A Cost Comparison of Futures and Etfs

13
The Big Picture: A Cost Comparison of Futures and ETFs How the world advances

Transcript of A Cost Comparison of Futures and Etfs

  • The Big Picture: A Cost Comparison of Futures and ETFs

    How the world advances

  • 1TOTAL COST ANALYSIS | MARCH2015 | CMEGROUP

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    Thisreportcomparestheall-incostofreplicatingtheS&P500totalreturnviaequityindexfutures

    andexchange-tradedfunds(ETFs)acrossavarietyofdifferentusecasesandtimehorizons.

    ThespecificproductsusedintheanalysisaretheCMEE-miniS&P500futureandthethree

    US-listedS&P500ETFs:theSPDRSPY,iSharesIVVandVanguardVOO.

    Theanalysisbeginswithadetailedlookatthecomponentsoftotalcostandtheassumptionsthat

    underliethecalculations.Thisincludesobservationsaboutrecentchangesintheimpliedfinancing

    ratesoffuturesandthedriversofthesemoves.

    Thetotalcostofindexreplicationacrossarangeoftimehorizonsiscalculatedforfourcommon

    investmentscenarios:afully-fundedlongposition,aleveragedlong,ashortpositionanda

    non-USinvestor.

    ThechoicebetweenfuturesandETFsisnotaneither-ordecision.E-miniS&P500futuresare

    showntobemorecost-effectivethanS&P500ETFsforleveraged,shortandnon-USinvestors

    acrossalltimehorizons.

    Forfully-fundedinvestors,theoptimalchoicedependsontimehorizon.Investorswithholding

    periodsuptofourmonthsarebetterservedbyfutures,whileforlongerholdingperiods,ETFsare

    preferablewiththeVOOthemostcostefficientalternative.

    Scenario

    Cheapest Option

    Short Term (3m)

    Fully-Funded Futures ETFs

    Leveraged(2x,8x) Futures Futures

    ShortSeller Futures Futures

    International Futures Futures

  • 2TOTAL COST ANALYSIS | MARCH2015 | CMEGROUP

    INTRODUCTION

    Thisreportcomparestheall-incostofreplicatingtheS&P

    500totalreturn1viaequityindexfuturesandETFs.

    Giventhediversityofclientsandpotentialusesforboth

    ETFsandfutures,thereisnoone-size-fits-allanswerto

    thequestionofwhichismorecostefficient.Theoptimal

    choicedependsonthedetailsofboththeclientandthe

    specifictrade.

    Theapproachisthereforetoconsiderfourcommon

    investmentscenariosafully-fundedlongposition,a

    leveragedlong,ashortpositionandanon-USinvestor

    andcomparethecostsofindexreplicationwithfutures

    andETFsineach.Whilethesescenariosdonotrepresent

    allpossibleapplicationsforeitherproduct,theycover

    themajorityofusecasesandanalysisofthescenarios

    providesinsightsintofactorsthatinvestorsshould

    considerwhenmakingtheirimplementationdecisions.

    ThisanalysiscomparestheCMEE-miniS&P500future

    (ticker:ES)withthethreeUS-listedS&P500ETFs:SPDR

    S&P500ETF(SPY),iSharesCoreS&P500ETF(IVV)and

    VanguardS&P500ETF(VOO).

    COST ESTIMATES AND ASSUMPTIONS

    The goal of this report is to quantify the cost of replicating

    the total return of the S&P 500 index over a given period of

    time using equity index futures and ETFs. The framework

    for analysis will be that of a mid-sized institutional investor

    executing through a broker intermediary (i.e. not DMA) for a

    hypothetical order of $100 million.

    The total cost of index replication is divided into two

    components: transaction costs and holding costs.

    Transaction Costs

    Transaction costs are expenses incurred in the opening and

    closing of the position. These apply equally to all trades,

    regardless of the time horizon.

    Commission: The first component of transaction cost is the

    commission or fee charged by the broker for the execution.

    These charges are negotiated between parties and vary

    from client to client. This analysis assumes execution costs

    of $2.50 per contract (0.25 bps) for E-mini futures and 2.5

    cents per share (1.25bps) for ETFs.2

    Market Impact: The second component of transaction

    costs is market impact, which measures the adverse price

    movement caused by the act of executing the order.

    Market impact can be very difficult to quantify. In the

    simplest case an unlimited market order sent directly to

    the exchange the impact can be accurately defined as the

    difference between the market price immediately prior to

    the order being submitted and the final execution price of

    the trade. However, as the execution methodology becomes

    more sophisticated and extends over a longer period of time

    (e.g. a working order participating at 25% of the volume,

    or an over-the-day VWAP target) it becomes increasingly

    difficult to separate the impact that was caused by the trade

    from market movements unrelated to the trade.

