Andre Du Pisani - Beyond the Barracks - Reflections on the Role of the Sadf in the Region

7/28/2019 Andre Du Pisani - Beyond the Barracks - Reflections on the Role of the Sadf in the Region

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D I E

S U I D -

A F R I K A A N S EI N S T I T U U T

V A N

I N T E R N A S I O N A L E

A A N G E L E E N T H E D E

geleentheidspublikasie

occasional paper

T H E

S O U T HA F R I C A N

I N S T I T U T E

O F

I N T E R N A T I O N A L

A F F A I R S

B E Y O N D T H E

B A R R A C K S :

R E F L E C T I O N SO N T H E R O L E

O F T H E S A D F

I N T H E R E G I O N

ANDRE DU PISANI


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Andre" du P is an i i s cu rr e n tl y t h e Manning D irec to r cf Research a t th eSAIIA. He taug ht po li ti c s in the Departirent of P o li ti c a l Science a tUNISA pr io r t o join in g th e I n s ti tu t e . Me du Pisa ni received h is MAa t th e U niv ersity of Stellen bcs ch and stud ied a t th e London School of

Economics and P o l it i c a l Science. He re ce n tly completed a Do ctorate i nP o li ti c s a t th e U niv ers ity of Cape Town. He is th e author of se v er alpublications, notably SWA/Namibia The Politics cf Continuity and Change,has contributed to five books, and co-authored an introductory text onurban p o li t i c s . His researc h inte re st s include Namibia, SouthernAfrican developments , p o li t i c a l change and co nf l ic t .

This paper is based on a t a l k d eliv ere d by Mr du P is an i a t th e SurmerSchool of t he U niver si ty of Cape Town, 18-21 January 1988.

I t should be noted th at any opinions expressed in th is a r t i c l e are theres po ns ib i l i ty of the au thor and not of the In s t i tu te .


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BEYOND THE BARRACKS:REFLE CTION S ON THE ROLE OF THE

SAD F IN THE REGION

ANDRE DU PISANI

ISBN: 0 908371 60 8

February 1988

The South African In stitu teof International Affairs

Jan Sm uts HousePO Box 31596, Braam fontein 2017, South Africa


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One thought preoccupies the submerged mindof Em pire: how not t o end, how not to d ie ,how to prolong it a er a. By day i t purs uesi t s enemies. I t is cunning and ru th le ss ,i t sends i t s bloodhounds everywhere. Bynig ht I t feeds on images of d is a st e r: the

sack of c i t i e s , the rape of popula t ions ,pyramids of bones, acres of desolation.

J H Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians

In t roduct ion

The study of the m il i ta ry in p ol i t i cs c on st i tu te s a burgeoning fiel d ofinq uir y, ch ara cte rise d by growing th eo re t ic al so ph ist ic at io n. The scope ofscho larship has als o undergone re de fin i t i on , in the sense tha t i t Is nolonger merely confined to the ' re la t ion sh ip between c i v i l au th or i ty and themi l i t a ry a s an i n s t i t u t i on o r e l i t e g roup

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(Perlm utter & Bennet t ,1980:199). The st a te i t s e l f ; the soc io -p ol i t i c a l condi t ions conducive Com il i ta r i sa t io n ; the corpora te cu l tu re of the m i l i ta ry ; the ro le of them ili ta ry as an agent of change - in na tion -bu ildi ng and as an instrumen t offoreign po lic y; to name but a few, are now a l l l eg iti m at e to p ic s.Moreover, the in st i t u t i o n a l Importance of the m il i ta ry has grown Inpo l i t i ca l sys tems chara c ter i sed by d iverse po l i t i c a l cu l tu re s andin s t i t u t io n a l a rrangements . Per lm ut te r, a no ted ana lys t of c iv i l - m i l i ta ryr e l a t i o n s , b o l d l y a s s e r t s :

Regardless of the nature of p o l i t i c a lculture In which he lives, the modernmil i tary officer is oriented towardMaximizing hi s influence la p o l i t i c sand/or pol i cy . (P erlmutter & Ben net t ,1980:3)

The m il i ta ry in South Africa has als o at t ra ct ed the a t te n t io n of loc al andoverseas scholars, while the use of the military as an instrument ofregio nal pol icy has had sig nif ica nt Implicat ions for South Af rica 'sreg iona l and in t e rn a t iona l r e l a t i on s .

In a recently published and profoundly original review of scholarship onthe military In South Africa, Annette Seegers of the University of CapeTown rem arks th at a ' pre oc cup atio n with po st-1 96 0 development s 'ch ar ac ter ise s much of th is schola rship (1986:192-200). She notes also tha t'c i v i l - m i l i ta ry re la t ion s scholarsh ip genera l ly - though not exc lus ive ly -seeks to know more about the military In a non-war-making capacity* andfinds that much of recent research lacks th eo re t ic al d is c ip l i n e.

The growing infl uen ce of th e South African m il it a ry In dom estic andregio nal pol icy arenas and the accompanying m il i t ar is a t i o n of socie ty ar ewidely at t r i bu te d to a se ri es of popular chal lenges to white minori ty ru leaf te r 1960, g rowing in te rn a t ion a l i so la t io n , the e ros ion of po l i t i c a lleg i t imacy of s ta te s t ruc tures , dec is ive sh i f t s l a reg ional powerrelat ionships fol lowing the col lapse of Portugese colonial role in Angolaand Mozambique, the coming to power of Mr Robert Mugabe in neighbouringZimbabwe in 1980, and the growing domestic political challenge in thepost-Soweto per iod (Leonard, 1983:>-4 ; J a s te r , 1985; Grundy, 1983a;Geldenhuys & Kotze, 1983; Vale, 1984; and Geldenhuys, 1934).


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The ap plic at io n of m il i ta ry power as an instrument of re gion al po licy ,es p ec ia ll y since 1975, has provided much m ate ria l for lo ca l and fo reignsc h o la rs . Following the pioneering work of O'Meara (19 77), H al le tt (1 978),and Geldenhuys (1 978 , 1 981, 198 2, 1983& 1984), various other analysts havedrawn on the se stu di es and deepened our und ersta ndin g. Es pe ciall ynoteworthy is the work of Leonard (1 98 3), Je st e r (198 5), Hanlon (1986a),Johnson & M artin (1 986 ), Cawthra (19 86 ), and Vale (1984& 1987).

Vale (1987 :176-194 ), for example, views South African re gio nal p olicy ashaving undergone a sh if t from what he terms the 'p o li t i c s of as se rt i veincorporat ion ' to that of the 'pol i t ics of coercive incorporat ion*, whi leO'Meara (1985:183-211) concerns himself w ith the doc trin e of 'T ota lStrategy* and i t s a pp lica t ion s in ' regio nal policy sin ce 1978.

The changing re gio na l environment and i t s im plic atio ns for South A fricanreg ion al policy has been syste m atica l ly examined by various an al ys ts, withpe rc ep tiv e co ntr ibu tio ns by Davies & O'Meara (198 3), J a s te r (19 80), Ktfhne(1984), Adam & Uys (19 85 ), and Du Pi sa ni (19 85 ).

With a few notable exceptions, such as the work of Frankel (1984) andSeegers (1986, 1987), the role of the mil i tary in the regional set t ing andits relat ion to the domestic poli t ical equation has not been adequatelyexplained in th eo re t ic a l terms. The majori ty of stu di es re f l ec t a concernwith post-1960 developments - Ignoring, for example, the role of the SouthAfrican mi l i ta ry in the suppression of the Bondelswarts re be ll i on in 1922and mi li ta ry ac tio n ag ai ns t th e Ovambo peop le in 1932 - but emphasizingregional mil i tary aggression as a function of the applicat ion of aco ns ist en t 'n at i on al sec ur i ty d oc tr i ne ' (Leonard, 1983; and Cawthra,1986:23-41).

