AFM Vol.2 Gen_En-Basic, Pt.2 Tactical Doctrine 1995

7/24/2019 AFM Vol.2 Gen_En-Basic, Pt.2 Tactical Doctrine 1995

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D/HQDT/18/34/47 ArmyCodeNo71583(Pt2)

THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

VOLUME II

GENERIC ENEMY (BASIC FORCES)

PART 2

TACTICAL DOCTRINE

Prepared under the direction ofthe Chief of the General Staff

1995


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CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

(ApplicabletocopiessuppliedwithMinistryofDefenceapprovaltoCommon-

wealthandForeignGovernments).

1. ThisinformationisreleasedbytheUnitedKingdomGovernmenttotherecipientGovernmentforDefencepurposesonly.

2. ThisinformationmustbeaccordedthesamedegreeofsecurityprotectionasthataccordedtheretobytheUnitedKingdomGovernment.

3. ThisinformationmaybedisclosedonlywithintheDefenceDepartmentoftherecipientGovernment,exceptasotherwiseauthorizedbytheMinistryof

Defence(Army).

AMENDMENTS

AmendmentNumber Bywhomamended Dateamended

AL1Cover&FacingPage

DISTRIBUTION

(see Catalogue of Army publications, Part II)

RegularArmy(otherthanthosementionedbelow).....................................ScaleC TA............................................................................................................... ScaleC

JointServicesDefenceCollege................................................................. 100

StaffCollege............................................................................................... 350

JDSC.......................................................................................................... 100

RMCS......................................................................................................... 50 RMAS......................................................................................................... 100

ArmsSchools............................................................................................. 50

CATC.......................................................................................................... 100

BATUS........................................................................................................ 100

AllBBGTs.................................................................................................... 10 Division/DistrictHQs....................................................................................10 BdeHQs......................................................................................................5


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CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE ii

CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Section1 TheGENFORCEArmedForces TD11

Section2 TacticalPrinciples TD11

Section3 CommandStyle TD12Section4 Communications TD17

Section5 CombatOrganizations TD110

CHAPTER 2 - THE MARCH

Section1 GeneralPrinciples TD21

Section2 AdministrativeMarches TD21

Section3 TacticalMarches TD24

CHAPTER 3 - RECONNAISSANCE


Section2 Resources TD32Section3 MissionsandMethods TD35

CHAPTER 4 - OFFENSIVE


Section2 TheAttackfromtheMarch TD46

Section3 TheAttackfromaPositionofCloseContact TD411

Section4 Combat&ServiceSupportintheOffensive TD412Section5 TheMeetingBattle TD427

Section6 Pursuit TD430

Section7 AttackingtheEnemyinDepth TD431

Section8 TheOffensiveinSpecialConditions TD435

CHAPTER 5 - THE DEFENSIVE

Section1 GeneralPrinciples TD51Section2 OrganizationandConductofPositionalDefence TD52

Section3 Fortifications TD56Section4 ConductoftheDefence TD59

Section5 ManoeuvreDefence TD512

Section6 CombatSupport TD515

Section7 DefenceinSpecialConditions TD521

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PREFACE

GENERIC ENEMY BASIC FORCES

GENFORCE

1. ThepurposeoftheGenericEnemyForce(GENFORCE)istoprovideabasisforthegenerationofenemyforcesforallexceptthemostspecialisedtrainingneeds.Itisdesignedtobeusedflexibly,inamodularfashion,tocraftenemyrequire-

mentsfortraining.

2. GENFORCEoffersthreetypesofartificial,yetchallengingandrealistic,opposing

forceoptions. Itwillbeissuedinaseriesofthreepackages:

Basic Forces: Thisenemyhasheavyandlightarmouredforces,predominantly

equippedalongFormerSovietUnion(FSU)lines. ItsTacticalDoctrineandOp-

erationalArtaremodelledonarevisionofArmyFieldManualVolumeII.

Mobile Forces: Thisenemyisfuturistic,moreadvancedintermsofequipment

andTacticalDoctrine,withanOperationalArtgearedtowardslessdensebattle-fieldscenarios.

Rest of the World Enemy (ROWEN): Thiscompositeenemyhasabroadrangeofequipmentsofmixedorigin. ItsTacticalDoctrineandOperationalArtarede-

signedtosupportspecificoperationalenvironments:normal,desert,mountain,

FIBUAandjungle.

GENSCEN

3. The TrainingSupportTeamattheCombinedArmsTrainingCentrehasdevel-

opedanevolutionaryscenariogenerator(GENSCEN)tobeusedwithGENFORCE.

GENSCENwillprovidearangeofcountry/infrastructureoptionstosupplement

andbringtolifetheGENFORCEselectedforaparticularexercise. Backgroundinformationisprovidedinaformatsimilartoreallifeintelligencedocuments,in-

cludingaselectionofcountrybriefs,withoptionsforpoliticalandmilitaryperson-

alitiesandsupportingdatainavarietyofforms.

BASIC FORCES

4. ThefirstofthethreeGENFORCEpackages, Basic Forces,isissuedinthree

separatefoldersasfollows:

Part1OperationalArt Part2TacticalDoctrine

Part3ORBATsandTablesofOrganisations&Equipment

5. GENFORCEBasicForcessupersedesArmyCode71357fortraining.However,

thelatterpublicationshouldberetainedandwillremainavailableondemand.

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

SECTION 1 - THE GENFORCE ARMED FORCES

1001. General. Asamajorlandpower,withextensiveborders,GENFORCEhasalwayspossessedalargeandformidablearmy.GENFORCEmilitarydoctrinehasbeenlargelywrittenbygroundforcesofficersandtheotherarmedforceshavegenerallybeenheldinlesseresteem. Thelandcommanderhastradi-

tionallyheldoverallcommandinjointoperations.

1002. Equipment. GENFORCEisamajorindustrialpowerandhasbeenabletosupplyitsarmedforceswithwelldesigned,ruggedandreasonablyuptodate

weaponry.

1003. Manpower.BecauseofthesizeofthecountryanditsarmyGENFORCEhas

alwaysreliedonconscriptiontofilltheranksofitsarmedservices. Itsofficercorpshoweverisaprofessionalandwelleducatedbody,trainedinexcellent

militarycollegesandacademies. Asmilitarytechnologybecomesmorecom-

plex,theproportionoflongservicesoldiersintheranksisgrowing.

1004. History.GENFORCEhasalonganddistinguishedmilitaryhistorywhichre-mainsasourceofpridetothecountryanditsarmyandisthemaindatabase

onwhichitsmilitarydoctrinehasbeendeveloped.

1005. Terrain.MostofGENFORCEswarshavebeenfoughtonaverylargescaleovercomparativelyfeaturelessopenterrain.AsaresultGENFORCEmilitarydoctrineemphasizesmassandmanoeuvre. Itsarmedforceshaverelativelylittleexperienceofoperationsonothersortsofterrain.

SECTION 2 - TACTICAL PRINCIPLES

1006. Tactics and Operational Art.AsexplainedinPart2GENFORCEOperational

Art,Chapter1,inGENFORCEdoctrinetacticsaresubordinatetooperational

art.Successattheoperationallevelisconsideredthekeytovictory.Itisthere-

forenotsurprisingthatGENFORCEprinciplesofoperationalartandtacticsare,inoutline,identical.TheseprinciplesarediscussedindetailinPart2but,forconvenience,arebrieflydescribedbelow.

1007. GENFORCE Tactical Principles.

a. Selection & Maintenance of the Aim. Themissionsetbytheseniorcom-manderwilldeterminetheaimtobeachieved.Oncethathasbeenidenti-

fied,everyeffortmustbeconcentratedonitsachievementwithinthetime

allocated.

b. Surprise.Surpriseiscrucialinwinningtheinitiativeandthrowingtheen-emyoffbalance. Thebasicplanningofconcealmentanddeceptiontakes

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placeattheoperationallevel;tacticalcommandersmustconformtothat

plan.Atthetacticallevelthereisusuallyneitherthetimenortheresources

forcomplicatedschemesandtheenemymaybesurprisedbysimpletech-niques,suchasspeedofmovementandreaction,feints,theuseofsmoke

oranunexpectedaxis.

c. Activeness and Speed. Tacticalcommandersoperateunderconstantpres-sureoftime;delaypermitstheenemytorecoverhisbalance. Theuseoftacticaldrills permits thecommander tousehis initiative toachieve theoperationalobjective.

d. Concentration. Theapplicationofsuperiorforceatthedecisivetimeand

placebringssuccessandcanbeachievedbymanoeuvreofforcesandfire,deceptionandskilfultacticalgrouping.Theneedtoidentifythedeci-

siveaxisandconcentrateforceonitisdeeplyingrainedinGENFORCE

tacticalcommanders. Economyofforceisvitaltothisendandtoshareassetsequallyamongsubunitsisalientosuchcommandersthinking.

e. Action Throughout the Enemys Depth. GENFORCEcommandersareex-

pected tousethe firepowerandmobilityoftheir resources tothefull to

striketheir immediateenemyindepth. Theyequallyexpect theirsenior

commanderstousethemindeepoperations,forexample,asraidingor

forwarddetachmentsorasairmobileforces.Thustheyareaccustomedtotheideaoffightingoutofdirectcontactwithfriendlyflankingorfollowon

forces.

f. Realism. Thevery detailed tacticaland logisticnormsdevelopedbyGENFORCEhelpcommanderstoavoidthetwinerrorsofovertaskingtheirtroopsorwastingresources.

g. Coordination. Moderncombatisacombinedarmsbattleinwhichitisthe

commandersresponsibilitytoensurethathisown,attachedandsupport-

ingforcesworkeffectivelyandefficientlytoachievetheaim.

h. Preservation of the Combat Effectiveness of Own Troops. Thisheading

coversawiderangeofactivity,fromactiveandpassivemeasurestopro-

tectonesforcesfromenemyattacks,throughlogisticsupportandthemain-tenanceofmorale,toactiontorestorecombatcapabilityafterenemystrikes.

SECTION 3 - COMMAND STYLE

1008. Image of the Battlefield.Part2GENFORCEOperationalArthasdescribed

theimageofthemodernbattlefieldwhichdominatesGENFORCEthinking. Itisanincreasingly openscene,withnoclearlydefined front line,nosecure

flanksandnosaferearareas.Theforcesofbothsideswillinevitablybeinter-

mingledoverwidefrontsandindepth. GENFORCEbelievesthatitsdoctrine

andcommandstylearewellsuitedtothissortofbattlefieldanditisattempting

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toexploitmoderninformationtechnologytosupportcommandersfightingfast

movingandrapidlychangingbattles.

1009. The Role of the Commander.Ateverylevel,GENFORCEcommandershave

soleresponsibilityforthefulfilmentofthemission.Althoughthisfocusesdeci-

sionmaking itcanalsodiscouragesubordinatesfromacting independently.Becauseofthestressontheoperationallevelofcommand,tacticalcommand-

ersareoftenquitejuniorandmaylacktheexperienceoftheircounterpartsintheBritishandotherwesternarmies. Initiative isnotdiscouragedin junior

commandersbutitshouldbeexercisedstrictlyinaccordancewiththesenior

commandersplan.Atthemostjuniorlevelsofcommand,officerscannoteas-

ilydelegatetotheirmostlyconscriptjuniorNCOsandcanbeoverwhelmedby

theweightofroutineadministration.

1010. Use of Drills. TacticaldrillsarewidelyusedbyGENFORCEinordertoallevi-

atesomeoftheseproblems. Theadvantagesofdrillsare:

a. Training.Drillscanbemosteasilytaughttoconscriptsoldiers,savingtrain-ingtime.

b. Planning. Theoverloadonjuniorcommandersisreducedbysimplifying

theplanningandorganizationprocess.

c. Flexibility. Byusingstandarddrillsthroughoutthegroundforces,

GENFORCEmakes iteasier for subunits tocooperatewitheachother

andforhigherlevelsofcommandtoregrouptheirforcesasthebattlefield

requirementchanges.

d. Speed. Thetimesrequiredforbattlepreparation,deploymentandchang-ingplansareallreducedbytheuseoftacticaldrills.

