American Labor History 1869-1936

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A Brief History of the American Labor Movement

1869-1936

The modern American labor movement can be said to start in 1869 with the founding of the

Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor. This was an unfortunate time to be starting a

movement for economic solidarity. The ´Long Depression,µ a global financial panic, reached the

United States in the Panic of 1873. The KoL, however, were much different from the already

existing craft and trade unions. Their membership was not limited like, for example, the Sons of

Vulcan, who only organized the iron puddlers at steel mills and iron works. Anyone who was a

´producerµ was allowed to join the Knights; a producer is better defined as not a ´parasite,µ i.e. not

a banker, lawyer, gambler, or saloon keeper.

With this novel structure, the KoL was able to survive and grow throughout the 1870·s.In

1878, they adopted a constitution that would be laudable even by today·s standards. Article XIII

even called for the KoL to, ´secure for both sexes equal pay for equal workµ (an idea which did not

receive statutory protection in the United States until the Equal Pay Act of 1963). By 1886, the KoL

had over 700,000 members in 1,500 local assemblies. Only seventy counties in the United States

were without a KoL lodge. Despite this unparalleled success, however, the KoL was still looked

upon with suspicion by many Americans who failed to make a distinction between the KoL and

other radical, proletarian movements like communists, syndicalists, socialists, and anarchists.

Yet the Knights of Labor were not the only group organizing workers. The Federation of

Organized Trades and Labor Unions was a small umbrella organization which initiated one of the

seminal conflicts of the labor movement. FOTLU leadership called for a massive general strike for

an eight hour day on May 1, 1886. The head of the KoL, Terrence Powderly, suggested that Knights

stay home and write letters to their representatives. The rank and file, however, were not in the

mood for such a cerebral exercise and struck in solidarity with FOTLU. In Chicago, the KoL



picketed with workers already outside of the McCormick Harvester plant. On May 2nd, two strikers

were killed by the police. A public meeting was called for on May 4th in Haymarket Square. When

the police attempted to break up the meeting, an unknown protestor threw a bomb which killed one

policeman. In the ensuing melee, six more officers were killed along with an unknown, though

certainly higher, number of workers.

The Haymarket affair, remembered by many as May Day, sounded the death knell for the

Knights of Labor. Though the leadership was in no way responsible for the tragedy in Chicago, the

rank and file Knights were by far the most visible scapegoats. FOTLU was completely restructured.

The organization and leadership that emerged, however, proved to be one of the most important in

the American labor movement: the American Federation of Labor and its first president Samuel

Gompers. A cigar maker by trade, Gompers united many of the nation·s trade and craft unions

under the umbrella of the AFL. Gompers was an advocate of union independence though, and

when these unions took action, the AFL did not direct their decisions, but rather coordinated

solidarity efforts such as boycotts and strike funds.

The AFL also served a political purpose. Unlike later efforts, 19th

century labor leaders

wanted the government out of industrial relations. The reasoning in this was that government

intervention was almost universally on the side of the employer and came in the form of bayonets

and injunctions. The bloody Homestead Strike exemplifies labor relations in the 1890·s. The

Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers struck and petitioned the AFL for help.

Gompers and the AFL obliged and managed to keep the unorganized manual workers out as well.

Henry Frick, with only token resistance from his partner Andrew Carnegie, played up the ethnic

divisions between the unskilled, immigrant workers, and the skilled AA members. The strike was

finally broken by the Pennsylvania State Militia when Frick and Carnegie·s private Pinkertons failed

to dislodge the workers. The famous Pullman Strike ended in a similar fashion. Future Socialist Party



presidential nominee Eugene V. Debs led the American Railway Union out on strike and President

Cleveland ordered in federal troops.

As mentioned previously, however, the courts and legislation were also an obstacle to labor.

For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in Vegelahn v. Guntner , 167 Mass.92 (1896) that

even a porous picket line could be enjoined (the case is nevertheless famous for the dissent by later

Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.). The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, and later

the Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914, were also both used to break strikes and organizing drives. The

most notable example is the case of the Danbury Hatter·s Strike. In response to proprietor Friedrich

Loewe declaring his factories open shops, the United Hatters of North America, with the assistance

of the AFL, organized a boycott of Loewe·s hats and the stores that carried them. An injunction was

issued to stop the boycotts and was contested to the Supreme Court. In a 9-0 ruling, Loewe v.

Lawlor , 208 U.S. 274 (1908), it was said that the boycotts violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by

operating in restraint of trade. The case was remanded to Connecticut state courts where Loewe was

awarded approximately $200,000 damages (confirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court in Lawlor

v.Loewe , 235 U.S. 522 (1915)). These damages, about $4.3 million in 2010 dollars, bankrupted the

Hatters union. The AFL organized a national collection so that Loewe could not pursue the

individual union members. This decision is why unions are now incorporated entities.

Despite these setbacks, the AFL was the most recognized and respected voice of organized

labor by the start of the 20th century. Much of this can be attributed to the greater fear politicians

and the public had of the radical Industrial Workers of the World, popularly known as the Wobblies.

