Annual report Bel V 2013

ANNUAL REPORT | 2013

Message from the Chairman .........................................................................................3Preface .........................................................................................................................................4Editorial .......................................................................................................................................5

1 | Regulatory activities in Belgium .............................................71.1 General assessment of nuclear facilities ..........................................................81.2 Overview of inspections at nuclear power plants .............................101.3 Overview of inspections in other nuclear facilities .............................141.4 Emergency preparedness and response ......................................................18

2 | Safety assessments and national projects .........212.1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) .............................................................222.2 Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR) ....................................................................................232.3 Long-Term Operation (LTO) .........................................................................................242.4 Shutdown program Doel 1/2 ....................................................................................252.5 BEST project: Belgian stress tests ...........................................................................262.6 Radioactive waste management ..........................................................................282.7 MYRRHA (SCK•CEN) .........................................................................................292.8 Reactor vessel flaws ........................................................................................30

3 | International activities & projects ...................................333.1 OECD and IAEA activities ................................................................................................343.2 Cooperation with safety authorities ..................................................................353.3 Cooperation with technical safety organisations ...............................373.4 Assistance projects of the European Commission ............................39

4 | Expertise management ...........................................................................434.1 Domestic experience feedback ..............................................................................444.2 Foreign operating experience feedback ......................................................454.3 Knowledge management .............................................................................................464.4 Research & development ...............................................................................................474.5 Training ................................................................................................................................................56

Financial report .....................................................................................................................57Balance sheet as at 31 December 2013 ...................................................................58Profit and loss account as at 31 December 2013 .........................................60Profit and loss account: notes .............................................................................................61

List of abbreviations ..................................................................................................................................62

CONTENTS

2013 | ANNUAL REPORT | BEL V 3

In 2013 Bel V celebrated its 5th anniversary. The achievements reached during that short period have been impressive. The workforce has nearly doubled, from a little over 40 to almost 80. Recruitment and training have been intensive. We

can be proud of the result: a multidisciplinary team of high-level experts in nuclear safety and radiation protection, working to protect employees and the public from the potential dangers of ionizing radiation. The range of services offered continues to grow, with developments in the areas of decommissioning, storage of radioactive waste, physical protection and the transport of radioactive products.

At the request of Belgium, an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) was scheduled for late 2013. In order to prepare for this IRRS, the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) and Bel V carried out a self-assessment exercise in 2012, based on the IAEA questionnaire. This exercise resulted in the development of an action plan, which was implemented in 2013. The mission in Belgium took place during the first two weeks of December and involved a great many experts from both Bel V and the FANC. The results (available on the website of the FANC) are very positive. In particular, they confirm the role of Bel V as a technical support to the FANC, thus forming an integral part of the Belgian regulatory body. Proposals for improvement were drawn up and incorporated into an action plan to be implemented in view of the follow-up mission expected two to three years from now.

Bel V’s mission of monitoring the safety of Belgian nuclear facilities is part of the overall inspection and control strategy developed in close collaboration with the FANC. In 2013, special attention was paid to the way the operators develop their safety culture. Safety culture observation sheets are used to this end, and are considered by the IRRS team as a good practice that can serve as an example. The annual safety evaluation of the various facilities was carried out according to the standards of our quality system. This evaluation is presented by Bel V to each of the operating organisations and discussed with its management in the presence of the FANC. The results of the annual evaluation are used for drawing up the control programme for the following year.

Given the financial resources available to Bel V, the Board of Directors decided to intensify Bel V’s research and development activities. Initiatives were taken to provide financial support to the work of researchers at Belgian universities in areas of interest to nuclear safety, to participate actively in international research programmes and to enhance Bel V’s computing means that make it possible to model the accidental behaviour of nuclear facilities. These actions are intended to foster the development of Bel V’s technical expertise.

Finally, I would like to congratulate the management team and thank the entire workforce for the results achieved and for the professionalism with which they carry out their tasks.

Michel JURISSE, IrChairman of the Board of Directors

MESSAGEFROM THE

CHAIRMAN

Michel JURISSE, IrChairman of the Board of Directors

4 BEL V | ANNUAL REPORT | 2013

Bel V, an incorporated foundation, was established on 7 September 2007 by the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC).

It is governed by the Belgian Act of 27 June 1921 on non-profit associations, international non-profit associations and foundations, and by its own Articles of Association as filed at the registry of the Brussels Court of First Instance.

Not intended for any pursuit of profit, it aims to contribute technically and scientifically to the protection of the population and the environment against the dangers of ionizing radiation.

In 2013, the Board of Directors of Bel V was composed of:

M. Jurisse, Ir past Chairman of the Board of the FANC

Ph. De Sadeleer current Chairman of the Board of the FANC

J. Bens, Ir General Manager of the FANC

J. Vereecken, Irdoctor in applied sciences, professor at the VUB

PREFACE

BOARD OF DIRECTORS


2012 had been marked by the detection of flaw indications in the steel material of the reactor pressure vessels at Doel 3 and Tihange 2. At the beginning of 2013, these two units remained shut down, until such time as

their operation could once again be justified in terms of safety. The justification file submitted by the operator at the end of 2012 was thoroughly analysed by the experts at Bel V as well as by colleagues abroad. The positive outcome of the analysis made it possible for the FANC to authorize in May the restart of the two units, provided an action plan was put in place in view of the refuelling outage planned for 2014.

The effect of the Fukushima accident continued to be felt throughout the year. For the nuclear power plants, Bel V continued to monitor the implementation of the operators’ action plans. For major nuclear facilities other than nuclear power plants, Bel V evaluated the reports drawn up by the operators in accordance with the specifications of the FANC, participated in preparing the national report and verified on the ground that the operators’ action plans were being implemented.

The decision of the Belgian government, in July 2012, to authorise operation of Tihange 1 for another 10-year period (i.e. until 2025) and to close Doel 1/2 permanently in 2015, prompted Bel V to redirect its efforts. For Tihange 1, the task consists essentially of two aspects: an analysis of the ageing of the facility on the one hand, and the safety improvements to be made on the other. For Doel 1/2, the decision to close down led the operator to identify three different types of action: preparing for the final shutdown (including the realignment of projects currently under way), building a treatment unit for decontamination and decommissioning waste, and evacuating spent fuel and other waste currently present in the spent fuel pools.

Several decommissioning projects are under way or in preparation. The decommissioning of BR3 at SCK•CEN, of the Belgonucléaire factory and of Ghent University’s Thetis reactor is being monitored in the context of the inspection of these facilities. There are plans to begin decommissioning the FBFC fuel factory at Dessel in the near future. Monitoring these projects provides Bel V with the opportunity to acquire knowledge and expertise that will be useful for preparing the supervision of the decommissioning of Doel 1/2.

The pre-licensing phase concerning the future facility for the disposal of radioactive waste in Dessel to be developed by ONDRAF/NIRAS came to an end in late 2012. Bel V cooperated very closely with the FANC in both the development of the requirements and in verifying how these requirements will be met. The official licence application was submitted by ONDRAF/NIRAS in early 2013. The evaluation of the safety analysis report on the facility was then initiated, in accordance with the principles laid down in the pre-licensing phase.

Benoît DE BOECK, IrGeneral Manager

EDITORIAL

Benoît DE BOECK, IrGeneral Manager


Regulatory activities in Belgium1


1| Regulatory activities in Belgium

1.1 General assessment of nuclear facilities

1.1.1 Nuclear power plants

Flaw indications were detected during outage in the reactor pressure vessels of Doel 3 (in June 2012) and Tihange 2 (in September 2012). Both units remained shut down until 17 May 2013. In view of this long shutdown period a specific inspection program was put in place together with the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) to closely monitor the restart of the units.

The Long-Term Operation (LTO) project is ongoing for Tihange 1, in view of the decision to authorise operation for another 10-year period, i.e. until 2025. An action plan was drawn up for the improvement of Tihange 1, based on the safety evaluation report established by Electrabel and reviewed by the FANC / Bel V . Specific inspections were carried out in the context of the follow-up of this action plan.

Electrabel developed an action plan for the end of operation and future dismantling of Doel 1/2. Discussions about this subject continued in 2013 between Electrabel and the FANC / Bel V.

In mid-2013 a gel-like substance was discovered in a number of drums containing conditioned waste, both at Belgoprocess and at the Doel site. As a result of this discovery, a close collaboration was initiated by the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials (ONDRAF/NIRAS), the FANC and Bel V to thoroughly investigate and remediate this problem.

In the wake of the Fukushima accident, operators were asked to conduct stress tests. Safety evaluation reports for the two sites were prepared by Electrabel and reviewed by the FANC / Bel V and external experts. Action plans were developed. Various modifications were made to the facilities or are in the process of implementation. In 2013, specific inspections were also carried out at Doel and Tihange to monitor the implementation of these modifications.

1.1.2 Other nuclear facilities

Following the Fukushima accident, stress tests were conducted for all Class I nuclear facilities in operation. Safety evaluation reports were drawn up by the operators and reviewed by the FANC / Bel V. On 16 April the FANC published the national report of these stress tests on its website. The required action plans for the respective licensees were finalised by 1 July, after which the implementation phase started.

Tests and conformity checks for the commissioning of Guinevere continued throughout 2013. Final commissioning of this facility took place in September 2013. Guinevere is a test facility, a step in the development of the MYRRHA project, for which study is ongoing.

Various projects are ongoing at BR2 with a view to continuing operation after 2016.


Dismantling activities are ongoing at Belgonucléaire, without any significant contamination incidents being reported.

Examination by Belgoprocess of the management of the liquid effluents coming from the National Institute for Radioelements (IRE) continued in 2013, in particular concerning the chemical compatibility of effluents from different origins. In 2013 the CILVA incinerator was also unavailable for several months and plastic bags with animal residu were discovered at site 2.

The challenges for the management of the IRE remain numerous. Efforts are continuing to improve the safety culture. Various action plans are being implemented, including for the disposal of historic waste.

A number of different projects are under study: conversion from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for the targets, reprocessing of uranium for recycling, design study of a new facility, increase in production (higher number of targets per week), etc.

MDS-Nordion was taken over by Best Medical Belgium in 2012, but the latter was declared bankrupt in 2012, and part of the facilities are now operated by ONDRAF/NIRAS and part by NTP. Some undeclared radioactive sources were discovered. Elimination of radioactive waste accumulated on site was started.

There is still no solution for the evacuation of old degraded sources of Sterigenics which are stored in the pool.

Dismantling of the Thetis research reactor started in 2013.

1.1.3 Integrated strategy for control

The integrated strategy for inspection (by the FANC) and control (by Bel V) was applied in 2013.

The control program for 2013 was sent to the facilities at the end of the previous year. Performance indicators are used to monitor the execution of the program.

