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The Ambiguities of Rawls's Influence

Author(s): Peter BerkowitzReviewed work(s):Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Mar., 2006), pp. 121-133Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688632 .

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Symposium

T h e Ambiguities f Rawls 's Influence

Peter Berkowitz

John Rawls s the towering figureof academic iberal-

ism. A gentle, dignified,self-effacingman, he taught

philosophy at Harvard for more than thirty yearsand from his

commandingpositionexerteda decisivein-

fluence on his profession.Through his scholarshipand

teachinghe playeda majorrole in establishingthe now-

dominantunderstanding f liberalismn the academyand,

more generally,of the method and purposeof the philo-

sophicalstudy of politics.Before Rawls, professors of philosophy, when they

addressedquestionsaboutpoliticsat all, tendedto restrict

their analysisto the use of words and their logical rela-

tions. Rawls's 971 masterwork, Theory fJustice, hangedthat. Bound to stand as a lastingcontributionto the lib-

eral tradition, Rawls'sbook restoredthe question of jus-

tice to its placeof preeminence n the philosophicalstudyof politicsand thereby naugurateda new era not only for

professorsof philosophy interestedin political ideas but

also for political theoristsheadquarteredn political sci-

ence departments.Rawls'sundertakingwas exceptionallyambitious. His

aim in A TheoryofJusticewas to extend and refine the

social contract tradition from Locke to Kant-especiallyKant-and, in a sense,to bringit to completion. Startingfrom intuitions about moralityand human naturethathe

held to be austere,widely-shared,and deeply rooted in

contemporaryiberaldemocracies,he

soughtto

provide,in 600 highly theoreticaland densely-arguedpages,a rig-orous deduction of the fundamentalprinciplesand insti-

tutional arrangementsof a well-orderedstate. The state

constructed n accordancewithjustice,according o Rawls,

protectedcertain basic individualrightsand, in a manner

consistentwith thoserights,redistributedgoodsto achieve

a substantiallymore egalitariansociety. What makesA

PeterBerkowitz eaches t GeorgeMason University chool

of Law and is the Tadand Dianne TaubeSeniorFellowat

Stanford'sHoover nstitution([email protected]).He is the editorof thecompanionvolumesVarieties

of Conservatism n America(Hoover nstitutionPress

2004) and Varietiesof Progressivismn America(HooverInstitutionPress 004).

Theory f usticedistinctive,however, s not the egalitarianversion of the modernwelfarestate that it seeksto vindi-

cate, but the complex conceptualmachinerythat Rawls

assembles o makethe case.

Although Rawls himself did not drawthe connection,

his well-orderedstate turned out to convergewith the

politicalprogram hampionedbythe leftwingof the Dem-

ocraticParty.This convergence ent credence to the pro-

foundly mistakennotion-reflexively embracedby manyacademicliberals,particularly hose who took to callingthemselves deliberative democrats-that policy debates

betweenconservatives nd progressives bout how to pro-tect freedomand achieveequality an be decidedbyabstract

reason n favorof progressives.1 he reflexhas had unfor-

tunateconsequences nside the academy,not leastfor the

liberal raditionthatRawlsstrove o vindicate.Those whodid not occupy themselveswith extending or refiningor

criticizingRawls-those who attemptednearlyanyinquiryin political philosophy not defined by the Rawlsian

project-were often regardedby Rawlsiansas, at a mini-

mum, suspect and sometimes as not practicingpolitical

theoryat all. Moreover,as Rawls's ollowers rose to posi-tions of prominenceand power in the universityworld,

more than a few fostered an environmentin which dis-

agreementwith progressiveopinion about the justice of

abortion,affirmativection,orwelfare eform,oranynum-

ber of otherdifficult and divisivequestions

ofpublic pol-icy, was viewed as giving expressionto antidemocratic

sentimentsandviolatingthe boundariesof reasonable nd

morallyrespectablediscourse.

