Agenda for the 138 - wrpc.gov.in · 400 kV Amreli-Hadala, 400 kV Amreli-Chorania, 400 kV...

Agenda for the 138th PCM to be held on 17.10.2019 at WRPC Mumbai.

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Agenda for the 138th

Protection Committee Meeting (PCM) of WRPC

to be held on 17.10.2019 at WRPC Mumbai.

ITEM NO.1: Confirmation of Minutes of the 137th PCM The 137th meeting of protection sub-committee was held on 17th July 2019 at

WRPC Mumbai. The MoM was circulated vide letter WRPC/Protection/

PCM/Minutes/2019/9463 dated 31.07.2019.

No comments have been received on the MoM.

Committee may like to confirm the minutes of 137th Protection sub-

Committee meeting.

ITEM 2:- Major Occurrences/grid disturbances:

2A. Occurrences in Gujarat system:

2A.1. Grid Incidence at 400 kV Amreli-Hadala line on 16th July 2019.

Event Category: GI-2 Event Summary as per the WRLDC report:

On 16.07.2019 at 11.14 hrs there was a grid incidence at on 400 kV Amreli-Hadala line. R-B phase fault occurred on 400 kV Amreli-Hadala line and

the fault was not cleared by Amreli end CB, which led to LBB protection operation and tripping of all the elements connected to 400 kV Amreli Bus 2. 400 kV Amreli-Hadala, 400 kV Amreli-Chorania, 400 kV Amreli-Jetpur 2,

400/220 kV 315 MVA Amreli ICTs 1&4, 400 kV Kasor 1 LR charged as BR at Amreli and 50 MVAR Amreli Bus reactor tripped.

Details of Occurrence as per GETCO report:

At the time of occurrence, the bus position of the feeders/X’mers were as

under and all the 400KV Bays were running along with 400KV Bus coupler as

follows (Bus bar protection type: Numerical ALSTOM- MiCOM P741).

400KV BUS

BUS-A BUS-B

1. AMRELI-JETPUR LINE-1

2. 400/220KV, 315MVA ICT-2

3. 400/220KV, 500MVA ICT-3

4. 400KV 125MVAr Bus reactor

1.400KV AMRELI-HADALA

2. 400KV AMRELI- JETPUR LINE-2

3. 400/220KV, 315MVA ICT-1

4. 400/220KV, 315MVA ICT-4

5. 400KV 50MVAr BUS reactor

6. 400KV 50MVAr Kasor-1 reactor

7. 400KV AMRELI- CHORANIA


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Sequence of Occurrence as per GETCO report

At 11:14:16:153 hrs. 400kV Amreli Hadala line fault occurred (Distance

protection R & B phase with carrier aided trip), but fault was not cleared on the

instant. After approx. 209 msec. i.e at 11:14:16:362 hrs, Int.LBB of 21-Main1

distance relay P444 operated. Which caused the 50BF-Bus-zone2 trip extend to

all adjacent CBKRs of BUS-2 along with 400kV Bus-coupler. 400kV Bus-bar

protection trip in zone 2 occurred due to LBB protection Optd., on 400kV

Amreli- Hadala line. Simultaneous to above Ext.LBB-96 scheme also optd.

The 50BF (LBB-prot.) signal was initiated only due to Main protection (distance)

of Hadala line failed to clear the fault as mentioned to above. At the time of fault

upgraded new data-base version loading in server was under process. During

such process of ALSTOMSDCADA Configuration all the bays’ control for NIT-

logic, A/R-status, Carrier selection (permissive/ direct-trip) goes on

disabled/default. Here in this case the prot. trip from distance relay Along with

“Normal” mode also became disable according to the relay configuration. The

400kv Amreli-Hadala line distance relay 21M1 (with correct phase & zone prot.)

operated. But master trip 86 didn’t operate which cause distance function base

internal LBB was operated after approx. 209 msec.(tBF2). Consequently 50 CB-

Fail1 prot. (tBF2) released as 50BF-bus zone2 trip command to whole 400kV

BUS-ZONE2 connected elements.

SLD/Event report is enclosed as Annexure 2A.1.

GETCO may inform OEM (ALSTOM) report available, if any, on the above

issue

Committee may like to discuss.

2A.2. Grid Incidence at 220kV KLTPS/Akrimota S/s on 21st July 2019.

Event Category: GD-1

Event Summary as per the WRLDC report:

On 21.07.2019 at 15.50 hrs there was a grid incidence at 220kV Akrimota S/S. At 220kV Akrimota, Bus 2 and Akrimota-Nakhtrana 2 were under shutdown. 220kV Bus 1 and Akrimota - Nakhtrana ckt 1 tripped due to heavy

chattering in PI of Bus. Since, both the buses tripped, ALTPS units 1 & 2 and 220kV ALTPS-KLTPS ckt 1&2 tripped and ALTPS station became dead. At the same time 220kV KLTPS - Kukma ckt 1&2 tripped on reflection fault. As 220kV

KLTPS-Nakhtrana ckt 1&2 were under outage due to tower collapse, units 1&4 at KLTPS tripped on loss of evacuation. 220 kV Kukma-Panandhro 1, 220 kV

Kukma-Panandhro 2, 220 kV Akrimota bus 1, 220 kV Akrimota-Nakharatna 1 and KLTPS Unit 1&4 tripped.


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Details of Occurrence (as per the report given by GETCO):

220KV Panandhro - Nakhatrana line - I & II under L/C by GETCO for

tower replacement work from 12.06.2019. 220KV Panandhro -Kukma- I & II

tripped at 15:50 Hrs. 220KV Panandhro-Akrimota line-I & II was hand trip from

KLTPS end On 21.07.2019, the status of both the bus at KLTPS (Pannandhro)

was as under:

BUS-I BUS-II

(a) GT#1 (a) GT#4

(b) ST#1 (b) ST #2

(c) Akari-II (c) Kukma-II

(d) ICT-1(on load ) (d) Akari-I

(e) Kukma-I (e) ICT-1(Soft Charged )

Relay and Indications:

Sr Name Of Feeder Relays –KLTPS end Relays Remote end

1 220 KV Panandhro -

Kukma- I

Distance Protection Zone-1,

(B-N), 40.67 Km,

IA – 89.81 A, IB – 1754 A, IC –

386 A,

Facia – Dist. Protection Optd.

Distance Protection Zone-

1, (B-N), 93.69 Km, IB –

1290 A,

Facia – Dist. Protection

Optd.

2 220 KV Panandhro -

Kukma- II

Distance Protection Zone-1,

(B-N), 45.8 Km,

IA – 88.59 A, IB – 1773 A, IC –

386.8 A,

Facia – Dist. Protection Optd.

Distance Protection Zone-

1, (B-N), 94.69 Km,

IB – 1310 A,

Facia – Dist. Protection

Optd.

3 220 KV Panandhro –

Akrimota – I

KLTPS end breaker not

tripped-hand trip

Facia – Under voltage and

under frequency

4 220 KV Panandhro –

Akrimota – II

KLTPS end breaker not

tripped-hand trip

Facia – Under voltage and

under frequency

4 70MW Unit#1 Relay:- Trip relay 86GA optd, under frequency trip relay

operated.

Facia:-415V USS Bus U/V alarm, V/Hz High alarm,

Channel in balance (Excitation), Under frequency protection

alarm, Under frequency protection trip, Metering PT fail

alarm, first rotor earth fault relay alarm 86GA Optd.

5 70MW Unit#2 Under shutdown

6 75MW Unit#3 Under shutdown

7 75MW Unit#4 Relay:-Group 1 GRP1-[Excitation CB + Turbine trip, VT fail

alarm, under frequency alarm and trip and over frequency

alarm. Group 2 GRP-3 [Excitation CB + turbine trip], under

frequency alarm and trip and over frequency alarm

Facia:-Gen trip relay optd.

GT Relay- over flux alarm(warning)

SLD/Event report is enclosed as Annexure 2A.2.



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2A.3. Grid Incidence at 400/220 kV Ukai S/s on 15th August 2019.

Event Category: GI-2


At 400/220 kV Ukai S/s, 400kV Ukai-Kosamba and Ukai-Navsari lines tripped

on over-voltage & 400/220kV ICT tripped on Overflux & differential protection

operation. Due to tripping of all the elements, 400kV Bus 1&2 at Ukai

substation de energized.

GETCO not uploaded the preliminary tripping report in the tripping portal.


2A.4. Grid Incidence at 400/220 kV Ukai S/s on 16th August 2019.



At 400/220 kV Ukai S/s, 400kV Ukai-Kosamba tripped on over-voltage &

400/220kV ICT tripped on Over flux protection operation. 400kV Bus 1&2 at

Ukai substation de energized as 400kV Ukai -Navsari was already out on voltage

regulation.

As per GETCO report direct trip received from Ukai end and 86A and 86 B trip

operated.


2A.5. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Panandhro S/s on 25th August 2019.



At 220 kV Panandhro, R-phase CT of 25MVAR BR caught fire and resulted in tripping of all the elements connected to 220 kV Panandhro Bus 2.

GETCO not uploaded the preliminary tripping report in the tripping portal.


2B. Occurrences in Madhya Pradesh system:

Nil


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2C. Occurrences in Maharashtra system

2C.1. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Kalwa S/s on 10th July 2019.

Event Category: GD-I


On 10.07.2019 at 09.04 hrs there was a grid incidence at 220 kV Kalwa S/S. 220 kV Padghe Bus 2 and 220 kV Padghe-Temghar 1&2 were under outage prior to the event. 220 kV Kalwa-Kalwa interconnecter 1&2 were in open

condition to reduce the fault level. 220 kV Apta-Taloja and 220 kV Kalwa-Apta tripped due to conductor snapping and resulted in overloading and tripping of 220 kV Kalwa-Colorchem and 220 kV Kalwa-AKP. 220 kV Kalwa 1,

colorchem,Themghar and Taloja got blackout due to the event. 220 kV Kalwa-Apta, 220 kV Kalwa-AKP, 220 kV Klawa-Colorchem and 220 kV Apta-Taloja

tripped. The Event Report (of WRLDC) is enclosed at Annexure 2C.1

Description of occurrence (As per MSETCL report):

On dated 10.07.19 at 05:33 hrs 220 kV Bus A outage was availed at Padghe

S/s as per approval from SLDC Kalwa. 220 kV Padghe –Temghar Line I & II were

under outage. The 220 kV Temghar S/s, 220 kV Colourchem S/s and 220 kV

Kalwa S/s were feed from 220 kV Kalwa II- Colourchem line, 220 kV Kalwa I –

Temghar, 220 kV Apta – Kalwa, 220 kV AKP - Kalwa & 220 kV Apta – Taloja –

Kalwa Line and these lines were acting as source lines. Inter-connector breaker

between 220 kV Kalwa I & II was kept off as per SLDC instruction for fault MVA

reduction.