1011. The Commanders Decision.EverythingintheGENFORCEsystemstems

fromthecommandersdecision. Thedecisionmakingprocessbeginswhenthecommanderreceivesacombatorderorwarningorderfromhisseniorcom-

mander.Hisfirststepsaretoclarifythemissionandassessthesituation:

a. Clarification of the Mission. Thecommandermustunderstandtheseniorcommandersconceptofbattleandhisownunitsroleinit. Atthispointhealsomakesatimeappreciationand,throughhischiefofstaff,setsintrain

anymeasureswhichareimmediatelyrequiredandissueswarningorders

tosubunits.

b. Assessment of the Situation. Theassessmentisconducted in these-quence:enemyforces;ownforces;flankingforces;terrain;chemicalsitua-

tion;weatherandtimeofday.

1012. Components of the Decision. Havingclarifiedhismissionandassessedthesituation thecommandermakeshisdecisionandmarksitonhismap. Thecomponentsofthedecisionare:

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a. Concept of Battle. Thecommanderspecifieswhichenemygroupingsare

tobedestroyed,withwhatresourcesandinwhatorder;thesectorofmain

effort;theorganizationofcombatgroupingsandthegeneralplanforma-noeuvre,concealmentanddeception.

b. Tactical Missions. Thesearelaiddownfororganicandsubordinatedsub-units.

c. Coordination. Thecommanderindicatesobjectives,phaselines,targetsandtimings.

d. Organization of Service Support and Command and Control. Oftenthese

questionsarelefttothechief ofstaff. Indeed,whentimeislimited,thecommanderconfineshimselftodefiningthemostimportantobjectivesand

everythingelse is left tothe staff,who thenproduce theirplansfor the

commanders approval.

1013. Putting the Decision into Practice. Thedecisionmust firstbereportedtotheseniorcommanderforhisapproval.Thedecisionisthenpassedtosubor-

dinatesandthechiefofstafftranslatesitintofullerplansandorders. Detailed

instructionsforcooperationandcoordinationareproduced. Uptothispoint

thecommanderwillbeworkingprimarily from hismap. Iftimepermitsthe

decisionwillnowberefinedontheground. Thecommandermayattendtheseniorcommandersgroundreconnaissanceandthenstudythegroundwith

hisownsubunitcommanders. IntheGENFORCEviewtoconductground

reconnaissancebeforemakingadecisionwouldbetowastevaluabletime.

Thedecisionmaybemodifiedasaresultofthegroundreconnaissanceandthenverbalorderswillbegiven.Thecommandersupervisesthepreparationsofhissubordinates, eitherpersonallyorthroughhisdeputyorchiefofstaff. At

theappointedtimehereportsthereadinessofhisunittotheseniorcommander.

1014. Tactical Norms.GENFORCEhasdevotedagreatdealofefforttoanalysing

pastwars,modelling futureonesand thusdevelopingmathematical normsexpressedincalculations,chartsandnomogramsand,increasingly,programs

forcomputersandelectroniccalculators.Althoughthesemayseemoverfor-

mal tooutsiders, theuseof thesetoolsspeeds the commandersdecision

makingprocessandtheworkofhisstaffindevelopinghisplans. Itisalsoanapproachwhichlendsitselftotheuseofautomatedcommandsystems.

1015. Command Posts. ItisinkeepingwiththeGENFORCEviewofthepersonal

significanceofthecommanderthatthetermcommandpostisused,rather

thanheadquarters.FromdivisionalleveldownwardsGENFORCEcommand

postsaregenerallysmallerthantheequivalentBritishheadquarters.InpartthisisbecausethelogisticresponsibilitiesofGENFORCEcommandpostsare

ratherlessthantheBritishcounterparts. Itisalsoaconsequenceofthecom-

mandstyleoutlinedaboveandarequirementoftheGENFORCEimageofa

fastmovingbattlefield.

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TABLE 1-1: DEPLOYMENT OF DIVISIONAL AND REGIMENTAL COMMAND

POSTS IN THE ADVANCE

CommandPost

Distance

fromFLUT

(km)

Number

of

Vehicles

Deployment

Area

(sqkm)

Remarks

DivisionalFCP 25 About10 Approx0.2 Movesconstantlywith

firstechelonuniton

themainaxis.

DivisionalCP 1020 About70 Upto10 Usuallydeploysbetweenfirstand

secondechelonsand

movesupto23times

daily.

DivisionalACP 1020 About3 Upto8 Asformain. Oftennotformedintheadvance.

DivisionalRCP 3040 About16 Upto5 Deployswithlogistic

elementsandmoves

upto23timesdaily.

RegimentalFCP 25 About4 Approx0.1 Movesconstantlywithfirstechelonsubunit

onthemainaxis.

RegimentalCP 58 About17 0.4 Usuallydeploysbetweenfirstandsecondechelons.

Movesbyboundsbehindfirstechelon.

RegimentalRCP 1015 About10 0.2 Deployswithlogistic

elements.

Notes:

1. Figuresareyardsticksonly. ThedistanceofaCPfrom theFLOTandthe fre-quencyofitsmoveswilldependonthetempoofcombat.

2. WithinCPs,dispersionispractisedtoreducevulnerability. Communicationscen-tresareremotedseveralkilometresawaytolessenthechanceofenemyDFactivity

leadingtolocationofCPitself. CPsaresitedsothatnosingletacticalnuclearweapon

willeliminatemorethanone.

3. TheprotectionofCPsbyairdefencetroopsisahighpriority,andengineersupportisusuallyavailabletodiginandhelpcamouflagekeyelements. Ideallytheyaresited

nearsecondechelon/reservestogainprotectionfromgroundorheliborneattack.

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1016. Command Post Deployments. The deploymentof CPs atdivisionaland

regimentallevelsissummarisedinTable11.

a. Command and Observation Post (COP). Formedat battalion,company

andplatoonlevelsonlyanditistheonlyheadquarterselementatthose

levelsofcommand. IntheattackfromthemarchCOPsaregenerallyvehi-cleborne,butindefenceandinanattackfromclosecontactCOPsmay

be duginpositions. ThebattalionCOPconsistsofthecommandersandchiefofstaffsvehiclesandmayincludethesignalsplatoonvehicle. The

commandersofattachedsubunits(especiallyartillery)areexpectedtobe

colocatedwiththeCOPofthebattalionorcompanytheyaresupporting.

b. Command Post (CP).Atregimentanddivision,thisisthefocusofcontrol.TheCPisrunbythechiefofstaff,whodirectstheformation/unitstaffin

translatingthecommandersdecisionintoplansandorders.Italsocoordi-

nates themovement and deploymentofallsubordinategroupingsandmonitorstheirprogressandcombatfitnessincluding supply states. Se-

lectedstaffofficers,thoroughlybriefedinthecommandersconcept,arefrequentlysenttosubordinateunitsandsubunitstoensurethattheyun-

derstandandimplementits spirit. TheCPusuallydeploysbetweenthe

firstandsecondechelons,butitisnotconstantlyonthemovelikethe

ForwardCP.NoStepUpisformed. WhentheCPmoves,iteitherretains

controlwhileonthemarch,or theForwardCPtemporarilyassumes thefullburden.

c. Forward Command Post (FCP). Commandersaremostconcernedthat

theirdecisions arebasedonthemostuptodateandaccurateevaluationofthesituation.Tothisend,theyformasmallarmouredFCPcomprisedoftheir mostimportantadvisors(chiefsoftheoperations, intelligenceandsignalsstaffs,thechiefofartilleryandanairforcerepresentative)andcom-

municationsmeans. TheFCPmoveswiththe firstechelononthemain

axis.Thecommanderisthusabletoacquainthimselfwiththesituationon

thekeysector,includingthenuancesthatarefilteredoutinsecondhandreportsandtoreactimmediatelytodevelopments. Hecanissueordersin

person, ensure thattheyareunderstood,personallysupervisetheirex-

ecutionandmonitorprogress.RegimentsdonotalwaysformaFCP,prob-

ablybecauseoflimitedmanpowerandequipment.However,aregimentalcommanderwilluseaFCPwheneverhefeelsthat hispersonalpresenceiscrucialtotacticalsuccess.

d. Alternate Command Post (ACP). Notfoundbelowdivisionallevelandonly

sometimescreatedbydivisions,mostcommonlyindefence.Itisareserve

CP,establishedatreducedmanninglevels,toassumecontroliftheCPisdestroyed. ItdeployslaterallyfromthemainCP.ACPsarealsoformed

whenoperatinginexceptionallydifficultterrain,ifthedivisionisdispersed

overawiderarea than usual and lateralcommunicationsaredifficult.

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e. Airborne. Inveryfluidsituations,ortomaintaincontrolwhentheCPmoves,

anairborneCPinahelicoptersuchastheHIPGmaybeusedatdivisional

level.

f. Rear Control Post (RCP). FromthisCP,whichislocatedintheareaofthe

rearservices(ie logistics) elements, the chief of the rearorganizeslogisticsupportforaconceptofbattlehereceivesfromtheCP. TheCP

keepstheRCPfullyandcontinuouslyinformedofoperationalrequirementsandRCP,inturn,keepstheCPabreastofsupplystates.

1017. Observation Posts (OP). Observationpostsarenormally reconnaissance

elementsdeployedwithinthebattalion.However,divisionsandhigherforma-

tionsandhigherformationsmaycreateOPsascommandandcontrolele-ments.Theywillbedeployedprimarilyawayfromthemainaxistoprovidethe

staffwithuptodateinformationontheprogressofoperations.Theyaremanned

byasmallnumberofofficersfromthemainstaff,withcommunicationsmeans.InstaticoperationsthecommandermayvisittheOPtoreconnoitretheground

himself.

SECTION 4 - COMMUNICATIONS

1018. General. GENFORCEcommunicationsreflecttheconcernofcommandersto

maintainuninterruptedtroopcontrol,flexibilityandsecurity.

1019. Division and Regiment. GENFORCEsignalstroopsuseradiorelaywithHF

backupandencryptionfacilitiesfromregimentrearwards. Severalnetsare

createdtocopewiththeexpectedvolumeoftrafficandstillprovideadegreeofflexibilityand redundancy incaseof interference throughphysicalorelec-tronicattack.

a. Command Net. Thisnet,whichisduplicatedwhenaforwardCPisformed,

linksthecommander,chiefofstaffandalternateCPtoallmajorheadquar-

tersandsupportingunits. Useismadeofskipechelonworking,ieena-blingthecommandertotalk twodown. Thisallowsthecommanderto

exercisedirectcontrol overkey subordinategroupings,ega divisional

commander may establish suchalinkwithaforwardor heliborneor

outflankingdetachmentofbattalionsize. Suchlinksmayalsobeusedtomaintaincontrolifanintermediateheadquartersisputoutofaction,thoughthenecessaryreconfigurationofthenetwouldbeaccompaniedbysome

delay.

b. Staff Nets.Certainprincipalstaffofficers,notablythechiefsofartillery,

engineers,reconnaissance,airdefence,aviation,chemicaldefence,andtherear,havededicatednetsto ensuretheuninterruptedflowofinforma-

tionandorders. Theyalsoprovidebackupnetsif thecommandnet is

interruptedoroverloaded.

c. Coordination Nets. Theseareestablishedwith flanking and secondech

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elonorreserveformationsandwithanygroupingsperformingspecialmis-

sionsinthedivisionorregimentssareaofresponsibility,suchasairas-

saultunits,orforwarddetachments.

d. Warning Net.AnetdevotedpurelytoairandNBCwarningandthepas-

sageofmeteorologicaldataisestablisheddowntobattalionlevel.