The m il i t ar y doc tr ine of Total Strategy is presented as a plan of a ct io ncomprising elements such as the ' al lo ca ti on of means in re la t io ns to ends;an ap pre cia t ion of enemy c ap ab il i t i es and po te nt ia l ; the time fa cto r; anev alu ati on of weapon systems and the ar t of wa r' (D utton , 19 77:12-1 3).

Fue lled by statem ents and w ritin gs by senior m ili ta ry p ersonnel (Dutton,ib id ; H eir ing , quoted by Baynham, 1985:3 - t o name but two rec en ta r t i c u l a t io ns ) , i t i s o ft en asse r t ed tha t th i s 'Na t iona l Secur ity Doc t r ine1has been influenced by the work of Beaufre1 (1963) and McCuen (1966).Frankel (1984:46), for example, w ri tes th a t : 'Total str at eg y, we wouldcontend, i s essent ia l ly Beaufr f i wr i t large in the par t icular

counter-revolutionary context of contemporary South Africa1

. He claim stha t ' the ideo logical and s t r a t eg ic sp i r i t of the South Afr ican m i l i tary i spart icular ly and peculiar ly Francophile in character and if there is anysi n gl e fig ure whose w riti ng s have had a formative influ en ce in how thecurrent generat ion of Defence Force leaders interpret the world in relat ionto counter-insurgency, it is above all the French General, Andrfi Beaufre*1*

While not denying the in sp ir at io n a l r ole of Be au fre's and McCuen's writi ng sIn the cr ys ta l l i za t io n of a counter-Insurgency do ct r ine , Fran kel ' shypothesis offers l lmited help in understaodlng the role of the SouthA fric an Defence Force (SADF) In the region - To ap pr ec ia te th is wouldrequire an analysis of the sources and dynamics of domestic and regionalc on fl ic t , the nature of the South African st a te and of the se cu ri ty

establishm ent and - a t the leas t - some understanding of th eo re t ic alp e r sp e c t i v e s on c i v i l - m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s .


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Praetorianism manif es ts i t sel f d i fferent ly in Afr ica, the Middle East andLat i n Americ a. In central and sub-Saharan Africa, and in the Middle Eas t ,praetorianisa is essent ial ly a consequence of a n unstable or weak civicorde r, incapable of dealing with the crises of modernisation,nat ion-bui lding and domest ic securi ty. The frequent ly superiororganisation al and bureaucratic structures of the military enable i t topenetrate the pol i t ical process and , in some cas es , it became the successorto colonial control*

In Lat i n America a long t radi t ion of mil i tary in tervent ion in pol i t ics andin wars of independence makes for a d i fferent relat ionship . In the earl ierperiod, arbi t rator praetorianism predominated; in the mo re recent period,ruler armies became dominant . Civi l governm ent , howev er, i s not completelyrejected by mil i tary in tervent ion, if only on funct ional grou nds.

The th i rd pat tern of in teract ion - the profess ional revolut ionary soldier -deno tes a relatio nship where the military i s integrated wit h arevolut ionary movement bent on mass mobi l isat ion of the populace. Here themil i tary is more ideological than in the previous tw o, often playing animportant part in the process of nat ion-bui lding. Arguably, the bestexample of th is pat tern Is the Maois t Chinese People's Liberat i on Army. InPerlmut ter 's analysis (1968:606-643) , the Israeli Defence Force exemplifiesanother type of profess ional revolut ionary army, in the sense of i t scentral ro le in nat ion-bui lding, i t s organisat ional ideology, and theextent to which the relations hip betwee n the military and civic, order hasbeen formalised-

Against this l imited theoretical backdrop, to understand the South Africanmilitary and its role in the regio n, a further no tion has to be introduced- that of the frontier army. Drawing on the considerabl e insights ofAnnet te Seegers , the South Aflean mil i tary, especial ly in i t s regionalset t ing , wi l l (at leas t in pa rt ) be analysed as a frontier army^. Thisdoes not , however , imply the development of what Frankel (1984:29-7 1) cal lsthe 'garrison sta te' , with a distinct counter- insurgency doctrin e of TotalStrat egy. (The role of the military as a 'service Instituti on' ha s norelevance to this pap er. ) The notion of a frontier army d o e s ,neve rth ele ss, offer some useful avenues for a better understanding of therole of the South African military in a regional setting.

The war in Namib ia: a Frontier Army in action

Follo wing the deployment of SADF units in northern Namibia I n 197 1/7 2,especial ly after Operat ion Savannah in Angola from August 1975 to March1 9 7 6 , as well as subsequent military action both within Namibia andtrans-border in to Angola and elsewhere in the region , the t radi t ional ro ledefin itio n of the military was expan ded. Faced by a changed regionalenviron ment that reflected significant shifts in power relatio ns, the SADFbegan to operate increasingly as a frontier army.

In Angola the socio-polit ical fabric disintegrated rapidly In the wake ofan internecine civil war . This resulted In an erosi on of power andprovided t he SADF and other outs ide forces opportuni t ies for mil i taryIntervent io n. In Seegers ' percept ive analysis : ' the SADF in southernAngo la operates in a grassroots polit ical vacuum : there is l i t t le or norestraint of military power and no mechanisms by which a civilian cancomplain about mil i tary b ehaviour ' (1987 :5 -6 ) .


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In Nami bia a second feat ure of the political landscape enhanced the role ofthe SADF as a frontier army - failure on the part of the South Africangovernment to establ ish a legitimate political alternative to SWA PO. Inits absen ce, the South West Afr ican Terr i tory Force (SWA TF) was establishedon 1 August 1 9 8 0 . 3 Th e SWATF itself has since become a key component InSouth Africa 's policy on Namibia. Its rapid growth and regular deployme nt,also into neighbouring Angola, signify its importance as a coercivealternative to counter the popular appeal of SWAPO.

Consistent with frontier army tradition, the South African state and theSADF fight what Hanlon (19 86 b:7 ) graphically calls 'a curiously hid denwar'. The entire notion of the 'operational area' is not only consistentwith this tradition but ensures that access to the area is strictlycontrolled and that the SADF operates largely out of the publ ic ey e. Inthis particular sense, the SADF does not recognise the institutional limitsposed by the civilian order*

Finally, the SADF's strategy is two-pronged: not only by an extensivemilitary build-up in Nami bia, but also by carrying the war into southernAngola using quasl-surrogates, notably UNITA, or special units such as 32Batta lion (created in 19 76 ) unde r SADF command. This strategy is premisednot only on preservation of SADF manpower, but also serves to ensureUNITA's mili tary (and hence i ts poli t ica l) credibil i ty. In a specia lsense, a strong UNITA in the bush also strengthens South Africa n demandsfor the withdraw al of the Cuban forces from Ang ola. Furth ermore , if SouthAfrica loses its ability to forward supplies to UNITA with relative ease,South Africa's bargaining position vis-3-vi s Angola and Nami bia will beweakened substantially . Reflecting on this dimension of the SADF as afrontier army , Leonard (198 3:6 0) remarks that the goal is ' to restore thebuffer that was lost by the collapse of Portugese colonial rule '.

Elsewhere (Du Pisani , 1 9 8 6 : 7 0 ) , I have attempted to show the links betw eenSouth African policy towards Namibia and Angola in the following way:

The two principal instruments of South Africa'sregional policie s - military action and diplomacy- were designed to ensure control over theprocess of political change in Namib ia. At thesame tim e, destabilisation wa s intended to beboth an incentive and disincentive to SWAPO andthe MPLA Government in Luan da.

