Agra case
description
Transcript of Agra case
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CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS
PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE COURT OF APPEALS and
ALVIN OBRIQUE, REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE
FARMERS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ORGANIZATION
(BUFFALO), respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to nullify the proceedings and decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for
brevity) dated September 4, 1989 and to set aside the decision
the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990,
affirming the decision of the DARAB which ordered the
segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and
contiguous portions of the Central Mindanao Universi ty (CMU
for brevity) land and their inclusion in the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP for brevity) for distribution to
qualified beneficiaries, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
This case originated in a complaint filed by complainants call ing
themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and Agricultural
Laborers Organization (BUFFALO for brevity) under the
leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso against the
CMU, before the Department of Agrarian Reform for Declaration
of Status as Tenants, under the CARP.
From the records, the following facts are evident. The petitioner,
the CMU, is an agricultural educational institution owned and
run by the state located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon
province. It started as a farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon in
early 1910, in response to the public demand for an agricultural
school in Mindanao. It expanded into the Bukidnon National
Agricultural High School and was transferred to its new site in
Managok near Malaybalay, the provincial capital of Bukidnon.
In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college with campus
at Musuan, until it became what is now known as the CMU, but
still primarily an agricultural university. From its beginning, the
school was the answer to the crying need for training people in
order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of
Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school had
a vision as to the future development of that part of the
Philippines. On January 16, 1958 the President of the Republic
of the Philippines, the late Carlos P. Garcia, "upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 53, of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended", issued
Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and
reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which
would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total
land area comprising 3,080 hectares was surveyed and
registered and titled in the name of the petitioner under OCT
Nos. 160, 161 and 162. 1
In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for
registration of the aforementioned grant of agricultural land,
several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the
petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming
part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted
so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was
reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.
In the early 1960's, the student population of the school was
less than 3,000. By 1988, the student population had expanded
to some 13,000 students, so that the school community has an
academic population (student, faculty and non-academic staff)
of almost 15,000. To cope with the increase in its enrollment, it
has expanded and improved its educational facilities partly from
government appropriation and partly by self-help measures.
True to the concept of a land grant college, the school
embarked on self-help measures to carry out its educational
objectives, train its students, and maintain various activities
which the government appropriation could not adequately
support or sustain. In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No.
160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling
Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the
University were leased to its faculty and employees. This
arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this
program the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of
five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how,
practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each
group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice
project. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land
use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and
their hired workers to establish houses or live in the project area
and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of
loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant
relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or
employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-
disciplinary applied research extension and productivity
program to utilize available land, train people in modern
agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty
and staff opportunities within the confines of the CMU
reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries.
The location of the CMU at Musuan, Bukidnon, which is quite a
distance from the nearest town, was the proper setting for the
adoption of such a program. Among the participants in this
program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero,
Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other
complainants. Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU
while the others were employees in the lowland rice project.
The other complainants who were not members of the faculty or
non-academic staff CMU, were hired workers or laborers of the
participants in this program. When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua
became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the
agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar
cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training
Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said
project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the
complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued.
As Assistant Director of this agri-business project, Obrique was
found guilty of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated
from service by virtue of Executive Order No. 17, the re-
organization law of the CMU.
Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU
launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement
Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources,
mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-
economic and technical training in actual field project
implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the
staff.
Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement 2
among the CMU, the CMU-Integrated Development Foundation
(CMU-IDF) and groups or "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the
CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda
for one (1) calendar year. The CMU-IDF would provide
researchers and specialists to assist in the preparation of
project proposals and to monitor and analyze project
implementation. The selda in turn would pay to the CMU P100
as service fee and P1,000 per hectare as participant's land
rental fee. In addition, 400 kilograms of the produce per year
would be turned over or donated to the CMU-IDF. The
participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or member
of their family to establish any house or live within vicinity of the
project area and not to use the allocated lot as collateral for a
loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord
relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.
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Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to
workers and staff members who were still employed with the
CMU and was not made available to former workers or
employees. In the middle of 1987, to cushion the impact of the
discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project on the
lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed them to participate
in the CMU-IEP as special participants.
Under the terms of a contract called Addendum To Existing
Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Participation To the
CMU-Income Enhancement Program, 3 a former employee
would be grouped with an existing selda of his choice and
provided one (1) hectare for a lowland rice project for one (1)
calendar year. He would pay the land rental participant's fee of
P1,000.00 per hectare but on a charge-to-crop basis. He would
also be subject to the same prohibitions as those imposed on
the CMU employees. It was also expressly provided that no
tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the
Agreement.
The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some
contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not
renewed were served with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the
rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to
termination or separation from the service and the alleged
harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and
precipitated the filing of the complaint.
On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the
private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be
beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB
ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact
and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in
the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
The petitioner CMU, in seeking a review of the decisions of the
respondents DARAB and the Court of Appeals, raised the
following issues:
1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and
decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and
coverage of land under the CARP.