1020. Battalion. Theorganizationofbattalionradionetswilldependonthetypeofoperations.Intheadvanceandwhenattackingaweakenemy, allbattalionvehicleswill probablybeon thesame VHFnet. Againstawellorganized

defence,andgenerallywhenoperatingonfoot,companynetsareoftenused.

1021. Organization of Battalion Radio Communications.Diagram11showsatypical example of theorganisation of radio communicationsinareinforced

motorriflebattalionintheattack. Thefollowingpointsshouldbenoted:

a. Communication With Regiment. Thebattalionscommanderandchiefof

staffareallocatedextraradiosbytheregimentalsignalscompany,throughwhichthey join the regimentalcommandnet (battalioncommanderand

chiefofstaff)andtheregimentalstaff net(battalionchief of staff only).

Thesecondecheloncompanycommanderwhoisnominatedtotakeover

commandifthebattalioncommanderisputoutofactionwouldbegiven

onlythefrequenciesoftheregimentalnet.Theregimentalheadquartersisalso able tomonitorbattalionnetsandcommunicatedirectlywithcompa-

nies.

b. Battalion Nets. ThemainbattalionnetusesR123 vehicleVHFradios.Itiscontrolledbythebattalioncommanderandincludesthechiefofstaff,com-pany commanders,commanders of themortarbattery, thegrenadelauncher,airdefenceandtheantitankplatooncommanders,thesupply

platoonandthecombatreconnaissancepatrolcommanders,thecommand-

ersofsubordinatedorsupporting subunits(suchasanartillerybattalion

orchemicalreconnaissancepatrol). InadditionallsectionAPCsaretunedtothisfrequencymakingatotalof40stationsormoreonthenet. Strict

disciplineisrequired toavoidchaos. Theonlystationswithauthority to

transmitarethebattalioncommander himself,companycommandersand

commandersofreconnaissanceandchemicalreconnaissancepatrolswhenmaking reportsto thebattalioncommander. Inaddition, inmountedat-tacks,companycommanders,withthebattalioncommanderspermission,

use thisnettocontroltheirplatoons. Aduplicatebattalionnetis main-

tainedfordismountedoperationsusingR159VHFvehicle/manpacksets.

Thisnetconsistsofthebattalionandcompanycommanders,thechiefofstaffandthemortarbatterycommander.Battalionfiresupportassets,egtheairdefence platoon,maybeorderedtotunetheirvehicleradiostothenet.

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c. Company Nets. IfcompanynetsareformedVHFmanpacksets(R148)

areissuedtothecompanycommander,3motorrifleplatooncommanders

andthecommanderoftheantitanksection(inBTRunits). ThebattalioncommandermayjoinacompanynetusinganR123set.

d. Platoon Nets. InexceptionalcircumstancesmotorrifleplatoonsmaybeissuedwithR147orR157manpacksetstoformtheirownnets.InthiscasesectionswillreceivetheR147Pradioreceiveronly.Aplatoonnetwillonlybeestablished whentheplatoonisoperatingindependentlyofthemainbody.Battalionsupportweaponsnormallymaintaintheirownsub-

unitnets,forexample,betweenthemortarbatterycommanderandfiring

positions,orbetweenthegrenadelauncherplatoon commanderandhis

threesections.Thebattaliondeputyfortechnicalaffairsmaintainsatech-nicalsupportnettolink damagedvehicleswiththerepairandevacuation

group.

e. Supporting Elements. Subunitssupportingthe battaliongenerallymain-

taintheirownnetsandoftenhave theirownlinkswithequivalenthead-quartersathigherlevels.Artillerybatterycommandersareexpectedtobe

colocatedwith thecompanycommandertheyaresupporting.Thismeans

thattheartillerynetcanbeusedforcommunicationsbetweenbattalionand

companycommandersif thebattalioncommandnetisnotworkingprop-

erly.

f. Tank-Infantry Communications. Atankcompanysupportingamotorrifle

battalionretainsconsiderable independence in communications. The

companycommandermayjointhemainbattalionnetoralternativelythebattalioncommander maypasshisorderstothetankcompanybytempo-rarilytuningtoitswavelength.Tankplatooncommandersandlinetanksdonot monitorthemotorriflebattalionnet. Intimatecooperationbetweena

motorrifleplatoonandasupportingtankdepends largelyonvisualsig-

nals,especiallytheuseoftracer,flaresandcolouredsmoke.

1022. NonRadio Communications. Whileradiomust,inevitably,betheprincipal

meansofcommunicationinafluid, mobilebattle,GENFORCEiswellawareof

thethreatposedbyenemyDF,interceptandcommunicationsjamming. The

useofalternativemeanswhenpossibleisstressed. Lineisused extensivelyin defence,inwaitingareasandalongmarchroutes. Muchuseismadeofliaisonofficersinhelicoptersand lightvehicles,andofpersonalcontactbe-

tweencommandersortheirrepresentativesandsubordinates.Visualandsound

signals, egflares,flagsandvehiclehorns,areusedwithsubunitswhenoutof

contacttopasssimplemessagesandinstructions.Asageneralruleradiocommunicationsarekepttotheminimumuntilcontactwiththeenemyismade.Thusabattalionintheattack willbeforbiddentouseradiosuntiltheirsupport-

ingartillery beginsitsbombardment. Indefencelinecommunicationsarethenormuntiltheenemybeginshisartillerypreparationoftheattack.

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SECTION 5 - COMBAT ORGANIZATIONS

1023. General. ThestandardorganizationsshownintheGENFORCEORBATSinPart1arenotcombatgroupings. TheyarethebasisonwhichGENFORCE

commanderscreatetacticalgroupings.Thesegroupingswillbedeterminedby

aformationsorunitsmissionandthedegreeofreinforcementithasreceived,ontheterrainoverwhichitisfightingandbythestrengthanddeploymentof

theenemyitisfacing.ThissectionoutlinessomebasicprinciplesofGENFORCEcombatorganizationsbutitmustbeemphasizedthatthesearenothardandfastrules,butgeneralguidelines.Inparticular,theyapplyprimarilytostandard

typesofterrainand,asindicatedintheappropriatesectionsofthetext,require

modificationwhenappliedtospecialconditionsandterrain.

1024. The Division. Divisionsarethebasicbuildingblocksofoperationalcommand-

ers.Adivisionsorganicassetsaresufficientforittoattackordefendona

secondarysectorbutwhenfightingontheaxisofmaineffortitwillrequireadditionalcombatandservicesupport. Armycommandersmayalsoreinforce

somedivisionsattheexpenseofothers,forexampleelementsmaybede-tachedfromsecondechelondivisionstoreinforceafirstechelonformation.

Secondechelondivisionsmayalsofindthatthearmycommandertakesdirect

controlofaunitforaspecificmission,egasanantiair landingreserve. In

suchcasesthearmycommanderwilltrytomakegoodtheselossesbeforethedivisioniscommittedintobattle.

1025. Divisional Combat Organizations. AGENFORCEdivisionconsistsofthree

orfourregiments,organiccombatandservicesupportunitsandanyreinforce-

mentsattachedbyhigherlevelsofcommand. Mostdivisionsareeithermotorrifleortankdivisions,dependingonthebalanceofmechanizedinfantryandarmourwithinthem,butthereareasmallnumberofrifledivisionsforuseincertaintypesofterrain,mostlyverymountainousareas.Rifledivisionshave

threerifleregiments,whicharenotequippedwithsectionAPCs,andhaveonly

atankbattalioninsteadofatankregiment. Rifledivisioncombatorganizations

andtacticsareverysimilartothoseofmotorrifleformationsandmajorvaria-tionswillbedescribedatappropriatepointsinthetext. Themainelementsof

adivisionscombatorganizationare:

a. Echelonning of Regiments. Thedeploymentofregimentsisdeterminedbytheechelonstructureofthedivision,usuallyineitheroneortwoechelons.Twoechelonstructuresareappropriatewhenattackingordefendinginthe

main sectorofeffort, particularly against anenemydeployed indepth.

Groupingthreeregimentsinthefirstechelonandoneinthesecondisthe

mostcommonlyadoptedvariant.Atwoandtwodeploymentissometimes

foundinthedefence,onanarmysmostthreatenedsector,butismorerarelyseenintheattack.

b. Reinforcements. Theexact compositionofanyreinforcementsreceived

byadivisionwilldependonitsmission,theterrain&c. Theymaybere-tainedunderdivisionalcontrol,allowingthedivisionalcommandertopushsomeofhisownassetsdowntoregimentsormayevenbeallocatedto

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regimentsthemselves.Themostcommonreinforcementisartillery,allow-

ingadivisiontocreateadivisionalartillerygroup(DAG)whilereinforcing

regiments,particularlyonitsmainsector,toallowthemtocreateregimen-talartillerygroups(RAGs).

c. Organic Combat and Service Support. Althoughdivisionswill reinforceregimentsfromtheircombatandservicesupportassets,thecommanderwillalwaysstrivetokeepaproportionoftheseassetsunderhisowncon-trol. Hewillusuallyemploythemtosupporttheregimentsonthemainaxisbuttheyarehispersonalmeansofinfluencingthebattleandcanbeswitched

elsewhereasthe situationdevelops. Someof theseelementsmaybe

nominatedasreserves(eganantitank,engineerorchemicaldefencere-

serve)butitisraretofindfieldartilleryinareserve.

1026. Motor Rifle Divisional Combat Organizations. AGENFORCEmotorrifle

divisionconsistsofthreemotorrifleregimentsandatankregiment,withitscombatandservicesupport. ThedivisionmayhaveeithertwoBMPequipped

regimentsandoneBTRequipped regimentorviceversa. The rolesof thedifferenttypesofregimentinthedivisionscombatstructuremaybeassessed

bythefollowingrulesofthumb:

a. BMP Regiments.BecauseoftheBMPsfirepowerandmobility,regiments

equippedwithitaremostlikelytobefoundonthedivisionsmainaxisintheattackanditsmostthreatenedsector inthedefence. Theyarealso

likelytobeinthefirstechelon,althoughintheattackaBMPregimentmay

beconsideredforanexploitationroleinthesecondechelon. Battalionsof

aBMPregimentarealsomostlikelytobechosenforspecialmissionsbythedivisionalheadquarters,forexample,toactasforwardorraidingde-tachments.

b. BTR Regiments. BTRequippedregimentsaremoresuitedtosecondary

sectors. InfantryfromBTRunitsmaybemoreoftenchosenforheliborne

operationsbecauseoftheirmanportableantitankweapons.

c. Tank Regiments.Becauseoftheirlackofinfantrytankregimentsarenot

suitableforuseinthefirstechelonofmotorrifledivisionswhenattacking

reasonablystrongdefences.Theyaremorelikelytobeusedinthesecondechelon,wheretheycanrapidlyexploitsuccess. Atankregimentmightbeusedinthefirstechelonagainstaweakdefence,whentheaimistostrike

asdeeplyaspossiblebeforetheenemystrengthenshisposition. Inde-

fencethetankregimentisalsomostlikelytobeinthesecondechelon

becauseitsequipmentandorganizationfititforacounterattackorcoun-

terpenetrationrole,ratherthanforholdingground.

1027. Tank Divisional Combat Organizations. Tankdivisionsaremostsuitedto

exploitationrolesintheoffensiveandmaybeconfiguredforuseasanarmys

operationalmanoeuvregroup.Indefenceatankdivisionisalmostcertaintobedeployedinthesecondechelonofthearmytoprovideacounterattackforce.

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IfatankdivisionhastoattackprepareddefencestheBMPregimentwillprob-

ablybeinthefirstechelon. BMPequippedelementsarealsooftenconsidered

forvanguardandforwarddetachmentmissions.