    The analysis in this report requires an estimate of the

    expected market impact from a hypothetical execution, rather

    than the actual impact of any specific trade. This anticipated

    impact is therefore a statistically-based estimate and may be

    very different from that of any particular execution.

    In deriving this estimate for the anticipated market impact,

    it is important to factor in the transfer of liquidity that

    occurs between different products tracking the S&P 500.

    1 Price return plus dividends.

    2 These rates are indicative of typical middle of the range pricing for institutional clients. While commissions and fees are a focus for short-term traders, in the context of the longer-term analysis here, they make only a very small contribution to the total cost.

  • 3TOTAL COST ANALYSIS | MARCH2015 | CMEGROUP

    When facilitating investor orders in any one of the products

    under consideration, liquidity providers will hedge with the

    least expensive alternative between futures, ETFs and the

    replicating stock portfolio. This creates a pool of S&P 500

    liquidity in which each product benefits from the liquidity

    of the others, which in turn greatly increases the liquidity of

    all products.

    Based on broker estimates and CMEs own analysis,

    the market impact of the hypothetical $100m order is

    estimated to be 1.25bps for E-mini futures, 2.0bps for the

    SPY ETF, and 2.5bps for both IVV and VOO.

    Table 1: Liquidity Comparison

    Product AuM / OI ($Bn) ADV ($Mn)

    ES 291.6 161,843

    SPY 194.7 21,113

    IVV 70.7 824

    VOO 30.43 232

    Fullyear2014ADVaverages.AuM/OIasof18Feb,2015.Source:CMEandBloomberg

    As a sanity check on these values, it is observed that

    $100 million represents 0.06% of the average daily notional

    value traded in the ES future of approximately $162 billion

    (2014 average). As such, a 1.25bps impact estimate

    equivalent to one tick increment appears reasonable.

    Given that the liquidity of the ES future is nearly 8x that

    of the SPY and more than 150x that of the IVV and VOO

    combined, the impact estimates for these products initially

    appear quite low. However, if one factors in the liquidity

    pool effect in the S&P 500 and the frictional costs of

    converting between the various products, the incremental

    cost of 0.75bps for SPY and 1.25bps for IVV and VOO

    corresponding to approximately 1.5cps and 2.5cps,

    respectively appear reasonable.

    Holding Costs

    Holdingcostsareexpensesthataccrueoverthetimethe

    positionisheld.Thesegenerallygrowlinearlywithtime

    (e.g.ETFmanagementfeeswhichaccruedaily)although

    therearesome,whicharediscretebutrecurring(e.g.

    executionfeesonquarterlyfuturesrolls).

    ThesourcesofholdingcostsforETFsandfuturesare

    different,owingtotheverydifferentstructuresofthe

    twoproducts.

    ETFs: TheholdingcostofanETFisthemanagementfee

    chargedbythefundfortheserviceofreplicatingtheindex

    return(generallythroughthepurchaseandmaintenance

    oftheunderlyingstockportfolio).Themanagementfee

    forthethreeETFsinouranalysisrangesbetween5.0and

    9.45bpsperannum.

    Asecondpotentialsourceofholdingcostwouldbetracking

    errorbetweenthefundsreturnsandthoseoftheindex

    (otherthanthoseduetotheapplicationofthemanagement

    fee).Thisriskwillbeignoredintheanalysisthatfollows,

    asithasneverbeenanissuewiththeETFsunder

    considerationandassuch,thereisverylimitedbasisfor

    estimatingthemagnitudeorimpactofpotentialdeviations.

    Futures:Futurescontractsarederivativesandprovide

    leverage.UnlikeanETF,wherethefullnotionalamount

    ispaidbythebuyertothesellerattradeinitiation,with

    futurescontractsnomoneychangeshandsbetweenthe

    parties.Rather,bothbuyerandsellerdepositmarginof

    approximately5%4ofthenotionalofthetradewiththe

    clearinghousetoguaranteetheirobligationsunder

    thecontract.

    AscomparedwiththeETFmanagementfee,buyersof

    futurescontractsareimplicitlypayingthesellersnotonly

    toreplicatetheindexreturns,butalsotodosowiththeir

    3 The VOO ETF is a share class of Vanguards unlisted S&P 500 Index Fund which has $195.8 billion in AuM.

    4 At time of writing the margin requirement on E-mini S&P futures is $4,600 on a contract notional of roughly $100,000. Margin amounts are subject to change.