2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for
Review on Certiorari and affirming the decision of DARAB.
In their complaint, docketed as DAR Case No. 5, filed with the
DARAB, complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are
tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants
claiming/occupying a part or portion of the CMU situated at
Sinalayan, Valencia, Bukidnon and Musuan, Bukidnon,
consisting of about 1,200 hectares. We agree with the DARAB's
finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of
the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the
livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it
was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship
existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants
in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the
harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the
CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land use
participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance
given to the participants by the CMU. Again, the agreement
signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated
that no landlord-tenant relationship existed, and that the
participants are not share croppers nor lessees, and the CMU
did not share in the produce of the participants' labor.
In the same paragraph of their complaint, complainants claim
that they are landless peasants. This allegation requires proof
and should not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not a
landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics Instructor
at CMU holding a very responsible position was separated from
the service on account of certain irregularities he committed
while Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of
cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the moment, own no
land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in
their places of origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the
record to show that they are landless peasants.
The evidence on record establish without doubt that the
complainants were originally authorized or given permission to
occupy certain areas of the CMU property for a definite purpose
to carry out certain university projects as part of the CMU's
program of activities pursuant to its avowed purpose of giving
training and instruction in agricultural and other related
technologies, using the land and other resources of the
institution as a laboratory for these projects. Their entry into the
land of the CMU was with the permission and written consent of
the owner, the CMU, for a limited period and for a specific
purpose. After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and
cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was
unauthorized and their settlement on the CMU's land was
without legal authority. A person entering upon lands of another,
not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title
of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or
with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a squatter.
4 Squatters cannot enter the land of another surreptitiously or
by stealth, and under the umbrella of the CARP, claim rights to
said property as landless peasants. Under Section 73 of R.A.
6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible
entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may
not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian
reform. Any such person who knowingly and wilfully violates the
above provision of the Act shall be punished with imprisonment
or fine at the discretion of the Court.
In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants
nor proven to be landless peasants, cannot qual ify as
beneficiaries under the CARP.
The questioned decision of the Adjudication Board, affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals, segregating 400 hectares from the
CMU land is primarily based on the alleged fact that the land
subject hereof is "not directly, actually and exclusively used for
school sites, because the same was leased to Philippine
Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Philippines)".
In support of this view, the Board held that the "respondent
University failed to show that it is using actually, really, truly and
in fact, the questioned area to the exclusion of others, nor did it
show that the same is directly used without any intervening
agency or person", 5 and "there is no definite and concrete
showing that the use of said lands are essentially indispensable
for educational purposes". 6 The reliance by the respondents
Board and Appellate Tribunal on the technical or literal definition
from Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary and Black's Law
Dictionary, may give the ordinary reader a classroom meaning
of the phrase "is actually directly and exclusively", but in so
doing they missed the true meaning of Section 10, R.A. 6657,
as to what lands are exempted or excluded from the coverage
of the CARP.
The pertinent provisions of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, are as follows:
Sec. 4. SCOPE. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229
including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
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More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of
forest of mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken
after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific
limits ad determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to
or suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon.
Sec. 10 EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS. Lands actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestration, fish sanctuaries
and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national
defense, school sites and campuses including experimental
farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot
production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant
thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto,
communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and
penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and
private research and quarantine centers and all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
(Emphasis supplied).
The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the
land area of the CMU to its present needs or to a land area
presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in
carrying out its present educational program with its present
student population and academic facility overlooking the very
significant factor of growth of the university in the years to
come. By the nature of the CMU, which is a school established
to promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast tract of
agricultural land and for future programs of expansion is
obvious. At the outset, the CMU was conceived in the same
manner as land grant colleges in America, a type of educational
institution which blazed the trail for the development of vast
tracts of unexplored and undeveloped agricultural lands in the
Mid-West. What we now know as Michigan State University,
Penn State University and Illinois State University, started as
small land grant colleges, with meager funding to support their
ever increasing educational programs. They were given
extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to be developed
to support their numerous expanding activities in the fields of
agricultural technology and scientific research. Funds for the
support of the educational programs of land grant colleges
came from government appropriation, tuition and other student
fees, private endowments and gifts, and earnings from
miscellaneous sources. 7 It was in this same spirit that
President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing
from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao
Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation
of 3,080 hectares as its future campus. It was set up in
Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, in order that it can
have enough resources and wide open spaces to grow as an
agricultural educational institution, to develop and train future
farmers of Mindanao and help attract settlers to that part of the
country.