At 08:58 hrs. Apta – Taloja line tripped on distance protection due to

conductor snapping at Tower No. 640 when carrying current @ 600 Amp. This

lead to increase in current on 220 kV Apta – Kalwa and 220 kV Kalwa –

Colourchem line. Loading of these lines reached @ 800 Amp., which is near to

the thermal limit of the conductor. At 09:04 hrs. 220 kV Kalwa –Apta line

tripped on distance protection due to conductor snapping at Tower No. 640 i.e.

same location. Apta source was been cut off which resulted in shifting the

complete load on 220 kV Kalwa – Colourchem Temghar – Kalwa link & AKP line

having distance source (Nasik). Due to this the 220 kV Kalwa – Colourchem line

current reached to 1300 Amp and got overloaded and tripped on back up over

current after approximately 4 sec. Due to this, the complete load of Colourchem,

Temghar, Kalwa & Taloja shifted to 220 kV Kalwa- AKP line. The 220 kV Kalwa -

AKP line's current reached to 1280 Amp and got overloaded and tripped on back

up over current approximately after 1.5 sec. This resulted in total failure of 220

kV sources. This caused shifting of total MSETCL load on TATA Netwok

(Through 100 kV TATA Lines viz 100 kV Kalyan, Salshette I & Salshette – II))

which caused disturbance in TATA network also.


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Initially system was normal catering the load of @610 MW at Colourchem,

Temghar, Taloja & Kalwa I S/s through 220 kV Kalwa II – Colourchem –

Temghar – Kalwa Link, Kalwa – AKP & Apta – Taloja – Kalwa D/C when 220 kV

Padghe Bus A outage availed with 220 kV Padghe – Temghar D/C kept off at

05:33 hrs. 220 kV Taloja – Apta Line tripped @ 08:58 hrs. The R-B ph fault

occurred @ Loc No. 640 due to conductor snapping when current is @ 600 Amp.

and line tripped on distance protection from both end. The complete load of 220

kV Taloja S/s were feed through 220 kV Kalwa S/s. Due to this, the 220 kV

Kalwa- Apta Line and 220 kV Kalwa – Colourchem line shared maximum load

above the thermal limit as being the strong source to the network. 220 kV

Kalwa-Apta Line tripped @ 09:04 hrs. The R-B ph fault occurred @ Loc No. 640

due to conductor snapping and the line tripped on distance protection from both

end. Now, the complete network were feed through 220 kV Kalwa-Colourchem –

Temghar – Kalwa I Link Line and 220 kV Kalwa – AKP Line. As being a strong

source, the 220 kV AKP Kalwa – Colourchem line got overloaded above thermal

limit i.e. 1300 A Approx. The contribution of 220 Kalwa – AKP line was very less

as being weak source. Due to the overloading of 220 kV Kalwa – Colourchem

line, the line tripped @09:04 hrs. from 220 kV Kalwa S/s end on over current

protection. Now, the only source available to the network is of 220 kV Kalwa –

AKP line which was also eventually got overloaded i.e. 1280 A approx. The 220

kV Kalwa – AKP Line tripped at 220 kV AKP S/s at 09:04 hrs end only due to

overloading. Now, the complete 220 kV source to the network lost. 100 kV

Kalwa- Kalyan line, 100 kV Kalwa – Kalyan-Salsette-1 & 2 Line (open at 100 kV

Salsette) were still in service which connected to generation at 100 kV Khopoli

S/s, 100 kV Bhivpuri S/s and 100 kV Bhira S/s (TATA NETWORK) & TPC –

MSETCL – AEML and 100 kV Khopoli Bhivpuri – 1 & 2 tripped on Zone -4 with 2

sec delay. Therefore, the 220 / 100 kV Kalwa I, 220 kV Colourchem, 220 kV

Temghar and 220 kV Taloja S/s suffered power failure.

Remedial Measures suggested & action taken in order to avoid recurrence.

1. Fours maintenance activities being old aged lines.

2. Thermo scanning to be done when loading is maximum.

3. Auto reclosing of Inter-connector under contingencies of overloading of

220kV Lines at Kalwa –I is kept ready and being taken into service on dtd.

12.07.2019.

4. Load trimming at Colourchem S/s is kept ready for contingency for Kalwa –

Colourchem line.

5. Kalwa – Mumbra – Pal – Taloja link to be kept on with load trimming

scheme for contingencies on 220 kV side at Kalwa, Taloja & Padghe to avoid

total failure of supply in coordination with MSLDC, Kalwa.

6. To avoid disturbance in either network of MSETCL & TATA network,

common contingencies to be devised in coordination with MSLDC Kalwa.


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Single Line Diagram:

MSETCL may give their views on (i) measures to control the overloadings

under such situations be explored and automatic load trimming schemes be

implemented. (ii) It may be explored whether the Bus Coupler can be

automatically put in service under such situations and then after

restoration of normalcy the B/B can be put out.


2C.2. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Kalwa S/s on 19th July 2019.

Event Category: GD-I


On 19.07.2019 at 19.28 hrs there was a grid incidence at 220 kV Kalwa S/S. 220 kV Taloja-Apta and 220 kV Jambhul-Anandnagar were under outage

prior to the event. 220 kV ICTs at Pal S/s were hand tripped from 100 kV side to shift the load of 100 kV Dombivalli S/s to 100 kV Pal-Mumbra and 100 kV Pal-

Taloja. At 19:28 Hrs, 220 kV Kalwa-Taloja tripped due to the snapping of B phase conductor and no source was available at Taloja S/s. 100 kV Pal-Mumbra tripped on overload and led to the total failure of supply at 220kV Taloja, 100 kV

Dombivalli, Taloja, DFPCL, FGIL, BOC, Hindalco and Mumbra S/s. 220 kV Kalwa-Taloja and 100 kV Pal-Mumbra tripped.


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Description of occurrence(As per the MSETCL report):

At 200 kV Taloja S/s, 220 kV Taloja –Apta line was under outage and

subsequently, At 19:28 hrs 220 kV Kalwa –Taloja line tripped due to snapping of

B ph conductor – Anandnagar line was also under outage and at 220 kV Pal S/s

ICT –I & II was hand tripped from 100 kV side and total load 100 kV Dombivali

S/s was shifted to 100 kV Pal – Mumbra and 100 kV Pal – Taloja line. At 19:28

hrs 220 kV Kalwa –Taloja line tripped due to snapping of B ph conductor at Loc

No. 14-15 and no source available to substation Because of which 100 kV

Mumbra – Pal line tripped on overload. This lead to total failure supply to 100

kV Dombivali, 100 kV Taloja, 100 kV DFPCL, 100 kV FGIL, 100 kV BOC, 100 kV

Hindalco, 100 kV Mumbra substations.

At 200 kV Taloja S/s, 220 kV Taloja –Apta line was under outage. At 19:28

hrs, 220 kV Taloja -Kalwa line tripped due to B ph conductor snap and fall on B

ph conductor resulting in R-B to Earth fault. At 220 kV Jambhul S/s, 220 kV

Jambhul – Anandnagar line was under outage. At 220 kV Pal S/s 220/100 kV I

& II was hand tripped to divert 100 kV load on Taloja & Mumbra line. As 220

kV Taloja was in dark total 100 kV load shifted on 100 kV Mumbra – Pal line.

Due to which 100 kV Mumbra – Pal line tripped on over load at Mumba end. 220

kV Kalwa – Taloja line tripped from Kalwa end first in Zone – 2 and then tripped

from Taloja end in Zone – I to weak source available.

Single Line Diagram

The Event Report is enclosed at Annexure 2C.2.

MSLDC is requested to give the loading pattern at and around Kalwa S/s

network. Also load trimming schemes implemented/planned, if any, may be

submitted.



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2C.3. Grid Incidence at 400/220 kV Khargar S/s on 25th July 2019.

Event Category: GI-I


On 25.07.2019 at 03.48 hrs there was a grid incidence at 400/220 kV

Khargar S/S. At 400/220 kV Khargar S/s, 220 kV Bus 1 and all connected

elements tripped due to the B phase bus CVT blast on Bus bar protection

operation. The 220 kV Khargar Bus 1, 400/220 kV Khargar ICTs 1&3, 220 kV

Khargar-Nerul, 220 kV Khargar-Uran 1, 220 kV Khargar-Panvel, 220 kV

Khargar-Borivalli and 220/33 kV Khargar ICTs 1&3 tripped.


220 kV Bus 1 B phase PT failed at Khargar substation and resulted in

tripping of all the elements connected to 220 kV Bus 1 on Bus bar protection

operation. The fault current during the event was 45.7 kA and the fault

duration was 64 ms. There was a load loss of 35 MW due to the event.

Details of indication for occurrence on 220 Kv ‘A’ bus on Dt. 25.07.2019

Own Station: KHARGHAR Other Station:

Window indication Relay Indication Window

indication

Relay

Indication

1)220KV BUS COUPLER

**NR TYPE BUS BAR

PROTN. AND ABB

TRIP BUS OPERATED

N.A

N.A

2)220KV URAN-I

a) BUSBAR TRIP RELAY

OPERATED.