  • 4TOTAL COST ANALYSIS | MARCH2015 | CMEGROUP

    ownmoney.Asaresult,thepriceofafuturescontract

    containsacomponentthatrepresentstheinterest

    chargesontheseborrowedfunds5.

    Giventhetradingpriceofthefutures,onecaninfer

    theratethatthemarketisimplicitlychargingonthese

    borrowedfunds.Whilethisfundingcostisimpliedin

    allfuturestransactions,itismostreadilyinferredfrom

    tradinginthefuturesrollandfrequentlyreferredtoasthe

    rollcost.

    Comparingthisimpliedinterestratewiththecorresponding

    USDLiborrateoverthesameperiod,onecancalculatethe

    spreadtoLibor,anddeterminewhetherthefutureisrolling

    rich(impliedfundingaboveLibor,positivespread)or

    cheap(impliedfinancingbelowLibor,negativespread).

    Forafully-fundedinvestor(i.e.onethathascashequal

    tothefullnotionalvalueoftheposition),therichnessor

    cheapnessoftherollisnotmerelyatheoreticalcostbut

    theactualholdingcostforindexreplicationviafutures.

    Theinvestorrealizesthiscostbybuyingthefutures

    contractsandholdinghisunusedcashinaninterest-

    bearingdeposit.Throughthefuturescontractshepays

    theimpliedfinancingrateonthefullnotionalofthetrade,

    whileontheunusedcashondeposithereceivesarateof

    interest,whichweassumetobeequalto3mLibor6.The

    differencebetweentheinterestpaidandinterestearned

    istheholdingcostofthepositionandisequaltothe

    richnessorcheapnessoftheroll.

    Observations on the Futures Roll

    Unlikeamanagementfee,theimpliedfinancingcostof

    thequarterlyfuturesrollisnotconstantbutdetermined

    bytheforcesofsupplyanddemandandarbitrage

    opportunitiesinthemarket.

    Historically,theimpliedspreadtoLiborofESfutureswas

    belowthelowestmanagementfeesonanyETF.Overthe

    10yearperiodbetween2002and2012,theESfuturesroll

    averaged2bpsbelowfairvalue7.

    Since2012,thepricingoftherollhasbecomemorevolatile

    andtradedathigherlevelsasshowninFigure1,withthe

    richnessaveraging35bpsin2013and26bpsin2014.

    Thisrecentrichnessisattributabletotwomainfactors:

    changesinthemixbetweennaturalsellersandliquidity

    providersonthesupply-sideofthemarket,andchanges

    tothecostsincurredbyliquidityproviders(particularly

    banks)infacilitatingthisservice.

    Inabalancedmarket,naturalbuyersandsellerstradeata

    priceclosetofairvalueneitherpartybeinginaposition

    toextractapremiumfromtheother.Whennonatural

    sellerisavailable,aliquidityproviderstepsintoprovide

    supply(i.e.sellfutures)ataprice.Thegreaterthedemand

    onliquidityproviders,thehigher(andmorevolatile)the

    impliedfundingcostswillbe.

    ThepersistentlystrongS&P500returnsoverthelast

    threeyearsaveraging20.3%annualgrowthsincethe

    startof2012hascausedadecreaseinthesizeofthe

    naturalshortbaseasinvestorsreduceshortsandbias

    theirpositionstowardslongexposure.Thishasincreased

    thedemandonliquidityprovidersespeciallyU.S.banks

    tomeettheexcessdemand.

    Beginningin2013,however,changesinbanksector

    regulationhaveincreasedthecapitalandliquidity

    requirementsforbanks,makingitmoreexpensivefor

    themtofacilitatefuturesbuyers.Theresulthasbeena

    higherimpliedfinancingcostinthefuturesrolls.

    5 The argument is symmetric for the seller. The short sale of an ETF would generate cash which would earn a rate of interest. The sale of a futures contract generates no cash and so the implied interest in the futures price compensates the seller for this.

    6 As with other assumptions in the analysis, this value represents a middle of the range yield on uninvested cash.

    7 Goldman Sachs, Futures-Plus, 22 January, 2015.

  • 5TOTAL COST ANALYSIS | MARCH2015 | CMEGROUP

    Figure 1: Roll Richness with High/Low Range8

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    Source: CME

    Itisunlikelythateitherofthesefactorsrepresent

    permanentshiftsinthemarket.In2014therollmarket

    begantorenormalizewiththeMar,JunandSeprolls

    averagingjust17bps(lessthanhalftheDec2012Dec

    2013level)andtradingaslowas7bpsinSep9.The

    subsequentrichnessoftheDec2014rollindicatesthat

    someyear-endeffectsremain.However,therehavealready

    beenindicationsthattheopportunitytocaptureabove-

    marketfinancingratesisattractingnewparticipantstothe

    equityfuturesmarket,whichwillinturndriveyieldslower.