In line with its avowed purpose as an agricultural and technical
school, the University adopted a land utilization program to
develop and exploit its 3080-hectare land reservation as
follows: 8
No. of Hectares Percentage
a. Livestock and Pasture 1,016.4033
b. Upland Crops 616 20
c. Campus and Residential sites 462 15
d. Irrigated rice 400.40 13
e. Watershed and forest reservation 308 10
f. Fruit and Trees Crops 154 5
g. Agricultural
Experimental stations 123.20 4
3,080.00100%
The first land use plan of the CARP was prepared in 1975 and
since then it has undergone several revisions in line with
changing economic conditions, national economic policies and
financial limitations and availability of resources. The CMU,
through Resolution No. 160 S. 1984, pursuant to its
development plan, adopted a multi-disciplinary applied research
extension and productivity program called the "Kilusang Sariling
Sikap Project" (CMU-KSSP). The objectives 9 of this program
were:
1. Provide researches who shall assist in (a) preparation
of proposal; (b) monitor project implementation; and (c) collect
and analyze all data and information relevant to the processes
and results of project implementation;
2. Provide the use of land within the University
reservation for the purpose of establishing a lowland rice project
for the party of the Second Part for a period of one calendar
year subject to discretionary renewal by the Party of the First
Part;
3. Provide practical training to the Party of the Second
Part on the management and operation of their lowland project
upon request of Party of the Second Part; and
4. Provide technical assistance in the form of relevant
livelihood project specialists who shall extend expertise on
scientific methods of crop production upon request by Party of
the Second Part.
In return for the technical assistance extended by the CMU, the
participants in a project pay a nominal amount as service fee.
The self-reliance program was adjunct to the CMU's lowland
rice project.
The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing
Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) was leased long before
the CARP was passed. The agreement with the Philippine
Packing Corporation was not a lease but a Management and
Development Agreement, a joint undertaking where use by the
Philippine Packing Corporation of the land was part of the CMU
research program, with the direct participation of faculty and
students. Said contracts with the Philippine Packing Corporation
and others of a similar nature (like MM-Agraplex) were made
prior to the enactment of R.A. 6657 and were directly connected
to the purpose and objectives of the CMU as an educational
institution. As soon as the objectives of the agreement for the
joint use of the CMU land were achieved as of June 1988, the
CMU adopted a blue print for the exclusive use and utilization of
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said areas to carry out its own research and agricultural
experiments.
As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be
necessary for use by the CMU, the school is in the best position
to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem
of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the
land was given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the
Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or
discretion on this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so
manifest as to show that the CMU has no real for the land.
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by
the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision
dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:
(1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public
domain;
(2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific
limits as determined by Congress;
(3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its
lawful owner, the CMU;
(4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A.
6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for school site and campus,
including experimental farm stations for educational purposes,
and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot
production centers. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear
that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters
involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it
is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands
falling within the coverage of the aforementioned program. It
does not include those which are actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such
purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up
experimental farm stations, research and pilot production
centers, etc.
Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and
adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of the
CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land
reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and
exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its
purposes. The CMU has constantly raised the issue of the
DARAB's lack of jurisdiction and has questioned the
respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case at
bar. Despite the law and the evidence on record tending to
establish that the fact that the DARAB had no jurisdiction, it
made the adjudication now subject of review.
Whether the DARAB has the authority to order the segregation
of a portion of a private property titled in the name of its lawful
owner, even if the claimant is not entitled as a beneficiary, is an
issue we feel we must resolve. The quasi-judicial powers of
DARAB are provided in Executive Order No. 129-A, quoted
hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue at bar:
Sec. 13. AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD
There is hereby created an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
under the office of the Secretary. . . . The Board shall assume
the powers and functions with respect to adjudication of
agrarian reform cases under Executive Order 229 and this
Executive Order . . .
Sec. 17. QUASI JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE DAR. The
DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters including implementation of
Agrarian Reform.
Section 50 of R.A. 6658 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial
powers as follows:
The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform. . . .
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 129-A is merely a repetition
of Section 50, R.A. 6657. There is no doubt that the DARAB
has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the
implementation of the CARP. An agrarian dispute is defined by
the same law as any controversy relating to tenurial rights
whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over
lands devoted to agriculture.
In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are
not share tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it ordered
the "segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous area of
Four Hundred hectares, more or less", from the CMU land
reservation, and directed the DAR Regional Director to
implement its order of segregation. Having found that the
complainants in this agrarian dispute for Declaration of Tenancy
Status are not entitled to claim as beneficiaries of the CARP
because they are not share tenants or leaseholders, its order
for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was
without legal authority. w do not believe that the quasi -judicial
function of the DARAB carries with it greater authority than
ordinary courts to make an award beyond what was demanded
by the complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian dispute.
Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the
complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are
demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that
quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to
future beneficiaries. The order segregation 400 hectares of the
CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not
entitled as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that
the CMU land which is excluded or exempted under the law is
subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was
asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief
prayed the complainants who were not entitled to the relief
prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly
among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic
programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other.
Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in
Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be
made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants
here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To
our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been
segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet
uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the
authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.
The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as
it concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and
research facilities may be gradually eroded by m isconstruing
the exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and
universities are the main vehicles for our scientific and
technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so vital to
the existence, growth and development of this country.
