Rawls Summary

POL 3652: HISTORY OF POL THOUGHT II [MODERNITY AND ITS CRITICS]

Notes on:

John Rawls (1971/1999). A Theory of Justice (revised edition). Cambridge, MA:

Belknap/Harvard.

DRAFT

John Rawls (1921-2002), b. Baltimore, grad. Princeton (A.B., 1943; Ph.D., 1950). Rawls taught at Princeton (1950–52), Cornell (1953–59), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1960–62) before becoming (1962) professor of philosophy at Harvard. He was subsequently elected president of the American Philosophical Association and served as department head of Harvard's Philosophy Department.

The major thing to know about the period in which this work was written (and the ideas in it developed — ca. 1955-1971) is that modern reform liberalism was on the rise, while philosophy was trapped in the sterility of "analytical philosophy", a perspective that held that philosophy's role was not to propose or support particular normative perspectives but only to clarify

and overcome the inexactitudes of language by careful analysis of terms and careful distinction among their various shades of meaning. Rawls's work, proposing and defending a particular normative conception, came at a time when liberals were looking for some philosophical justification for their intuitive sense that we needed to provide a social safety net and that our social policies should be oriented toward looking out for everyone, not just toward maximizing production and profit.

NOTES FOR CLASS

Critical terms and ideas are in italics. Elsewhere in the notes, italics are for emphasis, as usual.

One way of summarizing the argument

Issues at hand:

Teleological vs. deontological moralities The basic task of discovering (or constructing) principles of justice These principles govern our choice among constitutional forms or "the basic

structure" of society: how rights, opportunities, and other goods are distributed within a society (and between generations). In other words, he isn't concerned with regulating every little crevice of society.

The need for and assumption of a "well-ordered society"; the "compliance problem" / "assurance problem"

The four levels of application:o Choice among alternative possible principles of justiceo Choice among alternative possible constitutional formso Choice among alternative possible lawso Individual choice in specific situations

The social contract framework Deciding on the initial conditions within which the contract is made "Reflective equilibrium": the choice is made to create principles that accord

with our settled moral beliefs. This dialectic prevents the theory from becoming over-intellectualized, i.e., formally rational but substantively / practically unreasonable. (As with theory that animals have no consciousness and/or that we have no moral duties toward them.)

Rawls's initial conditions (a.k.a. "justice as fairness"): the "original position" behind the "veil of ignorance"

Rawls's principles of justice:o 1st principle: Maximum individual liberty consistent with a like liberty

for all. The distinction between liberty and the value of liberty.o Note issue of liberty vs. the value of liberty. In Political

Liberalism Rawls says that this is not really an issue because of a taken-for-granted "0-th principle" that everyone has enough primary goods to enjoy their liberties.

o "Lexicographical ordering" of the 1st principle vis-a-vis the second.o 2nd principle: the distribution of "primary goods"

Equal opportunity. Lexicographical ordering of 2a relative to 2b.

The " difference condition " : inequalities can be justified only to the extent that they improve the lot of the least-well-off. Note that Rawls casts inequalities in terms of "primary goods", not specific income-in-dollars.

Rawls's argument for these principles. [2005-01-22: Rawls argues for these principles as being better than the alternative, competing positions of utilitarianism and intuitionism. The selections we read do not really cover his argument with these alternatives, not because the argument isn't alternative but only because we are so limited in what we can cover. The important thing to notice is that (in my mind, at least) "utilitarianism" is a stand-in for "unrestrained, free-market capitalism", because a major justification of the latter is that it maximizes the wealth of all. In one sense, Rawls's argument is pointing out the ambiguity of the phrase, "of all". Does "all" mean that each one of us individually is better off, or does it mean that the aggregated total is better off even though some may be worse off? At this point I am not sure whether Rawls includes intuitionism simply for completeness — he does make an effort to cover all reasonable alternative theories of justice — or because, like utilitarianism, intuitionism also corresponds to a political position of major current importance.]

Note the difference between the right and the good. Rawls argues that the sense of justice is part of anyone's sense of the Good.

This dialectic (i.e., the reflective equilibrium between what is morally right and what people are actually willing to do) ensures that Rawls's theory of justice remains practical. (Contrast my earlier, impractical support of utilitarianism.)

Note the monological nature of the theory. The Original Position is conceived of as a place for a person to reflect by h/herself, not a place for a certain kind of discourse with others, i.e., a dialogical theory.

How do you respond to this theory? Has Rawls persuaded you?

Another way of summarizing the argument

Do you agree that justice is the first virtue of institutions? After all, there are alternatives: "coordination", "stability", "letting nature take its course", "efficiency", "tradition", "whatever we have now", "sustainability", "liberty", "equality", "personal virtue", "adherence to Biblical precepts", etc. We might wind up including them as part of our definition of justice, but the implication is that there is a domain called "justice" to which these are subordinate. (One might also choose to reject outright any discussion of justice [or these other alternatives] on the grounds that "people always

do what they want to do, not what some philosophy tells them to do, regardless of its arguments.")

Is it best (or at least o.k.) to use the "social contract" form of argument in deciding what justice is?

If we are going to use a social contract form of argument, does Rawls's procedure seem like the proper setting in which to consider and/or choose principles of justice? Do the conditions seem right to you? For example, how could Rawls deal with the objection that since people can't really forget who they are and what society is like, any conclusions from the original position will be tainted with self-interest. Another issue: is it a problem that the original position is completely a thought experiment, since Rawls doesn't require the contracting parties to actually talk to each other?

Given Rawls's original position, would you choose these principles?

What are the specific implications of these principles? (Remember that we don't know anything about our society yet.) In particular, do these implications accord with your settled views of justice (and/or do they clarify your previous views)?

Implications of the first principle: [whatever they are] Implications of the second principle: [whatever they are]

Now we unveil the general facts about our society: particularly its size, its level of technology, and its level of resources. (Anything else?)

What are the alternatives (or the nominations, anyway) for constitutions? Note that we can and should choose our economic system, even though our own Constitution doesn't, except by implication and current practice. (Note the contrast between political and economic rights.)

What will be the likely outcomes of these various constitutions ...

For the society's overall system of liberty? For the worst-off people in the society?

(Here I will note the circularity of "human nature" and "institutions", one implication of which is a rejection of any "New Soviet Man" approach. Note the connection of this with the "strains of commitment" problem, particularly whether people's sense of the good will conform to the society. And whether this gets us into another circular problem, where we construct societies to give people the forms of Good the society is good at producing.)

Part One. TheoryIn this first part of the book, Rawls sets forth his approach to justice and derives the principles of justice.

CHAPTER I. Justice As Fairness

[Note that "Justice as fairness" is the title of a well-known article of Rawls.]

Section 1 "The Role of Justice"

Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, and social justice arises from the structure of basic social institutions.

Principles of social justice are required to identify arrangements (e.g., evaluate prospective laws or combinations of laws) as being more or less just.

Concept of a well-ordered society:

people have publicly common principles of justice institutions known to satisfy them

[Note the absence of idealism: Rawls assumes people will want assurances of others' compliance. This is the so-called "assurance problem".]

Other (lexicographically subordinate) considerations are:

coordination efficiency stability

... but the inquiry is limited to the primary issue of justice: the other issues can't be dealt with decisively until the context of justice has been established.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

Does Rawls really contend that the issues of coordination, efficiency, and stability come only after justice? How can a system without coordination be justice? Can a chronically unstable society be desirable, even if "just"? If an

inefficient government wastes its resources, is that desirable, even if just? [Must consider justice first.]

What is a "well-ordered society" in Rawls's view? (See also Rawls's essay, "A Well-Ordered Society", in Peter Laslett & James Fishkin, eds. Philosophy, Politics and Society Fifth Series New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979.)

Section 2 "The Subject of Justice"

Social justice deals with those things that determine the overall character of a society:

"basic structure of society" "major social institutions"

Examples include the market economy; the family structure; inheritance laws.

Basic institutions determine people's life chances and "assign fundamental rights and duties" to them.

Unequal life chances raise issue of justice: is the current distribution of life chances just? Note that Rawls does not presume that any given unequal distribution of life chances is unjust: merely that the inequality requires a justification.

Limitations of inquiry:

no evaluation of international relations no evaluation of private associations, informal conventions, customs

... but theory of the present case may subsequently help us understand these other cases.

Assumes strict compliance, not partial compliance. (The latter is dealt with later.)


What is a "basic social institution"? Give an example and explain why it is an example. What institution would not be cosnidered basic? Explain why.

Why do you think Rawls chooses to deal only with basic institutions and (at least at first) strict compliance? [My answer: Rawls probably feels we can argue most clearly by starting with an ideal-typical society and relaxing its assumptions. Starting with the most complex case is confusing and unenlightening. ("Hard cases make bad law.")]

At the end of this section, Rawls says he has distinguished two senses of justice: "principles for identifying relevant claims"; and "balancing among these claims". I think I understand what this distinction is, but I don't see it as having structured his argument in this section.

Distinguish strict compliance theory from partial compliance theory. Is Rawls's limitation of his theory to the former fatal? Why or why not?

Section 3 "The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice"

Justice as fairness: in the social contract, don't set up specific government [basic institutions] but rather set up principles of justice for choosing among governments [basic institutions]. This is a more indirect choice situation than that found in Hobbes & Locke, who are concerned with choosing a specific government.

Free & independent & self-interested parties; rational reflection (i.e., means-ends rationality); variety of ends self-chosen (i.e., no assumption people will have similar ideas of the good). [So far, these assumptions are those of classical liberalism, e.g., of Hobbes & Locke.]

Choice behind a veil of ignorance. [Diverges from Hobbes & Locke.]

Then, after principles of justice are chosen, choose form of legislature that accords with the principles; pass specific laws through that legislature, etc.

Fairness of the original position ==> recognition of the justice of the principles ==> results are fair, the society is just, and people can legitimately be compelled to abide by its dictates.

Society's "members are autonomous and the obligation self-imposed", even if this is not recognized by actual participants. [Contract is hypothetical only, but there is nothing novel in this.]

Rawls says he will argue against utilitarianism [a philosophy allowing the balancing of one person's happiness against another's unhappiness].

Argues for two principles instead: Equality of rights; inequalities justified only if they redound to the benefit of the society as a whole (in particular, to the worst-off). [This is not a utilitarian argument.]

Note separability of issues:

validity of original position

validity of principles held to be chosen in it.

... One can argue for either, both, or neither.

Contract argument is limited to the issue of justice, not to issues of virtue and issues of how to relate to nature. [Although the arguments in the domain of justice might prove revealing in these other areas.]


Rawls says that justice as fairness is a "contract view". What will the contract specify? That is, what sorts of things do people decide in their negotiations? [Principles of justice, not specific institutions.]

What is the difference between the choice among principles of justice and that among social institutions? [Principles are used to evaluate and select among institutions.]

What, according to Rawls, is missing from "justice as fairness" to make it a complete contract theory? [Extension of the idea to a selection of virtues: "rightness as fairness".]

What is the difference between "rightness" and "justice"?

Section 4 "The Original Position and Justification"

Principles of justice chosen will vary depending on what original conditions are specified, so how are we to justify the conditions of the original position in the first place? Answer: two possible ways:

One answer: use widely accepted conditions and derive results from them. Conditions used here:

1. No one advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances.

2. Shouldn't tailor principles to fit own case.3. Generally, "one excludes the knowledge of those contingencies which sets men

at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices."4. All parties equal, free, able to advance & have considered any argument, able

to reason & decide & stick by their decisions.