To be sure, intolerance of dissent and the suppressionof inquiry does not representan iron law of necessity

imposed by Rawlsianprinciples. Rather,it is a tempta-tion that ariseswithin and is furnished meansby Rawls's

approach.For example,followersfound in Rawls's atio-

nalist method a justification for restrictive and self-

aggrandizing judgments about the proper aim and

boundaries of philosophical and political inquiry. They

assertedcorrectly hat to engage in reasonedargument twas necessary or interlocutors o proceedfrom common

ground, but then confused the Rawlsianresearchpara-

digm and their own political agendaswith the civility,toleration,and respectfor competingpoints of view that

March2006 1Vol. 4/No. 1 121



Symposium | John Rawlsand the Study

ought to provide the common ground in universities.2

On the basis of this confusion, academic liberalscould

persuadethemselvesthat they werejustifiedin excludingfrom their conversations,programs, and centers those

who did not embraceRawls as the point of departure ormoral and political thinking. The exclusion, however,

has hadcosts,including or the excluders.Depriving hem-

selves and their programsof the benefit of alternative

approachesand sealing themselvesand their centers off

from dissenting points of view, many academic liberals

lapsedinto equating liberalismwith Rawlsian iberalism,

and Rawlsian liberalismwith political philosophy itself.

For them, the philosophically valid and the politicallycorrectbecameincreasinglydifficult to distinguish.

Rawls was different. Throughout his career he con-

frontedquestions

aboutthe limits of reasonand thedepen-dence of justiceon opinions aboutwhich reasonablemen

andwomen could differ.Indeed,what is hinted at in cer-

tain recurringequivocationsand obscurities n his books

is confirmedby the explicitanalysisof the last of hisbooks,

Lectures n the Historyof MoralPhilosophy. usticein the

liberaltradition, in Rawls's onsideredopinion, is bound

up with controversialmetaphysicalnotions and a bibli-

callygrounded religiousfaith.To understandRawls'sleg-

acy, t isnecessaryo observehow hewrestedwithquestionsabout liberalism'sgrounds,aswell aswith the tendencyto

shut down even forms and topics of inquiry that derived

sustenancefrom his thought.The paradoxcan be glimpsed in Rawls'sexposition of

the "originalposition" in A TheoryofJustice.An up-to-dateversionof the "stateof nature"teaching,it is a hypo-theticaland nonhistoricalcondition thatRawlsconstructs

to illustratethe basicprinciplesthat perfectlyreasonable

persons would accept if asked to design a society from

scratch.3Choice is not wide open in the originalpositionbecauseRawlsassumes hat "eachpersonpossesses n invio-

labilityfounded on justicethat even the welfareof societyas a whole cannot override."4This assumption,an up-to-

datewayof speakingof naturalandinalienable

rightserves

as the foundation stone on which the moraland political

primacyhe ascribes o individualchoice rests.Indeed, to

speakof "choice"5 r "assent"6 r "consent"7n the orig-inal position as does Rawlsrepeatedly, o say nothing of

describing he principlesof justiceasemerging n the orig-inal position as "the result of a fair agreementor bar-

gain,"8 or of characterizingpersons in it as achieving

"unanimity,"9s to adornthe originalpositionwith a mis-

leadingdemocraticandparticipatoryacade.10nfact,con-

straints built into the original position are designed to

ensurethe reachingof a single conclusionabout the prin-

ciplesof justiceby allwho enterit, or rather he moralandpoliticalconclusionsare built into the constraints.1

Rawls calls the constraints mposed on personsin the

original position the "veil of ignorance."12By hiding

knowledge of the attributesthat distinguish one person

from another,the veil of ignoranceensures that the rea-

soning about fairprinciplesfor social cooperationin the

original position is not influencedby what Rawlsregardsas inessentialor morally rrelevant actors.13And because

Rawls, following Kant, considersonly what is universalin the human condition to be morallyrelevant,personsbehind the veil of ignorancearedeprivedof information

about what is given to them in particularby society and

what is give to them in particularby natureand fortune.

They are forbidden knowledge of family and friends,

social class and political opinions, nation and religiousbeliefs, height and weight and sex, and whetherthey are

healthy,wealthy,or wise. They do know that they share

desireswhose satisfactionrequires he cooperationof oth-

ers; rationality,which enables choice among the varietyof humanends;and the elementsof "moral

personality"-asense of justice and a capacityto formulate ideas about

what is good.14

Reasoning n the original position givesrise to "justiceas fairness,"which receivesexpression n two principles.15The firsthaspriorityandmaynot beviolated,evenfor the

sakeof the second. It provides hat "eachpersonis to have

an equalrightto the most extensivebasiclibertycompat-ible with a similarlibertyfor others."16The second stip-ulates that "social and economic inequalities are to be

arranged o that they are both (a) reasonably xpectedto

be to everyone'sadvantage,and (b) attachedto positions

and offices open to all."17These principlesrepresentaninterpretationof the political significanceof the freedom

and equalityof persons.But, to repeat,it is an abuse of

terms to see theseprinciplesas a resultof choice, consent,

agreement,or,as it is fashionable o say today,the productof deliberation.18 hey arebinding,forRawls,not because

they are hashed out in common and jointly assented to

but becausethey are reasonable.They "arenot contingent

uponexistingdesiresorpresent ocialconditions."19Alongwith the conception of moral personalitythey presup-

pose, they answerthe need for an "Archimedeanpoint."