It is the opinion of this Court, in the light of the foregoing
analysis and for the reasons indicated, that the evidence is
sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by
respondents Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. We
hereby declare the decision of the DARAB dated September 4,
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1989 and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 20,
1990, affirming the decision of the quasi-judicial body, as null
and void and hereby order that they be set aside, with costs
against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED
CMU vs. DARAB
G.R. No. 100091
Facts:
On 16 January 1958, Pres ident Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No.
467 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU, a
piece of land to be used as i ts future campus. In 1984, CMU
embarked on a project titled "Ki lusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels
of land were leased to i ts faculty members and employees. Under the
terms of the program, CMU wi ll assist faculty members and employee
groups through the extension of technica l know-how, tra ining and
other kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a service fee for
use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided that there wi l l be
no tenancy relationship between the lessees and the CMU.
When the program was terminated, a case was fi led by the
participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of s tatus
as tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among
others , the segregation of 400 hectares of the land for dis tribution
under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the bas is of
DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the condition for
exemption, that is, i t is not "actually, di rectly, and exclus ively used"
for educational purposes .
Is sue:
Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands
reserved for public use by presidentia l proclamati on is no longer
actually, di rectly and exclusively used and necessary for the purpose
for which they are reserved?
Held:
The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best pos i tion to
resolve and answer the question of when and what lands are found
necessary for i ts use. The Court a lso chided the DARAB for resolving
this issue of exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs ." The
Court s tated that the DARAB decision stating that for the land to be
exempt i t must be "presently, actively exploited and uti l i zed by the
university in carrying out i ts present educational program with i ts
present s tudent population and academic faculty" overlooked the
very s igni ficant factor of growth of the univers i ty in the years to
come.
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ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 97855 June 19, 1997
PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF FISHFARM PRODUCERS,
INC. petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
ROMERO, J.:
Before this Court are consolidated petitions questioning the
constitutionality of some portions of Republic Act No. 6657
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
1
Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, 2 Philippine Federation
of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-in-intervention
Archie's Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna 3 are engaged in
the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms.
They assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A.
6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures
contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988
issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional.
Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate
the Constitution in the following manner:
1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL
extend agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Section 4,
Article XIII of the Constitution limits agrarian reform only to
agricultural lands.
2. The questioned provisions similarly treat of
aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when they are
differently situated, and differently treat aquaculture lands and
other industrial lands, when they are similarly situated in
violation of the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection
of the laws.
3. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits
and burdens in favor of aquaculture employees and against
other industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3, Article XIII of
the Constitution mandate the State to promote equality in
economic and employment opportunities.
4. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its
government-induced investments in aquaculture even as
Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the
State to respect the freedom of enterprise and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns on investments and to
expansion and growth.
The constitutionality of the above-mentioned provisions has
been ruled upon in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform 4 regarding the inclusion of land devoted to
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
The issue now before this Court is the constitutionality of the
same above-mentioned provisions insofar as they include in its
coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly
fishponds and prawn farms.
In their first argument , petitioners contend that in the case of
Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 5 this Court
has already ruled impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not
agricultural lands. In aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farm s,
the use of land is only incidental to and not the principal factor
in productivity and, hence, as held in "Luz Farms," they too
should be excluded from R.A. 6657 just as lands devoted to
livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for the same
reason. They also argue that they are entitled to the full benefit
of "Luz Farms" to the effect that only five percent of the total
investment in aquaculture activities, fishponds, and prawn
farms, is in the form of land, and therefore, cannot be classified
as agricultural activity. Further, that in fishponds and prawn
farms, there are no farmers, nor farm workers, who till lands,
and no agrarian unrest, and therefore, the constitutionally
intended beneficiaries under Section 4, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution do not exist in aquaculture.
In their second argument, they contend that R.A. 6657, by
including in its coverage, the raising of fish and aquaculture
operations including fishponds and prawn ponds, treating them
as in the same class or classification as agriculture or farming
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and is,
therefore, void. Further, the Constitutional Commission debates
show that the intent of the constitutional framers is to exclude
"industrial" lands, to which category lands devoted to
aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms belong.
Petitioners also claim that Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10
issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
are, likewise, unconstitutional, as held in "Luz Farms," and are
therefore void as they implement the assailed provisions of
CARL.
The provisions of CARL being assailed as unconstitutional are
as follows:
(a) Section 3 (b) which includes the "raising of fish in the
definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural
Activity." (Emphasis Supplied)
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as
private agricultural lands devoted to fishponds and prawn
ponds. . . . (Emphasis Supplied)
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a
production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of
Agrarian reform the authority to summarily determine the just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by the
comprehensive Agrarian reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing
plan mentioned in section 13
. . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the
production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days at
the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other
farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation
they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or
entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per
annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determines a
lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an
additional ten percent (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be
distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety
(90) days of the end of the fiscal year. . . .