More attention is being paid to human factors and human performance, safety management and the development of a safety culture. In particular, the use of ‘safety culture observation sheets’ was continued and improved in 2013.


1.2 Overview of inspections at nuclear power plants

The regulations require permanent inspections during operation of the seven Belgian nuclear units. The aim of these inspections is to verify compliance with the licence, and to assess the licensee’s safety management and safety culture.

About 330 inspections were performed at the seven Belgian nuclear units in 2013.

An overview of the main inspection activities performed by Bel V inspectors is given hereafter for each unit.

1.2.1 Doel 1/2

There was no annual refuelling outage at Doel 1 in 2013.

On 28 February there was a planned brief outage at Doel 1 in order to repair a steam leak.

Doel 2 was shut down for refuelling between 31 May and 22 June.

The common annual outage for the safety injection and diesel sequence tests took place from 7 June to 13 June.

Neither Doel 1 nor Doel 2 had any reactor trips.

1.2.2 Doel 3

Doel 3 had been shut down since June 2012 while awaiting justification of the mechanical integrity of the reactor pressure vessel. After receiving a favourable opinion from the safety authorities with regard to start-up, the unit has been operational again since the beginning of June 2013. The unit operated at nominal power for the rest of the year, except for:

• a planned outage on 20 September for repair of a non-classified safety valve. At the time of the start-up after the aforementioned repairs, a reactor trip occurred on 21 September due to a very low level in a steam generator due to malfunctioning, non-safety-related control systems;

• a reactor trip on 7 November due to a complete loss of the main feedwater caused by human error.

An issue of non-compliance with the regulations for environmental qualification for a number of classified connectors was identified.

In the beginning of 2013 water seepage was observed in a space between the foundations of a number of buildings. The source of this seepage was ground water mixed with water from the Scheldt. It was demonstrated that this has no negative impact on the stability of the buildings and by extension on nuclear safety.


1.2.3 Doel 4

The reactor was at nominal power throughout the year, except for:• a planned outage (24 days, 19 July to 12 August) for replacement of the rotor on the turbo alternator;• an unplanned outage (1 day, 14 August) as a result of a reactor trip due to loss of the 380 kV connection with the grid.

Internal flooding of the mechanical support services building (GMH: Gebouw van de Mechanische Hulpdiensten) occurred, as a result of which the fuel supply pumps of two safety diesel generators were flooded.

1.2.4 WAB-SCG

WAB: The scale of the corrosion problem in the WAB was further revealed in the course of the year. In addition to the ground water evaporators and one concentrate tank, it now appears that several other concentrate tanks are also severely affected. Various projects are being launched to replace the necessary components in the short term. To date, the operation of the WAB has not been affected.

In the Spring, drums originating from KCD were found at Belgoprocess with gel leaking out. This resulted in a thorough investigation into this phenomenon, the origin of which is likely an alkali–silica reaction (ASR) in the drums containing conditioned waste. This concerns thousands of drums produced over the last decade. The production of the conditioning lines for concentrates and ion-exchange resins were stopped. A new conditioning process is being sought.

SCG: In the process of the investigation into the loss of pressure identified in container TN24SH22, a reflooding of the container was carried out in the docks (SPG) of Doel 4. The container was given a new cover and was once again placed in the SCG without any problems.

1.2.5 Doel site

The Bel V control program at the site was further implemented as follows:• Meetings were held with the heads of various departments (Maintenance, Operations, Care, Engineering) and services,

in order to evaluate their organisation and the management of different processes related to nuclear safety or radiation protection.

• More attention was paid to human factors and human performance, housekeeping, resolution of minor deficiencies, etc., bearing in mind the importance of the sustainability of improvement actions.

Bel V provided support to the FANC within the framework of its inspections, especially for the ‘management inspection’.


Bel V was also closely involved in the Belgian stress test project (BEST), which resulted in various changes to facilities and procedures. The change to the emergency plan organisation as a result of the BEST project was also implemented in the past year.

It is worth mentioning as well the follow-up on the action plan resulting from the common periodic safety review, which was completed at the end of 2011 and resulted in changes to facilities, procedures and the safety analysis report.

1.2.6 Tihange 1

The unit operated at nominal power throughout the year, except for:• the refuelling outage from 30 March until 2 June. Mention should be made of:

- the vessel inspection showing that there were no defects due to hydrogen and no underclad defects; - the replacement of the low-pressure safety injection pumps;

• a reactor trip on 2 June, due to a high level in a steam generator;• a reactor trip on 7 July, due to a low level in a steam generator.

1.2.7 Tihange 2

Tihange 2 had been shut down since September 2012 while awaiting confirmation of the mechanical integrity of the reactor pressure vessel. After receiving a positive opinion from the safety authorities in May 2013, the unit was restarted and operated at nominal power from 17 June for the rest of the year, except for:

• an automatic shutdown of the reactor on 31 July (spurious closure of a valve in the secondary circuit);• an automatic shutdown of the reactor on 19 September (error when carrying out a routine test of the logical reactor

protection signals).


1.2.8 Tihange 3

The unit operated at nominal power throughout the year, except for:• the refuelling outage from 24 August until 30 September. Mention should be made of:

- the vessel inspection showing that there were no defects due to hydrogen and no underclad defects; - the discovery of traces of boric acid on the vessel head. These come from a valve leak. The head was inspected and

it was noted that the pressure boundary has not been affected by the boric acid;• a manual emergency shutdown on 11 January as a result of the loss of the compressed air system (as a result of a

non-isolable leak).

1.2.9 Tihange site

The Bel V control program at the site was implemented as follows:• Meetings were held with the management and the heads of various departments (Maintenance, Operations, Care,

Engineering) and services in order to evaluate their organisation and the management of various processes relating to nuclear safety or radiation protection.

• Attention was paid to human factors and human performance, housekeeping, resolution of minor deficiencies, etc., bearing in mind the importance of the sustainability of improvement actions.

• Specific inspections were carried out to address topics that apply to several units.

Bel V provided support to the FANC within the framework of its inspections, especially the inspections relating to management and the follow-up of the BEST project.

Bel V was also closely involved in the BEST project, which resulted in changes to facilities and procedures and the construction of new buildings.

It is worth mentioning as well the follow-up on the action plan resulting from the periodic safety review, which was completed at the end of 2011 and also resulted in changes to facilities, procedures and the safety analysis report.


1.3 Overview of inspections in other nuclear facilities

1.3.1 Nuclear Research Centre (SCK•CEN)

The operating regime of the BR2 reactor in 2013 consisted of 3 cycles of 3 weeks and 3 cycles of 4 weeks.

In the context of the replacement of the beryllium matrix of the BR2 in 2015, Bel V and the FANC agreed with the positive assessment of the Health Physics Department regarding the design of the beryllium matrix (plans, material specifications and control program).

A formal report for the final acceptance of the modification of the VENUS facility, as part of the Guinevere project, was drawn up by Bel V in September 2013. Thereafter the confirmation decree was drawn up in October 2013 (Belgian Official Journal of 06/11/2013).

As a consequence of the Fukushima accident, a stress test of the facilities was carried out by SCK•CEN. This analysis led to the preparation of an action plan that was approved by the FANC. The progress of the stress test action plan is being monitored by Bel V.

1.3.2 Belgoprocess

As a result of the safety audit carried out in October 2010, Belgoprocess initiated the Strategic Safety Program (SSP). This action plan is periodically monitored by Bel V and the FANC.

In January 2012, a FLITS inspection took place at Belgoprocess. A follow-up inspection was carried out in 2013 to verify the implementation of the actions in the installations.

In February 2013, Bel V was informed of a number of leaking drums in building 151X. These drums contain concentrates coming from KCD. In the context of this problem, an initial inspection campaign of a number of drums was performed in July 2013. A comprehensive inspection plan was drawn up, according to which two drums from every concentrate campaign produced at KCD were inspected. These inspections took place in October and November 2013.

Monitoring of these KCD drums with a yellowish gel-like substance in buildings 150X and 151X was conducted by means of inspection tours and a higher frequency of air monitoring.

As a result of a leak in the boiler of the CILVA installation, the installation was unavailable for about seven months. While awaiting the repair of the installation, combustible waste was stored in a temporary controlled area in CILVA. The CILVA installation was restarted in October, after the necessary tests had been successfully completed.


Within the framework of the UF6 project, the changes with regard to the storage of cylinders in building 123X and the rinsing and recertification in building 102X were approved by the Health Physics Department and by Bel V. The commissioning of the facility for rinsing and certification has yet to take place.

As regards the problem of liquid waste at Belgoprocess, the tanks and their drip-trays in building 108 were inspected. A corrosion study and a neutron measurement of the NCP-evaporator were also carried out. Based on the results of the inspections and studies, Belgoprocess’ proposal regarding the future of building 108X will be discussed.

As a consequence of the Fukushima accident, a stress test of the facilities was carried out by Belgoprocess. This analysis led to the preparation of an action plan that was approved by the FANC. The progress of the stress test action plan is being monitored by Bel V.

The second presentation to the Scientific Council of the installation for the production of monoliths (IPM – ‘Installatie Productie Monolieten’) took place on 13 September. Belgoprocess filed an objection to the proposed licensing decree for IPM. The case was discussed at the 20/12/2013 session of the Scientific Council, at which the Council issued a favourable final opinion on the licence application.

1.3.3 Belgonucleaire

In 2013, work continued on the dismantling of the glove boxes in building A without any serious problems. At the same time, preparations began for the isolation and eventual release of building H. Before emptying out building H, non-nuclear spaces from building L, among other things, were converted into controlled or supervised areas. Thus rooms L4 and L5 were fitted with equipment for cutting neutron panels and the equipment for measuring releases was transferred to room L10. A radiological survey of building H was conducted and will serve as the starting point for the release of building H.

In the course of 2013, a thematic inspection was carried out focusing on ventilation, and in particular on the adjustments made during the isolation of building H from building A. Another inspection theme was ’experience management (REX)’, which indicates that for a facility in the process of being dismantled, such as Belgonucleaire, experience management has been embedded in the process of continuous improvement. Both positive and negative points are taken into consideration, thereby contributing to the company’s safety culture.


1.3.4 National Institute for Radioelements (IRE)

In 2013, there was a looming shortage in the global supply of Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99, an isotope used in nuclear medicine), a problem that continues until today. Two of the five Mo-99 chemical nuclear factories faced major safety issues or concerns in 2013. During this period, the IRE successfully supplied part of the missing product to the rest of the world.

The controls carried out by Bel V in 2013 have highlighted a number of trends:• The supervision of the key process as well as the management of the IRE have been continuously reinforced.• The IRE has continued its program to eliminate historic waste accumulating on site.• The IRE is developing new production capacity using low-enriched uranium (LEU) instead of highly enriched uranium

(HEU).• The IRE submitted a dossier to the Scientific Council of the FANC to increase production capacity.