As remarked earl ier, the 'frontier dimensi on' of the SADF in Namib ia andAngola should not blind the analyst to the service and civic roles of themili tary , especially in northern Namib ia. We shall return to thisimportant aspect later, but first a discussion of the origin and nature ofthe SADF in Namibia .

The role of the SADF in Namibia has to be viewed against a broaderhistor ica l and regional canvas. Apar t f rom South Afr ica 's poli t ica l andadministra t ive presence in Namibia which dates back to 1 91 5, the legalambiguities deriving from the League of Nat ion s' C Mandate were ruthlesslyexploited by successive South African governments for their own selfishinterests. Not only was SWA systematically incorporated into the Union ofSouth Afr ica , but poli t ica l control was ensured through the extension ofrac ia l , land and political policy* Contrary to the provisions ofArticle IV of the 'Mandate Agreement Regarding German South-West Africa* of


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17 December 19 20, which reads as fol lows:

The mil i tary t raining of the nat i ves , o therwisethan for purposes of internal police and thelocal defense of the territory, shall beprohibi ted. Furthetmor e , no mil i tary or navalbases shal l be established or fortificationserected in the territory.

At the time, Smuts persuaded the Union government to reinforce the policein SWA by sending 3 00 members of the South African Pol ice (SAP ) to theterritory and soon afterwar ds (in 19 39) to transfer co ntrol of the SWAPol ice to Che Union governmen t . When Wor ld War I I b roke ou t la t e r i n thesame yea r, the provisions of the original Defence Act of 1912 (as amen ded)wefe extended to SWA.

More important from the perspective of a frontier army was the deploymentof the Union Defence Force (UDF ) and Air Force to crush the Bondelswartrising of May 1922 and military action against Chief Impumbu of the Kuambi(an Ambo grouping) in 19 32. Very much l ike thei r German predec essors , theSouth African authori t ies , supported by the UDF , intervened direct ly intraditional power structures to smash resi stan ce.

Against the backdrop of an extended legal dispute over the locus ofsovereignty wi th regard to Namibia 's pol i t ical fu ture, b lack (African)polit ical opposition entered a new phase with the formation of nationalistpol i t ical movements in the period 195 7-19 60. Despi te organisat ional andpersonal r ival ry between SWAPO and SWA NU, both organisat ions campaignedinside the country and abroad for the terminat ion of South African control

and independence for Namib ia.

Regional developme nts , notably the independence of Zambia on 24 October1964 and the ongoing guerri l la war in neighbouring Angola, provided SWAPOwith new pol it ical and mil i tary opportuni t ies . In 1962, SWAPO's externalleade rship had already embarked upon a military training programme anddispatched some 200 volunteers to Egypt for train ing. Assisted by OAUrecog nitio n as 'the authentic and sole representative of African opinion inSouth West Af rica ' in 1 96 5, the first SWAPO guerril las returned to preparefor the coming struggle (Du Pisani, 1987:91-95) .

The controvers ial ru l ing of the Internat ional Court of Jus t ice (ICJ) on18 July 196 6 denying Ethiopia and Liberia any le gal r ight or in teres t in

the matter of the SWA Mand ate, effectively gave the green light to theembryonic liberati on movement to launch the armed strugg le. That same da y,a state ment from SWAPO's external leadership in Dar-es- Salaam declared thatthe ICJ'a 'inexcusable ref usal ' to act against South Afric a 'would relieveNamibians once and for all from any il lusions which they may have harbouredabout the United Na tions as some kind of saviour in their plight . . . Hehave n o al ternat ive but ta r ise in arms and bring about our l iberat ion. '(SWAPO, 1 9 8 1 : 1 7 7 ) .

The first military engagement took place on 26 August 1966 (Namibia D ay )whe n SWAPO guerri l las from the Ongulumbashe base camp in the Uukwaludhidistrict engaged SAP units in battle (Shay & Vermaak, 1971:172-173) . Amonth later, on 27 September 1966, SWAPO guerri l las set al ight an

adminis t rat ive complex at Oshikango.


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The se first guerril la acti vities wer e countered by tlie SAP , who wer eequipped and trained for counter-insurgency wa rfare . In May 19 67 , SUAPOwere to suffer a temporary military setback when its attempts to operate inCaprivi were undermined by the death of one of its most experienced area

commanders, Tobias Hainyeko. By the end of 19 68 , SWAPO's mili tarysuccess es were limited* The movement lacked both a popular base of supportinside Ovamboland) and also secure forward base camps with the concomitantsupply dumps and inf i l tra t ion routes* Moreo ver, SWAPO was only able todeploy some 25 0 trained guerrilla s at that stage.

The poli t ico-mili tary equation, however, was soon to change signif icantly -partly because of events in Ovamboland an d Namibi a, and in neighbouri ngAngola* SWAPO itself changed strategy, following the important TangaConsulta t ive Conference in Tanzania in December 1969 - January 1970, whichnot only ca lled for greater sacr if ices for the l ibera tion of Nam ibia , butspawned the SWAPO Youth League and prepared the groundwork for SWAPO'srecognition as 'the sole and authentic representative' of the Nami blan

people by the UN General Assembly in 1 9 7 34

( D u Pisan i , 1987 :96 -99 ) .

Ovamboland and the rest of Namibia experienced labour unrest (largely SUAPOinstigated) in December 1971 - January 197 2. Short ly af ter this the SouthAfrican authorities responded with emergency regulations for theadministra tion of the District of Ovambolan d. gazetted in terms ofProclamation R17 and R26 of February 197 2, which provided, inter a l i a , foedetention without tr ia l . Massive detentions followed, while church-sta teconfront ation took a turn for the worse wi th the expulsion of chur chmen andthe destruction of the church printing works at Oniipa in Ovamboland.Amidst growing conflict and political volatility in Namibia's moststrategically important homeland, the South African authorities introduceda revised constitution for Owambo (as Ovamboland became known) in April

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and indicated that elections would follow in August of that year.Mean whil e, in neighbouring An gola , the war turned slowly against thePortugese , fol lowing successful guerr i l la ac tion in the Bi e , Moxlco, Huamboand Cuanda-Cubango provinces (Wolfers & Berg erol , 1 9 8 3 : 4 - 6 ) . At the samet ime , UNITA opened a new front against the Portugese from Zaire.

Against this backdrop, the SADF took over responsibility for counter-insurgency operations. The first large contingents of national servicemenwere deployed in northern Namibia at the beginning of 1973.

From the perspective of a frontier army, it is important to reiterate thatthe SADF was introduced Into an already highly charged political arena inOwambo, whose outstanding characteristics were low levels of

institutionalisation and a dubious basis of legitimacy. The disastrouselections of August t 9 7 3 , which registered a poll of 2,5 percent, and theinvolvement of the SADF in these elec tions , gave rise to a widely-heldpercepti on of the SADF as an 'occupation force' , bent on the destructio n ofa popular and legitimate opposition compris ing SWAPO and the indigenouschurches- This viewpoint was reinforced by international developm ents -notably, the earlier ICJ Advisory Opinion of 1971 reaffirming that SouthAfrica's 'I llegal occupat ion 1 of Namibia was in contravention ofinternational l aw, and the special ascrlptive status conferred by the USGeneral Assembly and the OAU on SWAPO. The actions of the SADF withinNam ibi a, both in a military and non-military se nse, and the use of Namibiaas a springboard for aggression against neighbouring Angola, only served toentrench these vi^ws and to complicate even further the SAD F's 'frontier

ro le ' .