While the Court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void
when confronted squarely with constitutional issues, neither will
it preempt the Legislative and the Executive branches of the
government in correcting or clarifying, by means of amendment,
said law or act. On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881 6
-
was approved by Congress. Provisions of said Act pertinent to
the assailed provisions of CARL are the following:
Sec. 1. Section 3, Paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Definitions. For the purpose of this Act, unless the
context indicates otherwise:
(b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural
Activity means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm
products and other farm activities and practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by
persons whether natural or juridical.
Sec. 2. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.
xxx xxx xxx
b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for
prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage
of this Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have
not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been
subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by
voluntary offer to sell, or commercial farms deferment or notices
of compulsory acquisition, a simple and absolute majority of the
actual regular workers or tenants must consent to the
exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act.
when the workers or tenants do not agree to this exemption, the
fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the
worker beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a cooperative
or association to manage the same.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been
subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the
consent of the farm workers shall no longer be necessary,
however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on incentives
shall apply.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Section 11, Paragraph 1 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 11. Commercial Farming. Commercial farms, which are
private agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms,
orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms and cacao, coffee and
rubber plantations, shall be subject to immediate compulsory
acquisition and distribution after ten (10) years from the
effectivity of this Act. In the case of new farms, the ten-year
period shall begin from the first year of commercial production
and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year
period, the Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire
these lands, upon payment of just compensation for the land
and the improvements thereon, preferably in favor of organized
cooperatives or associations, which shall thereafter manage the
said lands for the workers beneficiaries.
Sec. 4. There shall be incorporated after Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 6657 a section to read as follows
Sec. 32-A. Incentives. Individuals or entities owning or
operating fishponds and prawn farms are hereby mandated to
execute within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, an
incentive plan with their regular fishpond or prawn farm workers'
organization, if any, whereby seven point five percent (7.5%) of
their net profit before tax from the operation of the fishpond or
prawn farms are distributed within sixty (60) days at the end of
the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other pond
workers in such ponds over and above the compensation they
currently receive.
In order to safeguard the right of the regular fis hpond or prawn
farm workers under the incentive plan, the books of the
fishpond or prawn owners shall be subject to periodic audit or
inspection by certified public accountants chosen by the
workers.
The foregoing provision shall not apply to agricultural lands
subsequently converted to fishponds or prawn farms provided
the size of the land converted does not exceed the retention
limit of the landowner.
The above-mentioned provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly
state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the
coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question
concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has
become moot and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST #6: ATLAS VS AGRA
Facts:
Before this Court are consolidated petitions questioning the
constitutionality of some portions of Republic Act No. 6657
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation of
Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-in-intervention Archie's
Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna are engaged in the
aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They
assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as
well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained
in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by
public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform as unconstitutional.
Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate
the Constitution in the following manner:
1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend
agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article
XIII of the Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural
lands.
2. The questioned provisions similarly treat of aquaculture lands
and agriculture lands when they are differently situated, and
differently treat aquaculture lands and other industrial lands,
when they are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
3. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits and
burdens in favor of aquaculture employees and against other
industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3, Article XIII of the
Constitution mandate the State to promote equality in economic
and employment opportunities.
4. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its
government-induced investments in aquaculture even as
Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the
State to respect the freedom of enterprise and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns on investments and to
expansion and growth.
-
The constitutionality of the above-mentioned provisions has
been ruled upon in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v.Secretary of
Agrarian Reform regarding the inclusion of land devoted to the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
The issue now before this Court is the constitutionality of the
same above-mentioned provisions insofar as they include in its
coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly
fishponds and prawn farms.
Issue:
Whether or not Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32
of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and
procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10
Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform are unconstitutional.
Held:
No, the contested provisions of R.A. 6657 and of A.O. Nos. 8
and 10 are not unconstitutional. The Suprem e Court has
already ruled impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not
agricultural lands. In aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farms,
the use of land is only incidental to and not the principal factor
in productivity and, hence, as held in "Luz Farms," they too
should be excluded from R.A. 6657 just as lands devoted to
livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for the same
reason.
When the case was pending, RA 7881 was approved by
Congress amending RA 6657. Provisions of R.A. No. 7881
expressly state that fishponds and prawn are excluded from the
coverage of CARL.
Thus, the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
HELD:
PETITIONERs contention
First argument: that in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, this Court has already ruled impliedly that lands
devoted to f ishing are not agriculture lands, for the use of land is only
incidental to and not the principal factor in productivity and, hence,
should be excluded from R.A. 6657.
Second argument: that R.A. 6657, by including f ishponds and praw n
ponds in the same classif ication as agriculture violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and is, therefore, void. the intent
of the consti framers is to exclude industrial lands, to w hich category
lands devoted to aquaculture, f ishponds, and f ish farms
belong.Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 issued by the Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform are, likew ise, unconstitutional, as
held in Luz Farms, and are therefore void as they implement the
assailed provisions of CARL.