A second answer: see if the conclusions derived match well-founded opinions in specific cases.

Reflective equilibrium. [Rawls says his concept is the result of this refection, etc. But even if we disagree with him, we can still follow his process further.] "The conditions embodied are the ones we do accept [i.e., the first answer] or if we do not, then perhaps we can be persuaded to do so by philosophical refection [i.e., the second answer]."

[Note the possibility of thought transforming previous ideas. This is a theme in Rawls -- that we can't simply throw our undigested ideas (or desires) into the hopper, as utilitarianism does, and expect to derive a good sense of justice. Our own experience shows us the importance of clarifying our thoughts.]

Even though the OP is hypothetical, it reflects our beliefs about what should go into considerations of justice.


How is one to go about selecting the proper circumstances in which to make the social contract? How can one justify any particular set of circumstances?

If the circumstances under which we choose our principles of justice are purely hypothetical, how can they serve to bind us in real situations? Isn't Rawls's contract approach simply an academic exercise?

Section 5 "Classical Utilitarianism"

Distinguish the concepts of the Right and the Good. [What one should do, vs. what one should/does want.]

Principle of utility: natural extension to society of the tradeoffs we make individually.

Note concept of teleological theories. [Telos]

Right derived from maximization of an independently defined good. [But the theory is testable by seeing if our sense of right squares with that derived from the good. Right cannot be analytically defined as the maximization of the good.]

Note that in utilitarianism, distribution of goods is not a good in itself. [If it were, we run the risk of the theory becoming tautological.]

Our desire for equality is explained as practical experience of how to maximize social utility. [Also explained by saying utility is not linear with, say, wealth.]

Image of "impartial spectator".

[Note the possibility of the people in the original position being gamblers.]


What is the distinction between the right and the good? What is a teleological theory? Rawls says (in this section and elsewhere) that his theory is a deontological, not

a teleological theory, meaning that he defines the Right independently of the Good. In other words, he does not define what people ought to do (the Right) based on a prior theory of the ends (the Good) they ought to pursue. How does this square with his statement (in Section 25 and elsewhere) that the parties in the Original Position are rational maximizers of the primary goods? Doesn't that make his theory teleological? [Hint: see Sections 11 & 15.]

What is Utilitarianism? Perfectionism? Hedonism? Eudaimonism? Rawls ends the section by claiming that "Utilitarianism does not take seriously

the distinction among persons." What does he mean by that? Do you agree with that? We'll have to ask later on if Rawls himself isn't similarly subject to this objection (if it is an objection), since the people in the Original Position can't know about themselves.

Section 6 "Some Related Contrasts [between utilitarianism and justice as fairness]"

Claims of liberty & right vs. aggregate social welfare: this is the basic issue raised by justice as fairness and utilitarianism.

The former seems to have priority in our everyday thinking. (Freedom is highly valued.)

Utilitarianism accounts for this priority only by "common sense";

Justice as fairness accounts for it directly.

Utilitarianism: principles of choice for society = extended principles for one person. [Note that utilitarians try to account for the difference principle by speaking of declining marginal utility of wealth.]

Justice as fairness: social choice is different.

Utilitarianism conflates all interests to that of one person;

Justice as fairness is individualistic, allowing people to recognize different interests.

Utilitarianism is teleological;

Justice as fairness is deontological [looks at right, but can take ends/consequences into consideration]

Utilitarianism admits any desires & aspirations [but we ourselves don't agree with that];

Justice as fairness only admits desires that accord with conditions of the original position -- the concept of the Right is prior to that of the Good.

Utilitarianism sees society as an efficient administration of social resources, given many value-systems;

Justice as fairness sees society as a scheme for cooperation & reciprocal advantage based on fair principles.


Contrast teleological with deontological theories. Which of these is Rawls's theory of justice? Which is utilitarianism? Why?

Rawls says that justice as fairness differs from utilitarianism in the underlying conception of society. What are the conceptions of society associated with each theory, and how do they differ? Which do you find more congenial to your own views? Why?

Section 7 "Intuitionism"

Intuitionism:

- plurality of (potentially conflicting) first principles

- no priority rule [This will be the crux of Rawls's difference with it]

These two considerations imply that one must decide among ("balance") principles by intuition

Other issues about intuitionism not relevant to Rawls's argument & not necessary to the intuitionism position.

Our intuition is confused by personal considerations, even when one abstracts to high-level national goals.

Example (p.37) of a conflict between ultimate principles: total goods vs. distribution of goods. [This is, of course, a standard liberal-conservative dispute. Its resolution is the concern of Rawls's second principle.]

[Note the use of indifference curves (p.37). Be sure students understand them. Note discussion questions below.]

[Note how slopes represent differential weights.]

Intuitionism is not intrinsically irrational ==> can only be refuted by showing that decision principles exist.

Intuitionism can be either teleological (disputes over the Good that is to be maximized) or deontological (total goods vs. distribution of goods).


Why can we assume that slopes of indifference curves go down to the right and up to the left?

Why can't curves cross? (Hint: crossing indifference curves would represent inconsistent judgments. Why?)

Why does it make sense that for most indifference curves are curved convex toward the origin? (But such curves are not characteristic of all indifference curves -- e.g., those of utilitarians.)

Section 8 "The Priority Problem"

Intuitionism's plurality of incommensurable principles contradicts utilitarianism's assumption that all goods can be reduced to "utility". Justice as fairness addresses both issues.

We need priority principles for a clear conception of justice.

Justice as fairness limits intuition. [Note that the following discussion is essentially motivating later analysis.]

1. The OP position requires a definite answer; no reliance can be placed on intuition, because no one is sure what their intuitions will be. Rawls notes that different priority principles are possible -- in particular, lexical ordering instead of balancing. [Make sure the students grasp the concept of lexical ordering.] Proposes the principle of equal liberty prior to consideration of any regulation of social/economic inequalities.

2. The analysis looks at the effect of the principles not on society as a whole but rather on a representative position -- in particular, that of the worst-off group.

3. The analysis casts the decision as a prudential decision rather than a moral one.

Intuition is not bad per se, only conflict between intuitions. If we can construct a framework that makes everyone's intuition the same, we have advanced.


Why do we need priority principles for a clear conception of justice?

Section 9 "Some Remarks about Moral Theory"

Moral principles are improved by reflection: considered judgments. [Rawls's intention is to undercut the sense that every burp is equally moral.]

Judgments might be changed by reflection, even changed in very fundamental ways.

Note that the interactive nature of reflective equilibrium means that one counterexample won't disprove an entire theory. [This point is missed by many of Rawls's critics.] After all, who knows where the mistake lies?

The basic issue is whether the scheme clarifies & advances our thinking, not whether it's right in every detail.

The basic conflict in this work is with utilitarianism, which has long been and is still dominant.


Why is Rawls so obsessed with arguing against utilitarianism? (Rawls's concept of reflective equilibrium is central to his argument, so you

should be sure to study it carefully.) In Rawls's theory, reflective equilibrium is reached in the interplay of what two moral considerations? That is, from what two sources do we draw moral knowledge? Which of the two sources is primary and which secondary, according to Rawls?

How does Rawls deal with the problem that his theory will not be right in every case -- that counterexamples to its tenets will undoubtedly be discovered? In scientific research, a theory can be falsified by even one good counterexample. Is that true here? Why or why not?

CHAPTER II. The Principles of Justice

xx

Section 10 "Institutions and Formal Justice"

Principles for institutions vs. for individuals: these are separate topics.

Institutions can be defined both abstractly (idealized) and concrete (i.e., as realized in the concrete situation). The present theory of justice applies to this latter situation. [Rawls not an idealist.]

Rawls defines an institution in a well-ordered society as arising from public commonness (in essence):

knowledge of rules regularity of behavior (actual compliance)

Must distinguish rules from strategies & maxims designed to advantage one within the rules [e.g., have one's name first on any ballot]. Of course the latter must be taken into account when creating rules! [E.g., rotate ballot position.]

Distinguish the evaluation of justice for three cases:

for individual rules for institutions for the basic structure as a whole

Individual rules (say) can be unfair if they are balanced by other rules unfair in opposite ways. Ditto for institutions vis-a-vis the basic structure. [Ultimately, of course, it is the basic structure that we must evaluate. We shouldn't get hung up on every little injustice.]

Rituals are not a concern unless they affect assignments of rights & duties.

Formal vs. substantive justice:

* Formal justice = adhering to a given society's idea of justice. Equal treatment of all per the law; only considerations considered relevant in that society's concept of justice are taken into account.

* Contrast this with substantive justice.


Do you get the distinction between formal & substantive justice? When is a society not formally just? When is it formally but not substantively just?

* Why is it plausible that formal & substantive justice go together? (Actually, my answer might be that there are few systems that are just in either respect, but this does not establish a causal relation.)

Section 11 "Two Principles of Justice"

Two principles:

- maximum equal liberty

- inequalities (a) to everyone's advantage and (b) attached to positions equally open to all

The two principles involve different aspects of the basic structure: political and economic.

- Liberties (must be equal):

* vote, run for office, freedom of speech & assembly

* freedom of conscience & thought

* personal freedom, including freedom from arbitrary arrest & seizure

* the right to hold personal property [distinguish toothbrush from factory (p.61)]

- Inequalities

* distribution of wealth & income (may be unequal but must benefit all)

* positions of authority

This simplifies the analysis; can consider the principles separately.

Serial ordering of the two principles, and serial ordering of (a) and (b) within the second principle.

Concept of primary goods [will be important later]: things that every rational person can be presumed (i.e., in the Original Position) to want to pursue a

rational life plan, no matter what the specifics of that plan might be. [Further simplification!]

Distinguish "primary goods" from natural goods:

basic goods are under control of social arrangements:o rights & libertieso powers & opportunitieso income & wealth

"natural goods" are those not directly under control of society:o healtho intelligenceo physical stature

Start the analysis of justice from the basis of total equality, not from the basis of the status quo.

General conception of the two principles: All goods distributed equally unless inequality is to the advantage of all. [Note that this does not address the priority principle.]

The analysis is to apply to institutions & representative persons (as defined by the basic structure), not to specific individuals. [Further simplification!]

There is an ambiguity about how all are to be advantaged. How to choose among arrangements?


What are the two principles of justice? To what domain of society does each refer?

What are primary goods? Can you think of other goods one might want? If so, what damage does their exclusion do to Rawls's conclusions?

Note that Rawls starts not from the status quo but instead from a position of equality, allowing inequalities to creep in from there. Isn't this an unreasonable place to start? (It's certainly a hypothetical one!)

There is an ambiguity about how all are to be advantaged. How does one choose among arrangements?

Notice the various simplifying assumptions that Rawls uses to make the issue of social justice soluble. What are those simplifications? To what extent are they reasonable?

Section 12 "Interpretations of the Second Principle"

Rawls assumes that the "economy is roughly a free market system" [see discussion question], but that "means of production may or may not be privately owned" [see discussion question].

Four interpretations of the second principle of justice

One dimension, concerning the meaning of "equally open" (openness of positions): "Careers open to talents" ["Positions are open to those able & willing to strive for them"] vs. "equality of fair opportunity".

Another dimension, concerning the meaning of "everyone's advantage" (inequalities): "Efficiency" vs. "difference principle".

Principle of efficiency (Pareto optimality) defined.

Note that there is no trade-off allowed among people. Make sure people understand the diagrams in this section. Note that there are many alternative distributions that are efficient and that the

range of possible optimal results depends on where one starts. This means that one needs a principle of justice to choose among them.

