A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and...

A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Rio de Janeiro, 21 March 2014 Revision 2

Zia Mian, Frank von Hippel, Alexander Glaser

2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014

About the IPFM

To provide the technical basis for policy initiatives to reduce

global stocks of military and civilian fissile materials

MISSION

• Established in 2006, IPFM has 28 members from 18 states

• Publications: annual Global Fissile Material Reports, research reports, and country studies

• www.fissilematerials.org and www.fissilematerials.org/blog

http://www.fissilematerials.org

http://www.fissilematerials.org/blog


Global Fissile Material Reports

2008: Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

2010: Balancing the Books: [Weapon State] Production and Stocks

2011: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production

2013: Increasing Transparency

NEXT: Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach

with country perspectives and draft FM(C)T

with country perspectives

of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks as a Step toward Disarmament

A Fissile Material to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation, MIT Press, 2014


Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons

HEU in weapons usually more than 90% enriched in U-235 (0.7% in nature)

The Hiroshima bomb used 60 kg of 80%-enriched HEU

Plutonium (mostly Pu-239) separated from irradiated uranium

The Nagasaki bomb used 6 kg of Plutonium



A modern thermonuclear warhead contains on average 3–4 kg of plutonium and 25 kg highly enriched uranium

Adapted from Final Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns

with the Peoples Republic of China (“Cox Report”), U.S. House of Representatives, 3 January 1999

Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons


Fissile Material Production for Weapons

Country HEU production Plutonium production for weapons

China stopped 1987

(unofficial) stopped 1991

(unofficial)

France stopped 1996 stopped 1992

Russia stopped 1987–1988 stopped 1994

United Kingdom stopped 1962

(but imports from United States) stopped 1995

United States stopped 1992 stopped 1988

Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are still producing


Highly Enriched Uranium, mid 2013

Stockpile available for weapons

Naval (fresh)

Civilian material

Excess (mostly for blend-down)

Naval (irradiated fuel)

Eliminated

Metric tons

Global stockpile is about 1350 tons, almost 99% is in weapon states

(25 MT of HEU are equivalent to 1,000–2,000 nuclear weapons)

*Estimate

11.7 MT26 MT*16 MT* 2.4 MT* 0.3 MT* 15 MT3.0 MT*

1.4 MT 8.1 MT4.6 MT

616 MT*

517 MT

260 MT

152 MT

100 MT

141 MT

63 MT

20 MT* 10 MT* 20 MT*

20 MT



Separated Plutonium, mid 2013

Military stockpile

Additional strategic stockpile

Civilian stockpile, stored in country (Dec. 2012)

Civilian stockpile, stored outside country (Dec. 2012)

Excess military material

Metric tons

Global stockpile is about 500 tons, more than half is civilian and this stock is growing

(5 MT of plutonium are equivalent to 1,000–1,500 nuclear weapons)

*Estimate

1.8 MT* 0.54 MT* 0.03 MT 88 MT*0.15 MT*0.84 MT* 38 MT6 MT* 3.2 MT

49.3 MT90.3 MT

49.5 MT

34.0 MT

35.0 MT

9.3 MT 11.0 MT

0.01 MT3.8 MT 2.0 MT

0.2 MT* 4.7 MT*

57.5 MT

0.9 MT

6 MT*


Disposed

4.4 MT


Global Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, IPFM, Princeton, NJ, September 2008

The Challenges of an FM(C)T

Many similarities to IAEA safeguards in NPT non-weapon states but some new issues

Verification challenges are small compared to the political challenges of negotiating a treaty

2000 NPT Review Conference on the FMCT

FMCT Verification

A non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively

verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear

weapons … taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and

nuclear non-proliferation objectives.”