Theyare of

practicalvalue"for

appraisingnstitutionsand

for guiding the overalldirectionof social change."20

Unfortunately,Rawlsobscures he functionof the orig-inal position and the veil of ignorancethat constitutesit,

throughuse of the metaphorof discussionand debate.In

fact, the originalposition is not a point of departure or

the collaborativediscoveryof the moral foundations of

politics. Nor is it a framework or the give and take of

restrainedpublic debate. Rather, t is a representationor

modeling of common intuitionsamong citizensof liberal

democracyabout moral and politicallife and a meansfor

clarifying nferencesthat should be drawn from them.21

Because it presupposesthat what is morally worthy inhuman beings is the capacityfor moral reasoning-andnot, forexample,also an individual'spassionsandvirtues;

or friendshipsand family and faith; or achievementsin

public and privatelife-the originalposition is suffused

122 Perspectiveson Politics

of Politics



with moraljudgment.22nd thereforet shouldbe con-

troversialamongreasonableeople.Indeed, the supposedlyaustereassumptionsabout

humannature n whichRawls'sreasoningelies re hem-

selvesnot securedby theory.Nor aretheyreally ustere.They are based nsteadon opinionsaboutpsychology,morality, nd metaphysicshat areverymuchopen to

question, ertainlymong hosewhose obit is to under-standmoralandpoliticaldeas. t is notjustthattheideaof the inviolabilityf individualss itselfa grandmoral

judgment. n addition,Rawls'sheorydepends n grandjudgments bouthumanpsychology.orexample,Rawls

supposeshat npracticehetwoprinciplesfjustice"leadto socialarrangementsn whichenvyand otherdestruc-tivefeelings renotlikely o bestrong,"23ithout ddress-

ingor even

mentioningBurke's

ritiquef the

arroganceof EnlightenmentationalismnReflectionsn theRevolu-tion nFrance, ocqueville'sxplorationf the democraticsoul's nvyof human xcellencen DemocracynAmerica,or Mill'sobservationsn chapter of OnLibertyn thelassitude ndirrational isdain orcustomand traditioninducedbythespirit fliberty.24ndthemoral ndmeta-

physicaldea,critical o the constructionf the originalpositionandtheinterpretationf Rawls'secondprinci-ple,thatourvices, ike ourvirtues ndaccomplishments,are"arbitraryroma moralperspective"25nd so justifytreating thedistribution f natural alentsas a common

asset"26lies n the faceof common enseand sanythingbutaxiomaticormorals ndpolitics,houghRawls ome-timeswields t asa truthofreason ndtheveryessence fthe moralpointof view.27

Theseflaws n the foundations o not preventRawlsfromilluminatingiberalism'sdeepstructurendendur-

ing imperatives. f particularignificance,ndcentral ohis derivation nd application f the two principles f

justice,s hisexplorationf howthe worthorenjoymentof rights n a liberaldemocracys necessarilyelated othe social and economicconditionsunderwhich those

rightsreexercised. reedomf

speech,or

example,on-

fersvastlygreater enefitson tenuredprofessorshanitdoeson individualswho can'tafforda soapbox.Whatremainsminently isputablefterRawls s the extentof

government'sapacity ndobligationo provide orthesocialand economicbasesof equality.

Rawlshas not been withouthis academic ritics, hebestknownof whom came o be called ommunitarians.

Perhaps otcoincidentally,hebestknown ormof com-munitarianriticismwasessentiallynother ormof pro-gressiveiberalism,ne thatsilently ssumed heprimacyofindividualrights ndwhichdidnotchallengeheredis-

tributivistrequirementsfA TheoryfJustice.8Nordid ttakeexceptiono the ideathat theprimaryask or aca-demicpoliticalheorywas ojustifyaleft-liberalnterpre-tation of Americandemocracy. ather,n the idiom of

analytic moral philosophy that it shared with Rawls, it

affirmed ertainsoundsociological bservations bout

humanbeings hatRawls,and the socialcontractchool

of liberalismromwhichhe hailed, ended o underplay.Nevertheless,he communitariancritiqueedastray.29