1028. The Regiment. Theregimentisthebasictacticalandadministrativeunitinthe

GENFORCEarmy.Battalionsandcompaniesaresubunitsandarenumberedaselementsoftheirparent regiment 1stMotorRifleBattalion,10thMotor

RifleRegiment or9th TankCompany,3rd TankBattalion,100th TankRegi-ment.Theyarenotexpectedtooperateindependentlyoftheirparentregimentwithoutreinforcement,andthenonlyforalimitedtime.Amotorrifleregiment

hasthreemotorriflebattalionsandatankbattalion.Arifleregimenthasthree

riflebattalionsandatankbattalion. Atankregimentinatankdivisionhasthree

tankbattalionsandamotorriflebattalionbutthetankregimentofamotorrifledivisionhasnomotorriflebattalion.

1029. Motor Rifle Regimental Combat Organizations. ItisrareforGENFORCEmotorrifleregimentstobefoughtasfourseparatebattalions. Themostcom-

monoptionsare:

a. Inaoneechelonformation,toallocateatankcompanytoeachmotorrifle

battalion.Sometimesonetankcompany,withthebattalionheadquarters,

isinitiallyretainedunderregimentalcommand.

b. Inatwoechelonformation,toallocateoneortwotankcompaniestothe

twofirstechelonmotorriflebattalions,whileretainingtherestofthebattal-ionunderregimentalheadquarters. Tanksarenotusuallysubordinatedto

secondechelonbattalionsuntiltheyareabouttobecommittedintobattle.

c. Indefence,particularlyinBMPregiments,fourbattalionsmaybedeployed

(2up,2back).Eveninthiscasethetankbattalionmayloseacompanyto

thefirstechelonmotorriflebattalions(seeChapter5,Diagram54foran

illustrationofthisoption).

1030. Ofcourse,theregimentalcommandermaychoosetofighthistankbattalionas

asingleentityifhefeelsthetacticalsituationrequiresit.Thismighthappenin

ameetingbattlewhenapowerfularmouredfistismostnecessary.

1031. Tank Regimental Combat Organizations. TankregimentsoftankdivisionsaremostoftenorganizedwiththeBMPbattalionsplitbycompaniesamongthe

tankbattalions. InsomecircumstancestheBMPbattalionmayremainintact

andevenbereinforcedwithatankcompanyandotherassets.Thismayhap-

peniftheBMPbattalionisactingastheregimentsvanguardorifitistaskedas

a forwarddetachment,especiallywhenchosen,becauseof its amphibiouscapability,tosecurearivercrossing.Itisrareforthetankregimentofamotor

rifledivisiontobereinforcedwithmotorrifletroopsfromanotherregiment.

1032. Battalion Combat Organizations. TacticalgroupingofGENFORCEbattal-ionsneverinvolvestheexchangeofsubunitswithotherbattalions,egamotorriflebattalionwillnotexchangeamotorriflecompanyforatankcompanywith

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atankbattalion. Battalionsareeitherreinforcedwithregimentalassetsorare

themselvesusedasreinforcements. Withinthebattalionthecommanderor-

ganizeshisforceinoneortwoechelonsanduseshisownandanyattachedsupportingassetseithertoreinforcesubunits(especiallyonhismainaxis)or

toremainunderhisownhand.

1033. Restoration of Combat Effectiveness.Ifaformationorunitsuffersheavylosses,compromising itscombateffectiveness,measuresmustbe taken toreorganizeitasrapidlyaspossible. Wherelossesarenotcatastrophic,thisismosteffectively achievedbyreducing thenumberofsubunitsundercom-

mand,while retaining theoutlineof itsstructure. Thusa regimentmightbe

reorganizedwith fewerbattalions thanusualoracompanywith fewerpla-

toons.Ifaunitcompletelylosesitscombateffectiveness(whenlossesofmenandequipmentreach70%ormore)itisbettertocreatecompositesubunits

fromtheavailablemenandmateriel.Thecompositebattalionisthemosttypi-

calsizeforsuchanelementanditmaycontainalmostanymixofmotorrifleandtanktroopsandavailablecombatsupport,suchasartillery.

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CHAPTER 2

THE MARCH

SECTION 1 - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

2001. Significance. Withitsdoctrinalstressontheimportanceofmanoeuvreanditsexperienceoflandoperationsconductedonacontinentalscale,GENFORCEnaturallyemphasises the importanceofconducting marchesefficientlyandrapidly.MarchesareexercisedoverconsiderabledistancesandSOPswell

developed.

2002. Types of march. GENFORCEconsiderstwomaintypesofmarch,dependentonwhethercontactwithenemygroundforcesisexpectedornot. Inthefirst

case,whencontactwiththeenemyisnotlikely,administrativeproblemspre-

dominate,althoughtacticalconsiderationscanneverbetotallyexcluded.Therisksofairormissileattacksandthepossibilityofenemyairborneordiversion-

aryforcesoperatingintheGENFORCErearareaarealwayspresent. Evenadministrativemarchesmustbeorganizedsoastoallowasmoothandrapid

transitionto tacticalmarchformations. Tacticalmarches,whencontactwith

enemygroundforcesislikely,areorganizedtoensurethatthemarchingfor-

mationisreadytoenterbattleattheshortestnotice.

SECTION 2 - ADMINISTRATIVE MARCHES

2003. Strategic Movement. OutofcontactGENFORCEmakesconsiderableuseof

rail,seaandairlinkstopreservethemarchingcapabilitiesofformations,byminimizing fuelconsumptionandmaintenancerequirements. Heavyequip-menttransportersmayalsobeusedwhenroadmovementisessential. Theaimistoensurethatvehiclesbeginanoperationwithatleast3,600kmof

operablerangebeforemajormaintenanceworkbecomesnecessary.

2004. Road Marches. Byminimizingwearandtearonvehiclesbeforeanoperationbeginsandbycarefullyplanningroutinemaintenanceduringroadmarches,

GENFORCEhopestolimitthefalloutrateonthemarchtonomorethan12%

ofvehiclesperday. Tables21and22showtheaverageratesofmarchand

dailymarchperformancewhichGENFORCEexpectstoachieve.

2005. March Planning. Marchesareplannedonthemap,usingstandardnorms

andstafftables.Routeswillbechosentoprovidethebestpossibleprotection

fromenemyreconnaissancemeansandmarcheswillbeconductedatnightor

inperiodsofbadvisibilitywheneverpossible.Therouteisdividedintosectors

accordingtothetypeofterrainandreportlinesarepreplanned. Regularpe-riodsofrestallow routinemaintenance,refuelling,feedingandsleep. (See

Chapter2ofBasicForceOperationalArtfordetailsofmarchorganization).

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TABLE 2-1: AVERAGE SPEEDS OF MARCH COLUMNS (KM PER HOUR)

ColumnTypes

PavedRoads DryDirtRoads Muddy,Hilly,

UrbanRoads

Day Night Day Night Day Night

MotorisedColmMixedColm

30402030

25301420

20251520

18201215

10151012

81081

Notes: (1) Duringfog,reduceby2530%ofdayspeed.

(2) Performanceissharplyreducedinmountains,desert,arctic,marshy

areasandduringwinter.

Resthalts: *Shorthaltof2030minutesevery23hours(firstoneafter12hours).

**Longhaltof24hoursnecessaryifaforcedmarchof1214hoursis

beingconducted.

TABLE 2-2: DAILY MARCH PERFORMANCE OF MARCH COLUMNS (KM)

ColumnTypes PavedRoads DryDirtRoads Muddy,Hilly,

UrbanRoads

MotorisedColm 250350 180300 80180MixedColm 200350 120240 80140

Note: (1) Therouteismeasuredonthemapand510%ofdistanceisadded

onaverageterrainand20%inmountainousterrain.

(2) Calculationisformarchof1012hours. Remaining1214hours

spent:

(1) Technicalmaintenance34hours.

(2) Servinghotmeal111/2hours

(3) Deploymentandcamouflage111/2hours

(4) Movementtostartline111/2hours.(5) Rest48hours.

(3) Onamarchofover1,000km,andpossiblyeveninashorterone,

therewillbearestday,probablyintherestareabeforethefinalassemblyareaforessentialrepairandmaintenancework.

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2006 March Routes. Tworoutesarenormallyconsideredsufficientforadivisionon

anadministrativemarchanda regimentmovesononeroute. Howeveran

alternativeisplannedforeachroute,incasetheprimaryroutebecomesunus-able. Lateralroutesarechosen topermitmanoeuvre fromone roadtoan-

other. TheGENFORCEunderstandingofaroadisnotlimitedtothosewith

hardsurfaces.Countrydirttrackswillsufficeandwill,indeed,bepreferrediftheyofferatacticaladvantage.

2007. March Formations. Inamarchwhenenemycontactisnotexpectedcolumnsareorganizedprimarilyforadministrativeconvenience.Vehiclesofsimilartype,

speedandcrosscountrycapabilitymaybekeptinpacketsratherthanbeing

tactically grouped. Trackedandwheeledvehiclesmayusedifferent routes.

Howeverthedeploymentofcertainsubunitsisdeterminedprimarilybytacti-calconsiderations,evenonanadministrativemarch.

a. Security elements. Someformofmarchsecuritywillalwaysbedeployed,becauseofdiversionaryandairbornethreats. Inthedeepreartheseele-

mentsmaybequiteweakpatrols but theywill increaseinnumberandstrengthastheformationapproachesitslineofcommitment. Securitypa-

trolsandoutpostswillbedeployedaroundrestandassemblyareas.

b. Air Defence. Duringanadministrativemarchprimaryresponsibilityforair

defencelieswiththehigherformationthroughwhoserearareathetacticalformationismarching. Thehigherformationsairdefenceassetsprovide

earlywarningandwillengageenemyaircraftatlongrange.Airdefence

subunitswill,however, bedeployed throughout the tacticalformations

marchcolumns,operatingonelectronicsilenceuntiltheirformationisdi-rectly threatened. Priorityindeploymentofairdefencesubunitswillbegiventoheadquarters,missileandartilleryunitsandthefirstechelon.The

higherformationwillalsoconcentrateresourcestocoverobstaclecross-

ingsandotherchokepoints.

c. Combat & Service Support. Engineer reconnaissance, route clearanceandobstaclecrossingunitswillbedeployedthroughoutthemarchingcol-

umnsbuttheprimaryresponsibilityformaintainingrouteslieswiththehigher

formationsheadquarters.Chemicalreconnaissanceanddefencesubunits

willalsobetacticallydeployedwithincolumns,incaseofenemystrikesduringthemarch. Higherformationheadquartersarealsoresponsibleformaintaining,refuellingandfeedingunitsmarchingintheirrearareas,so

thatthoseunitsare,asfaraspossible,committedintobattleatfullstrength

andwiththeirbasiccombatloadsintact.

2008. Troop Control. Firmandcontinuouscontrol isessential,as isthemainte-nanceofsecrecy.

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a. Deployment of CPs. Withinunitsandsubunitscommandpostsleadtheir

columns(apartfromanymarchsecurityormovementsupportdetachments).

WithinformationsoneCPmustalwaysbedeployed. ThepreferredoptionisforthemainCPtomovesimultaneouslywiththetroops(usuallyinthe

firstechelon)whilecontrolisexercisedfromtheforwardCPwhichissitu-

atedinthenextdailyrestarea. WhentheformationmovesintotherestareatheforwardCPmovesontothenextone.

b. Traffic Control. Themilitarypoliceexercisetrafficcontrol.Themarchrouteisdividedinto5080kmsectors,eachbeingtheresponsibilityofasubunit.

Postsarealsoestablishedatallobstaclecrossings,defiles,bypassesand

populationcentres.

c. Communications. Communicationssecurityisverytight. Radiosarenor-

mallyallowedtooperateinreceivemodeonly. Radiosilenceisonlybro-

kenforairandchemicalwarnings. Withinsubunitsthemarchiscontrolledbyverbalordersandvisualsignals,suchasflagsorlights. Communication

betweenheadquartersisbymobilemeans,suchasliaisonvehiclesand,athigherlevels,helicopters. Inadditionunitandsubunitcommandersmay

usemilitarypolice linecommunicationsorcivilsystemstonotifytheirpas-

sageofreportlines.