The stress test program for the existing facilities designed in the 1970s (as well as the periodic safety review) has identified some areas of improvement. Based on this exercise, the IRE submitted an action plan, which was discussed and approved by the regulator. The report of the stress test program has been published on the website of the FANC: www.fanc.fgov.be.

1.3.5 Thetis

In 2013, 9 systematic inspections, 12 specific inspections and 1 thematic inspection on fire safety were carried out.

In the second quarter, only one significant incident was reported to Bel V: ‘Lack of depression cascade in the reactor building’. Various measures were taken in order to prevent a similar incident in the future.

Dismantling of the reactor was carried out between March and August 2013.

The removal of the remaining asbestos (phase 4) and the activated reactor vessel, the floor plate and the underlying concrete (phase 5) is scheduled for 2014.

1.3.6 Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM)

In 2013, 12 systematic inspections, 1 specific inspection and 4 thematic inspections on fire safety, document management and emergency plan were carried out.

No significant incidents occurred in 2013.


1.3.7 Franco-Belgian Fuel Fabrication (FBFC)

In 2013, 11 systematic inspections, 1 specific inspection and 2 thematic inspections on fire safety and document management were carried out.

The dismantling licence for buildings 1, 2, 3, 5 and 5M were obtained at the end of October 2013.

The dismantling of buildings 1, 2 and 3 is proceeding on schedule.

In building 5, the dismantling of the installations began in December 2013.

No significant incidents occurred in 2013.

1.3.6 Other (Class II and III) facilities

Bel V carried out about 150 inspections in Class II and III facilities. No accidents were recorded. A few incidents were reported and correctly managed by the licensees.

The main safety concern regarding some of these types of facilities is the accumulation of radioactive waste, which is sometimes stored in public institutions such as universities.

Another safety issue is the fact that there are a number of accelerators in Belgium that will no longer be used. None of them has declared to have ceased activity, however, which has hindered the dismantling of these machines.


1.4 Emergency preparedness and response

1.4.1 Emergency response exercises

In 2013, six emergency preparedness and response exercises were held under the supervision of the Directorate-General Crisis Centre of the Federal Public Service Interior (DG Crisis Centre):

• in June for the Belgoprocess nuclear facility: partial exercise limited to the interaction between the emergency crisis cell of the licensee (on-site) and the evaluation cell CELEVAL (off-site);

• in June for the SCK•CEN nuclear facility: partial exercise limited to the interaction between the emergency crisis cell of the licensee (on-site) and the evaluation cell CELEVAL (off-site);

• in June: final part of the series of exercises held by the ‘Grande Région’ with focus on cross-border interactions between the Belgian, Luxembourg, French and German organisations involved. Unfortunately, due to the scope and characteristics this final exercise was very limited for Belgium (as was also the case in 2012);

• in October for the Doel nuclear power plant: partial exercise with participation of local authorities and emergency services in addition to federal units and committees (coordination committee, evaluation/information/measurement units). A support team assisted the participating bodies at all stages of the exercise (development, preparation, execution and evaluation);

• in December for the Tihange nuclear power plant: partial exercise limited to the interaction between the emergency crisis cell of the licensee (on-site) and the evaluation cell CELEVAL (off-site). It should be noted that this exercise was

observed by two team members of the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) of the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), on site and at the evaluation cell CELEVAL.

All these exercises were prepared, conducted and evaluated according to a new Belgian methodology for the preparation, execution and evaluation of emergency preparedness and response exercises. Bel V was heavily involved in these exercises, as a stakeholder but also as ‘controller’ and ‘evaluator’ for the Doel nuclear power plant exercise (a Bel V representative was appointed as ‘local exercise coordinator’ and member of the exercise management team). A Bel V representative was also involved in the two workshops for first responders that were held in Beveren in the context of this exercise.

In addition to the exercises mentioned above, Bel V observed an internal exercise at the Doel site in October, which focussed on improvements that were implemented in the context of the Belgian stress test program (BEST).


1.4.2 Other related activities

Bel V participated in the continuation of projects that have been initiated in previous years (such as the implementation, within the various Emergency Planning Zones concerned, of the principles and guidelines as defined in 2009-2010).

Bel V, together with the FANC, has been involved by the DG Crisis Centre in the process of reviewing the Royal Decree on the nuclear and radiological emergency plan for the Belgian territory. It is expected to publish a revised version of this plan before the end of 2015 after consultation of the stakeholders.

Bel V, together with the FANC, participated in the preparation and the progress of the specific module on emergency preparedness and response (module 10) of the IRRS mission in Belgium (December 2013).

1.4.3 Improvement of Bel V’s role

In order to improve the Belgian emergency preparedness and response in case of a nuclear emergency and especially the role of Bel V herein:

• Bel V staff participated in the Belgian emergency preparedness and response exercises, which, besides the response activities, required a lot of preparation, observation and evaluation of the response by the Bel V crisis team, by the licensee and by other parties involved (evaluation cell of the DG Crisis Centre);

• a Bel V representative participated as Emergency Preparedness & Planning Reviewer in a follow-up mission of the IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) in France (Cattenom, June 2013);

• Bel V participated in R&D activities in the domain of emergency preparedness and response, in the context of a research program with the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) in view of developing cognitive radio for nuclear power plants (4-year program connected with a Doctorate).

1.4.4 International collaboration

Bel V took part, partly in support of the Belgian competent authorities (nuclear safety authorities – TSOs), in the following working groups:

• Task Group on Accident Management of the OECD/NEA-CNRA (Paris, February 2013);• WG Emergencies of HERCA (Heads of European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities)

(The Hague, January 2013);• exchange meeting between IRSN, the FANC and Bel V on emergency preparedness and response

(Brussels, March 2013).

Safety assessments and national projects2


2 | Safety assessments and national projects

2.1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA)

In the context of the implementation of the WENRA Reference Levels for all existing nuclear power plants (as required by the Royal Decree of 30 November 2011) Electrabel and Tractebel Engineering continued their efforts to develop an Internal Fire PSA and an Internal Flooding PSA for the Belgian nuclear power plants. These PSA models will include a plant-specific PSA Level 1 for each of the units (except Doel 1/2, which will be permanently shut down in 2015) and a PSA Level 2 for a representative unit (Doel 3). All plant operating states will be covered. In 2013, Bel V reviewed further developments to the Internal Flooding PSA methodology and the development of the Flooding PSA study for Doel 3. For the Internal Fire PSA, focus was mainly on the follow-up of the collection of all required data and the cable routing for each unit, and to the review of the project schedule.

Bel V also monitors the on-site implementation of PSA recommendations (i.e. plant modifications, procedural changes, etc.) made in 2011 after a global upgrade of the PSA models for internal events, which took place during the previous Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR). In addition, these plant-specific PSA models were further updated in 2012/2013 by taking into account all plant modifications up to 2010.

The next upgrade of the PSA models for internal events should again review the PSA scope and methodologies, in particular taking into account the recommendations of an external peer review of the Doel 3 PSA against the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard for PSA. The preparation of this PSA upgrade is also subject of discussions between Bel V, Electrabel and Tractebel Engineering.

Through meetings with the PSA Standing Committee of Electrabel and Tractebel Engineering, Bel V monitors the gradually increasing use of the PSA models by Electrabel for various PSA applications. Examples are the use of a risk matrix, the evaluation of the plant status using the Risk Increase Factor, PSA-based event analysis (precursor analysis) of real events, and the PSA-based evaluation of the safety impact of planned modifications. For these PSA applications, recent developments and results worth mentioning are regularly presented by the licensee and discussed with Bel V.

Bel V’s international and R&D activities on PSA methodology and PSA applications are presented in Section 4.4 on research and development.


2.2 Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR)

A Periodic Safety Review consists in an evaluation by the licensee of 14 ‘safety factors’ as defined in the IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-2.10 (recently replaced by SSG-25), the use of which is required by the FANC for all Class I nuclear facilities.

• Nuclear power plants – 2nd Common PSRsScope and methodology documents according to the guidelines of the FANC were issued for all the units. All assessment reports for Doel 3 (one per safety factor and one for the overall safety evaluation) were reviewed by Bel V. The conclusions of these assessments were discussed by the safety authorities and the licensee. A final version of the resulting action plan still needs to be provided by the licensee.All assessment reports for Tihange 2 (one per safety factor and one for the overall safety evaluation) were submitted to Bel V in mid-July. A review of these started during the autumn. This review and the discussions on the conclusions of their assessment with the licensee will be continued until early 2014.The scope and methodology documents for the PSR of Tihange 1 & 3, Doel 1/2 and Doel 4 were reviewed, with the exception of Doel 1/2, for which a revised version was provided in mid-July following the decision to close those units in 2015.A number of initial presentations, for some safety factors, of the work to be performed by the licensee for those units in order to perform the PSR evaluation took place during the second half of the year.

• SCK•CENScope and methodology documents were issued and presented for all SCK•CEN installations.First deliverables in support of the assessment reports were provided to Bel V during the second half of 2013. The review of the PSR supporting document and assessment reports will be continued until June 2016.

• First periodic safety review of the IREThe periodic safety review of the IRE consists of 17 subjects, distributed over 154 tasks. The progress of the project is monitored through deliverables and quarterly meetings. Early 2013, nine subjects out of 17 were still open. Early 2014, two subjects were still open, but almost completed.

• Periodic safety review at BelgoprocessAll actions of the periodic satefy review have been completed for site 2.For site 1, two actions need to be further developed.


2.3 Long-Term Operation (LTO)

The study phase of the Long-Term Operation project launched by Electrabel for Tihange 1 and Doel 1/2 was completed in June 2012 with the publication of the final and approved summary LTO reports.

These reports include a detailed action plan and schedule for each area covered by the ‘FANC and Bel V Strategy Note on Long-Term Operation’:

• the development of an Ageing Management Program;• a re-evaluation of the design (Agreed Design Upgrade);• pre-conditions to be fulfilled before the start of the life extension period (2015);• knowledge management issues.

In July 2012, the government decided to permanently close Doel 1/2 by 2015 and to allow the implementation phase of the project (the so-called ‘LTO program’) for Tihange 1 under certain conditions. This was laid down in law in December 2013.

Meanwhile, the implementation of the agreed action plan for the Tihange site started in January 2013. The licensee organisation of the LTO program is now fully operational.

A detailed schedule of actions (‘commitments’) was prepared by Electrabel on the basis of the main milestones and LTO deadlines and in accordance with the final and approved LTO reports.

Bel V has put in place a specific organisation for monitoring the action plan implementation, verifying the compliance of these actions with the LTO study phase and observance of the schedule.