    Asforthereductioninthenaturalshortbase,thisis

    primarilyafunctionofthelow-volatilitygrindhigherin

    equitymarketswhichcannotcontinueindefinitely.An

    increaseinvolatilityoranequitymarketcorrectionwill

    leadtoanincreaseinnaturalshortpositions.

    Intheanalysisthatfollows,E-miniS&P500futuresare

    assumedtoroll20bpsabove3-monthUSDLibor.

    Table2summarizesthecostestimatesusedinthe

    analysis.Theexecutionfeesofthequarterlyfuturesroll

    areassumedtobethesameasinthetransactioncost,

    appliedtwiceateachroll.

    Table 2: Summary of Assumptions (in bps)

    Product Execution Fees

    Market Impact

    Holding Cost (per annum)

    ES 0.25 1.25 20.0

    SPY 1.25 2.00 9.45

    IVV 1.25 2.50 7.0

    VOO 1.25 2.50 5.0

    SCENARIO ANALYSIS

    Havingestablishedbaselinetransactionandholdingcost

    estimates,itisnowpossibletocomputethetotalcost

    ofindexreplicationviafuturesandETFsforvarioususe

    cases.Thisreportwillconsiderfourscenarios:afully-

    fundedinvestor,aleveragedinvestor,ashortsellerandan

    internationalinvestor(i.e.non-USdomicile).Ineachcase,

    totalcostiscomputedforallholdingperiodsupto

    12months.

    Allscenariosassumethesametransactioncostsand

    recognizetheround-tripfeesandmarketimpactat

    tradeinitiation.Futuresrollcostsareassessedonthe

    Wednesdaybeforeeachquarterlyexpiry.

    Whileitisnotspecificallymentionedinexplanationsof

    eachscenario,allfuturescarrycalculationshavebeen

    adjustedforthemargindepositedwiththeCMEclearing

    house,whichdoesnotearninterest.Atcurrentinterest

    ratestheimpactisapproximately1.3bps/annum.

    8 The blue line shows the weighted average richness of the roll over the three weeks leading up to expiry, and the grey bars indicate the highest and lowest average daily rate over the period.

    9 Source: CME Equity Quarterly Roll Analyzer tool

  • 6TOTAL COST ANALYSIS | MARCH2015 | CMEGROUP

    Scenario 1: Fully-funded Investor

    Forthefully-fundedinvestor,thetotalcostofindex

    replicationoveragivenperiodisthesumofthetransaction

    costsplusthepro-rataportionoftheannualholdingcosts.

    Figure2showsthecostofindexreplicationviaindex

    futuresandETFsfortimehorizonsouttosixmonths

    assuminganinitialtradeexecutiononJanuary2,2015and

    thetransactionandholdingcostestimatesinTable2.

    Figure 2: Fully-funded Investor, 6 months

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    Holding Period

    Futures SPY IVV VOO

    Thestartingpointforeachgraph(theintersectionwiththe

    verticalaxis)representstheround-tripexecutioncost,

    rangingfrom2.9bpsforfuturestobetween6.5and7.5bps

    forETFs.Thelinesslopeupwardastimepasses,reflecting

    thegradualaccrualoftheannualholdingcosts,withsmall

    jumpsinthefutureslineduetothecostofquarterly

    futuresrolls.Becausetheannualmanagementfeesonthe

    ETFsarebelowtheimpliedrichnessofthefutures,the

    graphsoftheETFsslopeupwardmoreslowlythanthatof

    thefutures.

    Forshortholdingperiods,thehighertransactioncostsof

    theETFsmakethefuturesmoreeconomicallyattractive

    (futureslinebelowallthreeETFlines).Thismakesfutures

    aparticularlyattractivetoolformoreactive,tactical

    andshort-termtraders.Forlonger-termholders,the

    cumulativeeffectsofhigherimpliedfinancingmakethe

    ETFamoreefficientalternative.

    ThebreakevenpointatwhichETFsbecomeamore

    economicallyefficientalternativeoccursinthefourth

    month.Inthisspecificexample,theVOObreakevenarrives

    firstonApril3(91days),followedtheSPYonApril7

    (95days)andtheIVVonApril16(104days).

