A View from NATO HQ

Guy B. RobertsDeputy Assistant Secretary Generalfor WMD PolicyInternational Staff, NATO HQ

April 2006NATOs Nuclear Policy

Overview-Alliance Strategy -- Nuclear Elements-Nuclear Arms Control-U.S. Nuclear Policy Changes -- Impact-Nuclear Planning Group -- Direction-High Level Group -- Policy development-NATO - Russia-NPG Staff Group -- Management-Public Information

Principles of NATO Strategy- Common commitment, mutual co-operation, indivisibility of security and indispensable transatlantic link- Strategy of war prevention- Alliance - no countrys adversary- Political will and military means for deterrence and defence- Significant role for arms control, disarmament and non proliferation- Fundamentally political purpose of the Allies nuclear forces:Preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war

Nuclear Elements of NATO Strategy (1) Key elements:

- NATOs conventional forces alone cannot credibly deter

- Maintain - for the foreseeable future - mix of nuclear and conventional forces, at minimum sufficient level

- NW ensure uncertainty in mind of any aggressor

- They deter the use of NBC weapons

- NW make unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression incalculable and unacceptable

- NW remain essential to preserve peace

Key elements:- Widespread participation by European Allies- Nuclear forces based in Europe- Strategic and sub-strategic nuclear forces (SSNF) Sub-strategic: DCA and Sub-Strategic Trident- Maintain transatlantic link- Political control under all circumstances- No operational plans in peacetime (SSNF) Adaptive nuclear planning- Circumstances for contemplation of nuclear use: extremely remoteNuclear Elements of NATO Strategy (2)

Nuclear Arms ControlThe Alliances policy of support for arms control,disarmament, and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliances security objectives. Strategic Concept, Para 40

NPT Article VI:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Alliance Strategic Concept:

Alliance nuclear forces will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

NATO and the NPT

I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies.

President George W. BushNational Defense University May 2001U.S. Nuclear Policy

French and U.K. PoliciesFrance (Chirac speech, Jan 06) nuclear deterrence remains the fundamental guarantee of our security. leaders of States who would ... consider using weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they would lay themselves open to a firm and adapted response on our part.

U.K. (Sec State Hoon to Parliament, Mar 02)States of concern with WMD can be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would be willing to use our nuclear weapons

Participation after EnlargementPolitical Principles require maximum Allied participation in nuclear employment optionsModels for Allies participation:Not obstructing preparations / planningActively advocating planning / operationsProviding permission for basing, overflight, logistic support or mission planningActive participation in operations

Implications for StrategyRole for NWs against WMD threatsNW role against terrorismRelationship between deterrence and MDDevelopment of Russia relationshipImpact of enlargement

SummaryNWs continue to play essential deterrent role in NATOs securityRisks and threats are changingImproving relationship with Russia Policies and plans must be adapted to new realities

-Alliance Strategy -- Nuclear Elements-Nuclear Arms Control-U.S. Nuclear Policy Changes -- Impact-Nuclear Planning Group -- Direction-High Level Group -- Policy development-NATO - Russia-NPG Staff Group -- Management-Public InformationDiscussion/Questions?

* Pleasure and honour to be closing this vital course: vital for future of Alliance that deterrence remains strong participation in this course means that each have an individual role to play in thatLittle part of personal background.Slides are marked NATO CONFIDENTIAL but briefing content may well cover NATO SECRET. Also ask to respect Chatham House Rules.You are the keyAt the end of the course I want you all to walk out of here believing in the concept of nuclear deterrence and wanting to start a campaign to nominate nukes for the Nobel Peace prize!*These are some of the issues which we deal with daily in NPD. I shall not cover them all but you should feel free to ask me any questions you have on any of them after I have given my brief presentation. My objective is to give you a short overview of how NATO looks at some topics at present. My emphasis is naturally on the political / policy perspective of these issues.

Do not aim to repeat what previous speakers have already said: rather give you opportunity to ask any remaining questions but also give you a feel for the things that worry me and what we at NATO HQ are aiming to do about them. Also want to give you a feel for types of issues that concern nations and which we are also involved in.(according to a Spiegel survey in 2005, 80% of population want nukes removed from Europe. more than 60 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki: best things that ever happened for short and long term. Deterrence must remain credible.)*To start with, lets look at the key aspects of NATOs strategy for war prevention. I know that Mr. Willy Meuws from our staff covered these with you earlier in the week. Drivers for NATO are peaceful co-existence in an unstable world with many potential indeterminate threats, including the possible use of WMD.How should NATO, or any nation for that matter, respond. Well, NATOs strategy is to keep its guard up against the unforeseeable. The Alliance relies upon political commitment to its missions and strong defence and deterrence as our insurance policy to protect our citizens. Strategy for war prevention needs capabilities across the spectrum of conflict Alliances nuclear policy is an explicit key part of that strategy.

(Only the dead have seen the end of war Plato. Is deterrence a weak reed on whish to lean.)* As part of deterrent strategy, these are the open statements that the Alliance has said about its nuclear policy. To me they represent pretty strong statements of solidarity. I do not intend to go through them but rather ask you is there anything here other than a common sense approach to security in an unstable world?