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Notwiths tanding considerable pol i t ical weakness In Namibia, the SADFfollowed the classical precepts of a frontier army both in a military andnon-military sense* Accelerated by events in Portugal in Apri l 1974 andthe prospect of Angol an in depen dence , the SADF not only increased forcelevels in northern Namib ia, but announced in June 1974 that an OvamboBat tal ion under the control of the SiDF would be formed (Du Pisani ,1 9 8 5 : 2 3 3 ) . This was a n important development , for i t was the beginning ofa policy to Namib ianis e the war and to militaris e the polit ical process innorthern Namibia in the absence of credible polit ical alternatives toSWAPO. In a context of heightened c onfl ict , especially bet ween traditionalpower structures supported by the SADF on the one hand, and SWAPO on theo t h e r , some 2 500 people had left Owam bo by October 1974 to unde rgomil i tary t raining wi th SWAPO guerri l las in Zambia and Angola .

Because of the escalat ion In guerri l la act iv i t ies in northern Namibia, theSouth African government extended the provisions of the Rioto us Ass emblies

Act of 1956 to Namibia . At the same t ime , the Suppress ion of Communism Actof 195 0 was renamed the State Securi ty Act . I t s provis ions were applied toNamib ia a l so .

Consis tent wi th front ier army t radi t ions , new measures to improve bordersecurity between Owambo and Angola were introduced in May 1976. Provisionwa s made for a 'depopulated zone' of 1 000 km along the border wi thAngola . Population relocation followed, and entry from Angola was onlypermitted through Ruacana and Cal ueq ue. Certain provisions of Proclama tionR17 of 1972 were inv oked, supplementing the decisions to depopula te a stripone ki lometre wide along the border wi th Angola (Du Pisa ni , 1985 :239 ) .

Village rs relocated from the border area were resettled in 'protected

vil lages ' under SADF control .6 White res ident ial areas of towns in Owambo ,Caprivi and Kavango were fenced off and surrounded by watch tower s. At thesame time, the policy of ethnic fragmentation was given further import inKavango and Caprivi, following the designation of these areas as'sel f-governing ' in 1973 and 1976 respect ively. By mid-1976 developmentassistan ce to Owamb o, Kavango and Caprivi was co-ordinated and extendedwith the establishment of area-based development co rpora tions .Significantly, further land allocations were made to these northern ethnicsub-systems in an attempt to strengthen the position of traditional powerstructures along the lines of indirect rule in the face of increased SWAPOguerri l la act iv i ty. '

Against the background of developments in neighbouring Angola and at tempt s

by the weste rn powers to secure the independence of Namibia throughdiplomatic mea ns, the South African government continued wit h its policy of'controlled chang e* in Namib ia, encouraged the Turnhalle ConstitutionalConference to reach agreement on a constitution premised on the exclusionof nationalist polit ical forces such as SWAPO and SWAKU, and announced inMay 1977 that the period of national service for white South African andNamibian conscripts would be extended from one to two years.

The war in northern Namibia took a new turn after the involvement of theSADF in the Angolan theatre fol lowing Operat ion Savannah during September1975-February 19 76. This led to the development of a special relationshipbetween DNITA and 32 Bat tal ion, who both ful f i l the role of surrogates .Th e war was further 'Naraibianised' with the establishment of 201 Battal ion,

(made up of San B u s h me n ) , 102 Bat tal ion in Kaokoland, 202 Battal ion in theKavango , and 203 Batta lion in Bushraanland (Dodd , 1980:291-300) . Specific


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Civic Act ion program mes, f i rs t in t roduced In 1974, were s ignif icant lyextended to encompass medical services , teaching; technical t raining,veterinary services and agricul tural ass is tance. By June 198 3, the SADF

and SWATF provided forty-nine of the fifty-eight medi cal doctors inKaokoland and Owam bo; f ive of the eight pharmacis ts in Owamb o; mannedtwenty-six clinics in Owambo and Kaokoland; provided twelve tons of medicalsuppl ies per month to the cl in ics ; had t reated 248 246 pat ients at thesecl in ics during 19 82 ; and provided the bulk of al l dental services Innor thern Namib ia (Para tus , vo l 3 4 , no 6 , June 1983 :9 -10 ) .

Areas regarded aa mil i tar i ly sensi t ive were target ted for civic act ionprogram mes in the hop e that t hese would enhance the legitimacy of ethnicpower s t ructures . In some cases , the implementat ion of specif ic civicaction programmes coincided with trans-border military operations againstSWAFO. It i s a moot point whethe r such programmes have not been underminedby the 'alienating effects of military brutality 1 (Cawthra, 1 9 8 6 : 2 0 5 ) . Th e

real i t y, however , was that a growing number of Namibians - perhaps as manyas 40 0 000 - became s tructurally dependent on the military for jobs, cashand security.* 1 The socio-economic and polit ical implications of this,especially in the event of withdraw al by the SADF, will be far-reaching ina post - independent Namibia.

The posi t ion of the San is especial ly vulnerable. In 1979 a group ofVaseke la San from Angola were brought to Luhebu in Bushmanland to form thenucleus of a mil i tary u ni t . Earl i er, the SADF had establ ished Alpha Baseat Rundu in the Kavango, where Baraqwena and !Kung San were t rained anddeployed as t rackers in SADF counter- insurgency operat ion s . The Alpha uni ttook part in Operation Savannah in 1975-76 and during the course of actionmet wi th the Vasekela San and thei r famil ies , who were engulfed by thecivi l war in southern Angola. Th e Vasekela San were f irs t reset t led atRundu and then moved to Omega Base where 201 Bat tal ion was es tabl ished.

The SADF is engaged in a programme of civic action based on the teaching offarming ski l l s and animal husbandry, and provides medical care, educat ion(Sub A to Standard Tw o) and housing (Fa rat u s , v o l 3 4 , n o 2, February1983:28-31) . Mili tary bases have al ready been es tabl ished at M'kata,Kanum, Nho ma, Luhe bu, Luhebu North and So uth, Khandu, Omatak u, Tsumkwe andVlcks Rus .

The San face the real risk of total social disintegration as a consequenceof mil i tar isat ion and westernisat ion by the SADF.

A development wi th major pol i t ical overtones has been the es tabl ishment ofthe South Vest African Terri tory Force (SWATF) on 1 August 1980 . Despi tethe fact that the SWATF had its own un ifo rms , rank str ucture s and payscales, i ts command structur e remains integrated with the SAD F. Theoperati onal com petence of the SWATF remains limited to Naadbf an unitsouts ide the Operat ional Area and specif ical ly excludes t rans-border act ionsin to Ango la .

Mark eted as 'part of the SWA i ndepende nce proces s' and as forming 'thebasis of the defence force of the new s tate ' (Major-General Charl es Lloyd,former 0 C , StfATF, quoted in Cawt hra , 1986 :201 ) , the SWATF, in the absenceof a viable polit ical alternati ve to SWAPO, provides a 'militarycounterweight ' to the popular appeal of SWAPQ (Seegers , 1 9 8 7 : 6 ) .


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Sinc e i t s format ion in 1 960 , the SWATF has grown rapidly to a force levelin excess of 21 000 , and has been involved in numerous trans-border actionsagainat SWAPO in southern Angola (The SADF: A Surve y, supplement toFinancial M a i l , 10 July 1987 :22 ) .

In addi tion to the SWATF, a SWA Pol ice Force (SWAPOL) was formal lyinaugurated in 198 1. SWAPOL now falls under the polit ical cont rol of theTransi t ional Government of Nat ional Uni ty (TGNU) , established in June1 9 8 5 . Th e Securi ty Pol ice uni ts and 'Koevoet ' ( renamed COI N in 19 86 )remain under the operat ional control of the SADF and SAP. Mo re recent ly,the SWATF has established Special U ni ts , which have been successfullydeployed against SWAPO inside Namibia and in southern Angola.