Apply principle to basic structure & representative positions. Two different principles of justice result, depending on the interpretation of "equally open".

"System of Natural Liberty" = free market system guarantees efficiency; distribution is the result of natural inequalities or inequalities of effort or of chance. [The modern conservative position]

"Liberal Equality" = free market system, but all should have equal chance to compete. Mitigate effect of social class & fortune. [The modern reform liberalism position]

The latter position is preferable, but it still has problems:

outcomes are still affected by accidents of birth family (& inheritance) still unequally affects people

Natural aristocracy = [?]

[Last two paragraphs are unclear to me.]


Does Rawls's assumption that the "economy is roughly a free market system" make him a liberal apologist?

Does Rawls's admission that the "means of production may or may not be privately owned" make him a closet socialist?

Section 13 "Democratic Equality and the Difference Principle"

[Make sure students understand the difference principle and in particular how the graphs (pp. 76 & 77) work.]

[Note Rawls's "defense" of free-market capitalism.]

Perfect justice (maximized worst-off) vs. a "just throughout" scheme (non-maximized, but still allowing further inequality) vs. a region of injustice (too much inequality)

Difference principle is (one) Pareto-optimal solution.

Note possibility of chain-connection: that inequalities favoring the least-well-off also help everyone else. [This does not mean that any change must help all people: if chain connection does not hold, we are still only concerned with the least well-off position. Note also that Prof. Gillespie's assumption that current policies can benefit everyone assumes that we are to the left of the max point. But it is apparent to me that our society is to the right of that point -- i.e., there is too much inequality.]

[Note that Rawls would like to use the idea of chain connection to make everyone feel that they have a stake in the fortunes of the least-well-off.]

If further inequality makes no change for the lowest position, consider the next-lowest position, the one above that, etc.


Does Rawls's defense of free-market capitalism mean that he's a closet conservative? (Note, for example, how much this justification resembles Reagan's "trickle-down" theory.)

Leaving aside the issue of whether it's factually correct or not, is the Reaganomics "trickle-down" theory identical to Rawls's defense? [No: Reagan claims that it will help the worst-off; not that it will be the best possible arrangement for them.]

Explain the shape of the indifference curves in Fig. 5. What is the meaning of the solid line O-P in Figure 6?

In Figure 6, why is O-P convex upward? (I.e., what does this shape assert about social reality?)

Why is "a" in Figure 6 the best point? In your estimation, are we to the left or right of point "a" in Figure 6? Why are the curves in Figure 7 convex toward O? Why are the indifference curves in Figure 8 straight? Why are the indifference curves in Figure 8 not slanted at 45 degrees? Why are the indifference curves different in Figures 7 & 8? Why is the X3 line below the X2 line in Figures 9 & 10?

Section 14 "Fair Equality of Opportunity and Pure Procedural Justice"

Principle of fair equality of opportunity arises from considerations not of distribution (whether efficiency or the difference principle) but rather of simplification (see below) and of self-realization. [Recall classical Greek idea of political activity as being part of a fully human life, not a burden to pay people to undertake.]

Contrast:

pure procedural justice [no independent criterion for the right result (e.g., fair gambles)]

perfect procedural justice and imperfect procedural justice [an independent, external criterion for the right result (e.g., division of cake for the former; criminal trials for the latter)]

Principle of fair equality of opportunity allows for us to admit variations in later distributions if competition is fair and initial conditions are fair. We don't have to get caught up in the thorny issues of how positions "ought" to be distributed/assigned.

[I'm not sure I grasp this section!]


Rawls says that offices must be open even if excluding certain types of people would be a more efficient arrangement. Why?

Distinguish pure, perfect, and imperfect procedural justice. Provide an example of each.

Why does Rawls seek a set of principles that provide pure procedural justice?

Section 15 "Primary Social Goods as the Basis of Expectations"

Idea of expectations as opposed to realizations.

In utilitarianism, must be summable across persons. [In classical utilitarianism, they must have a 0 point.]

[Note that the difference principle requires an ordinal measure (comparison only) but not summing.]

But the main issue is not measurability but whether such a conception is just.

Difference principle looks at expectations of primary goods as its (restricted) measure of utility.

Note the close relation of primary goods to aspects of the basic structure.

Note concept of rational life plan; primary goods are those required for pursuit of happiness; no judgment made of value of different plan. Allows for agreed-upon measure, whereas trying to evaluate goals is too subject to dispute.

How to compare the various primary goods (or combine them into one index)?

priority ordering means rights & duties considered first & made equal, so no problem

powers & opportunities & income & wealth have to be indexed. This is an intuitive judgment, but we've narrowed the scope of the question.

Note closing reference to results of theory as also justifying (i.e., beyond the philosophical arguments above) the use of the simplifying techniques.


Rawls notes, but does not lay a lot of stress on, the advantages that his theory has over utilitarianism in the area of measurability. What are those advantages?

What is a rational life plan? Do you have one? If not, is it reasonable to expect to predicate a theory of justice on the assumed existence of such plans?

What is the connection of the primary goods to the principles of justice?

Section 16 "Relevant Social Positions"

How to identify representative positions?

Starting point: expectations at birth.

For the first principle, the position is that of the representative citizen.

For the second principle, use position in the income/wealth distribution.

What is the exact definition of the least fortunate? Possibilities include the lowest 10%; those below 1/2 median family income, etc.

It is not super-important exactly what definition one uses. The issue is whether some standard is practical and helpful, not whether it's philosophically perfect.

Can also use other aspects (race, sex, health status) and consider position of worst-off. Again, one uses the difference principle: e.g., does men having greater advantages work to the advantage of women?


What are representative positions? How does Rawls intend to use them in his theory?

What sorts of representative positions are there in society? How do we decide where to set the cutoffs, and what difference does it make?

Section 17 "The Tendency to Equality"

Principle of redress (basic to the liberal perspective) is close to the difference principle.

The difference principle contemplates the distribution of the benefits arising from total natural talents, but this distribution need not be even (as in the principle of redress) but rather for the benefit of the least-well-off.

Note refutation of argument that no system can be just because of natural differences [Jimmy Carter: "Life is not fair."]: people with natural advantages deserve to use them, but not to disadvantage others.

The difference principle expresses the idea of fraternity -- but not (hypothesized) concrete "ties of sentiment and feeling".

[Again, note that Rawls is trying to avoid being termed an idealist, or to base his work on an empirical claim of much dispute.]

Not a meritocracy -- [?]


Rawls seems to distinguish his position from an equalitarian one (the principle of redress, i.e., redressing natural inequalities), but how is it different? [It's in between "devil take the hindmost" and "everyone must be the same.]

Some people say that no system can be just, given that people naturally have very different talents. How does Rawls address that?

Section 18 "Principles for Individuals: The Principle of Fairness"

Choose principles in specific order. Principles for individuals generally come after those for society.

Choose the "right" from the original position: "rightness as fairness".

This section gives the meaning of the principle of fairness; the justification of it is given in Section 52.

[Note distinction (p.111) between this as an analytic definition and a constructive definition. Rawls's concept goes beyond a mere explication of the natural-language meaning of the term to a construction of what we ought to mean by it.]

Distinguish obligations and natural duties:

Obligations: - arise from voluntary acts

- are defined by institutions

- are owed only to people cooperating in those institutions

Natural duties: - do not arise from voluntary acts

- are not defined by institutions

- are owed to all people (and thus apply to the law of states!)

All obligations arise from the principle of fairness: must obey rules of institutions when two conditions are met:

- the institution is just. One can have no obligations to unjust institutions.

- one has voluntarily accepted the institution's benefits or taken advantage of its opportunities.


What is the difference between natural duties and obligations? Give examples of obligations and natural duties you are subject to. Do the

obligations you cite meet both conditions? Rawls says all obligations arise from the principle of fairness. What is this

principle? Why is this so important to him? [It's what requires people to obey principles of justice established in the original position.]

Section 19 "Principles for Individuals: The Natural Duties"

This section gives the meaning of the natural duties; justification of them is given in Section 51.

There are many natural duties; Rawls asserts no single principle to account for them. [He's mostly concerned with the natural duty of justice.]

People would agree to these duties in the original position.

Duty of justice:

support & comply with just institutions advance even more just institutions, if such can be done at little cost to oneself.

[Note that this last leads into the issue of supererogatory acts, and note that utilitarianism has no such category.]


Rawls and utilitarianism differ in how they view supererogatory acts. How and why?

CHAPTER III. The Original Position

xx

Section 20 "The Nature of the Argument for Conceptions of Justice"

Basically, set up an initial situation to choose principles.

Different interpretations of the initial position lead to different principles chosen. ==> How are we to choose the preferred situation?

Answer: from two directions simultaneously, via reflective equilibrium

The initial situation must incorporate our best sense of the conditions under which one should choose principles, and

The initial situation must result in principles that accord with our considered judgments.


According to Rawls, we have to choose principles of justice in a contract starting from some philosophically preferred starting point. What are some alternative starting points? [Hobbes's state of nature (nasty, brutish & short); Locke's (tolerable, but with room for cooperation); Rousseau's (??); etc.]

Does where we start make a difference to the conclusion? [Yes] How then are we to choose among different starts? [Reflective equilibrium.

Note that this is an important question: a central juncture of the argument]

Section 21 "The Presentation of Alternatives"

What alternative principles should be considered?

We are limited by our current imagination, so all we can do is get a long list of the most plausible alternatives, plus those that suggest themselves by the original position, and see which conception beats all the others.

[Rawls then lists a variety of candidate principles.]

Note that all the principles apply to all states of society: they aren't phrased in terms of any specific level.

[Note (p.134 & fn.10) that the original position requires people to decide based on "certain relevant aspects of persons and their situation which are independent from social position, or their capacity to intimidate and coerce." (Disregards any "threat advantage".)]


Why are principles general? -- why not talk about principles relevant to specific states of society (esp. ours)? [Looking at things more broadly may help us clarify]

Section 22 "The Circumstances of Justice"

"The circumstances of justice" refers to those things we know about society that lead us to think about and seek principles of justice. Note that we know more than this about society; this is just what's necessary to convince us of the need for and reasonability of thinking about justice. (See Section 24 for further things we know.)

Some idea of society is required to be known to the parties in the original position in order for them to evaluate and decide among the competing principles.

This section describes the basics of society, without being so specific as to (1) throw the decision one way or another, or (2) be restricted to a narrow range of societies.

Conditions:

People coexist & interact. Scarcity, but moderate scarcity. Rough comparability of resources (a la Hobbes). Roughly comparable goals & needs, but own plans of life Mutual disinterest Limited information [?]

Issue of justice across generations: solved by considering people as having an interest in their immediate descendents


What is known about society to people in the original position? Why that much? Why no more?

Why does Rawls assume that people coexist and interact in the society? [No justice or cooperation without interaction]

Why assume scarcity? [So cooperation is desirable: issues of justice are irrelevant otherwise.]

Why assume moderate scarcity? [Cooperation would otherwise break down.] Why assume comparability of resources? [Cooperation is feasible as well as

desirable.]

Section 23 "The Formal Constraints of the Concept of Right"

The conditions imply certain constraints on all aspects of moral right (including justice). [Note neo-Kantianism]

Principles should be:

(1) [Generality] General -- no specific names allowed.

(2) [Universality] Universal in application: hold for all persons, and self-consistent when everyone obeys them.

(3) [Publicity] Known to all

(4) [Decisiveness] Must decide among conflicting claims; decisions must be transitive.

(5) [Finality] No higher standards, including law, custom, social rules, aesthetics, prudence, self-interest.