“


Global Fissile Material Cleanout


Frank von Hippel

Outline

Highly-enriched uranium �� Eliminating HEU to make disarmament more irreversible. �� Ending civilian use of HEU �� Ending naval use of HEU

Separated plutonium �� Ending plutonium separation and use �� Disposal of existing stocks

One ton of excess Russian weapon-grade uranium produced enough LEU to support a 1000-Megawatt (1-GWe) light-water nuclear power reactor for 1.5 years.

500 tons of Russian HEU – enough for 20,000 nuclear weapons were blended down 1993-2013.

Blending Down Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) for power-reactor fuel

as part of nuclear disarmament

Global HEU Stocks, by Category

0

200.00

400.00

600.00

800.00

1000.00

Military Naval fresh Naval spent Civilian Excess Eliminated

RussiaUnited StatesOther NWSNNWS

��

20,000 bomb equivalents


Eliminated

The special concern about

HEU and terrorists.

Simplicity of the gun-type

[Hiroshima] design http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/

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[LEGACY OF ATOMS FOR PEACE] Cleaning out HEU-fueled research reactors

(Focus of Nuclear Security Summits) Only 21 non-weapon states with more than 1 kg of HEU today

9/11

��

Critical & Subcritical Assemblies

Pulsed Reactors

Steady Power Res. Reactors

Naval Reactors

(+ icebreaker & training)

Total

<0.25 MWt

0.25-250 MWt

Russia 23 15 2 13 84 137 China 1 2 0 0 3 Europe 3 3 3 5 13 (UK) 27 USA 6 2 1 6 103 118 Others 5 2 9 4 2 (India) 22 Total 38 22 17 28 202 307

� 50 reactors

Focus of current policy

New naval reactors could be designed to

use LEU fuel

Lifetime cores. Could be retired or replaced with computer simulations.�

HEU-fueled reactors: Remaining challenges not yet addressed: pulsed and critical assemblies and naval reactors�(http://;22*,&-"3&1*",2�/1(/facilities/1&2&"1$)!".%!*2/3/0&!01/%4$3*/.!1&"$3/12�)3-,) �

Pulsed reactors are simply massive pieces (>100 kg) of

HEU metal alloy. This material could easily be

used to make an “improvised nuclear device” Jon Long, “Assessment of Pulse Reactor Fuel for Packaging and

Accountability”, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona, 10-14 July 2005.

Critical assembly mockup of large breeder reactor core Tens of thousands of disks containing: 0.7 tons HEU(90%), 2.8 tons HEU(36%) and 0.5 tons plutonium

(Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, Obninsk, Russia) The good news: 90% HEU is being eliminated (also in Japan).

HEU fuel for naval propulsion

Country Nuclear ships and submarines Naval fuel enrichment U.S. 11 aircraft carriers, 72 submarines 90+% U.K. 10 submarines Same as U.S. Russia 4 cruisers, 29 submarines (+7 icebreakers) 21-90+% India 1 submarine Average of 45%? China 14 submarines < 20%? France 1 aircraft carrier, 10 submarines < 10% going down to 5% Brazil submarines under development <20% Total 12 aircraft carriers, 136 submarines �

{ {

Signs of hope In January, U.S. nuclear Navy acknowledged possibility that it could

switch to LEU without unacceptable loss of life or performance.

Russia has developed high-power density LEU cermet fuel for its new icebreaker and floating nuclear power plant

Global Plutonium Stocks, by Category ��

0

100.00

200.00

300.00

Military CivilianAdditional Excess

USA

USA

Other NWS

Other NWS

Other NWSRussia

Russia

Russia Russia

UnitedKingdom

France

Japan

Others


Civilian plutonium

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Glo

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We)

1975

2013 High

2013 Low

Why all that separated civilian plutonium? �1975: Predicted imminent global need for plutonium breeders

Uranium was expected to run out; plutonium needed to start breeder reactors. Today, uranium accounts for only a few percent of cost of nuclear power and is

projected to be plentiful for at least 100 years. �

Projected nuclear �capacity (1975, IAEA)�

Projected band for nuclear capacity (2013, IAEA), Far East (~China)~ 40%)�

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Estimated Low-cost Uranium �(40-year supply for LWRs)�

High��Low�

MOX Fuel�

Spent LEU fuel storage�

Reprocessing Plant�

Spent MOX fuel storage �

MOX Fuel fabrication plant�

Plutonium & uranium�

Water-cooled reactors�

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Spent MOX Fuel�

Low-enriched uranium Fuel�

Spent LEU Fuel�

Separated �Plutonium �

US…�France…�

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Current Spent Fuel Management Policies��/23�$/4.31*&2��/43�/'��./6�23/1&�20&.3�'4&,��

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Countries that reprocess (% of capacity)

(GWe, [109 Watts])

Countries that have quit or plan to quit reprocessing and plan to store (GWe)

Countries that store (GWe)

France (85%) 63.1 (but EDF opposes)

Armenia (in Russia) 0.4 Argentina 0.9 Belgium (in France) 5.9 Brazil 1.9

India (�50%) 4.4 Bulgaria (in Russia) 1.9 Canada 12.6 Czech Rep. (in Russia) 3.7 Iran 0.9

Pilot plants Finland (in Russia) 2.7 Mexico 1.3 China (pilot plant) 11.7 Germany(in France/UK)13.1 Pakistan 0.7 Russia (pilot plant) 23.6 Hungary (in Russia) 1.9 Romania 1.3 Slovak Rep. (in Russia) 1.8 Slovenia 0.7

Future very uncertain Spain (in France, UK) 7.6 South Africa 1.8 Japan (100%) 44.2 Sweden (in France/UK) 9.3 South Korea 18.7 Netherlands(100%France) 0.5 Switzerland (France/UK) 3.3 Taiwan, China 5.0 Ukraine (5% in Russia) 13.1 UK 9.9 U.S. (since 1972) 101.1 Total 160.6 Total 62.5 Total 146.6

Most countries manage older spent fuel with safe low-cost onsite dry cask storage. (Japan has some dry cask storage at Fukushima-Daiichi.)

At Fukushima Daiichi Tokai

U.S. Connecticut Yankee (old picture)

Lingen NPP, Germany

after the tsunami

15

Plutonium Disposal – alternatives to MOX? UK, US and Japan together have about 200 tons to dispose of – enough

for more than 25,000 Nagasaki bombs

MOX (mixed uranium-plutonium oxide)fuel programs not working: �� UK MOX plant abandoned after an expenditure of ~ $2 billion �� U.S. has spent ~$4 billion on MOX plant construction and has decided

project is “unaffordable” �� Japan was only able to get permission to irradiate French-made MOX

containing 2.5 tons of plutonium in 10 years before Fukushima. �� Immobilization and direct disposal in a repository may be less a less

costly alternative.

Hot isostatic pressing of powder to immobilize plutonium in a low-leachable ceramic.

–UK National Nuclear Laboratory ~20

cm�

Will We Ever Be Able to Account for Global Fissile Material Stocks?


Alexander Glaser


How Much Fissile Material is There?

Baseline declarations of fissile material stocks

Establishing confidence in the completeness of declarations (Verification)

A Two-Step Process

Most weapon states have not yet made public their fissile material holdings

(United States and Britain are the exceptions)

Independent stockpile estimates carry significant uncertainties

(up to 20%, ton quantities in the case of Russia)

Baseline Declarations


Supporting Declarations Put Data in Context

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM:STRIKING A BALANCE

DEPAR

TMENT OF ENERGY

UNITED

STATES OFAM

ERICA

OFFICIAL USE ONLYContains information which may be exempt from publicrelease under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.552), exemption number 2. Approval by the Department ofEnergy prior to public release is required.