Itcorrectly ointedout thathumanbeingsdo not exist nisolationbut areconstitutednpartbytheassociations-

friendships,amily,neighborhoods,lubs and commit-

tees, nation,andreligion-of whichwe aremembers.talsocorrectlytressedhatalthoughwe oftendo notfreelychoose hese ssociations,embershipnthems animpor-tantgood that the statemustrespectn the processof

respectingitizensas individuals. nd it rightly mpha-sized hat n many nstancesweconsider urselves ound

byduties hat low romor aregiven o usbythe rolesweinhabit.However, ommunitarianriticscauseda greatdealof mischiefby

incorrectlyuggesting, espiteheir

ownimplicitommitmento individualreedom ndequal-itybefore he aw, hat twas omehowmpossibleoappre-ciate he social ideofournaturewhileremainingevotedto liberal rinciples.30

TwentywoyearsafterA Theory f ustice,Rawlspub-lished a majorrestatement f his views.In 1993, withPolitical iberalism,esought o provide defense f jus-ticeasfairnesshatwas"political,otmetaphysical."on-

trary o thewidespread erceptionhat his secondbookmarkeda fundamental evision n his thinking,Rawls

emphasizes,nd the bookbearshim out, thatPolitical

Liberalismnsteadrepresentsn effort o resolve ifficul-ties internal o his theory.31 is themeremainedhat ofthe reasonableimitations n choice n a liberaldemoc-

racy,or the principleshatpeoplewould chooseto liveunderftheyreasonedroperly.ndhecontinuedofocuson generaldeasand whathe took to be theirpoliticalimplicationsndnot onthe actual xpressedants,needs,anddesires f his fellowcitizens.ndeed,despitehe vari-

etyof competing onservativendprogressiventerpreta-tionsof liberal emocracyigorouslyebated eyond heboundaries f contemporarycademicife, Rawlsonce

againn PoliticalLiberalism

gaveo a

particularartisaninterpretationfAmericaniberalismhe colorof univer-

sality, bjectivity,nd moralnecessity.Inparticular,awlsried oallay he concerns f critics

whofound thatA Theory f usticewent too far,makingcomprehensivelaims boutmoralityndpoliticshat ailedto respecthe limitsof reason nd theclaimsof traditionand aith.His brand f liberalism,emaintained,id not

dependon comprehensive oralclaimsor controversialfirstprinciples, nd did not forsake,ndeedproceededfrom,theshared aluesand actualagreementsf peopleliving n today'siberal emocracies.32ndeed, ontended

Rawls,a fairlywiderangeof reasonable ut ultimatelyirreconcilablecomprehensiveeligious, hilosophical,rmoralviewscouldachieve n"overlappingonsensus"n

support f justiceas fairness.33nsucha conception,he

rightis priorto the good, which means thatgovernment's

March2006 1Vol.4/No. 1 123



Symposium | JohnRawlsand the Study

task is to protect people'sliberty to pursue the good as

they understand t, in partby assisting n the provisionof

those primarygoods which all citizens need a share of

whatevertheirunderstandingsof ultimatehappiness.34

The key innovation in PoliticalLiberalismnvolves theintroduction of "the dea of public reason."35This is the

form of reason,or that partof reason,that should govern

citizensof a liberaldemocracy n deliberatingabout "'con-

stitutional essentials'and questionsof basicjustice." 6 Its

content is roughlyequivalent o the two principlesof jus-tice that emergeout of the originalposition.37 It is based

on the ideaof the "reasonable," hich is exhibited"when,

among equalssay, personsarereadyto propose principlesand standardsasfair terms of cooperationand to abidebythem willingly, given the assurance hat otherswill like-

wisedo so."38This furtherrequires "willingness

oacceptthe consequencesof the burdensof judgment,"or recog-

nize that citizens in a freesociety inevitablywill come to

different onclusionsaboutfundamentalmoral,philosoph-ical, and religious questions.39In this constellation of

notions Rawls seeks to capturethe power and limits of

reason's apacityto bring politics into line with justice.Yetthe idea of public reasonis not a correction of the

falsedemocraticandparticipatoryacade oundin A Theory

of ustice but rathera restatementof it. Or at least it lends

itself to fortifying the facade. For while the purpose of

public reasons s to specifyprinciplesfor the conduct of

public debate in a liberalstate, it providescover for the

practice of advancingpartisanpolitical judgments as if

theyflowed fromimpartial eason.Takingone'sstandwith

reason rather than morality-especially a "reason" nto

which considerablemoralandpoliticalcontenthasalreadybeen poured-is a convenient way of being partialand