    Extendingtheanalysisouttoa12-monthholdingperiod,

    onecanseethatETFsarecheaperthanfuturesby

    between10.2and13.7bps.Theseresultsareconsistent

    withrecentanalysispublishedbysell-sidebanks10.

    Figure 3: Fully-funded Investor, 12 months

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    Futures (20bps) Futures (10bps) SPY IVV VOO

    Figure3showshowa10bpsrenormalizationofthe

    futuresimpliedfundingratefrom20bpsto10bps(the

    dottedline)impactsthesebreakevenpoints.Inthismore

    normalfuturesenvironmentthebreakevenpointsmove

    outseveralmonths.TheVOOisstillthefirst,crossingon

    July29(208days).TheIVVcrossestwomonthslateron

    September23(263days)andtheSPYafurthertwo

    monthsonDecember15(347days).The12-monthcost

    advantageofETFsinthisscenariorangesfrom0.2to

    3.7bps.

    10 BNP Paribas: Accessing Efficient Beta: ETFs vs. Futures, October 2014; Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Cost Comparison of Equity Futures, ETFs and Swaps, 22 April, 2014.

  • 7TOTAL COST ANALYSIS | MARCH2015 | CMEGROUP

    Scenario 2: Leveraged Investor

    Equityindexfuturesareleveragedinstruments.The

    investorpostslessthan5%margintotheexchange,

    whichresultsinover20xleverageontheirposition.The

    threeETFsinthisanalysisarenotleveraged11butmaybe

    purchasedonmarginbyinvestorswhodesireleverage.

    Thedifferenceisthequantityofleveragethatispossible.

    UnderFederalReserveBoardRegulationsTandU,there

    arelimitsontheamountabrokermaylendtoaninvestor

    wishingtopurchasesecuritiesonmargin.

    UnderRegT,themaximumamountthatcanbelentis

    50%ofthepurchaseprice,resultinginamaximumof2x

    leverage.Moresophisticatedinvestorsmaybeeligiblefor

    portfoliomarginingthroughaprimebrokerunderwhich

    theycouldpotentiallyachieve6-8xleverageunderRegU.

    Greaterthan8xleverageisnotpossible.

    ToderiveaholdingcostfortheleveragedETFposition,

    standardprimebrokerlendingratesforaninstitutional

    clientof3mLibor+40bpsareassumed.

    Two-times Leveraged Investor

    Thestartingpointfortheanalysisisthe2xleveragedcase.

    Thisimpliesthattheinvestorhas$50millionwithwhich

    totakeon$100millionofexposure.

    TheETFinvestor,whomustpaythefullnotionalamount

    ofthetradeatinitiation,borrows$50millionfroma

    primebrokertofundthepurchase.Theholdingcostof

    theleveragedpositionisthereforethesameasthefully-

    fundedposition(Scenario1)plustheinterestcarryonthe

    borrowed$50millionat3mL+40bps.

    Withfutures,itisnotaquestionofborrowingmoney,as

    aninvestorwith$50millionalreadyhasmorethan10x

    therequiredmargindeposit.Rather,itisacaseofleaving

    lessmoneyondeposit.Inthefully-fundedcaseitwas

    assumedthattheinvestorearned3mLiboronthe$100

    millionleftondeposit.Inthe2xleveragedcase,theamount

    ofdepositedcashisreducedby$50million.Thiscanbe

    viewedequivalentlyastheinvestordepositingthefull$100

    millionandthenpaying backtheinterestearnedon$50

    million.Viewedthisway,theholdingcostofthe2xleveraged

    scenarioforfuturesisidenticaltothefully-fundedscenario

    plustheinterestexpenseon$50millionat3mLibor.

    Figure 4: Total Cost for 2x and 8x Leverage, 12 months12

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    Futures 2x Futures 8x ETF 2x ETF 8x

    ThedashedlinesinFigure4showthetotalcostofindex

    replicationona2xleveredbasisforholdingperiodsupto

    12months.

    Comparedtothefully-fundedscenarioinFigures2and3,

    thetotalcosthasincreasedforbothpositions.However,

    duetoabove-Liborrateschargedonborrowedfundsbya

    primebroker,theETFholdingcosthasincreasedby20bps

    perannummorethanthefutures(40bpsspreadonone

    halfofthetradenotional).Asaresult,futuresarethemore

    economicaloptionacrossalltimehorizons.

    11 Leveraged ETFs are excluded from this analysis, as these have path-dependent returns which are very different from standard ETFs or futures.