2.4.1 Final shutdown of Doel 1/2

Since the government decision on the final closure of Doel 1/2 was announced, Bel V has been closely involved in the ‘final shutdown’ project in preparation for the decommissioning and dismantling of the units. It should be noted in this regard that during the various phases of the final shutdown, the same standards for nuclear safety and radiation protection will be adhered to as during operation.

Aspects which were analysed during the considered period or for which analysis is still ongoing:• reduction of the scope of the ongoing projects and modifications;• proposals for organisational changes for the period in which all nuclear fuel elements are located in the nuclear fuel

docks of the nuclear support services building (GNH);• proposals for changes to the technical specifications in order to render them more appropriate for the period in which

all fuel elements are located in the fuel docks of the GNH;• discussions regarding the preparations for the chemical decontamination of the primary loop.

2.4.2 Waste Management Facility (WMF) and Dismantling Licence Doel 1/2 (DL)

Electrabel is planning the construction of a Waste Management Facility (WMF) as a supporting building for the dismantling and decontamination activities for the final shutdown of Doel 1/2. This building will also be used during the final dismantling of the other units on the site.

The design of the building is currently under discussion. It is intended at first for cutting up and decontaminating (non-combustible) solid waste from the dismantling of Doel 1/2 that is eligible for near-surface disposal. Electrabel intends to package this waste in monoliths for transport to the near-surface disposal area, bearing in mind the acceptance criteria for the said disposal. As regards the design, monthly progress meetings are held with Bel V. During these meetings, efforts are made to ensure consistency with the later dismantling licence.

2.4 Shutdown program Doel 1/2


2.5 BEST project: Belgian stress tests

2.5.1 Nuclear power plants

In the wake of the accident that occurred on 11 March 2011 at the Japanese Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant, a wide-scale targeted safety reassessment program was set up among the Member States of the European Union that operate nuclear power plants on their soil. This ‘stress test’ program was designed to re-evaluate the safety margins of the European nuclear power plants when faced with extreme natural events, and to take relevant action wherever needed.

The stress tests of the Belgian nuclear power plants included the following main steps:1. reports of Electrabel (2011),2. national report of the safety authority (2011),3. peer review, country visit and final ENSREG overall report, in accordance with the ENSREG methodology (2012),4. action plan of Electrabel based on findings from the previous steps, and approval by the safety authority (2012).

Bel V was involved in steps 2 to 4.

Bel V is now in charge of the technical and organisational follow-up of the implementation of the actions by Electrabel. This follow-up includes the assessment of studies and implementations, regular follow-up meetings and on-site inspections, sometimes with the contribution of the FANC.

Electrabel indicated in the course of 2013 that some actions were delayed, for a number of reasons including the complexity of studies and implementations, additional actions resulting from conclusions of studies, delays due to difficulties resulting from equipment qualification by providers or organisation of the activities during the outages. The analysis of the causes of the delays resulted at the end of 2013 in a more realistic revision of the action plan, approved by the safety authority after assessment of the Electrabel analysis by Bel V.


2.5.2 Other Class I facilities

In addition to the stress tests of the Belgian nuclear power plants, the Belgian Federal Parliament decided (House of Representatives, ‘Résolution relative aux modalités des stress tests et leurs conséquences sur les installations nucléaires’, 16/06/2011) to adopt the FANC specifications for all Class I nuclear facilities (‘Belgian Stress Tests specifications – applicable to all nuclear plants, excluding power reactors’, 22/06/2011). The 6 Class I facilities concerned are: SCK•CEN (Mol), Belgoprocess (Mol-Dessel), the IRE (Fleurus), WAB (Doel nuclear power plant), FBFC International (Dessel) and IRMM (Geel).

In accordance with the FANC methodology, the stress tests of the Belgian nuclear plants were continued in 2013 with the following steps:1. publication of the six Bel V safety evaluation reports on 1 March 2013;2. publication of the publicly available FANC national report (based on the six Bel V safety evaluation reports) on 16 April

2013;3. publication of the six consolidated licensee action plans, as approved by the FANC, on 1 July 2013; 4. FANC / Bel V program to follow up the implementation of the action plans.


2.6 Radioactive waste management

During the first half of 2013 the licensing review (which began in December 2011) of the safety case about the future installation for the production of monoliths (‘Installatie Productie Monolieten’) continued and led to the second presentation to the Scientific Council of a Bel V report about the safety of this future installation. A number of remaining safety-related issues identified during the first presentation to the Scientific Council (in September 2012) were resolved by Belgoprocess and reviewed by Bel V. This second presentation occurred in September 2013.

In collaboration with the FANC, Bel V was also deeply involved in the licensing discussions (since the licence application by NIRAS/ONDRAF on 31/01/2013) concerning the future facility for the disposal of low and intermediate level short-lived radioactive waste (category A waste) in Dessel.

In February 2013, the FANC and Bel V initiated the official licensing review of the safety case. First, a ‘quick screening’ of the safety case was carried out independently by the FANC and Bel V on the 17 chapters of this safety case. As a result of this ‘quick screening’ process, the main comments on the safety case were transmitted by the FANC / Bel V to the future licensee in June 2013. In September 2013 it was agreed with NIRAS/ONDRAF to develop a process to follow up the key safety issues raised by the FANC / Bel V in their comments. In mid-2013 Bel V initiated a detailed analysis of the safety case.

Within the framework of the long-term safety evaluations, Bel V continued its activities (using its own modeling capacity) of independent safety verification (started in February 2012).

In 2013 the FANC invited Bel V to be involved in the discussions between the FANC and NIRAS/ONDRAF on the regulatory and safety issues of the NIRAS/ONDRAF project related to a future facility in Belgium for the geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel. The FANC also asked Bel V to further develop its expertise in the field of long-term safety assessments of geological radioactive waste disposal in order to be able to technically support the FANC in the near and long-term future.

In the context of control activities at nuclear facilities, the review of safety analysis reports of several nuclear facilities related to radioactive waste treatment and storage was carried out and followed up by Bel V. Bel V also reviewed a number of safety studies/assessments. Examples of topics covered include: safety issues related to storage and treatment of liquid waste, degradation of waste drums and the issue of waste matrix degradation (production of gelatinous substance), dismantling waste after the future decommissioning of the Belgian nuclear power plants…

Cooperation with other safety authorities in the field of radioactive waste management is described in Section 3.3.


2.7 MYRRHA (SCK•CEN)

MYRRHA is a multi-purpose irradiation facility coupling a 600 MeV proton accelerator with a fast spectrum reactor of 100 MWth through spallation reactions.

In 2011, a pre-licensing phase was initiated in order to allow for convergence towards a fixed concept of the facility that can be licensed by the authorities (the FANC and Bel V) and therefore will at least satisfy the safety objectives that have been set.

In the context of this pre-licensing, Bel V is in charge of the technical assessment. As a result, focus points (technical issues that are new or not yet mature enough, that are specific to MYRRHA and that have an impact on the safety of the facility) were identified.

In 2013, the pre-licensing phase of the MYRRHA project continued: • All focus points identified have been presented in leaflets, with points for consideration and expected deliverables.• Some answers to these focus points were received from SCK•CEN and analysed by Bel V. The assessment of SCK•CEN’s

answers to the focus points will continue until the end of 2015.• Technical meetings were held to discuss the focus points with SCK•CEN.

In support to the FANC, Bel V participated in the development of guidelines concerning aircraft crashes, earthquakes, flooding and safety assessments. Bel V was also involved in the review of the Design Options and Provisions File (DOPF) Volume 2 ‘Approach to nuclear safety’. The DOPF is a document prepared by the designer detailing, in a top-down approach, the safety goals and objectives, the safety options, the safety design and operational specifications, as well as the safety provisions. The other volumes of the DOPF will be provided and analysed in 2014 and in 2015.


2.8 Reactor vessel flaws

In June 2012, in addition to the third ten-yearly in-service inspection of the circumferential welds of the Doel 3 reactor pressure vessel, an ultrasonic inspection for potential underclad cracks in the beltline region of the vessel was carried out. This inspection was part of the inspection program decided for all the Belgian units in the framework of the operational feedback at Tricastin 1, where such cracks have been identified. It was the first time since the original manufacture of Doel 3 that a limited inspection of the base metal of the vessel outside the weld areas was carried out. No underclad cracks were detected but this inspection supplemented by an additional ultrasonic inspection resulted in the detection of several thousands of quasi-laminar flaw indications in the lower and upper core shell forgings. Following the detection of flaw indications at Doel 3, similar inspections were carried out in September 2012 at Tihange 2, which has a reactor pressure vessel of identical design and construction. Similar quasi-laminar flaw indications were detected, but to a lesser extent.

The licensee decided to keep both Doel 3 and Tihange 2 in cold shutdown state with the core unloaded and initiated analyses and a testing program in support of a request for restart of operation.

The failure of the reactor pressure vessel is an event that is not considered in the safety demonstration of the nuclear power plants. It is therefore essential to ensure that such a failure never occurs during the entire lifetime of the reactor.

With the support of internal and external experts, the licensee started an investigation into the nature and origin of these indications. Conclusion of this root cause analysis was that the most likely origin of the indications as identified in the Doel 3 and Tihange 2 reactor pressure vessels was hydrogen flaking during the forging process. This conclusion is supported by the number of flaws, their shape, orientation, and location in the highly segregated areas (ghost lines) of the forgings.

The safety demonstration by the licensee was documented in two safety cases, one for each unit, as submitted to the FANC in December 2012. The safety cases, backed by a number of technical documents, allowed the licensee to conclude that the safe operation of both units was guaranteed and that the units could be restarted immediately. At the same time, the licensee proposed an action plan including the implementation of several additional measures intended to further enhance the safe operation of the units and the launch of a confirmatory material testing program.

Meanwhile, the FANC set up a dedicated organisation and commissioned two national and international expert groups to seek scientific and technical advice in order to elaborate an independent, founded and balanced judgement about the issue.

For its own part, Bel V evaluated the safety cases and their supporting technical files. This evaluation was documented in a preliminary report submitted to the FANC. The findings of this report were discussed in depth with the licensee and the final version was issued in January 2013. AIB-Vinçotte also submitted the conclusions of its evaluation to the FANC.

During the assessment process, the FANC expert groups raised a number of questions that were discussed with the licensee.


Taking into account the advice of the various expert groups and the conclusions of both the Bel V and AIB-Vinçotte evaluations, in January 2013 the FANC issued its provisional evaluation report, which concluded that some issues remained open that impaired the level of confidence in the safe operation of the units, but also that these open issues, in the current state of knowledge and given the available data, did not represent conditions that required final shutdown of Doel 3 and Tihange 2. As a consequence, the FANC considered that, in the current state of events, Doel 3 and Tihange 2 could only restart once the requirements listed in its provisional evaluation report had been met by the licensee. These requirements include short-term and medium-term actions.