judgmentalwhile pretendingto stand abovethe partisan

fray.In an attempt to illustrate"comprehensivedoctrines

that run afoul of public reason,"40Rawls himself illus-

trateshow easyit is to abusethe idea of public reasonby

peremptorilydenyingits

approvalo moraland

politicaljudgments with which one disagrees.The illustration,

which occurs n along footnote,dealswith abortion.Rawls

proceeds by assuming "threeimportant political values:

the due respectfor human life, the orderedreproductionof politicalsocietyovertime, includingthe familyin some

form, and finally the equality of women as equal citi-

zens."41But in the veryeffortto show the real-lifeopera-tion of public reason, he dispenseswith argument and

insteadofferspersonalauthority:

Now I believeany reasonable alanceof these threevalueswill

giveawomana dulyqualified ightto decidewhetheror not toend herpregnancy uring he first rimester. he reason orthis

is thatat this earlystageof pregnancyhe politicalvalueof the

equality fwomen soverriding, ndthisright srequiredo giveit substance ndforce.Otherpoliticalvalues, f tallied n,would

not, I think,affect hisconclusion.42

Public reason, as Rawls brisklyapplies it to one of the

most difficult and divisive issues of the day, goes well

beyond providing the principles for conducting publicdebatebetweenpro-choiceandpro-lifeopinions.ForRawls

it functions as the final arbiterof the debate,proclaimingthat the pro-lifeview is unwelcome, becauseit does not

meet public reason'sminimum requirements. ndeed, the

idea of public reason fails to compel or inspireRawls to

examine,or recognizea need to examine,claimsmadeon

behalf of the key competing politicalvalue, "duerespectfor human life" in the form of the life of the fetus or

unbornchild.

To be fair,in subsequentpublicationsRawlsretreated

from his calmlydelivereddecree hatpublicreasoncleanlysettles the debateoverthe justiceof abortion.43Neverthe-

less, it remainssobering

to observethat even in the hands

of so conscientiousand high-minded a thinker as Rawls

the appeal o public reasoncanserveto deny the realityof

competinggoods and tragicchoices and intractableques-tions. The obscurityof its boundariesand the authoritywith which Rawls and his followers endow it allow it to

serve as a magical incantation for use in the heat of

debate-or in the leisureof scholarship-to advancepar-tisancausesby cuttingoffdiscussion,shuttingdown ques-

tioning,andstoppingtheinquiringmind dead n itstracks.

In The Law of Peoples,which appearedseveralyearsafterhis retirement,Rawlsextendedhis reasoningabout

justice to internationalrelations.Unsurprisingly,when itcomes to foreign affairsand the laws that binds nations

andstates, t turnsout reasonrequires progressive,nter-

nationalorderandan interventionist,nternational uman-

rights agenda. Unsurprisingas well is that the idea of

public reasonin The Law of Peoplesunctions once againboth to declareindependencefrom and disguise depen-dence on moralityand metaphysics.To avoid, under the

guidanceof public reason,the makingof universal,com-

prehensiveclaimsabout the human good, political liber-

als on the internationalplane, as on the domestic plane,seek a "sharedbasis of

justification"hat "can be uncov-

ered by due reflection."44Yet political liberalismsvery

quest for laws and institutions that can in principle be

sharedby and justifiedto all is motivatednot in the first

placeby prudential onsiderations boutthe need to gather

majoritysupport but by the sort of universal,compre-hensive claims-by virtue of our common humanity,all

people's opinions are deserving of respect-that it ear-

nestly forswearsand says, for the record, that it does

without.45

Rawls's"politicalconception of justice"was supposedto representa "freestanding"iberalism,a liberalismrest-

ing solelyon liberaldemocraticcitizens'shared ntuitionsabout the freedom and equality of persons in society.46But the ambiguitiesof Rawls'sown thinking cast doubt

on the propositionthat the intuition thatwe are free and

equal is itself freestanding,or that the determinationto


of Politics



respectwhat human beings share is devoid of substantial

or controversialmoraland metaphysicalpresuppositions.If liberalism'sundamentalpremise s not simplybasedon

observation or given by reason or vindicated by being

shared,might it also involve faith?Might it even derivefrom and be nourished by religious faith? While some

who follow Rawlsmight regardt asbad mannersorworse

in a discussionof politicaltheoryto raisequestionsentan-

gled with human natureand metaphysics, et alone reli-

gion, publicationat the end of his careerof Lecturesn the

HistoryofMoralPhilosophy2000) showsthat Rawlshim-

self raisedsuch questions and found something of vital

importanceat stakein how they wereanswered.