The IWW was first and foremost a proponent of industrial unionism (as opposed to the trade

unionism of the AFL). The difference between these two organizational philosophies was the

breadth of unionization. Trade unionists advocated only organizing skilled workers into small,



individual bargaining groups. The best examples are the buildings trades like the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,

and the United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters. Industrial unionists, however, wanted to

organize on the factory level in places like steel mills, coal mines, and meat packing plants. While this

idea eventually became the impetus for a great part of the American labor movement, the IWW was

hampered in that it also advocated for a neo-syndicalist revolution in which workers would seize the

means of production and join ´one big union.µ

The reaction of the American public to the IWW was swift and brutal. Their organizing

drives were met with outright violence and repression. With the coming of the First World War, the

reaction only grew worse. For Gompers and the AFL, however, WWI was a boon. Gompers helped

convince President Wilson to form the War Labor Board in order to facilitate industrial relations

and keep war production going. Gompers, who sat on the board, condemned the pacifism of the

IWW and promoted ´labor patriotism.µ In return, the Board promoted collective bargaining in

already organized industries. Conversely, federal and state governments raided IWW offices and

arrested their leaders. Civilian vigilantes, often organized by groups like the American Legion, broke

up meetings and occasionally murdered organizers like Frank Little. By the end of the war, the IWW

had been almost completely crushed while AFL affiliated unions reached all time membership highs.

Overall private sector union density was approximately 20% in 1918 (for comparison, it was around

6.9% in 2011 according the Bureau of Labor Statistics).

Unfortunately, post-war recession and government indifference reversed many of the AFL·s

war time gains and ended the immediate chances of unskilled labor being organized. This wasn·t for

lack of trying though; contrary to its history of supporting craft unionism, the AFL experimented

with organizing massive industries like steel, meat-packing, and coal mining during and after the war.

It was a disaster. Flush with wartime success, many of the largest unions went out on strike when



recession threatened their newfound prosperity, notably in the steel strikes of 1919 and the meat-

packers strikes of 1921. All of them failed. The AFL gave up on industrial unionization and its

inaction fulfilled its own prophecies.

The AFL, however, also faced serious problems in traditional trade unions as well. The

business conservatism inaugurated by President Harding·s campaign of a ´return to normalcyµ saw

one of the most violent periods of union busting since the 1880·s. The International Association of

Machinists, for example, lost 233,000 members, 70% of its total membership, from 1920 to 1923.

The coal industry was particularly violent; the 1920 Matewan Massacre, the 1921 Battle of Blair

Mountain, and the 1927 Columbine Mine Massacre shook America·s ideas of class. By the end of

the decade, aggregate union density fell to approximately 9%, the lowest in totals in modern

American history until 2009. A loss of only one member, however, damaged the AFL worst of all. In

1924, Samuel Gompers died after leading the AFL almost without interruption since 1886. The

biggest advantage the AFL had during the war was its centralized bureaucracy and an efficient

leadership that could work with the Federal Government. With Gompers· death, power fell to the

hands of the reactionary Executive Board, who chose the pliable William Green as his replacement.

When it looked as if things could not get any worse for the American worker, the New York

Stock Exchange decided otherwise. Black Thursday, October 24, 1929, was the start of the most

severe economic downturn in the history of the nation. The Great Depression hit the United States

hard; fortunes disappeared overnight. The plight of the slightly less wealthy, however, could not

compare to the devastation faced by the American working class. If their savings had not been

wiped out, they were most likely far from adequate³over the course of the 1920·s, savings levels

had fallen drastically. Moreover, the working families who could not outright afford the new

technologies and goods of the decade had been allowed to buy on credit. Even before the Great

Depression started, many families were burdened by debt. Debt and loss could be overcome though,



provided one still had a job. In 1929, there were only 1.6 million unemployed, a rate of around 5%.

By 1933, 12.8 million Americans were out of work. The unemployment rate was 37.6%.

In the midst of this economic catastrophe, the people of the United States had to contend

with the election of 1932. The choice between Republican incumbent Herbert Hoover and

Democrat Franklin Delano Roosevelt was stark. Labor leaders, like many Americans, had no

intention of supporting Hoover, who proclaimed until the bitter end that ´prosperity is just around

the corner.µ Hoover had succeeded in his goal of keeping Americans off of the dole; unfortunately,

this same goal kept them out of food as well. Roosevelt won the election in one of the biggest

landslides in American electoral history. Inaugurated in March 1933²the last March inauguration

before the 20th Amendment²Roosevelt immediately attempted to tackle America·s industrial

problems. The administration·s policy was based off of Roosevelt·s previous experience in the

federal government during WWI. Business, labor, and government would all have to work together

to revitalize the economy as they had done with production on the War Labor Board.

