G.R. No. 78409 September 14, 1989Petitioner: NORBERTO SORIANORespondents: OFFSHORE SHIPPING AND MANNING CORPORATION, KNUT KNUTSEN O.A.S., and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division)Petition: Petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirming the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in POEA which denied petitioner's claim for salary differential and overtime pay and limited the reimbursement of his cash bond to P15, 000.00 instead of P20, 000.00.Ponente: FERNAN,C.J.Facts of the Case:

In search for better opportunities and higher income, petitioner Norberto Soriano, a licensed Second Marine Engineer, sought employment and was hired by private respondent Knut Knutsen O.A.S. through its authorized shipping agent in the Philippines, Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation. As evidenced by the Crew Agreement, petitioner was hired to work as Third Marine Engineer on board Knut Provider" with a salary of US$800.00 a month on a conduction basis for a period of fifteen (15) days. He admitted that the term of the contract was extended to six (6) months by mutual agreement on the promise of the employer to the petitioner that he will be promoted to Second Engineer. Thus, while it appears that petitioner joined the aforesaid vessel on July 23, 1985 he signed off on November 27, 1985 due to the alleged failure of private respondent-employer to fulfill its promise to promote petitioner to the position of Second Engineer and for the unilateral decision to reduce petitioner's basic salary from US$800.00 to US$560.00. Petitioner was made to shoulder his return airfare to Manila. In the Philippines, petitioner filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a complaint against private respondent for payment of salary differential, overtime pay, unpaid salary for November, 1985 and refund of his return airfare and cash bond allegedly in the amount of P20,000.00 contending therein that private respondent unilaterally altered the employment contract by reducing his salary of US$800.00 per month to US$560.00, causing him to request for his repatriation to the Philippines. In resolving aforesaid case, the Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration or POEA found that petitioner-complainant's total monthly emolument is US$800.00 inclusive of fixed overtime as shown and proved in the Wage Scale submitted to the Accreditation Department of its Office which would therefore not entitle petitioner to any salary differential; that the version of complainant that there was in effect contract substitution has no grain of truth because although the Employment Contract seems to have corrections on it, said corrections or alterations are in conformity with the Wage Scale duly approved by the POEA; that the withholding of a certain amount due petitioner was justified to answer for his repatriation expenses which repatriation was found to have been requested by petitioner himself as shown in the entry in his Seaman's Book; and that petitioner deposited a total amount of P15,000.00 only instead of P20,000.00 cash bond. Accordingly, respondent POEA ruled and ordered respondents to pay complainant, jointly and severally within ten (10) days from receipt hereof the amount of P15, 000.00 representing the reimbursement of the cash bond deposited by complainant less US$285.83. Further, attorney's fees equivalent to 10 % of the aforesaid award is assessed against respondents. All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.Dissatisfied, both parties appealed to National Labor Relations Commission. Upon its careful examination of the records, it was found that there is in fact no alteration made in the Crew Agreementor in the Exit Pass.As the original data appear, the figures US$800.00 fall under the column salary, while the word "inclusive" is indicated under the column overtime rate. With the supposed alterations, the figures US$560.00 were handwritten above the figures US$800.00 while the figures US$240.00 were also written above the word "inclusive". As clearly explained by respondent NLRC, the correction was made only to specify the salary and the overtime pay to which petitioner is entitled under the contract. It was a mere breakdown of the total amount into US$560.00 as basic wage and US$240.00 as overtime pay. Otherwise stated, with or without the amendments the total emolument that petitioner would receive under the agreement as approved by the POEA is US$800.00 monthly with wage differentials or overtime pay included. Moreover, the presence of petitioner's signature after said items renders improbable the possibility that petitioner could have misunderstood the amount of compensation he will be receiving under the contract. Nor has petitioner advanced any explanation for statements contrary or inconsistent with what appears in the records. Thus, NLRC affirmed the decision of POEA.

Issue: Whether or not the provision in Labor Code saying that it is prohibited to alter or substitute employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor must be interpreted to include annotations and clarifications of said employment contract.

Held: No. In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission correctly analyzed the questioned annotations as not constituting an alteration of the original employment contract but only a clarification thereof which by no stretch of the imagination can be considered a violation of Article 34 of the Labor Code which discusses the Prohibited Practices. Under similar circumstances, this Court ruled that as a general proposition, exceptions from the coverage of a statute are strictly construed. But such construction nevertheless must be at all times reasonable, sensible and fair. Hence, to rule out from the exemption amendments set forth, although they did not materially change the terms and conditions of the original letter of credit, was held to be unreasonable and unjust, and not in accord with the declared purpose of the Margin Law.