The polit ical and military importanc e o the SWATF' ha s been augm ented bytwo further developments . Fi rs t , the in t roduct ion of a sys tem of areadefence that involves both SWATF and local commando units and, secondly,the introduction of compulsory military service in 1982 for the differentethnic groups in Nami bia. Notwithstanding resistanc e from SWAPO and theblac k chur ches , the SWATF has grown apace , especially for economic reasonsin the light of widespread unemployment and economic stagnation in somesectors of the local economy. The polit ical allegiance of some elements of101 and 201 Battalions in particular seems at best te nuous , as has beendramatical ly i l lustrated by incidents bordering on the nuti nous duringrecent operations in support of UNITA in southern Angola.

Pax Pretoriana : Namibia and the Angolan Factor

In the case of Angola, the SADF's frontier army features can best beillustrated wit h reference to two related (yet distinc t) dime nsio ns. Theseare : croas-border operations against SWAPO and the development of a specialsurrogate relat ionship wi th UNITA. While these two dimensions have beenempirically l inked at t ime s (for exa mpl e, in the SADF'e ongoing operationsin southern Ango la ) , they have to be separated for analytical purposesbecause they highl ight d is t inct aspects of the SADF's front ier ro l e.

As far as the cross-border operations against SWAPO are concer ned, chesehave been and are sti l l justified in terms of a counter-Insurgency doctrinethat views SWAPO as a 'revolutionary' organi sation. This implies thatSWAPO is seen as bent on the destruction of the prevailing socio-polit icalorder in Namibia (Paratus , vol 3 0, no 6 , June 1979:3 ) -

South Africa's war strategy evolved during the period 1 97 8-8 2, mainly Inresponse to growing SWAPO guerril la capabil i t ies, the introduction ofsophisticated military hardware in southern Angola, polit ical developmentsInside Namibia and in the regio n, and the change of adminis t rat ion InWash ingt on. I t bec ame , in the view of one analyst , ' Increas ingly apreemptive and aggressive strategy, not a reactive one* (Jas ter,1 9 8 5 : 4 5 - 4 6 ) .

The need for a preemptive strategy beca me patently obviou s i n 197 8, whenSWAPO demonstrated a capabili ty t o deploy in excess of 100 guerr il las Inthe white commercial farming districts of Grootfont eln, Tsum eb, Qtavi. andOtji waro ngo. Reacting to this devel opment , the SADF launched a


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cro sa-b ord et at t ac k aga inst SWAPO tra in in g and tr a n si t f a c i l i t ie s In theCunene pr ov inc e in May 1978 . Codenamed 'Moscow* and 'V ie tn am ', twoImpo rtant SWAPO tr ai ni n g and tr a n s it b ases were de stro ye d. De spite th isop er ati on , SWAPO g u e r ri ll a a c ti v it y in no rther n Namibia and in Ca privi andKavartgo showed an in c r e a se . On th e ni ght of 23 August 1978 SWAPO launch eda succe ssful rock et at ta ck on the Katimo Mulilo m il i ta ry b ase , k i l l i n g tenSouth Afr ican so ld ie rs .

Ag ainst the background of incre ased SWAPO g u e rr il la a c ti v it y and th ei rImproved t ra in in g and equipment (SWAPO re ce ive d tr a in in g on SAM 6 4 7m is si le s f or the f i r s t time i n 197 8), th e SADF responded with mechanisedin fa n try and a ir a tt ac k s on SWAPO base s in south ern Ang ola. Op erationSmokeahell in May 1978 se t th e tone fo r futu re op er at io ns . This op era tionwas of sp ec ia l mi lit ar y imp ortan ce, not only for the vast q ua nti ty ofequipment th a t was capture d (some 350 to n s) , but i t al so reve aled theex ten t of Sov iet involvement in th e Angolan th e a tr e and the type oEequipment atade available to SWAPO, as well a s th e ex te nt of th e op er at io na lin te g ra ti on tha t e xis ted between SWAPO and the Angolan m i l i t a r y . 'Moreover, Operation Smokeshell was the first of its kind to involve thenewly e sta bl ish ed SWA Sp ec ia lise Unit, formed in January 1978.

The South African cr os s-b or de r op er atio ns ag ain st SWAPO were ca rr ie d outwith surp risi ng f l e x ib il i t y and were adapted to changing p o li t i c a l andm ili ta ry co nd iti on s. For example, soon af te r June 1980, following theannouncement t h a t South A fric a had develope d i t s own 127mm ro ck et system tocou nter the th re at posed by the Soviet 'Red Eye' or 'S ta li n Org an' , th issystem was su cc es sf ul ly deployed a ga in st SWAPO in subseq uent op er at io ns .Anti-SWAPO propaganda such as l e a f l e t s th a t read 'J o in SWAPO and d ie 'were used after when Maj-Gen Charles Lloyd took over from Lt-Gen JannieGeldenhuys in O ctober 1980 as OC of SWA Command, when the l a t t e r wasappo inted Chief of the SA Army. The f i r s t South Af rican m arines were alsotra in ed i n the Op eration al Area in Apr il 1981, to be deployed la te r inop er at io ns ag ai n st SWAPO in sou the rn Angola (P a ra tu s, vo l 32 , no 5 , May1981:10-12).

The second major o pe ra tio n a ga ins t SWAPO f a c i l i t i e s in so uthe rn Angola -codenamed Op eration Pro tea - took pla ce in August 198 1. Th is ope ra tio n wasc ar ri e d out j o in tl y by SADF and SWATF u n i ts , made use of a ir co v er , re ly in ghea vily on the b a tt le experience and spe cia l s k i l ls of 32 Ba tta l io n and thefirepow er and m ob ility of 61 Mechanised B at ta lio n Group. In the co ntex t ofcro ss-b ord er op era tion s a ga in st SWAPO, Operation Protea was impo rtant forfour reaso ns. F ir s t , four Soviets - including two Lt-Co lonels - werek i l l e d i n th e SADF/SWATF a tt a c k on the towns of Xangongo and Ongiva i n theCunene Pro vin ce. This was seen as ' d ir e c t proof of Sov iet involvement inth e SWAPO campaign' (P ar at us , vo l 32 , no 10, October 198 1:68 -71 ).Secondly, this operat ion revealed for the f irst t ime the extent and natureof a n ti -a ir c ra f t defence systems in st al le d in southern Angola ( includin g anew 20mni tr ip le -b a rr el le d a n ti -a ir c ra f t gun made in Y ugoslavia, andadvanced ra da r) . Third ly, South Africa increased i t s m il i ta ry support toUN1TA; and f i n a l l y , i t paved th e way fo r aemi-permanent SADF oc cu pa tion oElarge parts of the Cunene province that only ceased in April 1985,following the tr ipart i te Lusaka Accordreached between South A fric g, theUn ited S ta te s and the MPLA government in Luanda in Feb ruary 198 4.


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for the es tabl ishment of a Joint Moni toring Commission (JMC) to oversee theimplementat ion of the agreement . Neverth eless , the agreement fel l apart

soon a f t e r I t was s igned .

Although the t r i lateral agreement made provis ion for part icipat ion by theUni ted Sta tes , the Angolan government subsequent ly denied par t icipat io n tothe US in the JMC while i t operated on Angolan so i l . The US accordinglyopened a l iaison off ice in Windhoek to serve as a contact between th e USgovernment and the JMC. This was closed in February 19 85 , when i t becameapparen t that only limited progress was being mad e. The JMC itself did nots t a r t t o func tion e ffec t ively un t i l 18 March 198 4 . By May 1 985 some 125violations of the agreement were recorded - South Africa admitting to foursuch violat ions*

Despi te the Lusa ka Ac cord, South Africa did not wi thdraw i ts forces from

southern Angola unt i l the las t week of Apri l 198 5. In the fol lowing montha uni t of i t s special Recce forces was captured whi le engaged in operat ionsagainst o i l ins tal lat ions in Cabinda. Cross-border operat ions againstSWAPO were resumed in late June 1 985 (Operat ion Boswl lger ) and furtheract ions occurred in. 1986 aad early 1 987. In June 1986 South Africanmarines launched a naval at tack on the southern Angolan port of Namibe,s inking a cargo vessel and dest roying two fuel s torage tanks . Thisincident and others that fo l lowed in 1 987 and more recent ly, coincided wi tha renewed FAPLA offensive against UNITA (Young, 1987 :224 ) .