In response, the licensee developed an action plan to meet those requirements, including a methodology and associated acceptance criteria where applicable. This action plan was implemented in the first half of 2013.

Once the licensee had completed its short-term action plan, the FANC, together with Bel V and AIB-Vinçotte, evaluated whether all the safety concerns at the origin of these requirements had been solved and whether the related reservations could be lifted. On this basis, on 17 May 2013, the FANC considered that Doel 3 and Tihange 2 could be restarted safely. Consequently Doel 3 and Tihange 2 resumed operation in June 2013.

The FANC also asked the licensee Electrabel to implement the medium-term actions within the deadline of the forthcoming refuelling outage of Doel 3 and to speed up the planned ultrasonic inspections for hydrogen flaking at the other Belgian units.

Given the recent decision of the Belgian Federal Government to extend the operation of Tihange 1 by ten years, the FANC had already asked the licensee to carry out the inspection at this unit early 2013. During the inspection (performed in April - May 2013) no quasi-laminar flaws were detected.

For Tihange 3 this inspection took place at the end of 2013 and no quasi-laminar flaws were detected.

For Doel 4 the specific ultrasonic investigations aimed at detecting potential flaws in the reactor vessel are scheduled for 2015. For Doel 1/2, the inspections initially scheduled in 2015 have been cancelled given the fact that both units will be decommissioned in 2015.


International activities & projects3


3 | International activities & projects

3.1 OECD and IAEA activities

Bel V participated in the activities of the following committees, working groups and meetings of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD):

• the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA); • the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI); • the Nuclear Science Committee (NSC); • the CNRA Working Group on Inspection Practices (WGIP); • the CNRA Working Group on Operating Experience (WGOE); • the CSNI Working Group on Fuel Cycle Safety (WGFCS); • the CSNI Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK); • the CSNI Working Group on Analysis and Management of Accidents (WGAMA); • the CSNI Working Group on the Integrity and Ageing of Components and Structures (IAGE), and its subgroups on the

integrity of metal components and structures and on the ageing of concrete structures; • the CSNI Working Group on Human and Organizational Factors (WGHOF); • the CSNI Working Group on Fuel Safety Margins (WGFSM); • various OECD projects (see also Section 4.4 on R&D); • the Incident Reporting System Coordinators’ activities (IRS, IRSRR, FINAS).

Bel V participated in the Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Bel V experts participated in several IAEA conferences, workshops and technical committee meetings (12 events in total), mainly on the following subjects:

• source term evaluation for severe accidents;• human and organisational factors and safety culture;• operational experience feedback;• safety of radioactive waste disposal;• decommissioning safety;• safety of fuel cycle facilities.

The General Manager of Bel V participated in two meetings of the Steering Committee of the Technical and Scientific Support Organization Forum (TSOF) of the IAEA, and in two meetings of the Program Committee of the TSO conference that will be held in Beijing in 2014.

A Bel V representative is a member of the Steering Committee on Competence of Human Resources for Regulatory Bodies (coordinated by the IAEA), and attended the fifth meeting of this committee.

Bel V contributed to the update of the Belgian report to be prepared for the sixth meeting (in 2014) of the contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. This report is available on the Bel V website.


3.2 Cooperation with safety authorities

3.2.1 Franco-Belgian Working Group on nuclear safety

This working group is composed of the regulatory organisations of France and Belgium (ASN, IRSN, the FANC, Bel V). Two meetings are held each year, one in Paris and the other in Brussels (the latter chaired by Bel V). The working group covers a large range of topics on nuclear safety.

In 2013, the following main topics were discussed: new initiatives on regulations, status of the Chooz and Gravelines nuclear power plants, cross-inspections, feedback on emergency response exercises, activities concerning the stress tests by way of follow-up of the Fukushima accident, the status of the findings and ongoing actions related to the flaw indications in the reactor pressure vessels of Doel 3 and Tihange 2, and safety issues related to the spent fuel pools.

3.2.2 Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA)

The General Manager of Bel V participated, in support of the FANC representatives, in the spring and autumn meetings of WENRA. At these meetings, the work progress of the subgroups (see below) was discussed. Interfaces with other international forums (especially ENSREG and HERCA) were also discussed at these meetings. In 2013, special attention was devoted to the future role of WENRA and the flaw indications observed in the reactor pressure vessels of Doel 3 and Tihange 2.

Reactor Harmonization Working Group (RHWG)Bel V participated in the three RHWG meetings held in 2013. One of these meetings was co-organised by the FANC and Bel V in Leuven. The RHWG worked mainly on the following topics: specific safety issues for new nuclear power plants, resulting in the publication of the ‘RHWG Report on Safety of new NPP designs’ and the follow-up of the Fukushima accident. With respect to the latter, the RHWG has several subgroups, working on a revision of the WENRA Reference Levels in light of the lessons learned from Fukushima. Bel V coordinates the subgroup ‘Containment in severe accidents’. The updated Reference Levels for existing nuclear power plants were published on the WENRA website for public comment, with the aim of having them published in 2014.In 2013, several meetings were organised involving the FANC, Bel V, Electrabel and Tractebel Engineering with the aim of ensuring the follow-up of the Belgian action plan for existing reactors. Some actions concerning the implementation of the WENRA Reference Levels at the nuclear power plants could be declared closed.

Working Group on Waste and Decommissioning (WGWD)At the request of the FANC, Bel V represented the Belgian regulatory body at the 31st WENRA/WGWD meeting in Trnava (Slovakia) on ‘Storage of Radioactive Waste’ and ‘Decommissioning’. During this meeting the national action plans of several countries for a harmonised regulatory framework at European level concerning the decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities were mainly discussed.


Furthermore, the progress made on the action plans of the Belgian licensees (Electrabel and Belgoprocess) with respect to the implementation of the WENRA Reference Levels for the facilities to store radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel was reviewed by Bel V, in collaboration with the FANC.

3.2.3 Task Force on Safety Critical Software (TFSCS)

Bel V continued to take an active and prominent part in the activities of this task force, which includes experts from Bel V, and British, Finnish, German, Spanish, and Swedish regulatory organisations (Safety Authorities or TSOs).

The last revision of their report on the harmonisation of licensing practices for nuclear safety critical software (first made publicly available in 2007 on behalf of the participating regulators) was published in January 2013. This report is available on the websites of the nuclear regulatory organisations concerned under the title: ‘Licensing of safety critical software for nuclear reactors. Common position of seven European nuclear regulators and authorized technical support organisations. Revision 2013’.

Since 2009 the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has participated intensively in the task force activities. The NRC considers ‘the common positions as a valuable reference for future improvements of their own regulatory guidance’. The NRC and the task force now work together towards a NUREG/IA international agreement report, which should be published in 2014. This NUREG/IA report will include the full task force common position report together with NRC commentaries to assist NRC staff in using information in its licensing review and regulatory framework.


3.3.1 EUROSAFE

The EUROSAFE Programme Committee met in Munich (February and June) and in Cologne (November), in order, among other things, to prepare the EUROSAFE Forum that was held in Cologne in November. The 2013 EUROSAFE Forum focused on ‘Safe disposal of nuclear waste’.

In the EUROSAFE Tribune 23 on ‘Nuclear safety: towards enhanced robustness’ (available at http://www.eurosafe-forum.org/eurosafe-tribune/tribune-023) Bel V contributed with an article presenting views of the General Manager of Bel V, with a contribution to an exchange of views on ‘long-term operation’ of nuclear power plants, and through an exchange of views amongst the seminar chairs of the EUROSAFE Forum 2012.

In the EUROSAFE Tribune 24 on ‘Stress tests for enhancing nuclear safety’ (available at http://www.eurosafe-forum.org/eurosafe-tribune/tribune-024) Bel V contributed with a short statement on the stress tests for the Belgian nuclear power plants and through an exchange of views on mitigation measures.

3.3.2 European Technical Safety Organisations Network (ETSON)

ETSON contributes substantially to all activities within the framework of the EUROSAFE approach (i.e. the Forum, Tribune and the public website), as well as to the work of strengthening the scientific and technical partnership. This work area applies to general or specific issues directly linked to the convergence of scientific and technical safety practices in Europe.

The ETSON General Assembly and/or Board met in Saint Petersburg (July) and Cologne (November).

In 2013 the extension of the network was further explored, and resulted in the acceptance of JSI (Slovenia) and INRNE (Bulgaria) as new members. Other potential memberships are being examined.

A Bel V representative continued chairing the ETSON Technical Board for Reactor Safety (TBRS) to oversee the technical activities of ETSON, such as the functioning of the ETSON Expert Groups and the publication of Technical Safety Assessment Guides (available at http://www.etson.eu/InformationCenter/Pages/Reports-Publications.aspx).

Bel V representatives took active part in the ETSON Expert Groups, aimed at sharing views and experiences with colleagues of other technical safety organisations.

From 26 August until 30 August, several junior Bel V members of staff participated actively in the sixth ETSON Summer Workshop in Kaunas (Lithuania). The workshop was devoted to ‘Accident management’. Bel V representatives participated by giving presentations and by coordinating work sessions.

3.3 Cooperation with technical safety organisations


3.3.3 European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute (ENSTTI)

ENSTTI is an initiative of the European Technical Safety Organisations Network (ETSON). ENSTTI provides vocational training and tutoring in methods and practices required to perform assessments in nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiation protection. ENSTTI calls on European TSO expertise to maximise the transfer of knowledge and proficiency based on practical experience and culture.

Bel V is member of this network and the General Manager of Bel V is currently President of ENSTTI.

In 2013 a Bel V expert in fire protection contributed by giving lectures for an ENSTTI course on ‘Fire safety in nuclear power plants’ (Cologne, November).

3.3.4 Collaboration with IRSN

In 2013 the Cooperation Agreement between IRSN and Bel V was renewed. Several activities were continued under the terms of this Cooperation Agreement, in particular in relation to the use of computer codes developed by IRSN, such as the Cathare code for thermal hydraulic analyses, the SYLVIA and ISIS codes for fire analyses, and the VESTA code for residual heat calculations (see Section 4.4 on R&D). A new activity in relation to experimental work in the IRSN laboratories on the long-term safety of radioactive waste disposal was launched in 2013 under the terms of this Cooperation Agreement.

The collaboration with IRSN in the field of radioactive waste management was also further strengthened in 2013 through an agreement with IRSN and Ecole des Mines de Paris aiming at co-sponsoring a third PhD thesis (on the long-term safety of radioactive waste disposal) devoted to the study of radionuclide diffusion in concrete and in clay-concrete interfaces taking into account the effects of ‘high’ temperature (up to 70°C).