[In case quotes from Strategic Concept needed 41. The Alliance's forces ... contribute to the preservation of peace, .By deterring the use of NBC weapons, they contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means. This is only reference in ASC about role of NWs against WMD.46. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.]* From those strong public statements flows the explicit need for widespread participation in our deterrence posture and the need for nuclear forces in Europe. One concern that is very current at the moment is what impact would it have on the Alliance and its deterrent posture if those calling for withdrawal of US weapons from Europe were to win and who would be the beneficiaries certainly not NATO, its allies and partners. Equally important, and implicit here, is the need for maintaining capabilities and skills be it planning, training, consulting or ensuring our policies are forward looking rather than retrospective. Para 42 Present of US Conv & Nuke forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe which is inseparably linked[In case needed: ASC Nuclear Forces section: 62. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. 63. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability. 64. The Allies concerned [excludes France] consider that, The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore extremely remote. Nonetheless, NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link. These will consist of dual capable aircraft and a small number of United Kingdom Trident warheads. No plan to change ASC in near term.]*Now touch upon Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. As you know, NATO has maintained a long-standing commitment to these issues, as an integral part of the Alliance security policy. Also regularly and explicitly confirmed in Summit/ Ministerial communiqus with reference to seeking enhanced stability and security by lowering arms levels and activities associated with the treaty regimes involved: NPT, CTBT, FMCT and CSBMs (all described by Kerry Karchner, albeit from US perspective) At the 1999 Washington Summit, NATO HOSG committed NATO to consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament, in the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced likelihood of use of nuclear weapons so NATO has made moves in the right direction but now awaits others to show the same commitment.Important aspect is the NATO-Russia nuclear dialogue although in its infancy, hope that dialogue will lead to mutual confidence-building and thus mutual verifiable reductions. Watching Moscow Treaty developments and adherence closely. [May be question on verification from this]*NATO has no direct role in the NPT regime not a nation!But, this is an example of NATOs policy commitment to NPT Article VI.Allies have re-affirmed their determination to contribute to the implementation of the NPT and to negotiate in good faith towards eventual nuclear disarmament but this end-state must not make the world less stable for the Alliance members; nor allow NATO nations to be the subject of nuclear or WMD blackmail - so a careful, verifiable and balanced approach to security must be followed.In addition, the ASC states that Alliance NF will be kept at the minimum level...*Just to be clear about this each of the NATO nuclear weapon states, has the same goal of minimum sufficiency as shown by this quote from President Bush. But there are other issues concerning the US and NATO:The recent questions about US NWs and forces in Europe. What would be the impact of removal?Of more importance perhaps is the perception of a growing technology gap between US forces and other NATO nations how does policy overcome that?This is evident in the questions facing us about replacing the ageing DCA fleet. There are national plans but are they coherent with the continuation of NATOs strategy of flexible response?and where does that leave burden-sharing?

* A key current issue for us is the relevance of use of NW against use or threat of use of WMD. Sensitive issues for which no specific NATO policy exists. Certainly a deterrent role for NW described in 1995 HLG paper. Also clarified by European Nuclear States (but from a national perspective) as shown here. So this could develop into a key area of debate in the near future and one for which the Alliance needs to develop a coherent policy. Looking towards the HLG to take the lead. However, may not be possible to achieve in the short term as this is a very difficult nut to crack. How do you respond sensibly to non-state actors for instance? Perhaps we can discuss this in questions.

[Questions arising:- Declaratory policy - Threats from regional powers with WMD - How to deter terrorists and non-state actors] * Another issue which we need to resolve is what degree of participation should the Alliance expect as a result of recent, and perhaps continuing, enlargement. These may be some examples of how to encourage all members to participate actively in nuclear roles. Does it need active (physically obvious) involvement? Another issue for questions?

[PPN: Planning for specific nuclear options should be influenced by the possibility that all Alliance members could provide support for such options, and by the requirement that as many nations as possible with nuclear roles participate in the employment options...Refers to burden sharing and solidarity]

SNOWCAT:Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics* So far, I have touched upon a number of key political issues which we need to wrestle with. There are many more of direct relevance to our nuclear policy and its future direction. These are thus matters with which the NPG and HLG need to engage soon.

[Given current risk assessment 1/2. Deterrent role of NW acceptable. Sensitive issue. NSA related.3. Different views on relationship between MD and Deterrence between the US (deterrence by denial vs punishment/reprisal), UK..., FR ( another military option: active defensive means)4.Do we need to maintain the three NOs Difficult to negotiate.5. Status of Allies related to nuclear posture:(N)NWS, ((non)-certified) DCA basing nations, new members, others (IRD DOBs, national policies,)6.Regularly question ASC changes is raised. Answer may be yes but outcome of discussion is unclear and therefore delayed... (NATOs missions, role, weight on political issues)]* So, that is a very quick summary of a number of the issues which I believe important not only for our present but also our future nuclear policy. If I could leave you with one thought, it would be that NWs continue to play an essential role in the security and strategy of this Alliance, just as the Strategic Concept states. They have a role in deterring aggression and preventing war. And deterrence is not credible if there is not viable capability to develop credible, executable, and realistic employment plans -- if and when needed. As well as clear political commitment to deterrent policies and the capability and willingness to consult regularly and actively on these issues. Essence: Need to be successful at the political level. What is lost there, will be irretrievably gone.**