In typical front ier army fashio n, South Africa 's t rans-border operat ionsagain st SWAPO are informed by some of the following polit ico-militaryob jec t ives :

- to dest roy SWAPO as a credible mil i tary force - which would undermineSWAPO's pol i t ical appeal and legi t imacy in Nam ibi a, as we l l as I tsinternational pos itio n, especially in maintaining continued militarysuppor t ;

- to demonstrate the Sout h African government's resolve in the face ofarmed insurgency and its determination not to be forced into makingpol i t ical concess ions on account of mil i tary weakness . Thle part lyexplains why the SADF's actions in Namibia and Angola are Invariablypresented as those of an 'heroic* and 'Invincible ' army ;

- to keep the mil i tary s i tuat ion in Namibia under control by containingthe war beyond the dis tant Angolan front ier, whi le seeking tos t rengthen 'moderate ' pol i t ical forces in the Terri t ory; and

- to bring mil i tary press ure to bear o n the Angolan government as ameans of forcing it to revise i ts policy towards SW APO - specificallyto discourage th e Angola n armed forces from playing a more di rectrole in support of SWAPO (Jaster, 1985:46-47) .

Among the mil i tary components of the war s t rateg y, special emphasis wa splaced on the prevent ion of SWAPO offensive capabi l i ty in southern Angola,and the establishment of an SADP-controlled buffer strip alo ng Angola'ssouthern border wi th Namibia. Both these components were di rected toward

reducing Namibia's polit ical vulnerab ili t ies in the absence of a legitimateal ternat ive to SWAPO and to providing the SADF wit h access to UNITA.


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The resurge nce of UHITA - the 'f ro n ti e r dim ension '

The second dimension of th e SADF's ro le In th e regio n - i t s su rr og at ere la t io ns hi p with UNITA - is of spec ial important to i t s ' fr on t ie r r o l e ' .

With a t o ta l land a rea of 1 246 700 sq km (431 354 sq m il e s) , Angola i s amassive co untr y, second in siz e af te r Za ire of the co un trie s south of theSa hara . Angola is an underpopulated co un try , with a to ta l populationofsome nine m illio n in 1986. It is overwhelmingly ru ra l and t r i b a l , with anes tim ate d 20% of the po pula tion li v in g i n urban are as of over 2 000pe ople . Angola is a country cha rac teris ed by considera ble ethnicdi v er si ty * The main eth nic d iv is io ns a re Ovimbundu, Mbundu, Kongo,Lunda-Chokwe, Nga nguela. Nyaneka, Humbe, and Aabo. A p ri n c ip a l fe a tu reofthe pop ulatio n is i t s y outh , with 42% under fi fte en yea rs old and only 4%over si x ty . The average l i f e expectancy i s about forty-on e years(Pe i l s s i e r, 1987 :219 ) .

Following Angola's independence on 11 November 1975, the countryexperienced a massive outflow of s k i l ls and ex pe rt i se . I t is est imatedth at over" 300 000 people (mostly white) le ft the co un try. Since th ec o ll a p s e of th e fr a g il e Alvor Agreement between t h e MPLA, UNITA and th eFNLA in 1975, and the subsequent in ter ne ci ne c iv il w ar, the ad m in istr ati veand s e t t l e r segments of the economy were worst h i t , causing majord is ru pt io n s in the modern se c to r. As a consequence of th e c i v i l war andthe mil i tary involvement of outside forces, including the South Africanm il i ta ry , some sig nifi ca nt st ru ct ur al changes - some with long-termim plica t ion s - have taken pla ce . These changes include an eth nicregrouping of African populations - the Ovimbundu in particular fellbackto the central and southern plateau; large-scale populat ion movements inthe northw est - some Kongo refugee s in Zai re retu rne d to Angola; a gen era lm igrat ion from c i t ie s to ru ra l ar ea s; the dea th of over 150 000 peop le,victims of strife, famine and disease; a reconcentratlon of the Ovimbunduin fo r t i f ie d v i l la ge s , esp ec ia l ly in the sou theas t and eas te rn provinces ;massive population dislocation in southern Angola as a consequence of SouthAfrica n m ili ta ry a c ti v it y and UNITA op er ati on s; and the formation of arefugee population in excess of 600 000, fle eing combat on the c e n tr a lplateau and the drought of the last few years.

In th i s c l imate of soc io-economic and po l i t i ca l d i s in tegra t ion , SouthAfrican fo rc es , ac ting on the mistaken be lief tha t the United Sta tesgovernment would support them, ov er tly inter ven ed on behalf of theanti-HPLA fo rc es . South Africa I n i t i a l l y interve ned in Angola on thepre tex t of safeguarding i t s in te re st s in the Ruacana and Caluequehy dr o~ ele ctr ic schemes, but i t was soon appare nt th at the SADF'sIntervention was linked to broader regional designs, as became clear inSeptember 1975 when the SADF became di r e c tl y involve d in the power st ru g g lewithin Angola.

In t he second week of August 1975 South Afric an fo rc es took co nt ro l of theRuacana hy dr o- el ec tri c i n s ta ll a ti o n . Two days la t e r an armoured ca t columnen te re d Angola and cap tur ed th e MPLA-held town of N glva. By mid-September1975 South African m il i ta ry advisors and in st ru ct or s were ass is t in g a sm allUNITA fo rc e to r e pu ls e an MPXA of fe ns ive on Nova Li sb oa . Ear ly In Octobe r1975 a combined UNITA/FNLA fo rc e of some 1 000 men was pu t under th ecommand of a se ni or South Af rican m il it a ry o f fi c e r. Accompanied by ot he rcommissioned and non-commissioned of fi c e r s , th e Zulu combat group came In to


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being , with th e sp ec ific obje ct ive of recap turing a s many towns in southernAngola as possible*

The Zulu combat group* by then supported by ground forces, hadsystematical ly recaptured Serpa Pinto, Arthur da Paiva, the southernd is tr ic t ca pi ta l of Pe reira d 'Eca , Rocadas, Joao de Almeida, Sa 'da Bandeiraand Mocamedea by th e end of Octobee 197 5. A modicum of UNITA/FNlad m inistr at io n was in st a l l e d , while the Zulu combat group, joined byt ra ined FNIA t roo ps , es tab l i she d i t s e l f a t the s t r a te g ic a l l y - loc a te d townof Sa't ia Bandeira to reorganise in preparation for an attack on theimportant towns of Benguela and Lobito*

With important parts of the Cunene province again under joint UNITA/PNLAco nt ro l, Zulu continued i t s advance. In the b a tt le for Bengu ela, the SouthAfrican forc es encou ntered fi er ce re si st an ce from th e 122mm rocke t

laun che rs which far exceeded th e SADF's 81mm mo rtars in e ff ec ti v e rang e-Fu rther a r t i l l e r y support was urg en tly requested from South Af-riea, whichar ri ve d on 11 November 1975 , en ab lin g the South African/UNITA fo rc es tocapture Benguela and Lobito (Paratus, vol 28, no 3, March 1977:3-10).

With the western front reasonably secure, Zulu and Foxbat (a SouthAfr ican- t ra ined ba t ta l ion wi th an armoured car squadron and art i l lery)advanced northwards and captured the towns of Cangamba, Menongue, Kuito andthe im portan t ra ilw ay town of Luso . By December 1975, South Africa haddeployed 2 000 men in Angola ov er an 800 km fr o n t.