    12 To simplify the graphical representations, Figures 4-6 show the average of the total costs of the SPY, IVV and VOO. The individual results for each ETF are within 2bps of the value shown at all time horizons.

  • 8TOTAL COST ANALYSIS | MARCH2015 | CMEGROUP

    Eight-times Leveraged Investor

    Theanalysisforthe8xleveragedcaseproceedsina

    similarfashion.Inthiscase,theinvestorhas$12.5million

    ofcashwithwhichtoobtain$100millionofexposure.

    TheETFinvestorthereforehasan$87.5millionloanfrom

    theprimebrokerwhilethefuturesinvestorhasan$87.5

    millionreductionintheirdeposit.

    ThesolidlinesinFigure4showthecostcomparisonfor

    the8xleveredcase.Astheamountoffundsborrowed

    increases,theincrementalborrowingcostofaprime-

    brokerfundedETFpositionincreases,ascomparedwith

    theintrinsicleverageoffutures.Inthe8xleveredcase,the

    40bpsfundingdifferentialon87.5%ofthenotionalofthe

    traderesultsina35bpsgreaterincreaseintheholdingcost

    ofETFsrelativetofutures.

    ThecostadvantageoffuturesoverETFsforaoneyear

    holdingperiodis8.2and23.1bpsforthe2xand8x

    leveragedcases,respectively.

    Thisanalysishasbeenconductedusingcurrent3mLibor

    ratesofapproximately0.25%.Asinterestratesrise,the

    absolutecostofleveragedexposurewillincreaseforboth

    products.However,thedifferencebetweentheholdingcosts

    ofETFsandfuturesisnotafunctionoftheabsoluteratebut

    ofthespreadbetweencashondepositandborrowedcash

    andpersistsacrossdifferentinterestrateregimes.

    Scenario 3: Short investor

    Ashortpositionprovidesnegativemarketexposureandis

    inherentlyleveraged.

    WithETFs,theleveragecomesintheformofaloanof

    sharestosellshortbyaprimebroker.Thesaleofthe

    borrowedsharesraisescash,whichremainsondeposit

    withtheprimebroker.Theshortsellerpaysabpsper

    annumfeetothelenderoftheETFwhichisdeductedfrom

    theinterestpaidonthecashraisedbythesale.

    Atypicalprimebrokerborrowfeeof40bpsperannum

    isassumed,resultinginareturnoncashraisedof

    3mLibor40bps13.

    Inadditiontothecashraisedfromtheshortsale,the

    investormustpostanadditional50%ofthenotionalof

    thetradeincashtothebrokerasmargin14.Theadditional

    fundspostedtotheprimebrokerwillbeassumedtoearn

    3mLibor.

    Becausetheyareusingderivatives,theshortseller

    offuturesdoesnotneedtoborrowsharesorpaythe

    associatedfee.Thesaleofafuturescontractisidentical

    tothepurchase,withthesamemarginpostedwiththe

    clearinghouse.

    Whenanalyzingtheeconomicsofashortpositionitis

    importanttorememberthattheholdingcostsforthelong

    investorbecomebenefitsfortheshort.ETFmanagement

    feescauseasystematicunderperformancerelativetothe

    benchmarkwhich,fortheshortinvestor,representsan

    excessreturn.Therichnessofthefuturesrollprovidesa

    similarbenefitforfuturesinvestors.

    TheholdingcostsforshortpositionsinfuturesandETFs

    canbedecomposedasfollows:

    Futures:

    1) Receivefuturesimpliedfundingrateof3mLibor+

    20bpsonthe$100million

    2) Receive3mLiboron$50millioncash

    13 This rate, combined with the assumption on long funding of 3m Libor + 40bps, results in an 80 bps through the middle prime broker bid / offer, which is consistent with market standards.

    14 Higher leverage may be eligible under portfolio margining but we will focus on the 2x levered case.

  • 9TOTAL COST ANALYSIS | MARCH2015 | CMEGROUP

    ETFs:

    1) Receivethemanagementfeeof5-9.45bps

    2) Receive3mLibor40bpson$100millionraised

    fromtheshortsale

    3) Receive3mLiboronthe$50milliondepositedwith

    theprimebroker.

    Figure5showsthatinbothcasestheholdingcostsare

    negativeovertime,theinvestorsrelativeperformance

    versustheshortreturnofthebenchmarkimproves,as

    demonstratedbythedownwardslopeoftheline.