Nil NIL NIL

3)220KV TSS PANVEL


OPERATED

NIL NIL NIL

4) 220KV BORIVALI-I


OPERATED

Nil Nil Nil

5) 220KV NERUL


OPERATED

Nil Nil Nil

6) 400/220/33KV 3X105

MVA ICT-I (HV/LV SIDE)


OPERATED

b) OLTC Buchholtz Trip

OLTC Buchholtz Trip

30H

Nil Nil

7) 400/220/33KV 3X105

MVA ICT-III (HV/LV SIDE)


OPERATED

Nil Nil Nil

8) 220/33KV 50MVA TF-I

(HV/LV SIDE)


OPERATED

Nil Nil Nil


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9) 220/33KV 50MVA TF-

III(HV/LV SIDE)


OPERATED

Nil NIL Nil

400/220 kV Khargar ICT 3 was charged at 04:48 Hrs followed by the other

elements as given in the restoration table. 400/220 kV Khargar ICT 1 was

charged on 26-07-19 at 12:09 Hrs after complete testing. 220 kV Khargar-

Borivalli was charged on 26-07-19 at 00:02 Hrs after the replacement of rotary

insulator of Bus isolator.

Single Line Diagram of 220 KV side of Khargar




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2C.4. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Boisar S/s on 29th July 2019.

Event Category: GI-I


On 29.07.2019 at 17.48 hrs there was a grid incidence at 220 kV Boisar S/S.

Due to the snapping of earth wire of multi circuit tower, 220 kV Boisar-

Boisar(PG) T/C and 220 kV Boisar-Nallasopara tripped. 220 kV Boisar-TAPS

also tripped at the same time on Directional earth fault and 220 kV TAPS-

Borivali tripped later on over current protection operation. The 220 kV Boisar-

Boisar(PG) 1,2&3, 220 kV Boisar-Nallasopara, 220 kV Boisar-TAPS and 220 kV

TAPS-Borivalli tripped.

The Event Report of WRLDC is enclosed at Annexure 2C.4.


On date 29.07.2019, due to snapping of OPGW at Location no. 16-17A-17,

220 kV PGCIL Line 2 tripped from both end over Y ph-E over distance protection

and 220 kV PGCIL – Nalasopara line tripped over distance protection from both

end. Simultaneously 220 kV Boisar 2 – PGCIL line 1 tripped over distance

protection at PGCIL end only. At the same time, 220 kV PGCIL Line no 3 tripped

over Distance protection R ph –E in Zone 1 from both end due to R ph Jumper

broken at Location no. 18. As all three 220 kV PGCIL lines to Boisar 2 ss tripped,

220 kV Tarapur line tripped over current protection due to overloading from

Tarapur end only.

At Location no 17A (newly erected multi circuit tower where 220 kV Boisar 2

– PGCIL Line 1, 220 kV Nalasopara –PGCIL line located at upper cross arms and

220 kV PGCIL line no 3 at Bottom), the hanging (not fixed at peak) OPGW

snapped and might be came in the induction zone of Rph (bottom side) of the

220 kV Nalasopara –PGCIL line 1 causing tripping over Distance protection at

both end. (AR is not available at Both end). The snapped conductor then fell over

220 kV Boisar 2 – PGCIL Line 2 initially over Y ph and then R ph at Location no

16. From Boisar 2 end, the line auto reclosed over Y-E fault initially, but as the

fault was persisted AR lockout initiated to trip the line. At PGCIL end, AR is not

available so line tripped on 3 ph. Simultaneously, the same fault was also seen

by the distance relay of 220 kV Boisar 2 – PGCIL line no 1 in forward direction at

PGCIL end and line tripped at PGCIL end only. At same time, 220 kV PGCIL line

3 auto reclosed from Boisar 2 end over R-E fault, but after approx. 6s (as per

DR), as the R-E fault sensed in the reclaim time, AR Lockout initiated and line

tripped. At PGCIL end AR is not available, Line tripped over distance protection.

Rph jumper found broken at Location no 18. Due to above, as all three sources

to Boisar 2 from PGCIL ss, 220 kV Tarapur line tripped over Dir. over current

protection due to overloading at Tarapur end only. No LTS operation and also

Load affected was Nil, but restoration process required load restriction, hence

220 kV Ghodbunder and Versova Line hand tripped and local load shedding

(107.6MW) carried out.


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Single Line Diagram


2C.5. Grid Incidence at 400/220 kV Padghe S/s on 31th July 2019.




Padghe S/S. At 400/220 kV Padghe S/s, R phase CVT of 400 kV Bus 1 blasted

and resulted in tripping of all the elements connected to 400 kV Bus 1. The 400

kV Boisar-Padghe 1, 400 kV Tarapur-Padghe 2, 400 kV Nagothane-Padghe 1,

±500 kV HVDC Chandrapur-Padghe Pole 2, 400/220 kV 315 MVA ICT2,

400/220 kV 500 MVA ICT 3 and 400 kV Bableshwar-Padghe 1 tripped.


At 12:54 Hrs. Dated: 31.07.2019 400 kV Rph A bus CVT ABB Make burst &

caught fire. As the CVT was directly connected to the A bus, fault was seen by

Main Bus 1 Different Zone of 400 kV Bus bar Protection at Padghe Substation.

Hence Feeders and ICTs connected to Main bus A 400 kV HVDC-2, Tarapur-2,

Nagothane-1, Babhaleshwar-1, 315 MVA 400/220 kV ICT-2, 500 MVA 400/200

kV ICT 5 and Bus coupler tripped on operation of Main bus A differential zone of

400 kV Bus Bar protection. At the same time 400 kV Boisar line which was


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connected to B Bus, tripped at both ends at Padghe on 87R reactor differential

protection and Boisar on DT received.

Conditions prior to Occurrence :

A-Bus Before tripping

1. 400 kV HVDC-2 0 MW (I)

2. 400 kV BBLR-I 415 MW (I) 3. 400 kV KALWA-I 0 MW (E) 4. 400 kV NAGOTHANE-I 62 MW (I) 5. 400 kV TARAPUR-2 256 MW (I) 6. 315 MVA ICT-2 240 MW (E) 7. 500 MVA ICT-5 344 MW €

B-Bus

1. 400 kV HVDC-I 0 MW (I)

2. 400 kV BBLR-2 420 MW (I)

3. 400 kV KALWA-2 555 MW (E)

4. 400 kV NAGOTHANE-2 182 MW (I)

5. 400 kV TARAPUR-I 261 MW (I)

6. 400 kV BOISAR(PGCIL) 168 MW (I)

7. 315 MVA ICT-3 250 MW (E)

8. 600 MVA ICT-4 460 MW (E)

Conditions after Occurrence

Feeders and ICTs connected to Main bus A 400 kV HVDC-2, Tarapur-2,

Nagothane-1, Babhaleshwar-I, 315 MVA 400/220 kV ICT-2, 500 MVA 400/200

kV ICT 5 and Bus coupler tripped on operation of Main bus A differential zone of

400 kV Bus Bar protection. 400 kV Boisar line which was connected to B Bus

tripped on 87 R reactor differential protection.

The sequence of tripping and restoration


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Bus Configuration & load Prior to occurrence:

Sr.

No.

400 kV Main Bus – I ( A Bus) 400 kV Main Bus – I ( A Bus)

Name of bays (Feeder/

ICTs/ TFs)

Load (MW)

04.00 hrs

Name of bays (Feeder/

ICTs/ TFs)

Load (MW)

04.00 hrs

1. 400 kV HVDC-2 0 MW (I) 400 kV HVDC-I 0 MW (I)

2. 400 kV BBLR-I 415 MW (I) 400 kV BBLR-2 420 MW (I)

3. 400 kV KALWA-I 0 MW (E) 400 kV KALWA-2 555 MW (E)

4. 400 kV NAGOTHANE-I 62 MW (I) 400 kV NAGOTHANE-2 182 MW (I)

5. 400 kV TARAPUR-2 256 MW (I) 400 kV TARAPUR-I 261 MW (I)

6. 315 MVA ICT-2 240 MW (E) 400 kV BOISAR(PGCIL) 168 MW (I)

7. 500 MVA ICT-5 344 MW (E) 315 MVA ICT-3 250 MW (E)

8. 600 MVA ICT-4 460 MW (E)

Relay / Flag Indications

Sr.

No.

Name of Feeder / bays Local End Indication Remote End Indication

WI RI WI RI

1. 1. 400 kV TARAPUR-2 NIL 96 Trip Relay DT Received DT Received

86 optd

2. 500 MVA 400/220 kV

ICT-5

NIL 96 Trip Relay NA NA

3. 400 kV Babhaleswar –I NIL 96 Trip Relay DT Received DT Received

4. 400 kV Nagothane-I NIL 96 Trip Relay DT Received DT Received

5. HVDC-2 NIL 96 Trip Relay NIL Converter CB

trip Scheme

6. 315 MVA 400 / 220 kV

ICT-2

NIL 96 Trip Relay NIL NIL

7. Bus Coupler Bus zone –I

optd,

96 Trip Relay NA NA

8. 400 kV Boisar Reactor Diff

Prot optd.

TCI /TC2

faulty, CB

PDR optd

87 R, Group

A Trip

DT Received DT Received

These were Old CVTs in section I of 400 kV Main bus A. Out of these, R and Y

phase CVTs were showing abnormal voltages during the bus outage availed for

bus conductor replacement. Hence new CVTs were erected & commissioned in

section 2 of A bus on dtd. 23.03.2019. After transfer of load from old CVTs to

new CVTs old CVTs were kept disconnected from secondary sides. As these CVTs

were connected directly to the main bus with the help of jumper, it was not

possible to isolate them from bus without bus outage. The outage for the same

was proposed on dtd. 31.05.2019 but was not approved by LD Kalwa & hence

could not be availed, thus CVT were in service. However on Date 31.07.2019 at

12:54 Hrs, 400 kV Rph A bus CVT WS Make burst & caught fire. As the CVT

was directly connected to the A bus, fault was seen by Main Bus I Differential

zone of 400 kV Bus bar Protection at Padghe Substation. Hence Feeders and

ICTs connected to Main bus A (400 kV HVDC-2, Tarapur-2, Nagothane-I,

Babhaleshwar-Im 315 MVA 400 / 220 kV ICT-2, 500 MVA 400 / 220 kV ICT 5)


15

and Bus coupler tripped on operation of Main bus A differential zone of 400 kV

Bus Bar protection.