Desp ite furth er rein forc em ents , th e South African forc es - hampered by poorcom mun ications, long l in e s of su pp ly, h o s t i l i t y between UNITA and the FSLA

for con trol over te r ri to ry , and plagued by gene ral bandi try - conc entratedon con sol ida t ing th ei r con trol over the Benguela rai lway and in st a l l in gURITA and FNLA ad m in is tr a ti on s in captu red town s. UNITA and FNl> t ro opscar ried out a reign of t er ro r again st those suspected of suppo rt ing theMPIA. A new UKITA 'r e p u b l i c ' was dec lare d in Huambo in t he S outh Af ricanoccupied are a, but the adm inistrat ion was in dis ar ray .

FAP1A began a suc ces sfu l cou nte t-off ens ive in the no rth . With th eassistance of a growing number of Cubans and the introduction of Sovietmil i tary hardware into the Angolan theatre , the t ide was turning againstUNITA and t h e FHTA by th e m idd le of February 1976.

Opera tion Savannah, as th i s South African i nt er ve nt io n i n Angola was

c a ll e d , was not on ly p o l i ti c a ll y misguided> but t he SADF made a number ofse r ious t a c t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c e r ro rs . Despi te a t t emp t s t o i n t e g ra t e andco nso lida te the UNITA/FNLA a ll ia n c e , t hi s never m at er ia lis ed . By thebeginning of 1976, the FNLA had vi r tu a ll y d is in te g ra te d , wh ile UNXTA'sac tion s in southern Angola were ch ara cte rise d by ba nd itr y. The soc ialfa br ic of south ern Angola f e l l ap a rt . Jonas Savimhi was evacuated toNamibia, where the SADF was de sp er ate ly atte m ptin g to r e c o n s ti tu te UNITA-A new front l i n e was est ab lish ed about eighty k ilo m etr es from the Hamlbianbord er, where South African forcea remained u n ti l th e ir f in al withdrawal atthe end of March 1976.

Bruised by their Angolan experience) and faced with a new regional andin te rn at io na l environment, the SADF entere d In to spec i a l su r roga t e

re la ti o ns h ip with, UNITA to fu rth er i t s reg ion al d esig ns in Namibia andAngola.


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In 1985 the mi lit ar y fortu nes of a l l the p a rt ie s changed. UNITAunsuccessfully started a campatga around the capital city of Luanda andannounced in March - in the presence of Afghan moudjahldin andre pr es en ta tiv es from other l i be ra ti on movements - tha t i t would engage theFAPLA for ce s and the Cubans in a 'd e ci si v e cam paign' la t e r t h a t year(Pourie , 1&8?:78).

In August the United States Congress repealed the Clark Amendment of 1975th at had u n ti l then effe cti ve ly pro hib ited US support for UNITA. InOctober 1985, on a viB it to Pa ri s, Savimbi confirmed the a r r iv a l of USStin ge r m is si le s. Pr esid en t Reagan indic ated in November tha t he favouredadditional covert support for UNITA.

Angolan fo rc es launch ed a major offen sive ag ain st UNITA po si ti on s In t h eea st and sou the as t in J uly 1985, re ca pt ur in g the town of Cazombo in Mexico

pro vin ce , and advanced on UNITA po sit io ns clo se to Kavinga, sou th of thest ra te g ic al ly -i m p or ta nt Lomfea ri v e r in the Cuando Cubango pro vin ce . Forth e fi r s t time In the war, the main UNITA base a t Jamba fu rt h er south wasth rea t ened .

Re alis ing t ha t the f a l l of Jamba would mean an ir re v e rs ib le setback forUNITA and the re fo re dim inish South A fr ic a's bar gain ing po sit io n on Angolaand Nam ibia, th e SADF deployed a mechanised u ni t backed by heavy a r t i l l e r yin suppo rt of UHITA at M avitiga and car ri ed out two de va sta tin g a tr at ta ck son Angolan forward p o si ti o n s, h a lt in g th e FAFLA/Cuban adv anc e.

Sho rtly af te r th is , the South African Min ister of Defence, General MagnusMalan, pu bl lc al ly d isc los ed South African m ili ta ry suppo rt f or UNITA.

Speaking on 20 September 1985, General Malan advanced several reasons forSouth African support, including: a common opposition to communism (addingthat Angola was 'Moscow's springboard to Southern Africa1 ) ; t ha t h i sgovernment would 'not yield to opportunistic Western polit ical preasurewhich uses South Africa as a handy distraction from their own problems';and emphasising USITA's u t i l i t y in ke eping SWAPO for ce s at bay { Pa ra tu s,v o l 36, no 10 , October 19 85 :22 -2 3). At pa ins to po in t o ut th a t TJNITA. was'not a creation of the South African Government', General Malan concludedby saying th a t 'sho uld Dr Savimbi be unsu cce ssful in Angola, then the Westwill be to blame because they permitted Eastern Bloc countries to actundeterred aga ins t Hestern in te re s t s . South Afr ica , support ing Westernin te re s t s , w i l l then have a c lear cons c ienc e ' .

In 1986 the SADF cemented i t s re la ti o ns hi p with UNITA by as si s ti n g th emovement to develop a semi-conventional capability and by training largenumbers of UNITA fo rc e s. South African d ir ec t m ili ta ry as si st an ce to UNITAamounted to cl os e on R400 m illi on in t ha t ye ar .

The most re cen t SADF and SWATF m i l i ta ry invo lvement i n sup po rt of UNITAst a r te d around 18 September 1987, m aintainin g the 1985 tr en d , when th e SADFinterve ned to stop FAPLA re -e st ab lis hi ng the important a ir base a t Mavtngasouth of th e Lomba r i v e r . A base th er e would enab le th e Angolan Air Forceto cootrol airspace right up to the Namlblan border, thereby denying SouthAfr i ca a i r supe r io r i t y.

As be for e, the SADF deployed 32 B at ta lio n In support of UNITA. I n i t i a l l yth is seemed to s u ff ic e ; however, i t soon became necess ary to augment th i swith a fu rt he r 2 000 SADF aod SWATF tr o o p s. S ig n if ic a n tl y , members of 101and 201 B at ta l ion s (Ovambo and Ra vag e w i t s re sp ec t iv ely ) refused to be


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in tegrated wi th UNITA forces , as ment ioned earl ier. The impl ications ofthis act ion have yet to be digested but must inevitably pose major proble msfor the S ADF, not leas t in i t s 'Namibianisat ion 1 policy*

Anothe r important development occurred when an Angolan Mig f ighter shotdow n a South Africa n Mirage jet in a dogf ight . For the f i rs t t im e, SouthAfrica los t an ai rcraft in Angola other than on account of a miss i le ormechanical fai lure. I t was also the f i rs t occasion s ince 1975 that theAngo la n Ai r Force , admi t t ed ly s t rengthened by Cuban p i lo t s , demonst ra t ed acapaci ty to exercise control over s ignif icant parts -of i t s own ai r spa ce.As frequent ly predicted, the s takes in the conflict have once again beenraised , as wi tnessed by the increasing technological sophis t icat ion ofweaponry ( largely of Soviet ori gin) employed by the Ango lans .