Dispositive:WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMEDin toto. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 46727 September 27, 1939

Petitioner: PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES' UNION, INC.Respondents: THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, composed to Honorables Francisco Zulueta, Leopoldo Rovira, and Jose Generoso, and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC.Petition: Petition for a writ ofcertiorarito review the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations promulgated on January 14, 1939, denying the demands of the Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc.Ponente: LAUREL,J.:

Facts of the Case:On March 26, 1938, the Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc., addressed a thirteen- point petition to the management of the Pampanga Bus Co. Upon the failure of the company officials to act upon the petition, a strike was declared by the workers on April 14, 1938. However, through the timely mediation of the Department of Labor, a provisional agreement was reached, by virtue of which the strike was called off, eight demands were granted, and the remaining five were submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement. One of these demands, in the language of the petitioner, is that the respondent Pampanga Bus Co. "pay to all Company drivers affiliated with the Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc., all the back overtime pay due them under the law." After trial on the disputed demands, the Court of Industrial Relations decidedinter aliathat the claim for back overtime pay could not be allowed.The Court of Industrial Relations ruled that the evidence is clear that even before the final approval of Act No. 4242 amending Act No. 4123, the Eight Hour Labor Law, by extending the provisions of the latter to other class of laborers including drivers of public service vehicles, that there were a lot of petitions addressed to the Governor-General, the Commissioner of and the Director of Labor expressing their satisfaction with the hours they work and the pay they receive for their labor including the special bonuses and overtime pay they receive for extra work, and asking, in view thereof, that the law be not applied to them.After the enactment of Act No. 4242, several transportation companies operating motor buses filed with Commissioner of Labor petitions for a readjustment of the hours of labor specified in section 1 of the Act on the basis of maintaining thestatus quoas to the hours the drivers were required to be actually on duty in order to enable them to make the prescribed hours daily that the exigencies of the service required. The petitions were based on the impracticability of applying the provisions of the law to drivers of public service vehicles without disrupting the public service and causing pecuniary loss to both employers and employees alike, and the resulting difficulties on the part of the drivers. The testimony of Atty. Carlos Alvear on this point is uncontradicted. Upon Commissioner of Labors suggestion, the executive secretary of the association filed a formal petition for the readjustment of the working hours on September 5, 1935. When this was filed the Department of Labor further suggested that the drivers of each company file and address a petition of similar nature designating their representatives who will represent them in a conference that the Commissioner of Labor may call for the purpose. With the filing of the petition, the conferees were assured by the Under-Secretary of Labor that the enforcement of the Eight Hour Labor Law in so far as the drivers were concerned, will be held in abeyance until such time as the meeting or investigations are held. It is not clear as to whether investigations and hearings were finally made but the evidence indicates that the petition was never decided and the companies continued its schedule of hours.Section 3 of Act No. 4123 provides the power of the Commissioner of Labor to decide in each case whether or not it is proper to increase or decrease the number of hours of labor fixed in section one of this Act, as long as the number of hours of labor shall in no case exceed twelve daily or seventy-two weekly while Section 4 says that employees or laborers desiring an increase or decrease of the number of hours of labor shall address an application to this effect to the Commissioner of Labor, stating their reasons. Upon receipt of an application of this kind, the Commissioner of Labor shall call a meeting of the employers and laborers of the establishment or industry concerned, for the designation of advisers as provided in the preceding section hereof. The Commissioner of Labor or his authorized representative, together with the advisers, shall make an investigation of the facts, giving special attention, in the first place, to the human aspect, and in the second place, to the economic aspect of the matter, and he may for this purpose administer oaths, take affidavits examine witnesses and documents and issuesubpoenasandsubpoenas duces tecum. The decision of the Commissioner of Labor may be reconsidered by him at any time."It seems clear that the petitions of both employers and employees for the non-enforcement of the Eight Hour Labor Law were made in accordance with these provisions of the law. As has already been stated it is not clear whether final action or decision has been made on the applications with respect to the drivers of the respondent; that it is undeniable fact that up to the outbreak of the dispute, the law was not observed nor enforced in the company; and that upon mutual agreement arrived at by the parties on April 14, 1938, the company worked out a schedule beginning May 1, 1938, placing all