In fact, the old quarrelbetweenliberalismand religion

goesback to the beginning,to the emergenceof the liberal

tradition in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in

response o the Europeanwarsof religion.In the nameof

the rightsof individuals,the foundersof the liberaltradi-

tion elaborated onstraintson religion'spoliticalauthorityand politics' religiousauthority.As the liberalidea took

hold, individuals demanded more and more autonomyfrom the state-and from religion.Yet whereasthe state

and its lawmakingapparatusgrew,in part to securethe

conditionsof freedom,the demandsof autonomyincreas-

ingly reducedfaith'sdomain.After much progress n free-

dom over several centuries, a question remains: Is it

reasonable or a liberal o bereligious?Canone reasonably

claim to put freedomfirst while also embracingon faith

teachingsabout where we come from, what we are, and

how we ought to live? Such doubts have a distinguished

pedigreein the liberaltradition, and they have impelled

manycontemporaryiberals o regard eligionwith intense

suspicion, if not outrighthostility.It is common to supposethat while liberalsmust toler-

ate religiousfaith it would be unreasonable or them to

profess t. But in the Lectures,which providessome of his

most searchingexamination of liberalism's oundations,

Rawlsprovidesreasonsto believe that far from being the

antithesisoffreedom,religious

faithof a certain sortmaybe the basis of our respect or freedom,theverything that

rendersour respectfor the dignity of man rational.

The Lecturess based on an extraordinary ycleof notes

that Rawlsregularly evisedfor a classon moralphiloso-

phy he taught on many occasions at Harvard between

1962 and 1991. As in all his writings, he gives pride of

place in the Lectures o questionsabout moralreasoning.

Despite the title'ssuggestion that it will provide a pan-oramic survey,and despite his extended discussions of

Hume and Hegel, Rawlsturns in the Lectureso the his-

tory of moralphilosophy in the apparentlynarrow nter-

est of making sense of Kant. But he turns to Kant withgrandambition: to make sense of the moral life as it trulyis. The implication,quite consistent with A Theory fJus-tice and the books that followed, is that the history of

moral philosophy culminates in Kant and more or less

comes to an end in the Kantian-inspiredmoralphiloso-

phy that Rawls'sown workexemplifies.His interpretationof Kant in the Lectures, asedon a

close and sympathetic reading, sheds light on Rawls's

consideredjudgmentaboutthe extentto whichliberalism'smoral foundations are secured by reason. On the one

hand, he emphasizesthe centralityto Kant'sphilosophyof "the fact of reason."This is "the fact that, as reason-

able beings, we are conscious of the moral law as the

supremelyauthoritativeand regulative aw for us and in

our ordinarymoral thought and judgmentwe recognizeit as such."47In other words, the very operationof rea-

son compels us to accept the moral law. On the other

hand, RawlsstressesKant'sview that the moral law onlyachieves ts full justification n the spiritof religious aith:

I concludeby observing hat the significanceKantgivestothe moral aw and our actingfrom it has an obviousreligious

aspect,and thathis textoccasionally asa devotional haracter.

Whatgivesa view a religiousaspect,I think,is thatit has a

conceptionof the world asa wholethatpresentst as in certain

respectsholy,or else asworthyof devotion and reverence. he

everyday aluesof secularife musttakeasecondary lace.If this

is right, then what gives Kant'sview a religiousaspectis the

dominantplacehe givesto the moral aw in conceivingof the

world tself.For t is in following he moral aw as t applies o us,and in striving o fashion n ourselves firmgood will, and in

shapingour socialworldaccordinglyhatalonequalifies s to be

the finalpurposeof creation.Withoutthis,our lifein theworld,and the world tself ose their

meaningand

point.Now, perhaps,we see the significance f the mention of the

worldin the firstsentenceof Groundwork: "It s impossible o

conceiveanything n the world,or even out of it, that can be

takenasgood withoutqualification, xcepta goodwill."