Conclusion

South A frican mil i tary involvement in Namibia and Angola const i tu tes a nimportant element in the Republ ic 's regional pol i t ical pol icy, determinedby the fol lowing interes ts : f i rs t , the ul t imate securi ty of the Republ i c ofSouth Africa in relat ion to regional securi ty ; secondly, South Africa 's owndomest ic pol i t ical considerat ions; and f inal ly, t he pol it ical s i tuat ion inNamibia i t sel f . In terms of regional pol icy, al l three are closelyintertwined. For example, the South African government 's percept ion ofthreat is shaped by its estimation of ho w Nami bia is ranked as a d omesti cpol i t ical i ssue by both the whi te and black inhabi tants of South Afri ca.Similarly, pol i t ical developments ins ide Namibia influence the government 'ssecurity asses smen t, especially in so far as they could be assumed to havea negative influence on domestic South African polit ics, i .e. if a unitary

vote system were to prevai l over the RSA-prefe rred, and vi rtual ly imposed,divis ive mul t ip le-t ier ethnic groupings-While pressures from the in ternat ional community and, more recent ly, theescalat ing coats of the war , have also influenced South African at t i tudes ,security and domestic polit ical considerations have remained of paramountimportance to decis ion-makers . In the context of Angolan pol i t i cs , therole of the SADF and Its surrogate relationship with UNITA have hadsignifican t influence and may wel l have long-term negative implications forthat countr y. While the full extent of South African aggression againstAngola is not known, an Internat ional Commission of Inquiry, headed by thelate Sean Hc Bride, former Ir ish foreign minis ter and Uni ted Nat ionsCommissioner for Namibia, calculated that SADF-sourced damage to Angola 'sinfras t ructure in the period 19 75-19 80 amounted to some US $7 bi l l ion(Leonard, 1983 :81 ) .

At the beginning of 198 6, an EEC miss ion to Angola es t imated the war damagecaused by the SADF and UNITA to exceed US$10 bi l l ion. The actual cost tothe Angolan economy would be considerably higher than this , especially ifone considers Indirect costs such as the loss in agricultural productionand the necess i ty to develop al ternat ive t ransport routes . Cos t ofrehabili tation of the Benguela railway itself is conservatively calculatedIn excess o f US$300 mi l l ion .

The widening pattern of conflict In Angola and northern Namibia ha ssignifican tly undermined what l imited social cohesion there is . In Ang ola

at large, more than 300 000 people have been displaced as a d i rectcons equen ce o-f the civil war , while the total refugee population insouthern Ang ola, northern Namibia and neighbouring Z aire to tals between


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80 000 and 100 000 p e op le . In th e ca se of Nam ibia, c lo se to 11 000 SWAPOg u e r r i l l a s , c iv il ia n s and members of the SADF and SWATF have l o st th e irli v e s since the s ta r t of the war in 1966. War ca su al tie s l i t Angola areest im ate d at between 20 000 and 25 000,

The so c io -p o li ti c a l consequences of South A fri ca 's war str at eg y i n Namibiaand Angola may, in a l l p ro ba bi li ty , fu rth er undermine the so ci al cohesionof these two co un tries and ret ard the processes of na t ion -bu i ldin g.P ol i t i ca l ly i t has been a h ig h-r i sk s t ra teg y - widening the con f l ic t inAngola and legitimising the involvement of foreign actors in the regionalth e at re . Thus, far from underpinning foreign pol icy in i t ia t i v e s in there gi on , th e r o le of the SADF has ac tu a ll y undermined diplomacy and hardeneda t t i t u d e s on a l l s i d e s .

In Namibia, the SADF as a fr on tie r army has contrib uted to the po la ris at io nof so ci et y, esp ec ia lly in the no rth . This is apparent in the growings t r u c t u r a l dependence of a growing number of Namibians on t h e SADF for jobsand se cu ri ty . The exten sion of mi lit ar y ser vice t o a l l Namibians in 1982cont r ibu ted s ig n i f ica n t ly to fur ther soc ia l po lar i sa t io n , espec ia l ly sincet h i s move was widely opposed i ns id e the co un try .

In the case of Angola, th e su rro ga te r e la ti o ns hi p between the SADF andUNITA is u nl ik ely to produce the p o l i t i ca l re su l ts desire d by P re to ria .Jonas M alheiro Savimbi of UNITA i s committed to so ci al is m , and even ifUNITA were to gov ern i n Luanda, they w il l fac e s er io us problems such as apoorly in s t i tu t io na l i s ed s oc io- po l i t i c a l o rder, adm inis t ra t ive weaknessand the formidable task of socio-economic reconstruction andna ti on -b u il di ng . A UNITA government, or even a c o a li ti o n in clu di ng UNITA,w il l Temain hea vily dependent upon foreign as sis tan ce and ex pe rt is e, andthis would not necessarily imply cordial t ies with a white minoritygovernment in Pretoria.

The SADF's co un ter- insu rge nc y do ctr ine Is Informed by both m il ita ry andciv ic e lements . M i l i ta r i ly , the fo llowing ob jec t ives a re of cen t ra limportance - locat ing the 'enemy' gu er ri l la fo rce; I nf l ic t in g heavyca su al t ie s on the 'enemy'; gaining de tai led knowledge of the te rr ai n ;r e s t r i c t i n g SWAPO's freedom of a c ti o n and movement; and f or cing SWAPO toco nso lida te or cease i t s insurgency opera tions- UNITA is es pe ci al ly usefulin th i s contex t because i t p rov ides for te rr i to r ia l compet i t ion aga ins tSWAPO.

The c iv ic component , com prises some of the fo l lowing a sp e c t s : pro vid ing

a d e q u a te I n c e n t i v e s t o s u p po r t t h e s e c o n d - t i e r e t h n i c a u t h o r i t i e s I nno r the rn Namib ia ; u s ing ind igeno us fo rce s on p r o j ec t s u se fu l to thep o p ul ac e in v a r i o u s f i e l d s s uc h a s t r a i n i n g , a g r i c u l t u r e , e d u c a t i o n ,he a l t h ) t r a ns po r t a t io n and economic development" , and s t a b i l i s in gs o c i o - p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s i o Owambo, K av an go a nd C a p r i v i .

F in a l ly , t h i s pape r has shovn some of the co n t ra d ic t io ns inh e re n t in thef r on t i e r ro le o f the SAOT bo th in Namib ia and Ango la , i n p a r t i c u l a r thef a i l u r e of S o ut h A f r i c a ' s p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y i n N a m ib ia .


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ENDHOTES

1. Th e term praetorian la borrowed from the Rom an guard that made andunmade emperors .

2. The role of the military In the 19th century in the United S tates offe rsmany examples of the ' f ront ier ' appl icat ion of mil i tary power.

3 . The South West African Terri tory Forc e (SWATF) was es tabl ished In termsof Proclamat ion Ho AG 105 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Establ ishment of South West AfricanTerri tory Fo rce, Official Gazet te of SWA , 1 August 198 0, No 4 2 3 7 .

4 . SWAPO was recogni sed by the UN Genera l Assembly Reso lu t ion 3 1 U (XXVIII )of December 1 973 as 'the sole and authentic representative of the peopleof Namibia*.

5 . In terms of Proclamat ion R1 04 of 27 Apri l 197 3, Owambo wa8 declared aself-governing area withi n Namibi a. The Proclamatio n made provision fora Legis lat ive Cou nci l of f t f ty-s ix members*

6. Th e system of 'protected villa ges' wa s also used by the Portuges e inneighbouring Angola and by the Rhodesians against ZAPU and ZANUguerri l las .

7 . The Bantu Laws Amendment Ac t , Ho 7 of 19 73 , provided for further land tobe vested In the South African Bantu Trust, to be reserved for thedifferent ethnic sub-syste ms. Part of the land envisaged was in thewestern part of the Caprivi strip.

8. Contra ry to military belief, this dependence is unlikely to translateinto polit ical alleg iance , for the reasons outlined earlier.

9. Since May 197 8 SWAPO was increasingly forced to integrate i ts trainingand command structure with that of FAPLA. One consequence of this hasbeen that SWAPO had to commit some of Its own manpower to the fightagainst UNITA,


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Andre Du Pisani - Beyond the Barracks - Reflections on the Role of the Sadf in the Region

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