Since 2007, all these projects have been financed by the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) programme of the European Commission. In 2014 a new instrument will be launched by the European Commission for the period 2014-2020.

3.4.1 Armenia

Bel V has cooperated with the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Agency (ANRA) for many years through Tacis/INSC-financed projects. At present, Bel V is participating in the project AR/TS/07: ‘Enhancement of the safety assessment capabilities of ANRA for licensing of Medzamor 2 safety improvements and decommissioning activities’ (follow-up of the AR/TS/06 project). The project started in July 2013 and the inception meeting took place in September. Bel V is participating in task 5 of this project: ‘Pilot decommissioning project and licensing related documentation’.

3.4.2 Jordan

Bel V is involved in the first and second cooperation projects between the European Commission and Jordan. The principal objective is to provide support to the Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission (JNRC) in order to enhance its skills and effectiveness as a regulator.

This first cooperation project ended in April 2012 and the second is ongoing. Bel V is participating in Task 1 and Task 6 of the JO/RA/02 project:

• Task 1: Update of the Strategy Plan, the Action Plan and the Cooperation Plan in the field of capacity building for the enhancement of National Regulatory Authority including an overview of the present situation;

• Task 6: Radiation Protection, occupational exposure (guidelines, instructions, enforcement, and inspection).

3.4.3 Morocco

Bel V was participating as Technical Project Leader and also in tasks 1 and 3 of the first cooperation project between the European Commission and Morocco, which started in April 2011.

During the first progress meeting in Rabat in January 2012, it was decided to freeze the activities due to the delay in the promulgation of the law creating the new regulatory authority. Therefore there were no activities in 2012 and 2013. The project will restart in January 2014 with a new Technical Project Leader, due to the retirement of the Bel V Technical Project Leader.

3.4 Assistance projects of the European Commission


3.4.4 Mexico

Bel V is participating in the first cooperation project between the European Commission and the Mexican regulatory authority (CNSNS). The objective of the project is to enhance and strengthen certain aspects of the regulatory regime for nuclear safety in Mexico in accordance with international obligations and internationally accepted criteria and practices. Bel V participates in Tasks 1 and 2 of the MX/RA/01 project:

• Task 1: Establishment/development of an action plan for cooperation in the field of capacity building for the enhancement of the CNSNS, including an overview of the present situation;

• Task 2: Development and implementation of quality management at CNSNS, aimed at the external certification of the regulatory authority by the end of the project.

3.4.5 Vietnam

Bel V is participating in the first cooperation project between the European Commission and Vietnam. This project was initiated in July 2012. The general purpose is to develop and strengthen the legal framework as well as the managerial and technical capabilities of the Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS) and the local Technical Support Organisation (TSO).

Bel V is involved in Task 2 of the project, i.e. the development of a quality assurance system for assessment and verification of safety and regulatory oversight (internal regulatory guides and procedures).

In 2013, the activities within the framework of this task comprised a meeting in Hanoï and a study visit in Europe (Helsinki and Brussels).


3.4.6 Ukraine

Bel V participated in the INSC Project U3.01/08 – Component UK/TS/39. The overall objective was to strengthen the SNRIU’s capabilities in safety assessment, as a basis for regulatory decisions and licensing at all lifetime stages of radioactive waste management facilities to be constructed / reconstructed in the immediate future according to the national strategy and radioactive waste management program. This project followed the previous TACIS project U3.01/04 – Component UK/TS/35.

Bel V was involved in the following subtasks:• Task 1a: Guideline for the assessment of the radiological impact of the ‘vector’ site with multiple facilities for radioactive

waste processing, storage, and disposal;• Task 2:

- 2b: Support to the licensing of the ICRSM Supporting SSE Technocentre in revising the SAR for Lot 3 – Safety assessment methodology;

- 2c: Review of Design Terms of Reference of Storage facility for LL-ILW (Part 1) + Review of Design Terms of Reference of Storage facility for HLW (Part 2);

- 2d: Safety analysis report on the long-term storage facility for spent ionizing radiation sources.

The project was completed in November 2013.

3.4.7 China

Bel V is participating in the first INSC project between the European Commission and China (CH3.01/11), i.e. ‘Enhancing the capacity and regulatory capabilities of the Chinese national nuclear safety authority and its technical support organisation’.

The agreement with the European Commission was signed in early December 2013. The project will last for three years. The main task for Bel V in 2013 was the development of the project manual (organisation and methodology) along with its consortium partners.

Bel V is involved in three tasks:• Task 2.3: Independent evaluation, validation and verification of the safety of digital instrument and control systems

used in nuclear power plants;• Task 3: Safety culture and safety management (Bel V is acting as task leader);• Task 5: Assessment of flood hazards.

The inception meeting will take place in early 2014.


3.4.8 Training and tutoring

In the context of the INSC, the European Commission has recently decided to launch multi-country projects dedicated to training and tutoring activities. As a member of the European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute (ENSTTI), Bel V is involved in the second training and tutoring project and it will organise a training course on management systems on its premises in April 2014.

In relation to this new type of projects, in October 2013 Bel V participated in a coordination meeting on training and tutoring projects organised by the European Commission in Brussels. The status of all the ongoing training activities was presented by the contractors and discussed with the other stakeholders (partner organisations, IAEA, European Commission). This exchange of information will allow the European Commission to better address the real needs of the partner countries in the future.

3.4.9 Regulatory Assistance Management

The European Commission (DG Devco) decided to disband the Regulatory Assistance Management Group (RAMG) at the end of 2010. Discussions continued to be held in 2013 (with the European Commission and between Member States) on the best way for the Member States to continue to give advice to the European Commission on the strategic aspects, the programming phase and the implementation phase of future European Commission projects.

Furthermore, the regulatory authorities and their technical support organisations (TSO) were invited to further discuss the new INSC instrument that will be put in place in 2014. The geographical and technical scope of the projects funded under this new instrument could be extended. Rules of tendering could change and a test case (CH3.01/11) was initiated to evaluate the new tendering procedure proposed by the European Commission.

In the context of these issues, Bel V participated in:• the INSC committee meeting of 10 June, where the Action Fiches of the Annual Action Program 2013 were discussed

and commented by the Member States;• the second meeting on European support to Regulatory Authorities under the new Instrument for Nuclear Safety

Cooperation (INSC) on 28 February 2013.

Following potential conflicts of interests for entities participating in both INSC meetings (early definition of projects) and projects (implementation), in October 2013 Bel V decided to resign from the INSC committee. The FANC now represents Belgium in this committee. As the FANC is the official Belgian representative in ENSREG, cooperation with the European Commission is managed in close collaboration between Bel V and the FANC.


Expertise management4


4 Expertise management

4.1 Domestic experience feedback

Each year, Bel V performs a systematic screening of events at all Belgian nuclear facilities, as well as an in-depth analysis of a number of events with emphasis on root causes, corrective actions and lessons learned. In 2013 more than 90 events were registered into the domestic experience feedback database.

For a number of events a more detailed event analysis was performed with a view to identifying lessons learned which are potentially applicable to a wider range of nuclear facilities. These analyses resulted in 4 IRS reports.

2013 was marked by the following events which are being analysed in depth by Bel V and for which appropriate regulatory inspection and follow-up was carried out:

• total loss of non-essential control air followed by a manual reactor trip at Tihange 3;• HPSI pumps not qualified to resist thermal shock in LOCA recirculation phase at Tihange 1;• flooding of emergency diesel generator auxiliary equipment due to the rupture of a rubber bellow at Doel 4;• formation of gel in drums with conditioned radioactive waste related to alkali-silica reaction at Belgoprocess.


In addition to screening domestic events, Bel V also performs a screening of events at foreign nuclear facilities as well as potential generic issues that are safety significant, require technical resolution by licensees or require generic communication to the licensees. In this context, the Bel V Operating Experience Feedback coordination committee selected the events below, resulting in either formalised Operating Experience Examination Request Letters (OEERL), Operating Experience Information Letters (OEIL) or follow-up inspections:

• non-compliance of component cooling system used in 900, 1300 and 1450 MWe French units;• seismic considerations – mainly issues involving tanks;• design vulnerability in electric power systems;• loss of seismic qualification for several valves in French units;• valve stem failure of primary system loop bypass valve;• presence of Alumina in both service air and control air systems.

4.2 Foreign operating experience feedback


For several reasons (one of them being that in the next 5 to 10 years several experienced Bel V staff members will retire), Bel V is attaching great importance to knowledge management. Various tools are used in order to generate, capture, transfer, use and store knowledge.

The Technical Responsibility Centres (TRC) continue to play a key role in knowledge management within Bel V. There are about 20 Technical Responsibility Centres, acting as ‘centres of competence’ for all important fields of expertise of Bel V. In line with developments in nuclear issues, new Technical Responsibility Centres are continuously set up (i.e. concerning decommissioning issues). Moreover, TRC management and operation is fully embedded in Bel V’s Quality System.

In 2013, several new engineers were recruited. This requires an important effort on the part of the more experienced engineers to ensure an adequate transfer of knowledge. A coach is assigned to every newly recruited person, to facilitate their integration. This knowledge transfer approach is combined with, among other things, on-the-job training and cross-functional activities. The recruitment of a high number of new people also requires customised training to suit specific needs (see Section 4.5). Mention should also be made of the Bel V focus on knowledge transfer from retiring experts to younger staff. A Knowledge Transfer Form is used for this purpose. In addition, we also use a Knowledge Critical Grid that aims to identify and reduce the risk of knowledge loss.

Knowledge management is also closely linked to the R&D program aimed at generating new skills, better ideas or more efficient processes (see Section 4.4).

The continuous implementation of the Bel V adapted Electronic Documentation Management software (KOLIBRI, based on Hummingbird DM) is an important step towards an efficient retrieval of information, good knowledge sharing and easier integration of new members of staff. To this end, a specific committee known as the DOCumentation USers group (DOCUS) focuses on user needs analysis and on improvements.

4.3 Knowledge management


4.4.1 Introduction

The Research & Development (R&D) program for 2013 was developed in February 2013. This section gives a summary of the significant R&D activities that were performed in 2013.

The total effort for 2013 amounted to 7,616 hours, which represents about 6,3% of the total work time for the technical staff.

The involvement in R&D activities remains an important pillar for the continuous development and sustainability of Bel V’s expertise.

4.4.2 Management activities

In 2013 as well, special attention was paid to the possibility of encouraging new R&D projects. A number of R&D collaboration agreements were signed with the Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), the von Karman Institute for Fluid Dynamics (VKI) and IRSN. Some of these collaborations had been discussed in the context of the R&D workshop held at the end of 2012.