its employees under an eight-hour schedule.Issue:Whether or not the determination of the drivers of motor vehicles in public utility enterprises that will be benefited by all the back overtime pay due them must be in favor of those who observed the eight-hour-labor law prior to the enactment of the legislation extending the benefits for following such law or after the enactment of such legislation extending the benefits.Ruling:The drivers who followed the Eight Hour Labor Law before the legislation providing for the benefits was enacted should be entitled to the overtime pay demanded for the whole period the law was observed or enforced in the company. For those who placed its employees under an eight-hour schedule only on May 1, 1938, they are entitled to payment of wages for hours worked in excess of the legal hours only beginning May 1, 1938. The evidence permits no other conclusion than that the employees were not coerced not intimidated by the respondent on the repeated occasions they signed and presented to the Department of Labor their petitions for non-enforcement of the Eight Hour Labor Law. The employees were indubitably aware of certain hardships the enforcement of the law at that time would bring to them and these prompted their attitude of preferring the continuation of the schedule of hours observed prior to the enactment of the legislation extending the benefits of the Eight Hour Labor Law to drivers of motor vehicles in public utility enterprises. Whatever pecuniary advantage they would have gained by the strict observance of the law by the company should they be made to work more than eight hours a day was apparently waived or given up by them in exchange of their personal convenience and of the additional monthly pay the respondent gave to those employees who were assigned to routes where the daily working hours exceeded the maximum fixed by law. The evidence that the company paid additional salaries not only to drivers but also to its conductors who were assigned to such routes stands uncontradicted and no attempt even was made by the petitioner to deny it. Without need of passing on the question as to whether the provisions of the law are mandatory or not, in the light of the above facts and applying the rules of equity invoked by the union, we are constrained to hold that the petitioners are not rightly entitled to the payment sought.InKapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Pantranco vs. Pangasinan Transportation Co.(39 Off. Gaz., 1217), we have held that, to be entitled to the benefits of section 5 of Act No. 4123, fulfillment of the mandate of the law is necessary, this being a matter of public interest. Where both parties, as in this case, we have violated the law, this court must decline to extend the strong arm of equity, as neither party is entitled to its aid. This is especially true in view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations which we should not disturb.The court finds no reason for disturbing the action taken by the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, which is a special court enjoined to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable" (sec. 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103).Dispositive:The petition is dismissed, without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 79255 January 20, 1992Petitioner: UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE)Respondents: BENIGNO VIVAR, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NESTL PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly FILIPRO, INC.)Petition: Petition for declaratory relief seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid employees for holidaypay.Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:Facts of the Case:Filipro Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) had excluded sales personnel from the holiday pay award and changed the divisor in the computation of benefits from 251 to 261 days. Both Filipro and the Union of Filipro Employees submitted the case for voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator. In his decision, Vivar directed Filipro to pay its monthly paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject only to the exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal restrictions as are provided for in the Code.With the decision by Vivar, Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to 3 years, (2) exclusion of its sales personnel (consisted by salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical representatives) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor. On the same light, the Union filed their answer that the award should be made effective from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, their sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay, and the use of 251 as divisor is an established employee benefit which cannot be diminished.Vivar issued an order declaring that the effectivity of the holiday pay award shall retroact to November 1, 1974, the date of effectivity of the labor Code. However, he adjudged the sales personnel are field personnel and, as such, are not entitled to holiday pay. He likewise ruled that the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 due to the grant of 10 days holiday pay and ordered the reimbursement of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay due to the use of 251 days as divisor.Treating the motions for partial reconsideration of the parties, Vivar forwarded the case to the NLRC, which remanded the case to Vivar on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to review decisions in voluntary arbitration cases. In a letter, Vivar refused to take cognizance of the case because, according to him, he had resigned from service already.