These constraints do rule out egoism: by generality (E1 & E2) or finality (E3). [E3 is the "null hypothesis": the failure of agreement.]


What does Rawls mean by ... "Generality"? "Universality"? "Publicity"? "Decisiveness? "Finality"? [This is not a very interesting question for discussion, but the students should be able to answer it.]

Distinguish the condition of generality from that of universality. [Universal but not general: "all must follow Pericles's law." General but not universal: "Adults must treat children well."]

Why are we willing to adopt these a priori as formal constraints on our principles of justice? Why are these important?

Does the fact that principles of justice rank higher than prudence mean that they require self-sacrifice? [Not unless one decides in the original position that some form of self-sacrifice is required by a principle of justice we want to adopt.]

Section 24 "The Veil of Ignorance"

Conditions under which choice is to be made: [Note that this restricts the form of argument allowed; the nature of justification. See Habermas's "ideal speech situation".]

"we must nullify the effects of special contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit [morally irrelevant: see previous section] social & natural circumstances to their own advantage." (p.136)

We don't know:

Our place in society (class position; social status; race; sex; etc.) Our natural assets & abilities (strength, intelligence) Our conception of the good; the life plan we have chosen Our psychological features (risk-taker or risk-averse; optimism or pessimism) The specific nature of society (its structure; level; generation)

We do know:

General facts (Section 22) Political affairs; economics; social organization; human psychology All general laws & theories (e.g., principles of justice should generate their

own support when adopted. This is relevant to utilitarianism).

==> No bargaining; no coalitions can be formed.

[I interpret this as a guide to the attitude we must adopt in our concrete discussions. Clearly as real thinkers about justice we are bound by our current understandings.]


What is known & not known? Is Rawls incorporating too much? Too little? What's the point of the veil of ignorance?

o People can't put away their special knowledge, even if they want to.o Even if they did put it away, wouldn't they renounce the principles when

the veil was removed? [See p.147 for Rawls's answer.]

Section 25 "The Rationality of the Parties"

How do the people reason about the alternatives? Answer: they want the most primary goods.

Note absence of envy; connected with issue of veil of ignorance & mutual disinterest. [Interesting: through the device of the original position, the mutual disinterest which denies us benevolence also denies us envy, its opposite.] Envy comes from injustice. [Note: this seems to slide into issues of moral psychology. Ditto with the issues of shame & humiliation. Note that Rawls tries to deal with this by saying we can pick principles first assuming no envy (etc.) and then seeing what effect the resulting institutions would have.]

[Note funny assumption about strict compliance: assumption that people are presumed capable of a sense of justice, but yet people must take into account that different principles may be differentially easy to adhere to. So where does that leave us?]

abcd, 08/02/14,

abcd, 08/02/14,

Rawls notes its applicability to real decisions in real life: we do the best we can.

Rawls notes that the theory is not egoistic, despite hypothesis of mutual disinterest; it wouldn't necessarily result in selfish principles.


How do people reason about the alternatives? Are there any other grounds (besides primary goods) for people to decide about

the alternatives? On what grounds does Rawls exclude envy as permissible? Is this reasonable? Marxists, feminists, and Rousseau would strongly disagree with the assumption

of mutual disinterest: they say people are inherently concerned with one another. If so, does that change Rawls's argument?

Why, despite the hypothesis of mutual disinterest, isn't the theory egoistic? [Nothing stops people from deciding that they will be better off if they decide to act altruistically when the veil of ignorance is removed.]

Section 26 "The Reasoning Leading to the Two Principles of Justice"

General conception: start with the basic idea of equality (built into the initial position), then accept inequalities only if advantaged.

The priority of liberty is argued later (defined in Section 39; argued in Section 82).

Note that liberty may be traded off against material goods, but only to make eventual liberty possible. [This is unclear to me.]

We can argue for principles directly (deductive) or from the virtue of their consequence (inductively). In this chapter, deductive; Part II has the inductive evidence.

Use maximin criterion of choice. [Explain concept.]

Special circumstances in which this criterion is of use [154-155]:

no account of likelihoods. [Veil of ignorance prevents good calculations either of probability or of the gain & loss table.]

is more concerned with ensuring a minimum than in getting more; "little reason to do better", but reason for concern if one does worse [slavery, etc.].

rejected alternatives have grave risks one could hardly accept [again, reason for concern if one does worse].

[I can't make heads or tails of pp.157-158. As best I can tell, it means the following:]

Does this mean that any advance for the worst-off position justifies total sacrifice for the better-off? Rawls says this case is unlikely to occur in any foreseeable situation, just based on our knowledge of society. (And he is entitled to use that knowledge, since the utilitarians do also. In fact, it is a general weakness of utilitarianism that it relies on natural "facts" so much.)

From the point of view of the original position, utilitarian calculations are very speculative. Why not "secure [our] liberties straightway rather than have them depend upon what may be uncertain& speculative actuarial calculations"?

Also, the outright statement of certain concrete principles may have its own advantages over the rather uncertain statement of utilitarianism. (See Section 29.)


What are Rawls's main grounds for the two principles? [Basic equality; priority of liberty; & maximin]

How does Rawls justify the priority of liberty? [He doesn't until later.] What is the maximin criterion? Why use the maximin criterion rather than the utilitarian? Doesn't this

introduce an impermissible psychological assumption that people are risk-averse, i.e., not gamblers?

Section 27 "The Reasoning Leading to the Principle of Average Utility"

xxDistinguishes the principle of average utility from that of classical utility. These are identical when populations are constant, so issue arises with population growth. Note that the classical principle seems to require infinite increase in population even if each person has less utility.

Classical utilitarianism would be rejected in the original position: its residents have no interest in total welfare but only in their own.

Basic argument of principle of average utility is that people who are prepared to gamble and who are willing to use very abstract probabilitic estimation would want to maximize expected value. [Define expected value.]


What are the main grounds for the average utility principle? [Gamble. See next section for Rawls's discussion of problems with this principle.]

Why would classical utilitarianism be rejected in the original position? What is the argument for the average utility principle?

Section 28 "Some Difficulties with the Average Principle"

Note two arguments Rawls does not raise:

- that it is difficult to find an interpersonally valid measure of utility

- that it is outrageous to demand that a slave allow himself to be exploited by virtue of some myth about a contract he never signed.

Note difficulties with average utility arguments:

1. We have no basis for assuming the "principle of insufficient reason" and the "Laplacean rule" (equal probability of being any member). [I don't follow this. It seems wrapped up in the idea of the initial position and how people are assigned their position once the veil of ignorance is removed.] Even Edgeworth's argument (that repeated trials will average out) does not save us, because the fundamental nature of the choice we make in the original position affects us all our lives (and those of our descendants).

[Rawls notes that once cannot justify his principles on the basis of actual risk-aversion of the parties (because we cannot know their psychological make-up) but must look at the circumstances of the original position itself.

2. Rawls doubts whether it is meaningful to average utility when each person's depends on a different view of the good. How are we to know what their good is? [But it seems to me that one can use the device of basic goods to create a neo-utilitarianism. Rawls acknowledges this (top of p.175) but says it "involves a major change in the theory which I shall not follow up."]


What are the main problems with the average utility argument? Why is the slaveholder's argument correct from the contractarian point of view?

But doesn't Rawls get around this in Section 29 by arguing that such a position is impossible to maintain (because of the strains of commitment)?

What are Rawls's argument against the average principle. Are you persuaded? What arguments persuade you? What arguments don't? Can you think of any other issues Rawls does not raise?

Section 29 "The Main Grounds for the Two Principles of Justice"

1. The "strains of commitment argument":

The two principles overcome the strains of commitment more than utilitarianism. The choice we must make is forever; we must be able to honor it in all circumstances. How can we know we will be able to give up our rights for the sake of others whose plans we may not agree with, as we are required to do under the utilitarian principles?

2. The "micro-macro argument" [or so I call it] [but this seems quite similar to the "strains of commitment" argument]:

We need a good relationship between social institutions and the personal sense of justice. Utilitarianism requires that people be willing to sacrifice themselves permanently for others -- a tenuous hope. The ordinary sense of justice does not accord well with that. Even though people do occasionally act in self-sacrificing ways, we can't demand it.

On the other hand, the two principles of justice mean that everyone is benefitted by cooperation. The principles also ensure the sense of self-respect (an important good) through respect of others. [* See discussion question.] The two principles of justice also give meaning to Kant's categorical imperative to treat people not a means but as ends in themselves.

3. The "publicity argument":

Utilitarianism cannot highlight mutual respect as the two principles do. Under justice as fairness the principles are the firm centerpiece of justice, known to all and a guide to all. Even if utilitarianism yields the two principles, it does so only contingently.

[I don't fully understand the final paragraph. Here's what I think it means:] The original position duplicates reasoning used in everyday life, so no more explicit agreement is needed. Utilitarianism seems to require an explicit agreement, which of course is not possible.


Rawls makes three basic arguments against the average utility principle and for his principles. What are they? [I would focus on the "strains of commitment" and "publicity" arguments.]

What is the "strains of commitment" argument? What is the "micro-macro" argument? What is the "publicity" argument? How do the two principles of justice give meaning to the sense of self-respect

through respecting others? [Ensure self-respect when others, respected by oneself, return that respect.]

What does the final paragraph say? [I don't know]

Section 30 "Classical Utilitarianism, Impartiality, and Benevolence"

[This section is generally of little interest (since I find classical utilitarianism so ridiculous), except to note problems with benevolence as a source of principles:]

Benevolence can't handle the problem of clashing interest. No source of balance.

Rawls terms love & benevolence "second-order notions": based on a contingent good that is already assumed. (His idea of non-contingent {i.e., categorical} Good is set forth in Part Three.)

Love of mankind vs. sense of justice: the former is more embracing & leads to supererogatory acts. But Rawls's is only a theory of justice.


Why, according to Rawls, can't benevolence provide a source of principles of justice?

What does Rawls mean when he terms love & benevolence "second-order notions"?

In your opinion, is it better to have a society with many more people somewhat less happy (on average) than a society with many fewer people somewhat more happy?

Part Two. InstitutionsOverall in Part II (Chs. 4-6), Rawls's implicit claim is that the two principles of justice reinforce and/or clarify our existing judgments. He has specific points to make (particular arguments to advance, etc.) but the overall purpose is to show us that his conception is borne out.

CHAPTER IV. Equal Liberty

Justice applied to institutions governed by the first principle (i.e., political/governmental institutions).

Section 31 "The Four-Stage Sequence"

Assumes a constitutional democracy, but does not assume it is the only just scheme.

Types or levels of political/moral judgment required of a theory of social justice:

specific legislation & policies. [But because people differ in interests, this leads us back to consideration of the prior issue of ...]

constitutional arrangements. [But because institutions are necessarily imperfect, this leads us to consider ...]

limits of political obligation (when should we obey & when not). This seems to be answerable at the level of a basic theory of justice.

Four levels of issues correspond to a sequence of questions/levels of discourse and levels of knowledge required to handle this discourse.

FORUM

QUESTIONS / ISSUES

KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED FOR DISCOURSE

Original position

Decide principles of justice (including problems of partial compliance & political obligation)

See Chapter III, esp. Section 24

Constitutional convention

a. Incorporate & protect liberties of equal citizenship

b. Devise constitutional procedures most likely to result in just legislation (i.e., corresponding to the two principles) [note the requirement of reflective equilibrium]

Basic institutions (relies heavily on the 1st principle of justice

Know general facts about their society: natural circumstances & resources; level of economic advance; political culture; distribution of beliefs & interests people are likely to have; political tactics

Legislation [Note that constitutional convention can consider 1st principle clearly, but satisfaction of 2nd principle is unclear. Legislation involves both principles.]