4.4.3 R&D on nuclear installation safety

Thermal hydraulic phenomena

During 2013, R&D activities on thermal hydraulics were carried out in the following fields:• OECD/NEA PKL-3 project.

- The Bel V proposal about the assessment of the natural circulation interruption phenomenon under linear cooldown procedure was carried out at the PKL facility. This test consisted in 3 runs with different cooldown rates and a different number of affected loops. Pre-test CATHARE calculations of this test were carried out by Bel V.

- The Bel V proposal for the assessment of the 3D impact on the natural circulation interruption phenomenon was carried out in the ROCOM facility with 3 runs using different inlet reactor pressure vessel boundary conditions.

- Bel V participated actively in defining the two natural circulation interruption PACTEL tests that were performed in 2013.

- Bel V participated in the ATLAS expert meeting in view of possible Bel V participation in the upcoming OECD/ATLAS project.

4.4 Research & development


• PREMIUM project. - The derivatives of the code (CATHARE) responses for all six FEBA tests were calculated. Their non-colinearity was

checked before the next step of the CIRCE calculations: application of the Nominal CIRCE step. - The preliminary results of Nominal and Iterative CIRCE calculations were presented in the Phase III meeting held at

the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) (Paris). Difficulties encountered were discussed with the other participants in the PREMIUM benchmark.

- PREMIUM Phase III was completed at the end of September: the contribution of Bel V to the Phase III report was written and sent to the Phase III coordinator.

- PREMIUM Phase IV started at the beginning of October. Input decks for the PERICLES-2D reflooding experiment were written and validated in boil-off configuration. The CEA’s uncertainty analysis platform URANIE (open source software) was installed.

• MYRRHA project.A simplified RELAP5-3D input deck of the MYRRHA was built. Steady-state and transient calculations were verified through a set of calculations including: - loss of heat sink without reactor scram; - reactivity insertion without reactor scram; - loss of forced reactor coolant flow without reactor scram; - blockage of flow thru one fuel assembly without reactor scram; - loss of heat sink; - loss of forced reactor coolant flow.

• Use of RELAP5-3D for pressurised water reactors (PWR).A generic input deck of a 3-loop pressurised water reactor is being developed, including the modeling of SG primary and secondary sides hydro-dynamic nodes and heat structures, as well as steamlines, battery of safety valves and a relief valve, water level measurements in SG secondary side, and feedwater flow rate control. The development of this input deck will be continued in 2014.

• Cooperation with IRSN.A second meeting was held in the framework of the Bel V/IRSN joint project. It was decided to continue the cooperation in the different R&D joint subjects and to extend it to the DENOPI project related to the experimental investigation of thermal hydraulic phenomena occurring during accidental conditions in the spent fuel pool. It was also decided to prepare a joint paper about a comparative study of the ROCOM tests between the CATHARE3 and CATHARE2 results.

• Application to nuclear power plants.Based upon experience gained within the PKL-2/ROCOM tests, the 3D CATHARE model of the reactor pressure vessel of the Doel1/2 plant was reviewed and updated. The objective is to carry out a more in-depth investigation of the natural circulation interruption phenomenon based upon mixing in the reactor pressure vessel downcomer. The assessment study considered parametric calculations and investigated the impact of key parameters on the occurrence of natural circulation flow interruption under asymmetric cooling conditions.


• Conference and publications. - Participation in the Common User Considerations (CUC) meeting in Grenoble from 9 to 11 October 2013 by

presenting the main Bel V achievements using the CATHARE code. - The Bel V paper entitled ‘Assessment of the CATHARE 3D capabilities in predicting buoyant driven flow under

asymmetric cooling loops conditions’ was published in the December issue of Nuclear Engineering and Design 2013.

- Participation in the international NURETH-15 conference with a paper published in the conference proceedings entitled ‘Assessment of natural circulation interruption phenomenon in a pressurised water reactor with inverted SG U-tubes’.

Severe accidentsFurther progress was made in acquiring the MELCOR code and developing a MELCOR simulation capability at Bel V. The code was obtained and installed on suitable hardware, and a contract was signed with GRS for external consultancy support and training on the use of MELCOR and for the development of the model(s) of the Belgian nuclear power plants. In the context of this contract, initial training was provided to Bel V. Bel V attended the European MELCOR Users Group (EMUG) meeting and participated in and contributed to the CSARP/MCAP/MELCOR workshop.

A steering committee to supervise the Belgian participation in the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) program on severe accident research was set up.

In support of Bel V’s activities related to spent fuel pool behaviour, Bel V attended various meetings of the writing group for the CSNI Status Report on Spent Fuel Pool under loss of cooling accident conditions and participated in the preparation of the status report.

The IAEA Technical Meeting on Source Term Evaluation for Severe Accidents was attended as well as the meeting of the WGAMA Task Group on Filtered Containment Venting.

In cooperation with the von Karman Institute, an R&D program was initiated with a view to modeling a single spent fuel assembly in case of a complete loss-of-coolant inventory accident (LOCA) using a CFD code.

PSA methodology and its applicationsAt the 16th Technical Meeting on Experiences with Risk-based Precursor Analysis (Brussels, 6-7 November 2013), PSA-based Event Analyses (PSAEA) performed by Electrabel for Belgian nuclear power plants and foreign organisations (utilities, TSOs) for nuclear power plants abroad were discussed.

On 31 May, Bel V hosted a meeting of the ETSON PSA expert group. A list of guidance documents that are useful for TSOs, either as PSA developer or PSA reviewer, was further prepared. Information was also exchanged on new developments in PSA.


Concerning PSA methodologies and results for internal hazards (fire, flooding), Bel V had the opportunity to exchange information with other regulatory organisations (ENSI, IRSN and GRS) about the Fire PSA and Flooding PSA in Switzerland and the Fire PSA in France and Germany.

Bel V also attended the Castle Meeting 2013 (Saltsjöbaden, 12 April 2013), the International Workshop on PSA of Natural External Hazards including Earthquakes (Prague, 17-19 June 2013) and the PSA 2013 Conference (Columbia, 23-26 September 2013).

With respect to PSA for external natural and man-made hazards, Bel V participates in the ASAMPSA_E project. The objective of this 7th Framework Program project is to develop guidance for Level 1 and Level 2 PSA for internal and external hazards. In particular, Bel V participates in the work package related to contacts (through questionnaires and workshops) with potential end-users of such guidance.

Fire protectionBel V participated in the OECD PRISME 2 meetings of May and November 2013. Bel V presented 4 test proposals during the first meeting.

An ISIS user club was organised by the development team. The post-doctoral researcher from Ghent University working under a Bel V grant implemented a new soot model for laminar flames in ISIS. His research continues, now dealing with soot in turbulent flames.

In September, Bel V participated in the 13th international post-conference seminar on fire safety in nuclear power plants and installations. A paper was published and a presentation was given on the validation of CFD code ISIS for compartment fires with leakage.

Finally, two papers were written:1. The paper ‘Computer simulations to study interaction between burning rates and pressure variations in confined

enclosure fires’ (F. Bonte, N. Noterman and B. Merci) was accepted by the Fire Safety Journal.2. The paper ‘Numerical Simulations of a Mechanically-Ventilated Multi-Compartment Fire’ (T. Beji, F. Bonte and B. Merci)

has been accepted for oral presentation at the 11th International Symposium on Fire Safety Science, which will be held in 2014.

Residual power computationNew computations were carried out using the most recent versions of MCNPX and VESTA. Results were finalised and a summary report was written, reviewed and distributed within Bel V and sent to the VESTA developer at IRSN. The results are consistent with many references (literature and the ANSI standard for example) and have highlighted interesting future developments.

The decay heat model was reused in the context of MYRRHA for benchmarking the ANSI standard decay heat curves.


Regulatory approaches and practicesETSON collaboration and expert groupsBel V continues to play an active role in the technical work performed by the European Technical Safety Organisations Network (ETSON). Bel V representatives are active in the many expert groups that are dealing with different technical domains, amongst others by contributing to the development of Technical Safety Assessment Guides.

Bel V is also chairing the ETSON Technical Board on Reactor Safety (TBRS), which is in charge, amongst others, of overseeing and coordinating the expert groups. In 2013, two meetings of the ETSON TBRS were hosted by Bel V. The status of the different ETSON expert groups was discussed and actions were defined for further management of these expert groups. This resulted in 2013 in the publication of the ETSON Safety Assessment Guide and three Technical Safety Assessment Guides on the ETSON website (www.etson.eu).

Bel V representatives participated in meetings of several expert groups, amongst others on ‘Safety Fluid Systems’, ‘Probabilistic Safety Assessment’, ‘Transient and accident analysis’ and ‘Safety concepts and defense-in-depth’. Bel V decided to take the lead in creating a new expert group on ‘Ageing’. Bel V will also participate actively in the newly created expert group on ‘Waste and Decommissioning’.

Two Bel V representatives participated in the ETSON workshop on ‘Results of National and European Stress Tests’ (GRS Garching, March 2013), where two presentations were given on the stress tests for nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities.

A Bel V member of staff actively participated in the ETSON R&D working group activities (amongst others through participation in two meetings in June and November).

Development of an inspection handbookAn inspection handbook was written, giving practical guidance about the field inspections.

4.4.4 R&D on waste and decommissioning

Waste disposalIn 2013 Bel V pursued its R&D efforts to strengthen its expertise in independently reviewing safety assessments for radioactive waste repositories. In this context, Bel V continued to develop its modeling capacities for supporting the review of long-term safety assessments for waste disposal facilities. A new code for water flow simulation and contaminant transport modeling was acquired and used to provide technical support for the review of the safety case for the project related to the near-surface disposal facility in Dessel.


In 2013 Bel V also strengthened its collaborations with other technical safety organisations (e.g. IRSN), universities and research centres. For instance, Bel V is now a member of the ‘Pôle Geochimie Transport’, which is supervised by ARMINES and is aimed at developing the reactive transport code HYTEC and exchanging knowledge on reactive transport phenomena. In collaboration with among others IRSN, CEA, Ecole des Mines de Paris and the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Bel V also supports and monitors three PhDs focusing on gaining a better insight into several key phenomena affecting the long-term safety of radioactive waste disposal facilities. Bel V’s international collaborations were also strengthened by participating in the SITEX project (Sustainable network of Independent Technical EXpertise for radioactive waste disposal) gathering technical safety organisations (TSO) and nuclear regulatory authorities (NRA). The purpose of this project (completed in 2013) was to develop Terms of References for a future TSO/NRA network, mainly by coordinating the R&D actions of TSOs at international level.