SECTION 3 - TACTICAL MARCHES

2009. Definition. Tacticalmarchesareconductedwhencontactwithenemyground

forcesispossible. Theyusuallybegininanassemblyareawhereformations

andunitsreorganizethemselvesfromtheorderinwhichtheycompletedtheadministrativemarchandcarryoutfinalmaintenanceandlogisticchecks.Theirnewmarchorderwillbedeterminedbytheirmission,theterrainthroughwhichtheymustmarchandthenatureoftheenemythreattheyface. Theformation

mustpermitasmoothandrapiddeploymentintobattleinaccordancewiththe

commandersplanandmustincludesecurityelementstopreventtheenemy

disruptingthatdeployment.

2010. Planning Factors. Innormalterrainadivisionwillrequireazoneofadvance

approximately30kmwide. Withinthatzoneitwillnormallyadvanceonthree

routes,withanalternaterouteallocatedforeachone. Innormalterrainregi-mentsadvanceononerouteuntiltheybegintheirdeploymentintobattle. Adivisionsmarchcolumnswillbe80100kmdeepfromleadingmarchsecurity

elementstothetail. A firstechelonregimentwillrequireover40kmofroad

space;asecondechelonregiment(withlessmarchsecuritydeployed)needs

2030km.Atthenormalmarchspeedof2025kphadivisionwillrequire45

hourstopassareportline.

2011. Intervals. Thestandardintervalbetweenvehicleswithincolumnsis2550m.

Thisisalsothestandardintervalbetweencompaniesandplatoonswithina

battalionsmainbody.Intervalsofupto5kmaremaintainedbetweenbattalionpacketswithinaregimentsmainbody.Atnightandwhenweatherorroadconditionsarebadgreaterintervalsaremaintained. Whenitisnecessaryto

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crossopencountryunderthethreatofenemyPGMs,speedsareincreased,

vehicleintervalsareopenedto 100150mandgapsof300400mmaintained

betweenplatoons.

2012. March Security. Marchsecurityelementsaresentoutfromthemainbodyto

preventsurpriseattacksbytheenemy,preventtheenemysreconnaissancepenetratingtothemainbodyandtoassistthemainbodysdeploymentinto

battle. Thestrengthandcompositionofthemarchsecurityelementswillde-pendontheintensityoftheenemythreatandthetypeofterrain. Thegreaterthe threatand themoredifficult the terrain,thestrongerthemarchsecurity

required. Marchsecurityelementsmaybeclassified underthetitlesofvan-

guard,rearguard,flankdetachment,mobilepicquets(forward,flankandrear)

andpatrols.Diagram21showstheseelementsinrelationtothemainbody.Theirrolesareexplainedbelow:

SeeDiagram21

a. Vanguard.Avanguardisdeployedbyadivisionoraregimenttoensurethesecurityof itsmainaxis. Inopen,mobileoperationsadivisionmay

sendanentireregimentforwardasitsvanguard.Alternatively,avanguard

consistingofa reinforcedbattalionmaybesentoutoneachregimental

routeduringanadvancetocontact. Whenexploitingabreakthroughorin

pursuiteachfirstechelonregimentislikelytoemployareinforcedbattalionasavanguard. Motorriflebattalionsarefavouredinthisrole,thoughtank

battalionsmaybeused. Typicalreinforcementsareeitheratankoramo-

torriflecompany,anartillerybattalion,anairdefenceplatoon,with2S6,at

leastasapperplatoon,possiblywithspecialistequipmentandoftenachemi-cal reconnaissancesection. Whenthere islittle chanceofmeeting theenemydivisionsmayuseonlyabattalionasvanguard;regimentswilluse

forwardmobilepicquetsratherthanvanguards.

b. Rearguard.Arearguard,insimilarstrengthtothevanguardsdescribed

above,isdeployedbydivisionsandregimentsconductingawithdrawal.Whentheenemythreatisweakarearmobilepicquetmaybeadequate.

c. Flank Detachment.Aflankdetachmentisemployedwhenmarchingparal-

leltothefrontlineandispostedontheflanknearertheenemy. Inaddition,wheneveraformationhastooperatewithopenflanks,forexamplewhenexploitingintothe enemyrearorinmountainareas,aflankdetachment

maybeused. ItoftenoperatesinconjunctionwithaMobileObstacleDe-

tachment(MOD)andanantitankreserveandmaymoveinboundsfrom

oneblockingpositiontoanother.

d. Forward Mobile Picquet. Thisisareinforcedcompanysentaheadofafirst

echelonbattalionorabattalionoperatingawayfromthemainbody,ega

vanguard, aforwardorraidingdetachment. Whenthe threatofenemy

contactislowregimentsmaychoosetoemployaforwardmobilepicquetaheadon theiraxis, ratherthana vanguard. Motorriflecompaniesareoftenusedinthisrole,evenintankunits.Typicalreinforcementsincludea

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tankplatoon (ormotor rifleplatoon for tankcompanies),an artilleryor

mortarbattery,anantitankplatoon(withmotorriflecompanies). Asapper

element,oftenincludingMT55,mayaccompanyaforwardmobilepicquet,oraMovementSupportDetachment(MSD)maybemarchingintheimme-

diatevicinity.

e. Flank Picquet.Aflankmobilepicquet,incompanystrength,isdeployedonathreatenedflank;itmaybereinforcedwithantitankandminelayingas-sets,orcooperatewithanantitankreserveandanMOD. Flankmobilepicquetsusuallymarchlevelwiththeheadofthemainbodyandabout5

kmfromthemainroute. Staticflankpicquetsareoftenused,forexample,

toblocktheexitfromamountainpasswhilethemainbodypassesby.

f. Rear Mobile Picquet.Againareinforcedcompanyinstrengthwhichmay

betherearelementofarearguardortheonlyrearsecurityelementofa

divisionorregimentwithdrawingwhentheenemyisnotclose. Rearmo-bilepicquetsarealsopostedintheadvanceduringmobileoperationsin

theenemydepth.

g. Patrols. Themostcommonsortofmarchsecuritypatrol isthe forward

patrol,whichmaybefound throughoutadivisions formation. Thus the

forwardmobilepicquetsoffirstechelonbattalions,vanguards,forwardde-

tachmentsandsoonwillprobablybeledbyforwardpatrols. Secondech-elonbattalionsmayuseaforwardpatrol. Whenthelikelihoodofcontact

with theenemyis low, forward patrols may beused insteadof forward

mobilepicquets.Althoughforwardpatrolshaveasecondaryreconnais-

sancefunctiontheyshouldnotbeconfusedwiththereconnaissancepa-trolsdescribedinChapter3. Forwardpatrolsoperateclosertothemainbody(generallyabout35kmsahead)andtravelalongthemainbodys

actualroute. Theyare lessinclinedtoavoidcontactwiththeenemy,but

shouldnotbeexpectedtoattackanenemywhoisclearlystrongerorin

wellprepareddefences. Flankandrearpatrolsareemployedinappropri-

atetacticalsituations. Motorrifleortankplatoonsareusedasmarchsecu-ritypatrolsandtheymayincludeengineerorNBCreconnaissance. The

smallestformofpatrolisthescoutsectionorscoutvehicle.Thesemaybe

sent aheadofplatoonsorcompaniesoperatingindependentlybuteven

battalionsdeepinthemainbodyofthedivisionmayuseascoutsectionasaminimalmarchsecurityelement. Scoutsectionsarealsofrequentlyde-ployedontheopenflanksofsubunits.

2013. Reconnaissance & Movement Support Detachments.Aunitorformation

willalsosendout reconnaissanceelementsasdescribed inChapter3and

MovementSupportDetachments(seeParagraph2019). WhenmovingoutofcontactwiththeenemytheMSDmovesaheadofthemarchsecurityelements;

whencontactispossibletheMSDfollowsimmediatelyafterthevanguardor

forwardmobilepicquet.

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2014. The Order of March: Division. Thiswillbedeterminedbythemission,the

terrain,intelligenceavailableontheenemyandthustheanticipateddeploy-

mentintocombat. AvariantofamotorrifledivisionstacticalmarchformationisshowninDiagram22. Somepointstonoteare:

SeeDiagram22

a. Mission. Thedivisionisadvancingagainstacoveringforcescreeningastrongdefensiveposition. Ithopestoavoiddeployingthemainbodiesofthefirstechelonregimentsduringthecoveringforcebattlesothattheywill

beavailable forthebreakthrough battle in themaindefensiveposition.

Thedivisionisnotoperatingonthearmysmainaxis;ifitweretheArmy

ArtilleryGroupandotherreinforcementswouldbeincludedinitscolumns.Theterrainisstandardandthereisnomajorwaterobstacletocrossuntil

themaindefensivepositionhasbeenbreached.

b. Reconnaissance. Thereconnaissancescreenisnotshownindetailbutis

likelytoincludeareconnaissancedetachmentfromthedivisionalrecon-naissancebattaliononthemainaxisand reconnaissancepatrols from

divisionandfirstechelonregimentstocovertherestofthesectorofad-

vance. SeeChapter3formoredetail.

c. Forward Detachment. Thedivisionsseparatetankbattalion,reinforced,isactingasaforwarddetachment. SeeDiagram25afordetailsofitsmarch

formation. Theforwarddetachmentsmissionmaybetoseizeareserve

demolitionbeforethecoveringforcecanwithdrawthroughitortotakevital

groundforthemainbodysbreakthroughbattle.Notethattheforwardde-tachmentwilltrytoavoidbattlebeforeitreachesitsobjectiveandthatitmovesoffthemainroutesofthedivisionalcolumns.

d. Vanguards. Theseconsistofreinforcedmotorriflebattalionsfromthefirst

echelonregiments;seeDiagram25bforatypicalmarchformation. Their

missionistoclearthecoveringforcefromthepathofthemainbodyandtheyarethereforepreparedtofighttoachievethis. Itishoweverunlikely

thatstrongpositionswillbeassaultedfrontallyifthiscanbeavoided.The

preferredoptionwouldbetoturntheflankoftheposition,forcingthede-

fendertopullbackandtoattempttodestroythewithdrawingforceonthemove.Vanguardstrytomoveabout2025kmsaheadoftheirmainbodies,ieoveranhoursmarch,butthismaybereducedifresistanceorobstacles

areencountered.

e. Movement Support Detachments. Thesemoveimmediatelyafterthevan-

guardsandwilltrytoclearroutesthroughorroundanyobstaclessothatthemainbodyisnotdelayed. SeeParagraph2019fordetails.

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f. Main Body of the First Echelon. SeeDiagram24aforanexampleofafirst

echelonregimentsmarchformation. Althoughtheregimentsmarchpre-

paredtodeployintobattleasrapidlyaspossible,theywillhopetoavoiddoingso.Thedecisiontodeployortobypassanenemytoostrongforthe

vanguardtodislodgewillhavetobeapprovedbythedivisionalcommander.

g. Divisional Command Posts. Thedivisionalcommandertravelsinthefor-wardCPinthecolumnofthemainaxisfirstechelonregiment,closetotheregimentalCP. Thisensuresaspeedycommandreactionatthemostcru-cialpoint.ThemainCPaccompaniesthesecondechelonregimentonthe

mainaxis. Therearcontrolpostleadsthedivisionalrearservices.

h. Divisional Artillery Group (DAG). TheDAGiscomposedoftheorganicandanyattachedartilleryofadivision. Itmovesonthemainaxisimmediately

behindthefirstechelondivisionsothatitmaysupportanattackfromthe

march. Theantitankbattalionmovestocoveranexposedflank.

i. Divisional Air Defence. IfmarchingoutofcontactthedivisionalSAMregi-ment,andlowerlevelassets,arelikelytomaintainelectronicsilence,rely-

ingonarmyandfrontassetsforlongrangecoverandearlywarning. Elec-

tronicsensorswouldbecomeactivein theeventofadirectthreattothe

division. InthepresentcasetheSAMregimentwouldbeonfullalertand

possiblydeployedwithabatteryaccompanyingeach firstechelon regi-mentandtwoothersontheflanksofthesecondechelon.

j. Second Echelon Regiment. Thesecondechelonregiment generallymoves

ontheaxisofmaineffort.SeeDiagram24cforanexampleofitsmarchformation. Partofthesecondechelonmaybenominatedasanantiairlandingreserve.

k. Divisional Combat Support and Rear Services. Thesewillbedistributedin

accordancewiththeterrainandtacticalcircumstances. Inthiscasethe

bulkoftheengineerassets,lessrouteclearanceelements,arekeptinanengineerreserveinthesecondechelonofthedivision. Ifawaterobstacle

hadtobecrossedassaultcrossingelementswouldaccompanythefirst

echelonandsomemightbewiththeforwarddetachmentorvanguards;

divisionalbridgingwouldfollowthefirstechelonregiments. Thechemicaldefencebattalionwillprovidechemicalreconnaissancepatrolsthroughoutthedivisionalformation,andiftheNBCthreatishighdecontaminationas-

setsmayalsobesplitbetweenfirstandsecondechelons. Thebulkofthe

divisionalrearservicesareshownintheirtraditionalpositionattheendof

themarchformation. Howevermaintenanceandmedicalevacuationas-setsmaybedividedbetweenthetwoechelonsandinalongmarchindifficultterrainresupplyfacilitiesmayalsobesplit.