Specific laws (2nd principle comes into play here)

Legislators don't know their own position

Application of rules & laws to cases

Full knowledge, including who one is

Ambiguities of choice at any stage (e.g. apparent equality of justice between two constitutions) is o.k.: what we'd expect.


Rawls moves from the original position to application in a 4-step process. What are the four steps? What additional information is introduced at each? What issues do the participants address in each? What is the logical connection between each stage and the next?

Why does Rawls employ a four-step process? Why not move directly to the real cases?

Section 32 "The Concept of Liberty"

Dismisses / sets aside exact definition of liberty, especially the distinction between negative and positive liberty. (Mention this to the class, however.)

Basic liberties must be assessed as a whole. Maximizing liberty as a whole, not each one individually because they conflict with one another). Can limit liberty only "for sake of others' equal liberty or for liberty as a whole".

Distinguishes liberty (formal/legal; defined by first principle alone) from the worth of liberty (capacity to pursue ends beyond mere liberty to do so; defined by first & second principles together)


Rawls says that liberty should be assessed as a whole, not individually. We are entitled to limit liberty only (1) for the sake of others' equal liberty or (2) for

liberty as a whole. Give an example of each. [#1: Everyone has the right to vote. #2: Rules of order; toleration; limitations on majority rule.]

Distinguish liberty and the worth of liberty. Do you agree with the distinction between liberty and the worth of liberty? Isn't

the restriction on the worth of liberty (permissible under the second principle) in effect an inequality of liberty, however much formal equality there is? And how does this relate to Rawls's discussion in Section 36 of how economic equality is necessary to fulfill the participation principle?

Section 33 "Equal Liberty of Conscience"

In order to strengthen the case for the principles of justice, we looked at liberty of conscience, one of the fixed points of our moral system. The original position allows three strong arguments for this liberty; other positions don't yield as strong a conclusion.

First, let's bring to bear in the original position the knowledge that:

people will have moral, philosophical, or religious interests they will desire to protect

people will have ties with the next generation

In the original position, equal freedom of conscience is the only possible conclusion, for three reasons:

1. need to value the right to examine one's beliefs (& not suppress others')2. need to guarantee liberty "straightway", not indirectly as per utilitarian

considerations, which are uncertain & conjectural3. don't want to gamble that one's beliefs are in the majority

What about absolute claims of divine law? [Such claims can't be absolute against other people and in any case are not justifiable in the original position]

Arguments for equal liberty of conscience are possible from other positions, but "we have more confidence in the principle of equal liberty than in the truth of the premises from which a perfectionist or utilitarian would derive it" [p.211]. [Note idea of reflective equilibrium]


What are the three arguments for liberty of conscience in the original position? [See 1-3 above.]

Religious dogmatists make absolute claims, based on divine law, for the right to restrict conscience. How does Rawls view these claims? On what grounds does he reject them?

Section 34 "Toleration and the Common Interest"

Liberty of conscience is restricted by our common interest in public order and security:

not because the government can take any interest in particular conceptions only because in the original position we would recognize that disruption of

public order & security would lessen our ability to achieve our goals.

In general, liberty can be constrained only for the sake of liberty.

Note effect on arguments re. tolerance:

Can't make the argument (e.g., that of Aquinas) that one must save heretics' souls by burning them: the grounds are merely dogmatic and would not be agreed to in the original position.

Locke & Rousseau can make an argument for the suppression of certain dogmatic sects on the grounds that they disrupt public order, but further experience shows this not to be true. So their arguments, even if formally correct, were made over-hastily.


On what grounds, if any, can one suppress communists who advocate the violent overthrow of the state? [See above for an impermissible argument, e.g., "Because communism is bad."]

The idea that liberty of conscience can be restricted because in the original position we would recognize that disruption of public order & security would lessen our ability to achieve our goals [See above] seems to confuse liberty and the worth of liberty.

Section 35 "Toleration of the Intolerant"

An intolerant sect does not have title to complain of being treated intolerantly. (They have a right to employ only arguments they themselves recognize.)

But this does not require the tolerant to be intolerant of the intolerant:

if no immediate threat experience by the intolerant of being tolerated may persuade them to toleration

[In fact, I would think that we still have a positive (natural) duty to be tolerant when the above conditions hold.]


May we justly be intolerant of the intolerant (say, the Ku Klux Klan)? [Yes; they have no claim to demand that we honor principles they themselves reject.] (I'm a little uncomfortable with that.)

Why might we choose to be tolerant of them? [See the two reasons shown above.]

Section 36 "Political Justice and the Constitution"

Judge constitutions by two criteria [mentioned earlier in Section 31]:

equal participation (= first principle [equal liberty] applied to the constitution greatest likelihood of passing just & effective legislation

Rawls basically sets up an ideal representative-democratic framework, including the following aspects:

representative legislature limited terms representatives selected by & accountable to electorate legislature has real powers, not an advisory body powers may be circumscribed by a sort of Bill of Rights to protect basic

liberties, especially the political participatory liberties of speech, assembly, association

all people participate (except those for whom the paternalistic principle would apply: children, the insane) and those who we are allowed not to tolerate (per the last chapter: criminals?)

one elector one vote; one legislator one vote fair, free, regular elections no gerrymandering right of a loyal opposition to exist recognized equal access to public office: restrictions (if any) must be reasonably related to

the tasks of office and must be in the common interest limitations on majority rule (deferred to the next section) equal rights of participants despite economic & social class

public forum (not necessarily the legislature, but more broadly the general area of intellectual discourse) must be: free; open to all; in continuous session; public/accessible; open agenda; autonomous from privilege (perhaps by having publicly financed political parties)

The participatory principle establishes the right of participation, not a duty of it. (Contrast countries where voting is obligatory -- to show regime support -- but practically meaningless.) Note that this differs from the classical Greek (& modern socialist) notion that full humanity is only to be found in political participation (and community).


How does the discussion of how inequalities of wealth affect the exercise of political liberty relate to Rawls's separation of liberty from the worth of liberty? (Seems contradictory to me, but perhaps I'm not following it.)

Section 37 "Limitations on the Principle of Participation"

[The "principle of participation" is defined on p.221 as the principle of equal liberty applied to the political procedure defined by the Constitution.]

Three ways of limiting this principle:

1. the constitution may set more or less extensive level of liberty

2. the constitution may allow inequalities in liberties

3. more or less resources may be devoted to making the worth of liberty equal.

[Only 1 & 2 are considered in this section.]

1. To what extent can the freedoms of participation arising from bare majority rule be restricted? Answer: less extensive freedom to participate can be outweighed by greater security and other liberties. Restrict or widen liberty to the extent that loss of control over those having power balances the security of liberty gained. (I.e., at the margin, the net liberty from a change should be 0.)

2. How can one argue for unequal liberty? Answer: the argument has three elements. (a) Reason from basis of person with least liberty. (b) Are inequalities to that person's advantage? (c) Remember, however, the "non-instrumental" argument: the advantage of equal liberty on the moral quality of civic life, meaning self-esteem; learning the

necessity to moderate one's own desires; "civic friendship". [Note connection to the good of justice, in Part Three.]


What is the required form of the argument for restricting the overall level of participation (i.e., not straight majority rule)? [See 1 above.]

How does Rawls feel intensity of desire should be factored into the majority rule? [Not at all, at least where basic writes are concerned. Consideration of intensity really leads to a utilitarian argument.]

How does Rawls say that one can argue for unequal liberty? [Answer: see the three elements discussed above in 2.]

Rawls says that one must argue that inequalities of liberty must be to the advantage of the least-free person. Give examples of how that might occur. [Possible answers: smarter people; sane people; adults.]

What does Rawls mean by his "non-instrumental" argument about the moral quality of civic life?

Section 38 "The Rule of Law"

Three elements to this chapter:

- the nature of the rule of law and the precepts of justice it implies

- the connection between the rule of law and liberty

- the theory of punishment

Rule of law: a system of public rules addressed to rational persons

==> the following (pretty standard) precepts of justice:

- "ought implies can": lawmakers must believe laws can be obeyed; good faith must be recognized by subjects; impossibility is a recognized defense.

- similar cases are treated similarly; use of precedents; impersonal justice; no bills of attainder

- no offense without a law: laws must be public & clear [as opposed to censorship practice]; no ex post facto laws

- "natural justice" precepts: orderly trials; rules of evidence; due process; impartial judges; fair & open trials

Connection with liberty:

(1) If boundaries of what we can do are unclear (or the other precepts are violated), our liberties are proportionately restricted because we become afraid to exercise them.

(2) Also, we need the rule of law (esp. punishments) to maintain mutual confidence. The risk of loss of liberty through unjust imprisonment (and cost of penal system) must be balanced against liberty arising from mutual confidence. This is true in both total compliance or partial compliance theory: liberty is only balanced against liberty.


What is the connection of the rule of law with liberty? [Answer: see (1) and (2) immediately above.]

Section 39 "The Priority of Liberty Defined"

Basically, the priority of liberty means that liberty can only be restricted for the sake of liberty.

We must evaluate liberty from the position of the least advantaged:

Limits on liberty that apply to everyone (e.g., restrictions on speech) are evaluated from the standpoint of the representative citizen. Overall reduction in one liberty must strengthen total liberty.

Limits that apply only to some (felons & children can't vote) are evaluated from the viewpoint of the least advantaged. Unequal liberty must be justified from the standpoint of the person with the least liberty (paternalism).

Problem of strict compliance vs. partial compliance: the two principles (and their lexical ordering) assume strict compliance (i.e., that people will generally comply) -- but do they extend to situations of partial compliance?

In the situation of partial compliance, what do we do with existing injustices?

It is still a natural duty to create & support justice. We must attack the most important injustices first. (For example, we would

attack violations of the first principle before those of the second.)


The two principles of justice and the lexical ordering are predicated on the assumption of strict compliance. How does Rawls address the issue of partial compliance? [Start with ideal theory as a baseand assess small variations from there -- sort of a calculus of variations idea.]

Section 40 "The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness"

The principle of equal liberty and of the priority rule can be derived from an interpretation of Kant. (Rawls notes that this is only his interpretation of Kant.)

Kant's position:

- moral principles are the object of rational choice

- choice must be made by & among free & equal rational beings

==> idea of autonomy: principles of action are chosen as expression of being free, equal, rational (in contrast to heteronomy, where actions depend upon social or natural contingencies).

Principles of justice thus chose are categorical imperatives in Kant's sense. Right action is simply an expression of one's self.

Sidgwick's objection: can't one choose to be a scoundrel and then express that free choice? Answer: one would not make such a choice in the original position -- that is, in a situation characterized by equality & agreement.

The desire to act justly derives from a desire for self-respect. Failure to do so provokes shame [at not living up to one's best image of oneself], not guilt [at failure to heed some universal "law"].


How do the two principles of justice give meaning to Kant's categorical imperative to treat people not a means but as ends in themselves? Why doesn't utilitarianism do that? [See Section 40 for the answer to this.]

How does the original position differ from / add to Kant's conception? [Principles apply to the basic structure of society, not moral law in general. Choice is made for primary goods.]

How does Kant distinguish hypothetical imperatives from categorical imperatives? [Hypothetical imperatives are those employed in pursuing an ideosyncratic end; categorical imperatives are those accepted as expressions of being free & equal, rational beings.] [Assetorical imperatives, e.g., happiness.]