Roosevelt, however, had to quickly improvise his plans to head off a thirty hour work week

bill which had recently passed in the Senate under the guidance of Senator, and later Supreme Court

justice, Hugo Black. William Green and the AFL ardently supported the bill and threatened a general

strike if it were not passed. Roosevelt had to reconcile the demands of labor for jobs and security

with business demands for a return to industrial stability. Roosevelt decided on a broad bill covering

economic plans for many industries; he was greatly aided by input from Gerard Swope, then

president of General Electric. The National Industrial Recovery Act firmly planted the federal

government in the realm of industrial planning. Along with a $3.3 billion stimulus for public works,

industry could now receive exemption from anti-trust legislation if they voluntarily followed

´industrial covenantsµ drafted by the agency responsible for administering the NIRA: the National



Recovery Administration. The intention was to allow prices and wages to rise in an attempt to fight

deflation.

Business response to the NRA covenants was mixed. For labor, however, the NIRA was a

godsend. The Norris²LaGuardia Act of 1932 had already ended strike injunctions; under §7(a) of

the new Act, the NRA ordered companies to recognize employee·s rights to collective bargaining.

Company unions and yellow²dog contracts were also outlawed. Unfortunately, the NRA had no

power to enforce these conditions. Moreover, many industries immediately challenged the Act in

court. By 1935, the case was before the Supreme Court in the form of Sc he c hter Poultry Corp. v. United

S tates , 295 U.S. 495 (1935). In a unanimous decision, the court found the NIRA to be

unconstitutional on the basis of §3, which contained the industrial covenants. Though the NRA had

not been able to adequately protect workers, they were now again without statutory protection for

collective bargaining.

While Roosevelt would have to find more restrained ways of industrial planning, his former

New York State Senate colleague, Robert F. Wagner already had the solution for labor·s collective

bargaining setback. Now Junior Senator from New York, Wagner introduced the National Labor

Relations Act to the Senate, which passed it in June 1935. The Wagner Act, as the NLRA is also

known, reaffirmed the collective bargaining protections of §7(a). Moreover, it created the National

Labor Relations Board, an adjudicative body which had the power to issue injunctions and cease and

desist orders to stop unfair labor practices. The NLRB could also oversee representation elections to

ensure they were conducted properly. The Wagner Act was extremely unpopular with business and

industry as it contained no benefits for them whatsoever. Like the NIRA, it was openly flouted and

immediately challenged in court. Had the industrialists paid attention, however, they would have

realized it was not §7(a) labor rights that had been deemed unconstitutional, but rather the

government·s regulation of trade and the expansion of executive powers in §3. In 5-4 decision, the



Supreme Court declared that in the case of N LRB v. Jones & Laughlin S teel Corporation , 301 U.S.

1 (1937), the Wagner Act was constitutional, to the great delight of all New Dealers. Of it, President

Roosevelt said ´By assuring the employees the right of collective bargaining it fosters the

development of the employment contract on a sound and equitable basis. By preventing practices

which tend to destroy the independence of labor, it seeks, for every worker within its scope, that

freedom of choice and action which is justly his.µ

The passage of the Wagner Act established the basis upon which modern American labor

law operates to this day in the private sector. It also unleashed an era of labor organization

unparalleled in at any point in American history. Early in the Depression, John L. Lewis, president

of the United Mine Workers of America, convinced William Green and the AFL executive board to

allow the formation of a committee on industrial organization; support was tepid at best. Lewis,

however, saw the potential delivered by the Wagner Act. After severe tension at the 1935 AFL

national convention²Lewis had punched William Hutcheson, president of the Carpenters, in the

face²Lewis and other members of the committee on industrial organization withdrew their unions

from the AFL and formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The new CIO represented

everything the AFL was not. Its unions did not discriminate by race and there was no knee-jerk

reactionism against socialists, or even Communists. Perhaps most importantly, it was committed to

organizing the vast swathes of unrepresented workers in the coal, steel, packing, rubber, and auto

industries.

Of all the challenges faced by the CIO, cracking Detroit proved to be the most difficult; the

United Auto Workers had only been founded in the wake of the 1935 AFL convention. By imitating

the success of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in taking on U.S. Steel, however, the UAW

was able to organize one of the most militantly anti-union industries in the nation. In December

1936, workers at General Motors· Fisher Body Plant Number One in Flint, Michigan stopped



working. Unlike normal strikes, however, they did not walk out on picket. The workers stayed in

their seats and locked the doors. The dies on which most of GM·s car bodies were fashioned were

inside with them. By seizing this one shop, the UAW shut down General Motors. The one flaw in

this plan was that it was all illegal. While the only true charge that could be brought against the

workers was trespassing, this had not stopped brutal strike repression in the past. Things were

different in 1936 though. Governor Frank Murphy of Michigan refused to send in the National

Guard and go down in history as ´Bloody Murphy.µ He was no Governor Pattison, who called the

militia on the Homestead Strike. President Roosevelt refused to take a side. He was no Grover

Cleveland who sent the Army to crush Eugene Debbs. General Motors finally caved. This and many

other successful organizing drives firmly cemented the CIO in the American political economy.

American Labor History 1869-1936

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