At first t seemsstrange hat Kantshould mention the world

here.Why go to suchan extreme?we ask. Now perhapswe see

why it is there.It comes as no surprise,hen,that in thesecond

Critique e shouldsaythat the step to religion s takenfor the

sake of the highest good and to preserve ur devotion to the

moral aw.Thesereligious, venPietist,aspectsof Kant'smoralphiloso-

physeemobvious;anyaccountof it that overlookshemmissesmuch that is essential o it.48

In view of how much, as Rawlsemphasizes, t shareswith

Kant, one is impelled to sayof Rawls'sphilosophy some-

thing similar to what Rawls says of Kant'sphilosophy.

Any account of it that overlooks ts metaphysicaland reli-

gious aspectsmisses much that is essentialto it.49

In the Lectures,s throughouthis writings,Rawls'spro-

digiousphilosophical aborsbrought o light, in somecases

unwittingly, stressesand strains, fissures and flaws, and

ironic twists and turnsin the liberalspirit.In the process,Rawls exposed conflicting qualities to which the liberal

spiritgivesrise. On the one hand,anappreciation hat the

moral foundations of liberalismarebound up with a faithin human dignity that is not entailed or guaranteedbyreasonmayencouragea certainhumility,of the sortdem-

onstrated n the virtue of toleration, n the energetic nter-

est in the varietyof waysof beinghuman,and in a certain

March2006 1Vol. 4/No. 1 125



Symposium I JohnRawlsand the Studyof Politics

skepticismabout comprehensiveclaimsabout moral and

political life. On the other hand, the conviction that the

foundingtruthsof liberalism reimplicitin common sense

and thatjudgmentsaboutpoliticalinstitutions andpublic

policy are derivableby the healthy operation of humanreasonmaypromotea certainhubris.It is this hubristhat

one sometimes sees among those who are satisfied that

those who disagreewith them on moralandpoliticalmat-

ters suffer rom wickedor twisted minds and deserve o be

segregatednto separate ntellectualcommunities.

In an instructivephrase n the Lectures,Rawlssaysthat

Kant'smoralphilosophyaspires o the ideal of an "aristoc-

racyof all."50This calls to mind John StuartMill'svision

of a societyof sovereign ndividuals,as well as the Protes-

tant notion of a "priesthoodof all believers."All three

representvariations on a venerable modern theme: the

harmonizationof a substantialhuman equality with a

sweeping ndividual reedom.To understand he sourceof

the liberalaspirationto an aristocracyof all, however, s

one thing. To think through its moraland political con-

sequences is another. Can the desire for distinction be

satisfied n a societyin which everybody s recognizedas a

kind of aristocrat, overeign,or priest?What are the prac-tical effectson ourheartsandmindsof the convictionthat

each person is a supreme authority?And what are the

implicationsfor politicsof a form of moralreasoning hat

authorizesall individuals equally to conceive of them-

selvesaslayingdown universalaws?These aresome of the

intriguing questions-seldom raised by Rawls or his

followers-that the publicationof his probing classroom

lecturesought to provokeamongthose who wish to assess,

rather than profess, the reasonableness of Rawlsian

liberalism.

Particularly ntriguing is the question about founda-

tions to which Rawlshimself constantlyreturnedand to

which he gaveconsistentlyconflictingindications. On the

one hand, he suggeststhat the founding moralintuitions

are all but self-evident.On the other,he holds that theyrest on faith.Yet f

good argumentscan be madeon behalf

of both propositions, then what is most evident is the

doubtabouthow precisely o understandiberalismsmoral

foundations.So it would be reasonableo pursue he stim-

ulatingthought that Rawls'sfreestandingiberalism s not

only consistentwith a varietyof religiousperspectives,as

he emphasizes,but derivescriticalsupport from specificforms of religious faith, which he gesturesat. PerhapsRawls'sconflictingaccountscanbe reconciled,as the Dec-

larationof Independence uggests,throughthe ideathata

certain faith impels us to hold as self-evident the truth

that all personsareby naturefree and equal.

This is certainlynot to saythat liberalismrequiresoneto be religious or that religiouspeople are more amplyendowed with the liberalspirit. But for those who care

about understandingliberalism, a more precise knowl-

edgeof its foundationsshould be welcome. And asa prac-

ticalmatter, or thosewho careaboutfreedomandequality,

knowledgeof the foundations of the truths about morals

and politics thatwe havelong held to be self-evidentcan

contribute to our abilityto cultivatethe conditions under

which we can keep our gripon them firm.Confrontingthe ambiguitiesof his legacyandpursuing

questions provokedbut not adequatelyaddressedby his

philosophizing belong to the task of conservingRawls's

achievement.