CHAPTER V. Distributive Shares

Justice applied to institutions governed by both the first and second principle (and here we concentrate on the second principle and therefore primarily on economic institutions).

How principles of justice apply to political economy (whereas Chapter IV applied them to institutions of political participation)

The choice between socialism and capitalism is left open

Section 41 "The Concept of Justice in Political Economy"

Political economy requires a sense of justice: economic institutions affect which people work, how they are to live, what wants they will come to have, therefore it is of moral consequence.

Problem of the institution-goals connection: Utilitarianism does have some independent outlook on the institutions-goals connection. Namely, one should choose institutions so that people have goals conducive to the maximization of utility.

But this is a vague criterion. Looked at beyond this vague criterion, the institution-goals relativity is a problem for utilitarianism: since utilitarianism sees any goals as permissible, it offers no guidance on how to choose institutions. Any institutions are o.k. as long as they can make people want what they provide.

Is the original position idealist -- that is, does it assume something that isn't there (unanimity; a sense of community)?

* Unanimity: not assumed; instead, made a condition of agreement; constrains possible agreements. (Or at worst, we look to limit the scope of disagreement & the play of intuition.)

* Community: not assumed; instead, it follows from the individualism of the original position. (See Part Three.) [But it seems to me that some such notion of community is important to make people willing to abandon their self-knowledge and assume the original position, as opposed to, say, a Lockean version of the social contract where people maintain their knowledge.]

abcd, 08/21/14,


W

If society & the political-economic institutions in particular determine people's wants, how can there be an independent concept of justice? [Answer: The original position is cast in terms of what all people want, and certain "goods" are not admitted by the theory. Changes in our understanding of basic goods may cause us to reenter the original position; this is just reflective equilibrium. (Socialist critics say we should do so once we recognize the inherent goods of close/communal ties.)]

* Utilitarianism does have some independent outlook on the institutions-goals connection. What is that outlook? Answer: One should choose institutions so that people have goals conducive to the maximization of utility. [But this is a vague criterion.]

* Why is the linkage between institutions and wants a problem for utilitarianism? Answer: Since utilitarianism sees any goals as permissible, it offers no guidance on how to choose institutions. Any institutions are o.k. as long as they can make people want what they provide.

Section 42 "Some Remarks about Economic Systems"

Distinguish this discussion from economics: we're trying to see the justice (now under consideration) of economic systems (assumed to be fully understood).

Two aspects of the public sector:

- Public vs. private ownership of the means of production. (Public ownership might refer to either state officials or workers' councils.)

- Proportion of total economic output devoted to public as opposed to private goods.

Public goods:

Defining characteristics of public goods: indivisibility (all citizens get the same amount, e.g. defense against foreign invasion) and publicness (access can't be restricted).

Two implications of these characteristics: (1) free rider problem; and (2) the externality problem.

The free rider problem: it is not individually rational for people to contribute to a public good. Because of publicness, they can't be restricted from using it, and because of indivisibility, they will get the same amount as everyone else.

The externality problem: the benefits of public goods may not match the costs imposed. Example: industries may be required to clean up their wastes, so everyone benefits but they alone pay (or pass along the costs to consumers of their product or to workers in their plants -- but again, these populations are not the same as those who benefit from pollution cleanup).

Taken together, these give rise to "the assurance problem" and thus a need for collective agreements organized & enforced by the state. The state arises to provide certain essential but public goods -- that is, to provide goods which would not be rational for individuals to provide for themselves (the problem of isolation) and to ensure mutual confidence among citizens that the necessary others are holding up their end of the agreement (the problem of assurance). This is a positive view of the state, as opposed to the negative view that the state only exists to overcome selfishness and wickedness.

A few remarks about market institutions, including (in particular) that they can be used by both socialist and capitalist economies

Both capitalist and socialist economies will find it easiest and most efficient to regulate consumption (and the direction of investment) through a market system (i.e., no rationing or price fixing; this regulation of consumption is termed the distributive function of prices). A socialist state, on the other hand, can regulate production and use of resources (e.g., by setting interest rates on capital and rents on other resources; this regulation of production is called the allocative function of prices). (Note that the interest and rents thus collected do not, however, go into the pocket of private individuals but rather into the hands of the state.)

Distinguish the issue of the overall rate of savings from the issue of the direction of investment (that is, where these monies saved should be invested). One can set the overall rate collectively and still rely on a market approach to say where the savings should go.

Market system is (ideally) Pareto-optimal ("efficient").

With the requisite background institutions (about which more later), the market system is consistent with equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity:

- free choice to pursue plans of life:

- through free choice of careers & occupations

- through free choice among mix of consumer goods

- decentralized power

Conclusion: Rawls will assume use of market arrangements and will assume a property-owning democracy. But he says this should not prejudge the justice of currently existing arrangements or prejudge against socialism. (See also his discussion of socialism and a critique of the socialist critique of the market in Section 43.)


W

Rawls assumes that we fully understand economic systems, so the only question left is how the principles of justice should be applied. What if, as has happened many times in the past, we come to a better and quite different understanding of economics? [Answer: Even if economic systems are not fully understood, we can just return to the constitutional convention level or even the original position level.]

* Why is Rawls so concerned with distinguishing the two aspects of the public sector, i.e., the question of ownership of the means of production and the proportionate effort spent on public as opposed to individual goods (aside from the intellectual point that the two aspects are different)? [Answer: He wants to clarify the contrast between socialism and capitalism, which has to do with the first dimension but not the second. Private property economies can produce public goods through government purchase of them from private suppliers for public use.]

* What is a public good? What are its two defining features? Give an example of such a good, and explain how it has those features. Is Jay Cooke Park a public good? [Note the user fee.] Are filling station restrooms a public good?

* What is the "free rider" problem? Why is it not rational for anyone to pay for defense? What if everyone decides not to pay? -- is it rational then for someone to pay for defense?

* What is the "externality" problem? Give an example.

* What is the problem of "assurance"? How do the free rider and externality problems give rise to it?

* Why is an ideal free market Pareto-optimal ("efficient")? [Answer: Because if there were some other mix of goods that would make everyone better off, the goods would have been exchanged already.]

* Overall, what does Rawls's attitude seem to be about socialism vs. capitalism? Which does he see as more just? Which does he discuss?

Section 43 "Background Institutions for Distributive Justice"

Elements

A just constitution (as laid out in Chapter IV), including fair equality of opportunity.

(Note competing precepts of economic justice: reward by need vs. reward by desert, market value, or work.)

Four main branches (and one optional branch) of the economic system:

(Note that these are functions, not necessarily actual branches of a bureaucracy.)

(First two branches are to preserve market efficiency)

1. Allocation branch, to allocate outputs (goods) produced by the system: preserve a free market, so that there are no monopolies or oligopolies; tax (or subsidize) externalities so that prices reflect social cost.

2. Stabilization branch, to allocate the inputs of labor & capital: preserve a free market for labor & capital; full employment; preserve free choice of careers

3. Transfer branch: set a social minimum & to answer the claims of need; anything above this minimum can be determined by the price system. [Note that this isn't quite "to everyone according to his need", but it isn't "devil take the hindmost", either. Thus Rawls plops down right between capitalism and Marx.]

4. Distribution [of wealth] branch:

a. Tax inheritances, gifts, etc. to prevent unjust concentration of power. Secures/preserves equal worth of liberty. Can allow inheritance as long as it benefits the worst-off.

b. Tax to raise revenue: use straight consumption tax to pay for education and other social goods required by justice. [Note the philosophy of taxation: not based on "ability to pay" or "benefits received": both are presumably already equalized by the minimum, etc.]

5. Exchange branch: citizens organize to buy and simultaneously finance all public goods not required as a matter of justice. Levies to support it must be universally approved by all being assessed. Requires:

- just background institutions, so that public goods required by justice are already present

- a separate representative body, since the principle at work is not that of justice

Socialism (public decisions about production) could live with these mechanisms, though distribution branch will differ. [Why? -- I'm not clear why this should be.] Note that difficulties with use of the market decline when background institutions are just. Injustices of capitalism may be correctable, not inherent.


W

What are the four background institutions for distributive justice?

* What is the fifth background institution? What purpose does it serve?

* Rawls would (or would he?) object to the public financing of (say,) art museums. How in his system could people who wanted an art museum get access to one? If one believes that art museums are beneficial to society as a whole, does this make a difference to one's ability to argue for public financing?

* Are these institutions, as outlined, more like capitalism or socialism?

Section 44 "The Problem of Justice between Generations"

Problem of justice between generations: "Each generation must not only preserve the gains of culture & civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established, but must also put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation" (p.285).

[We are not doing that:

- burden of our national debt

- degradation of our environment (destruction of species, rain forest, ozone layer, fossil fuels, fossil water, etc.)]

==> Problem of establishing a just savings rate. People in different generations have duties & obligations to one another.

Utilitarianism offers no clear guidance: varying assumptions about population increase, discount rate, and expected productivity increases can yield any answer.

Contract method:

- don't know what generation one is ==> whatever savings principle is adopted will be just

- savings can vary depending on social level. (It's hard to save if you're poor.)

- it's in the interest of every generation to have a just savings principle

- don't have to maximize indefinitely. The last stage need not have great abundance. [Why not? -- I disagree.]

- claims of each generation get treated equally.


What are the problems that utilitarianism faces in settling problems of justice between generations? Why do these problems not apply to Rawls's contract perspective?

Section 45 "Time Preference"

Time preference is defined as one generation's discounting of the claims of other generations (but one can take uncertainties and changing circumstances into account). The original position could be subject to such discounting, since its members know they are of the same generation.

Contract theory says no time preference because they don't know their generation. They determine what a just savings rate is for all generations, and then follow the resulting principle when they discover which generation they are in.

Utilitarianism says no time preference because of perfect sympathy with each person.


What is the problem of time preference?

Section 46 "Further Cases of Priority"

[Second priority rule discussed:

* the second principle of justice is prior to the principle of efficiency (Pareto optimality) and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages (utility)

* fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle

* an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity: "the attempt to eliminate these inequalities would so interfere with the social system and the operations of the economy that in the long run anyway the opportunities of the disadvantaged would be even more limited" (p.301).

* an excessive rate of savings must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing this hardship (e.g., "trickle-down" economics would be an example of the proper form of the argument -- although one is free to dispute the facts of whether the wealth does trickle down)]


W

According to Rawls, the Keynesian argument for wealth inequality can be misread as arising from the problem of just savings. What is that erroneous argument? Why is it erroneous? How does Rawls interpret Keynes's work?

* Rawls hold that restrictions on equality of opportunity are unjust even if they were known to make the worst-off better off. Why? Do you agree with his argument?

Section 47 "The Precepts of Justice"

The point of this section is to see to what extent two common sense precepts of (economic) justice are upheld in Rawls's theory of justice. After all, with reflective equilibrium, they should support it.


What are the two common sense precepts of justice? Why does Rawls say that his theory of justice is more important than the two

"common sense" precepts, particularly given his emphasis on reflective equilibrium between theory and intuition? (Gould may attack this.)

How are the two common sense precepts balanced in a just society (that is, one regulated by the principles of justice)?

Rawls presents three arguments to reply to the objection that he is assuming a perfectly competitive economy. Summarize them.

Section 48 "Legitimate Expectations and Moral Desert"

Should people be rewarded according to their "desert", i.e., what they "deserve"?