    However,duetothecombinationofhigherETFtransaction

    costsandthefundingspreadschargedbyprimebrokers,

    thefuturesprovideamorecost-effectiveimplementation

    acrossalltimehorizons.

    ThecostadvantageoffuturesoverETFsfora

    12-monthholdingperiodis53.6bps.

    Figure 5: Short Futures vs. ETF, 12 months

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    -30

    -20

    -10

    10

    20

    Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

    Tota

    l Cos

    t (b

    ps)

    Holding Period Short Future Short ETF

    Scenario 4: International

    CME does not provide tax advice. Investors should consult

    their own advisors before making any investment decision.

    Ingeneral,foreigninvestorsintheUSequitymarketare

    subjecttoawithholdingtaxondividendpaymentsbyUS

    corporations.Thebasewithholdingrateis30%,resulting

    inanetdividendreceivedbyforeigninvestorsequalto

    70%ofthegrossdividendavailabletoUSinvestors.

    Thiswithholdingtaxalsoappliestofunddistributions

    paidoutbyETFs.AllthreeoftheETFsinthisanalysis

    payaquarterlydistributionwhichrepresentsthepass-

    throughofdividendincomereceivedbythefundonthe

    underlyingsharesheld.ThedividendyieldoftheS&P500

    isapproximately2.0%,whichimpliesa60bpsadditional

    holdingcostperannumforforeignETFinvestorsdueto

    thewithholdingtax.

    Futurescontracts,unlikeETFs,donotpaydividends.The

    marketpriceofthefuturecontainsanimplieddividend

    amountwhichgenerallycorrespondstothefullgross

    dividendyieldontheunderlyingindex15.Thereisnofutures

    equivalenttothedividendwithholdingtaxonshares.

    Figure6showsholdingcostcomparisonforafully-funded

    longposition(Scenario1)asexperiencedbyanon-US

    investorbasedona30%withholding.

    Inthe3-monthperiodpriortothefirstdividendex-date

    thecomparisonisidenticaltoScenario1:thelower

    transactioncostsoffuturesmakethemacheaper

    alternative.Justpriortothecross-overpointwhereETFs

    becomemorecosteffective,the15bpsimpactofthe

    withholdingtaxonthefirstquarterlydividendhitsthe

    totalcostoftheETFcausingthejumpintheredline.Asa

    result,thefutureisamorecosteffectivealternativeover

    alltimehorizons.

    15 The market price of a futures contract is a function of interest rates and anticipated future dividends. Deviations from fair value can be attributed to either component based on the investors assumptions. For example, the futures roll trading above fair value can be viewed as the result of above-market implied funding rates, a lower dividend assumption or a dividend withholding tax. The market standard is to attribute deviations to implied funding costs unless there is a known ambiguity around the timing or quantity of a particular dividend.

  • 10TOTAL COST ANALYSIS | MARCH2015 | CMEGROUP

    ThecostadvantageoffuturesoverETFsfora

    12-monthholdingperiodis48.3bps.

    Figure 6: Foreign Investor (30% WHT), 12 months

    10

    20

    30

    40

    50

    60

    70

    80

    Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

    Tota

    l Cos

    t (b

    ps)

    Holding Period

    Foreign Holder Futures Foreign Holder US ETF

    Certaininternationalinvestorsareabletoreclaimsomeor

    allofthedividend/distributionwithholdingtaxonETF

    distributions.Apartialreclaimreducesthesizeofthe

    stepsinFigure6whileatax-exemptforeigninvestor(i.e.

    afullreclaim)iseconomicallyequivalenttoaUSinvestor

    (Scenario1).

    Fordividendrateslessthan92%ofgross(i.e.8%

    withholding),futuresaremorecosteffectiveacrossall

    timehorizons.

    UnlikeETFmanagementfees,whicharebeneficialtoshort

    investors,thewithholdingcostonfunddistributionsdoes

    notresultinoutperformanceforforeigninvestorslooking

    totakeonshortexposure.Thestandardinthestockloan

    marketisthattheborrowerofthesecuritypaysthefull

    grossdividend.

    Other considerations

    Thisanalysishas,thusfar,focusedoncost.Thereare,

    however,anumberofotherfactorsthatimpactinvestors

    productselectiondecisions.Forcompleteness,themore

    salientconsiderationsareenumeratedhere.

    Tax: E-miniS&P500futuresaresection1256contracts

    withablendedU.S.capitalgainstreatmentof60%long

    termand40%shortterm,regardlessofholdingperiod,

    whichmayimprovetheafter-taxefficiencyoffutures

    versusotheralternatives.