At the same time 400 kV Boisar line which was connected to B Bus tripped at

both ends, at Padghe on 87 R reactor differential protection and at Boisar on DT

received. As per instruction from PGCIL, Line reactor kept isolated and line

charged through TBC due to Own CB problem at Padghe (Y pole wiring burnt).

The CB problem is under investigation in coordination with PGCIL team & will

be rectified in due course.

400/220 kV Padghe ICT 2 was charged at 14:59 Hrs followed by the other

elements as given in the restoration table. The Y phase CB wiring of 400 kV

Boisar 1 found burnt and taken into service through TBC after isolating line

reactor. The bus old CVTs were removed from the bus.



2C.6. Grid Incidence at 400/220 kV Deepnagar station on 12th July 2019.




Deepnagar station. At 400/220 kV Deepnagar station, LBB of ST 4 & GT 5

operated which resulted in tripping of 400 kV Deepnagar Bus 1. The 400/21.75

kV 600 MVA Deepnagar GT-5, 400/21.75 kV 600 MVA Deepnagar GT-4,

400/11/6.6 kV Deepnagar ST 4, 500MW Deepnagar Unit 4&5 and 400 kV

Deepnagar Bus1 tripped.


Bus Configuration & load prior to occurrence


16

LBB prot. of GT-5 & STN 4B optd from GENCO. Due to that Main & Tie CB of

GT-5 & STN 4B Tripped is in order. Due to this LBB prot. (Optd. From GENCO)

Bus 1 -50Z1X LBB optd. (at 400kV BUSBAR Panel) and CB connected to 400kV

Main BUS-1 tripped is in order.

Bus wise tripping-

Present and past diagnostic testing (CB Timing and DCRM etc.) results are in

order.


17


After details analysis with tripping events and equipment testing results, it is

confirmed that the relay operation at 400kV MSETCL Deepnagar S/s is correct

and in order. Hence it was requested to check or verify the correct operation of

LBB relay of GT-5 & STN-4B at MSPGCL Deepnagar end .


2C.7. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Uran S/s on 3rd August 2019.



At 220 kV Uran S/s, flashover on Main Bus 2 R Phase Tension Disc Insulator

String at 220 KV ONGC Bay resulted in tripping of all the elements connected to

220 kV Uran Bus 2 on Busbar protection operation.


On 03.08.2019, at 20:29 Hrs, at 220 kV Uran S/s, Due to flashover and

bursting of Main Bus-2 R Phase tension disc insulator string over 220 kV ONGC

bay, resulting in a correct operation of 220 kV Busbar protection relay and

selective tripping of bus coupler and feeders on bus zone-B.

Relay and Flag indications as follows:


18

Single Line Diagram of 220 kV Uran S/s:



2C.8. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Uran S/s on 3rd August 2019.



At 220 kV Uran S/s, 220 kV Bus 1 and all the connected elements tripped due

to spurious LBB signal generated due to the faulty Binary input module of REB

670.


On dated 03.08.2019, at 13:41 Hrs, at 220 kV Uran S/s, Due to malicious LBB

Trip command received from 220 kV Station tf-1 of GTPS Bay, resulting in

operation of 220 kV Busbar protection relay for external LBB signal and triping

of 220 kV Buscoupler and feeders on 220 kV Bus zone-A.


19

During occurrence weather was stormy and cloudy with heavy rain, cable trenches were full of water with water level in yard was upto knee level.

Operational issues leading to Non-operation / Mal-operation of protection

system: Cable coming from OGM panel of 220 / 6.6 kV Stn. T.F. -1 of GTPS in yard to Bus Bar panel at 220 kV Uran Control Room found faulty due to insulation failure. Further, though Stn. T/F-1 of GTPS is out of service, A-Bus

isolator physically open but getting Close status in Bus Bar Panel due to improper contact in auxiliary relay in OGM Panel. Hence B/B/LBB trip signal extended to A-Bus trip relays

Relay and Flag indications:

Single line diagram of Uran S/s:




20

2C.9. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Uran S/s on 4th August 2019.





670.


On dated 04.08.2019, at 03:57 Hrs, at 220 kV Uran S/s, Due to spurious signal

of LBB Trip command received from 220/6.6 kV Station TF-1 ( Bay 17 of Busbar

panel) of GTPS Bay, resulting in operation of 220 kV Busbar protection for

external LBB signal and tripping of bus coupler and feeders on bus zone-A.

During occurrence weather was stormy and cloudy with heavy rain, cable

trenches were full of water with water level in yard was upto knee level.


system: Cable coming from OGM panel of 220 / 6.6 kV Stn. T.F. -1 of GTPS in

yard to Bus Bar panel at 220 kV Uran Control Room found faulty due to

insulation failure. Further, though Stn. T/F-1 of GTPS is out of service, A-Bus

isolator physically open but getting Close status in Bus Bar Panel due to

improper contact in auxiliary relay in OGM Panel. Hence B/B/LBB trip signal

extended to A-Bus Bus-Bar trip relays.


Single line diagram of Uran S/s:


21



2C.10. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Uran S/s on 4th August 2019.





670.


On dated 04.08.2019, at 05:27 Hrs, at 220 kV Uran S/s, Due to spurious signal

of LBB Trip command received from 220/6.6 kV Station TF-1 ( Bay 17 of Busbar

panel) of GTPS Bay, resulting in operation of 220 kV Busbar protection for

external LBB signal and triping of buscoupler and feeders on bus zone-A. During

occurence weather was stormy and cloudy with heavy rain, cable trenches were

full of water with water level in yard was upto knee level.


system: Cable coming from OGM panel of 220 / 6.6 kV Stn. T.F. -1 of GTPS in

yard to Bus Bar panel at 220 kV Uran Control Room found faulty due to

insulation failure. Further, though Stn. T/F-1 of GTPS is out of service, A-Bus

isolator physically open but getting Close status in Bus Bar Panel due to

improper contact in auxiliary relay in OGM Panel. Hence B/B/LBB trip signal

extended to A-Bus Bus-Bar trip relays.


22


Single line diagram:




23

2C.11. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Nashik S/s on 15th August 2019.



220 kV Nashik-Bableshwar 2 was taken on TBC at Nashik S/s for bus

sectionaliser 3 outage. Trip circuit faulty alarm appeared on the Nashik TBC. To

attend the problem the circuit was opened at Bableshwar end and the TBC

isolator was opened with charging current which rersulted in sparking of the

isolator and created R-E fault. As the trip circuit of the line was faulty, TBC not

opened and resulted in tripping of all the elements connected to 220 kV Nashik

Main Bus on LBB operation.


220kV LBB protection operated at 220kV GCR eklahare SS. Hence feeders

connected to bus Zone-1 and 3 tripped correctly. The 220kV Ghatghar line

which is in bus Zone-2, tripped from remote end.

Relay details

Control Panel Annunciation Dist prot. Optd.

Main-I Relay indications Dist. Relay: - A Ph-E, Zone-4, Loc. 112.20km, IR=1301A, IY=519A, IB=487A, IE=312A



2C.12. Grid Incidence at 220/132 kV Dhule(MH) S/s on 22nd August 2019.



At 220/132 kV Dhule(MH) S/s, due to the sparking in 220 kV Bus Bar relay

panel on RQDA module of RADSS bus bar panel, Bus bar protection operated

and all elements connected to 220 kV Main Bus tripped.


On dt.22.08.2019 220 kv Bus Bar (old yard) operated at 220 kv Dhule S/st. @

12:36 hrs.

Following feeders tripped

1. 200 MVA ICT-1

2. 200 MVA ICT-2

3. 50 MVA T/F

4. 25 MVA T/F

5. 220 kV Chalisgaon


24

6. 220 kV IC-1

7. 220 kV IC-2

After yard & Bus Bar panel inspection carried out, Spark is observed on 220 kv

Bus Bar relay panel on RQDA module of RADSS bus bar panel. After card

cleaned and with Ld NGP permission Restoration carried out.

Relay operation details

Control Panel Annunciation 86 Relay Optd , 96 trip relay optd.

Main-I Relay indications BUSBAR OPTD, ‘U’ FLAG OPTD.(U-TRIPPING FLAG)

Main-II Relay indications BUSBAR OPTD, ‘U’ FLAG OPTD.(U-TRIPPING FLAG)

Other Relay indications

220 kV BUS BAR PANEL BUSBAR OPTD, ‘U’ FLAG OPTD.(U-

TRIPPING FLAG), 96 Trip relay of 220 kV Interconnector- 1 & 2,

220 kV Chalisgaon, 200 MVA ICT- 1 & 2, 50 MVA T/F, 25 MVA T/F optd.



2D.Occurrences in Goa system:

2D.1. Grid Incidence at 220kV Ponda S/s on 29th July 2019.



On 29.07.2019 at 17.38 hrs there was a grid incidence at 220kV Ponda S/s. At 220kV Ponda, Bus 2 bus fault occurred due to the de-capping of bus insulator and resulted in tripping of all the elements connected to it.220 kV Mahalashmi-

Amona also tripped during the event. Tripping of 220 kV Ponda-Xeldem 1&2, led to black out at 220kV Xeldem S/S. The 220 kV Ponda Bus 2, 220 kV Ponda-Xeldem 1&2, 220 kV Mahalakshmi-Amona, 220/110 kV Ponda ICTs 2&3 and

220 kV Amona-Ponda 1&2 tripped.

The SLD/Event Report is enclosed at Annexure 2D.1

Goa Electricity Department may submit the detailed report.


2D.2. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Amona S/s on 13th August 2019.



At 220 kV Ponda S/s, Dropper of 220KV Ponda-Xeldem-2 fell on 220KV Bus-1

and all the elements connected to 220 kV ponda Bus 1 tripped.