Further, that in f ishponds and praw n farms, there are no farmers,
nor farm w orkers, who till lands, and no agrarian unrest, and therefore,
the constitutionally intended beneficiaries under Section 4, Art. XIII,
1987 Constitution do not exist in aquaculture.
COURTs decis ion
The question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions
has been rendered moot and academic because RA 7881, approved by
congress on February 20, 1995, expressly states that f ishponds &
praw n farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL.
The court will not hesitate to declare law or an act void when confronted
with constitutional issues, neither will it preempt the Legislative &
Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by
means of amendment said law or act.
-
[G.R. No. 86889 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 51
LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order
and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the
Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for
acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of
R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the
Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit
Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to
herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation
of the constitutional rights of the petitioner.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this
case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Phil ippines approved
R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and
32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section
11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in
the livestock and poultry business and together with others in
the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by
the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13,
Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657
otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and
of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2,
1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11
thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo,
pp. 2-36).: rd
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and
rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be
issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same,
insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other
livestock and poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny,
among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31,
1989. (Rollo, p. 98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24,
1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration
regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by
this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00.
This Court also gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989
(Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his
Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-
187).
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657,
insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and
poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise
or Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and
swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a
production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of
Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan
mentioned in Section 13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the
production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of
the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other
farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation
they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or
entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per
annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a
lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an
additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be dis tributed
to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of
the end of the fiscal year . . ."
The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections
3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well
as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in
accordance therewith.:-cralaw
The constitutional provision under consideration reads as
follows:
ARTICLE XIII
x x x
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively
the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive
a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits
as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits,
the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State
shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
x x x"
Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of
R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the
-
correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989)
affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the
said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in
including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising
is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary
resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five
percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and
poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential
lands all over the country who use available space in their
residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under
"contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing
corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers
(Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities
attendant to the raising of animals and birds . The use of land is
incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in
productivity in this industry. Including backyard raisers, about
80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production
occupy five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly
corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock
and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the
inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is
proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second
Edition (1954), defines the following words:
"Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and
raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding,
breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry,
farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking
. . .
Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm,
especially for profit.
Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic
or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83).
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in
the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land
Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).: rd
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution
begins with the language of the document itself. The words
used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co.
vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions
which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may
consider the debates in the constitutional convention as
throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It
is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by
itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by
the people of the Constitution the understanding of the
convention as to what was meant by the terms of the
constitutional provision which was the subject of the
deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the
understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural,"
clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as
defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any
growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds,
fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the
word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the
word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from
such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential
properties because all of them fall under the general
classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however,
was not considered because the Committee contemplated that
agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural
lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p.
30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a
Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among
others, quoted as follows:
x x x
"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the
primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means
that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this
provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and
farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. As
also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include
those who work in piggeries and poultry projects.
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if
somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for that
purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will
automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or
ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and
poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August
2, 1986, p. 618).
x x x
The questions were answered and explained in the statement of
then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:
x x x
"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami
nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na
hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang
kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang
inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang
piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM,
August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A.
6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition
of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited
agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian
reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to
include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian
reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the
requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing
"corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to
-
execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending
final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called
upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales
and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as
additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory,
and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).:-cralaw
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction
over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are
first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc.
v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo,
G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico,
G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when
confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to
declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must
be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be
the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to
probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives
and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot
influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as
intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and
Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall
heavily," where the acts of these departments, or of any official,
betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution
(Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo,
G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico,
G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the
scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the
judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government
had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial
power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art.
VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of
the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the
Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many
instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby
DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ
of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST #7
Luz Farms (petitioner) vs. Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (respondent) G.R. No. 86889. December 4,
1990
Ponente:
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order
and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the
Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for
acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of
R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the
Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit
Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to
herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation
of the constitutional rights of the petitioner. On June 10,1988,
the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage (Rollo, p. 80). On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in
Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80). On January
9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its
Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No.
6657. Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation
engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with
others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely
affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section
13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657
otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and
of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January
2,1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11
thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9,1989.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No.
6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) is
constitutional.
Held:
Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional i n so far as they
include lands devoted to ra ising livestock, swine and poultry within its
coverage. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor
or cons ideration of productivity in this industry.
The Supreme Court held that:
The transcripts of deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it
was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
l ivestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as
defined under Section 166 of RA 3844, as land devoted to any
growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds,
idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol . I II,
p. 11).
The Supreme Court noted that the intention of the Committee to
l imit the application of the word "agriculture" is further shown by the
proposal of Commissioner Jamir to insert the word "arable" to
dis tinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as
commercial and industrial lands and residential properties. The
proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee
contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and
sui table agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, 7 August 1986,
Vol . I I I, p. 30).