The liberal n John Rawls would have it no otherway.

NotesThis essayweavestogether(and in placescorrects) he

argumentof "JohnRawls and the LiberalFaith," n The

WilsonQuarterly, pring2002, pp. 60-69, and "The

AcademicLiberal,"n TheWeekly tandard,Dec. 16,2002.

1 See, for example,Berkowitz2003 and Berkowitz

1996, 36-42.

2 Mill drawsthe crucialdistinctionat the end of

chapter2 of On Liberty.3 TJ, 17-22.

4 TJ, 3.

5 TJ, 18. See also, for example,41-42, 48, 584.

6 TJ, 13.

7 TJ, 19.

8 TJ, 12. See also, for example,16, 17, 21, 28, 31, 42,44.

9 TJ, 141. See also, for example, 122-23, 140,

263-64.

10 Contrary o the misleadingfacadebut in keepingwith the actualstructureof his analysis,Rawls does

explainthat the argumentfor the principlesof jus-tice in the originalposition "aimseventually o be

strictlydeductive.... We should strive for a kind of

moralgeometrywith all the rigorwhich this name

connotes."SeeTJ, 121.

11TJ,

136-42.

12 Ibid.

13 TJ, 18, 53.

14 TJ, 17-22, 136-42, 504-07, 561.

15 TJ, 60. Rawls calls the formulationsof the two

principlesI cite here"provisional." ubsequently,he

offersa more refined and technicalversion of both

principles.SeeTJ, 302-303. For a more "provi-sional"formulation,seeTJ, 14-15.

16 TJ, 60.

17 Ibid.

18 When Rawls uses the terms "deliberation"r "delib-

erative"he generallyhas in mind not the give andtakeof discussionbut the calm and rigorof system-atic thinking. See, for example,TJ, 17, 416-24.

19 TJ, 263.

20 Ibid.




21 For a particularly lear statementof why the original

position should be seen not as a discussionbut as a

derivation,see PL, 273-74.

22 See, for example,TJ, 311-12.

23 TJ, 144, 534-41.24 Rawls does mention without discussingNietzsche's

analysisof ressentiment.J, 535n8. And he does

brieflydiscuss Freud'saccount of the origin of jus-tice in envy and jealousy,539-41.

25 TJ, 74.

26 TJ, 101.

27 TJ, 72-75, 100-108.

28 See, for example,Sandel, 1981.

29 See Berkowitz1995, 54-64.

30 Communitariancritics(aswell as Rawls's ollowers)

generallygaveshort shrift

to,or

simply ignored,Rawls's xtendeddiscussionof family, society and

the virtuesin PartIII of A Theory fJustice.31 PL, xv-xvi.

32 PL, 8-10.

33 PL, 133-72.

34 PL, 178-90.

35 See PL, 214-20. See also LP,131-80.

36 PL,214.

37 PL, 223.

38 PL. 49. In fact, Rawlssupposesaswell the much

strongerclaim that it is reasonable o regardother

personsas equal. See PL, 48-54.39 PL, 54.

40 PL, 243-44.

41 PL,243n32.42 PL, 243n32.

43 "The Ideaof PublicReasonRevisited," n LP,169,

especiallynote 80.

44 LP,19.45 See, for example,LP,68. It might be objectedthat

Rawls resistsuniversalizationnasmuchas he empha-sizes that peopleswhose politicalsocietyfalls short

of liberaljustice,so-called"decentpeoples,"never-

theless deservetolerationand membership n the

global "Societyof Peoples"governedby the law of

peoples. See LP,59-88. Yet Rawls makesclear that

this toleration and membershipareimperativesof

liberaljusticeappliedto foreignpolicy.And the verydefinition of a people as "decent,"which impliesboth the achievementof a

respectableminimum and

the persistenceof a defect, reflectsmoraljudgmentsrooted in liberalprinciples.Moreover, he "longrun

aim"of well-ordered ocieties"is to bringall soci-

eties eventually o honor the Law of Peoplesand to

become full members n good standingof the soci-

ety of well-orderedpeoples."See LP,92-93.

46 PL, 12.

47 Lectures, 60.

48 Lectures, 60-61.

49 Consider also Rawls'sassertion hat "political iberal-

ism startsby takingto heart the absolutedepth of

the irreconcilableatent conflict" ntroduced ntomorallife by the Reformation.See PL, xxvi.

50 Lectures, 11.

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Symposium I John Rawlsandthe Study

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