2015. Variations in the Divisional March Formation. Itshouldnotbeimagined

thattheformationillustratedwillbeusedinallcircumstances. Forexampleasecondechelondivisionmayadvanceontworoutes. Inverydifficultterrain,withpoorlateralcommunications,thedivisionmayadvanceinoneechelon,

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withastrongreserve. Whenexploitingabreakthroughamotorrifledivision

mightemployitstankregimentinthefirstechelon. Othervariationsarepossi-

bleandGENFORCEmarchformationsshouldnotfollowlimitedstereotypes.

2016. The Order of March: Regiment. Diagram23showsexamplesofthemarch

formationsoffirstechelonmotorrifleandtankregimentsandasecondech-elonmotorrifleregiment. Thefollowingcommentsmaybemade:

SeeDiagram23

a. Reconnaissance. Eventhoughdivisionalreconnaissanceismovingahead,

theregimentalcommanderwillwanthisownseparatereconnaissancepa-

trols, reportingdirectlyand immediatelytohis headquarters. Asecondechelonregimentwillnotdeploysuchpatrolsuntilitsmissionisconfirmed.

SeeChapter3formoredetail.

b. March Security.Firstechelonregimentswillusuallydeployreinforcedbat-

talionsasvanguardswhencontactispossible. Seediagram25bforanexample. Secondechelonregimentswillgenerallybecontentwithafor-

wardmobilepicquet. Note thattankregimentsareverylikelytousetheir

motorriflebattalionasthebasisof thevanguard, particularly inbroken

terrainorifawaterobstacleliesahead.

c. Routes. Beforecommitmentintobattlearegimentwillonlymoveonmore

thanonerouteinexceptionalcircumstances,suchasverymountainous

terrain.Howeverregimentalsubunitswithindependentroles,suchasflank

orbypassingdetachmentsmaymarchonaseparateroute.

d. Main Body Battalions. Thecombatgroupingoffirstechelonbattalionsmaydifferbetweentankandmotorrifleregiments. Atankregimentoftenallo-

catesacompanyofitsmotorriflebattaliontoeachofitstankbattalions

fromanearlystageinthemarch.Inmotorrifleregiments,however,the

tankbattalion,lessanycompanyallocatedtothevanguard,ismoreusuallyinitiallykepttogetheronthemarchandplacedattheheadofthecolumn,

immediatelyaftertheCP. Thisgivestheregimentalcommanderastrong

manoeuvreforceintheeventofasurprisecontactwiththeenemy. Then

ascommitmenttobattleapproachesthetankbattalionmaybeallocatedtofirstechelonmotorriflebattalions.Atankcompanymaybekeptdirectlyunderregimentalcontrol. Secondechelonbattalions,inbothtankandmotor

rifleregiments,receivelittlereinforcementbeforetheircommitmenttobat-

tle.

e. Artillery Elements.Aregimentsorganicartillerybattalion,oraregimentalartillerygroupifitisformed,maybeallocatedvariouspositionsinthecol-

umnofmarch. Whencontactwiththeenemyisimminenttheartilleryis

likelytobewellforward,perhapsclosebehindthecommandpostatthe

headofthecolumn.Thisarrangementisverylikelyifameetingbattleisinprospect. Insecondechelonregimentsandonotheroccasionswhencon-tactisnotexpectedtheartillerymaybefarthertotherear.Theairdefence

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battalionwillbedistributedalongthecolumnandsomeelementsmaybe

deployedinairdefenceambushesontheflanks.Amotorrifleregiments

antitankbattalionmaycoveranexposedflankormarchwelltothefore,dependingonthetacticalsituation.

2017. The Order of March: Battalion. Battalionswithindependentmissions,suchasforwarddetachmentsandvanguards,andfirstechelonbattalionsalltendtoreceivesimilarreinforcementsanditwillbedifficulttodetermineabattalionsrolefromitscombatgrouping.HowevercertaindifferencesdooccurandtheseareillustratedinDiagram24.

SeeDiagram24

a. Forward Detachment. Operatingwellforwardandperhapsevenaheadof

theregimentalreconnaissanceaforwarddetachmentrequiresatleastone

reconnaissancepatroltoavoidsurprisecontactwiththeenemy. Inamotorriflebattaliontheorganicreconnaissanceplatoonwillbeused. Atankbat-

talionislikelytouseaplatoonoftheattachedmotorriflecompany. Marchsecurityisprovidedbyaforwardmobilepicquet,whichmaydeployafor-

wardpatrolfromitsownstrength.Attachedartilleryiswellforward,espe-

ciallyifameetingbattleisanticipated. Engineerattachmentswilldepend

onthemissionandterrain,butgapcrossingequipmentislikelytobein-cludedanddivisionalassaultcrossingassetsmaybeattached.

b. Vanguard. Avanguardbattalionhaslessneedforadvancedreconnais-

sanceandmaythereforenotdeployareconnaissancepatrol,relyingin-

steadonaforwardpatrol.Amotorriflebattalionmayprefertouseanordinarymotorrifleplatooninthisroleandkeepthereconnaissancepla-tooninreserve. Itseemsequallycommontodeployanyattachedartilleryatthefrontorrearofthemainbody. Engineerassetswillemphasiseroute

clearancecapability,oranMSDmaymarchimmediatelyafterthevanguard.

c. First Echelon Battalion.Afirstechelonbattalionisunlikelytodeployacombatreconnaissancepatrolbeforeithaspenetratedtheenemysfirst

echeloncompanypositions,althoughaplatoonwillbenominatedtoactin

thisrolewhenthetimecomes. Marchsecuritywillprobablyconsistofa

forwardpatrol. Ifartilleryisattacheddirectlytothebattalion,ratherthankeptinsupportintheRAG,itismostoftenfoundattherearofthemainbody.

d. Second Echelon Battalion.Asecondechelonbattalionisnotusuallygiven

reinforcementsonthemarch,untilimmediatelybeforecommittalintobat-

tle. Inthisexamplethebattalionconfinesitsreconnaissanceandmarchsecurityeffort toasingle scout vehicle. The air defenceandgrenade

launcherplatoonsfollowthebattalioncommander,themortarbatteryfol-

lowsthemotorriflecompanies.

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e. Attached Tank/Motor Rifle Companies. Thepatternofdeploymentfollows

thatnotedatregimentallevel. Tankbattalionseitheruseanattachedmo-

torriflecompany,withatankplatoonandotherreinforcements,astheirforwardmobilepicquet,or,ifthisisnotnecessary,subordinateamotorrifle

platoontoeachtankcompany.Motorriflebattalioncommandersaremore

likelytokeepanattachedtankcompanyintact,lessanyplatoonwhichreinforcestheforwardmobilepicquet,andtoplacethetanksattheheadof

thebattalioncolumn.Ascontactbecomescloserthetankcompanymaybesubordinatedtothefirstecheloncompaniesofthebattalion.Tanksare

notallocatedtoasecondecheloncompanybeforeitentersthebattle.

2018. The Order of March: Company. Ifatankplatoonisallocatedtoamotorrifle

company,theentireplatoonmarchesattheheadofthecompanycolumn. Atankcompanyallocatedamotorrifleplatoonmayuseitasaforwardpatrol,if

oneisrequiredbythetacticalsituation. Otherwisethemotorrifleplatoonis

splitbetweenthetankplatoons,andindividualvehiclesfollowthetanksoftheirassignedplatoon.

2019. The Movement Support Detachment (MSD). Movementsupportdetach-

mentshavealreadybeenmentionedabove. TheMSDisaspecialistengineer

grouping,responsibleforrouteclearancewhichwillbeusedinbothadminis-

trativeandtacticalmarches.

a. Role. TheMSDmoveseitherbeforeorafterthevanguard,uptotwohours

aheadofthemainbody,andimprovestheaxisofadvance. Itfillsincraters

orconstructsbypasses,laysbridgesoverminorgapsandimprovesthe

approachestoandexitsfromthem,clearsandmarkslanesthroughminefields.TheworkoftheMSDisvitalbothtoarapidadvanceandtosecurity;ifitisnotcompletedintimethemainbodywillbeforcedtohalt,bunchup

andcreateatargetforairormissileattack. Oncethefirstecheloniscom-

mittedtobattletheMSDmovesbehindit,incaseitsadvanceischecked,

andtopreparearouteforthecommittalofthesecondechelon.

b. Composition. MSDsincludeengineerplantsuchastrackeddiggers,doz-

ers,cranes,dumptrucks,tankandtrucklaunchedbridges,minedetec-

torsandclearersandtruckstocarryexplosivesandmetaltrackway. They

mayhavemotorrifleandtanktroopsattachedfortheirprotection. Someofthetankswilloftenbefittedwithdozerbladesandthemotorrifletroopsmayalsoprovideextralabour.Chemicalreconnaissancetroopsoftenform

partoftheMSD. Withtheresourcesorganictoadivisionupto5or6MSDs

ofapproximatelycompanysizecanbeformed.

c. Grouping.AnMSDwillbeorganizedintwoorthreesubgroups.Theyarethereconnaissanceandclearancegroup(orseparatereconnaissanceand

clearancegroups)andtheroadbridgegroup. Someexamplesofthecom-

positionandgroupingof typicalMSDsaregivenin Table23. Grouping

dependsonterrainandthetacticalsituation. Itmaybevariedduringthecourseofoperations.

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2020. Countering RemotelyDelivered Mines. GENFORCEtakesthethreatposed

byremotelydeliveredminesveryseriously.AnRDMstrikemayhitthemiddle

ofaunitincolumnoranassemblyarea,wellbehinditsMSD,whichcannotbeexpectedtoturnandclearroutes. Unitsmustthereforetraintheirownmine

clearancegroups(atleastonesectionpercompany)intheuseofbasicequip-

menttoclearroutes. Individualvehiclecrewsareexpectedtoabletoclearasfarasthenextvehicleaheadinthecolumn.