25

Description of occurrence (As per Goa Electricity Department report):

The bus dropper of 220kV PXR-II line snapped and fallen on main Bus-I at

Ponda S/s and it pulled the 220kV Mapusa-Ponda I line and CB of 220kV Mahalaxmi-Amona at Amona S/s. Due to source tripping of above two lines the

main Bus-I having 2 nos. of 100MVA ICTs at Ponda Ss became dead. 220kV Mapusa-Ponda I line tripped and CB of 220kV Mahalaxmi-Amona at Amona S/s

The SLD/Event Report is enclosed at Annexure 2D.2.


2D.3. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Amona S/s on 15th August 2019.



At 220 kV Amona S/s, due to failure of Y-ph LA of 220KV Tillari feeder all the

elements connected to 220 kV Amona Bus 2 tripped. Description of occurrence (As per Goa Electricity Department report):

Due to failure of 'R' phase LA at Amona connected of 220kV Tillari-Amona line,

the 220kV Halkarni-Tillari line tripped. The line CB of Tillari-Amona did not trip.

220 KV Mahalaxmi Amona breaker at Amona tripped.

Main-I Relay indications DPR, Zone I, Phase:- R-N, Fault current :- 6.9kA, distance 2.7 Kms.

The SLD/Event Report is enclosed at Annexure 2D.3.



26

2E.Occurrences in Chhattisgarh system:

2E.1. Grid Incidence at 220/132 kV Bemetara S/s on 13th July 2019.




Bemetara S/s. 220/132 kV 160 MVA Bemetara ICTs 1&2 and 220/132 kV 160

MVA Gendpur ICT 2 tripped on overload and led to the blackout of 220 kV

Gendpur S/s and 132 kV Kawardha,Pandariya and Saja S/s. The 220/132 kV

160 MVA Bemetara ICT 1, 220/132 kV 160 MVA Bemetara ICT 2, 220/132 kV

160 MVA Gendpur ICT and 220KV Urla –Siltara tripped.

Event Description (As per CSPTCL report) :

220/132kV 160MVA Bemetra ICTs have different impedance due to which there

is difference in sharing of their load. On 13.07.2019 at 22:20 hrs, Bemetra ICT 2

tripped on overload due to increase in agricultural load, causing tripping of ICT-

1 also on overload. With the tripping of both the ICTs, load of 132kV Kawardha

shifted on 132kV Gendpur-Kawardha D/C causing overload and tripping of

220/132kV Gendpur ICT-2. Gendpur ICT-1 was out of service. This led to

cascade tripping of 132kV feeders causing total blackout at 132kV Kawardha,

Pandariya and Saja.

Sequence of tripping and restoration :


27

SLD indicating network around 220/132 KV Bemetra S/S

The SLD/Event Report is enclosed at Annexure 2E.1.


2E.2. Grid Incidence at 220 kV Raigarh S/s on 24th July 2019.



On 24.07.2019 at 18.11 hrs there was a grid incidence at 220 kV Raigarh S/s.

R-E fault occurred at 132 kV Raigarh-Salasar feeder at 2.3 km from Raigarh end

in Zone 1 and distance protection relay gave trip command to open the CB. The

CB got mechanically jammed and resulted in LBB operation and tripping of all

the elements connected to 132 kV Bus. 132 kV Raigarh-Raigarh Interconnector

1&2 tripped and 132 kV Raigarh,132KV Kodatarai, 132KV Dabhra and 132KV

S/S Baramkela supply got interrupted due to the event. There was a load loss of

125 MW due to the event. The detailed report submitted by the utility is attached

as annexure. The 220/132 kV 160 MVA Bemetara ICT 1, 220/132 kV 160 MVA

Bemetara ICT 2 and 220/132 kV 160 MVA Gendpur ICT 26.220KV Urla –Siltara

tripped.


28

The sequence of tripping and restoration (As per CSPTCL report):

Single line diagram:-

The total interruptions occurred due to mechanical jamming in Circuit Breaker

of 132KV Salasar feeder at 220 KV S/S Raigarh.

The SLD/Event Report is enclosed at Annexure 2E.2



29

2E.3. Grid Incidence at 220/132 kV Siltara S/s on 28th August 2019.



Due to the R phase fault in 132 kV Siltara-Vandana feeder, 220/132 kV Siltara

ICTs 2&3 tripped.

CSPTCL not uploaded the preliminary tripping report in the tripping portal.

The SLD/Event Report is enclosed at Annexure 2E.3


2F.Occurrences in Dadra and Nagar Haveli system:

Nil

2G.Occurrences in Daman and Diu system:

Nil

2H.Occurrences in PGCIL systems:

2H.1. Grid Incidence at 800 kV HVDC Champa-Kurukshetra Terminal on

05th July 2019.



On 05.07.2019 at 17.20 hrs there was a grid incidence at 800 kV HVDC

Champa-Kurukshetra Terminal. 800 kV HVDC Champa-Kurukshetra Pole 1&2

tripped on Metallic Return Line Differential(MRLD) protection and Earth over

current protection respectively due to Direct Metallic Return(DMR) line 1 short

circuit fault. The 800 kV HVDC Champa-Kurukshetra Pole 1, 800 kV HVDC

Champa-Kurukshetra Pole 2 tripped.

Event Description (As per PGCIL report) :

Pole-1& Pole-2 Tripped on DMR1 short circuit fault. MRLD Protection operated &

Earthover current protection operated.

The SLD/Event Report is enclosed at Annexure 2H.1



30

2I.Occurrences in NTPC systems:

Nil

2J. Occurrences in Green Infra Wind Energy Limited (GIWEL)

system:

2J.1. Grid Incidence at 220 kv Vadva S/s on 12th August 2019.



Due to the tripping of 220 kV Bhuj-Vadva S/C on B-E fault, 220/33 kV

Vadva ICTs 1,2& 3 deenergized at 220 kv Vadva S/s. B - phase temporary earth

Fault.

GIWEL may submit the detailed report.


2J.2. Grid Incidence at 220 kv Vadva S/s on 24th August 2019.



Due to the tripping of 220 kV Bhuj-Vadva S/C on O/C current protection

operation, 220/33 kV Vadva Icts 1,2& 3 deenergized at 220 kv Vadva S/s. line

tripped in low set over current.

GIWEL may submit the detailed report.


2K. Compliance of 128th PCM to 137th PCM recommendations:

The compliance status of the 128th to 137th PCM recommendations is enclosed at

Annexure-2K.1.

Utilities are requested to furnish the compliance in the PCM.

Committee may like to discuss/note.

ITEM NO. 3: Tripping of lines / ICTs : The minor incidences of tripping of lines and ICTs during the period 01-07-2019

to 31-07-2019 are to be discussed is enclosed at Annexure–3.

Committee may like to discuss/note.


31

ITEM NO. 4: State Level Relay Co-ordination Groups:

4A.1.)Back ground: In the 128th& 129th PCM the issue of formation of “State

level Relay Co-ordination Group” (SRCG) was discussed in detail to review the

relay settings within the State, so that the settings are coordinated. It was

decided that SLDC shall be the convener of the group and the SRCG of the

States shall periodically review the relay coordination in their State. The

proposals for revision of relay settings then shall be put up to the PCM forum for

ratification.

4A.2.) 131st& 132nd PCM discussion:

Following critical areas were identified for relay protection co-ordination in the

131st PCM;

Maharashtra : Akola, Talegoan, APL Tirora and Mumbai-MSETCL

interconnections.

Gujarat : SSP, Kakrapar,Kawas&Gandhar.

MP : Omkareshwar&Damoh.

Chattisgarh: Korba (W) & Bhilai.

4A.3.) 136th PCM Discussions:

NPCIL representative informed that the implementation of revised distance relay

settings of 220kV TAPS-Borivali feeder at TAPS end has been done on

26.04.2019.

MSLDC representative informed that based on the action taken report of the first

and second meeting, they have proposed to conduct the third meeting most

probably in the month of June 2019.

GETCO representative informed that most of the relay setting coordination

issues were addressed during the first and second meetings and also informed

that the third meeting will be held in the month of June 2019 or July 2019.

MS,WRPC stressed that regular meetings of the State level Relay Co-ordination

groups be held for review of relay coordination of interconnections and the MoM

to be shared with PCM.

4A.4.) 137th PCM Discussions:

MSETCL representative informed that the relay settings for the critical areas

identified above have been done and a report would be put up in the next PCM.

GETCO representative informed the 2nd meeting of the group was conducted and

the 3rd meeting would be held in August 2019.

MPPTCL & CSPTCL representatives informed that they are also conducting

regular meetings and the findings would be put up in the next PCM.

MSETCL, MPPTCL & CSPTCL may appraise subcommittee with regards new

developments/report etc. as committed in 137th PCM.



32

ITEM NO. 5: Hon’ble CERCs orders on the Grid

disturbance of 30.07.2012 & 31.07.2012 5.1: Compliance Status observations made in Protection Audit (Petition No.

220/MP/2012) BackGround:

5.1.1) Back ground:

CERC vide its order dated 21.02.2014 in respect to petition No. 220/MP/2012

filed by POWERGRID have directed that CTU and SLDCs shall submit quarterly

Protection Audit Report to the respective RPC latest by 15th day of the first

month of next quarter and RPCs shall submit the report to the Commission

latest by 15th day of the second month of next quarter. The Member Secretary of

Regional Power Committees shall monitor the protection related issues and

bring to the notice of the Commission any instance of non-compliance of the

Regulation 1.5 of the Grid Code in respect of the protection related issues

considered in the instant petition.

Maharashtra representative stated that they are taking up the protection audit in

a - Ø d manner and they have already identified the S/Ss to be taken up for

protection audit. Further the compliances are mainly pending for protection

audits carried out in the recent past.

Gujarat & MP representatives stated that they have also taken up identification of

the S/Ss for protection audit and the same shall be intimated to PCM as soon as

it is done.

5.1.2) Protection Audit of all critical S/Ss above 220kV level :

Protection audit of all the critical S/Ss above 220kV level has to be carried out.

Take up protection audit of newly commissioned S/Ss and S/Ss where protection

audit has been carried out 5 years back.

(Discussed in 132nd PCM)

5.1.3) Protection audit of second - phase :

The status regarding the taking up the protection audit of second - phase was

discussed and the update on the same is as follows;

PGCIL, GETCO & MPPTCL representatives informed they have already planned

the activity to be done through independent agency. MSETCL representative

informed that they are planning to carry out the protection audit through

independent agency. NSPCL representative informed that they have already

carried out PA of their S/S. NTPC & CSPTCL representative informed that they

will inform the status shortly.

