Adam Evans & Kristian Cruickshank, Nova Systems - Developing UAV safety cases

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Adam Evans & Kristian Cruickshank, Nova Systems delivered the presentation at the 2014 UAV Triple Zero Summit. The 2014 UAV Triple Zero Summit had a theme and focus on ‘Mobilising and Regulating UAVs in Australian Emergency Response’. It drew on government policy, current legislation and privacy protocol in establishing an informed analysis of the current and future scope surrounding the utilization of unmanned systems in this sector. For more information about the event, please visit: http://www.informa.com.au/uavtriplezero14

Transcript of Adam Evans & Kristian Cruickshank, Nova Systems - Developing UAV safety cases

  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence Developing UAV Safety Cases UAV Triple Zero Summit Mr Adam Evans Mr Kristian Cruickshank 1
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence Overview 2 Novas Background What is a Safety Case? When is a Safety Case Required? UAV Safety Case Paradigm Safety Case Process Levels of Acceptable Risk Emergency Services Risk Context UAV Operation Risk Analysis Treating Unacceptable Risk UAV Safety Management Systems Consolidating the Safety Case
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence Terminology UAV vs UAS vs RPA vs RP vs RPAS Throughout this presentation: UAV = RPA UAS = RPAS UAV Controller = RP 3
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence Origins in Defence T&E Involved in all significant ADF UAS projects to date: Heron Shadow 200 Aerial Targets Nova contracted by ADF to develop UAV regulatory framework Specialists in Military and Civil Airworthiness, inclusive of operational and technical risk management Aeronautical Engineers Australia specialists in Civil Airworthiness and CASRs Practitioners in various aerospace engineering and operational domains Novas Background 4
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence What is a Safety Case? Broad Definition: A structured argument of compiled evidence demonstrating that a system is acceptably safe No CASA definition for UAV Safety Case CASA Airworthiness Circular for Aerodromes: A documented body of evidence that provides a demonstrated and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for a given application and environment over its lifetime (AC 139-16(1)) Propose that the definition used in AC 139- 16(1) is suitable for UAVs 5
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence What is a Safety Case? Elements of a UAV Safety Case Adequate Level of Safety. Benchmark is acceptable* level of risk posed to the general public. Given Application and Environment. Safety case must define the types of UAV operations and the environmental factors present in those operations Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) or Concept of Operations (CONOPS) or equivalent Key environmental factors are population densities, physical environment, airspace category. Lifetime. UAV context may lessen the importance of this element possibly more disposable than most aircraft? Still requires consideration. * Acceptable may vary depending on a given emergency services scenario 6
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence What is a Safety Case? Elements of a UAV Safety Case (cont) System. Unmanned Aerial System plus the Safety Management System or equivalent implemented. Demonstrated Argument. Logical, valid, and defensible argument constructed from applicable body of evidence. No specific CASA guidance on what the argument must consider Experience with Military UAS provides a reasonable basis for considerations 7
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence When is a Safety Case Required? Implied by NPRM1309OS (regulations and guidance not published yet) Intent of once-off Area Approval is the same as a safety case, but safety case can be enduring Operation of Large UAV (> 150kg) Operating outside of Standard Operating Conditions Over Populous Areas Beyond Visual Line Of Sight Greater than 400ft Other than Class G airspace Closer than 3NM from aerodrome 8
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence When is a Safety Case Required? Put Simply: UAV OPERATIONS THAT WOULD BE OF MOST BENEFIT TO EMERGENCY SERVICES! 9
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence Likely Scenarios for Safety Case Search and Rescue BVLOS, Over Populous Areas, Above 400ft Fire Spotting Restricted Airspace? Police Tactical Operations BVLOS, Over Populous Areas, Controlled Airspace Natural Disasters BVLOS, Over Populous Areas, Above 400ft, Launching from Aerodromes Others? 10
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence UAV Safety Case Paradigm Different approach than regular aircraft Why? Aircraft Type Certification and Operational Management Regulations established and industry complies UAV origins Hobby and Military No internationally recognised Type Certification Requirements established Risk Management Approach instead of a Compliance to Standards approach 11
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence UAV Safety Case Paradigm The Future Safety Paradigm Establishing Compliance with Technical Airworthiness Requirements Confidence in Integrity of System Design Confidence in Quality of Manufacture Design of Maintenance Schemes that maintain aircraft reliability Same process as normal Aircraft Challenges with The Future Cost Establishing requirements for different UAV categories (Small, Medium, Large, Commuter?) Detect and Avoid + more 12
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence UAV Safety Case Paradigm The Current Safety Paradigm Technical and Operational Risk Management Defining Acceptable Levels of Risk to Public Determine worst credible Consequence of UAV accident Determine Probability of worst credible Consequence occurring Reliability of UAV (hardware reliability combined with integrity of software) if possible to determine Probability of fatality/injury given impact Population density + more Technical and Operational risk treatments Plus normal aircraft requirements (maintenance, flight operations system, Safety Management System, etc) 13
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence UAV Safety Case Process 14 Develop SOI / CONOPS Define Acceptable Levels of Risk System Safety Assessment Compare Risk to Acceptable Levels Risk Acceptable ? Develop Risk Mitigations Consolidate Safety Case Operational, maintenance, design, SOI change, etc Yes No Evidence SOI, Acceptable Risk, UAV design, Maintenance System, Safety Management System, Operators Manual, OEM Documentation
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence Statement of Operating Intent Analogous to Concept of Operations Derived from Military Context Defines types of operations and informs risk assessment process 15
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence Statement of Operating Intent Key Aspects Role. Function(s) or purpose(s) assigned to system SAR, Fire Spotting, Surveillance, etc. Tasks are a sub-element of Role. Tasks to be conducted under a given role. Environment. Totality of surroundings/conditions of operations (airspace, areas of operation, physical environment, etc) Flight Envelope. Defines outermost boundary of flight conditions for UAV to remain airworthy. Flight Usage Spectrum. Flight Profiles for each task/role, frequency of profiles, Rate of Effort, etc. 16
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence Safety Case Process 17 Develop SOI / CONOPS Define Acceptable Levels of Risk System Safety Assessment Compare Risk to Acceptable Levels Risk Acceptable ? Develop Risk Mitigations Consolidate Safety Case Operational, maintenance, design, SOI change, etc Yes No Evidence SOI, Acceptable Risk, UAV design, Maintenance System, Safety Management System, Operators Manual, OEM Documentation
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence Safety Targets Example Maximum acceptable Individual probability of fatality or serious injury to the General Public: 1 X10-7 per flight hour Maximum acceptable Collective fatality expectation to the General Public: 1000 X10-6 (1x10-3) per annum OR 5x10-7 per flight hour Maximum acceptable Individual probability of fatality or serious injury to the Mission Personnel: 1 X10-6 per flight hour Maximum acceptable Collective fatality expectation to the Mission Personnel: 10000 X10-6 (1 x10-2) per annum OR 1 X10-5 per flight hour 18
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence Defining Levels of Acceptable Risk What level of safety, integrity or reliability do we need to operate a 20kg UAV in an sparsely populated rural environment? What if the operation is attempting to prevent an assault? What if the operation is attempting to prevent a homicide? What if the operation is attempting to prevent multiple homicides What if the aircraft has sufficient range to fly into densely populated area? 19
  • http://www.novasystems.com.au Experience Knowledge Independence Emergency Service Risk Context May be quite simple to balance risk When exposing the public to risks, the basis for determining the risk as acceptable must be able to stand up to public scrutiny 20 Public risk benefit from UAV operation Public risk exposu