Finally, in 2013 Bel V participated in several international technical meetings devoted to waste disposal safety, such as the IAEA meetings ‘Practical Illustration and use of the Safety Case Concept in the Management of Near-Surface Disposal’ (PRISM), ‘Human Intrusion in the context of Disposal of Radioactive Waste’ (HIDRA) and ‘Demonstration of the operational and long-term safety of geological disposal facilities for radioactive waste’ (GEOSAF Part II), and a symposium devoted to ‘Modeling in concrete media’. Bel V also participated in the NEA Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) and in the 8th EURADWASTE conference.

Decommissioning and dismantlingThe explicit aim of the 2013 R&D activities was to gather information and build up knowledge in the field of decommissioning in order to support Bel V’s activities in preparing decommissioning of Doel 1/2 and other Belgian nuclear facilities. The idea is to learn from the practices, techniques and pitfalls of other countries where large decommissioning projects are under preparation or under way. For example, the contacts in relation to the DriMa project coordinated by the IAEA allowed us to get in touch with the Spanish authorities and gain insight into their decommissioning approach in the regulatory context.


4.4.5 R&D on cross-cutting issues

Safety culture assessmentIn order to reinforce Bel V’s assessment expertise in safety culture, an integrated process for safety culture observation has been redesigned. This process, which is aimed at linking safety culture field observations with the overall oversight process of the FANC / Bel V, is now operational.

Emergency preparednessIn view of enhancing Bel V’s expertise and competence in emergency preparedness and response, various R&D activities were initiated at both national and international level, such as the CAPS international benchmarking project on fast-running software tools used to model fission product releases during accidents at nuclear power plants, as well as testing of the JRODOS software. These initiatives were mainly focused on gaining more insight into software tools to be used for estimating the consequences of an emergency situation occurring at a nuclear facility.

Verification and validationA Technical Guidance document was drafted and finalised with a view to providing recommendations on how to ensure the validity of models and calculation results used in safety analyses, and to document the related verification and validation activities.

The objective of the guidance document is to recommend an approach that yields a convincing justification of properties that have an impact on safety and need to be modelled and evaluated. These properties can be of different kinds and may require different types of calculations: in reactor physics (core neutronics, cooling fluid thermo hydraulics, fuel thermo-mechanic), for criticity or risk of severe accidents, flow or transport for wastes.

On a somewhat different but related issue, a second guide was approved and published, providing recommendations on the validation of the use of commercial software (COTS) in safety-related applications.


4.4.6 R&D collaboration with other institutes

R&D collaboration with Belgian universitiesVrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)A research agreement was signed in October 2012 with the VUB, which will undertake studies in the field of cognitive radio for nuclear power plants. This project will make a contribution to the emergency support plan. The objective is to improve communication links during emergencies that might promote a stronger emergency management. The VUB submitted a yearly report for the activities undertaken in 2013 to Bel V in October 2013.

Also, for two years now, Bel V has been collaborating with the VUB on the R&D project entitled ‘Experimental analysis of

flow-induced vibrations and application to the fuel rod bundle of the MYRRHA reactor’. An intermediate report on the activities was submitted to Bel V. On the basis of the results presented in this report, it has been decided to continue collaboration on this R&D project with the VUB for another two years.

Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)Since November 2012, Bel V has been sponsoring an R&D project at the ULB, in the area of long-term safety assessment of radioactive waste disposal. This project relates to the modeling of the evolution of diffusion coefficients during degradation of cement used for waste disposal. An intermediate report was submitted to Bel V in July 2013.

Ghent UniversityA research agreement was signed in August 2012 with Ghent University, which will undertake studies in the field of fires in free atmosphere, and interaction of the fire with the mechanical ventilation system in a closed room. Within the framework of this research, quantative simulations will be performed with the use of the ISIS software. An intermediate report was submitted to Bel V in December 2013. Results obtained during these R&D activities will be presented during the International Association for Fire Safety Science (IAFSS) conference in February 2014.

Université catholique de Louvain (UCL)Two new R&D collaboration agreements were signed with the UCL:

• one agreement to undertake studies on pressurised thermal shocks in pressurised water reactors;• a second agreement on the modeling of the flow phenomena responsible for thermal stripping on the surface of a

vessel of a lead-cooled fast reactor.

Von Karman Institute for Fluid Dynamics (VKI)A one-year R&D agreement was signed with VKI to undertake studies in the field of simulations of thermal-hydraulic phenomena in a spent fuel pool of a nuclear power plant.


R&D collaboration with IRSNIn 2013 several R&D agreements were signed with IRSN, on a number of topics:

• radionuclides migration in waste disposal facilities – this R&D project will be carried out together with ARMINES;• development of a quantative simulation tool taking into account chemistry and hydrodynamic transport to be used

within the framework of the assessment of waste disposal facilities – this R&D project will be carried out together with ARMINES, AREVA, EDF, LAFARGE and CEA;

• radionuclides diffusion in clay – this R&D project will be carried out together with CEA.

A new, more global 5-year framework agreement was also signed with IRSN.


A structured training approach was adopted on the basis of the IAEA Systematic Approach to Training (SAT). Training programmes were developed for all staff members, and in particular for new hires, on the basis of the job descriptions and the relevant competencies needed. The training programme is implemented using different methods, depending on the availability of training materials and the adequacy of external courses: self-study, internal training sessions, external courses or on-the-job training.

A key element of the initial training of new members of staff is the programme of internal training sessions conducted by the Technical Training Manager with the help of experienced experts (mainly from Bel V and the FANC) as lecturers. This programme comprises 23 training modules. 4 sessions took place in 2009, 5 in 2010, 7 in 2011, 11 in 2012 and 9 in 2013:

• Safety culture observation • Radioprotection (3 sessions)• Deterministic approach• Probabilistic approach• Accident management• Dismantling• Lessons learned from PSA updates

Examples of external training courses with the participation of new members of staff at Bel V in 2013:• PWR description and operation, organised by Westinghouse (6 people during 1 week);• ETSON JSP Summer school in Kaunas (several people during 1 week);• full training course on radiation protection (120 hours), organised by Xios in Dutch (1 expert throughout the year).

Also worth mentioning is the participation of Bel V staff members in numerous specialised or refresher training activities, and in several international working groups, seminars and conferences.

In total, more than 80 training activities took place in 2013.

4.5 Training


Financial report


Balance sheet as at 31 December 2013(amounts in thousands of EUR)

2012 2013

ASSETS 14,156 13,489

FIXED ASSETS 6,843 6,408

II. Intangible fixed assets 1,414 1,143

III. Tangible fixed assets 5,427 5,263

A. Land and buildings 5,277 5,116

B. Plant, machinery and equipment 45 63

C. Furniture and vehicles 105 84

Financial fixed assets 2 2

CURRENT ASSETS 7,313 7,081

VII. Amounts receivable within one year 2,644 2,576

A. Trade receivables 2,628 2,519

B. Other amounts receivable 16 57

IX. Cash at bank and in hand 4,475 4,302

X. Deferred charges and accrued income 194 203


2012 2013

LIABILITIES 14,156 13,489

EQUITY 8,209 8,448

I. Capital 4,732 4,732

IV. Reserves 2,629 2,868

V. Profit carried forward 848 848

DEBTS 5,947 5,041

VII. Amounts payable after more than one year 2,000 1,500

IX. Amounts payable within one year 3,944 3,540

A. Current portion of amounts payable within one year

1,000 500

C. Trade debts 416 424

D. Advances received on contracts in progress 1,500 1,500

E. Taxes, remuneration and social security 1,028 1,116

F. Other amounts payable

X. Deferred charges and accrued income 3 1


Profit and loss account as at 31 December 2013(amounts in thousands of EUR)

2012 2013

Turnover 10,056 10,981

Other operating income 78 125

TOTAL OPERATING INCOME 10,134 11,106

Services and other goods 1,927 2,099

Wages and social security costs 7,391 8,173

Depreciation 531 515

Write-downs on trade receivables 9

Other operating charges 101 91

TOTAL OPERATING CHARGES 9,959 10,878

Operating result 175 228

Financial charges and income 23 11

Profit on ordinary activities 198 239

Profit for the financial year 198 239


Profit and loss account: notes

In 2013, activity continued apace, yielding a very slight increase in our turnover.

Operating incomeTurnoverIn 2013, the largest part of the turnover of Bel V (96%) was once again generated by the regulatory inspections and safety assessments in Class I facilities, which are invoiced on the basis of a rate which has been agreed with the FANC and which covers the costs of our services. This year was once again marked by activities linked to the stress tests and the implementation of the action plans, as well as by continuing the analysis of the confirmation dossier on the flaw indications in the vessels of two reactors.

A small part of the turnover (1.88%) derives from contracts with the European Commission for support to nuclear safety authorities in Eastern European and emerging countries. Regulatory inspections were also carried out in some Class II facilities (the future Class IIA).

Other operating incomeOther operating income is not actual revenue, but consists principally of contributions by staff for the private use of company cars and for the provision of meal vouchers.

Operating chargesServices and other goodsIn 2013 we made considerable use of subcontracting for technical matters relating to the pressure vessels. Our Research & Development expenses saw a significant increase (94%).

Wages and social security costsStaff expenses represent 75% of our costs, including training expenses.

Financial charges and incomeFinancial income comes from cash investments.

Operating resultOperating result for the financial year has been allocated to restricted funds.


List of abbreviations

ASME American Society of Mechanical EngineersASN Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (France)BEST Belgian Stress TestsCEA Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (France)CNRA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (OECD)CSNI Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (OECD)DG Crisis Centre Directorate-General Crisis Centre of the Federal Public Service InteriorENSREG European Nuclear Safety Regulators GroupENSTTI European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute (ETSON)ETSON European Technical Safety Organisations NetworkFANC Federal Agency for Nuclear ControlGRS Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktor Sicherheit (Germany)HERCA Heads of European Radiological Protection Competent AuthoritiesIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyINSC Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (European Commission)IPM Installation for the production of monolithsIRE National Institute for RadioelementsIRRS Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IAEA)IRSN Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (France)LTO Long-Term OperationNEA Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD)NRA Nuclear regulatory authorityNRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US)NUSSC Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (IAEA)OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentONDRAF/NIRAS Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile MaterialsOSART Operational Safety Review Team (IAEA)PSA Probabilistic Safety AssessmentPSR Periodic Safety ReviewPWR Pressurised Water ReactorR&D Research & DevelopmentSCK•CEN Studie Centrum voor Kernenergie – Centre d’études d’Energie Nucléaire (Mol)TBRS Technical Board for Reactor Safety (ETSON)TRC Technical Responsibility Centre (Bel V)TSO Technical Safety OrganisationTSOF Technical and Scientific Support Organization Forum (IAEA)VKI von Karman Institute for Fluid DynamicsWENRA Western European Nuclear Regulators Association

A N N UA L R E P O R T | 2013

w w w w.belv.be

Annual report Bel V 2013

Documents

Transcript of Annual report Bel V 2013