(Discussed in 133rd PCM)


33

5.1.4) Submission of Protection audit status to Hon’ble CERC :

Protection Audit Report for the fourth quarter of 2018-19 (January 19 to March

2019) has not yet received from CTU and SLDCs excluding SLDC, Gujarat and

SLDC, MP and PGCIL.

SLDCs and CTU/WRLDC are requested to submit the data at the end of every

quarter to WRPC, in compliance to the above CERC order dated 21.02.2014, so

that the quarterly data submission can be made by WRPC to CERC.

5.1.5) Issue to be discussed :

The compliances of protection audit observations received from the states for the

quarter (January to March 2019) have been sent to CERC, the same is available

on WRPC web site http://wrpc.gov.in/pcm/PAR_March_2019.pdf.

It has been observed that except Gujarat, MP & PGCIL, none of the

other constituents are regularly submitting the updated status, hence

the status already received is being communicated to Hon’ble CERC.

From the following compilation it is observed that the category A &

category B observations are still to be complied, which is serious.

The updated status of the protection audit observations is as given below

http://wrpc.gov.in/pcm/PAR_March_2019.pdf


34

As per the Hon’ble CERC order dated 21.02.2014 in respect to petition No.

220/MP/2012, SLDCs and CTU are requested to submit the data at the end

of every quarter to WRPC, so that the quarterly data submission can be

made by WRPC to CERC.



35

5.2: Relay Setting Database:

5.2.1) Background:

Hon‟ble CERC‟s vide order dated 22.02.2014 in the matter o f grid

disturbance occurred on 30.07.2012 & 31.07.2012 in petition No. 167/Suo-

Motu/2012, have made certain observations and issued directions.

According to this order, all the RPCs have to maintain the relay settings data of

all the ISTS lines and lines emanating from interface S/Ss of Utilities to ISTS

(400 kV& above and 220 kV interfacing lines). Therefore, all utilities were

requested to submit relay setting data to WRPC/WRLDC.

5.2.2) 136th PCM Discussions:

MS,WRPC briefly explained the database that is being prepared by WRPC to the

forum. He further informed to the constituents to furnish the data as per the

preferred format so that the data import from Excel to the database can be made

smoothly. He also informed to the forum that the compiled data base in Excel

sheets will be circulated to all the constituents and requested all the

constituents to update the data (if any) and furnish the updated data to WRPC.

5.2.3) Data formats and regular updation of the data :

The formats for relay settings were re-aligned as per the requirement of WRPC and

the same was sent to all the constituents vide email dated 07.06.2019.

Constituents are requested to send and update the data, strictly in the formats

circulated by WRPC vide the above email.

All the IPPs/ISGS and State generators are also required to submit the switchyard

setting data in the above formats. The generating Unit setting data should be

submitted by all these generators in the format enclosed as Annexure 5.2.3.


MSETCL representative informed that they would submit the data within 15

days. GETCO representative informed that the work is in progress. Committee

noted that the data was received recently from CSPTCL and is exactly as per

requirement of WRPC.

Committee requested the Generating utilities to submit the data in the format at

the earliest.



36

ITEM NO. 6: Task Force report Report of the Task Force on Power System Analysis Under

Contingencies:

Background:

Ministry of Power, GoI constituted a “Task Force on Power System Analysis

under Contingencies”, in December 2012 under the chairmanship of Shri

V. Ramakrishna as per the recommendation made by Enquiry Committee

headed by Chairman, CEA on grid disturbances that took place in NEW grid

on 30th and 31

st July 2012. The terms of reference of Task Force broadly cover

analysis of the network behavior under normal conditions and contingencies,

review of operational philosophy of protection relays, review of islanding

schemes and technological options to improve the performance of the grid. The

report of the Task Force was discussed briefly in 122nd PCM and subsequently

discussed in detail in a special meeting held on 18.12.2014. Thereafter the

recommendations were discussed in the previous PCMs. A brief on suggestions

given by Ramakrishna Committee, discussions/observations of the group and

PCM are as follows.

6.1) Formulation of Special groups for studies and protection coordination:

The Task Force recommended forming a group for studies, protection

coordination and relay settings. It also recommended that each utility should

establish a protection application department with adequate man power &

skills. The members of protection team shall undergo regular training to

enhance their skills.

6.2) Tuning of power electronic devices & PSS: The Task Force recommended

carrying out studies & reviewing the network at regular intervals (3-4 years) with

introduction of newer power electronic devices. The results may be implemented

within next 3-4 years. It also suggested that as this requires specialized dynamic

modeling, the task may be entrusted to reputed independent agency and

implementation of tuning be entrusted to respective manufacturer.

A meeting was held on 03.01.2017 at WRPC Mumbai, wherein representatives of

all the generating companies, SLDCs and expert from IIT-B attended the meeting.

WRP Committee in the 33rd WRPC meeting held on 01.02.2017, agreed and gave

approval for funding the studies software as above from WRPC fund for

developing the software through IIT-B. GETCO, CSPTCL, PGCIL WR-I & II

representatives informed that they would confirm their representation for the

study group shortly.

The 1st meeting of the WR Study Group was held on 29.10.2018 at WRPC,

wherein it was stressed that the updated network upto 31.09.2018 and the

planned network and system data upto March-2019 be submitted to WRPC for

taking up the Capacitor Studies.

Committee requested to submit the updated network upto 31.09.2018 and the

planned network and system data upto March-2019 to WRPC for taking up the


37

Capacitor Studies.

6.3) 136th PCM Discussions:

As regards to carrying out capacitor requirement studies, the data is still not

received from constituents and therefore all constituents are once again

requested to furnish updated network upto 30.04.2019 and the planned network

and system data upto March-2020 to WRPC for taking up the Capacitor Studies

The PSS tuning status received from WRLDC is enclosed at Annexure-6.


It was decided that nominations details will be made available to WRPC.

Subsequently, the contact details have been received which is tabulated

below.

Sl

No.

Name Organization Contact

Number

Mail ID

1 Shri. SSS Srinivas NTPC Solapur 9422508195 [email protected]

n

2 Shri Sachin Lomate SLDC Maharashtra 9029800895 [email protected]

3 Shri Vekhade

MSETCL testing

4 Shri G. T. Jawale

TPC 9223311419

[email protected]

om

5 Shri Sandeep

APL

6 Shri Sonu W. Korekar

Reliance

9324216663

sonu.korekar@relian

ceada.com

7 Smt.Pushpa Sheshadri

WRLDC 9869404482

[email protected]

8 Shri. Pradeep Sachan

SLDC MPPTCL 9425805277

p.sachan@mptransco

.nic.in

9 Shri. Kuleshwar Sahu Power Grid

Corporation of India

Ltd -WR-I

6260169298 kuleshwar@powergri

dindia.com

10 Shri Sanjoy Das Power Grid

Corporation of India

Ltd - WR-2

9429976244

sanjoydas@powergrid

india.com


https://mail.gov.in/iwc_static/layout/javascript:main.compose('new',%20'[email protected]')

mailto:[email protected]










38

National Power Committee(NPC) items:

ITEM NO.7: Violation of CEA Protection (Grid)

Standards-( NPC item): 7.1.1) CEA vide letter dated 30.08.2017, have intimated that following

protection standards were reportedly violated in respect of following cases;

(1) Non-availability of A/R at both ends of 220kV lines

(2) Non-submission of DR/EL data to RLDC within 24 hours of the event.

(3) Non-intimation of main reason for the events after its complete analysis.

(4) Higher fault clearance time than prescribed in the standards.

CEA has further directed that if the non-compliance of Grid/Standards/ Grid

Code continues, the matter may be reported to CERC under provisions of the

Grid Code, with a copy of the report to CEA. Committee (131 to 136th PCM)

requested all the utilities of WR to strictly follow the CEA’s protection standard

in future in order to ensure safe grid operation. A report of WRLDC on the above

subject covering details from July 19 to August 19 is enclosed at Annexure 7.

All the constituents are requested to submit the compliance report on the report

of WRLDC indicating violation of CEA Protection (Grid) Standard in case of

tripping of inter-regional lines of voltage class 220 kV and above level of WR


Committee requested all the constituents to submit the compliance report

on the report at annexure indicating violation of CEA Protection (Grid)

Standard of voltage class 220 kV and above level of WR.

7.2.1) Non-Auto recloser operation at RGPPL end (WRLDC item):

It is observed from the events in May ‘19 and June ’19 that the A/R at RGPPL

end did not operate and the lines tripped on transient faults. In all the events,

A/R was attempted and successful at remote end only and in each event the line

was holding.

The events are mentioned in the table below

Element name outdate out

time in date in time comments

400 kV RGPPL-

New Koyna 2 21-05-19 02:41 21-05-19 03:16

Line tripped from Dabhol end

only due to Y phase fault. A/R

successful at New Koyna end.

400 kV RGPPL-

New Koyna 2 22-05-19 01:10 22-05-19 10:35


only due to R phase fault.

400 kV RGPPL-

Nagothane 1 26-05-19 02:47 26-05-19 03:22

Tripped at Dabhol only; Y

phase fault; A/R successful at

Nagothane

400 kV RGPPL-

New Koyna 1 29-05-19 23:52 30-05-19 00:32

B Phase fault, A/R successful

at New Koyna end. Line

tripped at Dabhol end only.

400 kV RGPPL-

Nagothane 2 30-05-19 03:08 30-05-19 09:44


only. A/R successful at

Nagothane end.


39

400 kV RGPPL-

New Koyna 1 03-06-19 06:23 03-06-19 06:56

Y phase fault, A/R successful

at New Koyna tripped at

Dabhol end only

RGPPL may kindly update the status of A/R of 400kV transmission lines at

their end.



It was decided that a letter regarding the A/R issue be sent to RGPPL.

Committee requested all the utilities to attend the violations given in the

Annexure.