Issue:Whether or not the provision in the Labor Code which defines field personnel who are excluded from holiday pay as non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty must include Nestles sales personnel such as salesmen, sales reps, truckdrivers, merchandisers and med reps who report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to field work and come back at 4:30 p.m.

Ruling:Yes. Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. It is undisputed that these sales personnel start their field work at 8:00 a.m. after having reported to the office and come back to the office at 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m. if they are Makati-based. However, the Union maintains that the period between 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. comprises the sales personnels working hours which can be determined with reasonable certainty. However, the court does not agree. The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be reasonably ascertained. The company has no way of determining whether or not these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to field work and come back at 4:30 p.m., really spend the hours in between in actual field work. Moreover, the Court fails to see how the company can monitor the number of actual hours spend in field work by an employee through imposition of sanctions on absenteeism.The use of 251 days divisor by Filipro indicates that holiday pay is not yet included in the employees salary, otherwise the divisor should have been 261.It must be stressed that the daily rate, assuming there are no intervening salary increases, is a constant figure for the purpose of computing overtime and night differential pay and commutation of sick and vacation leave credits. Necessarily, the daily rate should also be the same for computing the 10 unpaid holidays. The respondent Arbitrators order to change the divisor from 251 to 261 days would result in a lower daily rate which is violative of the prohibition or non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the Labor Code. To maintain the same daily rate if the divisor is adjusted to 261 days, then the dividend, which represents the employees annual salary, should correspondingly be increased too incorporate the holiday pay. Moreover, the reckoning period for the application of the holiday award is October 23, 1984.

Dispositive:WHEREFORE, the order of the voluntary arbitrator is hereby MODIFIED. The divisor to be used in computing holiday pay shall be 251 days. The holiday pay as above directed shall be computed from October 23, 1984. In all other respects, the order of the respondent arbitrator is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 117442-43 January 11, 1995Petitioner: FEM'S ELEGANCE LODGING HOUSE, FENITHA SAAVEDRA and IRIES ANTHONY SAAVEDRARespondents: The Honorable LEON P. MURILLO, Labor Arbiter, Regional Arbitration Branch, Region X, National Labor Relations Commission, Cagayan de Oro City, ALFONSO GALLETO, GEORGE VEDAD, ROLAND PANTONIAL, REYNALDO DELAORAO, FELICISIMO BAQUILID, CECILIO SAJOL, ANNABEL CASTRO, BENJAMIN CABRERA, RHONDEL PADERANGA, ZENAIDA GUTIB, AIDA IMBAT and MARIA GRACE ATUELPetition: Petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of court with temporary restraining order to reverse and set aside the Order dated September 21, 1994 of the Labor Arbiter in the NLRC RAB X Cases Nos. 10-04-00232 (-00233)-94.Ponente: QUIASON,J.Facts of the Case:Petitioner FEM's elegance Lodging House is a business enterprise engaged in providing lodging accommodations. It is owned by petitioner Fenitha Saavedra and managed by petitioner Iries Anthony Saavedra. Private respondents are former employees of petitioners whose services were terminated between March and April, 1994.Sometime after their dismissal from the employment of petitioners, private respondents separately filed two cases against petitioners before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro City. Private respondents sought for unpaid benefits such as minimum wage, overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, full thirteenth-month pay and separation pay.On May 31, 1994, a pre-arbitration conference of the cases took place before the Labor Arbiter. It was agreed therein: (1) that both labor cases should be consolidated; and (2) that the parties would file their respective position papers within thirty days from said date or until June 30, 1994, after which the cases would be deemed submitted for resolution.On June 29, petitioners filed their position paper. On July 7, they inquired from the NLRC whether private respondents had filed their position paper. The receiving clerk of the NLRC confirmed that as of said date private respondents had not yet filed their position paper.The following events then transpired: on July 8, petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss for failure of private respondents to file their position paper within the agreed period on July 15, private respondents belatedly filed their position paper; on July 18, petitioners filed a Motion to Expunge Position Paper from the records of the case and on August 23, the Labor Arbiter issued a notice of clarificatory hearing, which was set for September 7. Prior to the hearing, petitioners filed a Motion to Resolve Motion to dismiss and Motion to Expunge Position Paper from the Records of the Case.On September 21, the Labor Arbiter issued the order denying the motions filed by petitioners. He held that a fifteen-day delay in filing the position paper was not unreasonable considering that the substantive rights of litigants should not be sacrificed by technicality. He cited Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which provides that all doubts in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of labor. He said that even under Section 15, Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court, a delay in the filing of a position paper is not a ground for a motion to dismiss under the principle ofexclusio unius est excludio alterius.Hence, the present petition where petitioners charged the Labor Arbiter with grave abuse of discretion for issuing the order in contravention of Section 3, Rule V of The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, Said section provides:Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. . . . Unless otherwise requested in writing by both parties, the Labor Arbitershalldirect both parties to submitsimultaneouslytheir position papers/memorandum with the supporting documents and affidavits within fifteen (15) calendar days from the date of the last conference, with proof of having furnished each other with copies thereof.Petitioners claimed that they were denied due process and that the Labor Arbiter should have cited private respondents in contempt for their failure to comply with their agreement in the pre-arbitration conference.Issue:Whether or not the provision on The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC saying that position papers should be submitted within 15 days should be strictly applied and should be a ground for dismissal and to expunge the case, regardless of the provisions mere procedural nature, petitioners failure to exhaust remedies and interest of substantial justice?Ruling: No. The failure to submit a position paper on time is not on of the grounds for the dismissal of a complaint in labor cases (The New Rules of procedure of the NLRC, Rule V, Section 15). It cannot therefore be invoked by petitioners to declare private respondents as non-suited. This stance is in accord with Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which resolves that all doubts in the interpretation of the law and its implementing rules and regulations shall be construed in favor of labor. Needless to state, our jurisprudence is rich with decisions adhering to the State's basic policy of extending protection to Labor where conflicting interests between labor and management exist (Aquino v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 118 [1992]).There is no question that the fifteen calendar days prescription is mere procedural in nature. Well-settled is the rule that technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases, for procedural lapses may be disregarded in the interest of substantial justice, particularly where labor matters are concerned (Ranara v. National Labor Relations commission, 212 SCRA 631 [1992]).The Labor Arbiter did not act with grave abuse of discretion for saying that a fifteen-day delay in filing the position paper was not unreasonable considering that the substantive rights of litigants should not be sacrificed by technicality. Moreover, the petitioners failed to exhaust their remedies, particularly in seeking redress from the NLRC prior to the filing of the instant petition. Article 223 of the Labor code of the Philippines provides that decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are appealable to the NLRC. Thus, petitioners should have first appealed the questioned order of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, and not to this court. Their omission is fatal to their cause. However, even if the petition was given due course, we see no merit in petitioners' arguments. The delay of private respondents in the submission of their position paper is a procedural flaw, and the admission thereof is within the discretion of the Labor Arbiter.Petitioners cannot claim that they were denied due process inasmuch as they were able to file their position paper. The proper party to invoke due process would have been private respondents, had their position paper been expunged from the records for mere technicality. Since petitioners assert that their defense is meritorious, it is to their best interest that the cases be resolved on the merits. In this manner, the righteousness of their cause can be vindicated.Dispositive:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-48605 December 14, 1981