-
Moreover, in his answer to Commissioner Regalado's interpellation,
Commissioner Tadeo clarified that the term "farmworker" was used
instead of "agricultural worker" in order to exclude therein piggery,
poultry and l ivestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol.
I I , p. 621).
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112526. March 16, 2005]
STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. JUAN B. AMANTE, FRANCISCO L. ANDAL
etc respondents.
[G.R. No. 118838. March 16, 2005]
JUAN B. AMANTE, IGNACIO PETATE, DOMINGO CANUBAS,
FLORENCIO CANUBAS, CRESENCIO AMANTE, etc
respondents.
A M E N D E D D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
By virtue of the En Banc Resolution issued on January 13,
2004, the Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend
the Rules so as to allow it to consider and resolve the second
Motion for Reconsideration of respondents,[1] after the motion
was heard on oral arguments on August 13, 2003. On July 9,
2004,[2] the Court resolved to submit for resolution the second
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 112526 together with
G.R. No. 118338 in view of the Resolution of the Court dated
January 15, 2001 issued in G.R. No. 118838,[3] consolidating
the latter case with G.R. No. 112526, the issues therein being
interrelated.[4] Hence, the herein Amended Decision.
The factual background of the two cases is as follows:
The Canlubang Estate in Laguna is a vast landholding
previously titled in the name of the late Speaker and Chief
Justice Jose Yulo, Sr. Within this estate are two parcels of land
(hereinafter referred to as the subject property) covered by TCT
Nos. 81949 and 84891 measuring 254.766 hectares and part of
Barangay Casile, subsequently titled in the name of Sta. Rosa
Realty Development Corporation (SRRDC), the majority
stockholder of which is C.J. Yulo and Sons, Inc.
The subject property was involved in civil suits and
administrative proceedings that led to the filing of G.R. Nos.
112526 and 118838, thus:
Injunction Case Filed by Amante, et al.
On December 6, 1985, Amante, et al., who are the private
respondents in G.R. No. 112526 and petitioners in G.R. No.
118838, instituted an action for injunction with damages in the
Regional Trial Court of Laguna (Branch 24) against Luis Yulo,
SRRDC, and several SRRDC security personnel, docketed as
Civil Case No. B-2333. Amante, et al. alleged that: they are
residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna, which covers
an area of around 300 hectares; in 1910, their ancestors started
occupying the area, built their houses and planted fruit-bearing
trees thereon, and since then, have been peacefully occupying
the land; some time in June 3, 1985, SRRDCs security people
illegally entered Bgy. Casile and fenced the area; SRRDCs men
also entered the barangay on November 4, 1985, cut down the
trees, burned their huts, and barred the lone jeepney from
entering the Canlubang Sugar Estate; as a result of these acts,
Amante, et al. were deprived of possession and cultivation of
their lands. Thus, they claimed damages, sought the issuance
of permanent injunction and proposed that a right of way be
declared.[5]
In their Answer, the defendants denied the allegations and
disclaimed any control and supervision over its security
personnel. Defendant SRRDC also alleged that as the real
owner of the property, it was the one that suffered damages due
to the encroachment on the property.[6]
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on
August 17, 1987,[7] but this was subsequently dissolved by the
Court of Appeals (CA) on April 22, 1988 in its decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 13908.[8]
After trial on the merits, the trial court, on January 20, 1992,
rendered a decision ordering Amante, et al. to vacate the
property, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs
hereby dismissing the complaint and amended complaint.
The plaintiffs are hereby ordered to vacate the parcels of land
belonging to the defendants Luis Yulo and Sta. Rosa Realty.
They are likewise enjoined from entering the subject parcels of
land.
Although attorneys fees and expenses of litigation are
recoverable in case of a clearly unfounded civil action against
the plaintiff (Enervida vs. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 339), this Court
resolves not to award attorneys fees etc. in favor of the
defendants because the plaintiffs appear to have acted in good
faith in filing the present civil action (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA
65) and that it would not be just and equitable to award the
same in the case at bar. (Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals, 121
SCRA 354) Accordingly, the other reliefs prayed for by the
defendants are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Amante, et al. appealed the aforesaid decision to the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 38182.