TABLE 2-3: MOVEMENT SUPPORT DETACHMENT COMPOSITION

AND GROUPING

Reconnaissance and

Clearance Group

Road-Bridge Group

a. SapperGroup(2xBTR),MT55,

TankwithKMT6

SapperSection(2xBTR),BAT2,

TMMx4b. IMR,MTK,SapperSection(BTR) BAT2,TMMx4,FireEnginex3

Reconnaissance Group Clearance Group Road-Bridge Group

c. SapperSection(BTR)

MT55

IMR,

SapperSection(BTR)

2subgroups,each

EngrSection,BAT2x2

&TMMx2

d. Helicopter

SapperSection(Truck)

MT55, TankwithKMT6

SapperSection(Truck)

TankwithBTUdozer

blade

EngrSection,BAT2x2

TMMx4

Reconnaissance &Mine-Clearing Group

Obstacle-ClearanceGroup

Road-Bridge Group

e. SapperPl(Section)

(2xBTR)

TankwithKMT6

SapperSection(BTR)

IMR,TankwithBTU

dozerblade

MT55,TMMx2

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CHAPTER 3

RECONNAISSANCE

SECTION 1 - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

3001. The Importance of Reconnaissance. IntheGENFORCEviewreconnais-sanceisthemostimportantelementofcombatsupport. Intheirvisionoffuturecombatthebattlefieldwilldevelopveryunevenlyandneitherunitsnorforma-tionswillbeabletorelyonthesecurityoftheirflanksortheirrear.Friendlyand

enemy forceswillbecome intermingledandsituationsdevelopandchange

veryquickly.Reconnaissanceelementsmustwarntheircommandersofrap-

idlydevelopingthreatsandidentifyfleetingenemyvulnerabilities. GENFORCEcommandersaretaughtthatitisnecessarytolocate7580%ofpossibletar-

gets beforelaunchinganattackifitistohaveareasonablechanceofsuccess.

100%of thehighestpriority targets (egPGMs, reccestrikecomplexesandcommandposts)mustbelocated.Thisdemandsaveryhighlevelofskillfrom

reconnaissancetroopsatalllevels.

3002. Principles. GENFORCEreconnaissancetroopsaretaughtthat,tobeuseful,

reconnaissancedatamusthavethefollowingcharacteristics. Itmustbe:

a. Relevant. Reconnaissanceactivityisstrictlysubordinatedtotherequire-mentsofthe commanderand the fulfilmentofhismission. Reconnais-

sanceeffortswillbeconcentratedonthemainaxisandkeyobjectives.

b. Continuous. Commandersatalllevelsareresponsiblefororganizingcon-tinuousreconnaissance. Reconnaissanceisanallarmsmissionandnotsolelythebusinessofspecialistreconnaissancetroops.

c. Aggressive.Acquiringintelligenceabouttheenemywillalwaysbeastrug-

gleandthereconnaissancebattlemustbewagedaggressivelywhetherin

attackordefence. Reconnaissancetroopsmustdisplayinitiative,skillandresourcefulnesstodefeattheenemyscountermeasures.

d. Timely. Thebestintelligenceisuselessifitisnotreceivedintime. When

settingareconnaissancemissionacommanderwillalsosetthetimebywhichherequirestheinformationtobeprovided.

e. Secure. GENFORCEcommandersareawarethattheenemymaylearna

greatdealabouttheirintentionsbydiscoveringtheirreconnaissanceplan.

Theyacceptthatitisimpossibletohidecompletelythefactthatreconnais-

sanceisbeingconducted,butwillstrivetoconcealthescale,missions,targetsandnatureoftheirreconnaissanceeffortand,inparticular,willaim

nottorevealwheretheyareconcentratingtheirmainstrength. Itwillnotbe

easytoreconciletheneedsforspeedandsecrecy.

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f. Accurate. GENFORCEenthusiasmfordeceptionbreedsafearofbeing

deceived.Aneffortwillalwaysbemadetoconfirminformationfromone

sourcebyanother.

3003. Zones of Reconnaissance Responsibility.Eachheadquarters,fromdivi-

siontobattalion,hasazoneofreconnaissanceresponsibility,subdividedintothreeparts(seeDiagram31). Thepartsaredefinedasfollows:

a. Detailed Reconnaissance Zone. ThedepthofthiszoneisdeterminedbytheeffectiverangebeyondtheFEBAoftheweaponsystemscommanded

bytheheadquarters.

b. General Reconnaissance Zone. Withinthiszonetheheadquartersmustbeabletomonitorenemyactivitysufficientlytoensureitsownplansare

notdisturbedbyunexpectedenemymoves.

c. Rear Reconnaissance Zone. Withinitsownrearareatheheadquarters

mustbeable tomonitorenemyactivity,particularly theuseofchemicalstrikesorairmobileforces.

d. Thewidthof the zoneofdetailedreconnaissanceresponsibilitybroadly

equatestotheheadquartersfrontageofoperations,butinthegeneralre-

connaissancezonemayoverlapintothezonesofflankingelements. Foraregimentthezoneofreconnaissanceresponsibilitymaycover500600sq

kmandforadivisionitcanreach34,000sqkm.

SeeDiagram31

SECTION 2 - RESOURCES

3004. ThereconnaissanceresourcesorganictoaGENFORCEdivisionaresumma-

rizedbelowbut,giventhesizeof theareaofresponsibilityand the levelof

detailrequiredcommandersarealwayslikelytofeelashortageofassets.

3005. Command and Control of Reconnaissance. Indivisional and regimental

headquarterstheChiefofReconnaissanceisresponsiblefororganizingre-

connaissanceinaccordancewiththecommander'splan. Inbattalionsthechiefofstaffisresponsible.Divisionsandregimentsorganizespecificradionetstolinkreconnaissancesubunitswiththeheadquarters. Battalionsmaymonitor

thisnet,especiallywhenoperatingindependentlyofthemainbody(egasa

forwarddetachment)butdonotusuallymaintainaspecificreconnaissance

net. Everylevelofcommand isexpectedtomaintaina reconnaissancere-

servetobetaskedformissionswhichariseduringthecourseofoperations.

3006. Higher Formation Assets.Muchofadivisionsintelligencewillcomefrom

higherformations. TheGENFORCEair forcedeploysaconsiderablerecon-

naissancecapabilityusingthefullrangeofmodernsensors,andlongrangedronesarealsoinservice. Whilesortieswillbetaskedatarmyandfrontlevel,

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reportsmaygodirecttoconcerneddivisions,aswillrelevantIFREPs. Higher

formationsalsodeployaformidableSIGINTandSPFeffort,theproductsof

whichwillgotodivisionsasnecessary.

3007. Divisional assets. Themainassetisthedivisionalreconnaissancebattalion:

a. ThebattalionhastwoBMPreconnaissancecompaniesequippedwithBMPandBRM1Kwhichmayeitheroperateasacompany,formingaRecon-naissanceDetachment(RD),orbedeployedasplatoonsizedReconnais-sancePatrols(RPs). The companies will operate across thedivisional

frontageandtoadepthofupto50kms. Ifnecessarytheymayberein-

forcedbyadditionalRDsorRPsformedfrommotorrifleortanksubunits.

b. Thelongrange reconnaissancecompanyisinsertedingreaterdepth,up

to100kms. ThecompanyoperatesinteamsknownasReconnaissance

Groups(RG)whichmaybeinsertedbytheirorganicBTR,BRDMandUAZ-469 vehiclesorbyhelicopterorparachute. The companymayalsobe

usedtoprovideanairassaultcapabilityagainsthighvalueenemytargetssuchasheadquarters.

c. Theradioandradarintercept/DFcompanycaninterceptHFgroundwave

outtoabout80kms,andVHFto3080kms(low/highpoweranddepend-

ingonterrainmasking). VHFdirection finding(DF)maysometimesbegoodenoughtotargetMRLs. Itiscertainlygoodenoughtodirectother

reconnaissancemeanstorefinetheintelligencegained,ortodirectraidsorperhapsairstrikes.TURNSERIESBBVsarebeingreplacedbyMTLBu

SIGINTvariants,improvingthecompanyscapabilitiesandsurvivabilityintheforwardarea.

d. Forwardandraidingdetachmentswillprovidevaluableintelligence,evenif

thatisnottheirprimaryfunction. Unitsincontactmustalsokeepdivisional

HQuptodatewithinformationabouttheenemy.Formationsnaturallyalso

exchangeintelligencewithflankingheadquarters.

3008. Regimental Assets. Tankandmotorrifleregimentshaveareconnaissance

company. ItincludesaBMPplatoonwith2BMPvehiclesandaBRM1Kas

headquartersvehicleandaBRDMplatoonwith4BRDM2.Thecompanycandeploy2RPstocovertheregimentsfrontwhichusuallyoperate10to15kmsinfrontof theunitsFEBA. Itappearsnottobegeneralpracticetomixthe

companysBMPandBRDMvehicleswithinpatrols.AdditionalRPsmaybe

formedfrommotorrifleortanksubunits.

3009. Battalion Assets.Motorriflebattalionshaveanorganicreconnaissancepla-toonwithaBRM1KandeitherBMPorBTRvehicles. Inadditionordinary

motorrifleplatoonsmaybeusedasRPsorcombatreconnaissancepatrols

(CRPs). Battalionshaveshortrangeportablegroundradarscapableofidenti-

fyingvehiclemovementtosupplementtheirOPsinstaticphasesofbattle. Atankbattalionhasmuchmorelimitedrecceresourcesandmustuseordinary

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tankplatoonstoprovidereconnaissancepatrols,unlessamotorriflesubunit

hasbeensubordinatedtoit. Battalionsmaydeployavarietyof reconnais-

sancegroupings.Ascoutvehicleontheaxisofadvanceistheabsolutemini-mum,andasthebattalionapproachestheenemyaForwardPatrol(FP)will

usuallyformpartofthemarchsecuritygrouping. Inmobilebattles,forexam-

pleafterbreakingthroughtheenemystacticaldefenceandinmeetingbattles,andwhenthebattalionhasanindependentmission,suchasaforwarddetach-

ment,aCRPwillbeformed. Whentheterrainortacticalsituationdemandittwooreventhreepatrolsmaybeformedfromonebattalion.

3010. Other Reconnaissance Assets.

a. Air.Divisionshaveneitherdronesnortheirownhelicopterassets.How-everhelicoptersarefrequentlyusedbyengineerandchemicaltroopsto

assessroutesandobstaclesandareasofcontaminationbehindtheFLOT.

Thisisnotgenerallydonewithinenemyairspace,thoughopportunitiesmayariseinahighlyfluidbattle.Attackhelicopterswill,ofcourse,submitnor-

malIFREPsduringtheirmissions.

b. Engineer.Itiscommonpracticetoreinforcereconnaissancepatrolswith

anengineerelement. Thedivisionalengineerbattalionhasareconnais-

sanceplatoonandtheregimentsengineercompanycanprovidescoutsas

well. Theengineerelementmayconsistofasectionwithitsownvehicle(BTR,BRDMorIRM)oracoupleofsapperstravellinginoneofthepatrols

vehicles. InadditionEngineerReconnaissancePatrols(ERPs)maybe

despatchedtoexaminemajorobstaclesorimportantroutesindetail. In

defence,orbeforeanattack fromapositionofclosecontact,engineerobservationpostswillbeestablished.

c. NBC.Allsubunitsareresponsibleforcontinuousmonitoringoftheirown

NBCstate. Inadditiondivisionalandregimentalchemicaldefencesub-

unitscanprovidespecialist reconnaissanceteams. Theymayoperate

fromtheirownvehicles(BRDMRKhorRKhM)ortravelinapatrolsvehi-cles. Any reconnaissancepatrolmayhaveachemical reconnaissance

elementattachedandadditionalchemicalpatrolswillbedispersedthrough

unitcolumnstoevaluateenemystrikes.

d. Artillery.ArtillerytargetsacrossthewholedivisionszoneofadvanceareacquiredbyamixofmobileOPswithACRVsandPRP3/4(SMALLFRED)

deployedbyartillerybattalionsandelementsofthedivisionalartilleryob-

servationbatterywithsoundandflashranginglines,surveillanceradars

(withBIGFREDhavingapossiblemortarandhowitzerlocatingcapability)

andradarDFequipments(POLEDISH).