    UCITS:Equityindexfuturesareeligibleinvestmentsfor

    EuropeanUCITSfunds,whileUS-listedETFsarenot.

    Currency: Theleverageinherentinafuturescontract

    allowsnon-USDinvestorgreaterflexibilityinthe

    managementoftheircurrencyexposuresascomparedto

    fully-fundedproductslikeETFs.

    Short Sale: Manyfundshavelimitations,eitherby

    mandateorregulation,whichlimittheabilitytosellshort

    securities.Thesefundsmay,however,beabletotakeon

    shortexposureviaderivativessuchasfutures.(UCITS

    fundshavesuchrestrictions.)Futuresarealsonotsubject

    tolocaterequirements,RegulationSHOorRule201.

    Fixed Versus Variable Dividends: Afuturescontractlocks

    inafixeddividendamountatthetimeoftrade,while

    ETFsaccruetheactualdividendstothefundsNAVasand

    whentheyoccur.

    Product Structure: ETFsaremutualfundswhilefuturesare

    derivatives.Fundinvestmentmandatesandlocalregulations

    maytreatthesestructuresdifferentlyandimposediffering

    degreesofflexibilityintheirusagebythefundmanager.

    Theassetmanagementcompany(ortheparticularfund

    manager)mayalsohavepreferences.Somefundsmaylook

    tolimittheiruseofderivativesandthereforeprefertheETF.

    Alternately,managersmayprefernottouseaproductwhich

    paysamanagementfeetoanotherassetmanagerorhave

    concernsaboutinvestorsperceptionsoftheiruseofother

    issuersfundsintheportfolio.

  • 11TOTAL COST ANALYSIS | MARCH2015 | CMEGROUP

    CONCLUSION

    Figure7summarizestheresultsoftheanalysis.Forall

    scenariosbutone,futuresprovideamorecost-effective

    vehicleforreplicatingS&P500indexreturns.

    Figure 7: Summary of Results

    Scenario

    Cheapest Option

    Short Term (3m)

    Fully-Funded Futures ETFs

    Leveraged(2x,8x) Futures Futures

    ShortSeller Futures Futures

    International Futures Futures

    Theexceptionisthatofafully-fundedUSinvestor(or

    tax-exemptforeigninvestor)withalongtime-horizon,

    wheretherecentrichnessoftheESrollhasincreasedthe

    costoffuturesrelativetoETFs.WithS&P500impliedand

    realizedvolatilityhigherin2015thanatalmostanypoint

    inthelasttwoyears,itremainstobeseenhowlongthis

    situationcanpersist.

    Investorsareremindedthattheresultsinthisanalysisare

    basedonthestatedassumptionsandgenerallyaccepted

    pricingmethodologies.Theactualcostsincurredbyan

    investorwilldependonthespecificcircumstancesofboth

    theinvestorandtheparticulartradeincludingthetrade

    size,timehorizon,brokerfees,executionmethodologyand

    generalmarketconditionsatthetimeofthetrade,among

    other.Investorsshouldalwaysperformtheirownanalysis.

    FormoreinformationonCMEGroupssuiteofequityindex

    futuresandoptionsonfutures,pleasecontactyourCME

    Groupaccountmanagerorsalesrepresentative.

    ForquestionsorcommentsaboutthisreportorCME

    EquityIndexproducts,[email protected].

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    Futurestradingisnotsuitableforallinvestors,andinvolvestheriskofloss.Futuresarealeveragedinvestment,andbecauseonlyapercentageofacontractsvalueisrequiredtotrade,itispossibletolosemorethantheamountofmoneydepositedforafuturesposition.Therefore,tradersshouldonlyusefundsthattheycanaffordtolosewithoutaffectingtheirlifestyles.Andonlyaportionofthosefundsshouldbedevotedtoanyonetradebecausetheycannotexpecttoprofitoneverytrade.Allexamplesinthisbrochurearehypotheticalsituations,usedforexplanationpurposesonly,andshouldnotbeconsideredinvestmentadviceortheresultsofactualmarketexperience.

    TheinformationwithinthisbrochurehasbeencompiledbyCMEGroupforgeneralpurposesonlyandhasnottakenintoaccountthespecificsituationsofanyrecipientsofthisbrochure.CMEGroupassumesnoresponsibilityforanyerrorsoromissions.AllmatterspertainingtorulesandspecificationshereinaremadesubjecttoandaresupersededbyofficialCME,NYMEXandCBOTrules.CurrentCME/CBOT/NYMEXrulesshouldbeconsultedinallcasesbeforetakinganyaction.

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