7.3) Status of Auto recloser of 220 kV Malanpur-Auraiya and 220 kV

Mehgaon-Auraiya (WRLDC item)

Due to the non-availability of phase segregated LBB relay at Auraiya end, A/R of

Malanpur and Mehgaon lines were kept off at Auraiya and MPPTCL ends from

September 2016.

As per letter dated 26.03.19 from MPPTCL to NTPC Auraiya, MPPTCL has made

request to Auraiya authority to procure the LBB relay as per their requirement

and the cost in this regard shall be paid by MPPTCL. As per mail dated 08-04-

2019, MPPTCL informed that ‘Auraiya has procured the LBB relay and the same

is being commissioned shortly’.

MOM of the meeting between MPPTCL and Auraiya regarding this issue and

letter given by MPPTCL to NTPC Auraiya are enclosed as Annexure-7.3.


Committee suggested that NTPC & MPPTCL would resolve the issue

mutually.

NTPC & MPPTCL may kindly update the status.



40

ITEM NO. 8: Details of Protection Audit and

Implemented Defence Mechanism –Reg (NPC Item).

8.1) National Power Committee Division (NPC) / CEA vide letter dated

10.09.2018 informed that a meeting was taken by Hon’ble MoSP (IC) on

20.08.2018 to discuss the draft National Electricity Plan. During the discussions

CEA has been asked to prepare report and presentations covering aspects of grid

reliability and security,especially with respect to grid failure and remedial

measures including mechanisms such as is-landing schemes,SPS,UFR,Third

Part Protection Audit etc.

NPC/CEA vide letter dated 10.09.2018 requested WRPC, the details in

prescribed formats on the following may please be furnished

i. Protection Audit Carried out so far and its observations

ii. Islanding scheme implemented in the region.

iii. SPS implemented in the region.

iv. Status of implementation of AUFLS in the region .

v. Status of implementation of df/dt relays & its settings in the region.

WRPC vide mail dated 12.10.2018 and dated 26.10.2018 requested

MSETCL,MPPTCL,CSPTCL,GETCO,Goa Electricity Department (GED), DD,

PGCIL , NTPC and DNH to furnish the information sought by NPC vide letter

dated 10.09.2018 to WRPC at the earliest. However, information was not

received from constituents except WRLDC and MSETCL. The letter & formats

received from NPC,CEA is enclosed at Annexure 8.

MPPTCL, CSPTCL, GETCO, GED,DD,DNH, NTPC is requested to submit the

information before the PCM or in the PCM.

The details sought by NPC have been received from WRLDC, MSETCL and PGCIL.


Committee requested MPPTCL, CSPTCL, GETCO, GED,DD,DNH & NTPC to

submit the data immediately.

MPPTCL, CSPTCL, GETCO, GED,DD,DNH, NTPC is again requested to submit

the status.



41

ITEM NO. 9: Enquiry Committee recommendations-

( NPC Item).

9.1)NPC, CEA vide letter no 7/GSC/NPC/CEA/2019/87-93 dated 16.01.2019

requested to submit the updated status of implementation of Enquiry Committee

recommendations. The last updated information of all constituents is enclosed

as Annexure -9.1. All the constituents are requested to update information and

submit the updated information (in excel format) to WRPC, so that the same

can be furnished to NPC, CEA. WRPC, vide mail dated 25.01.2019 (prc-

[email protected]) requested the constituents to submit the updated status of

implementation of Enquiry Committee recommendations at the earliest to WRPC.

9.2)135th PCM Discussions:

All the constituents are requested to submit the updated status of

implementation of Enquiry Committee recommendations at the earliest to

WRPC.

However, the data has not received from the constituents except PGCIL WR-I

and SLDC Gujarat.


WRPC representative informed that the data has not received from the

constituents except PGCIL WR-I and SLDC Gujarat.

MS, WRPC informed to the forum that NPC,CEA consistently following up

the subject matter with WRPC.

MS,WRPC requested all the constituents consider the subject matter as

priority and to submit the updated status of implementation of Enquiry

Committee recommendations at the earliest to WRPC.

WRLDC has furnished the latest status of implementation of Enquiry

Committee recommendations.

Constituents are requested to regularly update the data. Chattisgarh,

Goa, DD & DNH, and IPPs have not submitted the data so far. They may

submit the data immediately.


Committee requested Chattisgarh, Goa, DD & DNH to submit the data.

Chattisgarh, Goa, DD & DNH are again requested to update the status.





42

ITEM NO. 10:- Recommendations of M/s PLI. Canada-

NPC Item.

10.1.)Ministry of Power, Government of India constituted a “Taskforce on Power

System Analysis under Contingencies” in December 2012 as a follow-up of the

recommendations of Enquiry Committee under Chairperson, Central Electricity

Authority (CEA) on Grid Disturbances of 2012 in Indian Grid.

The Taskforce broadly made recommendations regarding analysis of the network

behavior under normal as well as contingency scenarios, review of the

philosophy of operation of protection relays, review of islanding schemes, review

of tuning of power electronic controlled devices, review of relay coordination and

technological options to improve the performance of the grid. The Taskforce

further recommended the appointment of consultants for the above.

To fulfill part of the above recommendations, Powertech Labs, Inc. (PLI) was

contracted to perform the following tasks:

Task I: Examination and recommendation of methodology for

optimum calculation of transfer capability in the planning

and the operational horizons.

Task II: Calculation of transfer capability for the entire country.

Task III:

Guidelines for developing and implementing system

protection schemes and islanding schemes, and

review of existing schemes.

Task IV:

Operational planning and long term planning for the

secure and efficient operation of the grid.

Task V:

Suitable suggestions in the Regulatory framework to

ensure secure and efficient grid operation.

Task VI: Review of the tuning of all power electronic devices and

suggesting retuning of setting of these devices, as per

“Taskforce Report on Power System Analysis”.

A meeting of officials from CEA,CERC,CTU and NLDC was held on 22.03.2019 in

the O/o Chief Engineer (NPC) for finalization of action plan of all the

recommendations in the report of the Tasks I to VI of the M/s Powertech Labs

Inc. Canada under Package B ( Review Transmission System Transfer Capability

and Review of Operational and Long Term Planning). During the meeting action

plan of the recommendations of Tasks were finalized.

NPC vide letter dated 15.05.2019 forwarded the finalized action plan of the

recommendations of Tasks and the same is enclosed as Annexure 10.1.

The recommendations that are required to be implemented by RPCs has been

highlighted by adding extra columns in the recommendation sheets of PLI and is

enclosed at Annexure 10.2.



43

Western Region Islanding schemes:

ITEM NO. 11: Islanding scheme for KAPP - 3&4, Nuclear

Power Units of NPCIL. 12.1) NPCIL letter no. NPCIL/Trans/2018/M/29 dated 10.10.2018 have

requested WRPC for evolving an Islanding scheme for KAPS 3 & 4 so that it can

be implemented before the unit start up. WRPC vide letter dated 07.12.2018

requested GETCO,NPCIL,WRLDC to furnish the required information for doing

detailed study to evolve the islanding scheme for KAPS 3 & 4. The data required

as follows:

1) Data/details/information to be furnished by NPCIL/KAPS:

a) Generation details

i. Generation trip details.

ii. Speed control operation of governor.

iii. UF/LF trip settings.

iv. Other relevant requirements.

b) Load details- load to be included in Island.

2) Data/details/information to be furnished by GETCO:

The downstream network & feeder wise loads at the next bus and further

downstream low voltage network.

3) Data/details/information to be furnished by WRLDC:

Latest network & peak &off-peak loadings of lines emanating from KAPS &

adjacent buses.

A meeting was held at KAPS NPCIL on 14.11.2018 to discuss the Islanding

scheme. Generator data was received from KAPS NPCIL vide their letter dated

04.01.2019. Data has been received from GETCO by mail.

12.2)135th PCM Discussions:

SE (P), WRPC suggested that a separate meeting would be better to discuss and

formulate the Islanding scheme for Kakrapar Atomic Power Project (KAPP - 3&4)

2x700 MW capacity Nuclear Power Units of NPCIL and the date of the meeting

could be decided and intimated to NPCIL,GECTO& WRLDC later on.

12.3) KAPS Islanding meeting held on 24.04.2019 at WRPC Mumbai.

A meeting was held on 24.04.2019 at WRPC Mumbai (copy of MoM enclosed at

Annexure-15.5) to discuss Islanding scheme for Kakrapar Atomic Power Project

(KAPP - 3&4) 2x700 MW capacity Nuclear Power Units of NPCIL.

During the meeting all the participants discussed about the option 1 and option

2 proposed by GETCO.

After detailed discussion, all the participants, agreed to choose option-II for

KAPS 3 & 4 islanding out of two options proposed by GETCO. It was also agreed

to put up the decision of choosing option –II in next PCM for further direction (if

any).


44


A meeting was held on 24.04.2019 at WRPC Mumbai (copy of MoM enclosed at

Annexure-12.4) to discuss Islanding scheme for Kakrapar Atomic Power Project

(KAPP - 3&4) 2x700 MW capacity Nuclear Power Units of NPCIL.

During the meeting all the participants discussed about the option 1 and option

2 proposed by GETCO.

After detailed discussion, all the participants, agreed to choose option-II for

KAPS 3 & 4 islanding out of two options proposed by GETCO.

DNH representative was not present during the meeting.


DNH representative informed that they in-principle agree with the option-2 given

above. They would discuss with their management and revert back. As regards

to the seasonal variation of load on the identified lines, they informed that the

same would be submitted shortly.

NPCIL representative informed that the protection setting data would be shared

with GETCO, as desired by GETCO.

Committee felt that with the above data GETCO would carry out detailing of the

Islanding scheme and forward the same to WRPC. After receipt of the detailed

scheme, a meeting would be arranged to finalize the Islanding scheme.

DNH & NPCIL has furnished the data as above to GETCO.

GETCO vide mail dated 07.08.2019 (copy enclosed as annexure 12.5) has

requested for additional data and the same was forwarded to NPCIL and

DNH. A separate meeting has been arranged on 16.10.2019 at WRPC

Mumbai. The out come would be informed in the PCM.