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SECTION 3 - MISSIONS AND METHODS

3011. Missions. Reconnaissanceelementsaretaskedtoacquirethefollowingtypesofdata:

a. Enemy Forces. Thecomposition,subordination,capabilities,locationandintentionsoftheenemyarenaturallyvitalinformationtothecommander.Thelocationandreadinessstateofprecisionandchemicalweaponsaregiventhehighestpriority.Headquarters,communicationcentres,defendedareasandartillerypositionsarealways important. At the lowertactical

levels detailsof the enemys fire andobstacleplansmustbeknownin

detail. Divisionalandregimentalcommanderswillalsowishtolocateen-

emyreservesandsecondechelons.Everyeffortwillbemadetodiscoverboundariesandopenflanksastheseareseenasweakspotsespecially

suitableforattack.

b. Topographical.MuchofGENFORCEsreconnaissanceeffortisdevotedto

findinggoodroutesformanoeuvreunits,especiallythroughdifficultterrainthattheenemymightconsiderimpassable. Lateralroutes,theidentifica-

tionofvitalgroundandofpossiblesitesforGENFORCEcommunications

equipmentandforassemblyareas&carealsoimportant.Timelyinforma-

tiononthenatureandextentofobstaclesisseentobeessentialifthe

advanceistocontinuewithoutpauses;especiallyimportantinthiscontextarepossiblesitesforcrossingwaterobstaclesandassessmentsofenemy

demolitionsandminefields.

c. Contamination. Areasofcontamination,resultingfrombothenemyandGENFORCEstrikes,havetobedetermined,togetherwiththedegreeofhazardinvolvedincrossingthem.

3012. Groupings.AgraspoftheterminologyusedtodescribeGENFORCErecon-

naissancegroupingsisvitaltoanunderstandingoftheirtactics.Thefollowing

termsareused:

a. A Reconnaissance Detachment (RD)maybeformedfroma reconnais-

sance,motorrifleortankcompanyoramotorrifleortankbattalion. Itis

usedduringmobilephasesofoperationsonthemainaxis,ortoreconnoi-trekeyobjectivesindepth. CompanysizedRDsaremostcommon. Bat-talionbasedRDsareusedtoreconnoitreobjectiveswhichitmaybead-

vantageous toseizeand hold for some time, for exampleamountain

defileorarivercrossing. RDssendouttheirownreconnaissancepatrols

andthusenabletheseplatoonsizedelementstooperatemoreindepend-

ently of the main forceand for longer periods. RDsareoftenallarmsgroupings;typicalRDsmightbecomposedofamotorriflecompanywitha

tankplatoon,engineerandchemicalreconnaissancesectionsora tankcompanywithamotorrifleplatoon,engineerand chemical reconnais-

sancesections.Anartillerybattery,airdefenceelementand(formotorrifletroops)antitankelementmightalsobeadded. Helicoptersmayalsobeassigned to cooperatewith theRD. SometimesanRDmaybe tasked

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duringamissiontoseizeakeyobjectivewhichhasbeenfoundtobelightly

defended,forexampleaweaklyheldrivercrossing. (SeeDiagram32for

thetacticalgroupingofan(RD).

SeeDiagram32

b. A Reconnaissance Patrol (RP)isaplatoonsizedelementwhichmaybereinforcedbyengineerandNBCreconnaissanceteams. RPsaresentoutbyreccebattalionsandcompanies,byRDsandbyleadingtankandmotorriflebattalions.AnRDalwayshasatleastone,andusuallytwo,RPsoper-

atinginitssector,atdistancesofupto10kmsfromtheparentbody. One

RPwillalwaysbeforwardontheRDsaxis. RPsareusuallysentoutby

motorrifleandtankbattalionswithindependentmissions(suchasforwardorraidingdetachments)orfirstechelonbattalionsinopenphasesofbattle.

InsuchcasestheRPmayoperateupto15kmsfromthebattalion. (See

Diagram33).

SeeDiagram33

c. A Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP)isaplatoonsizedelementsent

outbyandreportingtoatankorMRbattalionheadquarters. Againitmay

includeengineerorNBCreconnaissancetroops. CRPsarenotdeployed

byallbattalions;secondechelonbattalionsnormallyhavenorequirementforaCRP,unlesstaskedwithanantiairlandingmission. CRPsareoften

usedbyadvancedguardsandbattalionswithindependentmissionsand

firstechelonbattalionsareexpectedtodeployCRPsoncetheyhavepen-

etratedthefirstcrustofenemydefences. CRPsusedinclosecontactwiththeenemynormallyoperatenodeeperthantheirparentbattalioncansup-portthembyfire,butoutofdirectcontactCRPsmaybeseparatedbyupto

10kmfromthemainbodyofthebattalion.

d. A Forward Patrol (FP)isamarchsecurityelementsentoutbyaforward

picquetorbythevanguarditself. Itisnotprimarilyareconnaissanceele-mentbutwhilecarryingoutitsprimarymissionwillalsobeabletoprovide

intelligenceontheenemyfor theheadquarterswhichdeployedit. (See

Chapter2,para2012g. formoredetails).

e. A Patrol Section (Patrol Vehicle, Patrol Tank) is,asthenameimplies,asinglevehicle(ormotorriflesectioninoperationsonfoot)withareconnais-

sancemission. PatrolSectionsmaybetheonlyreconnaissanceelement

whentheriskofmeetingtheenemyislow.Theymayalsobesenttocover

theflanksorrearofasubunit.Allformsofpatrol(RP,CRPorFP)deploy

aPatrolSection(Vehicleor Tank) to thelimitofvisibilityaheadof them(4001200metres). (SeeDiagram33).

f. A Reconnaissance Group (RG)operatesindependentlyintheenemysrear

area. Withinadivisionit isalmostcertaintocomefromthe longrangereconnaissancecompany. RGsareusuallysectionstrengthandarepar-ticularlytargetedonPGMs,headquartersandreserves.

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3013. Tactics. Themostcommonmethodsofconductingreconnaissanceinclude

observation,raids,ambushesandpatrols.

a. Observation. Observationis,ofcourse,themostcommonreconnaissance

techniqueinallformsofbattle.Observationpostsassuch,however,aremostcommonlydeployedinmorestaticphasesofthebattle,suchasin

defenceandwhenpreparinganattackincontact.Theymaybereinforcedwithengineerandchemicalreconnaissancetroopsand,atnightorinbadweather,areoftensupplementedbylisteningposts.

b. Raids. Raidsareoftenusedwhen indirectcontactwith theenemyto

snatchprisoners,documentsorequipmentandmaybemountedbyeitherspecialistrecceormotorrifletroops. Specialistreccetroopsmayalsobe

taskedwithraidsdeeperintotheenemyrear,againstcommandpostsor

highprioritytargetssuchasPGMsystems.

c. Ambushes. Thevalueofreconnaissanceambushesisincreasinglystressed.Subunitsmaybespecificallytaskedtolayanambushtocaptureprison-

ers,documents&c.Alternativelyapatrolmaysetanambushduringits

operationsintheenemydepthwhenthiscomplieswiththeCommander's

intentions.

d. Patrols. Inopen,mobileformsofwarfarewhichGENFORCEexpectsto

dominatethefuturebattlefieldOPs,raidsandambusheswillbelesssignifi-

cantsourcesofintelligencethanpatrolssentoutbymarchingunits. The

typesofpatrolwhichGENFORCEoperateshavebeendescribedinthepreviousparagraph.Patroltechniquesaredescribedbelow.

3014. Patrol Techniques. Whateverthedesignationofthepatrol,itsmodusoperandi

isfairly standardized. Diagram33 summarizes thesetechniques. Onthe

moveapatrolusuallysendsapatrolvehicleforwardtothelimitofvisibilityand

supportbyfire.Obviouslythisdistanceisdeterminedbyterrain, timeofday,weatherandsoon,but itisusuallyexpressedas4001200metres. When

enemycontactisnotexpectedallthepatrolvehiclesmaybemovingatthe

sametime,butwhencontactisimminentthepatrolmovesmorecircumspectly

betweengoodoverwatchpositions. Thepatrolcommanderwillobservefromsuchapointwhilethepatrolvehiclemovescovertlytothenextposition. Inopenterrain,wherecovertmovementisdifficult,thepatrolvehiclemakesits

boundatbestspeed,followedbytherestofthepatrolonceitissafelyinplace.

3015. Whenenemycontactisnotanticipated thepatrolmovesalongitsassigned

axisatitsbestspeed. Whencontactispossiblethepatrolneverusestheaxisitself,butrathermovesbyboundsbetweenpositionsfromwhichitcanobserve

theaxis,makingeveryefforttoavoiddetection.Iftheenemyisdiscoveredinanunexpectedposition,thepatrolcommandermustimmediatelyreportthe

locationtohisownheadquarters. Ifapatrolobservesenemyreconnaissanceormarchsecurityelementsitstaskistoavoidcontactandpressontolocate

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themainforceasrapidlyaspossible. Intheeventofasurpriseencounterwith

asmallenemyforce,andwhenevasionisimpossible,thepatrolisexpectedto

actdecisivelytodestroytheenemy,captureprisonersifpossibleandcontinueitsmission. Onthewholereccepatrolstrytoavoidcombat,whichisalmost

boundtocompromisetheirmission.

3016. Thecombinationofthesereconnaissancegroupingsandtechniquesusedwithinadivisionalareawillvarywithcircumstances. Thefollowingparagraphsout-linetheorganizationofreconnaissanceduringdifferentphasesofbattle.

SeeDiagram34

3017. Reconnaissance In The Advance. (SeeDiagram34). WhenadvancingtocontactandpenetratinganenemycoveringforceaGENFORCEdivisionwill

cover its frontwith patrols,eachwitha23 kmsector. ARDwillprobably

advanceonthemainaxis;theremainderofthefrontwillbecoveredbyRPs.Thisscreenwillavoidcombatasfaraspossibleandpressontocontactthe

mainbodyoftheenemyforce. InameetingbattlesomepatrolswillthenstayincontactwiththeleadingenemyunitsastheyapproachtheGENFORCE

formationorunit,movingbackonaparallelroute. Otherpatrolswillattemptto

penetratetheenemymainbody.Iftheenemyispreparingtoholdamain

defensivepositionsomepatrolswillestablishalineofstaticobservationposts

andreportonthenatureofthedefences. Otherpatrolswillseekgapsoropenflanksandpressonintothedepthoftheposition. SomeRPswillbedeployed

ontheflanksofthedivision.Thenumberofsuchpatrolswillbedeterminedbytheclosenessoffriendlyformations. RGsmaybeinsertedbyvehicleorairat

leasttothedepthofthedivisionsmission.

3018. FirstechelonregimentswilldeploytheirownRPsbehindthedivisionalpatrols.

Theadvancedguardbattalionsoftheseleadingregimentsandanyforward

detachmentswilldeployCRPsandpossiblytheirownRPs. Battalionsinthe

mainbodyoffirstechelonregimentsmaydeployFPs,butwillnotemployCRPs

unlesstheyareabouttocontacttheenemy.Withinsecondechelonregiments,onlypatrolvehiclesarelikelytobeused.

3019. Reconnaissance In The Breakthrough Battle. (SeeDiagram35). Muchof

thedivisionsintelligencewillbeacquiredbyobservationpostsinthefrontline.Radars,DFandartillery reconnaissanceassetswillbefullydeployed. Thedivisionreconnaissancebattalionandfirstechelonregimentsreconnaissance

companieswilltrytofindgapsthroughwhichRPsmaybeinsertedtoidentify

targetsindepth. Snatchraidsmaybemountedbyreconnaissanceormotor

rifleunitstoidentifyopposingunits.Aconsiderableproportionofthedivisional

reconnaissanceassaultcompanyshouldbynowhavebeeninsertedintothedepthoftheenemydefences.

SeeDiagram35

3020. Reconnaissance By Battle. Ifthesesourcesfailtoprovidethedetailedtar-geting informationrequiredtoensurethesuccessofthefireplanitmaybe

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necessarytoemployreconnaissancebybattle. Thisison

AFM Vol.2 Gen_En-Basic, Pt.2 Tactical Doctrine 1995

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Transcript of AFM Vol.2 Gen_En-Basic, Pt.2 Tactical Doctrine 1995