Reviewed by: _________________ Date: ______________

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - DRAFT

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - DRAFT

A HISTORICAL REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM PRODUCTION,ACQUISITION, AND UTILIZATION ACTIVITIES

FROM 1945 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1996

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR

FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

REVISION 1

DECEMBER 2005

14

1996 and 2001 U.S. Declarations on Plutonium and HEU

and can help lay the basis for verification of fissile material production and stocks



Plutonium: The First 50 Years: United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition and Utilization from 1944 Through 1994 U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/DP-0137, 1996, www.ipfmlibrary.org/doe96.pdf

Detailed Fissile Material Production Declarations

Example

Annual U.S. weapons plutonium

production by site (and grade)

Same information available for HEU

Weapon states should prepare to declare the histories of their HEU

and plutonium production, use, and disposition

Will We Ever Be Able to Verify the Completeness of Such Declarations?


Many Aspects of Declarations Can Be Reviewed

for Consistency Even Without Verification

17

Simulated data for 1981 (annual mean); Ole Ross, Simulation of Atmospheric Krypton-85 Transport to Assess the Detectability of Clandestine Nuclear Reprocessing, PhD Thesis, Hamburg University, Germany, 2010

Historic atmospheric krypton-85 levels have been recorded and can be used to estimate large-scale plutonium production in some nuclear weapon states



Public Historic Documents Can Often Help

Reconstruct Production Histories

18

Le retraitement des combustibles irradiés: La situation de la Hague et Marcoule, Analyses et positions de la CFDT

Rayonnement, Syndicat National du Personnel de l'Energie Atomique, No. 92, Février 1981


Much better would be formal data exchanges of historic production records

Developing and Demonstrating Effective Verification of Fissile Material Production Histories

Will Require Cooperative Projects


Nuclear Archaeology for Plutonium(U.S. Hanford B Reactor, 1944–1968)

Graphite

Sampling Position



Nuclear Archaeology for Historic Production of Highly Enriched Uranium Has Yet to be Demonstrated

Storage area for cylinders of depleted uranium in 2001

at K-25 Site, Oak Ridge, TN

Equipment in storage from the gaseous diffusion plant

in Pierrelatte, June 2009, www.francetnp2010.fr

Nuclear archaeology for uranium enrichment is potentially more challenging

because it is less obvious which signatures in equipment and waste materials would

be most effective for verifying cumulative production of HEU

S. Philippe and A. Glaser, "Nuclear Archaeology for Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment Plants," Science & Global Security, 22, 1 (2014)


“The Clock is Ticking”Shutdown production reactors and enrichment plants are being decommissioned

Shutdown of the last Russian plutonium production

reactor ADE-2 in Zheleznogorsk, 2010

Source: U.S. Department of Energy

Demolition of the K-25 uranium enrichment plant began

in December 2008 and has been completed in 2012

Source: Bechtel Jacobs

In many cases, facilities have been temporarily preserved;

but in other cases, environmental concerns (or site stewardship decisions)

have led to the demolition of former production sites


Offer Test Beds for Nuclear ArchaeologyTo begin countries could offer single sites or facilities as test beds and invite

partners with similar production facilities to engage in “site-to-site exercises” tojointly demonstrate verification approaches and measurement techniques

Left: Windscale Piles, www.sellafieldsites.com Right: G2/G3, Marcoule, www.francetnp.fr

http://www.sellafieldsites.com

http://www.francetnp.fr


Even in Many Non-nuclear Weapon States, Candidate Facilities Would be Available to Demonstrate

Methods Required for Nuclear Archaeology

NRX, Canada Ågesta Reactor (105 MWt), near Stockholm, Sweden


Summary

• Over 2000 tons of fissile material are in the global stockpile The civilian stockpile of plutonium is growing

• Need a verifiable FMCT

• Major reductions of Cold War stockpiles of HEU have been accomplished No progress on plutonium disposal

!• Consensus to phase out civilian uses of HEU but none yet on HEU naval reactors

• Need to end civilian reprocessing of spent fuel

!• Accounting for global stocks of fissile materials requires more transparency

Baseline declarations and collaborative efforts needed to demonstrate completeness

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