ITEM NO. 13: Certificate for Healthiness of Batteries

13.1) Background:

As per the MoP direction given in pursuant to recommendations of the Enquiry

Committee (NEW grid disturbance on 30th & 31st July, 2012), RPCs are

required to obtain from their respective Constituents the monthly certificate for

healthiness of batteries, installed at 220 KV and above voltage level Substations

(for power supply to Relays, RTUs and PLCC equipment) and furnish the same to

CEA/MoP.

With reference to above, the Constituents are requested to submit the certificate

on healthiness of batteries on monthly basis (i.e. status for a month shall be

sent by the 7th day of the following month) to WRPC Secretariat.

The certificates have been received from KSK Mahanadi, TRN Energy,

GSECL/GETCO, MSETCL, TATA Power, Essar Power, Rinfra, NCA, SKS, CGPL,

PGCIL WR#2, LANCO, Jaypee Nigrie, NSPCL, GSEL, MCCPL.

Constituents other than above may submit the certificates on regular basis.



45

ITEM NO. 14: Third-Party Protection Audit Teams (TPPAT).

14.1) The issue of "Formation of Third-Party Protection Audit Teams(TPPAT) for

carrying out third party protection audit in WR" was discussed in the 37th

WRPC meeting held on 18.12.2018 and it was agreed to form protection audit

teams in WR for carrying out the protection audit of S/Ss in WR.

Table –A: Number of members to be nominated with relay testing and

coordination background.

Utility No. of members to be nominated

with relay testing & coordination

background

Nomination status

Genco Transco Others

Maharashtra 1 1 - TRANSCO

1. Mr- R. H. Satpute

Superintending Engineer

Design and Protection Dept.

GENCO

1. Mr R S Alone EE(Testing)

Madhya Pradesh 1 1 - GENCO

Shri. Hapreet Singh Bomrah,

AE. (O &M)

Gujarat 1 1 - Shri. R.A. Patel DyEE(T)

Mehasana

GSECL

Shri.P.A.Parekh,DE,CHPH

EMD, Ph no. 9687663077

Mail :-

[email protected]

Chhattisgarh 1 1 -

PGCIL: W-1 - 3 - 1. Shri Dinesh Reddy, Dy

Manager

2. Shri S Naveen, Asst

Manager

PGCIL:WR – II - 3 - 1. Sh. SachinSavke, Asst.

Manager – Jabalpur PS

2. Sh. Pramod Pathak, Asst.

Manager – Navsari

3. Sh. Kumar Siddhant, Asst.

Manager – Navsari

NTPC 3 - - 1.Shri R K Aash

[email protected]

9429408449

2.Shri S K Waryani

[email protected]


46

8275045135

3.Shri Umesh Kumar

[email protected]

6265530641

IPP : APL 1 - -

IPP : CGPL/TATA 1 - - Shri G.T.Jawale

IPP: SASAN 1 - -

SSP/NCA 1 - -

WRLDC - - 2 Shri. Selvamani Prabaharan

M and Shri. M. Venkateswara

Rao

Table-B : Number of teams, its composition and duties.

Sl No. Team Composition System to be audited

1 Team -I 1. Gujarat Transco -1

2. Gujarat Genco – 1

3. PGCIL – 1

4. NTPC -1

5. DNH-1

Maharashtra

IIP S/Ss

2 Team – II 1. MP Transco – 1

2. MP Genco -1

3. PGCIL – 2

4. NTPC -2

5. APL

Gujarat

Chhattisgarh

3 Team – III 1. Maharashtra Transco -1

2. Maharashtra Genco -2

3. PGCIL 2

4. NTPC-3

5. SASAN

6. Goa

Madhya Pradesh

PGCIL

4 Team – IV 1. Chhattisgarh Transco – 1

2. Chhattisgarh Genco – 2

3. CGPL/TATA

4. DD -1

5. SSP – 1 & NPCIL - 1

Goa

DD

DNH

NHPC

NPCIL

NTPC

WRPC vide mail dated 08.01.2019 requested all constituents to give the

nomination so that the work of protection audit can be initiated latest by

15.01.2019. Nominations have been received from MSETCL,PGCIL WR-II &

NTPC only. The other constituents in Table-A may give the nominations at the

earliest.


47


WRPC representative informed that the details of protection audit teams in WR

for carrying out the protection audit of S/Ss in WR has been circulated to the

constituents by mail ([email protected]) dated 08.01.2019 and 19.03.2019.

However, nominations are still awaited from all constituents except PGCIL and

NTPC.

MS,WRPC requested all the constituents to furnish their nominations at the

earliest to WRPC so that the third party protection audit in WR can be started.


Constituents were requested to give the nominations at the earliest.

Committee in reference to queries whether the utilities can carry out the third

party protection audit by hiring/appointing out side agency, Committee

recommended that utilities can proceed by hiring/appointing out side agency for

carrying out third party protection audit. However the protection audit should be

carried out strictly as per the guidelines given in the “Report of task Force” and

Tractable.

The list of critical sub stations and Sub stations where protection audit has

been carried out 5 years back is enclosed as Annexure 14.3

Committee may like to discuss the plan for third party protection audit of

the critical sub stations through above formulated teams.




48

WRLDC Items :

ITEM NO.15:

15.1 ) Mock Testing of Local and Wide area System Protection Schemes

(SPS) in Western Region

15.1.1) Background:

The details of local SPS are as follows: -

1. CGPL SPS

2. Sasan SPS

3. JPL Stage 1 & 2 SPS

4. Essar Mahan SPS

5. Sipat SPS

6. 220 kV Vapi-Kharadpada

7. APL Mundra SPS

8. APL Tiroda SPS

9. Mouda SPS

10. High Frequency SPS (tripping of Korba Unit 7 , Vindhyachal Unit 7,

CGPL Unit 40)

Details of Inter-regional SPS Schemes (Wide Area) are as follows:

11. Agra-Gwalior SPS at Gwalior end.

12. HVDC Mundra Mohindergarh SPS

In the 129th PCM it was decided that mock testing of the local SPS can be

done without much coordination and therefore WRLDC may prepare a

schedule for mock testing of local SPS and carry out the mock testing as

per the schedule in coordination with the generators concerned. The Wide

Area SPS requires coordination among the inter region, therefore these shall

be scheduled in consultation with the NLDC and respective RLDCs.

It was decided that wherever the SPS has operated successfully in the

recent past, it would not be required to carry out the mock testing of SPS.

15.1.2) Updates:

1. The updated status of recent successful operation of SPS received from

WRLDC is enclosed at Annexure-15.1.2 (A).

2. Schedule of mock testing of SPS along with SPS operations (2016-19) as

received from WRLDC is enclosed at Annexure-15.1.2 (B).



49

15.2) Revision of SPS implemented at JPL:

The SPS for safe evacuation of generation at JPL was implement in Sept 2011

and later on reviewed in April 2015. It was formulated for N-1-1 stability of JPL

Stage-I (4X250 MW+2X135 MW) and JPL Stage-II(4X600 MW) TPS.

The implemented scheme is as follows:

If Generation at JPL Stage-I (4 * 250), JPL Stage-II (2X600 MW) & DCPP (2 * 135

MW) in service, Net Generation 2180 MW.

1. One circuit of 400 kV JPL-Raipur line and 400 kV JPL Stage-I to JPL Stage-

II inter connector or One of the line is out of service and other circuit trips:

a. Ex Bus Generation at JPL Stage-1 to be brought to 590 MW (Trip one

unit of 250 MW & 2-Unit of 135 MW along with 60 MW of Generation

reduction in 3-4 Minutes.)

2. Tripping of 765 kV Tamnar-Kotra D/c lines or One circuit on outage and

other line trips: a. Trip one unit of 600 MW and immediate backing down

other unit such that Ex Bus generation of JPL Stage-I + JPL Stage-II should

not exceed 1160 MW.

WRLDC vide email have informed that M/S JPL has requested for revision of

SPS after commissioning of 765 kV Tamnar-Kotra-D/C lines. TRN Energy

(2X300 MW) is connected to 400 kV Tamnar PS and is evacuating through 765

kV Tamnar-Kotra-D/C lines. Therefore, in case of N-1-1 contingency i.e.,

tripping of 765 kV Tamnar-Kotra-D/C lines, TRN Energy also has to be included

in SPS along with JPL.


Committee observed that since the representatives of TRN & Jindal power are

not present in the meeting, it would be discussed in special meeting/next PCM



50

ITEM NO. 16:- WRLDC Tripping report portal

16.1) Indian Electricity Grid Code (IEGC),2010 part 5, operating code, clause 5.2

( r ) stipulated the timeline for submission of grid incident reports to WRLDC and

WRPC which is as follows:

“ All the users, STU/SLDC and CTU shall send information/data including

disturbance recorded/sequential event recorder output to RLDC within ( 24

hours ) for the purpose of analysis of any grid disturbance/event. No user,

SLDC/STU or CTU shall block any data/information required by the RLDC

and RPC for maintaining reliability and security of the grid and for

analysis of the event.”

CEA (Grid standards) regulations, 2010 clause 15. (3) Stipulated the timeline for

submission of grid incident reports to WRLDC and WRPC which is as follows:

“All operational data, including disturbance recorder and event logger

reports, for analysing the grid incidents and grid disturbance and any

other data which in its view can be of help for analysing grid incident or

grid disturbance shall be furnished by all the Entities within twenty four

hours to the Regional Load Despatch Centre and concerned Regional

Power Committee.”

WRLDC tripping portal was operationalized from 01-06-2019 for uploading FIR,

DR/EL and other details related to the tripping.

User IDs and password were issued to utilities to upload the tripping details in

the following link.

http://103.7.130.115/Trippingnew//Account/Login.aspx

As per IEGC 54.2(r), utilities need to submit the data within 24 hours of the

event.

In the 137th PCM, all Utilities are requested to use the WRLDC tripping

portal and submit the data through the same. However, it is found that

utilities are not uploading the data on the above link.


ITEM NO. 17: Date and venue of the next meeting

Committee may like to decide the next PCM (139th PCM) date and venue.

http://103.7.130.115/Trippingnew

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