Justice as fairness says no, for two reasons:

1. There's no way to choose what the principles of desert are.

2. People who follow the rules of just institutions have a right to expect to be rewarded. No further / other system of reward is appropriate. ("For a society to organize itself with the aim of rewarding moral desert as a first principle would be like having the institution of property in order to punish thieves" [p.313].)

[Recall that Stage 6 goes beyond issues of praise & blame.]


Why, according to Rawls, isn't "desert" (paying people according to what they deserve) a just criterion for rewards? [HINT: He cites two reasons. Answer: (1) No way of defining the requisite criteria of "deservingness" in the original position. (2) Fails to distinguish between moral desert and legitimate expectations.]

Section 49 "Comparisons with Mixed Conceptions"

xx


What is a "mixed conception" of justice? Why are mixed conceptions harder to argue against than straight utilitarianism?

Rawls advances several reasons for preferring his principles of justice to mixed conceptions: (1) his conception depends less on intuition; and (2) his conception is defined more precisely, since (2a) it doesn't have problems with defining the slippery notion of utility. Elaborate.

Section 50 "The Principle of Perfection"

Strict perfectionism: "is the sole principle of a teleological theory directing society to arrange institutions and to define the duties and obligations of individuals so as to maximize the achievement of human excellence in art, science, and culture" (p.325).

Problems:

* People in the original position "do not have an agreed criterion of perfection that can be used as a principle for choosing between institutions" (p.327).

* May not permit equal liberty, which is a primary principle.


How does the principle of strict perfectionism define justice? How does "weak" perfectionism differ?

Rawls argues that strict perfectionism has two problems. What are they?

CHAPTER VI. Duty and Obligation

This chapter looks at the Rawlsian perspective on duty and obligation: how these arise, and how they are applied in specific cases. Again, note reflective equilibrium: they go to justify Rawls's orientation.

Section 51 "The Arguments for the Principles of Natural Duty"

Recall the earlier discussion (Section 19) of the meaning of natural duties: duties are things one must do regardless, as opposed to obligations (treated in the next section). This section gives a justification of them. [Remember also the concept of supererogatory actions.]

Natural duties:

1. Support just institutions (acquiescence, support, creation).

2. Other natural duties mentioned in Section 19:

* to help others in need (if easy to do)

* to avoid harm or injury or unnecessary suffering

3. Duty of mutual respect

* attention to others' perspective

* duty to give good (& truthful) reasons for one's actions

* extend small courtesies and favors

4. Duty of mutual aid

From whence do these duties arise? Two major arguments

* Duties must conform to sense of social justice when applied to public officials, at least.

* Duties cannot be mere obligations (i.e., things one must do because of one's own acceptance of those responsibilities), because the lack of any clear taking up of the obligation creates problems of mutual assurance.

In addition, the duty of mutual aid arises from a couple of other argument:

* utilitarian reasoning (we may need aid ourselves)

* sense of mutual esteem in society is pleasant

Discussion of conflicts between duties. (To wit:) Duties can conflict.


How do duties differ from obligations? What are "natural" duties? What are the natural duties Rawls lists? What are the major reasons he

advances for them? Can duties ever conflict? If so, does Rawls suggest a resolution? If not, does he

explain why not?

Section 52 "The Arguments for the Principle of Fairness"

Recall the earlier discussion (Section 18) of the meaning of the principle of fairness from which obligations arise (as opposed to natural duties, which hold regardless). This section gives a justification of the principle.

Rule of promising vs. principle of fidelity (or fairness). Notice that promises are mini-contracts. Advantages of promising would be seen in the Original Position -- so we'd accept the principle of fairness.


How do we acquire obligations in a just society? [Through the principle of fairness.]

What are the two parts of the principle of fairness? [ (1) One must acquire obligations voluntarily. (2) One is only obligated to adhere to just institutions.]

What obligations, if any, do people have to unjust institutions. [None, according to the fairness principle, but see the next section.]

In some cases, things that look like obligations are simply an extension of the natural duty of justice, i.e., to comply with a just institution. Give an example of such a duty. Give an example of an obligation that is not such an extension of natural duty.

Distinguish the role of promising from the principle of fidelity. What is the reason we would accept the principle of fairness?

Section 53 "The Duty to Comply with an Unjust Law"

This begins the discussion of partial compliance theory.

1. We don't have to comply always with an unjust law.

2. We do have some duty to comply with unjust laws:

* because they arise from just but necessarily imperfect constitutional frameworks.

* because the natural duty of civility requires maintaining overall good faith; we shouldn't use injustice as an excuse.

3. But there are limits to the laws we can be morally forced to comply with:

* burden of injustice should be equally distributed over the long run

* no one injustice should be too great


Why should we ever comply with an unjust law? In what circumstances don't we have to? Give examples of a situation in which one need not comply with an unjust law

because (1) the burden of injustice is not equally distributed and (2) the injustice is too great [capital punishment].

Section 54 "The Status of Majority Rule"

[I don't find this of much interest now.]


If the legislators are already impartial, what advantage does majority rule have? [Greater variety of viewpoints means greater information. Rawls doesn't emphasize any increase in neutrality. Note the implications this has for our understanding of what goes on in the Original Position.]

Section 55 "The Definition of Civil Disobedience"

Contrast civil disobedience with conscientious refusal (Section 56).

Three parts of theory of civil disobedience:

1. Definition of dissent (this section) and discussion of its purpose

2. Set out grounds (justification) of civil disobedience (Section 57)

3. Explain the role such actions play in a near-just society (Section 59)

Definition of civil disobedience: "a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political [i.e., not solely religious] act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government" (364).

Further discussion of the definition: [Note that these are not justifications but rather prolegomena to such justification.]

* "... does not require that the ... act breach the same law that is being protested" (364). Rawls gives as an example that an over-broad law against treason need not be protested by treasonous action.

* "the ... act is indeed thought to be contrary to law" (365). In other words, we are not just creating a test case to determine the interpretation of a law.

* "one invokes the commonly shared conceptions of justice" (365). As will be apparent later, the whole purpose of civil disobedience is to recall the community to those shared conceptions.

* it must be a public act (366), since it is designed as a means of political persuasion.

* It must be a nonviolent act (366-7), for two reasons. First, injury to others is incompatible with justice, so one cannot call others to a sense of justice violently. Second, nonviolence gives a bond of one's basic fidelity to law, since one breaks only one law.

* The civilly disobedient must be willing to accept punishment (367-8); otherwise, the act is one of rebellion, not one recalling people to justice.


W

What, according to Rawls, is civil disobedience? How does it differ from straight-out rebellion?

* Must the civilly disobedient violate the law being protested?

* Must the civilly disobedient believe that the action they are taking is actually in violation of the existing law?

* What are the two reasons that Rawls advances for requiring that civil disobedience be nonviolent?

* Why, according to Rawls, must the civilly disobedient be willing to accept punishment for their actions? Why must the civil disobedience be public?

Section 56 "The Definition of Conscientious Refusal"

xx


What is conscientious refusal? How does it differ from civil disobedience? Rawls mentions "several contrasts" (369).

Rawls believes that there is some justification for tolerating absolute pacifism, even though he believes that pacifism is at best only partially justified. What is that justification?

Section 57 "The Justification of Civil Disobedience"

Civil disobedience is justified by reference to justice, and particularly from the duty of justice. (There may be other grounds, but this is Rawls's.)

One must establish certain preliminary things is order to make civil disobedience permissible:

* There must be a clear violation of the principles of justice. (Rawls notes that violations of the first principle are easier to establish than those of the second.)

* Reasonable steps have been taken to eliminate the injustice by legal means.

* One must forebear if there are too many people with the same sort of claim, since "there is a limit on the extent to which civil disobedience can be engaged in without leading to a breakdown in the respect for law and the constitution thereby setting in motion consequences unfortunate for all" (374). One shouldn't overload the political circuits.

We have established the conditions under which civil disobedience is permissible, not required. We are entitled to consider the issue of prudence before deciding we must undertake it.


In what circumstances, if any, is civil disobedience justified? How do those circumstances provide justification for it?

* What role does prudence play in deciding if one is justified in engaging in civil disobedience?

Section 58 "The Justification of Conscientious Refusal"

xx


What, according to Rawls, are the criteria for a war to be just?

What limits, if any, would Rawls place on the exercise of one's religious belief in pacifism?

Section 59 "The Role of Civil Disobedience"

The basic role of civil disobedience is to stabilize [!] the society. Civil disobedience maintains and strengthens just institutions by acknowledging the basis of society as an agreement among equals. By refusing to cooperate, people remind others (i.e., the majority) of the basis in justice under which their acquiescence can be commanded.

Note that civil disobedience involves justice (a political issue), not one's private (e.g., religious) beliefs.

Is the sense of justice too weak to sustain civil disobedience? No -- not in a nearly just society. The sense of justice leads people to restrain themselves, even if they are in the majority.

Note the risk of civil disobedience (388-9): "Up to a certain point it is better that the law and its interpretation be settled than that it be settled rightly" (389).


Does civil disobedience have any positive role to play in a constitutional government? What is that role?

* Why does civil disobedience stabilize the society?

* What risks are incurred by the practice of civil disobedience?

Part Three. EndsPrepares the way to settle the following questions:

I. [Chapter VII:] Accounting for the values of society

II. [Chapter VIII:] Stability: "Will a Rawlsian society be able to generate its own support?" This involves the additional question, "How do people come to have a sense of justice?"

III. [Chapter IX:] Congruence (between justice and goodness): Does this theory of justice mesh or conflict with our understanding of the Good? Basically, is Justice a

Good? -- For all people? For some? Can the sense of justice work together with our sense of what is good?

Like Part Two, Part Three has a twofold purpose:

* to show that the basic approach (justice as fairness) is right, because it produces natural conclusions [reflective equilibrium]

* to elaborate the theory in the area of Ends. But let us make this last statement much more explicit. The basic point of Part Three is one of the stability of the society implied by Rawls's theory of justice.

A. Stability of a society arises from two sources (Section 69, pp.454-5):

1. the sense of justice fostered one's development within the society.

2. the propensities toward injustice fostered by the society.

B. Chapter VIII ("The Sense of Justice") argues the first point: that justice as fairness, more than any other conception, fosters a sense of justice. The basic argument is that the psychological process by which people develop a sense of justice is congruent with the structure of a Rawlsian society.

C. Chapter IX ("The Good of Justice") argues the second point: that people will have no propensities to be unjust, because in a Rawlsian society their sense of the Good will include a commitment to Justice. Rawls characterizes this as the problem of the congruence between Justice and Goodness.

D. I don't completely understand the purpose of Chapter VII ("Goodness As Rationality"), except that it is necessary to discuss goodness before dealing (in Chapter IX) with the good of justice. Chapter VII is interesting in showing that much of our sense of the Good can be accounted for by a perspective similar to that of the original position (rational choice under uncertainty), and it is important in showing the perspective of the Good as contingent on life plans. The former shows (very indirectly, remotely) the power of the general Rawlsian approach; the latter is necessary as a lead into framing the question of the final chapter in terms of the role of justice in life plans as a whole.

E. I still don't understand why Chapters VII and VIII couldn't be reversed. Chapter VIII doesn't seem to refer to the issue of the Good at all!

CHAPTER VII. Goodness as Rationality

This chapter fleshes out the theory of the good which has already been implicit in the earlier concepts of primary goods and rationality.

