International Lawand Economics, 29 (1) 1995, 1-144.

Bian, Jiang and Gaudet, Gérard (1997). “Antidumping Laws and Oligopolistic Trade”, Journal ofEconomic Integration, 12(1), 62-86.

Bronckers, Marco C.E.J. (1996). “Rehabilitating antidumping and other trade remedies throughcost-benefit analyses”, Journal of World Trade, 30 (2), April, 5-37.

Ehrenhaft, Peter D., Hindley, Brian V., Michalopulos, C., and Winters, A., (1997). Policies onImports from Economies in Transition, the World Bank.

Federal Register, Notices of the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commissionon the initiation of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, on preliminary and finalresults of such investigations and on preliminary and final results of sunset and administrativereviews; various issues from 1966 – 1999.

Guasch, J. L., and Rajapatirana, S. (1998). Antidumping and Competition Policies in Latin Americaand Caribbean: Total Strangers or Soul Mates, World Bank Working Paper.

Gupta, R.K. (1996). Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures: The Complete Reference, NewDelhi, Thousand Oaks, California.

Hansen, W. L., and Prusa, T. J. (1996). “Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The sum of theparts is greater than the whole”, Economic Inquiry 34 (4).

Hindley, Brian, and Messerlin, Patrick A. (1996). “Legalised Protectionism in the WTO: Antidumpingand What to Do About It”, American Enterprise Institute, Washington.

Hoekman, Bernard M., and Mavroidis, Petros C. (1996). “Dumping, antidumping and antitrust”,Journal of World Trade, 30 (1), February, 27-52.

Horlick, Gary N. (1993). “How the GATT became protectionist: an analysis of the Uruguay Rounddraft final antidumping code”, Journal of World Trade, 27 (5), Oct., 5-17.

Horlick, Gary N., and Shea, Eleanor C. (1995). “The World Trade Organization Antidumping Agree-ment”, Journal of World Trade, 29 (1) Feb., 5-31.

Inside U.S. Trade (1993). Letter from U.S Trade Representative Michael Kantor to Senator ErnestHollings, 29 June 1993 (reprint), 2 July.

Kufour, Kofi Oteng (1998). “The developing countries and the shaping of GATT/WTO antidumpinglaw”, Journal of World Trade, 32 (6) Dec. 1998, 167-196.

Messerlin, P. A. (1988). “Antidumping Laws and Developing Countries”, PPR Working Paper, TheWorld Bank, 1988.

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Messerlin, P.A. (1989). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal 1980–1985”, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 125(3), 563-587.

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Pangratis, Angelos, and Vermulst, Edwin (1994). “Injury in anti-dumping proceedings: the need tolook beyond the Uruguay Round results”, Journal of World Trade, 28 (5), Oct., 61-96.

Prusa, Thomas J. (1998). “Cumulation and Anti-dumping: A Challenge to Competition”, BlackwellPublishers Ltd, 1021-1033.

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No. 1 Erich Supper, Is there effectively a level playing field for developing countryexports?, 2001.

No. 2 Arvind Pangariya, E-commerce, WTO and developing countries, 2000.

No. 3 Joseph Francois, Assessing the results of general equilibrium studies of multi-lateral trade negotiations , 2000.

No. 4 John Whalley, What can the developing countries infer from the UruguayRound models for future negotiations?, 2000.

No. 5 Susan Teltscher, Tariffs, taxes and electronic commerce: Revenue implicationsfor developing countries, 2000.

No. 6 Bijit Bora, Peter J. Lloyd, Mari Pangestu, Industrial policy and the WTO, 2000.

No. 7 Emilio J. Medina-Smith, Is the export-led growth hypothesis valid for develop-ing countries? A case study of Costa Rica, 2001.

No. 8 Christopher Findlay, Service sector reform and development strategies: Issuesand research priorities, 2001.

No. 9 Inge Nora Neufeld, Anti-dumping and countervailing procedures – Use orabuse? Implications for developing countries, 2001.

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