On June 28, 1994, the CA affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court in the injunction case. The dispositive
portion of the appellate courts decision[10] reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the defendants-appellees
are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs -
appellants nominal damages in the amount of P5,000.00 per
plaintiff. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Nominal damages were awarded by the CA because it found
that SRRDC violated Amante, et al.s rights as possessors of the
subject property.[12]
Amante, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration thereof,
pointing out the DARABs decision placing the property under
compulsory acquisition, and the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
27234, affirming the same.[13] The CA, however, denied the
motion, with the modification that only SRRDC and the
defendants-security guards should be held jointly and severally
liable for the nominal damages awarded. It also made the
clarification that the decision should not preempt any judgment
or prejudice the right of any party in the agrarian reform case
pending before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 112526).[14]
Thus, Amante, et al. filed on March 2, 1995, herein petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 118838 on the following grounds:
4.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE
CONTRARY TO LAW OR APPLICABLE SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS BECAUSE:
-
4.1.1 FIRST, PETITIONERS MAY NOT BE LAWFULLY
EVICTED FROM THEIR LANDHOLDINGS CONSIDERING
THAT:
-- (A) PETITIONERS ARE ALREADY THE REGISTERED
OWNERS UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION SINCE FEBRUARY 26, 1992 BY
VIRTUE OF RA 6657 OR THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW;
-- (B) THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS AFFIRMED THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAGUNAS DISMISSAL OF THE
EJECTMENT CASES FILED BY RESPONDENT SRRDC
AGAINST PETITIONERS; AND
-- (C) ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ONLY
THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT YET THE REGISTERED
OWNERS OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION,
RESPONDENTS MAY NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP IN THIS CASE FOR INJUNCTION WITH
DAMAGES, THE SAME TO BE VENTILATED IN A SEPARATE
ACTION, NOT IN THIS CASE BROUGHT TO PREVENT
RESPONDENTS FROM COMMITTING FURTHER ACTS OF
DISPOSSESSION [BACAR V. DEL ROSARIO ET AL., 171
SCRA 451 (1989)].
4.1.2 SECOND, PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO MORAL,
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES, INSTEAD
OF MERE NOMINAL DAMAGES, CONSIDERING THAT THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOUND RESPONDENTS TO HAVE
UNLAWFULLY AND ILLEGALLY DISTURBED PETITIONERS
PEACEFUL AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION.[15]
Ejectment Cases Filed by SRRDC
Between October 1986 and August 1987, after the injunction
case was filed by Amante, et al., SRRDC filed with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna, several
complaints for forcible entry with preliminary injunction and
damages against Amante, et al., docketed as Civil Cases Nos.
250, 258, 260, 262 and 266. SRRDC alleged that some time in
July 1987, they learned that Amante, et al., without their
authority and through stealth and strategy, were clearing,
cultivating and planting on the subject property; and that despite
requests from SRRDCs counsel, Amante, et al. refused to
vacate the property, prompting them to file the ejectment
cases.[16] Amante, et al. denied that SRRDC are the absolute
owners of the property, stating that they have been in peaceful
possession thereof, through their predecessors -in-interest,
since 1910.[17]
On May 24, 1991, the MTC-Cabuyao rendered its decision in
favor of SRRDC. Amante, et al. were ordered to surrender
possession and vacate the subject property. The decision was
appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna (Assisting
Court).
On February 18, 1992, the RTC dismissed the ejectment cases
on the ground that the subject property is an agricultural land
being tilled by Amante, et al., hence it is the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), which has jurisdiction over the
dispute.[18] The RTCs dismissal of the complaints was brought
to the CA via a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
33382.[19] In turn, the CA dismissed the petition per its
Decision dated January 17, 1995 on the ground that SRRDC
failed to show any prior physical possession of the subject
property that would have justified the filing of the ejectment
cases.[20] Also, the CA did not sustain the RTCs finding that
the subject properties are agricultural lands and Amante, et al.
are tenant/farmers thereof, as the evidence on record does not
support such finding. The parties did not file any motion for
reconsideration from the Court of Appeals dismissal, hence, it
became final and executory.[21]
Administrative Proceedings
While the injunction and ejectment cases were still in process, it
appears that in August, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage to SRRDC,
informing petitioners that the property covered by TCT Nos. T-
81949, T-84891 and T-92014 is scheduled for compulsory
acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP).[22] SRRDC filed its Protest and Objection with the
MARO on the grounds that the area was not appropriate for
agricultural purposes, as it was rugged in terrain with slopes of
18% and above, and that the occupants of the land were
squatters, who were not entitled to any land as
beneficiaries.[23] Thereafter, as narrated in the Decision of the
Court dated October 12, 2001 in G.R. No. 112526, the following
proceedings ensued:
On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the
BARC chairman answered the protest and objection stating that
the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the
land is suitable and economically viable for agricultural
purposes, as evidenced by the Certification of the Department
of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna.
On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a
summary investigation report and forwarded the Compulsory
Acquisition Folder Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter, PARO).
On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his
endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform.
On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of
the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Development, DAR
forwarded two (2) Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders
covering the landholding of SRRDC, covered by TCT Nos. T-
81949 and T-84891 to the President, Land Bank of the
Philippines for further review and evaluation.
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam
Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition to
petitioner, stating that petitioners landholdings covered by TCT
Nos. T-81949 and T-84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and
58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93,
respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters
separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the
Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its
formal protest, protesting not only the amount of compensation
offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2) notices of
acquisition.
On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the
DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657, Section 16.
On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders
previously referred for review and evaluation to the Director of
BLAD mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding
due to some deficiencies.
On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez
wrote the Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to forward
the two (2) claim folders involving the property of SRRDC to the
DARAB for it to conduct summary proceedings to determine the
just compensation for the land.
-
On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the