I don't completely understand the purpose of Chapter VII ("Goodness As Rationality"), except that it is necessary to discuss goodness before dealing (in Chapter IX) with the good of justice. Chapter VII is interesting in showing that much of our sense of the Good can be accounted for by a perspective similar to that of the original position (rational choice under uncertainty), and it is important in showing the perspective of the Good as contingent on life plans. The former shows (very indirectly, remotely) the power of the general Rawlsian approach; the latter is necessary as a lead into framing the question of the final chapter in terms of the role of justice in life plans as a whole.

I still don't understand why Chapters VII and VIII couldn't be reversed. Chapter VIII doesn't seem to refer to the issue of the Good at all!

Section 60 "The Need for a Theory of the Good"

Thin vs. full theory of the good

Full theory can be based on the thin theory plus the principles (and underlying theory) of justice.

The thin theory has been used to:

* define the least advantaged

* give content to rationality

The full theory is needed to:

* define beneficent & supererogatory acts

* define/state/ground the moral worth of persons

* see if being a good person is a good thing for that person

* account for social values [xx?]


What is the difference between Rawls's "thin" and "full" theories of the Good?

* Why do we distinguish between the "thin" and the "full" theories?

Section 61 "The Definition of Good for Simpler Cases"

Goodness is tied in with usefulness to a rational life plan

Goodness depends on context: something is good depending on the purpose for which it is used. Goods are not general goods unless it is rational for everyone (or most people on the average?) to want them.

Curiously, the concept of goodness is morally neutral, in that we have to evaluate the purposes, not the goods.


Rawls ties the determination of something as Good to a rational life plan. Why might he want to do that? What problems might arise from trying to determine the Good for an irrational life plan?

Rawls says that the determination of something as Good depends on the context in which it is used or the point of view by which it is appraised. What does he mean by this dependence? Give examples to illustrate.

Paradoxically, Rawls says that the sense of Good is morally neutral. What does he mean by that?

Section 62 "A Note on Meaning"

xx


xx

Section 63 "The Definition of Good for Plans of Life"

I. Commentaries on the nature of life plans:

A. Main source of happiness

B. becomes more general at more distant time horizons

C. Involves a hierarchy of desires: the most general first, then more specific later (after the first have been decided)

D. Rawls notes slightly later in this section that the concept of life plans is not ethnocentric, even for long-term plans. Society may limit one's options (or attempt to remove them entirely, as in a rigid caste system), but one is still free to have them. Basically, Rawls is saying that choice is not ethnocentric.

II. Principles of rational choice for short-term plans:

A. least expenditure of means ("effective means")

B. more is better ("inclusiveness")

C. greater likelihood is better

III. Principles of rational choice for long-term plans

A. Some principles (effective means and greater likelihood) have natural parallels with those for short-term plans

B. The principle of inclusiveness might seem not to extend from short-term to long-term plans, because it might be argued that we are stuck with our existing desires. (How can one "choose" the greater number of desires over the lesser if one doesn't want those greater number of desires already?) However, Rawls says the inclusiveness principle does extend, and he advances the following points:

1. The Aristotelian principle means we want more (so as to exercise our talents).

2. We can choose what wants we will develop.

IV. Note that these principles of choice are necessary (rational) but not sufficient to allow us to choose definitively among plans. There is some ambiguity what plan we should adopt (and thus what wants we are choosing to pursue). Rawls will use this fact later (in Section 68) in arguing for the superiority of justice as fairness over utilitarianism.


Why are life plans the main source of happiness, according to Rawls? Do you agree? If so, what is the life plan that is giving you pleasure?

* Why might the concept of life plans be thought ethnocentric? On what grounds does Rawls believe it is not?

* According to Rawls, some people might see a problem in extending the principle of inclusiveness from short-term to long-term plans. Why might they see that? What argument(s) does Rawls advance to overcome their argument(s)?

Section 64 "Deliberative Rationality"

Responsibility to self: one lives so as never to have cause for self-reproach. One must be able to affirm one's life plan at every time.


xx

Section 65 "The Aristotelian Principle"

[Note the parallels between the problem of defining justice and defining goodness]

Definition of good is formal & abstract [just as the Original Position is]

To apply our definition to human life requires some sense of what people are like [Just as the Original Position has the concept of primary goods]

I. Plans must take account of:

A. "broad features of human desires & needs"

B. constraints of human capacity

C. the Aristotelian principle: plans must develop capacities highly. This is a tendency, not a requirement. Doesn't specify what activity is developed.

D. Social interdependency ==> some things need to be encouraged & supported. Human goods are constrained by requirements of justice. Virtues are "coordinate" goods: our having them makes things better for others, and vice-versa. Having them implies self-respect and the respect of others.


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Section 66 "The Definition of Good Applied to Persons"

From an earlier (p.404) description of this chapter: "In order for goodness as rationality to hold for the concept of moral worth, it must turn out that the virtues are properties that it is rational for persons to want in one another when they adopt the requisite point of view." In other words, can we use the theory of goodness as rationality to evaluate persons [and societies: Chapter IX] (as well as artifacts -- "a good watch" -- and roles -- "a good judge"). The requisite point of view is, of course, the Original Position.

I. Look for "broadly based virtues": properties we want people to have regardless of their role:

A. Fundamental moral virtues, including a sense of justice -- leads us to act on principles of the right: benevolence, justice, etc.

B. Natural assets -- but these are not moral in nature.

II. So the Rawlsian perspective can give an economic/instrumental account of goodness applied to persons, even though we usually accept that they are "used" for anything.


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Section 67 "Self-Respect, Excellences, and Shame"

I. Two elements of self-respect:

A. sense of value of self & life plan

B. influence in ability to carry out life plan.

II. Self-respect is very important

III. Can we account for it easily here? [If yes, then this is an argument for this theory.]

IV. Some distinctions:

A. Shame vs. regret: regret is the loss of any value; shame the loss of self-respect.

B. Goods of value primarily to us alone vs. goods of value to both ourselves and others.

C. Moral shame vs. natural shame: natural shame arises from the lack of some excellence that would be of use to ourselves and others; moral shame arises from the lack of right behavior.

D. Shame vs. guilt: guilt is our knowledge that we have transgressed our sense of right and justice; shame is the loss of self-respect (and other-respect) that this behavior implies.


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Section 68 "Several Contrasts between the Right and the Good"

I. Three contrasts:

A. Right is based on an agreement in the original position, but good is individual and need not be agreed-upon.

B. It is good that we differ in our sense of the Good, but not in our sense of the Right.

C. "Right" is chosen under the veil of ignorance, but "Good" is chosen with full knowledge.

II. Now note the problem this causes with utilitarianism. Justice as fairness allows people to create their sense of the good; the indeterminacy of people's plans presents no problem fir it. Utilitarianism does not allow people to create their sense of the good; it takes preferences as given and doesn't allow alteration; indeterminate life plans undercut the whole point of utilitarianism.

III. Rawls goes on to discuss in a summary way the nature of reflective equilibrium: that these considerations go to support his theory.


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CHAPTER VIII. The Sense of Justice

The stability of a society arises from two sources (Section 69, pp.454-5):

1. the sense of justice fostered one's development within the society.

2. the propensities toward injustice fostered by the society.

Chapter VIII ("The Sense of Justice") argues the first point: that justice as fairness, more than any other conception, fosters a sense of justice. The basic argument is that the psychological process by which people develop a sense of justice is congruent with the structure of a Rawlsian society.

"Basically, the task of this chapter is to explain how justice as fairness generates its own support and to show that it is likely to have greater stability than the traditional alternatives, since it is more in line with the principles of moral psychology" (456).

The chapter is divided into the following sections:

I. [Section 69:] The definition of a well-ordered society and the implications of that concept for stability.

II. [Sections 70-72:] The three types of morality (authority; association; principles) that would develop in a just society. (This is based on Kohlberg's theory, so my presumption is that it describes how morality would develop in any society.)

III. [Sections 73-74:] Discussion of various concepts of moral psychology (sentiments, attitudes, and feelings).

IV. [Section 75:] The principles of moral psychology: how morality is induced to develop (that is, the dynamics of morality, as opposed to Sections 70-72, which simply discuss what the stages of morality are).

V. [Section 76-77:] How stability and equality arise from this view of moral development.

Section 69 "The Concept of a Well-Ordered Society"

I. The definition of a well-ordered society and the implications of that concept for stability.

II. A well-ordered society:

1. advances the good of its members

2. is effectively regulated by a conception of justice

3. holds that conception of justice publicly. (This last rules out the device of "the Noble Lie". Conceptions of justice must be justified by the conditions of our life "as we know it" (454) -- no "pie in the sky".

III. "Stability is a desirable feature of moral conceptions" (455), but not decisive.

IV. The stability of a society arises from two sources (454-5):

1. the strength of the sense of justice fostered one's development within the society.

2. the weakness of the propensities toward injustice fostered by the society.

V. Moral learning seems to arise from either (or both) of the following processes: social learning theory and rationalist (structuralist) theory. We will assess the concept of moral learning in a just society against a mixture of these theories. (If we should conclude that one of the two -- or some other theory -- is the truth, then we can look at our argument again to see if it continues to hold water.)


What is a well-ordered society?

* Rawls says the stability of a society arises from the relative strength of two forces. What are they?

* What are the two basic theories by which morality is learned, according to Rawls? Does he prefer one to the other? Does it make any difference to Rawls which is correct? What if we learn later that one theory is right and another wrong? -- how would this affect Rawls's argument?

Section 70 "The Morality of Authority"

Sections 70-72 discuss the three types of morality (authority; association; principles) that would develop in a just society. (This is based on Kohlberg's theory, so my presumption is that it describes how morality would develop in any society.) This section discusses the first of these.


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Section 71 "The Morality of Association"

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Section 72 "The Morality of Principles"

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Section 73 "Features of the Moral Sentiments"

Discussion of various concepts of moral psychology (sentiments, attitudes, and feelings -- the last two in the next section).


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Section 74 "The Connection between Moral and Natural Attitudes"

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Section 75 "The Principles of Moral Psychology"

The principles of moral psychology: how morality is induced to develop (that is, the dynamics of morality, as opposed to Sections 70-72, which simply discuss what the stages of morality are).


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Section 76 "The Problem of Relative Stability"

How stability arises from this view of moral development.


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Section 77 "The Basis of Equality"

How equality arises from this view of moral development.


W

CHAPTER IX. The Good of Justice

Chapter IX ("The Good of Justice") argues the second aspect of stability: that people will have no propensities to be unjust, because in a Rawlsian society their sense of the Good will include a commitment to Justice. Rawls characterizes this as the problem of the congruence between Justice and Goodness.

[Recall the first aspect of stability, covered in Chapter VIII: that a Rawlsian society would foster one's development of a sense of justice.]

This chapter discusses the congruence between justice and goodness: Does this theory of justice mesh or conflict with our understanding of the Good? Basically, is Justice a Good? -- For all people? For some? Can the sense of justice work together with our sense of what is good?

Section 78 "Autonomy and Objectivity"

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Section 79 "The Idea of Social Union"

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Section 80 "The Problem of Envy"

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Section 81 "Envy and Equality"

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Section 82 "The Grounds for the Priority of Liberty"

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Section 83 "Happiness and Dominant Ends"

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Section 84 "Hedonism as a Method of Choice"

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Section 85 "The Unity of the Self"

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Section 86 "The Good of the Sense of Justice"

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Section 87 "Concluding Remarks on Justification"

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Page URL: http://www.d.umn.edu/~schilton/3652/Readings/3652.Rawls.ATheoryOfJustice.htmlAuthor: Stephen Chilton [email] | Last Modified: 2005-02-09Honor Roll | UMD | Pol Sci Department

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