Petitioner: DOMNA N. VILLAVERTRespondents: EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Philippine Constabulary)Petition: Petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits.Ponente: FERNANDEZ,J. Facts of the Case:Domina N. Villavert, the petitioner, is the mother of the late Marcelino N. Villavert who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis on 12 December 1975 employed as a Code Verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. The deceased also performed the duties of a computer operator and clerk typist. On 11 December 1975, the deceased reported as usual to the Constabulary Computer Center in Camp Crame. He performed his duties not only as Code Verifier but also handled administrative functions, computer operation and typing jobs due to shortage of civilian personnel. Although he was complaining of chest pain and headache late in the afternoon of said day, he was required to render overtime service until late in the day, typing voluminous classified communications, computing allowances and preparing checks for the salary of PC-INP personnel throughout the country for distribution on or before 15 December 1975. Gasping for breath, perspiring profusely, and mumbling incoherent words while asleep, and when he was not able to regain consciousness, he was rushed to the University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay (UERM) Memorial Hospital where he died at 5:30 am. The NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown, although most research data agree that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease.On 18 March 1976, she filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under PD 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). GSIS denied the claim on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert and the nature of his employment. The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). On 31 May 1978, the ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS denying the claim. Hence, the petition.Issue:Whether or not the claim for death benefits can be denied on the ground that there was no evidence presented that the illness of the employee was caused or aggravated by the nature of his duties, regardless of the fact that the employee was obliged to do strenuous and excessive duty before his death.

Ruling:No. Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor. It is not necessary to present an evidence which closely provides for the connection between the disease and the work of the employee. From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as code verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. The Medico Legal Officer of the NBI stated that the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis (acute inflammation with hemorrhagic necrosis of the pancreas) is still unknown despite extensive researches in this field, although most research data are agreed that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a bout of alcoholic intoxication shortly before he died, neither is there a showing that he used drugs; negating the association provided by Principles of Internal Medicine (by Harrison 7th Edition, p. 1571). Dispositive:WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission sought to be reviewed is set aside and judgment is hereby rendered ordering the Government Service Insurance System to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6, 000.00). SO ORDERED.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA G.R. No. 76633, Oct. 18, 1988

Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses. The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue: Is Saco an overseas worker or a domestic employee?

Decision: We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985. Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. A contract worker is described as "any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen" or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen." These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. The second is its payment of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers." WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.